

HISTORY OF MYSORE

(1399-1799 A. D.)

INCORPORATING THE LATEST EPIGRAPHICAL, LITERARY AND
HISTORICAL RESEARCHES

48446

BY

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NEW DELHI

VOL. III

(1766-1799)



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P R E F A C E

THIS Volume deals with the period 1766-1799, commencing with the accession of Nanjarāja Woḍeyar and ending with the death of Tipū Sultan and the restoration and installation of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar III. Besides four appendices and a separate index as usual, it contains genealogical tables drawn from various sources. A note on illustrations used in the entire work has also been drawn up at the end for the convenience of those interested in the subject.

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
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
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


P R E F A C E

THIS Volume deals with the period 1766-1799, commencing with the accession of Nanjarāja Wodeyar and ending with the death of Tipū Sultan and the restoration and installation of Krishnarāja Wodeyar III. Besides four appendices and a separate index as usual, it contains genealogical tables drawn from various sources. A note on illustrations used in the entire work has also been drawn up at the end for the convenience of those interested in the subject.

BANGALORE,
16th Jan. 1946. }

C. HAYAVADANA RAO.




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
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Nanjarāja Wodeyar, 1766-1770.

ary 1769; Madras, his immediate objective—The English advances for accommodation with Haidar, January-February 1769; Haidar's attitude on the subject; Capt. Brooke's interview with him, January 1769—Mr. Andrews appointed to negotiate, and Col. Smith assumes command of the English army, February 1, 1769; the negotiations of February 22, 1769; Haidar's demands rejected; and hostilities resumed, March 6, 1769—Haidar's further movements, March 1769; arrives at St. Thomas Mount, March 29, 1769—Towards Peace, March 30—April 2, 1769—The Peace, April 2-3, 1769: *Treaty* between the English and Haidar, *The Treaty of Madras*, April 3, 1769; *Treaty* between Haidar and Nawab Muhammad Ali—Reflections on the Peace—Wilks' criticism of Col. Joseph Smith—An honourable Peace—The clause relating to the Mahrattas—Haidar's limitations—True significance of the Treaty—In defence of the Madras Government—Why the Peace relegated the Trichinopoly issue to the background: a probable explanation—Haidar's motives in concluding the Treaty—What Haidar aimed at—Open military alliance the main objective—The English to be a trading nation—The English cobelligerents—Renewed Mysore-Mahratta relations, 1769-1770: Haidar levies contributions from Cuddapah, Kurnool, Gadval, etc., July-December 1769; Peshwa Madhava Rao vs. Haidar, December 1769-January 1770—Haidar's attempted peace negotiation, January 1770—A stiff fight, January-May 1770; the siege and capitulation of Nijagal, February-May 1770; Peshwa Madhava Rao retires to Poona, May 1770—What it meant for Bednur—Haidar's visit to King Nanjaraja Wodeyar, February 27, 1770—Death of Nanjaraja Wodeyar, August 2, 1770—The murder a political crime—The Dowager Queen's error—The wages of sin is death—Haidar's base act—Conflicting motives and passions—Haidar beside himself.

IN the midst of the campaign in Malabar, Krishnarāja Wodeyar II died in Seringapatam. His demise, however, did not mean an easy Birth and accession. succession to the throne to Nanjarāja Wodeyar, his elder son by Dēvājamma of Kalale,

daughter of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya.¹ In the ordinary course, he should have been installed king but there were not wanting designs to supersede him. Nanjarāja was about eighteen years of age and was by right entitled to ascend the throne. But evidently it did not suit those who coveted the real exercise of power in the State to think of any but an younger man, if not, indeed, an infant. Haidar was then absent in Malabar, actively engaged in the campaign against the Nairs. If the contemporary writer De La Tour is to be believed, there were some mysterious tactics employed by all concerned in the matter. Some "artifice", as he calls it, centred round Haidar's own choice. On the death of Krishnarāja, Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, it is said,² wrote to Haidar suggesting the status of king to Beṭṭada Chāmarāja, the younger son of the

1. *Annals*, I. 203, referring to the date of Nanjarāja Wodeyar's installation as *Vyaya, Nija-Chaitra* ba. 13 (May 6, 1766); *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 96; see also and compare *Mys. Raj. Cha.*, 44; De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 243-244; and Peixoto, *Memoirs*, 84. The *Annals*, however, makes Nanjarāja Wodeyar the younger son of Krishnarāja Wodeyar II, dating his birth in 1762. According to the earlier chronicle *Mys. Raj. Cha.* (I. c.), however, he was the elder son of Krishnarāja. Stewart (*Memoirs*, 18) and Wilks (*Mysoor*, I. 537), among later writers, are also in agreement with this position, and spell the king's name as "Nundā Rājī" and "Nunjeraj" respectively. The contemporary writer Peixoto, who does not actually mention Nanjarāja by name, is uncertain about his age. In one place (*Memoirs*, 84), he speaks of the latter's accession as a boy of six years of age, and in two other places (*Ibid.*, 148, 157) as a boy of nine years. Dēvachandra (*Raj. Kath.*, XII. 490) and Wilks (I. c.) record the local tradition that Nanjarāja was a young man of eighteen years of age at his accession. This tradition read in the light of the testimony of the contemporary Diarist Ananda Ranga Pillai (*Ante*, Vol. II. pp. 194-195, f. n. 46) would enable us to hold that Nanjarāja must have been not more than eighteen years of age in 1766.
2. De La Tour, I. c. De La Tour does not actually mention the name of the successor of Krishnarāja II but merely distinguishes the latter's two sons as the "eldest" and "youngest." With contemporary European writers, he refers to Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya as "Nand Raja", while he mentions the dowager queen Dēvāmma as "Dayva", the regent. Elsewhere, we have noticed already the term "Dayva" (see *Ante*, Vol. II. pp. 388-389, f. n. 4).





Haidar Ali.

late Rāja, in preference to the elder, Nanjarāja, who, he affirmed, was a weakling and as such unsuited to the royal office. Nanjarājaiya's letter, however, availed little with Haidar, who was at the same time solicited by the dowager Queen Dēvājamma in favour of the elder son. In answer to both, Haidar, then in the midst of the war against the Nairs, would, as *Sarvādhikāri*, seem to have intimated to Saiyid Mokhdum that he would prefer the succession of only that son of the late king who was most worthy to reign. By the same courier, however, he secretly made known to Mokhdum that the younger son should be enthroned. This proceeding, which, as might be readily imagined, excited the anger and ill-will of the dowager and the greater part of the nobility of the kingdom, gave Haidar an opportunity, on his arrival at Seringapatam, to make a parade of his sense of justice by bestowing the throne on the elder! Thus, however much Haidar favoured the selection of the younger son in his own personal interests, he had to make a virtue of necessity. The truth appears to have been that Saiyid Mokhdum, his agent at Seringapatam during his absence, acting on his own responsibility, and probably won over by the court party, installed, on the throne, Nanjarāja Wodeyar, the elder son, and secured for his act the formal approval of Haidar on his arrival at Seringapatam early in 1767. Thus did Nanjarāja Wodeyar ascend the throne on May 6, 1766, on the thirteenth day following the death of his father.³

The death of Krishnarāja II was not allowed to become an impediment to the prosecution of the war on the West Coast. On the contrary, Haidar determined on an extension of it further south. He had already made

Haidar's advance
on Travancore.

3. See *Annals*, cited in f. n. 1 *supra*. Wilks states that Krishnarāja Wodeyar died in April 1766 (o.c., I. 537). The exact date of death was 25th April 1766 (see *Ante*, Vol. II. p. 617, f. n. 91).

up his mind to attack Travancore and annex it. With its conquest, he would have extended the territorial limits of Mysore to the sea towards the south. He had an ostensible cause for this projected invasion. The king of Travancore had, in his view, instigated, if not actively aided, the war in Malabar and could not be left alone, as he would prove a source of perpetual trouble in that region. But the real cause was the extension of Mysore's territorial limit towards the south, thus bringing under its control the whole of the south and thus subordinating to it the foreign European nations who had come by the sea and had made the sea the source of their power. He had tried the English, the French, the Dutch and the Portuguese in turn to aid him in his ambitious designs and they had, each and all of them, failed him, while one of them had even refused to carry out the solemn engagements they had entered into with his master.

With this objective, Haidar had already given directions to the augmentation of his forces.

His preparations. Recruiting had already begun, both from the necessity of placing strong garrisons in the conquered country and to add to the numerical strength of the army in view of the possible extension of the war into Travancore.⁴ At the end of the Malabar campaign, about the close of 1765, Haidar returned to Coimbatore, and there distributed the cavalry widely over the country to secure all the available forage. The men lately recruited by his agents had reached that place by then and there was considerable discontent among them. Indeed, he found 4,000 Mahratta horsemen ready to revolt over the question of the amount they had received as charges due to them.⁵ Haidar's agents averred they had

4. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 144-146.

5. These 4,000 men are referred to by Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 536). But his statement that this "body of 4,000 cavalry, sent by his emissaries" was

overpaid them, while the recruits protested they had been underpaid.⁶ The French Commandant of troops⁷ undertook to arbitrate in conjunction with Mahfuz Khān, whose knowledge of Portuguese helped much in this connection. An accommodation was soon arrived at on the footing of Rs. 40, man and horse, for those entertained as regular cavalry, and Rs. 25 for those as irregulars, the time allowed for the journey being three months. This difference thus settled and the pay of the new French recruits being also fixed up, Haïdar began to prepare for the invasion of Travancore.⁸

Travancore, at the time we are writing of, was ruled over by Bālarāma-Varman.⁹ He ruled from about 1758 to 1799. He succeeded Bāla-Mārtāṇḍa-Varman, otherwise known as Mārtāṇḍa-Varma, who has been justly called the maker of modern Travancore. Beginning his rule in 1729, Mārtāṇḍa-Varma subdued the congeries of petty chiefships into which Travancore was till then divided. He not only unified the country but also prepared it, as it were, to withstand the onslaughts of the ambitious neighbours of the future. He had his troops disciplined in the European fashion—one of the earliest in South India to do it—by a Flemish officer named De Lannoy, whose tomb may be seen to-day in

The strategic position of Travancore.

despatched by them "to engage in the Mahratta State of Najpoor", seems unintelligible. "Najpoor" is probably "Nagpoor," then the seat of the Bhōnsle Rājās of that place; at present the capital of the Central Provinces. The last real ruler of the Bhōnsles of Nāgpur was Raghuji Bhōnsle, who died on 22nd March 1816, see Grant-Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, II. 455.

6. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 128-131.

7. He was evidently De La Tour himself, though he does not say so (*Ibid* 132). He is referred to as the "French Commandant" (*Ibid*) and "Commandant of Europeans" (*Ibid*, 146).

8. *Ibid*, I. 132-144.

9. He is known as Vanchi Bāla Perumāḷ Bāla Rāma Varman and Rāma Varman. He is the "Rama Raja" mentioned by De La Tour (I. 144 *et seq*).

the ruined chapel in Udayagiri fort in South Travancore. He strengthened the fortifications of the State, improved its revenue administration, adorned it with temples and palaces, and multiplied its opportunities for trade and commerce. In all his undertakings, he was ably seconded by his Minister, Rāma Ayyan Dalawa,¹⁰ who was his Commander-in-Chief. Both were so intimate with each other in their daily work that they are even now the subjects of many popular anecdotes. Rāma Ayyan Dalawa not only helped in making conquests but also took a leading part in consolidating the conquered areas, suppressing internal dissensions and establishing peace and order throughout the State. What is more, he organized a Commercial Department for the development of trade, introduced a well-conceived excise system and laid down for the first time a scale of State expenditure based on the revenue raised, which has ever since been the sheet anchor of its financial policy. Most of his rules and regulations, popularly known as Rāma Ayyan Dalawa's *sattam*,¹¹ are still in force, thus bearing abundant testimony to their utility and soundness. Bālarāma-Varma, better known as Rāma-Varma, followed in the foot-steps of his predecessor Mārtāṇḍa-Varma. He subdued the remaining chiefs and still further unified the country. Though his kingdom was relatively small in area, it was a populous one. Rāma-Varma also took steps to provide for its defence by constructing the historic *Travancore Lines*, stretching in an almost straight line from the shore of the Cochin backwater, opposite the town of Cranganore, to the foot of the *Ghāts*, to protect the country against incursions threatened by Haidar.¹²

10. *Dalawa*, Malayālam for Kannaḍa *Daḷavai*, lit. "mouth of the army," the Commander-in-chief of the forces.

11. *Sattam* or *Chattam*, lit. legislative enactment, law, regulation.

12. The *Travancore Lines*, called in Malayālam *Netum Kōtta*, lit. a long fort. It is a mud wall, with stone bastions and forts at intervals,

Haidar's activities, indeed, inspired energetic preparations to resist his threatened invasion on the part of Rāma-Varma. He had, indeed, by his deeds more than his words, which silently did their work with his neighbours, won a reputation for his valour and prudence, which confirmed the belief that any attempt on the part of Haidar against him would be attended with much difficulty.¹³ He continued the new military discipline introduced by Mārtāṇḍa-Varma. His army was well armed and possessed a train of artillery, which was served by good cannoneers, procured from the Danes, the

extending actually from Paliport to the Ghāts, a distance of about 40 miles. Begun in 1761, it was finished in 1766, by the time that Haidar made preparations for his first invasion of Travancore. It was primarily intended to be a means of protection against the encroachments threatened by Haidar. Here, in 1789, as we shall see later, Tipū, his son, was repulsed in an attempt to force an entrance through the wall. Ruins of this wall are still visible here and there throughout its length. De La Tour refers to the wall when he says that "Ram Rajah had caused fortresses to be constructed" in the narrow passages through mountains, through which alone the country could be penetrated (*Ibid.*, I. 145). The *Travancore Lines* proved an exception to the remark of Gibbon, in his great work, about the efficacy of fortifying large tracts of country. Remarking on Probus' fortifications in Swabia, he observes: "But the experience of the world, from China to Britain, has exposed the vain attempt of fortifying any extensive tract of country. An active enemy, who can select and vary his points of attack, must, in the end, discover some feeble spot or unguarded moment. The strength as well as the attention of the defenders is divided; and such are the blind effects of terror on the finest troops, that a line broken in a single place is almost instantly deserted. The fate of the wall which Probus erected may confirm the general observation. Within a few years after his death, it was overthrown by the Alemanni. Its scattered ruins, universally ascribed to the power of the Dæmon, now serves only to excite the wonder of the Swabian peasant." (Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, I. Chap. XII). The fate that overtook the Maginot Line in France during the European War which broke out in September 1939 fully sustains the truth underlying Gibbon's observation. Gibbon had served in the Militia in his own country and his experience as Captain of the Hampshire Grenadiers had not proved useless to him as "the historian of the Roman Empire." For further particulars about the origin and early history of the *Travancore Lines*, see below.

13. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 144.

Dutch and the English. He strengthened his position with the English at Madras, who assembled troops on the Madura-Travancore frontiers in view of eventualities.

Haidar, knowing that Rāma-Varma was exerting himself in every way possible to oppose his advance, took all needful precautions before deciding on opening his campaign against him. He tried to win over the English at Madras by conciliatory methods. To their deputies, who had waited on him recently, he had made promises of a friendly nature. He not only confirmed them in their former privileges, but had, besides, granted permission to them to open a factory at Onore (Honāvar). In the light of this friendly attitude, he persuaded himself that the assembling of English troops on the Madras-Travancore frontier was only to protect the border and no more. He knew also that the English were otherwise busy, assisting as they were Nizām Alī in his wars. Nizām Alī had, about this time, got into touch with Mahfuz Khān, to whom he had sent presents of great value. Haidar, from the goodwill and generosity he had shown to Mahfuz, expected him to win over Nizām Alī to his side. He had also opened negotiations with the Mahrattas, with a view to prevent their incursions into Mysore during his absence.

But Haidar greatly miscalculated the odds against him. Hardly had he begun his march against Rāma-Varma, he had news of a combination of forces against him.

His partial progress against Travancore, August 1766.

This did not, however, perturb him. He despatched forthwith Mahfuz Khān to Nizām Alī, and by the close of August took Callacaud and attempted to fix a contribution on Rāma-Varma.¹⁴ But before he could achieve

14. It would seem that Haidar actually started on the campaign and took Callacaud and tried to fix up the contribution, when news of a combi-

his objective, he had to retrace his steps to Coimbatore and there prepare for his return to Seringapatam.

While Haidar was engaged in his operations on the West Coast, his ambitious designs were bringing together men who would, under other circumstances, have not, perhaps, combined against him. What made them come together is not so difficult to imagine as what made such a combination possible, a combination the like of which had not so far been thought of, and a combination too that eventually spelt the ruin of not only Haidar but of his son Tipū Sultān as well. It was the first combination of its kind—of the English at Madras, the Nizām of Hyderabad and the Mahrattas at Poona. Among the causes that made such a combination possible was the change that was brought about in the position of the English at Madras by the *Treaty of Paris*, which terminated the wars between France and England on the 10th of February 1763.¹⁵ This *Treaty*, whether it intended it or not, whether the Company was aware of it or not, transformed the English from a

nation of his opponents called him back to Seringapatam. (See *Mily. Cons.*, XXV. 507, *Letter* from Wood to Palk, dated September 6, 1766, referring to "Haidar's return to Coimbatore (last Sunday evening) from Callacand, which garrison he has taken and almost settled with the king of Travancore"; also *Mily. Sund.*, XXXII. 384, *Letter* from Madras to Bombay, dated October 11, 1766, referring to Haidar thus: "Hyder Ally Cawn returned to Coimbatore the 31st August after having retaken Calacad and it is said settled with the Travancore Rajah for a large sum"). In the light of these authorities, the statement of De La Tour that the "discovery of the intentions of the English caused the departure of the army to Travancore to be suspended" (o.c., I. 155), has to be treated as lacking in authority. Similarly, the statement of Mons that in the "month of January 1767 he (Haidar) got tidings that the Mahrattas and the Nabob of the Deccan, Nizam Ali, were approaching to invade Mysore" and that "he at once moved off with his army" (*Memo*, 154). The sequence has not been correctly developed here.

15. The Preliminary Treaty was signed at Fontainebleau on 3rd November 1762. See *Collection of Treaties*, I. O. Library, 15 G. 17, P. 1.

mere trading community into a political nation in India. So far, as we have seen,¹⁶ the English had fought, or had pretended so to do, in the war in and around Trichinopoly, as subsidiaries, not as principals; as "allies to the Circar", not as chiefs; as "merchants," not as political.¹⁷ They had disavowed all intention to act for themselves and had disowned all responsibility in the matter of the surrender of Trichinopoly according to Muhammad Ali's treaty with Nanjarāja.¹⁸ This assumed status was all changed by the *Treaty of Paris*. That *Treaty* converted the English and French traders in India into political parties, principals in making wars and concluding treaties, and representatives of their respective nations in this country, vested with power to make alliances or annul alliances once made, and in a word act for themselves as territorial magnates, if not powers, who could act on their own initiative. The conversion of traders into territorial powers marks from the day, it may be said, that this *Treaty* was signed. What is more important even to note is that this *Treaty*, instead of disowning such a status, confirmed it definitely by its Eleventh Article by acknowledging Salābat Jang as the lawful Subādār of the Dekhan, at a time when that office had for over a year and a half been assumed by his brother Nizām Ali; and by the same Article recognised—the two nations agreeing to do so—Muhammad Ali as the lawful Nawāb of the Karnātic.¹⁹ The man whose title to the Nawābship

16. See *Ante*, Vol. II, Ch. XVI.

17. *Ibid.* On November 3, 1752, they wrote: "We wrote to the King of Mysore that we were merchants, allies to the Circar, not principals." Wilks, citing this passage, remarks: "The English Government had endeavoured to evade the ignominy of being associated in the fraud of Trichinopoly, by representing themselves as mere auxiliaries, who took no part in the political direction of the war" (*o.c.*, I. 326).

18. See Vol. II, l.c.

19. The XI Article of the *Treaty of Paris* corresponds to Article X of the Preliminary Treaty. It is interesting to note that the Preliminary

had been disputed came to be acknowledged by both the real disputants as the Nawāb, though those who had been described as the primary parties to the contested succession refused to do so still. The recognition marked, indeed, a revolution in words and deeds. The English and the French intended by the *Treaty* to put an end to the fight they had waged and to secure order and peace on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa as the *Treaty* itself recited. But they did not perceive fully the effect of what they had done. The conferment of the Nawābship on Muhammad Ali meant the creation of a sovereign authority but neither the English nor the French understood of what he was to be the sovereign—of what country and what territory. Nor did they care to enquire whose deputy he was as

Treaty does not contain any mention of the mutual recognition of Muhammad Ali as Nawāb of the Karnātic and of Salābat Jang as Subah (Soubahdar) of the Deccan (see George Chalmers, *Collection of Treaties*, I. 467). The XI Article of the Definitive *Treaty* runs as follows:—"In the East Indies, Great Britain shall restore to France, in the condition they are now in the different factories, which that crown possessed, as well as the coast of Coromandel and Orixā (Orissa), as on that of Malabar, as also in Bengal, at the beginning of the year 1749. And his most Christian Majesty (i.e., France) renounces all acquisitions which he had made on the coast of Coromandel and Orixā since the said beginning of the year 1749. (Though Madras had been in the possession of the French at the beginning of 1749, as under the *Treaty* of Aix-La-Chapelle, signed on 7th October 1748, there was a general restitution of conquests; it was held to be in the possession of the English from that date). His Most Christian Majesty shall restore, on his side, all that he may have conquered from Great Britain, in the East Indies, during the present war: and will expressly cause Nattal and Tapanonly, in the island of Sumatra, to be restored; he engages further, not to erect fortifications, or to keep troops in any part of the dominions of the *Subah* (i.e., the Mughal Soubadari) of Bengal. And in order to preserve future peace on the coast of Coromandel and Orixā, the English and French shall acknowledge Muhammad Ali Khan for lawful Nawab of the Carnatic, and Salabat Jang (who had been deposed by his brother Nizam Ali on the 27th June 1762) for lawful *Subah* (i.e., Soubadar) of the Deccan; and both parties shall renounce all demands and pretensions of satisfaction with which they might charge each other, or their Indian allies, for the depredations or pillage committed on the one side or the other during the war."

“Nawab”, a term which literally conveyed the import of a lawful deputy of a superior in the government of a country—but the superior was not named nor his government defined. Whether the recognition meant anything more than the renouncing of all future support to other candidates by the contracting parties, or a direct recognition of sovereign authority in the person they thus acknowledged, as was afterwards sought to be assumed, it was not clear to them. Whatever it may have been taken to mean at the time, there is no doubt that an act that was intended to compose the agitations in which he had been concerned, tended, as time passed, only to stimulate an ambition too large for his talents, a corruption too prodigal for his means, and a combination of foreign and domestic intrigue, tending to objects of which he had probably never formed a distinct conception, profitable alone to the instruments employed, and to himself productive of nothing but misfortune.²⁰ Another effect of the *Treaty* may also be noted. While it removed—at least seemingly—the impediments in the way of the Company's trade, it is not clear if it left them free to abstain from views of political aggrandisement. The *Treaty* carried the seeds of such aggrandisement and it served no purpose whatever whether the English authors of it were aware of it or not. As the military historian of Mysore says, this, indeed, is a question which applies with the same force to every subsequent period of British history in India as to the short but important interval covered by 1763-1765, which placed the revenues of Bengal at the uncontrolled disposal of the English Company.²¹ Moderation in the prosecution of political ambitions is undoubtedly a great virtue but whether that virtue can always wield

20. See Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 538-539. His remarks on the *Treaty of Paris* are both just and critical to a degree.

21. *Ibid*, 539.

the upper hand and whether it has not to yield to expediency not infrequently is a matter that might appeal to different minds in different ways. But there can be no doubt whatever that generalization in a matter of this nature is altogether an impossibility, unless we can concede the position that human affairs can be rendered stationery by human wisdom. The history of the thirty-four years from 1765-1799, to be narrated below, shows how the English at Madras were drawn into the vortex of the struggle that raged for domination in the South and later from the South to the rest of the Indian peninsula. The question whether even Lord Clive,²² who was the first to obtain territorial sovereignty for his nation in this country with characteristic penetration and promptitude, and used with lightning rapidity the combination of circumstances which, without design on his part, led to an aggrandisement large in area and larger in its general effects, would have counselled moderation for all time or have allowed his country to act according to the needs of the hour is not difficult of an answer, knowing as we do how quickly he acted and how quickly he arrived at momentous conclusions where the interests of his nation were concerned.²³

22. Lord Clive was Governor of Bengal from 3rd May 1765 to 29th January 1769.

23. Wilks, who expatiates at considerable length on this topic, offers the following characteristic observation:—"The wisdom and virtue of political moderation, and the inexpediency and injustice of aggressive wars, are among those propositions familiarly denominated *truths*, which more frequently pass through the ear than the understanding, and extend themselves over so large a surface as scarcely to be anywhere distinctly tangible. Nature has erected no visible boundaries to mark the proper extent of political power; and moderation, that word of amiable sound, which changes its meaning in the concerns of private life at every step from one hundred to one hundred thousand, is as perfect a Proteus in the political vocabulary: while in the very act of applying its ever varying form, ambition will not fail to whisper, that the fundamental principles and proportions which regulate a smaller scale remain precisely the same in the construction

Thus it came to pass that the *Treaty of Paris* opened up new ambitions in both Muhammad Ali and the English at Fort St. George. The elimination of the French, who under that *Treaty* renounced all pretensions to their former acquisitions on the whole of the East Coast, from the extreme south to the extreme north-east, had voluntarily committed political suicide. That each had agreed to restore what had been conquered from the other, did not abate a jot from the effects of this act of surrender of political ambitions on the part of the French. Whether it was diplomatic error on the part of those who concluded the *Treaty of Paris* to have recognised Salābat Jang the *lawful* Subādār of the Dekhan, when he had been openly superseded for over eighteen months by his brother Nizām Alī, and Muhammad Alī, who had supplanted his elder brother and according to some, the legitimate heir to authority, Mahfuz Khān, as the *lawful* Nawāb of the Karnātic, there is no doubt that it led to political consequences of the most momentous character. Two European nations had for the first time assumed to themselves the right of not only deciding for themselves—without any reference to the extraneous authority to which they

of a larger.....To determine the evanescent line which separates moderation from ambition would seem to be a problem beyond the reach of general rules, and to require a consideration of the facts of each individual case, for its solution. The lights to guide our opinion on a question which appears simple to those only who confine their examination to its surface, must therefore be derived from a close attention to the progress of events" (o.e., I. 539-540). That is just so; only the English at Fort St. George in the negotiations that followed the death of Chandā Sahib and the fall of Trichinopoly would not allow any scope for the ambitions of Mysore, ambitions which had been founded on a formally agreed to Treaty between their "principlal" Muhammad Ali and the Mysore sovereign of the time. Expediency dictated a different course of action, though they did not like to endorse, from a moral point, the "fraud" practised on Nanjārāja by Muhammad Ali in the flagrant manner he did.

had so far pretended deference—on political and territorial claims, over which so far they had not established any actual authority but also the right of conferring official appointments to high territorial office—including the Nizāmships and Nawābships—and thus by virtue of their military power to determine the interior arrangements of the Mughal Empire itself, of which they had so far pretended to be but auxiliaries and allies in a subordinate capacity. One result of this assumption of high power on the part of the English was that Muhammad Ali, who as a servant of the Mughal—whose patents of office he had produced so far to support his claims—could not claim a rank higher than that of a deputy's deputy—the deputy of the Nizām, himself a deputy of the Mughal—began most prudently to rest his own pretensions to a non-descript authority, on the legality of a decision so solemnly and in such definite terms recognised by two foreign powers, who by virtue of their military power, were far more competent to decide a claim that had yielded so far only to the arbitrament of the sword. Whether its legality was “imprudently”²⁴ recognised by them, as has been suggested, need not trouble us in the least, for prudential restraints were set aside by them as out of date and irrelevant, having regard to the actual circumstances in which they had found themselves. The fact of the matter was that the Mughal Empire, after Aurangzib, was dissolving, while the disappearance of the kingdoms of Bijāpur and Gōlkonḍa had led to confusion which had

24. Wilks says it was “imprudently recognized” (o.c., I. 542), but he forgets that the *Treaty of Paris* of 1763 sought to set aside an intolerable position in the South of India. Trade cannot go on without peace in the land, while peace in the land was impossible without control of territory. The passing of the trading character and the emerging of the political character of the English Company is first discerned in it. Unlike the French, the English emerged a territorial power in India as the result of the fight over Trichinopoly, even long before their conquest of Bengal. See *Ante*, vol. II, Ch. XVI.

been only worse confounded by the advent of the European nations, who desired to trade in a quarter in which trade was continually impeded by political turmoil. The *Treaty of Paris* tried to resolve this confusion on paper for the moment, though it had to wade through a course of fighting that occupied the energies of the English nation for well over half a century.²⁵ The immediate effect of the recognition accorded to the Nawābship of Muhammad Ali was that it fixed his ambitions in no uncertain manner. He, indeed, found the limits laid down to his newly created sovereignty all too small, too restricted, and too cramping. His ambition of power extended in the north-east to the ousting of the Nizām of Hyderabad himself; in the south to the occupation of the country as far as Cape Comorin and the country of Travancore, which he coveted as much as the rich district of Tanjore; and in the south-west to the whole of Mysore, contemplating in his scheme of conquests the territory of Mysore and the driving out from it of Haidar Ali, who had become so capable a successor, both in capacity and in character, to Nanjarāja, whom he had so far so successfully circumvented.²⁶ These objectives became the main aim of the rest of his life. Whether they were practicable, and whether he had the means to prosecute even a part of them, he did not stop to enquire. But the *Treaty* gave him a base to stand on; to set at naught his supposed masters, the Mughal and his deputy, the Nizām; and to

25. The *Treaty of Paris* was concluded on 10th February 1763, while the capture of Bāji Rao II, the Mahratta Peshwa, was accomplished in 1818, an event which may be taken to mark the British conquest of India. The period covered by these events is about 55 years.

26. Wilks writes: "In the eager anticipation of boundless dominion, the limits of this newly created sovereignty, became too narrow for his growing fortunes. The Soubadāree of Decan, including the whole South, was the lowest but the most immediate object of his grasp" (l. c.).

concert in open and undisguised fashion measures for their attainment. It is true they were hardly consistent with the realizing of even less difficult projects but he was led into them no less by his political imbecility as by the misleading counsels of his European political advisers who now began to swarm round him to his ultimate ruin.²⁷

But Muhammad Ali had not reckoned with his competitors in the art of dissimulation. Haidar, the

The aims and objectives of the other Indian Powers.

Sarvādhikāri of Mysore; Mādhava Rao, the Mahratta Pēshwa; and Nizām Ali, the *de facto* Nizām of Hyderabad, had each aimed at domination in the South.

Of these, Nizām Ali, who had imprisoned his brother Salābat Jang, and ascended the throne on the 18th July 1761,²⁸ and had since then carried on the government in his own name, openly giving out that the Mughal Emperor at Delhi had displaced Salābat Jang for his misconduct, murdered him in September 1763, within seven months of the signing of the *Treaty of Paris*,²⁹ and followed it up by acts which showed that he was resolved upon the execution of a definite policy of aggression in the South. He had in 1763 tried to uproot the Pēshwa himself by an alliance with Jānōji Bhōnsle of Berar, who had yielded to the glamour of

27. This characterization may look too summary but is well warranted. Take, for instance, what Wilks says of the matter: "The projects concerted for its attainment (the subjugation of the whole South of India by Muhammad Ali) were more open and undisguised than was consistent with the practical and sober prosecution of less difficult achievements, and the inflated ambition of this political pretender was nourished and incited by the still more absurd and corrupt counsels of his European advisers" (l.c.).

28. This is the date given by Wilks (o. c., I. 539). Mussulman writers give 14th Zihije A. H. 1176, which is adopted by Grant-Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I. 536, f. n. 13.

29. Grant-Duff gives the 8th Rubbi-al-Awl A. H. 1177, which is 15 months after Salābat's imprisonment (*Ibid.*). Salābat's natural imbecility would, it is said, have prevented his ever becoming a formidable rival of his brother, whilst unsupported by a foreign power.

usurping the place not only of the Pēshwa, but also that of the Rājā of Satāra himself. He forgot how his house had been enriched by the family that he planned to subvert. The defection of Jānōji at a critical moment of the war,³⁰ and the death of Vittal Sundar, better known as Rājā Pratāpvant, the Dewān of Nizām Alī, at the battle of Tandulza, extinguished all hopes in that direction.³¹ But bitter memories die hard. Both Mādhava Rao and Nizām Alī remembered the treachery of Jānōji and were nursing it daily and waiting indeed for an opportunity, each in his own way, to wreak his vengeance on him. Meanwhile, Nizām Alī got a respite in 1765, which he utilized by a successful campaign south of the Krishṇa, during which he reduced his brother Basālat Jang to subjection. This enabled him to think of the project of a conquest of both Haidar Alī and Muhammad Alī, who had risen to power, the one in the wake of Nanjarāja and the other with the active support of the English at Madras; but their conquests had prevented him for the moment from proceeding further south to claim the country which nominally formed part of the viceroyalty of his father, which he had seized for himself by usurpation and murder. Mādhava Rao saw his opportunity, about 1766, to humble Jānōji at the expense of Nizām Alī, a policy which suited his purposes well. The last campaign against Haidar had not accomplished all the objectives aimed at by Mādhava Rao. Haidar's activities since his last treaty of peace had not allayed the fears of Mādhava Rao as to his ambitious designs. He soon found that

30. Grant-Duff, *o. c.*, I. 539-541.

31. *Ibid.*, 541-542. He was won over by Raghunātha Rao, the uncle of Mādhava Rao. His ambitious hopes had been damped from a suspicion of the duplicity of Rājā Pratāpvant. On a promise of territory yielding Rs. 32 lakhs, a portion of what had been promised to Nizām Alī, he agreed to withdraw his support and soon found a critical opportunity to back up his word by his deed (Grant-Duff, *o. c.*, I. 541).

Nizām Alī was ready to enter on an offensive alliance against Jānōji, with the eventual hope of obtaining his active aid against Haidar. The result was a secret treaty entered into early in 1766, in accordance with which both Mādhava Rao and Nizām Alī marched against Jānōji and made him surrender to Nizām Alī three-fourths of the districts he had gained by the former war, by his treachery against the Pēshwa on the one hand and Nizām Alī on the other. While Jānōji had something yet to lose, Mādhava Rao's diplomacy showed that Nizām Alī rather than himself had gained anything by this war. But Mādhava Rao, though he contrived to bring about this arrangement with a view to the firm establishment of peace and friendship between himself and Nizām Alī—probably pointing to early conjoint action in the south—soon found that Nizām Alī was more dangerous as a friend than even as a foe.

The English at Madras were inextricably drawn into the war that was now looming large in the horizon.

The English drawn into war with these Powers. They had tried and failed to obtain a lease of the Northern Circars from Nizām Alī, who had at one time offered it to Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of

Arcot. Though the English at Madras offered to pay six times the amount he had before received for it, he positively refused to lease it to them. The Court of Directors were anxious that the French should be kept out of that area and that their agents at Madras should make all possible endeavours to obtain it from Nizām Alī. Lord Clive determined to take possession of it at any cost and for this purpose tried to obtain a grant of it from the Mughal Emperor at Delhi. Lord Clive's political prescience led him into a clearer understanding of the situation that was developing at the time in the peninsula. What necessitated the basic conceptions underlying the *Treaty of Paris* dictated to him a course

of conduct that was justifiable both from the moral and political standpoints. On receiving from the Emperor of Delhi the *Divāni* of Bengal in 1765, he solicited and obtained at the same time Imperial grants conferring on the English East India Company the possession of the Northern Circars. In conveying the grants to the English at Madras, he enjoined on them their immediate occupation. This was effected eventually in 1766 except for the areas comprising Chicacole and Guntūr, the latter of which formed part of the *Jaghir* of Basālat Jang and was not to be possessed by the English until his death, unless his conduct should prove inimical to them before then.³² But the Council at Fort St. George, after thus seizing it under the direct authority of the great Mughal, deemed it wise to despatch an embassy to Nizām Ali for negotiating a treaty, under which they were to hold it as a free gift from him and as a tributary dependency under one who himself was a dependent, if he could at all be reckoned one such, and to whose exclusion it had been conferred and despite whom it had been taken possession of by force.³³ Under this treaty,

32. The free gift by the Mughal Emperor was made known by Lord Clive in October 1765. Brigadier-General Calliaud was sent to take possession of Northern Circars early in 1766. He accomplished this easily except that Konḍapalli had to be stormed and taken (March 7, 1766).

33. In justice to the English at Madras, it should be added that when they found that Nizām Ali was not disposed to surrender his claims, such as they were, without resistance—after the capture of Konḍapalli—and threatened to invade the Karnātic or get it invaded by Haidar, they, becoming alarmed, tried to form an alliance with Haidar, who refused to receive their envoy, having already got into touch with Nizām Ali. In this dilemma, Mr. Palk, the Governor at Fort St. George, took counsel with Lord Clive. Lord Clive suggested the opening of negotiations with Nizām Ali, which should have for its object the reduction of Haidar, and an alliance for checking the rising power of the Mahrattas. This suited admirably the ambitions of Nizām Ali. He wished to reduce Haidar; to humble the Mahrattas; and to use the regular troops of the English for his own purposes with as little expense to himself. But as he had already made a compact with the Mahrattas against Haidar, he deemed it best not to break with Mādhava Rao, until he had effected Haidar's overthrow. The

concluded at Hyderabad by General Calliaud on 12th November 1766, it was stipulated that an English auxiliary force, indefinite in strength, and equally loose in its applications, should be placed at the disposal of Nizām Ali, "to settle," as it was said, "everything right and proper, the affairs of His Highness's Government." This very equivocal and wise objective was taken to include, in the immediate future, an invasion, if not the conquest of Mysore, as Nizām Ali had been, as we have seen above, concerting a plan with Mādhava Rao, the Mahratta Pēshwa, for the purpose. This objective, however, was not entirely in keeping with the policy of Lord Clive, who had views of his own in the matter. He had expressly suggested that any aid which might be afforded to Nizām Ali should be directed to restrain the growing power of the Mahrattas rather than augmenting it. To check the soaring ambition of Mysore in any direction in which it might affect English interests was, in his judgment, an object of legitimate policy; but he was definitely against crushing Mysore, the only power in the South which had been able to oppose Mahratta aggression to any respectable extent and which could form, if its friendship could be secured, a most useful barrier between the Mahrattas of Poona and the English at Madras. That was, indeed, in direct opposition to his political views. Such a policy, however, was capable of execution only by the

English, not knowing the chicanery of Nizām Ali, concluded with him the Treaty of 12th November 1766, referred to in the text. Nizām Ali, by this Treaty, consented to the cession of Rājahmundry, Ellore, Chicacole and Guntūr, subject to an annual tribute of Rs. nine lakhs; with the proviso that Guntūr, then in the possession of Basālat Jang, was to be continued to him for life, during which period the tribute was to be limited to Rs. seven lakhs. In the alternative, the English were to assist Nizām Ali with two battalions of infantry and six pieces of cannon. In case the troops were to be required, the seven lakhs were to be appropriated for their expenses. Nizām Ali's subsequent conduct showed that his ill-feeling against the English continued for some time even after signing the Treaty.

hand of the master mind that conceived it; in any other hand, it was bound to prove disastrous, if not dangerous. Its very equivocal character rendered it difficult of realization. The profound statesman who propounded it would have created by it an intermediate State, which, from its very strength, would have proved an effective barrier; a less capable personage would have rendered such an objective wholly nugatory and invited instead aggression from all sides, and instead of a barrier, would have only created a high road of invasion.

Pēshwa Mādhava Rao was being fully kept aware of what was going on at Fort St. George, Seringapatam and Hyderabad. News of combinations and counter-combinations of the Nizām was reaching his ears. He was aware of the objectives aimed at by these alliances and so without waiting for his "ally," if he can be called one, he prepared to act by himself. He had his own objectives as well to realize. He had concluded his last campaign in Mysore without securing the release of Rāṇi Virammāji of Bednūr, and he had left over the conquest of part of the country as well to another occasion. Both these objects had to be attained, if his reputation was not to be soiled. Mādhava Rao professed nothing short of the entire subversion of Haidar's usurped authority,³⁴ and he also disputed his right to levy contributions from the chiefs of Bellary, Chitaldrug and other places, claimed to be under the protectorate of the Pēshwa himself.³⁵ Mādhava Rao, accordingly, crossed the Krishna early in January 1767 and rapidly advanced on Sīra. On the way, he halted at Savaṇūr, whose Chief joined him with his troops. Murāri Rao, who stood to gain by the invasion, joined

34. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 550.

35. *Set-Pesh-Daft.*, XXXVII, Letter No. 109, dated December 13, 1766.

later from Gooty, while the Pālegār of Chitaldrug, as one who had old scores to pay off, also advanced to meet the Pēshwa.³⁶ Pushing on to Rāyadurg early in February, Mādhava Rao marched down the bed of the Hagari to Sira. Mīr Ali Razā Khān, brother-in-law of Haidar, who was stationed at this place with 4,000 horse and 6,000 infantry, proceeded with his troops, but he soon returned after viewing the Mahratta army, and began to defend himself. Mādhava Rao stationed his artillery on the tank to the north of the fort, and began to breach the fortifications from a considerable distance. Mīr Ali Razā offered what seemed a stout defence for nearly a fortnight, when, betraying his trust, he with his protege Chikkappa Gauḍa of Koratagere made a truce (*sallā māḍi koṇḍu*) and gave up the keys to Mādhava Rao. Always a courteous man, Mādhava Rao treated him with consideration, and kept him with himself as a volunteer (*umeidvār*) until his arrival in due course at Gurramkoṇḍa, his ancestral seat, 150 miles to the eastward. He next passed on to Maddagiri, which offered a stout defence for about a month.³⁷ Here were imprisoned Rāṇi Virammāji, her adopted son, the Pretender, and others. The Rāṇi and her son were duly released by Mādhava Rao, who next advanced on Channarāyadurga.³⁸ Here he met with opposition from Sardār Khān, the Mysorean General, who had been despatched at the head of 2,000 foot and 1,000 irregulars (*ahashām*). For twenty-three days the Mahrattas closely invested Channarāyadurga. The garrison being

36. Kirmāṇi, *Neshauni-Hydari*, 150. Kirmāṇi is, however, wrong in setting down the Mahratta campaign to A. H. 1076? 1176 (or A. D. 1762).

37. *Ibid.*, 150-151, 156; see also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 37-38, and Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 552-553. Mīr Ali Razā Khān, referred to in the text above, was also known as "Meer Saheb" (*Haid. Nām.*, l. c.; Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 553). De La Tour refers to him as "Mirza Ali Khan" (*Ayder Ali*, I. 188-194).

38. *Haid. Nām.*, l. c., *Sel-Pesh-Daft.*, *o. c.*, Letter Nos. 132, 135-138, 141-142, 146-154, etc.; also Robson, *o. c.*, 39-40.

reduced to extremities owing to exhaustion of supplies, Sardār Khān, at length, in April, surrendered the fort to the Pēshwa (*rastu mugidu, kille kavalige kottu*) and retired to Seringapatam.³⁹ Hoskōṭe, Chikballāpur, Doḍballāpur, Kōlār, Muḷbāgal and Gurramkoṇḍa were successively taken by Mādhava Rao,⁴⁰ who, after bestowing the last mentioned fort in *jaghīr* on Mīr Ali Razā Khān, marched on by way of Channapaṭṇa to attack Seringapatam.⁴¹

Haidar had returned to Seringapatam from Coimbatore in March.⁴² On receipt of

Haidar's movements.

intelligence of Mādhava Rao's movements, he had marched to Bangalore with the whole of his horse, foot and artillery. Finding the Mahratta army to be more numerous than his own, he considered it imprudent to come into contact with them. Without, therefore, making any opposition, he retired to Seringapatam.⁴³ Never failing in resources, Haidar, putting the fort of Mysore in the best state of defence, laid in a sufficient store of ammunition and provisions, and to effectually arrest the progress of the Mahrattas, issued the most peremptory orders to his officers, civil and military, to break down the embankments of tanks; to poison the wells with milk-hedge;

39. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 38.

40. *Ibid*; Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 155-156; also Robson, *l. c.*

41. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 156; see also and compare De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 207, 211.

42. Maens, *Memo*, 154. De La Tour gives a graphic account of Haidar's march from Coimbatore to Seringapatam (*o. c.*, I. 178-187). The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 39) places the arrival of Haidar in Seringapatam from Coimbatore roughly in April 1767 (*Sarvajit, Ghaitra*). This is hardly reconcilable with the statement of Maens, according to which Haidar left Coimbatore immediately on receipt of intelligence of invasion of Mysore by the Mahrattas and Nizām Ali in January 1767 and that he found means to rid himself of the enemy two months after his return to Seringapatam. Since the Pēshwa and the Nizām were, as we shall see, finally bought off in May, Haidar could not have been in Seringapatam earlier than March 1767.

43. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 151.

to burn all forage; to drive off the villagers (*valasa*) and cattle to the woods; and to lay up in store, in Seringapatam, grain and provisions of all kinds which could be found within a radius of thirty miles. Presenting thus a scorched earth to the enemy and collecting what force he could spare for the field, he encamped them under the walls of Seringapatam; caused the flanks and front of the encampment to be entrenched and fortified; threw up batteries round the fort, and stationed his artillery and his regular and Karnātic infantry for its defence, keeping at the same time his stable horse and the Pinḍāris concealed in the jungle of Mākāḷidurga with orders to harass the enemy.⁴⁴ On receipt of information of the Pēshwa's design, however, Haidar, marching northward with the whole body of his cavalry, sought cover in the forests of Māgaḍi. While waiting here, it happened that suddenly the advanced guard of the Mahrattas (*Bee-ni-usakir*), with a great quantity of stores, provisions, artillery and standards of the Pēshwa,

A night attack.

arrived and encamped in the neighbourhood of Hutridurga. Haidar, keeping his men in constant readiness, marched about midnight and came upon the rear of the unwary Mahrattas, and made a vigorous and successful attack; and with the spoils returned to Seringapatam, where he resumed his ground of encampment. Mādhava Rao then left the neighbourhood of Channapaṭṇa where he was encamped and sought temporary shelter in Ambājidurga. The Mahrattas continued their harassing warfare as far as the Bārāmahal, despite the efforts of Haidar's *kuzzaks* to disperse and straiten them.⁴⁵

44. Robson, *o. c.*, 40; De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 196-200; Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 550; and Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 151-152.

45. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 156-159. The reference to "Chintamani" on P. 158 of this work ought to be "Channapaṭṇa" in the light of other sources.

It was now April. Thus far the Mahrattas had over-run all the east of Mysore. But Haidar, alarmed by tidings of the advance of Peace negotiations, March-May 1767. Nizām Ali on Seringapatam, resolved to repeat his efforts at negotiation.⁴⁶ Already in March, while the Pēshwa was engaged in the settlement of the newly conquered principality of Maddagiri, Haidar had started negotiations through Karīm Khān and Appāji Rām, a witty and skilful negotiator.⁴⁷ Appāji Rām, persisting in his address, purchased the retreat of the Mahrattas for thirty-five lakhs of rupees, half of which was paid on the spot late in April. Mādhava Rao had obtained possession of all the districts of Mysore to the south-eastward of Sīra, and the treaty provided for the immediate restoration of the whole, with the single exception of the fort and district of Kōlār, which remained in pledge for the payment of the balance. This sum being also discharged in conformity to the treaty, early in May, Mādhava Rao finally evacuated Kōlār and retraced his steps to Poona on the 11th of May.⁴⁸

46. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 553-554.

47. *Sol. Pesh-Daft*, *o. c.*, I. Letter No. 148, dated March 8, 1767; also No. 153, dated March 21, 1767. About Appāji Rām, two "anecdotes" are narrated by Wilks (*o. c.*, I. 556-557), one of which is discounted by Grant-Duff as inconsistent with Mādhava Rao's high sense of dignity and decorum. "He would excuse", says Grant-Duff, "want of form and even an ebullition of anger, but he never tolerated indecency or impertinence" (see Grant-Duff, *o. c.*, I. 567). As regards the other story—the one justifying usurpation on the part of Haidar on the ground of the Pēshwa's own usurpation of the Maratha throne, this seems equally without foundation. It is not, however, denied that Appāji Rām was a man of considerable address and one possessed of both decorum and wit. If the *Pēshwa Daftars* are to be believed, whatever might be said of the private life of individual persons, the Mahratta court was a dignified one and open ribaldry was not tolerated by it.

48. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 555-556. Wilks speaks of the payment of half the amount stipulated "late in the month of March" (*o. c.*, I. 555). This is evidently an error for "April" in the light of other sources. Robson also, agreeing with Wilks, mentions the amount paid to Mādhava Rao as "thirty-five lakhs of rupees" (*o. c.*, 41), while Peixoto refers to it as "Rupees thirty-six lakhs" (see *Memoirs*, *o. c.*, 84). Among the

Meanwhile Nizām Alī, as an ostensible ally of the Mahrattas and the English, was actively engaged in prosecuting his own design against Mysore. In January, on the pretext of espousing the cause of Razā Alī, son of Chandā Sāhib, to the Nawābship of Arcot,⁴⁹ he, with his brother Basālat Jang and a detachment of English troops under Colonel Joseph Smith, proceeded from Hyderabad to join Mādhava Rao.⁵⁰ Taking an eastern route, he marched on to Seringapatam, effecting a junction with the Mahrattas, near Channapaṭṇa, in April.⁵¹ By now Haidar, having, as we have seen, in part bought off the Pēshwa's retreat, manouvred to alarm Nizām Alī in turn, by encamping with his troops midway between Channapaṭṇa and Seringapatam.⁵² Foiled, however, in his object of sharing the spoils with his ally Mādhava Rao, Nizām Alī saw the extent to which he had been

Marāṭhi documents, dated between May 3 and 27, 1767, referring to the treaty and the Pēshwa's return to Poona, are *Letters* Nos. 158 to 163 of the *Sel-Pesh-Daft.* (o. c.). *Letter* No. 160, dated May 8, 1767, specifically mentions the amount of levy agreed upon by Haidar as "thirty-one lakhs." De La Tour speaks of the sum received by the Pēshwa as "six lakhs of rupees in hand, and six payable in six months" (o. c., I. 211), while Kirmāṇi refers to this as "seven lakhs of rupees in money" (o. c., 159-160). These varying figures are to be taken to represent part payment of the amount actually levied, i. e., Rupees thirty-five lakhs. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 38), which refers to the return of the Mahrattas to Poona by way of Chikballāpur and Maddagiri, in May 1767 (*Sarvajit, Vaisākha*), hardly mentions the terms of peace between Haidar and Mādhava Rao. On the entire topic, see also and compare Dr. N. K. Sinha's article entitled "Hyder Ali's Relations with the Marathas (1766-1767)", in the *Ind. Hist. Qrly.* for March 1940, pp. 1-8, written mostly with reference to Marāṭhi sources but lacking in details from the local point of view.

49. *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 88: *Chandā Sabara maga Rājā-mallī-Khānavigu Arkāḍa davalattu koḍisabekemba nimitya*. See also *Telli. Fact. Rec., Diary* (1766-1767), p. 210: *Entry* dated June 29, 1767, advising of "some overtures made by Nizam Ally (Nizām Alī) to Rājah Saib (Razā Sāhib), the son of Chunda Saib, respecting his father's former possessions in Arcot," etc. Regarding Razā Alī, see further below.

50. Robson, o. c., 39; also Wilks, o. c., 557.

51. *Ibid.*; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 39; also De La Tour, o. c. I. 207. 52. De La Tour, o. c., I. 212.

outwitted by him. Haidar, too, anxious to get rid of the combination of his rivals, started negotiations with Nizām Ali through Mahfuz Khān.⁵³ At length, about the middle of May, soon after the Pēshwa's final departure northwards,⁵⁴ he bought him off for

The Nizām bought off.

Rupees thirty lakhs, with a large cession of lands.⁵⁵ At the same time a

treaty was concluded between the two parties through the mediation of Rukn-ud-daula, Dewān of Nizām Ali.⁵⁶

It was agreed that Tipū, Haidar's eldest son, should marry the daughter of Mahfuz Khān, who, as the eldest son of Anwar-ud-dīn, was the lawful Nawāb of Arcot;

Conclusion of

Treaty between the two Powers.

53. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 567-569; Robson, *o. c.*, 40-41.

54. *Ibid.*, 560. The Mahrattas began their march northwards on 11th May 1767, as stated in the text above. This is confirmed by the *Haid. Nam.*, which fixes their return home in May 1767.

55. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, II, 158, No. 599, dated October 10, 1767. Compare Wilks (*o. c.*, I. 558), who merely speaks of Haidar having "repeatedly urged him (Nizām Ali) to accept of 20 lacs, and the promise of a fixed tribute of six," and of his having, since his adjustment with Mādhava Rao, "observed a profound silence on the subject of money and strongly incited him to a joint retaliation on the English and Mohammed Ali," etc.

56. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 216. Rukn-ud-daula, according to this authority (*Ibid.*, 177, f. n.), was brother-in-law of Muhammad Ali, Nawāb of Arcot. The designation of "Diyan," affixed to his name, signified, according to De La Tour, that he was "the minister and keeper of the great seal of the Suba" (Hyderabad). He succeeded Rāja Prabhāvant as minister of the Nizām of Hyderabad in 1765 and died in 1775. His real name was Mir Mūsa Khān, "Rukn-ud-daula" being the title bestowed on him by Nizām Ali Khān, fourth son of Asaf Jah, in 1765, Nizām Ali was ruler from 1761 to 1803. The title of "Nizām" taken by the rulers of Hyderabad came into general use with the accession of Nizām Ali. Rukn-ud-daula had a brother named Tuar Jung, who is mentioned by Col. J. Smith in one of his despatches as "Tower Jung." He served in the fight at Changama. See *Col. Smith's despatch* dated 13th September 1767, p. 48 below. De La Tour spells the name of Nizām Ali's minister as "Rocum Dawla", "Rocum Daula" (*o. c.*, I. 177, 214-215); Grant-Duff as "Rookun-ud-dowlah" (*o. c.*, I. 554, 560-562). Wilks, however, does not mention the name, though Sir Murray Hammick, in a footnote, spells it as "Ruku-ud-daula" (Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 558, n. 1). The standard spelling "Rukn-ud-daula" (as in "Rukn-ul-mulk") is adopted here.

that Mahfuz Khān should surrender all his claims to Nawābship to his future son-in-law, who in a few days after the signing of the treaty, was to be invested with the Nawābship of Arcot by the Nizām; that the two Powers should join their forces to reduce Muhammad Ali and those who took his part; that, during the time the two armies acted in conjunction, Haidar should pay Rupees six lakhs per month (to the Nizām) and should have the sole right of putting garrisons in the several fortresses of the Nawābship of Arcot, the command of which should be given to Mokhdum Ali, brother-in-law of Haidar, who was to govern the country in the names of his nephew, Tipū, and Mahfuz; and that the former should enjoy the whole revenue of that Nawābship, for which Mokhdum was to account after deducting the charge of supporting the troops and administering the government.⁵⁷ Further, Razā Ali Khān, son of Chandā Sāhib, to unite all the claims in the person of Tipū, now yielded up to the latter all his pretensions as well to the

57. *Ibid.*, 216-217; see also *Cal. Pers. Corres. (L.c.)*, which refers to the Nizām as having "declared a treaty between Haidar Naik and him self and a resolution to invade the possessions of the ally of the English, Muhammad Ali Khān." Kirmāni also hints, though only tacitly, at a similar understanding having been arrived at between Haidar and the Nizām (see *Neshauni-Hydr.*, 247-249). According to him, the Nizām "cast his plans and schemes aside" and consulted Tipū "on the feasibility of chastising Muhammad Ali," immediately after Tipū, with a well-appointed force and presents, met him in the camp eastward of Maddūr. Further, according to Kirmāni, Haidar, "agreeing in the objects and wishes of the Nizām," marched on with his army, etc. Wilks, who briefly touches on the "alliance" between Haidar and Nizām Ali (*o. c.*, I. 563), is not quite clear as to the issue involved in the negotiations. He adds that under it, Haidar, as the more experienced officer, should regulate and direct the united operations of the troops, but entirely misses the main point of the treaty, *i.e.*, the expulsion of Muhammad Ali from the Karnātic and the occupation of that country by Haidar under cover of a domestic arrangement which would help to satisfy all parties while it enabled him to realize his own territorial ambitions. That was the object of the exchange of "deputations" on the most pompous scale indulged in by both the parties, to which Wilks somewhat derisively refers (*Wilks, o.c.*, I. 563).

Nawābship of Arcot as to Trichinopoly and Madura. And Haidar and Tipū, on their part, engaged to give him all the country of Tanjore after deposing the Rājā as a punishment for the murder of Chandā Sāhib. The country of Tanjore was to be held by Razā Ali under the same vassalage to the Nawāb of Arcot as it had so far been held by the former Rājās. And finally, the two Powers engaged not to separate but to exert all their forces to carry this treaty into effect.⁵⁸ By the 24th of May, Nizām Ali marched off and joined Haidar's army. Meantime Col. Smith had retired with his detachment to the borders of the Karnātic, for the English had certain intelligence of the designs of Haidar

58. *Ibid.*, 217. Razā Ali Khān, according to the *Haid. Nam.* (ff. 29), had taken refuge with Haidar in Bednūr since 1763, and Haidar, treating him with due honours, had bestowed upon him the Nelamangala-sime for his maintenance, with assurances of his support in obtaining for him the Nawābship of Arcot. Razā Ali had sought the aid of the Nizām also in this direction, so that, in 1767, Haidar Ali with the Nizām was in a favourable position to renew, and give continuity to, the old Karnātic War, with prospects of advantage to Mysore, as will be shown below. A *Fort St. George* record advises further "of the Nabob (Haidar) with Raza Saib (Razā Ali) having joined Nizam Ally (Nizām Ali) to attack Mahomet Ally (Muhammad Ali Wallājah)—*Telli Fact. Rec., Diary* (1767-1769), p. 30: *Entry* dated September 17, 1767. See also *Mily. Cons.*, XXV. 386-387, referring to "the favour" Haidar shewed to Razā Sāhib. Compare Kirmāṇi, who, writing about 1800, refers to two versions of the cause of the Nizām's advance on Mysore and the course of affairs leading to Haidar's war with Muhammad Ali. According to one of these, the Nizām proceeded towards Mysore, agreeable to his plan of displacing Nawāb Muhammad Ali of Arcot (who had treacherously violated his treaty with Nanjarājaiya during 1752-1754 and usurped the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt with the aid of the English) and taking possession of the Karnātic himself with the aid of Haidar (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 244-246). According to another version, which, he says, has been related by another historian, Muhammad Ali, apprehending that Haidar would wreak his vengeance on him for having violated his faith at Trichinopoly (1752-1754), desired the English at Madras to persuade the Nizām to undertake the conquest of the Karnātic-Bālaghāt, and the Nizām accordingly marched thither to seize upon his territory or operate advantageously in the destruction of Muhammad Ali himself, as circumstances suited him (*Ibid.*, 246-247). Kirmāṇi hardly reconciles these versions, and leaves readers in a state of suspense as to the actual issue involved.

and the Nizām and that their grand object was the entire conquest of the Karnātic.⁵⁹ So secretly and quietly was this treaty brought about that the English at Madras knew nothing of it until it was an accomplished fact.

Here we have to hark back a little, if we are to get a full picture of the duplicity that Nizām Ali had played on both the English and the Mahrattas. We have seen above, how, as an ostensible ally of both these, he had entered into negotiations with Haidar, with a view to prosecuting his own aims and objectives. Making the Mahrattas believe he was co-operating with them against Haidar, he was pretending to co-operate with the latter against them, with the aid of the English at Madras. Mādhava Rao, more astute than Nizām Ali, would not deceive himself. Opening the campaign promptly, he had completed it quickly, and was stationed at Kōlār and was about to return home with the spoils of the war. It was then that the English had a glimpse of the duplicity that Nizām Ali had played on them. The tardy expedition of Nizām Ali, which started a month later than Mādhava Rao's, aided by Col. Smith's detachment, had achieved nothing so far and Col. Smith had begun to suspect that his own government had engaged in what he described as a "disjointed expedition." In his despatch

59. Robson, *o. c.*, 41; see also and compare Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 560-562. The Haidar-Nizāmite alliance was, from the diplomatic point of view, a blow to the English at Madras, who had flattered themselves with the hope that they might be enabled "to assist (the Nizām) in reducing the Mysore Government within its ancient and proper bounds as well as check the ambitious designs of a man dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the Nabob's (i.e., Muhammad Ali's) dominions (i. e., the Carnatic)." (see *Fort St. George Records*, *Mily. Sund.*, XXXII. 384; *Mily. Cons.*, XXIV. 615, etc; also Dr. N. K. Sinha's article "*Hyder Ali's relations with the British, 1760-67*," based on these unpublished *Records*, in *Proc. I.H.R.C.*, Vol. XVII, pp. 67-72). That was how they had viewed the political position in the country as allies of Nawāb Muhammad Ali.

dated the 9th March, he insisted on the evolving of "some reasonable plan of action," without which, he said, "one of three events can only happen; either Madoo Row (Mādhava Rao) will do his business himself, or we shall be beaten in detail, or we shall do nothing at all." While Mādhava Rao had done the business for himself, Haidar had, by his diplomacy, prevented the English from doing anything. Rukn-ud-daula, fifteen days after Col. Smith had conveyed his doubts to his government about the want of active co-operation on the part of his ally the Nizām, attempted to pretend that his master had once again—for a third time—been deceived by the Mahrattas and thus tried to turn his anger on them. He even pretended to show his disgust at what had happened by proposing a withdrawal of troops to his own country and returning in the ensuing year! And this while he had not even advanced half way towards his objective! But he had so far proceeded in his negotiations with Haidar that he thought he would be deceived here also, if he did not make a forward move. Haidar had by this time settled with Mādhava Rao and had become cool towards Nizām Ali. Rukn-ud-daula thus stood in jeopardy of being doubly overreached—first by Mādhava Rao and then by Haidar. He, accordingly, made a few marches, more for the purpose of accelerating the determination of Haidar, who had strongly urged on him to accept Rs. 20 lakhs with the promise of a fixed tribute of six lakhs, and who, since the treaty with Mādhava Rao, had come to maintain a profound silence on this topic but had proposed joint retaliatory action against Muhammad Ali and the English. Col. Smith saw that while Nizām Ali had been outwitted by Mādhava Rao, his court was "poor, indolent, rapacious, and unsystematical" and as such wholly undependable. He proposed to his government at Madras more vigorous action. The Governor (Charles Bouchier) sent him his brother

(James Bouchier) to relieve Col. Smith from a portion of his political cares. Col. Smith, despite his misgivings, continued his march in the feeble hope of sharing in his spoils of war or of inducing Mādhava Rao to persevere in the original purpose of prosecuting the campaign against Haidar. Moving towards him, while he was yet at Kōlār, Col. Smith despatched to him Col. Tod, in command of the Indian infantry under him, with a confidential agent of Nizām Ali on this errand. They were received civilly by Mādhava Rao, who treated the suggestion of Nizām Ali's agent for a share of the spoils of war with "broad ridicule." On his return, Col. Tod reported "that when he reported to Madoo Row that he was come to talk on business, they (the Mahratta durbar) could not keep their countenances but burst out alaughing in his face."⁶⁰

Mādhava Rao's departure on the 11th May on his homeward march, without paying the smallest attention to Col. Smith's representations, was the signal for a clear watch being kept on the doings of Nizām Ali. Col. Smith saw him march the same day to Bangalore, where Haidar awaited him. The monsoon burst, and the wet weather increased so much the sickness among the English troops that they were compelled to stay at Dēvanhalli, twenty-four miles north-east of Bangalore. Lack of transport added not only to the delay but also to the suspicions of Col. Smith. The liberal promises of Nizām Ali in the matter of providing transport remained a dead letter. Col. Smith's suspicions were more than confirmed when he saw that Nizām Ali, on entering Mysore, treated it as a friendly country. He made it known to his own government that inimical combinations were

60. See *Fort St. George Cons.*, Letter from James Bouchier and Col. Smith, dated 3rd March 1767. On the deputation to Peshwa Mādhava Rao, see Appendix I-(1).

afoot and that the most vigorous measures were necessary, if they were to ward off an invasion of the Pāyanghāt territories by Haidar and Nizām Alī. On this, he was allowed the option of returning to the Pāyanghāt with his troops whenever he and Mr. James Bouchier agreed that such a measure was necessary. Smith and Bouchier accordingly deemed it prudent to present to the Nizām the distinct alternative of moving the troops in that direction or of obtaining from him a satisfactory explanation of his real intentions. Nizām Alī and his minister again succeeded in deceiving Col. Smith and his colleague. They professed firm friendship and inviolable attachment to the English and urged an immediate movement of the English troops towards Bangalore, where their joining would help to conclude an important negotiation with Haidar. Thus taken in once again, Smith moved his troops towards Bangalore, only to find, to his utter amazement, that as the English troops entered the encampment marked out for them, by mutual agreement, the troops of Nizām Alī departed at the opposite route, for marching off at a distance of 12 miles, without a word of explanation! The truth was that Haidar confided no better in Nizām Alī than did Col. Smith and his colleague; he wanted an overt act on the part of Nizām Alī that his misgivings were unfounded. Nizām Alī furnished his proof of moving away from the English! Col. Smith, in sullen indignation, moved his troops to his own frontier. But his government, however, still would not think ill of Nizām Alī or his minister. Governor Bouchier believed negotiation was still possible and his hopes were fed by Rukn-ud-daula by false protestations of sincerity. Nizām Alī agreed that the English troops might remain in their own frontier—only three battalions with their field-pieces might be allowed to remain in his camp as a demonstration of friendship and alliance. The English knew not that

this was to protect himself against eventualities, the negotiations with Haidar being still unconcluded. But such was their lack of prescience that they granted the request, "contrary", as Wilks puts it, "to every principle of military prudence or political dignity."⁶¹ This had the desired effect. The pact between Nizām Alī and Haidar was finally signed and sealed, the English knowing not what had actually happened in their "ally's" camp. Nizām Alī, who had confirmed his new alliance by moving his troops towards Channapaṭṇa, 37 miles south-west of Bangalore, now returned back to the north-east, in search of forage. Nizām Alī had ere this pretended to return to his country, but the Commandant of the English troops with him was disillusioned the next day when he saw his troops move in the opposite direction! These troops were still on duty but they were destitute of food and their pay was in arrears and that in the enemy's country. Col. Smith sent out a detachment of 500 men and Rs. 800 under Capt. Cosby, who performed this service with admirable dexterity by a circuitous march, guided chiefly by the compass, involving a march of 350 miles in 13 days, including two days occupied in delivering his charge and refreshing his troops. It is recorded that only one man was lost in the discharge of this difficult duty and that was the Indian trooper who actually carried the money in his holsters. This man delivered the money entrusted to him and deserted the next day, an act not without parallel among his 'compeers of the day. The desertion was due to starvation; the fidelity was part of the character of the trooper.⁶²

Though not yet firm in the friendship of his new "ally", Nizām Alī found no further use for his old "ally". He, at length, permitted the English brigade with him

61. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 560-562.

62. See Wilks, who records the anecdote, *Ibid.*, 564.

to depart, leaving five companies as a guard of honour to himself! It was really a provision against anything untoward that might happen! Fear operated as much as fraud with Nizām Alī. It is something he did permit the English brigade to go then, for hostilities had already broken out in another quarter. Shortly after their departure, Nizām Alī gave safe conduct to the remaining five companies—just three days before the war against the English and Muhammad Alī Wāllājah began! When Col. Smith returned to his headquarters, he found the new confederated army already on the move and yet his own government ignorant of what was happening. "Although", he exclaimed in despair in a letter to his friend Lord Clive, "it was as plain as noon day to every person (except the Council) that they (Nizām Alī and Haidar) were preparing to enter the Carnatic jointly, no measures were taken to establish magazines of provisions in proper places, nor any steps to supply our army in time of need," and even three days before the actual invasion, he was positively directed to pass to the enemy a supply of provisions of which his own troops were in the greatest need. Such were the counsels that guided the English at Madras at the time that they were wholly unprepared for a war for which Haidar had prepared himself for sometime. Haidar had not only broken the combination between the English, the Mahrattas and the Nizām against himself but had effectually detached each from the other, and while he had got the retreat of the Mahrattas, he had won over Nizām Alī as an ally on his side to fight Muhammad Alī and the English in a determined manner to oust both of them from the South, if possible; if not, at least to separate the English from Muhammad Alī and thus secure the opportunity to deal with the English later at a more convenient opportunity.

The expansion of Mysore in the South, commencing from Arcot in the Karnātic Pāyanghāt, had been the definite objective of Haidar's activities since 1761.⁶³ Already during 1765-1766 he had an eye on Trichinopoly,⁶⁴ the limit of that expansion since the ill-fated expedition of his master Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya (1752-1755). Indeed, Haidar was in an advantageous position to attempt its acquisition in 1767, having subdued a greater part of the country north and south of Mysore. His only obstacle in the way was Muhammad Ali Wallājah, Nawāb of Arcot, who, well aware that the affair of Trichinopoly, where he had so grossly violated his faith, "still rankled like a thorn in the breast of the Nawaub (Haidar)," systematically viewed with apprehension his rise to power and sought to oppose him with the active aid of his allies, the English.⁶⁵ In 1766, Haidar had even sent word to the

63. See *Mily. Count. Corres.*, X. 169-171 (*Letter* dated July 27, 1762—Nawāb Muhammad Ali to Governor), where the Nawāb apprehends Haidar's design of "overrunning and taking possession of the Carnateck country as well as the English settlements." Haidar's intention of disturbing "the Nabob's country to the Southward" (Karnātic-Pāyanghāt) is reflected in *Letters from Fort St. George*, XL (1765), 203, and in *Telli. Fact. Rec., Letters Received* (1765-1766), p. 29, No. 42. According to a *Fort St. George* letter, Mahfuz Khān, who had been sent by Haidar to the court of the Nizām in 1766, on his arrival at Sira, despatched by Nizām Ali's *hircurrahs* "the sanads he brought for Hyder Naigne for the Subadarship of the Paun Ghat country; upon the receipt of which at the village of Punchincotah about eight cos from Seringapatam, Hyder Naigne seemed excessively glad, ordered the Nobut to be beat, guns fired and sugar to be distributed all through his country..." (*Mily. Cons.*, XXV. 386: *Consultation* dated July 3, 1766). According to another letter dated December 5, 1767, it was reported that Haidar Ali had offered the Nizām a crore, provided he (Nizām) would put him in possession of the Karnātic (see *Selections—Marathi Series*, I. 148).

64. *Ibid.*, XIII. 328-329, *Letter* No. 233, dated September 20, 1765, from Nāthamuni, Muhammad Ali's Vakil; also *Telli. Fact. Rec., Diary*, XXIX. 135; *Mily. Cons.*, XXIII. 1054; XXV. 475-476, 482, etc.

65. Kirmāṇi, *Neshamuni-Hyduri*, 246. Kirmāṇi is, however, as shown in f. n. 58 *supra*, confused and uncritical in his treatment of the course of affairs leading to the War of 1767-1769.

66. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, X. 170-171; XI. 64-65; XII. 91; XIII. 291-292, etc.

Nawāb to the effect that if Trichinopoly was delivered to Mysore under the old treaty with Nanjarājaiya, there would be no room for any misunderstanding, failing which he would proceed against him. Muhammad Alī, however, turned a deaf ear to the proposal.⁶⁷ And Haidar, by virtue of his treaty with the Nizām, attempted to counteract him by advancing his claim to the Nawābship of Arcot itself as a preliminary to the realization of his grand object. He also "induced Nabob Nizam Aly (Nizām Alī) of the Deccan to join in an attack on Nabob Mahomed Aly (Muhammad Alī) and the English, and first to conquer Trisnopally (Trichinopoly) and the Madura country."⁶⁸ Previous to the ratification of the treaty, Haidar obtained at the hands of the Nizām the investiture of the Nawābship of Arcot for his son Tipū during the latter's visit in state to him.⁶⁹ Then, he transmitted a formal statement to the English Governor at Madras through his Vakīl Vinnāji-Pant, acquainting him that he (Haidar) and Nizām Alī, being well informed that Nawāb Muhammad Alī, by his continual usurpations and intrigues, was the author of all the troubles that had so long agitated Hindustan, had resolved to make war upon him, till they had deprived him of all territory he possessed to the exclusion of the proper and legitimate heirs; that in consequence they thought proper to warn the English against affording him any assistance, and required them to withdraw their troops out of any garrisons they might possess in the Nawābship of Arcot, or any of the countries usurped by Muhammad Alī; that nevertheless, as it was known that these places were pledges for sums due to them from

67. See *Haidar Kaifiyat* (c. 1800), a Mackenzie Ms. (vol. 24) in the *Mad. Or. Lib.*, pp. 384-385.

68. See Moens in *Dutch Records* No. 13, P. 155.

69. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 217-220. Kirmāni also refers to this visit (*Neshawni-Hydrī*, 247-248; also f. n. 19 *supra*). According to him, Tipū was, on this occasion, addressed by the title of "Nuseebuddowla" (Nasīb-ud-daula) (The fortune of the State) (*Ibid*, 248).

Muhammad Alī, Haidar offered to reimburse them in any sums lawfully due, among which he could not reckon those sums that had been expended in dispossessing the Nawābs of Vellore, Wandiwash and other rightful proprietors of their territories; but, on the contrary, he expected that these last should be indemnified from all the losses they had sustained.⁷⁰ Meanwhile

Muhammad Alī
commences hostilities,
May-June 1767.

Muhammad Alī aided by the English commenced hostilities, with a view to taking possession of the Bārāmahal and then extending his frontier to the summit of the second range of hills, while Haidar was being prevented, by the engagement, by the armies of Poona and Hyderabad, from disturbing these operations. Col. Smith, who had just taken leave of the Nizām at Bangalore, was entrusted with this work. He found, on his arrival, that Vāṇiyambāḍi, Changama, Tirupattūr and Caveripatam (Kāvēripaṭṇam) had been taken and Krishṇagiri laid siege to.⁷¹ This rock-fortress was stoutly defended and had to be blockaded, with the result that a great body of troops was fruitlessly held up on an ineffectual operation. At the same time, he had news that Nizām Alī was already on the crest of the hills which overlook the Bārāmahal country and that Haidar, in full equipment, was following at the interval of two days' march. And,

Haidar marches on
the Karnātic, August
1767.

in August 1767, Haidar, after promptly overcoming the opposition at home caused by his old master and rival

70. *Ibid.*, I. 220-221.

71. *Ibid.*, II. 25; also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, XVI. 186, *Letter* No. 112, received from Bednūr, July 6, 1768—Haidar Alī to William Hornby, Tellicherry, referring to the occurrences of May-June 1767. Col. Joseph Smith, who had taken leave of the Nizām during the latter's negotiations with Haidar, was in charge of these operations under orders from the English Government at Madras, on behalf of Muhammad Alī (De La Tour, o. c., I. 213-215, II. 24-25). See also and compare Wilks (o. c., I. 565-566), who writes as if the war was one between Haidar Alī and the English.

Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, as we shall see in the sequel,⁷² marched on with his ally by way of the Bārāmahal towards the Changama Pass, assigning at the same time to Mahfuz Khān the part of employing his influence among the Pālegārs of the South to excite a general insurrection, and, aided by the resources of Dindigal, to wrest the whole of these provinces from Muhammad Ali and the English.⁷³ As allies of Muhammad Ali, however, the English attempted in vain to reconcile

72. See Ch. IV below.

73. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 39 : *Sarvajit, Śrāvaya-Bhādrapada*; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 598. According to De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 254), the army of the Nizām took the road of Hoskōte and that of Haidar passed by the way of Bangalore. Mœns speaks of the march of the combined armies against Trichinopoly and of their defeat at the hands of the English and Muhammad Ali in a pitched battle there, etc. (*Memo*, 155.) There is so far no independent evidence to corroborate this, although Haidar steadily kept his eye on Trichinopoly during 1767-1769. A *Fort St. George* letter merely records advice of a considerable body of Haidar's troops having marched from Seringapatam "towards Trichinopoly." (*Mily-Cons.*, XXVI. 580: *Consultation* dated July 17, 1767.) Another record refers to Haidar's "drawing together a body of forces on the frontiers of the Mysore country towards Trichinopoly" (*Ibid*, XXVII. 824: *Consultation* dated August 25, 1767). All the authorities are agreed that Haidar started by his entry into the Bārāmahal Valley and then made descent on the Changama Pass. At the very outset, Haidar, in view of the conditions in which he found himself, appears to have deferred his projected attack on Trichinopoly, pending reduction of Arcot. Mœns seems to have been slightly misinformed on this point. He wrote nearly fourteen years after the event. Evidently both Mœns and the English at Madras expected Haidar would first attack Trichinopoly and then the Arcot country. Hence the letters to *Fort St. George* and possibly also to the Dutch, above referred to, from their news-writers, of the supposed movements of Haidar towards Trichinopoly.

As regards Mahfuz Khān, Haidar's expectations of the part assigned to him were soon doomed to failure. For, as Wilks records, "the formation of the army had drawn all their disposable troops from those countries (in the South), and Mahfuz Khan, with a slender escort, was moving from the residence of one chief to another, in furtherance of his views; when Colonel Buck, who commanded at Madras, sent out a detachment by night, which surprized and conveyed him to that fortress as a prisoner, on the 2nd of October 1767. He was given up to Mahommed Ali, and closely confined during the war: but it must be added, to the credit of that Nabob, that he afterwards liberated his brother, and provided him for the remainder of his life, with a decent maintenance at Madras" (Wilks, *l.c.*).

him and Haidar.⁷⁴ Almost simultaneously a section of Mysore forces led by Tipū and Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao raided the Arcot country.⁷⁵ At last, Muhammad Ali with the English takes the field about the close of the month, Muhammad Ali, with the English army from Madras under Col. Joseph Smith, took the field against Haidar.⁷⁶

Independently of Nawāb Muhammad Ali, the relations of Haidar with the English since 1761, it is necessary to note at this point, were generally friendly. Thus, on May 27, 1763, Haidar granted a *Firman* to the Hon. English East India Company, permitting them to establish a Factory and Warehouse at Honāvar (Onore) and enjoy certain commercial privileges.⁷⁷ In February 1764, Haidar wrote a letter to the Governor of Madras expressing his wish "that everything that will conduce to the increase of our friendship may be done by us both", and sending *Khillats* which included a turband woven with gold thread, one piece of flowered border, two pieces of flowered coat, one piece of Gujerāti waist band, one piece of Damāsk and shawl.⁷⁸ During October-December, while engaged in the war with the Mahrattas, Haidar was in communication with the factory at Tellicherry, expressing his strong desire for improving the friendship existing between him and the Hon. Company and requesting that he might be supplied with soldiers, sepoy, gunners and arms and ammunition, in return for the privilege of trade allowed to the English in "whatever sandalwood or rice produced in Mysore

74. *Mily. Cons.*, XXVII, l. c.

75. *Haid. Nām.*, l. c.; see also *Telli. Fact Rec., Letters Received* (1767-1768), p. 2, No. 2.

76. *Ibid.* On the numerical strength of the various armies on the occasion, *vide* Vol. II, Appendix III—(6).

77. See Appendix I—(2).

78. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, XII. 59-60, No. 50.

dominions, which will pass unmolested.”⁷⁹ In June 1765, he wrote to his Vakīl at Madras referring to his “strictest alliance and friendship with the Company” and asking him “to take care repeatedly to mention to the Governor that his, Hyder Naigue’s, views are solely to maintain a lasting friendship with the English.”⁸⁰ On February 23, 1766, during his invasion of Malabar, Haidar confirmed and ratified the grants and privileges made over to the Hon. Company by the several Malabar powers for the sole purchasing and exporting of pepper, sandal-wood and cardamom from the Malabar frontier to the northward of the Zāmorin’s dominions.⁸¹ In May, again, he wrote to the Chief at Tellicherry assuring that “he will always keep friendship with the English and hope the same from them,” etc.⁸² During 1766-1767, the friendly relations between Haidar and the Hon. Company continued, except that he came into conflict with the Factors at Tellicherry on their refusal to help him with powder and shot during his invasion of Malabar (1766), which the English Government at Bombay sought to mend by proposing a treaty of peace with him.⁸³ The conclusion of this treaty was, however, deferred for the time and only put through on August 8, 1770.⁸⁴

Thus broke out a war between Haidar and Nawāb Muhammad Ali Wālajah (popularly referred to by English writers as “*The First Mysore War*”), a war in which the Nizām and the English, despite their assumed status under the *Treaty of Paris*, were allies of the respective parties, a

War with Muham-
mad Ali (*The First
Mysore War*), 1767-
1769.

79. *Telli. Fact. Rec., Diary*, XXVIII. 88-90, 94, 116, 135-136, etc.

80. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, XIII. 175-176, No. 141.

81. See Appendix I—(3).

82. *Telli. Fact. Rec., Diary*, XXIX. 351.

83. *Mily. Cons.*, XXVI. 24-27; also *Telli. Fact. Rec., Diary*, XXIX. 385-386.

84. See Appendix I—(5).



Nawāb Muḥammad Ali Wālājah.



war too which was fought over the issue whether or not Mysore was to be the ultimate successor to the sovereignty of the whole of South India including the Karnātic Pāyānghāt.⁸⁵

Haidar entered the Karnātic, at the head of his cavalry, on 25th August 1767, by one of the passes near Krishnagiri, driving off a number of cattle belonging to Col. Smith's camp at Kākankarai, and defeated Nawāb Muhammad Ali's horse which had followed to recover them. He detached several bodies of horse also to harass and surround the English. On the evening of the same day, he appeared before the fort of Caveripatam, on the Ponar, about 7 miles off Krishnagiri, and laid siege to it. The garrison repulsed two assaults, but the place being untenable, Captain McKain, who commanded, capitulated on the 27th. On the 30th, Col. Smith marched for

First Phase: August-December 1767.

The action at Changama, September 2, 1767.

85. The *Haid. Nām.* and De La Tour among the contemporary sources, as we have seen, fully reflect this position, though De La Tour's account is not satisfactorily dated. The account of Mons, the contemporary Dutch writer, though it agrees in the main with these authorities, is very brief and based in part on hearsay (see *Memo*, 155). Capt. Robson, the contemporary English writer, who took part in the war of 1767-1769, hardly develops the course of affairs leading to it, though he speaks of the "duplicity of the Soubah", "the designs of Hyder and the Soubah" and "their grand object", namely, "the entire conquest of the Carnatic" (*Hyder Ally*, 41). Among later writers, Kirmāni agrees in the main with the *Haid. Nām.* and De La Tour and Robson, though he lacks precision and antedates the war and sets it down to 1771 (A.H. 1185) (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 244, 264). Stewart gives a somewhat confused account of the efforts of the Haidar-Mahratta-Nizām combination (1767), mixing up the issues; and endows the war of 1767 with a "religious colour", suggesting it as having been undertaken by a coalition of Mussulman powers, as he calls it, "in an attempt to place Mahfuz Khān on the musnad (of Arcot), and, with the assistance of his friends, to drive the English from Madras" (*Memoirs*, 18-19). Stewart also makes it appear as if the war was one between Haidar Ali and the English, quite relegating Muhammad Ali to the background (*Ibid.*, 19-21). Wilks' account of the Haidar-Nizāmite relations is, as already pointed out above, not clear. Nor is the contemporary Portuguese writer Peixoto, who cursorily touches on this subject and the war of 1767-1769 (see *Memoirs*, 84-88 *et seq.*), a safe authority for the period.

Tiruvannāmalai, by way of Singarapettai, partly to meet the detachment under Lieut. Col. Wood, then on the march from Trichinopoly, and partly to find provisions, of which he was in need. Haidar followed him immediately, hoping to bring Smith to action before the junction could be effected, keeping close contact with him both on his flanks and rear. On the 1st September, Smith reached Changama, still accompanied by Haidar's horse in larger numbers. At Changama, the night was made more troublesome for Smith, Haidar keeping him alert the whole night, and in the following morning, 2nd September, burning the pettah of Changama. During the night, Haidar received here a large reinforcement of sepoys and a considerable artillery. Col. Smith, on this, decamped the following noon, the tents left standing, while the baggage filed off, hoping thus to deceive Haidar as to the design he had formed of marching that day. But Haidar got notice of Col. Smith's arrangements, and immediately the English forces got into motion, they discovered, moving to their right, Haidar's army. Haidar had determined on attacking Col. Smith here. He had pursued Smith so far and it was about 3 P.M. in the afternoon of the 2nd September. Col. Smith had just passed a small river, on the other side of which, and to his flank, Haidar had posted himself. The locale was as follows : near the river was a considerable space overgrown with bushes ; beyond this were three pretty steep hills. These hills, Haidar covered with his horse. His sepoys were posted behind them. The bushes were occupied by the Nizām's troops under Rukn-ud-daula and his brother Tuar Jang, with their cannon, and rocketmen. The whole of this disposition was supported by a very numerous cavalry. Col. Smith, with his forces, immediately faced to the right, and, with a view to dispossess the opposing confederate forces of the hills, he inclined the army out of the road and

ordered two of the battalions of Captains Cook and Cosby, supported by a third (that of Cowley), to attack them. This was done forthwith in spirited fashion, the confederate forces being driven over the hills. The English forces now took possession of the ground vacated. The posts were important to both sides: to the English to secure their march, to the confederates to impede it. Haidar quickly perceived his mistake in not occupying these hills with his own infantry. But he would not give up the position so easily. On foot, at the head of his choicest troops, he repeatedly attacked the hills with the utmost vigour with masses of his men, but every effort was rendered fruitless by the firmness of the Indian sepoys on the English side. Ghalib Muhammad Khān, the brother of Fuzzul-ullāh Khān, fell, while Haidar himself was thrown down in the *melee*, received a wound in his leg and had to be carried from the field. Meanwhile, a constant fire of cannon and musketry was being mutually exchanged on the side of the bushes. Haidar, possessing the advantage to be under cover, made several attempts to break through the English line. An attack on the two last of the eight field-pieces, which crossed the river and were being impeded in their march, was beat back, causing great loss to the confederates. The English, now, felt so far emboldened that they tried to dislodge the confederate forces from the bushes, and thus prevent them from keeping up their constant fire. The Grenadiers advanced, and supported by twelve companies of sepoys under Captain Baillie, entered the cover, driving the confederate forces before them. They were supported by two six-pounders firing grape. The confederates lost many men here, many that were not discovered from the nature of the place of action. These were driven quite across the river, where they left two guns spiked up. It was now dark and the English, giving up the pursuit, continued their march to a *tope*, about 12 miles

further, which they reached just past 4 P.M. Haidar, however, would allow them no rest. Hardly had they halted an hour and a half, Haidar was at their back. Despite the great loss he had sustained, he pushed through, his guns still active, surrounding, plundering and killing the stragglers and followers of the English forces. He made an attempt on their baggage, a good deal of which, including all the rice, was thrown off by the bullock-drivers and plundered, while the bullock-drivers took to flight in all directions with their animals. What was really a victory to the English was lost to them—partly because of the effective pursuit that Haidar instinctively organized and partly because the English found themselves unable to effectively beat back the gunners owing to scarcity of water and want of ammunition. These tactics of Haidar compelled Smith to resume, within two hours of his arrival at the *tope*, his march at 6 A.M. (on the 3rd September), and re-passing the Changama Pass, retreat to Tiruvannāmalai, 20 miles to the south-east, at about 4 P.M., a march of 27 hours, without the least refreshment for man or beast, “who”, he says, “were never unloaded.” Col. Smith expected to be reinforced here but was not, much to his disappointment.

In this action, the flower of Haidar’s army sustained the heat of the battle, headed by himself, while the Nizām’s attacked the English in their rear and flank. The battle was fought with great obstinacy on both sides, till about 8 o’clock in the night, when the Nizām’s army gave way and Nizām Alī himself was on the point of being hemmed in between the legs of an elephant. Haidar lost above 1000 of his best men, while the Nizām’s loss was much greater, though unascertained.⁸⁶

86. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 568-575; Wilson, *Madras Army*, I. 238-243; Wilks’ account is based on Col. Smith’s despatch dated 13th September 1767 to the Government of Madras. Wilks justly corrects Smith when he says that it was not Haidar’s “brother-in-law” that was killed in this battle but one of his generals Ghalib Muhammad Khān; also De La

The confederates, meanwhile, encamped on the river of Kilpauk, whence they pushed forward strong outposts on all sides of the English troops.⁸⁷ On the 8th of September, Col. Wood effected, without molestation, the junction with Col. Smith. But Tiruvannāmalai, despite Muhammad Ali's assurances to his allies, being found to be a place of no strength and destitute of provisions, Col. Smith was soon compelled to move eastward in quest of food. On his departure, the confederates, discouraged by the result of their first encounter and still occupied in discussion of the past, neglected to attack Tiruvannāmalai until the 14th, when Col. Smith, having collected a scanty supply of provisions, returned to its protection. He was just in time to see the confederates draw off the cannon which they had been in the act of placing in battery against it.

Tour, *o.c.*, II. 26-50, 51-55; Robson, *o.c.*, 42-45; and *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 39. See also and compare Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 249-250), who speaks of the English officer at Changama as "a Colonel Hewit or Howard, with a body of five thousand regular infantry and a thousand soldiers or Europeans." Kirmāṇi generally refers to Col. Wood as "Hewit or Howard," but he is mistaking Col. Smith for Wood here. Though Kirmāṇi's account of the action at Changama is brief and rather confused—but not entirely untrustworthy—it agrees in the main with the other sources cited above. De La Tour spells Changama as "Singue-man"; Wilks refers to Changama as "the pass of Singarpetta" (*o.c.*, 571), by which name it has been sometimes called for long. Wilks dates the action 3rd September (*Ibid.*, 573), but the contemporary Robson specifically dates it 2nd September; and so does Wilson (*o.c.*, I. 239). Col. Smith's despatch gives the date as 2nd September. Though Col. Smith was a fighting and not a writing general, and was sometimes careless about dates, in this instance, he was correct. His account of the action at Changama will be found in Wilson (*o.c.*, I. 239-243). According to De La Tour (II. 54), Haidar lost 900 of his grenadiers during the action; according to Robson (*o.c.*, 44), he lost "above 1,000 of his best men". Sir Murray Hammick suggests that Kirmāṇi's "Col. Hewit" is "the native reading of Smith". This is a patent mistake, as it is undoubtedly a corruption of "Col. Wood" (see Sir Murray's note in Wilks, *o.c.* I. 573 *f.n.* I). Robson's account is brief but spirited as may be expected from one who took part in the fight.

87. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 250.

A corps of 10,000 horse, which had been advanced by Haidar to cover this operation, was driven in with some loss, and the battering guns accompanied by the confederate forces hurried off to the north-west, and encamped, late in the evening, at only six miles off from the English position. Colonel Smith, being now joined by most of his detachments, determined to attack the confederates on the ensuing morning and moved at daylight for that purpose. But, on approaching their position, he found them in complete security from the interposition of an impassable morass. In this short interval, his supply of provisions was again expended; and he was again compelled to move to the eastward for food on the 16th. In this wretched state, the north-east monsoon burst in all its fury and a council of war was held, which was unanimous on the expediency of evacuating Tiruvannāmalai, removing the wounded and the stores to Chetput (Seṭṭupaṭṭu) and moving the troops into cantonment at Arcot, Vellore or other place, where they could obtain food. But the consequences of placing the army in cantonment were deprecated, while the cavalry of the confederates had overspread the country up to the very gates of Madras, and their whole army was consuming or destroying its resources. Col. Smith continued accordingly to manoeuvre in the neighbourhood of Tiruvannāmalai. The confederates, after the last action, had agreed on the propriety of sending light detachments of irregulars to ravage the country in every direction, and to reserve their best horse for the purpose of distressing the English army, and uniting in the attack, which they determined to make, when it should be reduced by famine and fatigue to the expected extremity of retiring from the frontier in the direction of Arcot. But Col. Smith, in his excursions to the eastward, had not only received reinforcements of troops but convoys of provisions and large hidden stores of grain; and the

troops which the confederates supposed to be in the lowest stage of wretchedness and want, had, for the last fortnight, been daily improving in physical strength and efficiency. The confederates, apprehensive that the supposed wretchedness of their enemy might produce efforts of desperation, had assumed a strong position, which they fortified with regular redoubts, covering not only the front and flanks of their encampment, but commanding every avenue by which their retreat could be interrupted; and steadily declined all the opportunities which Col. Smith presented to them of attacking him in the plain. At length, however, Nizām Ali, impatient at the delay in the realization of his expectations and at the intelligence of sources of danger nearer home, insisted on the necessity of bringing the contest to the issue of a general action. And while he was concerting with Haidar the best mode of effecting this object, Col. Smith, who had by great efforts collected the means of making a movement on a more extended line, was occupied in devising the means of drawing the confederates into the plain; and had encamped with a force of 10,430 effective men, besides 1,500 bad horse.⁸⁸


Haidar, arranging his troops in the best order and position possible, had firmly occupied his ground of encampment, and Nizām Ali had stationed himself on the right flank of the English troops with the least order in his

The action at Tiruvannāmalai, September 26, 1767.

88. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 576-581. Kirmāṇi speaks of Col. Smith from Trichinopoly (*Nathar-nagar*) having joined Col. Hewit or Howard (*i. e.*, Col. Wood) at Tiruvannāmalai with "four thousand regular infantry, eight hundred Europeans, three thousand horse of the Souba of Arkat, four thousand Karnatic foot, and a great quantity of provisions and stores" (*o. c.*, 252). We know from other sources that it was Col. Wood from Trichinopoly who joined Col. Smith at Tiruvannāmalai. Kirmāṇi, as already pointed out, is mistaking the one for the other here. As to the strength of the opposing armies engaged in the First Mysore War, see Vol. II, Appendix III—(6).

army.⁸⁹ About noon, on the 26th of September, the confederates moved a column, accompanied by sixteen of their heaviest cannon, to a position in front of Col. Smith's left, from whence they commenced a distant cannonade. A morass intervened, difficult but not impassable; and it was Haidar's plan to entangle his opponent in this difficulty and cause him considerable loss. Even if Col. Smith were to pass the impediment without discomfiture, a line of redoubts was still in his front, and the main strength of the confederate army was disposed in a situation to fall in force on his right, in the event of his advancing within range of the redoubts. Col. Smith, however, made a movement on his left, wholly unaware of the existence of the morass, extending beyond his right to the foot of a hill, which concealed the great body of the confederates from his view. Then, perceiving the extent of the impediment, he pointed the first direction of his column of march to the north-east. The confederates, perceiving in this movement nothing less than their final retreat towards Arcot, put their troops into instant motion for the purpose of crossing the direction of the English columns, pressing on its flanks and rear, and rendering its retreat impracticable. The confederates were thus marching round the hill from the south-west, and the English from the south-east, the movement of each being concealed from the view of the other. The confederates made a hurried movement to occupy the hill, but an English corps (commanded by Capt. Cooke), anticipating the design, repulsed them from its summit. Some rocks on the plain formed a point of considerable strength for the support of the future movements, but before it could be finally

89. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 263. Elsewhere Kirmāṇi writes that the English officers (Cols. Smith and Wood) "did not estimate the Moghul (*i.e.*, Nizām Ali's) army at the value of a grain of barley" (*o.c.*, 262), which was their estimate of Nizām Ali's forces in comparison with those of Haidar.



Tiruvaymala, 1767—Defence position.

occupied by a large body of the best infantry of the confederates, three English battalions (commanded by Captains Cosby, Cooke and Baillie) were contending with these superior numbers for its possession, and dislodged them after an obstinate resistance. This point became the subsequent support of Col. Smith's left, and his line was quickly made to extend opposite to the great mass of the confederate forces, who, during this movement, completed their formation on a commanding eminence, and placed some guns in position, which annoyed the English army while deploying into line. A powerful body of infantry was drawn up in the rear and on the flanks of the confederate artillery; enormous masses of cavalry formed a huge crescent, enveloping the British troops, and apparently ready to overwhelm them, on a concerted signal. But Haidar's plan had been disconcerted; of upwards of 100 pieces of cannon, no more than 30 could be brought into action, the remainder were in the redoubts, or had not joined from the positions allotted to them in the original plan. The English artillery amounted to 31 light pieces; the line cautiously advanced from one strong position to another, and after nearly silencing the artillery of the confederates, they directed their fire against the thickest masses of their cavalry; and the havoc produced quickly covered the field with a disorderly rabble of cavalry flying in every direction, the infantry and guns continuing to maintain their ground. The English line now began to move on at a steady pace, preceded by the cannon; and Haidar, who had perceived that the battle was lost, drew off his own cannon within the line of the redoubts, and rode towards Nizām Ali, to entreat that he would give similar orders and cover the operation by the movements of his cavalry. But Nizām Ali, indignant, declared his determination to maintain his position to the last. When, however, the English army began its advance in line, Haidar renewed his remonstrances.

and the guns were ordered to commence their retreat, covered by Haidar's infantry, which made a regular demonstration until the near approach of the English line, when they retreated within the protection of the works, Nizām Alī sustaining a loss of several elephants. Night closed upon the English army as they reached the last ground abandoned by the enemy, only nine guns falling into their possession.

Though the confederates had thus far sustained a considerable loss, they had not abandoned their fortified position, which was still as tenable as before the action. Nizām Alī, who had been heard to loudly declare that he would prefer a death like that of Nāsir Jang to a dishonourable flight, was now at full speed with a select body of his cavalry, in a western direction, and did not stop till he was fairly through the pass of Changama, leaving to his minister and commander-in-chief, Rukn-ud-daulā, the care of directing the immediate retreat of his other troops. Haidar, finding himself thus abandoned, began to provide in the best manner for the security of his own army and had put his field train into full march on the only road, before that of his ally was ready to follow. His infantry occupied the redoubts and the whole night was employed in getting the artillery and baggage into motion, and clearing the fortified position. Col. Smith, who saw in the confusion of the enemy's camp an opportunity of striking an important blow, made a disposition for a midnight attack under Major Fitzgerald, who, however, after fruitless efforts, largely misguided by his guide, who was a spy in the pay of Haidar, reluctantly returned to camp. At daylight, the English army was in motion and soon passed the redoubts which were entirely abandoned. The road was throughout covered with the confederate army; a train of artillery was, however, distinctly visible, which it still seemed practicable to overtake. The English army, cheered at

this sight, quickened its pace, and captured in the course of the day forty-one pieces of heavy artillery belonging to Nizām Ali; but as Haidar could not accelerate the pace of the latter's equipments, he was compelled to abandon them one after another to the English infantry, with little material resistance, thus terminating the operations of the day⁹⁰. In the action, the Nawāb of Kurnool was wounded in the arm, while Nizām Ali's great elephant was killed and the howdah plundered and stripped of its ornaments by the English forces.

90. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 581-586; also De La Tour *o.c.*, II. 55-95; Robson, *o.c.*, 45-54; and Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 243-248, where Col. Smith's report of the action will be found extracted *in extenso*. See also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 253-254), whose account of the action, though brief and marked by a mixing up of details, agrees substantially with the other sources. Wilks speaks of the loss sustained by the confederates during the action as having "probably exceeded 4,000" men with 64 guns (*Ibid*, 586). According to Robson, the confederates lost, in the battle of Tiruvannāmalai, "upwards of 1,200 men killed" (*o.c.*, 51). According to De La Tour, "the number of killed in the army of the two Subas, did not exceed four hundred men" (*o.c.*, II. 81). The disparity between these figures is rather staggering, while Col. Smith, in his despatch dated the 3rd October 1767, describing the battle, says: "What the enemy's loss is I cannot get a precise account of, but it must be great." Wilks says that the loss on the English side was "no more than 150 men killed and wounded," while Col. Smith states that it amounted to only 115—"48 Europeans and 67 sepoy's killed and wounded." The authority for Wilks' figure is not known. Wilson, on whom Wilks' account is based, does not mention the confederate loss in men—killed and wounded—though he wrote with the aid of the despatches and other military records pertaining to the battle. As against "64 guns" lost by the confederates according to Wilks, Col. Smith's despatch mentions only 37, while De La Tour states that the single trophy of the English was one *iron three-pounder*, on which Wilks calls him "a dramatic quidnunc, who hears everything and seizes the wrong end of all that he hears". De La Tour places the battle roughly "in the month of November" (1767) (*o.c.*, II. 95). But Robson, who actually took part in it, dates it September 26, 1767 (*o.c.*, 46, 47), in keeping with Wilks, whose date is in keeping with that mentioned in Col. Smith's despatch, his primary authority, though he does not specifically mention this fact. De La Tour's account is full of strategic details and digression, which may not prove interesting to the general reader. Stewart gives a translation of the description of the battle as narrated in a Persian *Memoir* from Hyderabad (see *Memoirs*, 19-20), which agrees in the main with the other sources. His account of the war of 1767-1769 is, however, very brief. Curiously enough, the contemporary local chronicle *Haid-Nām*, passes over a greater part of

Col. Smith was now, through the excessive fatigue entailed by the action, under the positive necessity of relinquishing the more decisive results to be expected from a second day's pursuit, and of retracing his steps to procure food. The monsoon was fast approaching. Reckoning on the inaction of the confederates during the next three rainy months, he soon decided on proceeding to Madras after garrisoning Tiruvannāmalai, Vāṇiyambādi and other advanced outposts, and disposing his army in cantonments at Arcot, Vellore, Gingee, Conjeeveram, Wandiwash and Trichinopoly. At the same time, the battle of Tiruvannāmalai having produced a considerable change in the views of the confederates, Nizām Alī, full of open indignation at the conduct of Haidar and feeling little of secret complacency at his own, assembled his army at Calaimuttūr in the Bārāmahal (identified with Muttūr, 14 miles south-west of Tirupattūr), where Haidar also established his headquarters. Here they remained for nearly a month, without action, or determination, or interview. Meanwhile, Haidar, who had despatched his son Tipū at the head of a detachment of cavalry, regular and irregular infantry and light guns, accompanied by Mīr Alī Razā Khān, Saiyid Mokhdum, Muhammad Ali (Commandant), Ghāzi Khān and other generals of note, to lay waste the country of Arcot up to the gates of Madras, quickly despatched his camel-riders and messengers (*hircarrahs*), commanding him to return. His example was followed by the rest of those in command of the light detachments, just

the details of the warfare of the period 1767-1769. Wilson remarks that in the two actions at Changama and Tiruvannāmalai the Madras sepoy army "received its *baptême-de-feu*," for in those actions, it was called on, for the first time, not only to fight, but to manœuvre; and this against an enemy who could himself manœuvre extremely well (*o. c.*, I 16). The identical remark would seem to apply to Haidar's own new army.

the very thing they should not have, from a military point of view, done. Thus, the country being unexpectedly cleared of Haidar's troops, Col. Smith covered it with his troops and turned towards Madras; there to devise, if possible, a new department of supply, to be worked under his own personal direction. With the arrival of Tipū, Haidar also sent a message to Nizām Alī to the effect that he had been sorely disappointed in the expectations he had formed of his troops and the ability and experience of his Amīrs and officers; that with such troops, therefore, strong only in numbers and show, they could not evidently expect to conquer the English; and that if the Nizām could only encamp at Caveripatam, he (Haidar) would be enabled to oppose and put them to flight. Accordingly the confederates, moving on, cantoned their armies in a palmyra grove at Uttanakarai about November, when Tipū, who had proceeded in his ravages as far as "Black Town", Madras, joined them.⁹¹

In this battle, as in that at Changama, the newly formed army of Haidar was opposed to that of the newly formed army of the English. As the historian of the Madras Army well remarks, in these two battles, more especially than in any others fought before then, the close fighting was done entirely by the sepoys and Haidar's manœuvring at the first of these actions was

Haidar's conduct
of the battle.

91. *Ibid.*, 587-589; Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 251, 254-255, and *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 40. See also and compare, on this section, De La Tour and Robson (*l. c.*). Kirmāṇi's reference to Nizām Alī's encampment at Caveripatam about this time (*o. c.*, 255) is incorrect in the light of the contemporary work *Haid. Nām.*, according to which the confederates cantoned at Uttanakarai as stated above. The *Haid. Nām.* specifically states: *Uttangere tāṭi tōpinallī ubhaya daṇḍu ilidu*. De La Tour speaks of the place of encampment as "a plain five leagues distant from Caveripatam, and six from Vaniambari (Vāṇiyambāḍi)" (*o. c.*, II. 100-101). The reference here, obviously, is to the Uttangere of the *Haid. Nām.* This is the modern Uttankarai, 16 miles S. S. W. of Tirupattūr, the head-quarters of a taluk of the same name in the old Salem district and now part of the present North Arcot district.

"excellent." At the second battle, Haidar did not command; the manœuvring on his side was, therefore, "not so good." Still, according to the same authority, the movements were various and complicated, and the sepoy showed not only courage but coolness and skill. On Haidar's side, his men fought with skill and intrepidity. In the first battle, if he had not been disabled personally at the beginning of the engagement, it would not have been so soon ended, as Wilson freely acknowledges. The weakness on his side was not caused by his men but by those sent by his ally, the Nizām, who promised much and expected a deal, but could contribute little or nothing to the success of the enterprise. His men were a rabble and his commanders not worth a day's purchase. They together proved more an encumbrance than an advantage. Loud in his blame, Nizām Ali was not an ally who could be depended upon in a military venture. Col. Smith's despatches on both these battles refer in mild terms to the mistakes committed by Nizām Ali's troops. While Wilks refers to "Nizam Ali's inefficient equipments," and to "the absurd but invariable practice of Nizam Ali to be accompanied in the field by his favorite wives, with all the splendid appendages of rank," and to his lack of appreciation of military movements on the field of battle, Kirmāni is openly critical of the capacity of Nizām Ali's troops. Kirmāni quotes with evident approval the remark of the English commanders that "they did not estimate the Moghul (*i.e.*, the Nizām's) army at the value of a grain of barley." He elsewhere says that the Nizām was "firing away with his guns, without aim or object" and that his army was "like a herd of timid deer standing about without order" and allowed itself to be routed and plundered by the English forces. According to Col. Smith, the commander of the English forces, when the battle of Tiruvaṇṇāmalai ended on 26th September, while Nizām Ali left Haidar

at midnight and did not stop until he reached Singarpettah, Haidar "kept his men in close order and moved very slowly, retiring as our cannon and troops advanced." Though Haidar lost the battle and was bitter against Nizām Alī, he and his troops showed considerable skill in their movements, which were various and complicated and presented situations which required not only courage but also coolness on the part of the sepoy, who did the main part of the fighting on the English side.

By now Haidar's alliance with Nizām Alī, far from being advantageous, had become a real burden to him. Nizām Alī, too, perceiving that the conquest of the country of Arcot was by no means so easy of accomplishment as he had flattered himself that it would be, was desirous of returning to his own dominions after making the best bargain with Haidar and Nawāb Muhammad Alī as well as the English. Each of the confederates had so much of blame to impute to the other, that it was at length agreed to waive all discussion of past events and endeavour to concert more successful operations. Nizām Alī accordingly invited Haidar to a superb festival in his camp. Haidar, accompanied by Tipū and a select number of followers, paid him a visit in state with numerous *Khillats*. Nizām Alī rendered to Haidar the highest honours due to him; and, among other things, caused him to sit on a kind of throne or sofa of massive gold, with cushions of cloth of gold, which he presented him with in the evening when they parted, distinguishing him at the same time with the title of *Haidar Jang*. Haidar, in turn, invited Nizām Alī to his camp, but, instead of causing his guest to sit on a throne of wrought gold, he placed him on a *seat* or *musnud*, composed of bags of coined silver, amounting to a lakh of rupees, covered with cushions of embroidered

The confederates
concert.

silver, all of which the attendants were desired to carry away, with the other presents, according to the established etiquette in similar cases. It was also agreed at this interview that Nizām Alī should march to Hoskōṭe, attaching to Haidar Rukn-ud-daula, his minister, Munavar Khān Kurnooli, Ismail Khān Elichpoori, Rai Rumbha, and twenty thousand horse; that the confederate armies should finally separate themselves after Haidar had taken possession of Vāṇiyambāḍi and Āmbūr; that Haidar should continue the war against Nawāb Muhammad Alī and the English; and that Nizām Alī should attack the English on the side of Masulipatam, to oblige them to divide their forces.⁹²

Early in November, Nizām Alī marched towards Hoskōṭe⁹³ and Haidar with his own and the allied troops, advancing into the Bārāmahal Valley, and taking advantage of the English forces which had gone into cantonments, invested Tirupattūr and Vāṇiyambāḍi, two of the indefensible places in the possession of the English.⁹⁴

These mud forts fell without material resistance on the 5th and 7th of November, and Haidar, after garrisoning them, proceeded by the Pass of Tubulpalli to the siege of Āmbūr, a considerable fortification on a rock of smooth granite, accessible on only one face, the town (or *pettah*) situated below, and environed with a mud wall, the entire structure terminating the valley of the Bārāmahal on the north and overlooking the fertile vale, which, forming a right angle with the Bārāmahal, extends to the eastward, down to

92. *Ibid.*, 539; De La Tour, o. c., II. 96-98; and *Haid. Nām.*, l. c. See also and compare Kirmāṇi, o. c., 255-257. As regards the conferment of the title of *Haidar Jang*, the *Haid. Nām.* says:—*Nawāb Haidar Ali Khān Bahādura Haidar Jangannendu kitābu yināyatāgi sanmānādinda.*

93. Kirmāṇi, o. c., 256-257.

94. Wilks, l. c.; Wilson, o. c., I. 249-250.

Vellore and Arcot. Haidar arrived here on the 10th of November, and befriended Maklis Khān, the Killedār, who agreed to surrender the fort. But this being found out, and he and his men being imprisoned, Haidar tried other ways and means to get its possession. Raising batteries against the lower fort (*pettah*), he so completely dismantled it on the 15th, that Captain Calvert, the officer commanding, deeming it no longer tenable, retired with the garrison to the upper fort or the citadel; and sent off an express to the Governor of Madras. Haidar pressed on the siege and left no means untried to take the place. He erected six batteries, two of which were mounted with eighteen and twenty-four pounders, and the others with twelve and sixes, and soon opened fire from them. Two of these were on a hill which commanded the fort, while another enfiladed part of the works. He made three large breaches in a few days, but the frequent sallies that Captain Calvert, with his 500 sepoy and 15 Europeans, made from the fort, prevented him from attempting to take it by storm. The last sally proved so far successful to the English that Haidar continued a kind of blockade till he had news of the advance of the relieving army from Vellore, about 30 miles off. Khāki Shah, Haidar's relation and most confidential friend, fell by a cannon shot in an early part of the service. At length, on the 6th of December, after a steady defence of twenty-six days, Captain Calvert was relieved by the approach of the English army, when Haidar raised the siege, and moved up the valley again, encamping in the neighbourhood of Vud Cheri (Vakkalēri) and Bapunpalli (Bāpanapalli).⁹⁵

95. *Ibid*, 589-594; Wilson, l.c.; also De La Tour, o.c., II. 101-116; Robson, o.c., 54-55; and Kirmāni, o.c., 257. Robson incorrectly places the investment and surrender of Tirupattūr and Vāṇiyambādi in "the latter end of November" (o.c., 54). De La Tour speaks of Haidar's siege of the citadel of Āmbūr as having lasted for "seventee day" (o.c., II. 110-113). In keeping with Wilks, this would correspond

The English army had scarcely been established in cantonment after the battle of Tiruvannāmalai before it became necessary, on intelligence of Haidar's movements, to make arrangements for reassembling it. The division of Col. Wood, which had been cantoned at Trichinopoly, had been ordered to move to Tiruvannāmalai and from thence to enter the Bārāmahal by the Pass of Changama. The remainder of the army under Col. Smith which had assembled at Vellore, making forced marches by the route of Karnātic-Garh, Dhōbi-Garh, Kailās-Garh and Pallikonḍa, hastened to the relief of Āmbūr, and had the satisfaction of perceiving the British colours still flying on the morning of the 7th of December.⁹⁶ Then Col. Smith moved in pursuit of Haidar, who, as soon as the English approached near to his army, placed his cavalry under the command of Tipū, and forming the right wing, and committing his left to the command of Rukn-ud-daula and others, posted himself in the centre with his artillery, his senior officers and Muhammad Alī, Commandant. In the meantime, the English officers despatched one battalion and two companies of soldiers, with two guns, to attack Rukn-ud-daula; and two battalions of Indians and a *risāla* or regiment of Europeans, with four guns, to attack Tipū; and Col. Smith himself marched straight on to attack the centre or main body. A mortal strife followed. Haidar's troops, "steady as rocks", planted the feet firmly on the

to the period 20th November to 6th December 1767. As regards *Vud Chēri* and *Bapunpalli* mentioned by Kīrmāṇi, the former is probably Vakkalēri, about 10 miles S.W. of Kōlār, and the latter place is to be identified with Bāpanapalli *alias* Pāpanapalli in the present Kōlār taluk (see *List of Villages in the Mysore State*, p. 28). The good defence set up by Captain Calvert won for him and his troops warm approval. The first honorary distinction conferred on the Madras Army was granted on this occasion by the Madras Government (see for details, Wilson, *o. c. I.* 251, f. n. 2; also Wilks, *o. c. I.* 592).

96. *Ibid.*, 594-595; Kīrmāṇi, 1, c.

ground, passing rapidly from volleys of artillery and musketry to the active employment of the sword and spear, hand to hand. The troops of Rukn-ud-daula, however, from the attack of one battalion and a few shot from their guns, cowardly retreated until their arrival at Vāṇiyambāḍi. But before the English could defeat the main body, Tipū at the head of his horse had charged them several times and then attacked and put to flight their guard (consisting of 3,000 horse and 4,000 foot, having in charge stores of provisions and cattle collected by them), taking several of their officers and soldiers prisoners, with their horses and palankins. Col. Smith instantly halted, but Haidar, speeding up, fell upon the battalion sent to pursue Rukn-ud-daula and returned with the spoils to Vāṇiyambāḍi, where Tipū also joined him. The English officers remained on the field of battle, but Rukn-ud-daula being bitterly expostulated by Haidar for the late conduct of Nizām Ali's troops, it was settled that he should always encamp at the distance of half a *fursung* (two miles), and that none of his men should enter Haidar's camp, messages being sent by *hircarrahs* in case of need.⁹⁷

On the morning of the 8th of December, Col. Smith with the English army appeared before Vāṇiyambāḍi, where he found Haidar already posted, his right wing covered by the fort and *pettah*, and his front and left by some bad redoubts lately constructed, and by a fordable river. By now Nizām Ali had moved farther south into the Bārāmahal towards Caveripatam, and it was no less Haidar's intention to gain time by this demonstration for the retreat of his ally and for the uninterrupted movement of his own heavy artillery.

The action at Vāṇiyambāḍi, December 8, 1767.

97. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 257-261. Kirmāṇi refers to this action as the 'Battle of Dhoby Garh (o.c., 268, foot-note P). This is not mentioned by Wilks, o.c. I., 595.

Accordingly, Haidar with the flower of his army took post in a manner, which showed a determination on his part to have a trial with the English, solely with his own troops. With the river in his front and his left secured by some impassable ground, Col. Smith was soon obliged to attack Haidar in front. Some guns were immediately drawn up on the high banks of the river, which was almost dry. From there the English officers kept up a severe fire, under cover of which, some of the English army began to cross the river, when Haidar's troop of European horse appeared on the sands, in the bed of the river, and moved round towards the left of the English. The English cavalry in the meanwhile discharged several cannons from the right hand column on their flank, which killed two horses, one of which was that of Monsieur Aumont, the Commandant of Haidar's Europeans. He fell instantly and found himself surrounded by the English dragoons and abandoned by his own men through the treachery of the greater number, who, together with their officers, gave themselves up to the English, agreeably to a projected plan of one Chevalier St. Lubin to draw off the Europeans in Haidar's service. By this time, the main body of the English were in the river, when a hot fire ensued on

Haidar's retreat to
Caveripatam,

both sides for over an hour, and Haidar, evacuating the fort of Vāṇiyambāḍi, and closely followed by the English as far as Tirupattūr, retreated with his whole army to Caveripatam, where Nizām Ali had also encamped.⁹⁸

98. Wilks, I. *o.c.*, 595-596. Wilks suggests that Haidar's real intention by taking post at Vāṇiyambāḍi was no other than to gain time for the retreat of Nizām Ali, and for the uninterrupted movement of his own heavy artillery, which had been sent off on the first appearance of the English army (see Wilks, *o.c.* I. 595). Wilks' description of how Vāṇiyambāḍi was abandoned is all too brief, while Robson's account is, though short, striking to a degree. Wilson, however, on this topic (*o.c.*, I. 251), gives no details; also De La Tour, *o.c.*, II. 115-139; Robson, *o.c.*, 55-58; see also and compare Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 261), who merely speaks of

Here Haidar pitched his tent on a plain surrounded by a plantation of saul trees and a marshy ground, and raised strong redoubts in front, mounted with cannon and manned by his European troops, while Rukn-ud-daula was stationed outside the limits of his camp. Meanwhile Col. Smith, reinforced by the southern division from Trichinopoly under Col. Wood, a junction which had not been prevented, had approached Caveripatam, but, in view of the much improved position of its defences, specially carried out under the orders of Haidar by a French officer deputed for the purpose, had determined to decline the risk of an attack. At this juncture, however, sources of separate but serious alarm contributed to distract the attention

The defection of Nizām Ali, December 1767.

Haidar marching from Vāṇiyambāḍi and encamping at Caveripatam after passing through Tirupattūr. Wilks refers to the "confederated armies" retiring towards Caveripatam from Vāṇiyambāḍi (*o.c.*, I. 596). But Robson is correct when he records that Haidar "joined the Soubah" at Caveripatam (*o.c.*, 58). About November 1767, Nizām Ali had moved from Hoskōte towards Caveripatam in the Bārāmahal. As regards the "Chevalier St. Lubin", mentioned in the text above, the reference here is to the "Chevalier de St. Louis" of De La Tour, according to whom he was an adventurer, a surgeon by profession. He first announced himself as "Chevalier de St. Louis" to Haidar at Coimbatore (1766), found credit with the Commandant of Haidar's Europeans and through his influence obtained the command of a battalion of Haidar's sepoys, with power to make appointments to the value of £ 50 *per mensem*. Having, however, proved treacherous and unprincipled, he was dismissed from Haidar's service in less than three months, but permitted to practice as a surgeon, now becoming a "Chevalier de Christ." He soon engaged himself in a futile plot to secure the desertion of Haidar's Europeans to the English, by whom he was later confined in Madras as an impostor (see De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 121-140, for details; also Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 620). A *Fort St. George Consultation* makes mention of Chevalier St. Lubin's proposals to draw off the Europeans from Haidar's service (see *Mily. Cons.*, XXVII. 959-960: *Consultation* dated September 25, 1767). Robson states that his schemes to bring off the major part of the Europeans in Haidar's service "proved abortive". Wilks later, after referring to his appointment as the "privy counsellor and guide" of the Field-Deputies, remarks that his true character may be summed up in the single word "impostor" (*l. c.*). As to the attempt on Capt. Fitzgerald, see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 599, and Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 252-253.

of the confederates. On the 14th of December, Haidar, on receipt of intelligence of the rebellious attitude of the Nairs of Malabar, sent off his heavy guns and baggage to the westward, accompanied by Tipū and Ghāzi Khān, with a light corps, to reinforce the provincial commandant Lutf Ali Bēg. Haidar, however, covered this movement by a show of increased activity. He unsuccessfully attacked a convoy, under the command of Capt. Thomas Fitzgerald, at Singarapettah. He charged in person at the head of his cavalry, had his horse shot under him and received a bullet through his turban. A few of his more valued officers were killed in this enterprise. Undismayed, Haidar returned to his head-quarters. Nizām Ali had by now solid ground of alarm for the safety of his own capital, for a detachment of English troops from Bengal under Col. Peach, making a powerful diversion by sea and landing in the Northern Circars, had vigourously penetrated as far as Warrangal, to the north-east of Hyderabad. These apprehensions, added to the unpromising aspect of his southern campaign, had induced Nizām Ali to open a secret communication with Col. Smith in the early part of December and to bribe and engage Rukn-ud-daula in his own interest. Haidar soon came to know of this treachery but put on an air of open confidence. About the middle of the month, Col. Smith, leaving Col. Wood's division in charge of Vāṇiyambāḍi and Tirupattūr, encamped on the slope of a hill, at the distance of one *fursung* (four miles) from Haidar's army. The outposts of Haidar, however, pressed the English army closely on the flanks, and on one side, the horse of Rukn-ud-daula were stationed to guard the road. Col. Smith, intending to make a nocturnal attack, got his troops in readiness, and marched by the very road which was held by the pickets of Rukn-ud-daula. From the ignorance of his guides, Col. Smith, during the night, had been led

among the saul trees, and into the marsh, so that his guns had stuck fast in the mud, occasioning much delay and distress. Day, however, dawning, Haidar's batteries opened a heavy fire on the English troops, causing great havoc in their ranks. By now Rukn-ud-daula, having concerted and taken the path of union with the English, although he was openly professing to give aid to Haidar, was systematically encouraging spoliation in his army (*chōri māḍisuttā*), while he himself began by daily visits to Haidar to temporise and divert his attention from the affairs of the hour. At length, on the night of the 18th of December, Haidar sought to outmanœuvre Nizām Alī by making his way to the latter's own camp. Rukn-ud-daula tried in vain to obstruct him (*aṭakāvu māḍalāgi*), and Nizām Alī was about to meet Haidar. Thereupon Rukn-ud-daula repeatedly gave currency to the report that Haidar, having conspired with the English, was out plundering Nizām Alī's army. On this false alarm, Nizām Alī retreated with his forces to Hyderabad in a northern direction, hotly pursued by Haidar's cavalry. A light field train, with nearly the whole efficient force of his army, remained with Haidar, who, after some minor operations, returned to Bangalore, about the close of the year, at just the time when the English army was obliged once again to move in an opposite direction in quest of food.⁹⁹

Haidar's return to
Bangalore.

The year 1768 opened with prospects by no means favourable to Mysore. Nizām Ali, on the eve of his departure from the confederate camp, had sent his minister

Second Phase :
January-November
1768.

99. *Ibid.*, 596-601; Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 253-6; Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 261-263; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 40-41. See also and compare Robson, *o.c.*, 58-61. De La Tour abruptly speaks of Haidar's retreat from Āmbūr as the signal of Nizām Alī's separation from him and of his retirement into the country of Cuddspah (*o.c.*, II, 115).

Rukn-ud-daula to Nawāb Muhammad Ali to confer on the subject of peace, despatching at the same time his *Vakils* to treat with the English. On his way, Nizām Ali encamped at the entrance to the Dāmalcheruvu Pass, about 120 miles north-east from Madras, and the negotiations terminated, at length, on the 23rd of February, in the conclusion of a treaty between himself on the one part and Nawāb Muhammad Ali and the English East India Company on the other, by virtue of which Nizām Ali confirmed Muhammad Ali in the government of the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt independently of the *subah* of the Deccan under *sannads*, real or supposed, he had held from the Mughal; and ratified his own cession to the English of the Northern Circars—comprising Chicacole and Rājahmundry, yielding a customs revenue of Rupees thirty lakhs—in consideration of an annual payment of Rs. 5 lakhs, subject to a deduction of Rs. 32 lakhs by yearly instalments of Rs. 3 lakhs, as an indemnification for the expenses of the war. It was also stipulated that Guntūr was to be left in the possession of Basālat Jang, the Nizām's brother, until his death, that the Chicacole Circār was to be held by the English Company free of any tribute, and that the fort and *Jaghīr* of Kondapalli should be made over to it. His defection from Haidar being thus complete, Nizām Ali, after the conclusion of this treaty, returned to Hyderabad by the route of Cuddapah and Kurnool. Haidar sent a messenger, almost simultaneously, to Col. Smith, to sound him. But his superiors—too much involved in the affairs of Muhammad Ali—would not think of a peaceful settlement and turned down all overtures.¹⁰⁰

100. *Ibid.* 601-605, where Wilks' reflections on the Treaty will be found, including the *forged* character of the *sanads*, on which the grants of Nizām Ali were based. See also De La Tour, *o.c.*, II. 141-142; Wilson

Meanwhile, affairs in the west of Mysore had continually engrossed Haidar's attention, ever since his return to Bangalore.

The campaign in the West.

The arduous and distant operations in which he had been involved having revived a hope of independence among the chiefs of Malabar, the latter had lately succeeded in carrying several of the block-houses

Haidar proceeds to the Malabar Coast, January 1768.

he had constructed in 1766, and keeping Asad Ali Khān Mehtari, his provincial commander, in a state of incessant alarm, although assisted by the whole force of Ali Rāja, the Moplah chief of Cannanore. At the same time, the chiefs of the English establishments on that coast had been directed to aid and encourage these combinations, and the English at Bombay, by way of diversion, were equipping a formidable expedition for the purpose of obtaining possession of the Mysorean fleet in the harbours of Kanara, reducing the places of strength on the coast and eventually penetrating into the interior of that part of the dominions of Mysore. Already on the 14th of December, Haidar, as we have seen, on receipt of intelligence of these designs, had despatched a light force under Tipū to reinforce by forced marches

o.c., I. 254-5, and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 264-266. Wilks digresses at some length on the alleged pretensions of Nawāb Muhammad Ali to the Government of the Karnātic. Kirmāṇi speaks of Nizām Ali as having marched from Hoskōṭe towards the ghaut or pass of Cuddappah ("Kurunpat") (*o.c.*, 264-265). But, as we have seen from other sources, he had pitched his camp at Caveripatam when he retreated to Hyderabad by that pass. Robson merely refers to the conclusion of peace by Nizām Ali with the English (*o.c.*, 60). As to the deaf ear turned to Haidar, see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 602; also *Report on the Palk Mss.*, 111. Governor Palk wrote on November 5, 1769:—"When Nizam Ali settled with Hyder, certainly we should have done the same. We should then have given all India a strong impression of our power and probably have secured the Carnateek from future invasions." Muhammad Ali had by then so corrupted the English at Madras that the Directors in England were fully justified in believing that in all their negotiations with Haidar, their servants at Fort St. George had allowed private advantage to outweigh public good. Sir Murray Hammick, the Editor of Wilks' work, takes the same view (see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 602, f.n. 1).

the provincial commandant Lutfi Ali Bēg. The heavy train followed at the regulated rate of movement, and about the 20th of January, Haidar himself—who, as a general, believed in one thing at a time and that done well—proceeded with the principal part of his army by long marches towards the Malabar coast, leaving the defence of Bangalore to Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān (Hybut Jung).

The English successes, February-April 1768.

Meantime, Lutfi Ali Bēg, deceived as to the first object of attack by the English expedition from Bombay, had marched off with his whole force in the direction of Honāvar (Onore), imprudently leaving Mangalore with an insufficient garrison. The result was that during February-April, the English successively reduced the Mysorean ports (in Kanara) of Honāvar, Mangalore and Basavarājadurga, and threatened to advance on Bednūr (Nagar) itself, while an injudicious attempt of theirs from Tellicherry to carry by assault one of the principal detached works of Cannanore was repulsed with the loss of fifty-seven Europeans and thirty-three Indians, killed and wounded.¹⁰¹

In this posture of affairs, Tipu arrived at Mangalore and effected his junction with Lutfi Ali Bēg. The commanding officer of the English detachment now strengthened the works of the fort and, to the distance of a *fursung*, surrounded them with a redoubt. The loss of Mangalore and the insufficiency of their means to attempt its recapture, however, induced the Mysorean officers commanding, after closely examining the state of the place, to retire inland; to limit their exertions to the preservation of order in the interior; to cutting off the English force from all means of intelligence; and by

The relief of Mangalore, May 1768.

101. *Ibid.*, 606-608. See also and compare Robson, *o. c.*, 63-64; De La Tour, *o. c.*, II. 143-146; and Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 267-268.

apparent inaction lulling them into security, until the arrival of efficient means which were approaching under the personal command of Haidar, to whom Tipū had despatched an express. Haidar soon entered Bednūr. It being his object to make his advance as imposing as possible, he collected about 20,000 of the peasantry from the countryside and providing them with wooden muskets of ebony and standards of coloured cloth, marched them down to Mangalore, not a man being visible until he appeared with the overwhelming mass of his whole united army before Mangalore early in the month of May, and displaying the forces on high ground within sight of the fort, ordered Tipū to attack the English batteries in flank. Tipū, after some fighting, succeeded in taking them. But this success having thrown the English into some confusion, they left the batteries the same night and retreated towards the fort before Tipū, who kept up a smart fire. Haidar, too, on receipt of intelligence of this victory, galloping with his cavalry, broke the order of the English garrison by a volley of arrows and rockets, and followed them to the sea-shore, from where they embarked for Bombay, abandoning their sick and wounded, and all their field-pieces and stores. Mangalore being thus relieved, was garrisoned; Honāvar and Basavarājadurga were next recaptured; and Haidar, before the outbreak of the monsoon, despatching the army and all the heavy equipments by the Pass of Subramanya to Bangalore, visited Bednūr and levied heavy fines on all the land-holders for furnishing supplies to his enemies. From here, he skilfully patched up a peace with the Nair chiefs by allowing them the semblance of independence, on condition of their reimbursing his expenses of war, which they, in their love of liberty, were soon deceived into agreeing. But this did not affect Alī Rāja's position or Haidar's holding in his own possession Pālghāt, by this means securing two positions

in the south-east and north-west of the province. Thus

Haidar returns to
Bangalore, July 28,
1768.

replenished and free from all care on this side, Haidar at length returned to Bangalore on the 28th of July, after an absence of above six months.¹⁰²

While Haidar was thus engaged, Nawāb Muhammad Ali with the English had resumed the field against Haidar, resolved to dispute with him every inch of ground in the Karnātic-Bālaghāt. The English army being formed

Renewed campaign
in the Karnātic.

Movements of the
English army, down
to May 1768.

into two divisions in January 1768—the northern division under Col. Smith and the southern division under Col. Wood—it became the great objects of the war to occupy the whole of the fertile country contiguous to the frontier of the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt, between the first and second ranges of hills, extending from Vāṇiyambāḍi on the north to Diṇḍigal and Pālghāt on the south-east and south-west; to establish as soon as possible depots of provisions and stores in the places most convenient to the old frontier, for supporting the eventual operations of the army; and to make a single concentrated effort for penetrating to Bangalore, and in the event of success, to Seringapatam. The division under Col. Smith, after appearing once more before Caveripatam (which was

102. *Ibid.*, 608-611; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 268-270. Wilks, quoting Col. Smith, says that the impression by the British was "disgraceful in the last degree." Haidar's ruse succeeded beyond measure. Evidently the people of Bednūr helped the British with a view to regain their own independence. Haidar assembled them and before exacting his money from them, told them he had discovered their treason (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 609). See also and compare Robson, *o.c.*, 64-65; De La Tour, *o.c.*, II, 153-157, and *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 42-43. The contemporary Robson specifically refers to Haidar's arrival at Bangalore from Bednūr on the 28th of July 1768 (*o.c.*, 65). Robson thus enables us to correct Wilks, who elsewhere speaks of Haidar's entering Bangalore on the 4th of August, the very day that Murāri Rao formed his junction with Col. Smith (*o.c.*, I. 626-627). For details as to Haidar's settlement of the affairs in Malabar, see under *Malabar* below.

evacuated in the night), moved northward as far as Pallikonda, about 7 miles west of Vellore, for the purpose of approaching the army of Nizām Alī, then at Punganūr, about 45 miles west of Pallikonda, and quickening the peace negotiations of his minister at Madras. This object being effected, Col. Smith blockaded Krishnagiri, which surrendered on the 2nd of May; and successively reduced Pālakōḍe, Ratnagiri, Śūlagiri and Ankuśagiri. The division under Col. Wood, in the meanwhile, after the capture of the remaining fortified places in the southern extremity of the Bārāmahal, proceeded below the ghāts, reducing with rapid success Tingrecotta (Tenkarai-kottai), Dharmapuri, Salem, Attūr, Nāmakal, Ērōḍe, Satyamangalam, Daṇṇāyakankōttai, Coimbatore and Dinḍigal, among others, and securing and establishing positions at the Gajjalahatti, Talamalla (Talamalai) and Caveripuram passes which connect these places with Mysore. From the military point of view, it was a mistake to have spread over so large an area and occupied so many places with the insufficient forces at his command.¹⁰³

About this time, the plan was officially promulgated by the English at Madras, in conformity to the wishes of Nawāb Muhammad Alī, by which Col. Smith was to be aided in the future operations of the war, with the advice and direction of two members of the Council at Madras, Col. John Call and Mr. George Mackay, as Field Deputies, accompanied by the Nawāb himself, who was to assume the fiscal management of the territorial conquests; occupy with irregulars the minor forts; conduct the negotiations for "drawing

103. *Ibid.*, 615-618; see also and compare Robson, *o. c.*, 61-63; De La Tour *o. c.*, II. 146-152. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 42; and Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 270. As to Col. Wood's occupying so many places with the insufficient force at his disposal, Wilks is highly critical (*o. c.*, I. 618).

off Haidar's adherents;" and generally assist them with

Bangalore, the objective of Muhammad Ali and the English. Bangalore being the definite objective of Muhammad Ali and the Field Deputies,

the latter had been enjoined on the necessity of watching the motions of Haidar to prevent his marching to Bednūr and overpowering the troops from Bombay. But so defective was the system of intelligence organized by Muhammad Ali and the English that they became officially aware of Haidar's march to Bednūr, in April, nearly three months after his actual departure, while the general impression continued to correspond with the tale Haidar had caused to be propagated of his having moved in a north-west direction to oppose the Mahrattas.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, on the 8th of June, the advanced division of the English army, under Col. Donald Campbell, ascended the Pass of Būdīkōṭē, 18 miles south of Kōlār, and on the 16th, reduced and occupied the mud fort of Venkaṭagiri. The forts of Pednāyakanadurga, Māsti and Muḷbāgal were next taken in rapid succession, the last-mentioned by stratagem by Captain Richard Mathews, a most daring and enterprizing officer, who dressed and painted himself as a Soubadar and headed his troops for the purpose; and, after regular approaches had been carried to the crest of the glaxis, Kōlār itself surrendered at discretion to the Colonel on the 28th, by which time Nawāb Muhammad Ali and the Field Deputies having ascended the Pass of Būdīkōṭē, had moved on the direct road to Kōlār as far as Araḷēri. An attempt by Capt. Cosby on Bāgalūr (under whose walls Saiyid Mokhdum, Haidar's general, was reported to have taken post) having proved fruitless in the mean-

104. *Ibid.*, 619-621. See also and compare De La Tour, *o. c.*, II. 146. As regards the two Field-Deputies, it may be added that one of them had the contract for victualling the troops and also that for the supply of carriage to the army, the profits therefrom being shared by the whole Council, with the exception of the Governor.

while, Col. Campbell was now directed to join the headquarters of the army. The main English army under Col. Smith, moving by Bāgalūr on the 3rd of July, laid siege to Hosūr, which fell on the 11th following. Ānekal and Denkanikōṭe were next reduced. Then followed an interval of inaction, partly occasioned by the unfortunate combinations of military supply (which left, in the first stage of their progress from Madras and Vellore, the battering train destined for the siege of Bangalore, and intended to proceed by the intermediate posts of Venkaṭagiri and Kōlār to Hoskōṭe), and partly by the indisposition of Nawāb Muhammad Alī, which fixed the army for nearly a month at Hosūr. During this period, Col. Smith, in accordance with Muhammad Alī's ideas of military and fiscal policy, detached a division of troops under Col. Lang to secure a series of other positions, commanding revenue, to the southward of the Cauvery, and which were to form a chain of defence for the lower countries in connection with the conquests of Col. Wood in that direction. Col. Smith having also, at an early period of the war, agreeably to the wishes of Muhammad Alī, recommended to the English Government to endeavour to obtain the services of Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe of Gooty, of whose efficiency in the wars of Lawrence he had had frequent means of personal observation, a negotiation had been concluded with him for his personal service, with a body of his select troops. Yoonas Khān, Murāri's general, with an advance guard of 300 men, joined the English army at Hosūr. Towards the close of the month, Col. Smith, accompanied by this reinforcement, marched on to Hoskōṭe, where Murāri Rao also, at the head of 3,000 horse and about 2,000 irregular infantry, formed a junction with him on the 4th of August. At this time, Col. Wood, whose operations to the southward had terminated with the

Murāri Rao joins
Muhammad Alī and
the English at Hos-
kōṭe, August 4, 1768.

capture of Diṇḍigal, was on his march by the Pass of Topūr and the province of the Bārāmahal, with a view to reunite with the main army; while Col. Smith held to the view that at whatever period the siege of Bangalore might be attempted, the force ought to admit of being formed into two divisions, one for the operations of the siege, and the other to oppose the field army of Haidar, who would unquestionably make the greatest efforts for its preservation.¹⁰⁵

From Hoskōṭe, where a strong garrison was left and where Nawāb Muhammad Alī and the Field Deputies were to remain, Col. Smith, following the advice of Murāri Rao, moved on to the siege of Chikballāpur, preparatory to the attack on Bangalore.¹⁰⁶ On the 9th of August, Haidar, who since his arrival at the latter place, had been busy putting his troops in the best order in his power,¹⁰⁷ began to reconnoitre and harass the skirts of

105. *Ibid.*, 621-627. On the junction of Murāri Rao with Muhammad Ali and the English, see also and compare Robson, o. c., 65; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 43, and Kirmāṇi, o. c., 271. Kirmāṇi, in keeping with Wilks, speaks of Nawāb Muhammad Ali having from his residence at Kōlār sent for Murāri Rao of Gooty to his assistance. The *Haid. Nām.* refers to Murāri Rao having joined the English in the Hosūr-Ḍenkanikōṭa region. Robson writes of the English army being joined by Murāri Rao "with about 1,500 horse, in the beginning of August." The junction of Murāri Rao, for which Muhammad Ali as his old ally was mainly responsible, is significant, as it points to the fact that both the Nawāb and Murāri had still their grievances against Haidar, whose extirpation in alliance with the English was their steady objective. Muhammad Ali hardly recognised Haidar's claims to the Karnātic-Bālaghāt any more than Haidar himself recognised Muhammad Ali's pretensions to the Karnātic-Pāyāngḥāt; and Murāri Rao only sought in their contentions an opportunity to wreak his personal vengeance against Haidar, whose master Nanjarājaiya he had, as we have seen, grossly wronged during the Mysorean struggle for Trichinopoly (1752-1764). (*Ante*, Vol. II. Chs. VII-VIII).

106. De La Tour, o. c., II. 158. Col. Smith, according to this authority, with the intention of making Hoskōṭe the storehouse for the siege of Bangalore, caused it to be fortified (o. c., II. 152). The siege of Chikballāpur is not mentioned by Wilks, whose account is mainly based on Robson. See Wilks, o. c. I. 627.

107. Robson, o. c., 65.

the English camp.¹⁰⁸ Haidar, soon perceiving that he could not prevent Col. Smith opening his trenches before Chikballāpur, raised his camp and marched towards Hoskōṭe,¹⁰⁹ where Murāri Rao, disregarding Col. Smith's advice to him to encamp in communication with the English line, and within the protection of its pickets, had thrown a line of works at some distance of the English, with a morass between them.¹¹⁰ On the night of the 24th, Haidar made a disposition for the attack of Murāri's camp, in the following order: 6,000 horse in two divisions (preceded by elephants), to break down the flimsy works of Murāri Rao; these were to be followed by two columns of infantry; and Haidar, with the body of his army, to remain in reserve, support the attack, and counteract any movements which should be made by Col. Smith. The position having been previously examined by all the officers employed, Haidar's cavalry was ordered to penetrate direct to the tent of Murāri Rao, whose head was the great object of the enterprize; to overwhelm the whole camp and prevent their mounting, while the infantry should enter in succession and complete the destruction of the whole. Always quick in perception and fertile in resources, Murāri no sooner found that his camp was attacked by cavalry than he gave instant orders that not a man should mount, and that each should remain at the head of his horse and cut down without distinction every person on horseback. The irregularity of the tents and huts, and the interspersion of the *Bēḍar* peons, impeded considerably the progress of cavalry in the night, and the confusion was increased by Murāri's state elephant receiving an accidental wound, and breaking loose from his pickets through the camp. Haidar was enraged at the

108 Wilks, o. c., I. 627.

109. De La Tour, o. c., II. 159.

110. Wilks, o. c., I. 627-628; Robson, I. c.

pusillanimity of the infantry, but as the alarm was now given to the English camp, he did not think proper to renew the attack, and withdrew his cavalry. While Haidar's loss in this injudicious attempt was not inconsiderable, Murāri was himself slightly wounded in two places, his nephew severely, and his general, the brave and experienced Yoonas Khān, had his right arm nearly cut through by a sabre in two places, and the bone irretrievably destroyed.¹¹¹

Murāri Rao, in this position, kept closer to the English.¹¹² Haidar, proceeding further, attacked and carried the suburb of Hoskōṭe, which was defended by a single entrenchment of earth, and a ditch the English had made. He took a considerable number of soldiers and sepoys the English had placed in an hospital there, and pressed on the siege of the place, ordering his troops to prepare ladders for scaling the ramparts, personally animating and giving money to the workmen, and promising the highest rewards to his army if the town should be taken,

111. *Ibid.*, 628-629. See also and compare Robson, l. c.; *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 43, and Kirmāṇi, o. c., 271. Wilks dates the night action at Hoskōṭe 22nd August 1768; while the contemporary Robson dates it 24th August. According to Kirmāṇi, the night attack took place at Narasipuram (? in the neighbourhood of Hoskōṭe), where Murāri Rao and the English had encamped. Haidar's loss in the action, according to Wilks, "amounted to near 300 men killed and wounded, and 80 serviceable horses secured by Murāri Rao. Murāri's loss amounted to no more than 18 men, and 30 horses killed and wounded" (o. c., l. 629). Robson speaks of Haidar as having "retreated with the loss of 150 of his best men." On the English side, Col. Smith had to lament the loss of his aid-de-camp Captain Gee, an intelligent and promising officer, who rode into Murāri's camp on the first alarm and was cut down in the dark as the result of the judicious but indiscriminate nature of the orders issued by Murāri Rao. Cap. Gee had been married but a few months before to Marian Carter, daughter of Roger Carter, Governor of the Company's Establishment at Bencoolen, Sumatra.

112. Kirmāṇi, l. c. He says that he took to flight, leaving all his guns and stores behind him. But Wilks does not countenance this statement. He was with the English till 14th November, when he accompanied Col. Smith and the Field-Deputies to Madras, leaving his corps with the English army. Wilks, o. c., l. 643. Wilks is undoubtedly correct.

and Nawāb Muhammad Alī made prisoner. Alarmed by these developments, Muhammad Alī at length desired Col. Smith to raise the siege of Chikballāpur (already far advanced) and proceed to the relief of Hoskōṭe.¹¹³ Col. Smith, pressing Haidar in the rear, encamped in the plain to the eastward of the town.¹¹⁴ On the 3rd of September, Muhammad Alī, determined no longer to

Muhammad Alī with the Field Deputies moves on to Kōlār, September 3, 1768.

run the risk of falling into the hands of Haidar, on pretence of illness, moved on with the Field Deputies under a strong escort to Kōlār, leaving at Hoskōṭe the immense quantity of artillery and ammunition intended for the capture of Bangalore. Col. Smith covered the movement by an intermediate march by Mālūr in the direction of his reinforcements, while Haidar, having adequately garrisoned the fortress of Bangalore, raised the siege of Hoskōṭe and made a circuitous march in a southern direction, hoping to cut off the division of Col. Wood, now ascending from the Bārāmahal.¹¹⁵

On the 5th of September Col. Wood was expected to be at Būdikōṭe and move towards Mālūr on the 6th. But Col. Smith, unaware of Haidar's motions for the last two days, threw his baggage into Mālūr on the 5th, marched a few miles further on the same day, and early on the next morning was in motion towards Būdikōṭe. The route of Col. Wood to form the junction was through a long defile, which pointed north-west for a few miles, and at a comparatively open spot, where another road, opened to the north-east, made an obtuse turn in a direction due west. Haidar, calculating on Col. Smith's waiting the

113. De La Tour, l. c.

114. Kirmāṇi, o. c., 272.

115. De La Tour, o. c., II. 159-160. Wilks, o. c., I. 629-680; Kirmāṇi, l. c.

arrival of his reinforcements near Mālūr, had taken the most effectual means to conceal his own movements, and assumed a position to the north-eastward of the angle of the defile, intending to seize the proper moment for opening an enfilading fire on Col. Wood, from positions previously chosen, and availing himself of the consequent embarrassment, completely to overpower him, while his own rear was open to the north-east in the event of failure. The hills which formed these defiles were interspersed between Col. Smith and Haidar, as well as between him and Col. Wood; and reports were brought to Col. Smith of both Haidar's army and Col. Wood's division being seen in motion in the direction described. Perceiving that he should be able to reach and clear the angle of the defile sooner than Haidar, and to assume a position to receive him with advantage, the Colonel quickened his pace and sent scouts to apprise Col. Wood of his intentions. But he had scarcely reached the angle of the defile, and was making dispositions for a formation, in the open country to the north-east, when he and Haidar were equally astonished at hearing a regular salute, in the defile to the south-east, which Col. Wood had thought proper to fire in honour of Col. Smith, on receiving the message of his approach. Haidar instantly countermarched to assume a more respectful distance, and Col. Smith, indignant, made an immediate disposition for a vigorous yet fruitless pursuit, during which Col. Wood's division, who outmarched their guns, left two of them without protection, and the artillery-men all destroyed, before the guns could be

The junction and
after.

rescued. The next day, the united force being properly distributed into two divisions, Col. Wood resigned his command in consequence of his imprudent conduct, which had deprived Col. Smith of a probable victory; and his division was placed under Col. Lang. Col. Lang was ordered to

pursue Haidar in the direction of Bētamangalam, midway between Venkatagiri and Kōlār, while Col. Smith marched towards Kōlār and then moved in quest of Haidar. The divisions of Cols. Lang and Smith pursued Haidar considerably to the northward, Col. Smith himself advancing as far as Rāmasamudram on the 15th. Finding Haidar still to precede them, with a rapidly increasing interval, they once more returned towards Kōlār, having established a post at Mārgamalla, two marches to the northward of that place.¹¹⁶

Meantime, Haidar had been drawn still farther to the north in consequence of the defection of his brother-in-law Mīr Alī Razā Khān (Mīr Sāhib), and his establishment by Pēshwa Mādhava Rao at Gurramkoṇḍa since 1767. Notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of Haidar's wife and her promises for the continuance, and even the enlargement, of his *jaghīr*, if he would only return to his allegiance, Mīr Alī Razā, having no immediate hope of relief from any quarter, long hesitated between the fear of extinction and the hope of independence. On Haidar's march to Gurramkoṇḍa, he even wrote to invite the English to fall upon his rear; but on his nearer approach, the terms of reconciliation were finally adjusted. Haidar, taking with him Mīr Alī Razā and leaving at Gurramkoṇḍa the

116. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 630-632. See also and compare Robson, *o. c.*, 65-69. According to Robson, Haidar marched from Bangalore to Būdīkōṭe "with 10,000 horse and 8,000 sepoy, and 14 light-pieces" (*o. c.*, 66). Robson's account of the action at Būdīkōṭe glosses over Col. Wood's conduct, and he speaks of Col. Wood's indisposition as the cause of Col. Lang being ordered to take the command of his division (*o. c.*, 68). Wilks describes Colonel Wood's salute as "incomprehensible" (*o. c.*, I. 632 f. n.). Wilks' "Long" is a mistake for "Lang", he being Col. Ross Lang, who figured in the siege of Fort St. George in 1763 and in 1777 became Commander-in-Chief at Madras, on the suspension of Col. James Stuart.

latter's nephew Saiyid Sāhib, deviated to the right to destroy the largest portion of Murāri Rao's territory; and returned, respectably reinforced, about the end of September, towards Kōlār, where the battering train of the English army was drawn out, and the Field Deputies continued to report their confident expectation of the early investment of Bangalore.¹¹⁷

By now the affairs of Mysore had certainly got into a critical state. One half of the territory and some places of strength in it were in possession of its enemies; a chain of posts had been established, and a battering train advanced for the siege of the second place in the kingdom; and an officer of merited reputation was at the head of the hostile army. But Haidar was the last man to be dismayed. He saw that the greater part of these imposing appearances rested on no solid basis; that not one of the captured places was adequately occupied; that the possession of the territory under such circumstances was but a fleeting vision; and that a respectable defence at Bangalore would enable him to destroy the whole chain of communication, and starve the besiegers, while his lighter troops carried fire and sword into the open and defenceless territory of the enemy and extinguished their resources. He was aware also of the limitations of Col. Smith. But, in the midst of his optimism, he had vision enough to see that the chances of war were likely to expose him and Mysore as well to disaster.¹¹⁸ Realising full well that his war with

117. *Ibid.*, 632-633. See also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, (ff. 41), which erroneously places the return to allegiance of Mir Ali Razā in 1767 (*Sarvajitū*). De La Tour speaks of this event as having taken place during Col. Smith's march against Chikballāpur (August 1768) (*o. c.*, II. 161-163). Wilks' sequence is undoubtedly more in keeping with the context than De La Tour's or the *Haid. Nām.*

118. *Ibid.*, 633-634.

Nawāb Muhammad Alī over an old issue had drawn him into an inevitable conflict with the latter's allies, the English, with whom neither he nor Mysore had personally cause for quarrel, he had already in an earlier part of the struggle—during the siege of Āmbūr (November-December 1767)—despatched propositions of peace to the English at Madras, of which the chief preliminary was “that everything should remain in *statu quo*.”¹¹⁹ This had proved a vain endeavour. But nothing daunted, Haidar tried again. Finding it safe to conclude a treaty with the English, who had shown themselves already a fighting nation, and refusing to admit as a party to it Muhammad Alī, who was being fast relegated to the background by his own supporters, Haidar now definitely commissioned his *vakīl* to make known to the English that he was actuated by a desire of making moderate sacrifices for the attainment of peace, professing his readiness to cede the province of the Bārāmahāl and pay Rupees ten lakhs to them. Col. Smith, whose health about this time would not permit him to keep the field and who had with the Field Deputies just moved from Kōlār to escort Muhammad Alī to the Pass leading into the Karnātic, insisted on Haidar making a present sufficient to reimburse the losses the officers had sustained during the war. The Field Deputies, however, advised by Muhammad Alī, demanded of him the Coimbatore country and the Bārāmahāl, a line of territory which should include Krishnagiri, Śankaridurg, and Diṇḍigal; payment of war expenses amounting to upwards of Rupees seventy lakhs; numerous concessions on the coast of Malabar; and payment also by

119. De La Tour, *o. c.*, II. 117-118. The bearer of Haidar's peace proposals, according to De La Tour, was an Englishman, formerly factor or consul at Kārvār. On his arrival at Madras, the English, he records, “treated him as a young man, and derided his propositions; but the consequences gave them sufficient reason to repent” (*Ibid*).

Haidar of that tribute to Nizām Alī which the English had engaged to pay in the event of their conquest of Mysore, together with some important cessions to Murāri Rao. These demands not proving acceptable to Haidar, his *vakīl* left the English camp and hostilities were resumed on both sides about the end of September 1768. The English had soon cause to regret that they had not been more reasonable in their demands¹²⁰.

Nothing further of importance, however, occurred before October, when the fort of Muḷbāgal was retaken by Haidar by a night attack. Col. Wood, who had resumed the command of his division on the 3rd of the month but had marched to secure a convoy of provisions, immediately marched back thither and stormed and took possession of the *pettah*, and attempted to carry the rock by escalade. On the 4th, Haidar moved on to the relief of Muḷbāgal, and an obstinate and severely contested action ensued. Haidar, pressing on with a resolution he had never shown before, attempted to surround with his horse Col. Wood's infantry, and advanced with eight pieces of cannon and a continual loose fire of musketry. Col. Wood maintained his ground till two o'clock, when, being outnumbered by Haidar, he retreated to a more advantageous position, resolutely contending with him. Haidar, with the superiority of artillery now on his side—his guns being served with skill, spirit and decision by some skilled Indian artillery sepoy who had deserted to him, on account of scarcity of provisions, from the English side—continued to push through both in the rear and on the flank of the English reserve, allowing practically no time for the restoration of order and confidence on the English side. At this moment, Captain Brooke, though

The action at Muḷbāgal, October 4, 1768.

wounded, moved with his four battalions and two guns, by a circuitous but secret route, to the summit of the rock, and opened his two guns with the utmost vivacity, on Haidar's flank, every voice on his side crying out *huzza, huzza, Smith! Smith!* creating the impression that Colonel Smith's division had arrived. This stratagem proved magical and Wood, availing himself of the time thus secured, assumed a more regular disposition. Haidar, perceiving the change, at once indignantly returned to the attack, making even desperate attempts to charge up the hill with his cavalry. But these proved wholly ineffectual and the day closed. At length, Col. Wood being joined by a fresh party of his division, Haidar beat a retreat, leaving Colonel Wood in possession of the field of battle, though he had but narrowly escaped defeat.¹²¹

Col. Smith, on receipt of intelligence from Col. Wood, moved on the 6th of October, encamping near Mulbāgal early on the 7th. Meanwhile Haidar, having exhausted his ammunition and giving up all ideas of renewing his attack, marched off with his army, and sat down before Mārgamalla. The English army proceeded in two divisions to its relief but on their approach,

The subsequent movements of the English and Haidar, October 6-14, 1768.

121. *Ibid.*, 634-639; Robson, *o. c.*, 69-73; see Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 637-639, for an animated narration of this action. He estimates the loss on Haidar's side at 1,000 men and on the English side, 8 officers, 229 rank and file and two guns, while both sides had expended nearly the whole of their ammunition. Col. Smith's report of the battle, based on "the best accounts" he was able to get, praises "the steady and determined behaviour" of Wood's troops but offers no commendation of his conduct. See Wilson, *o. c.*, I. 258-262. As to Haidar's conduct of the action, Col. Smith gave, as a great soldier, warm praise. "I have only to remark," he said, "that the enemy have behaved with a courage far beyond anything I could have expected from them, at times withstanding the charge of bayonets, and their horse in general more resolute than they yet appeared, and in some instances desperately enterprising. Upon the whole, it has been the most serious and warmest contest that Hyder has as yet supported, and nothing but the most steady and determined behaviour could have resisted them" (*Ibid.*, 262).

Haidar moved off and became invisible. On the 14th, the two divisions were again in motion to the northward in a vain attempt to bring Haidar to a general action, which, however, only drove him on to pillage the territory of Murāri Rao, perpetually harassing the English army, whose ranks were already getting thinned by sickness and

Col. Smith at Mārgamalla, October 19-29, 1768.

desertion in an alarming degree. Perceiving the futility of following Haidar, Col. Smith resolved to halt at Mārgamalla from the 19th to 29th of October, determined no doubt to persevere in collecting every disposable man for the purpose of strengthening his division, in obtaining from Venkaṭagiri supplies of ammunition and stores, and in divesting the army of every possible incumbrance (including the removal to Madras of Muhammad Ali and the Field Deputies, the most ponderous of his incumbrances, who required a body for their personal protection at Kōlār, little inferior to one of his divisions) by taking the opportunity of sending the sick and wounded by Venkaṭagiri to Kōlār. During this period, he represented to the Field Deputies the necessity of adopting some other method of carrying on the war. They, however, insisted on adhering to the original plan of bringing Haidar to a general action.¹²²

Col. Smith then marched again in quest of Haidar, who at times would come almost

Haidar alarms Muhammad Ali and the Field Deputies at Kōlār, November 5, 1768.

within cannon shot of the English army and then move off with ease. By these feints, he drew them to a considerable distance through the country, and by a circuitous movement alarmed Muhammad Ali and the Field Deputies at Kōlār by a cannonade

122. *Ibid.*, 639-641; Robson, *o. c.*, 74-75. *Mārgamalla* is at present the head-quarters of a hōbli of the same name in Chintāmaṇi taluk, Kolar District. Its more correct name is *Muragamakūṭi*, the hill of Lord Siva. Robson spells it as "Margamully".

on the *Pettah* on the 5th of November. On the 7th, the English army came near Kōlār and Haidar retired, driving off the inhabitants of the countryside (*valsa*), and burning the villages in a circuit of several miles around. Col. Smith, recalled by the intelligence of this alarm, returned to Kōlār on the 8th. Heavy rains intervened. By now Muhammad Alī and the Field Deputies, who had remained stationary throughout the greater part of their visit to Mysore, having found the campaign to be not so pleasant an amusement as they had anticipated, had hinted a wish to return. Having become odious to the army, they had also thrown the odium of their own idle, vain and undigested plans on Col. Smith. In consequence of these differences, Col. Smith was desired by the Council at Madras to submit a plan for more successful operations, and in such an event, he was invested with the direction of the war.

Col. Smith recalled and Col. Wood succeeds to the command of the English army.

But if he would suggest none that could be immediately carried into effect, he was requested to repair to Madras to aid the deliberations of the government. Col. Smith, fully appreciating the position, chose the latter alternative; and Col. Wood, whose career in the southern campaign and personal attention to Muhammad Alī and the Field Deputies had established with them and with the members of government the reputation

Col. Smith escorts the Nawāb and the Field Deputies to the Karnātic, November 14, 1768.

of transcendent military talents, was appointed to succeed him. On the 14th of November, Col. Smith, accompanied by Murāri Rao, accordingly escorted Muhammad Alī and the Field Deputies to the Karnātic, leaving the general command of the English army to Col. Wood and the command of his own division to Major Fitzgerald. Arrived at Madras, he suggested that if the detachment under Colonel Peach,

then in the Northern Circars, were spared to replace the regiments of his own army which had been reduced to mere skeletons, he would be enabled to retrieve the position, by penetrating from Coimbatore to Seringapatam. This suggestion, however, came to nothing; for Col. Smith, it was well known at the time, had not been called back to Madras for real consultation as for his making room for Col. Wood in the command of the army¹²³

Meanwhile Haidar, following his retreat from Kōlār, had laid siege to Hosūr. Col. Wood, reinforced by the 2nd regiment of Europeans and Captain Cosby's battalion, marched for its relief on the 16th of November. On his arrival at Bāgalūr (about 18 miles from Hosūr) on the 17th, Col. Wood, meditating a night attack on Haidar's camp, ordered the whole of his baggage, camp equipage and surplus stores (including the two brass eighteen-pounders) into the *pettah* or walled town; and proceeded at ten, the same night, towards Hosūr. On his approaching Hosūr on the morning of the 18th, Haidar withdrew and made a show of an action. A severe cannonade commenced but Haidar

Haidar lays siege to Hosūr, November 14-18, 1768.

Draws off to Bāgalūr, November 18, 1768.

soon drew off, and taking a circuit, arrived that night at Bāgalūr (commanded by Captain Alexander and corps, one of the best in the service of Muhammad Ali), the *pettah* of which he stormed and took possession, together with the stores and baggage, the two eighteen-pounders, and upwards of 2000 draught cattle. The carnage was terrific, nearly

123. *Ibid.*, 641-643; Robson, *o. c.*, 75-77. As to the Field Deputies, see below—section on Wilks' Criticism of Col. Joseph Smith. See also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2503-2506, where their responsibility for the failure of the English campaign of 1768 is fully discussed with reference to Wilson's *History of the Madras Army*.

2000 human lives being lost. On receipt of this intelligence, Col. Wood, throwing on the 20th some ammunition and stores into Hosūr, measured back his steps to Bāgalūr on the 21st, and prosecuted his march the same evening to Araḷēri, an intermediate post on the road to Kōlār. Haidar, who had by now disposed of his trophies and spoils, suddenly made his appearance about noon of the 22nd. Immediately he set up two batteries on a nearby eminence and forthwith opened fire on Wood's forces. Being far too away, the English field-pieces could not reply. Instead of making a fresh disposition of his forces and advancing on Haidar, Wood wasted his ammunition in returning Haidar's cannonade, in which Captain Cosby was wounded and among the other killed and wounded were six subalterns, twenty Europeans and two hundred sepoys. On the 23rd, Haidar's parties continually harassed and intercepted Col. Wood's division during his march and cannonaded them from every high ground they came to, until the Colonel was relieved by Haidar's retreat to the

Retreats to the south-east and crosses to Hoskōṭe-Kōlār, November 23-25, 1768.

south-east, and the arrival by way of Kōlār of Major Fitzgerald from Venkaṭagiri. After getting supplies from Kōlār, the entire English army again encamped on the plain and moved towards Haidar, who, about the close of the month, having received intelligence of Muhammad Alī's return to the Karnātic and Col. Smith's recall to Madras, led the English a circuit back by Bāgalūr and crossed the country towards Hoskōṭe, and from thence to Kōlār. The situation of Bāgalūr having in the meantime become an object of discussion between the English officers, Major Fitzgerald suggested that Captain Mathews should be sent to relieve and withdraw the garrison, while the remainder of the army should repair its losses at Kōlār; but Col. Wood, so far from

risking a division, declared his fixed opinion that the whole was insufficient to oppose Haidar. Thereupon, Major Fitzgerald having represented to Col. Smith the urgent necessity of placing the troops under other

direction for the recovery of their "lost honour," the Government of Madras immediately ordered Col. Wood to proceed in arrest to Madras and Col.

Col. Wood superseded by Col. Lang, December 1768.

Lang, in consequence, assumed the command of the army early in December.¹²⁴

124. *Ibid.*, 645-652; Robson, *o.c.*, 77-82. Col. Smith received this public representation of Major Fitzgerald on the very day he arrived at Madras and sent it without comment to the Government (see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 651-652). Col. Wood's report of the actions at Bāgalūr and Araḷēri has been set out at length by Wilson, who characterizes them as "very meagre and unsatisfactory" (see *o.c.*, I. 263-64). For Major Fitzgerald's account, see *Ibid.*, 264-267. The words "the recovery of our lost honor" occur in his report dated Colar, 24th November 1768. Col. Wood, on his return, was tried by Court-Martial, at the end of 1769, on nine charges of misappropriation of stores, grain, etc., while other charges related to his misconduct in the field at Hosūr, Araḷēri and other places. He was acquitted of the charges regarding stores, etc., on the ground that they belonged to Muhammad Ali and not to the Government of Madras. He was found guilty of misconduct at Araḷēri but the Court desisted from passing any sentence in consideration of his former services. Col. Wilks' remark that "incapacity, the chief fault of Col. Wood, is not one of those for which the articles of war provide a punishment" (*o.c.*, I. 652, f. n.) seems thus to be wide of the mark. Wilson, indeed, says, "it is not apparent why he was acquitted of having neglected to provision the forts" (*o.c.*, I. 267, f. n. 1). The Government of Madras disapproved of the finding of the Court-Martial and directed it to revise. But the Court refused to do so. Government thereupon dismissed Col. Wood from the service and ordered the recovery of the value of the stores, etc., misappropriated by instituting proceedings against him in Court (Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 269). But the Court of Directors upheld the acquittal of the Court-Martial and confirmed it. The officers composing the Court-Martial could not probably condemn Wood for many things which most of themselves had been guilty of, nor disapprove of the proceedings without acknowledging those perquisites to be illegal, which they would vain establish as their right (see Letter from W. M. Goodlad to R. Palk, dated 5th February 1770, in *Report on Palk Mss.* 121). Warren Hastings, then a Member of the Council that disapproved of the acquittal of Wood and ordered his dismissal, wrote to R. Palk on 29th January 1770, hoping that the Chairman of the Board of Directors would "applaud the conduct of the Board (i.e., the Madras Council), if he

The departure of Muhammad Alī and the Field Deputies having in the meantime relieved Haidar from anxiety for Bangalore, he prepared to execute without delay the farther objects of his campaign.¹²⁵ Resolved to attempt the recovery of the Bārāmahal valley and the Coimbatore countries in the South,¹²⁶ Haidar, proceeding from Kōlār, followed in vain Col. Smith as far as Vellore,¹²⁷ and on learning that Muhammad Alī had left his camp at Denkanikōṭe on the pretence of sore eyes,¹²⁸ spread the report that the Nawāb had run away and the Colonel gone to Madras; that he had beaten the English army and taken their guns; and threatened the severest vengeance on all those who would not submit to his control.¹²⁹ He now changed entirely his manner of making war: he divided his cavalry into three bodies, the command of one of which he himself took and gave the command of the other two to Saiyid Mokhdum and Mīr Alī Razā, his brothers-in-law. He kept no other troops but his grenadiers, *Kaḷḷars* and *Karnātakas*, whom he likewise divided into three bodies, between himself and his brothers-in-law, forming three flying columns as it were. With these light troops, he

Haidar aims at the recovery of the Bārāmahal and the southern countries.

Changes the mode of his warfare.

believes it to have been just, and be the first to confirm their proceedings" (*Ibid.*, 117-118). After his dismissal from service, Col. Wood lived in Madras, where he died on 3rd July 1774, aged 48 years. He married Elizabeth Owen on July 28, 1762 (see Love, *Vestiges*, III. 62, f. u. 1). He lies buried in St. Mary's Cemetery, Madras. There are verses on his tombstone by his wife (see also *List of Tombs and Monuments in the Madras District*, p. 16).

125. *Ibid.*, 652.

126. Robson, *o.c.*, 81.

127. De La Tour, *o.c.*, II. 163.

128. See *Haid.* Nām., ff. 43, stating this specifically thus: *kannu nōvu bantu endu.*

129. Robson, *o.c.*, 84.

began to traverse the entire country, harassing the English.¹³⁰

This apart, Haidar having already, on his return from the campaign in the West in July 1768, relieved Fuzzul-Ullāh-Khān from the command of Bangalore, had sent him to Seringapatam, where he continued to be actively employed in procuring new levies to take over garrison and provincial duties and relieve the old troops, which were re-organized and equipped (including the detachment from Malabar) as a field force to oppose the English army advancing by the way of Trichinopoly. Early in November, Fuzzul-Ullāh-Khān, taking the field with a corps of 7,000 cavalry and infantry, and ten guns, and a command over the irregular infantry, forced his way through the Passes of Caveripuram and Gajjalahatti, and between the 19th and 29th of the month, obtained some advantages against the English (under Serjeant Hoskan and Captain Orton respectively), who, having taken Dinḍigal, Coimbatore, Pālghāt, Karoor and Dhārāpuram, were about to march up the Pass of Gajjalahatti and make an incursion into Mysore and Seringapatam. A first attack on Gajjalahatti on Nov. 18 was repulsed by Lieutenant Andrews, but the assault was renewed by Fuzzul-Ullāh-Khān, the next day, and carried after a gallant defence by Lieut. Andrews, who was killed. The place was unhealthy and had proved the grave of most of the men of his detachment, whose pay had been in arrears for three months. Then he sent a despatch to Haidar to report that he should have completed his descent of the Pass by the 4th of December, with fresh equipments. In a few days the rumour of Haidar's approach having been confirmed, Capt. Johnson, who commanded at Dhārāpuram,

retreated to Trichinopoly; Lieut. Bryet, commanding at Pālghāt, withdrew to Travancore and thence returned by Cape Comorin to the south-eastern dependencies of Madras; Capt. Faisan having been given the option of evacuating Caveripuram and joining Capt. Orton at Ērōde, he preferred to await the events of war at the former place, while all the minor posts throughout the country successively fell without resistance.¹³¹

Determined to re-occupy the Mysorean posts in the lower country, preparatory to the conquest of Madras, Haidar, on the 6th of December, leaving Tipū with the main army to oppose his encroaching enemies, himself with 6000 regular infantry, 4000 horse and 15 guns, descended eastward into the Bārāmahal by the Pass of Pālakōde (a little to the south of the present Morappūr Railway Station, on the Madras-Mettupalaiyam section), and thence southwards through that of Tōpūr. The forts of Dharmapuri, Tingrecotta, Ōmalūr, Attūr, Salem (commanded by Capt. Heyril) and Nāmakal were taken in rapid succession between the 6th and the 17th, without firing a shot. Descending the Gajjalahatti Pass, Haidar then crossed the Cauvery, about thirty miles to the west of Trichinopoly, and marched to Karoor, which with Kāngyam fell without much resistance on the 19th. Moving up the right bank of the Cauvery, he next advanced on Ērōde, surprising and worsting the English detachment under Capt. Nixon (afterwards Major-General Sir Eccles Nixon), at Kolanelli, about 40 miles from Karoor, after a gallant resistance, which Capt. Roderick Orton (who had lately succeeded to the command consequent on the ill-health of Col. Daniel Frieschman, who

131. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 656-659; Wilson, *o.c.*, 270-273; see also and compare Robson, *o.c.*, 83-84; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 272-273. Lieut. Bryne's name is given as "Bryant" in Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 659), which is corrected by Wilson in his work (see *o.c.*, I. 268).

retired to Trichinopoly after the descent of Fuzzul-Ullāh-Khān) had sent to bring in provisions. Arriving at Ērōḍe, Haidar summoned the place to surrender. On the 25th, Capt. Orton capitulated with his garrison of 200 Europeans, two battalions and a half of sepoy, 500 of Nawāb Muḥammad Alī's horse, and the entire battering train of artillery used by Col. Wood (consisting of eight pieces of cannon, some mortars, field-pieces and muskets). Caveripuram, long besieged by the main body of Fuzzul-Ullāh-Khān's corps and defended by Capt. Faisan, having also surrendered in turn, Haidar remained at Ērōḍe for some time. The faulty and unmilitary disposition of the troops left behind by Col. Wood made all these places an easy prey. The officers had been left, for the most part, without provisions, without money, and without instructions.¹³²

132. *Ibid.*, 661-666; Robson, *o.c.*, 84-86, and Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 267-271. Captain Orton was tried by Court-Martial, found guilty and cashiered in 1769 (*Ibid.*, 272). It is said by both Wilks and Wilson that he was not sober when he went to see Haidar. Capt. Orton tried to send Capt. Robinson, his second in command, who had broken parole, granted to him at Vāṇiyambāḍi, and refused to go to Haidar to negotiate the terms. Nixon pleaded that he surrendered because the provisions could not last for more than two days. It appeared, however, from the evidence that there was food for 10 or 12 days and that he was not sober when he went to Haidar's camp—just after taking his food. After his capitulation, he and his men were not released by Haidar, who pleaded the breach of parole by Robinson and sent them all to Seringapatam as prisoners. While Capt. Orton was released in 1769, Capt. Robinson died in prison. The statement of De La Tour that Robinson was captured in march from Madras to Madura and immediately hanged on tree seems wrong (see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 665, f. n.). De La Tour also by a mistake transfers the incidents that occurred at Ērōḍe to Elvasanūr, near Tiaghur (*Ibid.*). Wilks states that Orton was compelled to order Robinson to surrender the fort by threat of force on the application of torture, but Orton did not plead this excuse. Kirmāṇi countenances compulsion by Haidar's servants but not torture (see *Neshawani-Hydrābādī*, 273-278). Wilson holds that Orton could have held out until relieved by Fitzgerald (*o.c.*, I. 272-273). See also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 43, and Kirmāṇi, *i.e.* Kirmāṇi, who dwells at some length on the attack on the English convoys by Haidar's matchlockmen and the capitulation of Ērōḍe, refers to that place as "Hurroor" (modern Harūr).

Meanwhile Col. Lang, having directed the withdrawal of the battering train from Kōlār and risked a garrison there under Capt. Kelly, detached a division of English troops, numbering about 5,000 men, under Major Fitzgerald to overtake and arrest Haidar's progress in the South. This he failed to achieve, as Haidar successfully eluded Fitzgerald's efforts to come up with him at every point. Major Fitzgerald, who marched on the 10th of December and followed with rapid strides, had, indeed, the mortification to hear, at each successive march, of the surrender of the place which he next hoped to relieve. As he approached the Cauvery, about the 18th, he had intelligence that Haidar had crossed, or was about to cross the river, a little to the eastward of Karoor, and had determined to leave Fuzzul-Ullāh-Khān to invest that place and Ērōḍe, and to proceed himself with the main army to attempt Trichinopoly and levy contributions on Tanjore and the southern provinces. Deeming, however, Ērōḍe to be safe for the present (it being defended by 200 Europeans, 1200 regular sepoys, eight pieces of good battering cannon and two mortars), and knowing Trichinopoly to be in a defenceless and dangerous state, having been drained of its troops for the service of Coimbatore, and having received instructions that that place should be his first care, Major Fitzgerald moved down eastward for the protection of that more important object. On his arrival at Trichinopoly, towards the close of the month, the Major sent off a battalion of sepoys to Madura, which was also destitute of troops. Trichinopoly was, however, by sheer accident saved for the English, for had Haidar, the ultimate objective of whose southern campaign was the recovery of that age-long bone of contention between the rulers of Mysore and the Karnātic, instead of turning to Karoor, gone down to

Trichinopoly saved
for the English by
accident.

Trichinopoly, he would certainly have got possession of it.¹³³

Haidar having thus within a short space of time recovered nearly the whole of the territorial possessions of Mysore in the South, moved, in January 1769, towards the Karnātic, leaving Fuzzul-Ullāh-Khān to operate with his corps from Dindigal; to carry on the war further to the southward and penetrate into the Madura and Tinnevely countries. For his immediate objective now was to close up with the English at Madras.

Haidar's further movements, January-February 1769.

Madras, his immediate objective.

Recrossing the Cauvery, he directed his march by Toreyūr to the eastward, along the northern banks of that river. Abandoning that place, his troops entered the Trichinopoly bounds and began to pillage, whereupon Major Fitzgerald, who was now at Munsoorpet opposite Trichinopoly, detaching from his small force for the security of Trichinopoly and Madura, moved towards Outatore (Uttattūr), to prevent Haidar's passing to the northward. Finding on Haidar's nearer approach that he pointed to the north-east, he marched with all diligence to place himself farther north, for the purpose of intercepting his direct progress to Madras. Haidar, however, soon appeared near Outatore, and moved off at night to the south-east, in the rear of Major Fitzgerald's tract. Marking the direction of his course by a wide expanse of flaming villages, Haidar descended by the banks of the Coleroon into the Tanjore country, accepting a contribution of Rupees four lakhs from the Rāja for sparing his country. Marching by Cuddalore, he next moved on to Valikonḍapuram, and, in February, making a circuit to the eastward, turned towards Pondicherry and back to Tyāgadurg.¹³⁴

133. *Ibid.*, 661-662; Robson, o.c., 86.

134. *Ibid.*, 666-668; Robson, o.c., 86-89; Wilson omits all details, see o. c.,

Meantime, alarmed by Haidar's rapid progress in the lower country, the English at Madras, who had rejected Haidar's overtures for a reasonable peace in September 1768, had begun their advances for an accommodation with him, which, despite the recent successes that had attended him, he had received with good-will and complacency. In January, while Haidar was camping at Outatore, the Governor and Council at Madras sent him a letter on the subject. Haidar returned through Major Fitzgerald a suitable answer to the letter, desiring a confidential officer being sent to his camp, to whom he might explain the grounds of accommodation to which he was willing to consent. Capt. Brooke, who had distinguished himself so well at Muḷbāgal, was accordingly selected by Major Fitzgerald for the purpose, and he interviewed Haidar during the latter's movement on the banks of the Coleroon to the boundaries of the Tanjore country. Haidar began by observing, among other things, that

Haidar's attitude on the subject: Capt. Brooke's interview with him, January 1769.

since 1765 Nawāb Muhammad Ali had been incessantly engaged in endeavours to create a rupture between him and the English and perpetually counteracting his (Haidar's) systematic efforts to establish a solid and lasting amity with them; that though he had failed with Messrs. Pigot and Palk, he had succeeded with Mr. Bourchier, too manifestly the aggressor in this war; that he had for many years kept an envoy at Fort St. George for the express purpose of endeavouring to establish a solid and lasting peace with the English, but all his efforts had been continually frustrated by Muhammad Ali; that since the commencement of the present war, he had

I. 273. Kirmāpi briefly and vaguely refers to Haidar's "crossing by forced marches the Ghant or pass of Gujul Hutti (Gajjalahatti)," and returning "to make head once more against the English army" (o.c., 278).

been twice unsuccessful in his overtures for accomodation with them, once to Col. Smith at Krishnagiri, and again to the Field-Deputies at Kōlār, in both of which, although the party aggrieved, he had consented to considerable sacrifices; that he was sincerely desirous to promote and cherish the goodwill of the English and the prosperity of their commercial establishments on the West coast and their trade in sandal, pepper and other products of Mysore in exchange for the manufactures of Europe; that the influence of Muhammad Ali had extended to that Court also to the disadvantage of both sides, and had compelled him to turn his attention thither to protect Mysore interests; that, during his absence, a large portion of Mysore was overrun, and, exclusively of the destruction inseparable from war, Nawāb Muhammad Ali had levied pecuniary contributions to the extent of Rupees twenty-five lakhs; and that, notwithstanding these injuries and his recent successes, he was still willing to make peace with the English, if they would look to their own interests, exclude Muhammad Ali from their councils, and send up Col. Smith, or a member of council to the army with full powers to treat. Haidar, at the same time, added that the Mahrattas periodically invaded Mysore to levy plunder; that his opposition to them rendered Mysore a shield to the Arcot country; and that they had frequently proposed to him a partition of the latter country, a suggestion which he had always opposed from the conviction that it would prove eventually injurious to himself. Haidar, then, dismissed the attendants who had waited at the interview, and said, turning to Capt. Brooke, that what he was about to say now, was in confidence to the English alone; that the Mahrattas were then preparing a powerful invasion of the Arcot country, which, he added, might have been already known to them through their Vakīl at Poona; that his interests were directly opposed to any

union with the Mahrattas; but that he was unable to oppose both the Mahrattas and the English at one and the same time; that he would be under the immediate necessity of choosing between the two; and that it now depended on the English what election he would be compelled to make, whether as heretofore to shield them from danger for the preservation of his own interests, or in a more unpleasant pursuit of the same interests, to combine with the Mahrattas for the destruction of the English. There was not the slightest exaggeration or untruth in these frank and straightforward statements of Haidar. Nizām Alī was a member of the confederacy, as the English at Fort St. George had themselves intimated in their despatch to Coimbatore in the preceding month of October. Actually, Mādhava Rao, Pēshwa, had marched from Poona, but the receipt of intelligence of an unfavourable nature from Madras had recalled him. Mādhava Rao was also negotiating at the time with both the Nizām and Haidar. Mādhava Rao tried to obtain money from Haidar in return for aid against the English at Madras. Capt. Brooke, as resourceful in conversation as in warfare, replied to the statesmanlike statement of Haidar in a suitable manner. Furnished with no powers, he said, he could only observe, representing himself, that from Haidar's own statement of the case, it was his obvious interest to cultivate the alliance of the English, whose friendship, he added, it depended on himself to render a permanent good; while that of the Mahrattas resembled, he suggested, the delusive streaks of light which preceded a storm. Haidar rejoined that these were precisely his own thoughts; and it was therefore that he wished Col. Smith in particular to repair to his camp, invested with full powers. Capt. Brooke intimated the probable expectation of Haidar's sending a *Vakil* to Madras, to which Haidar replied that he would never so negotiate a peace, because independently of the

umbrage it might give to the Mahrattas in consequence of the expectation of the confederacy which he had found himself obliged to encourage, he knew that at Madras every such effort would be frustrated by Muhammad Ali, who would always desire to keep the English at war, in order that he might himself plead poverty and thus keep them in a state of perpetual dependence, poverty and impotence. The report of this conversation having been forwarded to Madras, Capt. Brooke was again ordered to repair to Haidar's camp, to communicate an outline of the terms to which the English were willing to agree. These terms, which Haidar deemed to be totally inconsistent with the actual condition of the parties, were positively rejected; but Haidar said that he would be still ready to receive Col. Smith, or a gentleman of rank, charged with reasonable proposals and full powers.¹³⁵

Accordingly Mr. Andrews, a member of the Madras Council, was appointed for the purpose, and Col. Smith was prevailed upon to take again the command of the English army. Mr. Andrews was a man of about 45 years of age, with some twenty-six years of service to his credit. He was evidently reckoned a hard, political-headed man. He had been chosen, in 1743, while still young, by Governor Nicholas Morse to negotiate with the Indian chiefs of Ganjām to secure facilities for the easy transit of the Company's letters between Madras and Bengal. He had also been commissioned to enquire, while at Berhampore, particularly into the conditions of that city and its people to establish themselves, if possible, among the

135. *Ibid*, 668-671; Robson, *o.c.*, 87-88; Wilson omits all details, *o.c.*, I. 273; Wilks' details regarding Capt. Brooke's interview are based on Capt. Brooke's *Despatch*, *o.c.*, I. 669-671. As to Mādhava Rao's negotiations with Haidar at the time, see Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, 559, foot-note.

weavers there. Later, in 1753, while Resident at Bandarmalanka, he not only skilfully arranged for the Company's "investment" as against the French Company's agents but also kept a watchful eye on the French transactions there. Indeed, he was the first to inform his masters at Madras of Salābat Jang's grant of Ellore, Rajahmundry and Chicacole to Bussy in 1753. He was also the first to intimate Bussy's attack on Bobbili and the heroic defence offered by the Chief of that place. When in 1757 the French took Bandarmalanka, he saved the Company's goods and cash and escaped to Madraspatam and from thence to Masulipatam. He had visited Bengal (in 1757) and had served in the Council at Madras when Pigot became Governor. Having been an associate of Bouchier on Pigot's council, Bouchier should have appraised his worth and work and selected him for the post of envoy to Haidar. At any rate, his antecedents and his status in the Government at Madras recommended him for it and it is not his fault if his mission did not prove successful. That was evidently beyond his personal control. A rather disparaging remark is made against him by W. M. Goodlad in a letter to Palk, written in 1768, which seems wholly unjustified. "Mr. Andrews' appointment," Goodlad wrote, "is the only thing that vexes me, for I profess a regard for the service, and I cannot think that a man will pay a proper attention to the Company's concerns who was totally lost to any care for his own! and this is the man expressly sent out because it was necessary to strengthen the Council with *sober* and *sedate* people! Fie on it." These animadversions seem wholly misplaced in the light of Mr. Andrews' known record of public service.¹³⁶

136. For the past services of Mr. Andrews, see *Letters to Fort St. George*, Vol. XXXIII, 1752-3 *et passim*; *Ibid.*, XXXVII, 1757, Letters dated 16th May, and 25th May 1757; also H. D. Love, *Vestiges*, II, 337, 339, 437,

On the 1st of February, Col. Smith with the divisions of Major Fitzgerald and Col. Lang assumed the command at Chetput (Seṭṭupaṭṭu), about 70 miles south-west of Madras. Having been furnished with good and sufficient carriage, he began to press Haidar hard. But several overtures of peace were made by the English Government at Madras about this time. After some fruitless manouvres, Mr. Andrews passed to Haidar's camp on the 14th. The Council at Madras had proposed to Haidar that during the conference, his army should retire to Ahtoor (Attūr), while Col. Smith was to remain at Tyāgadurg. Haidar, however, on his way from Valikōṇḍapuram, proposed Wandiwash and Conjeeveram, distant 80 and 40 miles respectively from Madras. Col. Smith, rejecting this, wrote to Haidar that if he chose to remain near Tyāgadurg during the conference, he would march the English army to Chetput. This being done, Col. Smith, proceeding further, encamped at Tiruvenellore (Tiruveṇṇanallūr, about 14 miles S. E. of Tirukkōyilūr), and from here, Mr. Andrews proceeded on the 22nd to

The negotiations
of February 22, 1769.

negotiate peace with Haidar at Tyāgadurg. Haidar was very high in his demands, which Mr. Andrews undertook to submit to the Council at Madras. It was agreed that a cessation of arms should take place for twelve days, and Haidar's army should lie about half-way between Gingee and Pondicherry, and the English army should march to Arcot or Conjeeveram. Col. Smith, however, objected to Haidar's being so near Pondicherry, he and the French being friends. Haidar, however, moved with his army to the tract assigned to him, and Mr. Andrews proceeded to

589. He was still living in Fort St. George in 1790, when he was about 65 years of age. He entered service as Writer in 1743, a year before Robert Clive. Love quotes *Fort St. George Records, Pub. Cons.*, LXXIV, 5th October 1744. For Goodlad's remarks, see *Report on the Palk Mss.*, o. c., 78.

Madras to report Haidar's ultimatum and receive orders. The Council at Madras having refused to accede to the propositions conveyed by Mr.

Haidar's demands rejected.

Andrews, notice was given of the cessation of the truce. Haidar, without intimating the least desire of prolonging it, took the opportunity of sending a *Vakil* to Col. Smith, stating his wish to receive an answer to his letter, then transmitted to the Governor, before he should finally determine on his next step. He assured Col. Smith through the *Vakil* that he was sincerely desirous of peace with the English; that he had rejected, and should continue to reject, the large pecuniary offers which he had received for consenting to the mediation of Muhammad Alī, of whose political existence he recognised no trace but in secret mischief; that his treaty must be directly and exclusively with those with whom he had been at war, and not with a person who would frustrate their mutual desire of amity; and finally he requested, through Col. Smith, an early reply from the Governor, which should determine his future measures. Hostilities, however, having been resumed on the 6th of March, Col. Smith moved towards

And hostilities resumed March 6, 1769.

Haidar, who whereupon retreated back to Tiruvenellore.¹⁸⁷

Haidar, who knew that the Mahrattas were preparing for another invasion of Mysore, had become really desirous of peace with the English independently of Nawāb Muhammad Alī, but on finding himself opposed by a really capable officer in Colonel Smith, and being appre-

Haidar's further movements, March 1769.

187. *Ibid*, 672-673; Wilson, o. c., I. 273-274; Robson, o. c., 88-90. *Tiruvenellore*, identified with *Tiruvēṇṇanallūr* above, is a place in the present Tirukkōyilūr taluk, South Arcot District, celebrated for its connection with Kamban, the poet who translated the *Rāmāyana* into Tamil, and with Sundara, the Śaivite poet-saint (*Gazetteer of South Arcot Dist.*, p. 381).

hensive further of some disaster, he resolved to endeavour to put an end to the war by a bold stroke, without running the risk of a general engagement. The country was once more in flames. The burning of the "Black Town" and suburbs of Madras being known to be his favourite object, the English garrison was reinforced and the division of Col. Lang at Conjeeveram was placed under the orders of Col. Smith on the 16th of March, in consequence of the sudden interposition of Haidar. Col. Smith, knowing Lang's critical situation, was close to Conjeeveram and pursued the route of Haidar, directing Col. Lang to follow him at the interval of a day's march. Haidar by now having doubled to the southward, and the movements of the armies having again brought them nearly 140 miles to the south of Madras, Haidar detached the greater part of his infantry, cavalry and artillery, with orders to retire through the Pass of Attūr, reserving with himself 6000 chosen horse and 200 foot.¹³⁸ The detachment, under Tipū and Mīr Alī Razā Khān, retook in rapid succession all the places in the Karnātic-Bālaghāt garrisoned by the English, except Hoskōṭe,¹³⁹ and descending the Sātgarh Pass, raided Tirumal-Khēṇi (Triplicane) and Mutyālpēt, both parts of the modern city of Madras, to the abject consternation of Nawāb Muhammad Alī, now in Madras.¹⁴⁰ Muhammad Alī, convinced of the futility of his own projected invasion of the Bālaghāt, and foreseeing the impending

138. *Ibid.*, 673-674; also Wilson, *o. c.*, I. 274. The two hundred men were made of two companies of infantry, of one hundred men each, without even a single gun or impediment of any kind.

139. De La Tour, *o. c.*, II. 169 (The reference to Mirza Faizulla here is incorrect. It must be Mirza Alī or Mīr Alī Razā, in keeping with the context). See also and compare Kirmāpi, *o. c.*, 278-284. His account of the movements of the Mysore army in the Karnātic-Bālaghāt is confused and unintelligible. He speaks of Haidar himself being present in the tract during the period under reference, which is not borne out by other sources of information.

140. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 44.

loss of the Pāyānghāt country itself,¹⁴¹ hastened to make overtures for peace with Haidar.¹⁴² Resolved, however, upon finishing with the Nawāb's English allies, Haidar threatened to set fire to the old "Black Town" of Madras, and making a forced march from Tiruvenellore, arrived near Permacoil.¹⁴³ Then he moved towards Arcot and suddenly changed his route to Gingee, closely followed by the English army. Meantime Col. Smith had marched to Wandiwash and Col. Lang ordered with his division to Tyāgadurg and Tiruvannāmalai to intercept all connection between Haidar's army and the Mysore country. Haidar now turned towards Cuddalore, and on the appearance of Col. Smith, moved to Villupuram. From there, he next marched to Tinḍivanam, arriving with his chosen corps at St. Thomas' Mount, about seven miles west of Madras, on the 29th of March, after covering a distance of 130 miles on horse-back, in three days and a half.¹⁴⁴

Arrives at St. Thomas' Mount, March 29, 1769.

Towards Peace, March 30-April 2, 1769.

On the 30th, Haidar's companies of infantry arrived at the same place. Haidar had, since the renewal of hostilities, again written to the Governor of Madras (Charles Bouchier) expressing his desire for peace. He now addressed another letter announcing his visit in person for that purpose, and desiring him to

141. Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 284. On this point Kirmāni writes significantly thus: "Muhammad Ali saw that in his wish to obtain the country of the Balaghaut, the whole of the Payanghaut would be lost," etc.

142. *Haid-Nām.*, l. c.; Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 284-285. The *Haid-Nām.* refers to Nawāb Muhammad Ali having sent to Haidar a deputation consisting of Aziz Khān, Khāji Azim Khān and Ali Zumā Khān. Kirmāni speaks of the Nawāb (Muhammad Ali) having appointed Nujeeb Khān and Danishmund Khān his plenipotentiary *Vakils* and despatched them with four lakhs of rupees, and friendly letters and presents to Haidar, etc. (*o. c.*, 285).

143. Robson, *o. c.*, 91-90.

144. *Ibid.*, 91-92; also Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 674-676. Wilson gives no details, *o. c.*, I. 274.

send Mr. Josias Du Pre (Member of Council, lately arrived from England to succeed Mr. Bouchier as Governor), and to issue immediate orders to prevent Col. Smith from approaching (with his army) the vicinity of Madras. Col. Lang having in the meanwhile made no attempt to annoy the main body of Haidar's army owing to the insufficiency of the force under his command, Col. Smith himself followed Haidar with his usual celerity, and early on the 31st, received at Vandalūr, about ten miles from the Mount, the mandate from the Government, written at Haidar's solicitation and despatched on one of his own dromedary couriers, to desire that he would halt wherever that letter should reach him. Haidar, on discovering that Col. Smith's force had approached so near, frankly declared that no consideration should induce him to remain within twenty-five miles of that army. A fresh order was accordingly despatched at his request, desiring Col. Smith that he might move beyond that distance. Col. Smith received this order on 1st April, and answered that he would obey it on the ensuing day. Haidar, observing that the Colonel remained, however, where he was, shifted his party to a more convenient spot, about eight miles to the north-west of Madras, early on the 2nd. Thereupon the Government, alarmed for the "Black Town," instantly directed Col. Smith to march to the northward, or direct to Madras, as he might judge most expedient. Col. Smith (who had uniformly recommended peace but had never suppressed his indignation at the circumstances of unnecessary and insulting degradation under which his Government were now treating) obeyed the order with alacrity. He had not, however, moved as far as Vandalūr, about half way to his object, before he was met by another order desiring him to halt. Haidar had waited to observe the effect of his movement, before he announced it; and on ascertaining

the alarm it created, and the consequent movement of Col. Smith, sent to explain that he had only moved ground for the convenience of forage, to a place about six miles to the northward of "Black Town."¹⁴⁵

A suspension of arms was now agreed on.¹⁴⁶ The Council deputed to Haidar Messrs. Du Pre and George Bouchier (brother of the Governor).¹⁴⁷ Haidar on his part sent his *Vakīl Vinnāji-Pant*.¹⁴⁸ Peace was concluded on the same evening. Considerable difficulties, however, arose in determining who were to be the parties to the treaty. Haidar, in the first instance, having declined the instrumentality of Nawāb Muhammad Ali, and he in return having affected to object to be a party to any treaty in which Haidar should be styled a Nawāb, it was at length agreed by Muhammad Ali that the Company should negotiate in their own name for their own possessions and for the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt; and that he should, by letter to the Governor, officially signify his consent to this procedure, a promise which, after the execution of the treaty, he refused to perform.¹⁴⁹ Accordingly, on the 3rd April, a treaty was executed as between the English East India Company on the one part and Haidar on the other, by which it was agreed that there should be perpetual peace and friendship between Haidar and the English; that the contracting parties should mutually assist each other in driving out their enemy when attacked; that there should be absolute liberty of commerce between

Treaty between the English and Haidar: The Treaty of Madras, April 3, 1769.

145. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 675-677; Robson, *o. c.*, 93-95.

146. De La Tour, *o. c.*, II. 171.

147. *Ibid.*

148. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 44. Vinnāji-Pant was a Baḍaganāḍu-Mādhva Brāhmaṇ diplomat in the Mysore service. His descendants still live in Pachchūr and other villages near Jālārpēt, the well-known Railway junction on the Madras South-West line.

149. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 677.

Mysore and the English Company's settlements (including those in the Bombay Presidency, for which he agreed to conclude a separate treaty with the Company's agents at Bombay, which he did a little later); that the prisoners on both sides should be released, and that the forts and places taken by either party should be mutually restored (with the exception of Karoor, an ancient dependency of Mysore, which had been retained by Muhammad Alī since the last war, by tacit acquiescence, and was now to be restored to it). Haidar also tried to negotiate for the restitution of his ships of war, but gave up this contention on the representation that they had long since been sold for the benefit of the captors.¹⁵⁰ At the same time, another treaty was executed as between Haidar and Nawāb

Treaty between Muhammad Alī, which the Company
Haidar and Nawāb engaged themselves to perform, by
Muhammad Alī. which it was stipulated that Muhammad Alī should immediately evacuate the town and fortress of Hoskōṭe, and, after delivering to Haidar all the artillery, arms and ammunition, should retire into the country of Arcot; that Muhammad Alī should annually pay Mysore a tribute of Rupees six lakhs, of which the first year's dues should be paid down at once; and that all the families of the princes and other persons of distinction, formerly established in the country of Arcot and then prisoners (i.e., the Navāyat dependents of Chandā Sāhib's family), should be released and be at liberty to reside where they pleased; that both the Nawābs (Haidar and Muhammad Alī) were to maintain their respective *status quo ante*, and that the English were not to

150. See Appendix I—(3); also Wilks, l. c., and De La Tour, o. c., II. 172. The reference here is to the *Treaty of Madras* (April 3, 1769), to which the English and Haidar were the principal parties. De La Tour dates the Treaty 15th April 1769 (o. c., II. 171). Robson dates it 4th April 1769 (o. c., 96). The latter was the date on which Haidar signed it, Wilson, o. c., I. 274.

interfere in their affairs except when Haidar himself was the aggressor.¹⁵¹ On the conclusion of this peace, and after mutual exchange of presents and festivities, Haidar, towards the close of the month, returned at leisure to Kōlār and from thence proceeded to Bangalore, where he gave his army some repose.¹⁵²

151. De La Tour, *o. c.*, II. 172-173; *Haid. Nām.*, l. c. See also and compare Kirmāpi, *o. c.*, 285-287. De La Tour dates this *Treaty* also 15th April 1769, though it must be 3rd April 1769, in keeping with the context. The last two terms of the Treaty between Haidar and Muhammad Ali, mentioned in the text above, are from the *Haid. Nām.*, the wording textually being as follows: *Nawābara simeyalli Nawābarā, tamma simeyalli tāvū sahā iruvanteyā, Nawābaru tāvāge kenakidaga jagalavē horatu Engrijaru kārya bhāga māḍa kūḍadendu khaṇḍa-neyāgi*... Wilks, who omits to mention this separate treaty with Muhammad Ali, refers only incidentally to the question of the release of the Navāyat prisoners (*o. c.*, I. 678-679). Embroiled as he was in war with Nawāb Muhammad Ali's allies, the English, Haidar no doubt found it expedient to treat with them first. However much Haidar may have detested the idea of an independent treaty with Nawāb Muhammad Ali for reasons set forth elsewhere in the text of the Chapter above, the conclusion of a treaty with him also, *on the English guarantee for its performance*, is very significant, as it gives a finishing touch to the main issue involved, namely, war with Muhammad Ali. Wilks notes that Muhammad Ali agreed to signify his consent by letter to the Governor to the procedure of the Company negotiating the treaty "*in their own name, for their own possessions, and for the Carnatic Payanghaut*," and adds that "after the execution of the treaty, he refused to perform" this contract. He does not state the reason for this failure on Muhammad Ali's part, thereby suggesting that it was habitual with him never to perform promises made by him. This may have been so; but a more cogent reason may have been that he entered into a separate treaty on the same date with Haidar and that treaty the Company, as stated above, engaged themselves to perform. The most surprising part of the whole affair was that Haidar should have deceived himself into the belief that Muhammad Ali would carry out the terms of the Treaty with him any more than he carried out the Treaty he so solemnly entered into with his master Nanjarājaiya in regard to the cession of Trichinopoly. But then every man thinks he can succeed where others before him have failed. Haidar was not above or below humanity. He sacrificed the present for the future. The imminence of a fresh Mahratta invasion settled the matter, so far as he was concerned.

152. *Ibid.*, 173-174, 177; *Haid. Nām.*, l. c.; Kirmāpi, *o. c.*, 287; and Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 682.

Thus was concluded Haidar's war with Nawāb Muhammad Alī, a war which embroiled him for the first time with the Nawāb's allies, the English, and a war, too, in the conduct of which the English at Madras were condemned by the Court of Directors. Col. Joseph Smith, the Commander-in-Chief had been constantly interfered with by the Field Deputies, the provision of carriage, ammunition and military stores had been scandalously defective, and the want of cavalry showed gross mismanagement throughout. Haidar, on his part, displayed considerable military skill, in fact, strategy of the highest kind, in the conduct of this war. Wilks, indeed, goes so far, in reviewing the conduct of the war, as to risk the opinion that Haidar committed not one political mistake, while of his military errors, more ought to be ascribed, he says, to his just diffidence in the talents and discipline of his officers and troops than to any misconception of what might be achieved with better instruments. At Changama, his manœuvring, as we have seen, was "excellent." As Wilson has remarked, if Haidar "had not been disabled at the beginning of the engagement, it would not have been so soon ended." At the second action, Haidar did not command, but yet, he showed himself on this, "as on all other occasions, a good general, and a brave soldier." Haidar, indeed, had organized for war, while the English did not even know that war was coming. High strategy did not with Haidar mean the mere manœuvring of armies, but the cleverest use of all forces and advantages in the political as well as the military sphere. It included also a close study and understanding of psychological factors. Haidar, like Napoleon, reckoned the supreme strategist of all time, knew this. He was so much a tactician and a psychologist that he was able to discover and express the truth that the moral

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was ten times superior to the physical force in war.¹⁵³

Col. Wilks, however, strongly criticises all the parties concerned in this war on the English side: the Madras Government, the Field Deputies, Muhammad Ali and Col. Joseph Smith, the Commander-in-Chief on the field.¹⁵⁴ Of the last of these, he remarks that it may be safely affirmed that "he cannot be charged with one fault exclusively military," but, Wilks adds, although Col. Smith's "general views regarding the conduct of the war appear at an early period to have been extremely defective, it may yet be presumed from the confident judgment, which he was provoked to record at the most

153. *Vide*, on this section, *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2503-2506, referring to Wilson's *History of the Madras Army*, vol. I. pp. 274-279. As for Wilks' opinion, see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 618-614, 680-681.

154. Col. Joseph Smith had a hereditary connection with the Madras Army. He was the son of Joseph Smith, Gunner and Engineer, Fort St. George. Born about 1783, he entered service at Fort St. George as Ensign in 1749; served under Olive in the Karnatic, 1753; taken prisoner by the French, 1753; commanded the Trichinopoly garrison, 1757-8; and defended it against D'Auteil; was present at the taking of Karaikal and the siege of Pondicherry, 1760-1; Major, 1760; Colonel, 1766; Brigadier-General, 1767; concluded the treaty with the Nizām, 1768; commanded the Army in that capacity, 1767-1775, and conducted the campaigns against Haidar and the Rāja of Tanjore, and the expedition against the Maravas, in 1772; Major-General; retired to England, 1775, where he lived at Bath, at which place he died on September 1, 1790. He was a friend of Lord Olive, to whom he wrote an account of the war (with Haidar) after its conclusion. This has not been published so far, though made use of by Col. Wilks in his account of the war. See Wilks, I. 547; also Orme, *Indostan*, II. 402; Wilson, I. *et passim*. Col. Smith's son, Matthew Joseph Smith, entered the covenanted services of the E. I. Co. at Madras in 1788. (Love, *Vestiges*, III. 396). His Private Secretary, Thomas Parkinson, tried unsuccessfully to open up a timber trade in the Godavari country in 1787 (*Ibid*). A Joseph Smith, who died on 3rd July 1875, aged 55 years, lies buried in the Nellore cemetery. Whether he belonged to Col. Joseph Smith's family is not known (Cotton, *List*, 277). Col. Joseph Smith was, as we know, famous for his "whirling" movements, travelling swiftly to evade the enemy or to catch him when he least expected being caught, and was known as "whirling Joe", a name that stuck to him. A witty story of him, that even in Heaven he would not rest in a stationery abode of peace but would be "whirling" about far and near in search of others, like other anecdotes of the kind, illustrative of his character, has long been current, though probably it has really no legs to stand upon.

unprosperous part of the contest, that his diffidence of more decisive measures at an earlier time was exclusively founded on his conviction of the radical and incurable vices of the system of command, as well as supply, which rendered movements of calculation and concert altogether impracticable." There was, in Wilks' opinion, a strange combination of vicious arrangements, corrupt influence, and political incapacity, which directed the general measures of the Government of Madras at the time, and to these he would obviously set down the defeat they sustained rather than to lack of military talents or leadership on the part of Col. Smith. This verdict is, on the whole, fair, though it is, to some extent, harsh on Col. Smith himself; for if he on occasions, submitted himself to the dictation of the Madras Government—however vicious or incapable, it was still a government and had to be reckoned with at least while the campaign was on—he again and again pointed to the wrong policies pursued by it. The utmost that could be said against him is that he did not protest at first as loudly as he did later. Col. Smith, it is clear from his letter to Lord Clive on this campaign, and from his despatches to the Madras Government, had suspicions that the latter was engaged in what he termed as "a disjointed expedition" and urged on them the indispensable necessity of insisting on the adjustment of "some reasonable plan of action," and that without "this preliminary," he added "one of these events can only happen, either Madoo (Mādhava) Row will do his business himself, or we shall be beaten in detail, or we shall do nothing at all."¹⁵⁵ Nor

155. Despatch, dated 9th March 1767. In his letter to Lord Clive, detailing the campaign, he wrote thus: "Although it was as plain as noon day to every person (except the Council, i.e., the Council at Madras) that they were preparing to enter the Carnatic jointly, no measures were taken to establish magazines of provisions in proper places nor any steps to supply our army in time of need" and even three days before the invasion, Col. Smith was positively directed to pass to the enemy a supply of provisions of which his own troops were in the greatest want (see Wilks, o.c., I, 567.).

is Wilks just to Col. Smith when he suggests that he did not make a proper choice of operations when an opportunity presented itself and Haidar departed from the eastern scene of operations to the West Coast. "The Government of Madras and their Commander-in-chief did not exactly coincide," says Wilks, "in their opinion of the most eligible." That was not the fault of Col. Smith. Colonel Smith was, as Wilks himself admits, perfectly conversant in the technical part of his profession, and possessed in an eminent degree the confidence and attachment of those whom he commanded; from the labour of applying his knowledge and experience to a reform of the ill-administered departments of his army, he may be supposed to have been deterred, by the conviction of sources of counteraction, open and concealed, which he had not the power to control. But these causes, Wilks adds, cannot explain "the strange carelessness of reputation, which, with a respectable talent of recording his own thoughts, left the care of his public dispatches to an incompetent secretary." While it may be readily conceded that Col. Smith was sometimes careless about his dates, he was never careless as to facts or to the ideas underlying them, or on occasions even giving expression in language at once forcible and decisive. Nor did he lack that high sense of duty that makes one pause, even at critical moments, and think and then take to a decision and adhere to it. It is because Wilks was unable to clearly appreciate the impelling motives that guided Col. Smith on this occasion that he became so critical of his conduct. In truth, as Wilks, again, concedes unreservedly, Col. Smith was "the best tempered man living," though "this was", in Wilks' opinion, "the great vice of his character." We are not, with all respect to Wilks, so sure of that, at any rate, judging from the single instance from which this generalization is made. But what follows is even more

difficult to maintain, if the whole of Col. Smith's life-history is considered. As the result of this equanimity of temper, suggests Wilks, Col. Smith "suffered himself to be overruled by men whose intellect was diminutive when compared with his own; he had not the heart to contest a point, although he knew himself to be in the right and his character was stamped with indecision everywhere excepting in the presence of the enemy." As a charge, that is a serious one to make; Wilks evidently would have preferred Col. Smith to have put up an open fight with the Madras Council and compelled them to accept his plan of operations rather than their own. To say that is one thing and to stamp him as a man "with indecision everywhere excepting in the presence of the enemy," *i.e.*, on the field of battle, is quite another. It is not only not just but also lacking in foundation. For the duty of a soldier is to place his own view-point before those who are entitled to have it and leave it to them to decide and carry out thereafter the policy actually decided upon by the Government.

In the present case, it cannot be denied that it was the Government that was to decide on policy and that the Commander-in-chief had to execute the policy decided upon. It may be that the Government showed little appreciation of the army's greatest needs if the Government's policy was to be adopted and put into execution by the Commander-in-chief. That Col. Smith was so far able to convince the Government that their ideas were incapable of execution without a better appreciation of the needs of the army on the field on their part is evidence to prove that he was not a mere trimmer or a blind acceptor of others' views, without thinking of the possible consequences of such action. If he could not induce the Government at the top to speed the change in the outlook required by the hour, it was not his personal fault but the fault of the character of the Government

he had to deal with and its lack of both morality and adaptability. He desired an aggressive policy with adequate preparation for prosecuting it; but the Government he had to deal with, wanted an ambitious policy to be pursued without any preparation for its successful prosecution. Wilks cannot be justified when he charges Col. Smith with "an indifference to objects not congenial to his taste," because there is nothing to show that he failed to put forward his views plainly or that he refused to carry through what was eventually put to him as the objective of the Government in combating the invader. As Wilks himself admits, quite apart from the unjustified charge he makes, Col. Smith's deficiency "was compensated by the most indefatigable attention to details exclusively military." There is something more that he says of Col. Smith that needs to be stressed in this connection. Cool, cheerful, and unembarrassed in the midst of danger, Col. Smith evinced, adds Wilks, "in all movements to be executed in the presence of an enemy, a degree of rapid penetration, and sound decision, which indicated the hand of a master. As an executive soldier, he may justly be classed among the first of the age in which he lived; but"—it is here that Wilks misjudges Col. Smith once again—"in those more arduous combinations of political foresight and military skill, which constitute, perhaps, the highest efforts of human intellect, he would be entitled to claim but a secondary rank." Col. Smith might not have been a Clive who carried everything before him but having been brought up in his school, he had the foresight to see what he could attempt and what he could accomplish without inviting defeat for himself and infamy for his nation in whatever he tried. And if Clive had a Saunders to understand him and appreciate his political and military talents, Smith had but a poor Bouchier to listen and overrule

him. The fact of the matter is that the Madras Council of the period was an illsorted set of men, who neither understood political or military strategy nor could follow the advice of a general of the type of Col. Smith, earnest, intelligent and far-seeing. A Council that resolved on clogging the wheels of military progress by the appointment of Field Deputies, who did no more than help to exhaust the supplies on the one side and to deplete the strength of the fighting troops by appropriating a good part for personally guarding them and that most undependable of all men Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of Karnātic, may be presumed to be the last to think of for the support of a policy that might mean victory on the field or success at the Council table for sane views or workable policies. Another point to note is that Col. Smith was only a Brigadier-General in rank and though Commander-in-Chief, for all practical purposes, on the field, the legal Commander-in-Chief was Charles Bouchier himself, the Governor. Col. Smith's position was a most difficult one and it is small wonder he chafed at the restraints he was placed under, and if he succeeded in the field so much as to make Haidar dread him and his presence anywhere near him, it should be said to his credit that he was not only a great commander of armies but also a man who could get along even with a body of Councillors who neither appreciated public morality nor worked for the benefit of their employers.¹⁵⁶ The duties that should have been

156. Charles Bouchier took over charge as Governor on January 25, 1767, and assumed command as Commander-in-Chief on the same date. He laid down both the offices on 8th February 1770, sailing to England on that date. Before him, Robert Palk held both the offices from November 14, 1763 to 25th January 1767. Before Palk, while George Pigot as Governor from January 14, 1755 to November 14, 1763, held both the offices, Brigadier-General Caillaud became Commander of the Forces on the Coromandel Coast, his date of commission being November 14, 1761, while Robert Palk, on his appointment as Governor and Commander-in-Chief, on November 14, 1763, became

performed by the Commander-in-Chief were appropriated by the Field Deputies and the Government put the supplies under people who were, to say the least of it, not disinterested. The Council desired to consider and decide from day to day not merely large questions affecting strategy and war policy but also matters beyond their ken. Col. Smith would never have denied to them general superintendence, suggestion and guidance but when they went beyond that, he made them know in a plain manner that that would mean military defeat. The Madras Council of the day failed to devise the right machinery to meet the extraordinary difficulties and dangers to which they had been subjected, as the result of their own conduct at Trichinopoly and thereafter, by Haidar, who was as great as an organiser for war as a leader of armies. As Wilks himself, later on, admits, the Madras Council "appear to have had just conceptions of the general outlines of operations; and in others to have entertained projects too absurd for serious belief, if they were not found upon their records." Among these, according to Wilks, was a grave discussion of the means by which their army of infantry was to cut off the sources of supply from the enemy's army of cavalry. "Upon the whole," he remarks, "although on some occasions they formed just views, on all occasions they miscalculated the means by which their ends were to

the legal holder of both the posts as and from that date. Brigadier-General Joseph Smith similarly held the office of the Commander of the Forces on the Coromandel Coast from April 12, 1774, when Alexander Wynch was Governor and Commander-in-Chief in name from February 2, 1773 to 15th February 1776. The system of unified control of civil and military affairs at Madras continued in the hands of the Governor for many years longer, while a Commander of field forces was appointed when war became a necessity, as it did on occasions. The result of it was that the Commander-in-Chief in the field suffered from a sense of his subordination, which, always inevitable, became worse when the majority of the Council combined rightly or wrongly and practically isolated him.

be accomplished." To illustrate his point, as it were, he quoted the instance of Haidar's withdrawal of his main army to the West Coast and the rumour that was prevalent in the English camp at the time that he had remained behind in person at the head of his cavalry, with the intention of changing the plan of the war. He caused it to be known that he was directing his efforts to starving the English army out of the Mysore territory and eventually carrying fire and sword into the Madras region for the destruction of its resources. Under the influence of this persuasion, and hopeless of a better system of military supply, Col. Smith was of opinion that to penetrate into the interior—as the Madras Council desired—where the difficulties of supply were stated to be excessive, for the purpose of striking a vital blow at Seringapatam, the capital, was a visionary project, however attractive or desirable it might seem. He also felt convinced that with an army equal to any efforts, experience had shown that under the arrangements possible, it would be impracticable to move fifty miles from the Madras frontier, without the risk of being starved. Col. Smith, therefore, determined and put forward the view that the primary object of the war should be to occupy the whole of the fertile country immediately contiguous to that frontier and establish as quickly as possible depots of provisions and stores in the places most convenient to it for supporting the operations of his army. This was undoubtedly opposed to the views and projects of the Madras Council, whose opinion was more favourable to a single concentrated effort, for penetrating to Bangalore, and in the event of success, to Seringapatam, the capital. That that was ambitious, the events subsequently proved, beyond doubt. Wilks, though critical of the political strategy of Col. Smith, does not suggest he was wrong in his plans or his views; but complains that with a force inadequate to the full

execution of either of the projects—of Col. Smith and the Madras Council—a plan of operations was concerted somewhat awkwardly, composed of both. He would seem to suggest, though he does not say it in so many words, that Col. Smith was wrong in agreeing to this compromise, which failed not because Col. Smith in putting it into operation failed in his own duty, but because he was wrongly seconded in the field and hopelessly unsupported in the matter of supplies.

Col. Wood who was in charge of one of the two divisions into which the army was formed, proved so persistent in his errors that he had, as before stated, eventually to be recalled and court-martialled. Though he took many places and went as far as Seringapatam to be within but seventy miles of it, he could neither garrison them nor even hold them against the Mysore forces which could descend against them at their pleasure through the difficult and secret passes of the hills! As to Muhammad Ali taking over such unguarded places for their direct fiscal management, it was one beyond his power, but it was clear that he was the real inspirer of all these arrangements. No wonder Wilks stigmatises the whole business as one “impressed with the mark of a short-sighted, second-rate, Indian policy for realizing revenue and exactions.” As regards supplies and indeed all future operations in regard to the war, Col. Smith was officially told that he was to be aided in the future with the advice and directions of two members of the Council as *Field Deputies*—Deputies of the Council; and, what is more noteworthy, that Muhammad Ali would accompany them for the purpose of assuming the fiscal management of the territorial acquisitions, ‘occupying with irregulars the minor forts, conducting the negotiations for drawing off the adherents of Haider, European and Indian, and generally aiding

Col. Smith and the two Deputies with his advice on all other subjects. The records of the period, it may be noted in passing, profess that the Madras Council *had prevailed* on Nawāb Muhammad Ali to accompany the army for these purposes, and that he had requested that some of the Council should accompany him! As Wilks remarks, there was not one folly or one misfortune of those times that may not be traced to Muhammad Ali or to his interference. He proved himself a source of distraction, inefficiency and encumbrance, to the English side and Col. Smith had the added anxiety to look after his welfare and the safety of the two Field Deputies in the midst of a harassing war. What was worse, to perfect the inversion of all intelligible relations, as Wilks rightly terms it, one of the two Field Deputies was appointed Commissary General to the Army, the superior, the colleague, and the inferior of the Commander-in-Chief! And to cap it all, a person calling himself Chevalier St. Lubin, who had travelled overland from Europe, and affected to have been received at the Mysore Court by Haidar and professed to possess the most intimate knowledge of all his plans and resources, and an extensive influence among his officers, Indian and European, was appointed to accompany the Field Deputies and Muhammad Ali as its privy councillor and guide! The whole history of this man's adventures, of which he was the sole informant, was implicitly believed in and the influence he possessed over the measures of the English army would be too ridiculous for words, if it were not true! So utterly unscrupulous a person he proved himself to be that Wilks does not hesitate to dismiss him, after mentioning his name, in the single word "impostor." There can be no doubt that he was one such, for Haidar had neither known him nor had anything to do with him. He was evidently of the class to which the Portuguese monk Noronha, styled the

Bishop of Halicarnassus,¹⁵⁷ belonged and greedy of money, made himself indispensable to the English Council, who were taken in by his pretensions.

It was the appointment of the Field Deputies and the association of Nawāb Muhammad Alī with them that contributed to the lack of success on the English side more than any fault on the part of Col. Smith. In fact, it may be said with some justice that Haidar himself became desirous of peace—when he found himself opposed by a really capable general like Col. Smith and being apprehensive of some disaster, resolved to endeavour to put an end to the war by a bold stroke without running the risk of a general engagement. His despatch of the main body of his troops back to Mysore, and marching off 130 miles in three and a half days, with but a select corps of 6,000 horse and 200 foot, and appearing before Madras and asking that Mr. Du Pré should be sent to him to determine the terms of peace, can bear no other meaning than that¹⁵⁸. The persons chosen as Field Deputies were John Call, the Engineer, who was a Member of the Madras Council, and George Mackay, who had begun his career at Madras as a Free Merchant and had subsequently risen to be a Member of the same executive body. Their presence helped considerably to break the unity in strategy and supply that is so badly needed, then as now, for the successful prosecution of a war. What was worse, one of these two gentlemen held the contract for victualling the European troops and also that for the supply of carriage to the army, while the arrangements in Council had stipulated for the sharing of the profits by the other Members of the Council, with, be it said

157. See *ante*, II. pp. 229-230. He was befriended by Lally and with his aid negotiated for the transfer of Tiagar to Haidar, 1760. Also Orme, II. 637. The *Haid Nam.*, which mentions many other names, does not refer to him.

158. See Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, I. 274.

to the credit of Mr. Bouchier, the exception of the Governor. The supply for the Indian troops had been left to Nawāb Mahammad Alī, and it might be readily understood, he and his agents saw to it that the troops got practically none of it. Not only did the Field Deputies and Muhammad Alī draw off a part of the European infantry and several battalions of sepoys for their own protection and thus diminished the troops at the disposal of Col. Smith, but they also interfered with him in his field arrangements as Commander-in-chief of the army. A notable instance of this was the withdrawal of the regular garrison from Mulbāgal, with the result that that rock was lost to Mysore. Added to this source of annoyance, the want of carriage, the scarcity and dearness of provisions, and the inadequate supply of ammunition and military stores, all combined to retard the movements of Col. Smith's army and impaired wholly its fighting power. The Madras Council, in a report to the Directors, written in March 1769, admitted as much when they attributed the failure of the campaign, principally to the want of hearty co-operation on the part of Nawāb Muhammad Ali, to the lack of cavalry and to the deficiency of funds. The feeling of indignation raised by the mismanagement on the field proved so great that they found it necessary to appoint a Committee to go into the causes of the failure in respect of supplies, particularly of carriage and provisions. This Committee, which presented its report in November 1769, frankly admitted the utter impropriety of Members of Council becoming principals in the contract, though they ascribed the bad condition of the cattle generally to causes over which the contractors had no control, *viz.*, rainy weather, bad roads, want of forage and the like, and they exonerated them from any default in the matter of providing for the Europeans. They found that the rice furnished to the Indian troops had been bad in quality and deficient in quantity, but

they held Nawāb Muhammad Ali and his agents responsible for this, as this part of the supply had been left to them! The Madras Council, though largely condemned by the Committee, defended themselves, both in regard to the contract and the general management of the war, in their despatch to the Court of Directors. But the Court, as might well be expected, refused to agree with them, stigmatising their conduct heavily in almost every particular. "Upon the return of the Army from the Mysore Country into the Carnatic", they observed in their general letter, dated 15th September, "we find that the Field Deputies are come back to the Presidency of Madras. We cannot but disapprove of their original appointment which could have no other tendency but to impede the operations of the campaign, and give rise to very mischievous disputes between the Commander-in-Chief and the Deputies, by which we fear the public service has suffered essentially.

. . . Our opinion is that when the Company has made choice of a proper person to be a Commander-in-Chief, all trust and confidence should be reposed in him to direct the plans and operations of the campaign." The necessity for unity in strategy and supply and the means by which it ought to be secured during war could not have been stated in more pithy terms. Col. Smith stands vindicated here in a manner at once just and fair to him, both as a Commander and as a man. Nor is this all. The Court of Directors, a little later—in March 1770—reviewing the conduct of the campaign, remarked that they were satisfied that the army had not been properly supplied either with provisions, stores, or carriage; and in reply to the explanation given by the Madras Council in regard to the contract, they pointedly referred to the acceptance of Mr. Call's tender in 1767 and the arrangement then made by the Members of the Council to take shares in the contract and strongly

criticised their acts. "The advantages of the Council (you say) were small, therefore Mr. Call proposed", they said in this connection, "that the members thereof should become joint subscribers for carrying on the business of that contract, which it was their duty to put on the best and most beneficial footing for the Company." And what is more, the Directors keenly regretted the absence of all moral restraint in the Members of Council as a whole. "We were", they add, "yet much more astonished and concerned to find that of all the Members of our Council, not one had honour or virtue enough to reject a proposal which was as wholly incompatible with their duty, as it was unworthy of their character and station to accept." They also expressed their further disapprobation that the Council had failed to call for public tenders, after making the arrangement. In regard to the manner in which the contract had been carried out, they remarked that "the contractors had an eye to the profits rather than any regard to promote the public interests." They wound up by saying that the defence set up by the Council was contradictory, loose and unsatisfactory, while they stigmatised the omission to advertise for fresh tenders as "highly criminal." A more severe indictment of the arrangements of the Madras Council and a better vindication of Col. Smith cannot possibly be required. If only the Madras Council had shown greater integrity and discharged its duties with its superiors more dutifully, the war would have gone on different lines altogether. If only the Madras Council had appointed Col. Smith not only their Commander-in-chief in name but also in fact; had vested him with all the powers of that office; had given him unified control of strategy and supplies; and had kept the other Members of Council to their proper sphere, the Council room; and had asked Muhammad Ali to hold over his adventures in the field; and had agreed to

the policy of garrisoning places on the lines chalked out by Col. Smith and taken by stages the offensive, the result would have been entirely different. Col. Smith was not only a military commander, but also a man of the world. He was eminently of a practical turn of mind and knew the distinction between possibilities and impossibilities. When the Council favoured a single concentrated effort for penetrating to Bangalore, and in the event of success, to Seringapatam, he saw the impossibility of it, without the establishment of depots of provisions and stores at centres most convenient to the frontiers for supporting the eventual operations of the army. When the egregious Council would hurry their way to the siege of Bangalore, the cautious and wary Smith made it known to them that it was his considered opinion that at whatever period that siege might be attempted, the forces ought to admit of being formed into two divisions, one for the operations of the siege, and the other to oppose the field army of Haidar, who would unquestionably make the greatest efforts for its preservation; and he made it plain to them that he doubted whether the greatest force which could be collected would be sufficient for the accomplishment of this double purpose. When, again, he found that it was necessary to develop a cavalry force for the purpose of keeping open his communications, and for furnishing escorts and to enable him to follow any success he might obtain in the field, the Council, though convinced of the need for such a force, would not accept it for fear of wounding the feelings of Muhammad Ali, who thought it an encroachment on his own special preserve and requested him to place a small portion of his horse—2,000 of them—under their discipline and even these quitted the camps of Cols. Smith and Wood, early in 1768, “being in distress for want of pay.” When he perceived what Haidar could do with his own army and equipment, Col. Smith did not draw back from calling a

Council of the Field Deputies and telling them some plain truths. On their pet scheme of a siege of Bangalore and the possibilities of bringing Haidar into action, he stated categorically thus: first, that with the relative force actually possessed by the contending armies, the siege of Bangalore could not be safely undertaken, unless Haidar should be previously beaten in a general action; secondly, that it was impracticable, while moving in one body, to force him to a general action, contrary to his inclinations; and, thirdly, that the only hope of such an event rested on moving the two divisions, and seizing such accidental opportunities as had been marred at Mulbāgal by the mistakes of Col. Wood. Nor did he fail to make it known to the Council at Madras, that though it would be good to persist in bringing Haidar to a general action, it would be even more advantageous if Muhammad Ali were nearer Madras for enabling them to reflect that he and the Field Deputies were not only the most ponderous of his encumbrances but also helped to withdraw from his disposable force a body for their protection, little inferior in strength to one of his divisions!¹⁵⁹ This gentle but pointed protestation of the utter impracticality of their arrangements seemed to have impressed the Council but they used the opportunity thus afforded of reconsidering them for their own purposes. If they could not well avoid Col. Smith's protestations formally submitted to them, they knew how to circumvent him. In this they were the more emboldened to move, because the Field Deputies and Muhammad Ali had hinted to the Council that they would like to return, having found that following an army was not after all so pleasant an affair as they had imagined. The Council disposed of his representations by directing him to submit a plan for more successful operations, with the means

159. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 639-640, citing Col. Smith's letters to Council, Fort St. George, 8, 9 and 11th October 1768.

then actually at his disposal; and in that case, he was to consider himself invested with *the direction* of affairs. If he could not suggest such a plan—a plan that could be carried into immediate effect—he was to repair to Madras for aiding the Council in its deliberations there. Col. Smith, though he had so far, in deference to higher authority, continued in nominal command, under the perpetual tutelage of the Field Deputies and Muhammad Ali,¹⁶⁰ refused to take over the sole responsibility of operations which the mismanagement of others had brought to the verge of disaster. He distinctly saw before him the sources of counteraction which “would convert into mere mockery the delusive professions of investing him with the *direction* of measures.” He accordingly accepted the alternative provided by the Council and proceeded to Madras, where, without any reference whatever to the past, he suggested how they were to act, if they were to succeed in the future. He said that with the aid of a detachment, to replace the losses of his own arms,¹⁶¹ he would bring the war to a successful issue by penetrating to Seringapatam through the Coimbatore country, and that, notwithstanding what had occurred, the lack of provisions could not stand in the way as it “could be abundantly provided against.” The Council would not return an immediate reply. They had already made up their minds in a different manner. They had decided to entrust the command—so at least it was currently believed then—to

160. Wilks, in his righteous indignation, would seem to suggest that Col. Smith had gone too far in thus retaining “nominal command under the degrading tutelage” as he calls it, his suggestion being that he would not have been wrong if he had taken a step further and placed his resignation in the hands of the Council. He remarks that his “degradation had gone so far that it cannot even now (i.e., at the time of his writing) be contemplated without sorrow and surprise” (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 642.)

161. He asked, as already mentioned, for this purpose, the recall of Col. Peach's detachment, then in the Northern Circars. See *ante* p. 87-88.

Col. Wood, superseding in fact if not in words, Col. Smith. Col. Wood had, by his apparent successes in the southern campaign and his personal attention to the Field Deputies and to Nawāb Muhammad Alī, established with them and the Madras Council the reputation of a great military genius.¹⁶² Col. Wood was a relation of Lawrence Sullivan, then a Director of the E. I. Company and previously the Chairman of the Board of Directors, and the Madras Council evidently tried to keep to the right side of so powerful a personage, in view of eventualities.¹⁶³

Wood was, as we have seen, outmanouvred by Haidar. His reports were meagre and unsatisfactory, while he disgusted his colleagues so much that one of them, Major Fitzgerald, wrote to request that steps should be taken "for the recovery of our lost honour." Haidar's successes and rapid recovery of his possessions induced the Madras

162. Wilks' words are "the reputation of transcendent military talents."

Wilks writes at this point with the aid of personal information gathered by him. So bitter is he in his comments upon Col. Wood, the Field Deputies and Muhammad Ali, that he wants to frankly own, a little later, that he writes with strict regard to the facts as disclosed by the records of the period. "In noticing the effects on the fortune of the war," he remarks, "of the unhappy Commission (the Field Deputies) . . . I have endeavoured to restrain, as far as stubborn facts would admit, the mixed tone of ridicule and indignation, which their proceedings were calculated to provoke; seeking the light of truth as my single guide, I have been jealous of the possible influence of professional prejudice, in opinions which I have formed; and I seek security against that influence, in describing these effects, in the language of the authors of the measure" (Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 643-44). Wilks may be readily acquitted of all personal prejudice in this connection.

163. Warren Hastings, who became a Member of the Madras Council in September 1769, discloses the fact of this relationship between Laurence Sullivan and Col. Wood, in a letter to Robert Palk, dated January 29th, 1770 (see *Report on Palk Mss.*, 117-118). Laurence Sullivan became Chairman of the E. I. Co. in 1760. He was a Member of the Board of Directors from 1755 to 1758; 1760 to 1764; 1769 to 1772; 1778 to 1781; 1783. He was Chairman in 1760-1761; Deputy Chairman in 1763, 1772 and 1780. His Christian name should be spelt *Laurence* and not *Lawrence* as is done in Sir Murray Hamrick's Edition of Wilks' *History* at I. 668, f. n. 1.

Council not only to recall Wood and try him by Court-Martial but also directed Smith to resume command of the army in the field. He resumed command at Chetput on 1st February 1769 and began to press Haidar hard. Haidar offered to come to terms, but Governor Bouchier vacillated. While affecting to treat, he directed Col. Smith to threaten Haidar. Haidar lured Smith to the southward at Cuddalore, and then, causing the bulk of his own army to retire, himself with but 6,000 cavalry and 200 foot, made a forced march to St. Thomas' Mount, where he virtually dictated terms of peace. "At the last march before the peace," the Madras Council wrote to the Directors, "he (Haidar) gave our army the slip and arrived at the Mount about 48 hours before our army halted at Vandaloore, twelve miles short of the Mount." That proved the determining factor.

Except for the single misfortune of allowing himself to be thus lured by Haidar, Col. Smith acted with care throughout the campaign. Neither from the military point of view nor from the political, did he give cause for complaint. When we remember this, our astonishment is the greater when we read Wilks' adverse criticism of a General for whom he throughout expresses the greatest admiration, especially for his leadership in the field. There is one other point to note. While Wilks writes as one who had gathered independent information of the period he was writing about, apart from what he learnt from a perusal of the records of the period, and from that point of view speaks highly of Col. Smith subject of course to the limitations we have referred to above, contemporary opinion of him seems to have been rather divided. Philip Dormer Stanhope, who had served for a time in the 1st Dragoon Guards and had been on the recommendation of Col. Smith appointed to one of Nawāb Muhammad Ali's cavalry regiments, in 1774, spoke of him in praise-

worthy terms. On Smith's retirement, Stanhope wrote home that "the memory of General Smith will ever be revered in India while either heroic bravery in the field or the most unbounded generosity in private shall be deemed a virtue."¹⁶⁴ This may be regarded the language of gratitude, though there is no need to doubt the sincerity of feeling underlying it. It is remarkable that Governor Du Pré should have thought that he was deficient in the qualities of the head, though not of the heart. "I am quite of your opinion," he wrote to Orme, "in regard to General Joseph Smith. A man of a better heart I never knew, with a good deal of good sense; but a little knowledge of mankind is sufficient to evince that those are not qualities fit to govern Yahoos. . . A man at the head of a military corps should have an active mind, and order, discipline and subordination should never be absent from it: an Ensign should know or be taught that he is not a Colonel."¹⁶⁵ If the Field Deputies or the Members of Bouchier's Council at Madras were such rude and uncultivated characters as are represented to us, then, there can be no mistake in acknowledging that Col. Smith was unequal to them. Though a son of Mars, Col. Smith impresses one who reads his despatches and reports that he had a cultivated mind and an urbanity of disposition that won for him later the goodwill of even such a man as Muhammad Ali.¹⁶⁶ The suggestion that Col. Smith had not "an

164. Love, *Vestiges*, III. 81, quoting *Genuine Memoirs of Asiaticus*, published in 1784.

165. *Orme Mss.*, Vol. XXX, 10th June 1769.

166. So good were his relations with Nawāb Muhammad Ali that he received from the latter, in 1775, the village of Vandalūr as a *shrātriam* (an assignment of revenue for a sacred or charitable purpose) at the annual rent of 50 pagodas for the erection and support of a choultry for travellers at that place. The grant was renewed in 1785 (see Love, *o. c.*, III. 293-294). When Col. Stringer Lawrence died in 1775, the Nawāb transferred a pension of pagodas 3750 per annum, he had settled on him, to Col. Smith. This was confirmed by the Court of Directors (*Ibid.*, 896; also Wilson, *o. c.*, I. 305).

active mind " or lacked a sense of " order, discipline and subordination " is not borne out by facts. The further remark that " an Ensign should know or be taught that he is not a Colonel " may be a piquant reference to Col. Smith's start in life and his position in the army, one of subordination to the Governor, then titular Commander-in-chief, but was unworthy of Du Pré, because of the really honorable part he played, both in the field and in the counsels of the Government. Indeed, from a fuller reading of the records, to which Wilks refers, especially their later portions, it is seen that Col. Joseph Smith was throughout in the right and the Madras Council almost throughout in the wrong. It is not claimed that Smith was a heaven-born general or a military genius ; or that he was one who could impress his personality on others, especially those placed in authority above him. But that he was an able general who knew his work ; who was honest in his endeavours ; who took his colleagues into his confidence ; and a person who realised the limits up to which he could go, there can be no doubt. If such a man had been duly supported at the Council table and out of it on the field ; if Muhammad Ali's unrealizable ambitions had been kept properly under check ; and if the Madras Council had placed the Company's interests before their own individual gains, there is no doubt that the fortunes of war would have been different even if these did not end in favour of the English.

We have made an exception, however, against Col. Smith. That seems to require a few words. Col. Smith was an eminent Commander and knew not only everything about warfare but also everything of the particular variety of it peculiar to Haidar. Yet he allowed himself to be lured by Haidar and lost the chance of cutting him off at a critical moment. In the words of Bouchier, Haidar, "after having led

Col. Smith a dance of near a month, had the address, after drawing him as far as Vilaporam (Villupuram), to slip by him, and making a march of no less than 45 miles the first day, got so much ahead of our army that he reached the Mount three days before they got the length of Vendaloor (Vandalūr)¹⁶⁷. The Madras Council used nearly the same language when they addressed the Court of Directors in defence of themselves.¹⁶⁸

"At the last march before the peace, he (Haidar) gave our army the slip, and arrived at the Mount 48 hours before our army halted at Vandaloor, twelve miles short of the Mount." Col. Smith, in his narrative of the war, tries to meet the argument that this "slipping by him" led to the forcing of the peace on the Madras Council. In doing so, he but unwittingly spoils his own case, by suggesting that Col. Lang did not do his part of the duty cast on him as required of him. While Col. Smith by his movements did all he could to prevent the passage of Haidar's main army and to keep close to him at every stage in his northward march towards Madras, there can be no gainsaying the fact that Col. Lang collaborated with him to the best possible extent. Even Wilks, who is anxious to defend Smith to the utmost extent, finds it difficult to blame Lang. "Two days before the separation of Hyder," Wilks writes, "from his army, Col. Smith had reinforced the division of Col. Lang, and sent him in the direction of Tiagar and Trinomalee, with orders to take post at either, if a greatly superior force should appear, and to act on the communications of the enemy, with the passes of Ahtcor (Attūr, 30 miles east of Salem on the road to Tiagar, 40 miles east of Attūr) and Changama. When apprised of the decision of Hyder, which was correctly reported to him the very day of its execution, he sent orders to Col. Lang to risk

167. Bouchier's letter to Palk dated 29th June 1769. See *f. n.* 186 below.

168. See *f. n.* 184 below.

an attack on these unwieldy bodies while entangled in the passes; in his narrative he complains that Lang made no attempt to annoy them; but in justice to that officer, we must recollect the fearful insufficiency of his force, for a contest with the main body of Haidar's army, which he must necessarily have risked, by moving under these circumstances to a distance from Tiagar. This is no mere exculpation of Col. Lang's conduct; it is bare justice to him. The fact is that Col. Smith, though he kept close to Haidar and adopted tactics suitable to the occasion and made himself almost ubiquitous by adopting the roads on which he was the least looked for, found it impossible to keep pace with the rapidity of his opponent's movements. It was one of those movements of Haidar which were peculiar to him and with which the most active and diligent of opposing commanders cannot easily cope with. Wilks, however, is less happy when he suggests that the Madras Council made much of the safety of the "Black Town" of Madras and guided the movements of Col. Smith to suit their own requirements. He is, in doing this, less generous to the Council than he might well have been. As a matter of fact, they could not well avoid the directions they gave from time to time, if they were to conclude the Treaty they were bent upon. They could not have both asked for peace and determined upon preventing it, by not taking the steps necessary for it. And among these steps, the first one was to please Haidar by agreeing to his solicitations that Col. Smith should halt wherever their letter should reach him. There can be no question that Haidar desired to avoid close contact with Smith and he prescribed a minimum of 25 miles' distance between his own and Col. Smith's forces, even while negotiating. Wilks suggests, evidently on the basis of Smith's own narrative, that while he had uniformly recommended peace, he "had never

suppressed his indignation at the circumstances of unnecessary and insulting degradation under which his government were now treating." It is difficult to see the actual basis for this "indignation" on Smith's part. The Government, for their own reasons, desired to treat and they had to create the atmosphere necessary for it. They found they had to agree to the request of Haidar, whose son had actually overrun Madras City not long ago and the Governor and others had just escaped from being taken prisoners of war.¹⁶⁹ While Smith may have been right in his military appreciation of the position, there was hardly any ground for him to complain of the act of the Council who were anxious for a speedy resolution of the difficult position they were in. The fact remains that Smith never disputed the competency of the Council to issue the orders they did and he even obeyed them with alacrity sometimes. But he seems to have felt that, despite the fact he had been lured by Haidar, he was quite equal to attacking him and even routing his forces. Robson, who was serving under Smith as a Captain, and whose account of this war is the earliest one in date and the main authority for Wilks, quite apart from what he gathered from others personally from the English and Mysore sides and the narrative of Smith himself, suggests that if only the Madras Council had "abided by the opinion of General Smith, who was for carrying on the war a little longer, as he well knew, by experience, and the knowledge he possessed of Hyder's affairs, which were then in a desperate situation, so that he could not possibly have remained any time in the Carnatic, and, of course, would have been glad to have accepted of any terms, they might have made a more honourable peace." This seems a soldier's estimate

169. See Love, *o.c.*, II. 506-507: also *ante*, p. 104. Governor Bouchier and Nawāb Muhammad Ali and his son escaped from the Company's country house in a small vessel that by accident was opposite to it.

of the position. It overlooks the fact that the lack of cavalry on Smith's part made it always easy for Haidar to evade capture at Smith's hands. Actually at the time, Smith had only 68 men as his effective force of cavalry! Haidar knew this and that is the reason why he boldly ventured on a dashing ride to the walls of Madras, there to conclude peace personally, avoiding all envoys who could not sign a treaty but only act as agents without the power to do the requisite thing. Robson forgot that Haidar had regained in six weeks what he had lost during the whole course of two campaigns!

This is not to say that Col. Smith did not inspire fear in Haidar. It might be said with justice that he even inspired in him respect for his personal charm and talents as a military commander. So far, indeed, did he fear Col. Smith that he was wont to declare that he desired no contact with the divisions commanded by Col. Smith, while, he added, he would not fail to attack Col. Wood wherever he could find him.¹⁷⁰ He always kept to a respectful distance of Col. Smith's forces. In the course of conversation with Captain Brooke, who saw him as the representative of the Madras Council,¹⁷¹ he said he would be glad if they could send Col. Smith with full powers to treat. Wilks notes the fact that at the conclusion of the peace, Haidar expressed an anxious desire for an interview with the Colonel, whom he referred to as his "preceptor" in the science of war, and whom he desired to make his "friend". As circumstances did not permit this, Haidar requested that he might be favored with his portrait, which later was sent to him.¹⁷²

170. A common saying of Haidar recorded by Wilks as having been the uniform statement made by all his principal officers.

171. See *ante*, P. 99.

172. This portrait was later deposited by Tipu among other plunder in Seringapatam. On the capture of this place in 1799, it was sold by auction with other prize property and later came into the possession of General David Smith, of Cometrow, in Somersetshire, a friend of Col. Wilks. See Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 669, f.n. General David Smith had, in 1800, commanded at St. Thomas' Mount (Love, *o.c.*, III. 491).

Whatever the shortcomings of Muhammad Ali's allies, and whether the English at Madras were justified or not in making terms with Haidar behind the walls of Madras, the actual conditions of the two treaties which terminated the war, while difficult of execution, must be held to be perfectly reasonable, and in no way dishonourable to either party. Indeed, Robson, among contemporary authorities, speaks of the Peace of 1769 as having "redounded to Hyder's honour";¹⁷³ while De La Tour observes that¹⁷⁴ "by this Peace, Ayder Ali Khan gloriously finished a war, which all India supposed would terminate in his ruin." Referring to the two treaties, De La Tour adds,¹⁷⁵ "the two treaties were made to save the honour of the King and the English nation; and consequently the first treaty only was made public by authority. But as there is always an opposition wherever there is an English government, the second treaty was soon made public in England and elsewhere, with such annotations as the interests or opinions of individuals might lead them to make." De La Tour gives also an interesting description of a contemporary print depicting "the different sentiments of those who were then at the head of the Madras Government" regarding their treaty with Haidar.¹⁷⁶ The English

173. *Hyder Ally*, o. c., 96.

174. *Ayder Ali*, o. c., II. 174.

175. *Ibid.*

176. De La Tour writes: "There was fixed to the gate of Fort St. George, called the Royal Gate, a design, in which was seen Ayder Ali Khan seated under a canopy, upon a pile of cannon; Mr. Du Prè and the other ambassador being on their knees before him. Ayder held in his right hand the nose of Mr. Du Prè, drawn in the form of an elephant's trunk, which he shook for the purpose of making him vomit guineas and pagodas, that were seen issuing from the mouth of this plenipotentiary. In the background appeared Fort St. George; and on one of the bastions, the Governor and Council were drawn on their knees, holding out their hands to the Nabob. On one side of the Council, was a large mastiff growling at Ayder, the letters *J. C.* (for John Call) being marked on his collar; and behind the mastiff stood

view may be said to be represented by Wilks. He holds that¹⁷⁷ though there is "genuine moderation observable in this treaty," nothing could relieve it from the character of "perfect dictation" on Haidar's part under the walls of Madras, and nothing could take away from it "the unnecessary and insulting degradation" under which it was concluded by the authorities at Fort St. George. Equally significant is the opinion of Edward Thornton, who, closely following Wilks, and writing from the point of view of Muhammad Ali's allies, declares that the war with Haidar Ali was one "needlessly and improvidently commenced, and conducted on the part of the Madras Government, with singular weakness and unskilfulness," and adds the remark that "its conclusion was far more happy than that Government had any right to expect either from their own measures, or from the character of their enemy,"¹⁷⁸ thereby suggesting that the Peace of 1769 was advantageous to the English. The English preferred concessions to capitulation. They did not, however, ask themselves what margin separated concessions from capitulation. They did not realize they had capitulated and let themselves down. They wanted time for defending the *status quo*. There was no question, so far as they were concerned, of their giving away anything for the present, much less everything that Haidar prized. Haidar found later he had been deceived. - After this breach with the English,

a little French dog, busily employed in licking his posteriors. This last animal was adorned with a star, such as the Chevalier de Christ, Colonel Call's confidant, wore. At a distance were seen the English camp, and General Smith holding the treaty of peace in his hand, and breaking his sword" (De La Tour, *o. c.*, II. 175-177). This is the "French writer" referred to by Mr. Lewin B. Bowring in his *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* (Rulers of India Series), at page 58, f. n. 1, where this caricature is briefly adverted to.

177. *Mysoor, o. c.*, I. 675-677.

178. Edward Thornton, *History of the British Empire in India* (1841), I. 573-574.

Haidar's need was to achieve a united Mysore-Mahratta-Nizām policy. After fifteen years, it should have been impossible for him to contemplate the tearing off of the English from Muhammad Ali. He should have made the Nizām to admit the change coming over the scene. He should have convinced himself of the change. The task was not an easy one or even a pleasant one. He should not have prejudged the position. He should have decided on a course free from trouble, a course which others would not have objected to or be ashamed of.

Another feature of the treaty with the English which demands notice is the second article which stipulated that "in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other, to drive the enemy out," the pay of the auxiliaries being defrayed at fixed rates by the party demanding assistance. By this article, the contracting parties agreed on the following points: (1) the two mutually promised military co-operation for the joint defence of their countries, *i. e.*, if one of them was attacked, the other was to assist in repelling the attack; (2) the joint defence was to be offered from their respective countries; and (3) the objective to be aimed at was the driving out of the enemy from the invaded country. While the two latter conditions limited to some extent what was required under the first, there can be no question that Mr. Du Prè had agreed to an *offensive* alliance against a third party. This clause, as was openly avowed by Haidar himself, was intended by him to be operative against the Mahrattas, whom he considered at the time his greatest foes in the way of the expansionist policy he wanted to follow in the north of Mysore. As we have shown in the foregoing pages, Haidar was already tired of war with his old opponent Nawāb Muhammad Ali, which had entangled him in a

The clause relating to the Mahrattas.

strenuous fight with the Nawāb's allies, the English, at a time when the Mahrattas were about to renew their incursions in Mysore. The defection of his own ally Nizām Alī in the earlier stages of the war had been a deep blow to him. There was every reason to fear that the attitude of the English, who were fighting as much in the interests of Nawāb Muhammad Alī as in their own, and who had all along sustained heavy losses as the result of the defective policy they had so far pursued, might also change for the better. The idle vanity, thirst for power and jealousy of control on the part of Muhammad Alī had rendered all dependence on him precarious, fully justifying the subsequent remark of the Madras Government that "in the late war, they were, step by step, and by remote causes, drawn into measures by far too extensive for their means, depending on the support of an ally who ought never to be depended upon."¹⁷⁹ Indeed, as Wilks observes,¹⁸⁰ "the liberal assistance derived from Bengal, alone enabled the Company to continue this ill-fated war: Mahommed Alī, as the general letters record, wished them to carry it on with their own resources; and they, on the other hand, deemed it 'unreasonable to exhaust their treasures for the support of countries, and the acquisition of others from whence they were to derive no advantage.' But it is the most remarkable feature in the conduct of this remarkable ally, that although during the war he could furnish neither pecuniary resources nor military supplies, yet on the point of concluding it, when Hyder steadily rejected his participation, he then pledged himself to furnish all the expenses of the war, and to subsidize the Mahratta army, provided the Government would consent to break with Hyder; fortunately for the public, Mr. Du Prè had, at this time, an ascendancy in the Councils of

179. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 679-680.

180. *Ibid*, 680.

Madras, and on a subsequent occasion found it necessary to remark, that when Mahommed Ali's acknowledged debt to the Company came to be discussed, he had again no money." In these circumstances, and "desperate" as might have been the situation of Haidar's affairs, as another writer suggests,¹⁸¹ Haidar, with some justice, thought that by a timely peace with the English, he could not only have them on his side but also compose his differences with, and keep off for the time being, their protege Nawāb Muhammad Alī, and be enabled successfully to overcome the Mahrattas, and extend the territorial limits of Mysore from the Tungabhadra to the Krishna in the north. In this he was grievously mistaken. Though his efforts in this direction appeared successful at first, he was destined to fail ultimately in achieving his objective.

Haidar, we should add, had his own limitations. When he emerged victorious in 1769 and agreed to the English appeal for a treaty of peace, he entered the dangerous field of negotiation and diplomacy, in which he was no master. Though he evinced high qualities as a tactician, he had not the sagacity of a born diplomatist, as has been suggested by a modern writer.¹⁸² What he won in the field, he lost in the conference. Diplomacy by agitation should not have taken the place of diplomacy by contemplation. The art of negotiation and opportunism go ill together. Haidar won the war, in a word, but lost the peace. He did not possess the skill to secure advantages, which is the essence of all diplomacy. Haidar should have tried to avoid a further political conflict with the English, by proposing terms to secure immediate fair treatment. In the alternative, he should have stipulated for a peace which possessed the possibilities of its being kept up by the

¹⁸¹ Robson, l. c.

¹⁸² See Bowring, l. c.

English, so that he might secure later what he aimed at. The Treaty he actually got was one which did not secure immediately his aims nor did it help to secure them later ; nor even did it help him to compel the English to keep to the terms they had agreed to. He failed to see what he was agreeing to. He was blinded by success and there was no go for it but to lose what all he aimed at. He could organise for war but could not organise equally well for peace. He lacked skill in true diplomacy. The Treaty he entered into was practically one that could not be carried out by the English, committed as they were to Muhammad Ali. It would have meant their own and Muhammad Ali's annihilation. Haidar did not realize this. Various suggestions have been made to explain this mistake of Haidar. One such is that he tried to secure the recognition of the English at Madras for his son's succession after himself.¹⁸³ There is no evidence for this suggestion,

183. See Lt. Col. L. H. Thornton, *Light and Shade in Bygone India* (1927), P. 89, where the author, raising the question why Haidar, "who occupied so strong a position, came to agree to terms so favourable to his opponents," observes: "The reason was to be found in Hyder's anxiety to establish his dynasty and to hand on his possessions to his son. To be in a position to do this, it was necessary that he should have a powerful ally to assist him in repelling the inroads of his restless neighbours, the Mahrattas." There is, as indicated above, absolutely no evidence in support of this position. All that the available literature on the subject points to is that Haidar, as the *Sarvadhikari* of Mysore, was more anxious to preserve the territorial integrity of the kingdom than either to "establish his dynasty" or "hand on his possessions to his son." (See *Ibid.*, p. 44). He had neither time nor leisure for the latter objective. Having himself fought his way to *supreme power in the State* in the wake of his predecessors and masters the Dalavāis, it seems to have been uppermost in his mind to *establish himself in it and perhaps perpetuate that position and that only for his son, Tipu, without either aiming at "Royalty" or creating a kingdom for himself and his successor.* If this fundamental position is rightly understood, then we can easily appreciate his public relationship with the kingdom of Mysore on the point at issue. Regarded from this broad standpoint, Thornton's attempt to view Haidar's political activities as being governed by mere dynastic considerations on his part has to be dismissed as thoroughly lacking in foundation and at variance with the main trend of his activities.

nor is it in keeping with Haidar's theoretical position as the Regent or *Sarvādhikāri* of the kingdom of Mysore, to which he always stuck. The Treaty of Madras was not really an attempt to carry out by discussion an agreed solution. It gave away more than what it secured for Mysore. Haidar did not realize that many things would follow from it, which he would not—and could not—approve of, and which he would later wish he had done differently. He should have asked himself, where was the need for such a Treaty with a fallen foe? He forgot that five years before, Muhammad Yusuf had been subdued and the English were extending their influence both in the south and in the Bengal and Bombay areas. He showed no sign in executing the Treaty that he desired to block the English in the south—from the practical possession of the rich countries of Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Madura and Tinnevely. He gave up his idea of encircling them either in the military or the economic sense. He deceived himself into laying down his aggressive policy against the English for the moment wholly and fully without adequate guarantees as to the cession of the territories in and about Trichinopoly. He should have seen to it that he did not render himself so weak relatively to the English and his two other ambitious neighbours—the Mahrattas and the Nizām—that his diplomacy could not, later, enter on discussions on a footing of equality. If the Treaty of Madras had been properly made and suitably followed up, that would have ended Muhammad Ali and there would have been the possibility of a new era for Mysore and the South. Haidar made the mistake of thinking he had won his initial aims, whereas he had failed in attaining them and had indeed been taken in. He thought the signing of the Treaty meant that there was no need but to sit and wait for the next step. The crisis came and he called on the English, and they failed him. He realized too late what the Treaty meant

He should have exploited the position there and then, when the English were eager to conciliate and to yield. The Treaty of Peace was really an unilateral affair. Such a treaty could not but fail him. He should have asked for and obtained the appeasement he aimed at. He failed to do so, and he lost for ever the chance to do so. His policy was good but the results of his policy he failed to reap for all time. He handed over by the Treaty the keys of Southern India finally to the English merchants at Madras and with it of all India. Madras helped to win India for the British. Haidar must have asked for a radical revision of the settlement of that *vexata questio*, the cession of Trichinopoly. The war he had waged had for ever destroyed the settlement under which Mysore had lost that much coveted fortress. He should have made it clear that the English at Madras should have had no illusion about the perpetuation of the *status quo* in absolute contrast to the needs of life and history.

By not doing the right thing at the right moment, Haidar put himself in the wrong. To have deferred action in regard to Trichinopoly, was to commit a serious mistake. He should have remembered that emphasis would sharply shift from place to place in politics and warfare. His failure to act at the moment when he could have done so most easily was only inviting trouble in the not distant future both on himself and on the country for whose welfare he was responsible. By his shortsightedness, he allowed the situation to deteriorate much to his own disadvantage. It was, in a word, a war of lost chances to Haidar. The monotonous series of reverses sustained by the English until they recalled Wood and appointed Col. Joseph Smith to take the field once again had really unnerved them and they were ready for a settlement that would have meant real peace to them. Haidar's original object was to aim the most powerful blow he was capable of delivering against

the English at Madras. He prepared himself for it and he launched a vast offensive against them. It led to months of bitter fighting. It ended, however, in a series of tactical successes, which brought no decision and not even an outstanding strategic advantage. The outlook for Mysore at the end of the war was black. Haidar put in everything without regarding cost and on the success or failure of the enterprize one would have thought depended largely the issue of his continuance even at the head of the realm in Mysore. To say of such a man that he was thinking of establishing a line of succession for himself is to say something wholly incredible, if not entirely fantastic.

As to the true significance of the Treaty, it must be remarked that it was literally a military union. It was, so far as Haidar was concerned, meant to be the beginning of a relationship between the two, based on the power possessed by each. Haidar desired to make known by it that his leadership in the South was now unquestioned; that his resources were great, if not tremendous; and that the English could not escape his attention, if they deserted him. While the English could not act against him, Haidar's capacity for mischief, from the English point of view, was curbed for the moment. This military accord brought the English and Haidar closer together than ever before. Their meeting together revealed to themselves—at least for the moment—and the world the community of interests and outlook uniting the great southern powers, and indicates their readiness to help forward a resettlement of the South. It invited others who aimed at power in the South to make their contribution to the same end. If the English and Haidar could collaborate from the military point of view, why could not the South be settled on a basis agreeable to all?

It must, however, be conceded that neither Mr. Bouchier nor the Madras Council of the time nor Mr. Du Pré who actually negotiated the Treaty in person had any option in the matter. They found peace "necessary" to them at the time; they had "to save as much of the Jaghir as possible from plunder," and as they explained in their Consultation of the 10th April 1769, they had to carry out the positive orders of the Court of Directors themselves in the matter of effecting a peace conveyed in their letter dated 13th May 1768. They thus defended themselves to the Court of Directors regarding the Peace:—

"Much invective hath been circulated in this colony, and nearly in the terms in which you express your sentiments of the peace 'dictated at the gates of Madras'; and we find it hath been used as industriously at home to establish the same ideas. If an indifferent person were to read of an enemy dictating peace at the gates of a fortified town, the idea that would immediately occur would be that the enemy came with a superior force; that the garrison, seeing no hope of dislodging the enemy, and fearing for their town, their lives and property, accepted the terms prescribed. This is the idea that men have endeavoured at home and abroad to propagate; how justly will appear. Our army had been in pursuit of the enemy in the southern part of the Carnatic for nearly four months without being once able to come up with him; at the last march before the peace he gave our army the slip, and arrived at the Mount about 48 hours before our army halted at Vandaloor twelve miles short of the Mount. One of the first points he insisted on was, that an order should be sent to Colonel Smith to halt at 10 coss (about 25 to 30 miles) from him, and declared that although he came to negotiate a peace, he would not remain there, unless an order was sent, but would march immediately to the northward of Madras, or Tripasoor, where he could be more conveniently supplied with provisions and provender. As a peace was necessary to us, and every day increased our distress, it

appeared better to us to negotiate with him near at hand than at a distance, and it was very material to save as much of the Jaghir (modern Chingleput district) as possible from plunder. It missed Colonel Smith, but the messenger returning overtook him at Vandaloor, twelve miles from the Mount. What then, it might be asked, could induce us to make the peace, if the enemy was so much afraid of our army. The motives are clearly and fully assigned in our reasons entered in Consultation on the 10 April 1769. This being the case, we cannot see why it was more disgraceful to negotiate at the Mount than at 100 miles distant." ¹⁸⁴

Du Pré's own personal views did not differ much from what has been set down above. In a private letter to Orme, ¹⁸⁵ he wrote thus :—

" We have at length concluded a peace with Hyder such as will do us no honor ; yet it was necessary, and there was no alternative but that or worse. The reason it seems so disgraceful is that it [the war] was begun with ideas of conquest on our part, and it is said this is the first time a country enemy has gained an advantage over us. The latter part of this war, which probably will be thought the most disgraceful, is in reality nothing more than we have always thought the country liable to. An army of Moratta horse we always dreaded, because we always knew that it was not their business to fight, but to plunder, burn and destroy. The difference has only been in a name: it was Hyder instead of Moratta, and I think there can be no doubt but that, whilst our force consists of infantry only, any power with a large body of horse may plunder and ruin the country ; and if we have nothing to support our armies in the field or in garrison but the current revenues of the country, the failure of these must bring ruin on us ... What then must have been our condition had the war continued ! We had but provision for 15 days in the

184. See *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2501-2503, quoting from *Fort St. George Records*.

185. *Orme Mss.*, vol. XXX, 10th June 1769.

Black Town when the peace was concluded. Nothing could have prevented him in this part more than in the south from burning and destroying all the grain in stock in the villages, and on the ground. A famine would have ensued; and as it is, grain is scarce, and there certainly will be great distress before the next crop.

"Although it was clear that the peace, such as it is, was better for the Company than the continuance of the War, yet my mortifications are not small, and I cannot avoid thinking myself unfortunate in coming to India just in time to share disgrace, and to have, from henceforth, affairs to manage which are so encumbered and entangled that I can see no course we can take without being exposed to new embarrasments..."

What Charles Bouchier, the Governor, who made the treaty, thought of it, is fortunately available to us in a private letter he wrote to Palk dated the 29th June 1769.¹⁸⁶ "We have at length", he wrote outlining his reasons for it, "happily put an end to the enormous expenses occasioned by the war by concluding a peace with Hyder, who, having led Colonel Smith a dance of near a month, had the address, after drawing him as far as Villaporam (Villupuram), to slip by him, and making a march of no less than 45 miles the first day, got so much ahead of our army that he reached the Mount three days before they got the length of Vendaloor (Vandalur). On his arrival there, he wrote to me that he was come, so near to make peace with us himself. In the extremities we were reduced to we gladly embraced the opportunity of opening the Conference again; for the country being entirely at his mercy, our army being incapable of protecting it or bringing him to a decisive action, and daily diminishing by sickness and fatigue; the promised succors of horse by the Nabob (Muhammad Ali) and Mora Row (Murāri Rao) not arrived nor likely

186. Love, *Report on the Palk Mss.*, 105-106.

to be for some months, and our distress for money great; our whole dependence being on the Nabob, who, though he promised largely, we had doubts of his performing; and it being also the Company's positive orders to make peace, we were under the necessity of doing it almost at all events." In the same letter, Bouchier stated that Muhammad Ali owed the Company at this time $12\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of pagodas, besides another $14\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of pagodas, being the expenses of the war. It would seem that the concluding of a treaty was the most expedient thing to do at the time for the Madras Council, though they could have done it earlier, and saved themselves the ignominy of being dictated to, as suggested by Wilks, under their very walls. That was what made the difference between a peace earlier and a peace at the time it was actually concluded; between a peace at the Mount and a peace 100 miles off Madras to the Southward. Both Bouchier and Du Prè in urging that there was no difference between these two different positions forgot for the moment that they were defending the indefensible when they said that the making of a treaty was more important at the moment than the circumstances in which it was made. There is no doubt, however, that while the Court of Directors were right in condemning the manner in which the war against Mysore had been conducted by the Madras Council and had justly found fault with them for their constant interference with the Commander-in-Chief in the field and for mismanagement in the matter of the provision of the requisite cavalry, carriage, ammunition and military stores generally, it is remarkable that they did not specifically point to any of the conditions of the treaty as either unreasonable or dishonourable to the Company or to those who concluded it. Nor did they even distantly hint also what were those conditions which they thought were calculated to produce greater evils than would have

resulted from a continuation of the war, which, the Madras Council frankly avowed, had been undertaken on the basis of Muhammad Ali providing the funds for it, which at no time was actually forthcoming. The fact seems to be that they agreed to the Treaty while they were loth to admit that their agents had acted honorably in the actual conduct of the war. The idea—left unexpressed—underlying their mind was that if the war had been properly conducted there would have been really no need for any Treaty at all with Haidar. That is a proposition that is hard to agree to in the light of the actual facts governing the position of the Company as it found itself in 1768-1769.

The following is an abstract of these reasons which are set forth at considerable length in the Proceedings of the Madras Government quoted above :—

(1) The repeated anxiety for peace which had been expressed in several letters from the Court of Directors, and their positive orders on the subject, dated 13th May 1768.

(2) The insufficiency of the means of maintaining a body of cavalry, the want of which army enabled the enemy to protract the war, and to deprive the Government of their ordinary sources of revenue by laying waste the Karnatic; Haidar being able to detach a large body of horse to cut off communications, and to prevent Colonel Smith from obtaining any intelligence regarding his movements, while he on the other hand was kept fully informed as to those of the Colonel.

(3) The losses sustained by the army from death, sickness and desertion, as evinced by the state of Colonel Smith's force at the Mount on the 4th April 1769, at which time the effective Cavalry, European and Indian, had been reduced to 68 men, the two regiments of European Infantry to 379 of all ranks, and the battalions of sepoys to less than half of their established strength of 1,000 men.

(4) The state of the Karnatic, which had been reduced to a desert by Haidar's policy of avoiding an engagement, and ravaging the country.

(5) The safety of the districts of Madura and Tinnevely, which had been entered by detachments of the enemy.

A close examination of these reasons shows that the English at Madras were willing to make the best of the bad situation they were in. They accordingly were led into the very thing they desired to avoid and agreed to a treaty of peace that they could not, when the time came for it, fulfil. Haidar's first demand was for an alliance, offensive and defensive, which, after much discussion, Mr. Du Pré, as the English envoy, had peremptorily refused. But it will be evident from the sequel that by the article (the second article) ultimately agreed to, he and his confrères subjected themselves to all the embarrassments of an offensive alliance without any of its advantages; and that Mr. Du Pré had acquiesced in the spirit of an article, to the letter of which he had objected as fundamentally inadmissible. Historical justice demands, as even Wilks freely admits it, this reluctant notice of an error committed by Mr. Du Pré, whose political wisdom and distinguished talents were undoubtedly great. He and his friends had agreed to more than they could fulfil; to meet immediate needs, they had mortgaged a great deal of the uncertain future. In the result, they earned the undying ill-will of Haidar.¹⁸⁷

It might be suggested that Haidar left the territorial question—the cession of Trichinopoly—purposely unsettled for the moment. He could easily have taken it, as we have seen, if he had been bent on taking it in the course of this campaign and asked for its confirmation at the end of the war. But he studiously avoided doing so, as it were, by design; and he did not make it a bone of contention at the moment the terms and conditions of the Treaty

Why the Peace relegated the Trichinopoly issue to the background: a probable explanation.

^{187.} *Mys. Gaz.*, l. c.

of Peace were being talked over. What was his object in leaving undone the very thing that he was bent on achieving—the very objective he was seeking to achieve? He might have thought it inopportune to push this subject forward and sacrifice altogether the higher aim he had developed since the war began—to put down the Mahrattas, with the aid of the English if possible; if not, by neutralizing them and making them inactive when he was fighting his bitterest foes to the northward! This would be directly in keeping with the policy of Lord Clive, who conceived the Mysoreans as a good buffer against the Mahrattas, especially as they had made the conquest of the South their main objective since the days of Śivāji. Any raking up of the question of Trichinopoly, at such a time, would be politically inexpedient while actually it might mean the relighting, in his opponent's view, the dying embers of an old controversy, which might finally be set at rest when the Mahrattas had been suppressed and the English at Madras had been won over for the moment and lulled into the belief that Haidar meant no more than behave like a good neighbour. At any rate, he would not wish to break with the English towards the south while the Mahrattas in the north were threatening them with another of their expeditions. He desired to delay a break on this particular issue the longest. He would not like to allow himself to be provoked over it at this moment, especially as the English had been reduced to a grovelling disposition. He might not have been wholly pleased with them or the measure of injustice they had meted out to Mysore on the Trichinopoly issue, but he did not consider it opportune to say so and make a fresh grievance of it and lose the chance of realizing the greater objective of humbling both the Mahrattas and the English one after the other in succession.

All this may be so and may prove a good defence of Haidar's forgetting for the time being the issue of Trichinopoly altogether. But was it prudent to do so? That is the question that has to be answered. One in the hand is always worth two in the bush. It is especially so in the political field. Haidar should have known that the objective of every war has to be realized, if it is to be reckoned a success. The postponement of such realization may mean not only its deferring for the moment but also for ever. That is what it proved ultimately in the case of the cession of Trichinopoly for Mysore.

As suggested above, Haidar's motives for concluding this Treaty have not been understood either by his contemporaries or by his historians. First, it has to be noted that to Haidar, peace at the moment was a great necessity. One English writer has suggested, as already stated, that it was his idea that the English would prove greater friends to him than any other European nation, and that they would recognize his sovereignty and thus help him to found a dynasty of his own. There is no evidence whatever to substantiate any part of this suggestion, for the idea of founding a dynasty had never so far crossed the mind of Haidar. Accordingly other reasons must be sought to explain Haidar's desire for peace with the English at the very hour of his great victory over them. Haidar appears to have recognized that the maintenance of peace at that time was by itself an objective to be aimed at in his own interests. He aimed at a peace that would be enduring; and an enduring peace must, he appears to have held, rest on foundations of frank reciprocity. On that basis, he carried on negotiations; such negotiations, it will be conceded, were both possible and desirable. His conduct of the negotiations and the methods he adopted in carrying

them through show that he was trying in fact to strengthen and not undermine the foundations on which English confidence in him rested. The more he gained the more he thought Muhammad Ali would lose with the English. With the vanishing of the trust the English placed in Muhammad Ali, he thought he would succeed with the English. As subsequent events showed, in this he was mistaken. Little progress in fact, though much in promise, was made with the problems that arose from the war which ended with the Treaty of Madras. His attempts to better his relations with the English failed. He would not risk a repetition of these disillusioning experiences. That was the cause of the next war. The conviction had steadily grown upon him that he had displayed too keen a desire on his part to make terms with the English rather than make the English to seek terms from him. That could never be the attitude of one who meant to succeed. And that could never be the method by which to attain lasting peace. He felt he had created the wrong impression that constant pressure on him would make him yield. He felt equally that progress depends on the temper he showed and that temper must find expression in a firm spirit. That spirit, ever dominant in Haidar, showed itself in a determined manner before long. He feared not to give voice to it when occasion demanded it. If he had done so earlier, he would have been neither fair to himself nor to his country. Haidar's policy was not, it should be observed, based on expediency but on principle.

The central motive of Haidar's technique was his long continued anxiety over the danger of delay in preventing a combination of the English and the Nizām and the Mahrattas. If he could get the English to his side, he would have achieved two things at one stroke: weaning

What Haidar
aimed at.

them off from Muhammad Ali and preventing his own isolation. In view of the anxiety to reach an agreement with the English as soon as possible, Haider showed too much readiness to accept modifications in the form of words. While all the time he appears to have reiterated his insistence upon what he regarded as in essential substance a firm Mysore-English military commitment openly designed to operate against the Nizām and the Mahrattas in the event of any further machinations on their part and to drive a wedge if possible between the English and Muhammad Ali, he gave way in regard to the form in which the objective he aimed at was actually expressed in the Treaty. That he erred in thus neglecting the form, while he insisted on the substance, there can be no doubt. No wonder that at the very first test, the Treaty crumbled to pieces. What the English had agreed to in substance, they failed to perform in actuality.

Nor were the terms of the Treaty happy. What was agreed to was in reality a political and military pact. (1) No period of time was fixed in it for its duration. The fixing of such a period of time would have made it look less onerous and more definite. Of all obligations of an onerous kind, an indefinite one is about the worst. At any rate, there is no chance of revising such a Treaty except by mutual consent or by the worse process of denunciation. (2) It failed to state how the clause as to the defensive and offensive alliance should be given effect to. It did not say, for instance, that in the event of a conflict, endangering their common interests, the English and Haider would immediately undertake military consultations; would consider their interests as indissolubly bound, meaning thereby that they would, in the event of a conflict, form a military bloc immediately to unify their interests and strategic action; would afford full political and diplomatic support to each other if the

security or vital interests of one of the parties was threatened from outside ; and would bind themselves to lay down arms only simultaneously after an agreement. If one of the parties to the treaty became involved in war-like complications with another power or powers, was the one to go to the aid of the other with all its military forces ? Such aid was evidently expected by Haidar but the treaty was not specific. The military section of the treaty was dangerously defective, one would think, out of the design.

The political section was equally defective. It left vague certain important points in particular : (a) whether the contracting parties agreed mutually to respect each other's friendly relations with third parties where they had been, on the date of the Treaty, determined by well-defined treaties or understandings analogous to engagements which could not be broken ; and (b) whether they agreed not to negotiate or sign any new agreement without previous consultations between themselves as a first preliminary. There was nothing in the Treaty to compel it to remain permanently in contact with one another in order to enable them to agree—by means of such contact—on all questions affecting their own or the South Indian situation as a whole. Haidar forgot that the Treaty was not an end in itself but a means to an end.

Haidar failed definitely in achieving what he aimed at : a hard and fast mutual assistance pact between himself and the English at Madras. The principle of reciprocity he desired was in the words of the Treaty but the words were not capable of definite interpretation. Its vagueness virtually killed it. There was nothing in the Treaty—outside of it, in the form of subsidiary articles—to compel the parties to intensify co-operation, as the direct result of the Treaty, in the military sphere and in the sphere of war economics. Nor did it mention how the parties were to keep themselves informed about the measures

for the practical provision of the pact they had signed. It seemed a pact of permanent political collaboration and absolute military co-operation; in fact, it pretended to signify the formation of an unbreakable bloc of two friends marching together to some definite end and seemed to advertise to the South Indian world that attempts to set off one partner to the Treaty against the other would prove a miserable failure. But it was really nothing of the sort. It was only a blind and Haider fell an easy prey to it. He was, to diplomatically speak, a child and no wonder he failed to get, when the time came to test it, anything out of the Treaty.

Haider wanted and advocated an open military alliance with the English at Madras. The Open military alliance, the main objective. advocates of such an alliance (in his cabinet) assumed that there must be ultimately a war on the two fronts. They wanted an alliance with Madras on the ground that it would be more advantageous to them to wage a war on somebody else's territory than to have English soldiers looting Mysore villages.

Haider and his cabinet did not believe—or at least made up their minds—that immediate action against the English at Madras was unavoidable. Those who believed that failed—in their view—to realize that by a skilful disintegration of intervening powers—the Mahrattas or the Nizām—they could avoid or at least postpone a war against Madras or thus dispense with the unpleasant necessity of defending themselves on two or even three fronts simultaneously. Both the Mahrattas and the Nizām, in their then status, were as dangerous as friends as foes. As foes, they were dangerous for obvious reasons. But as friends, they would also be dangerous, for they would naturally regard themselves as menaced by a Mysore-Madras alliance. When Mysore was engaged

The English to be
a trading nation.

elsewhere, the Nizām might attack it. Mysore would then be forced to send armies into the Nizām's dominions and thus get into a distraction that would prove a source of danger. In order to make the Mahrattas and the Nizām useful instruments, Haidar first of all tried to destroy the status of the English at Madras. They were emerging as a local power and he desired to disintegrate them, if possible by peaceful strategy. While allowing them to exist as a local trading nation, he desired to break their backbone so as to prevent any independent action on their part. At the same time, they were to be allowed to flourish and grow but only as a trading nation and under control, incapable of independent action on their part. They were not to grow territorially, but as traders they could increase their trade and even grow in making profits for themselves as middlemen do in trade. In the whole of the problem that confronted Haidar, Madras seemed the key. Madras must be captured—in the sense that it was to be wholly dependent on Haidar at Mysore. It should be part of it—if not territorially, at least in the sense in which a dependent town or country would be. The blow to Madras must, however, Haidar held as part of his policy, be softened by concessions in trade. Such compensation was to be adequate but only just adequate and no more. The result of such a bargain was threefold: the English were not to be allowed to become a local power; that was to be countered in a gentle and effective way. Their capacity to ally themselves with the Nizām or the Mahrattas was to sink to zero. And they were to realize slowly but steadily that henceforth they were to exist at Haidar's pleasure.

After some time, it should not be difficult for Haidar to suggest to the English at Madras that the seizure of Arcot—the capital of the hated Muhammad Ali—was a just necessity for Mysore. Nor would it be difficult for

him to create a situation that would make the Nizām and the Mahrattas opposed to each other and the English opposed to both these severally. At the same time, his agents would carry on a campaign of incitement and propaganda in both these countries, with the result that their relationship with the English would soon become unenviable. They would have such insoluble difficulties both at home and abroad as the result of this strategy that they would be ever obedient servants of Haidar. Haidar could then agree to help the English and even guarantee to them peaceful trade for so long as the Sun and Moon lasted. The English would then become a mere company of traders and no more—not provocative enough to Mysore to go to war with it. It would then be possible to keep the temperature on the Madras coast at a level suitable to Mysore. The other two powers would not feel themselves compelled to intervene, for nobody could take objection to the English making their own conditions with Mysore for their own purposes.

His new technique of aggression was neither understood nor studied by the English at Madras. They were, still, more traders than warriors, though they had had opportunities to realize that the times were fast changing. As it was, they viewed matters from the point of view of safeguarding their trading rights. All that they desired was uninterrupted opportunities for trade. Haidar was not slow to note the essential weakness in their position. With him, ambition grew with the perfecting of his new discipline. His easy successes, both at home and abroad, from Goa to Cochin, made him feel that he could try on a wider field. The idea of an Empire embracing all the South, which had taken firm hold of him early in his career and had developed rapidly in his mind under conditions which made him feel that it could be successfully realized if only

it was prosecuted with zeal, came thus to be put in the forefront of his political programme.

The Treaty possessed the subtle significance that Haidar and the English agreed to become *co-belligerents*, if a third party invaded either of their territories, though not, in the exact sense of the term, *allies*. Haidar was not so much anxious to obtain English military aid as to neutralize English military strength, in case a third party attacked him. Their aid he treated as of comparatively trivial import. But as an impressive demonstration of his own strength in the South, he regarded the pact with the English as of great value. That was the real meaning of the Treaty: that he was, for the moment at least, supreme in the South. His self-reliance and self-confidence, always great, shone to advantage by the English signing this Treaty. Mysore, with him as its representative, was not squealing for any outside help. If others could or would lend a hand, well and good. If they could not or would not, Mysore—he said—would be equal to meet and deal with the enemy, whoever he may be.

If, after 1769, Haidar looked on the English as an enemy *direct* or *indirect*, but always the same, it should not surprise us. Haidar always spoke of "Mysore's sacrosanct rights" in Trichinopoly and ever had his eye on it, but death intervened and foiled all attempts at its recovery. Neither Muhammad Ali nor the English at Madras realized to any extent what they were bargaining for with the disappearance of Nanjarāja in the new situation they found themselves in. Before long they were to see how Haidar tried to shape himself. For the moment they were secure in the hope that Mysore had been put off; that Nanjarāja, who coveted Trichinopoly, was fallen, and that Mysore was in the throes of a revolution of its own. But they had lulled themselves

into a sense of false security. Soon they saw the extent of the mistake they had committed. Immediately the war with France broke out again, the French at Pondicherry turned to Mysore and Haidar. They were perplexed at the new position. They knew ere this what a broken reed Muhammad Alī was but they were yet to realize that Haidar was to be to them the bitterest foe they encountered in India.

Haidar had hardly any respite since his return from Madras on the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace. While he was still engaged with the English, the Mahrattas, ever intent upon checking his aggressive policy,¹⁸⁸ had advanced again on the Karnāṭak under a *Sardār* by name Mahimāji Sindhia, commanding 400 horse and a powerful confederacy of the neighbouring Pālegārs.¹⁸⁹ Encamping at Shāhid Ganj, they were about to attempt the acquisition of Gurramkoṇḍa with the aid of Halīm Khān, son of Abdul Majīd Khān, Nawāb of Cuddapah. Haidar, shortly after his return to Bangalore, despatched thither an army of 5,000 horse, 4,000 foot and 4,000 irregulars, commanded by Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao and Mīr Alī Razā Khān. In the action which took place in July 1769, Mahimāji was so thoroughly outnumbered by Haidar's forces that he retreated to Poona by way of Cuddapah and Gooty.¹⁹⁰ Haidar had, however, by now intelligence from Poona that the visit of Mādhava Rao to the south was not relinquished but deferred, and he determined to employ the intervening time in acquiring such means as should enable him to meet the Pēshwa's heavy demands in the succeeding year.¹⁹¹ The secret

188. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXXVII, Letter No. 168, dated February 16, 1769.

189. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 44; also *Press List: Foreign Series* (1766-1774), I. 186.

190. *Ibid.*, ff. 44-45; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, o.c., Letter No. 172, dated July 19, 1769.

191. *Wilks, o.c.*, I. 682

articles of the treaty between Haidar and Nizām Ali (1767) for the joint invasion of Coromandel having provided for the transfer to the former of Cuddapah, Kurnool and other places between the Tungabhadra and the northern limits of Mysore as nominal dependencies, Haidar deemed it expedient to substantiate the existence of the right by its early exercise. Accordingly

Haidar levies contributions from Cuddapah, Kurnool, Gad-vāl, etc., July-December 1769.

he personally took the field, and moved to the north-east, levying contributions from the chiefs of Cuddapah, Kurnool, Kenchalugūḍa (Kenchan-gūḍa) and Gadvāl. Thence he inclined westward, exacting sums from the Pālegārs of Coticunda (Kōtikonda) and Kupthal (Kupgal, 35 miles from Raichūr, on the M. & S. M. Ry.), and deviated to Gooty, where he received with apparent complacency the amicable advance of Murāri Rao. From Gooty, Haidar proceeded to Bellary, a dependency of Adoni, the *jahgīr* of Basālat Jang, where his demand of contribution being refused, he prepared to enforce it, and was beaten off with great loss, in an attempt to carry the place by a general assault. Accepting the professions of dependency and the promise only of future contribution, Haidar moved from Bellary in a nearly south-western line, securing the contributions from the Pālegārs dependent on Sīra, and assuming a direction apparently intended to oppose the invasion of Mādhava Rao, beyond his own frontiers, in the province of Savanūr.¹⁹²

Pēshwa Mādhava Rao vs. Haidar, December 1769-January 1770.

Alarmed by these movements, the Pēshwa, in December, marched against Haidar, questioning his right to levy contributions from the Pālegārs directly under his (Pēshwa's)

192. *Ibid.*, 684-685. See also and compare *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 45-46; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 298-298. Kirmāṇi, however, sets down this northern campaign of Haidar to 1771 (A. H. 1185), which is not in keeping with the other sources. According to Kirmāṇi, Haidar levied from Halim Khān of Cuddapah, and Munawar Khān of Kurnool, Rupees five

control, and challenging him to submit the issue to the arbitrament of war.¹⁹³ Mādhava Rao advanced south of the Krishna and was within 20 *kōś* from Haidar.¹⁹⁴ The forces of the Pēshwa were too superior in number and in quality to admit of open competition in that plain country, and Haidar had once before suffered by the experiment of resisting him in the woods of Bednūr. The military talents of Mādhava Rao were certainly of a high order; and Haidar did homage to those talents in retiring as he advanced along the skirts of the woods to the protection of Seringapatam in January 1770, leaving Mīr Alī Razā Khān and Tipū in the borders of Bednūr to hang on the rear of the Mahrattas, intercept their supplies and cut off their detachments.¹⁹⁵ Crossing the Tungabhadra on the back of his elephant *Imām Baksh*, Haidar eventually encamped at Hassan.¹⁹⁶ Following him, Mādhava Rao, accompanied by Medekere Nāyaka of Chitaldrug and Murāri Rao, marched on to Seringapatam by way of Penukōṇḍa, overrunning the territories of Mysore up to Nāgamangala,¹⁹⁷ for the Pēshwa was not to be satisfied with anything short of completely humbling Haidar.¹⁹⁸

lakhs each; and from the Pālegārs of Gadvāl and Kupthal, Rupees two lakhs each. The details of the campaign couched in the usual inimitable metaphorical style of Kirmāñi would afford interesting reading to the general reader. Kenchaluguḍa, referred to in the text above, is identical with *Kenchanaguḍḍam*, now a village on the bank of the Tungabhadra, four miles S.W. of Siruguppa, Bellary Taluk. The place contains a lower fort in which most of its inhabitants reside and another on the top of the rock called *Kenchanaguḍḍa*, which gives the village its name. At the foot of this rock is the temple of Gangādhara, imbedded in the southern wall of which is a long inscription dated A.D. 1708, giving the genealogy of one Kenchana Guḍḍa, who is stated to have built the temple and the upper fort, whence the name. (*Gazetteer of Bellary Dist.*, ch. XV: see under *Bellary Taluk*)

193. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 46.

194. *Ibid.*; also *Mily. Sund.*, XLV. 76, referring to *Letter* from Poona, dated January 18, 1770.

195. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 685.

196. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

197. *Ibid.*, ff. 47; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *o.c.*, *Letter* Nos. 194-195, dated February 15, 1770.

198. *Ibid.*; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *o.c.*, *Letter* No. 194, cited *supra*.

Haidar, realising too well the character and abilities of the Mahratta chief to hope for a successful termination of the war by his own unaided efforts, deputed Razā Ali Khān (son of Chandā Sāhib) and Appāji Rām, to treat for an adjustment of his demands. Mādhava Rao demanded a crore of rupees on the ground that Haidar had levied on *his* Pāle-gārs large sums of money; and owed on his own account two years' tribute, estimated by the Pēshwa at twelve lakhs annually. Haidar, in answer to these exorbitant demands, observed that he was a soldier of fortune, and possessed no treasure but his sword; that the territories of Mysore had been recently ravaged and the Mysorean treasury exhausted; but that if twelve lakhs would satisfy him for the present, he would endeavour to collect it. The negotiation failed; Appāji Rām returned, though Razā Ali took advantage of the opportunity by renouncing his connection with Haidar and remaining under the protection of Mādhava Rao.¹⁹⁹

199. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 686-688; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *o.c.*, *Letter* Nos. 187, 190, 192, dated January 5, 15, and February 1, 1770. The circumstances connected with Razā Ali Khān's separation from Haidar are worth noting here incidentally. "In the event of complete success in the late confederacy with Nizam Ali," writes Wilks, "the Nabobship of Arcot was to have been at Hyder's disposal; and he had alternately given confidential hints of encouragement to Maphuz Khan and to Reza Ali; and rumour had carried to other countries an assurance that the deeds of investiture had been actually executed by Nizam Ali in the name of Tippoo. But it is the opinion of all those who were most intimately acquainted with Hyder's character and habits, that he never would have conferred during his life-time, on either of those persons, that or any other authority which he could himself retain. The proposed marriage of Reza Ali with his daughter was the bond of union by which Hyder persuaded that person that the dignity was intended for him, and since the peace which terminated the project of sovereignty, that of the matrimonial union had been revived; but now that the connexion was shorn of its political lustre, Reza Ali, who had been reconciled to it by that single consideration,

Stiff fighting, however, continued between the Mysorean and Mahratta troops.²⁰⁰

A stiff fight, January-May 1770.

About February, when a section of the Mahratta army under Gōpāl Rao, Daulat Rao Bhōnsle and other *Sardārs* was encamped near Māsūr, Haider surprised them by a night attack, capturing horses, palankeens, tents, flags, utensils, etc., in their camp, and cutting off the noses and ears of the men in their ranks.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, Pēshwa Mādhava Rao, accompanied by garrisons regularly organized, and independent of his field force, passed for the present the woody tract on his right, and proceeded to occupy all the posts in the districts of Kaḍūr, Bāpāvār, Hassan and Bēlūr, and from thence eastward. Passing for the present Sāvandurg and Bangalore, he reduced Nandidurg, Chikballāpur and Doḍballāpur, Kōlār and Muḷbāgal, and nearly the whole range of open country to the eastern boundary, including Minchukaldurga and Dēvarāyadurga. His progress was, however, arrested

The siege and capitulation of Nijagal, February-May 1770.

for a considerable time by the fort of Nijagal, about thirty miles north-west of Bangalore. After the commencement of the siege, Sardār Khān, a reputed officer of Haider, had been detached from Bangalore to throw himself into the place by a forced night march, and assume the command. With a force of 3,000 men, he continued for three months to foil the

was alive to nothing but disgust at the degradation of the alliance; and having resolved to avert it by flight, availed himself of his present situation, to remain under the protection of Madoo Row, whose proceedings seemed to abandon the ordinary routine of Mahratta plunder, and to point to the fixed conquest of the whole country." (o.c., I. 687-688).

200. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 47-49; *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, o.c., Letter Nos. 182-207 (January-May 1770.)

201. *Ibid.*, ff. 49; *Mily. Count. Corres.*, XVIII. Letter Nos. 55, 64 and 90—Haider Ali to Governor of Madras (February-April 1770); Peixoto, *Memoirs*, 162.

efforts of the Mahratta chief, during which period Nārāyaṇa Rao, his brother, was wounded by a bullet shot on his right wrist in directing the operations of the siege after an unsuccessful assault; and Mādhava Rao, already sufficiently indignant at being detained at the fort, ordered it to be instantly stormed, and no man to return at the peril of his life. The assault was, nevertheless, again repulsed and Mādhava Rao, in a fit of overwhelming rage, ordered fresh troops for the storm, placing himself at their head. At this juncture, the Pālegār of Chitaldrug with his colleagues, encouraged by valuable presents from the Pēshwa and the promise of remission of their *Pēshkāsh* for two years, interposed to solicit the post of danger, offering to undergo the penalty that the Pēshwa might inflict on him if he returned unsuccessful from the breach. This chivalrous offer being accepted, the Pālegār, placing himself at the head of his brave *Bēdars*, carried the place on the 1st of May; and Mādhava Rao, in retaliation for the punishment which Haidar had lately ordered to be practised on the Mahratta soldiery, directed the noses and ears of all the survivors of the garrison at Nijagal to be cut off on the spot. Sardār Khān was last led out, and approached with a firm step and undaunted aspect. Being questioned by the Pēshwa as to the consistency of his own person being also mutilated and disgraced, Sardār Khān replied, "the mutilation will be mine, the disgrace yours," whereupon Mādhava Rao immediately ordered his unconditional release. Mādhava Rao continued his operations in Mysore with unprecedented success, and Haidar's

fortunes were at a low ebb during
Pēshwa Mādhava Rao retires to Poona, May 1770. May, when the Pēshwa, broken down in health—for he had been the victim of a deadly attack of consumption—retired from the army to Poona, accompanied by his brother, leaving his

uncle Triambak Rao Māma at the head of 40,000 horse, to prosecute the war.²⁰²

However dazzling the prospects of Mahratta domination south of the Krishṇa during the last years of Pēshwa Mādhava Rao, his sudden departure, followed by his untimely demise two and a half years later, proved the death-blow to the Bednūr Rāṇi, whose cause he had professedly espoused since 1764. We have seen how he compromised with Haidar, just before concluding the Treaty of Bednūr, in 1765, when he could have easily taken Bednūr and restored the Rāṇi.²⁰³ Though there is reason to believe that he had not totally deserted the Rāṇi then but only postponed action to a little later date, still it cannot but be remarked that he did not exert himself in the Rāṇi's interests. The attitude of Mādhava Rao after the fall of Bednūr was, from the point of view of Rāṇi Virammāji, a disastrous one. For Mādhava Rao left Mysore without raising his little finger on her behalf. She and her son had been fed upon hopes—hopes never to be fulfilled. But by allowing them to rot in their hill captivity, they were wholly incapacitated from action. They saw no sign

202. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 688-690; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 48-49; *Sol. Pesh. Daft.*, *o.c.*, Letter Nos. 203-204, 206-207, dated in April-May 1770. In connection with the siege and capitulation of Nijagal, see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 152-154. Kirmāṇi sets down this event to 1762 (A. H. 1176), and mixes it up with the Mahratta campaign of 1767, which is also set down to 1762. As regards the assistance rendered by the Pālegār of Chitaldrug to the Pēshwa during the siege of Nijagal, "Hyder", as Wilks observes, "never forgave this memorable instance of attachment to his enemy; and it was the ground of the subsequent destruction of that Poligār" (*o.c.*, I. 689, f. n.).

203. See *Ante*, Vol. II. p. 514. In confirmation of what is stated above, it may be mentioned that among the conditions that Mādhava Rao and Nizām Ali were to agree with the English, as the result of the conversation of the English envoys to be sent to the former (in 1767) was this one: that Bednūr should be handed over to the Mahrattas, and restored by them to the Bednūr Chief's family. (See Col. Love, *Report on the Palk Mss.*, 22-43.)

of a move in their behalf for long. Mādhava Rao came and went back, attending to his own objectives. During his campaign of 1767, he put up a fight for and released Rāṇi Virammāji and her adopted son from their confinement in the hill fort of Maddagiri. Rāṇi Virammāji, however, after her release, died on her way to Poona, and her adopted son also passed away later at the Mahratta capital. There was a hiatus of nearly three years' time between the release of the Royal captives²⁰⁴ and the Pēshwa's final and most successfully conducted campaign of 1770, and whether they died within that period or not, Mādhava Rao's neglect to reinstate a *scion* of the Bednūr house on the *masnad* was neither just to him nor in keeping with the promises he had presumably held out to Rāṇi Virammāji and her partisans. Indeed, his failure to do this bare act of justice has to be reckoned as perhaps the only blot on his otherwise unblemished character. That may seem a harsh judgment but historical justice demands it. Though it is rather difficult to say at this distance of time what the Pēshwa would have done for the unfortunate royal refugees had he not been cut off in the middle of a most promising career, it is clear that Mādhava Rao put off energetic action at the very moment when it would have been expected from him. It is not denied that, had he been spared sometime longer, he might have moved in the matter of rendering some justice to them, at least in discharging some part of the duty he had undertaken in their behalf when they placed themselves, after the insurrection, in his hands. Whether any money passed into Mahratta hands then, it is not known. Perhaps, it did, the Rāṇi and her associates parting with perhaps their last jewels and gold. He might have tried to use Bednūr as a buffer State between the Mahrattas and

204. *Ibid.*, pp. 515-516.

Mysore in pursuing the expansionist policy of his predecessors. Looking to his policy of vacillation, his object in sending the queen and her adopted son to Poona was for no better purpose, perhaps, than to use them as a pawn in his future fight with Mysore. The interests of his own nation seem thus to have far out-weighed considerations for the just rights and expectations of an ancient neighbour in distress. With the deaths of Vīrammāji and of Mādhava Rao, Bednūr lost all chance of regaining its individuality. Being merged for ever in the kingdom of Mysore, the Mahrattas cast their own covetous eyes on it till so late as January 1792, when Paraśūrām Bhau Patwardhan, as we shall see, relinquished his last attempt on it.

In the midst of pressing and strenuous military operations described in the foregoing pages, Haidar hardly forgot the duty he owed of paying formal homage to his sovereign, the reigning King Nanjarāja Wodeyar, as the *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore. On the 27th of February 1770, eleven days after his arrival at Seringapatam, at the end of his first encounter with the Mahrattas in the Bednūr region, he visited the King.²⁰⁵ "The Nabob," in the words of the contemporary Peixoto,²⁰⁶ "quitted his Palace and went to that of the great King, and was received by the King with attention in the customary form, which is, the King remains sitting, and the Nabob to throw himself at his feet. The King wanted to exempt the Nabob from this humble ceremony, but the Nabob did it instantly. The King then ordered him to sit down, which he did, after

205. Peixoto, *o.c.*, 151. The office of *Sarvādhikāri* was an ancient one and combined, at the time we are writing of, practically all executive power. It ceased to exist in Mysore after 1799. It still exists, in an attenuated form, in the Travancore and Cochin States.

206. *Ibid.*, 151-152.

saying he could not sit in his presence. There was with the King his mother, who, it is said, is a lady of good judgement, and daughter of the Rajah Nande Rajah [Nanjarājaiya]....., and after the compliments were over, during which the Queen mother looked very grave, the Nabob told the King that the Marrata (the Mahratta Pēshwa) was come with great power to contribute that kingdom, and that he asked a very great sum which seemed to him too much, wherefore he would rather fight and shew him that this kingdom dreaded not his power, that he hath been in the field on that account and hath already shown his intentions.....that he, the Mahratta, did not stand to give battle, but only took satisfaction to ruin the country as much as possible, breaking, burning and totally ruining the inhabitants, which he could not hinder him from, as the Marratta force did consist in cavalry, and his own in foot. Wherefore he acquainted him, that he might order him what he thought proper in this particular. The King answered him, 'I and this whole kingdom' do not dread any invasion of the Mahratta, nor any other enemy, as long as God preserves your life. All what you do for the utility, conservation and ease of the people, are precious enamels with which you augment your name. The security and defence of the kingdom is in your hand, and in me the confidence that you will prosper in everything.' The Nabob remained mute without answering the King, and without any farther long stay, took his leave and came to his Palace." The language is characteristic of Peixoto and the representations attributed to Haidar have to be taken as that of a cunning courtier who assumed the rôle of a humble servant of his Sovereign. The record of sober history is the best corrective that could be applied to them, if we are to extract the truth from them.

The Mahrattas under Triambakrao Māma, as related above, were continuing their excursions in and about Mysore, and Haidar was actively preparing to repulse them, when, on August 2, 1770, King Nanjarāja Woḍeyar passed away in the Palace at Seringapatam, in his twenty-second year.²⁰⁷ “He [Nanjarāja Woḍeyar] was not,” records Peixoto,²⁰⁸ “sick, but was found dead on the morning of the said day. This did cause great inward sorrow to all, not only his vassals, but even to the most part of the grandees of the camp, for.....he showed such a Royal presence of spirit by which it was judged that he would not suffer much time the subjection in which he was kept by the Nabob, but Death made an end of these hopes. The author of this success is known, of whom fear does not permit to make mention of. In the night in which he died, which was at 2 o'clock in the morning, he hath drank, after supper, a cup of milk which the Nabob hath sent him. As soon as it was day, and it was divulged that the King was dead, the Nabob seemed to be sorry, and sent instantly to examine into the cause of this success; sent for the surgeon who attends annually in the Royal Palace and asked him the motive of that success; he knew to answer no more than that after it was already night, he hath retired from the Palace to his House and that he hath left the King in health, and that this was all he could say to the Nabob. The surgeon was put prisoner

207. *Ibid*, 157; also *Annals*, I. 206: *Vikṛitī, Śrāvṇa śu. 10*. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 53) roughly dates the death of Nanjarāja in 1771 (*Khara*). And so does Stewart (*o.c.*, 18). Dēvachandra (*Rāj. Kath.*, XII. 490) and Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 704-705) place the event in 1772 (*Nandana*), for which there is no evidence whatever.

208. *Ibid*, 157-158. The *Haid. Nām.* maintains a discreet silence on this topic. Dēvachandra and Wilks (*l.c.*) record the tradition that Nanjarāja was strangled in the bath by orders of Haidar. In the absence of confirmatory evidence, the authority of the contemporary Peixoto is preferred here.

and condemned to pay a great sum into the Royal Treasury, accusing him greatly of the King's death, and in this manner the Nabob shews his sorrow by the surgeon's prison, and by the condemnation, utility to his Treasury, where all the Nabob's interests do center....." Evidently, Nanjarāja Wodeyar being found to be a promising young man with an independent turn of mind, Haidar contrived to bring about his death by administering poison to him, thus preparing the ground for a more pliant King of Mysore.²⁰⁹

And so passed away, quietly in his bed, King Nanjarāja, just as he was entering his majority, a victim to the madness that seems to have possessed Haidar at this moment. He committed no crime against Haidar, his "servant," as the latter described himself in open Durbar; he but showed signs of manliness, of independence of spirit, and of love for what was his own. He did not know that Death was lurking in the shadows, challenging the Divine rule, evidently believing that the ecstasy of earthly rule is its own reward, whatever may happen. His worst crime, in Haidar's eyes, seems to

209. There is no evidence in support of Wilks' position (l. c.) that Nanjarāja Wodeyar "had made the vain attempt of opening up a communication" with the Mahrattas (under Triambak Rao Māma) against Haidar, which induced the latter to order his strangling in the bath, etc. If De La Tour is to be believed (see text, p. 1 and f.n. 2 *supra*), Haidar was at the very outset opposed to the accession of Nanjarāja, being the elder of the two sons of Immaḍi-Krishnarāja, and favoured that of his (Nanjarāja's) younger brother Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja, a boy of seven, in 1766. Nanjarāja's accession having, however, been brought about by Haidar's agent Saiyid Mokhdum, under the influence of the court party, during Haidar's absence from Seringapatam, Haidar quietly acquiesced in it and was biding his time till 1770, when he found an opportunity to remove him, as mentioned above. Haidar, like his predecessors, the Dalavāis, always found it safe to carry on his *regime* as the virtual regent of Mysore, with boy-kings nominally on its throne. Peixoto suggests that "the author of this success is known" and adds, "of whom fear does not permit to make mention of." Haidar was the undoubted "author", while the instrument was probably a wretched nobody.

have been that he should have shown any gesture of a will of his own, of kingliness, or of royal magnificence. Haidar pictured his own destruction in the existence of a king who could assert himself at any time, then or thereafter. Thus was denied to the youthful Nanjarāja

“...the ripest fruit of all,

That perfect bliss and sole felicity,

The sweet fruition of an earthly crown.”

The hand of the secret assassin snatched away from him what the Almighty had blessed him with at his birth.

The Dowager Queen, who had befriended Haidar, must have seen in the murder of King

The Dowager
Queen's error.

Nanjarāja the hand of the hard-hearted tyrant she was daily dealing with.

She must have realized too that the change from Dalavāi Nanjarājaiya to Haidar was no better than a change from king Stork to king Log. If anything, so far as she herself was concerned, it had proved something worse. There is evidence to believe that she had been centring her hope in King Nanjarāja. But her hopes were finally blasted with his disappearance from the earthly scene. It was some time before she or those around her could gather strength to assert themselves or help to rouse popular goodwill against the man who was showing a tendency to transgress the bounds of his office by the arbitrary exercise of his will.

If Lopez, the Jewish physician, deserved death for participation in a plot to poison

The wages of sin is
death.

Queen Elizabeth in the sixteenth century, what punishment should have

been meted out to the perpetrators of a similar conspiracy to do away with Nanjarāja, King of Mysore, in the eighteenth century? Public feeling had been stirred to the depths in England against a dastardly attempt on a popular sovereign. Here, in Mysore, tyranny had so far succeeded in suppressing public

feeling in the matter, that not a whisper was heard of it, though, if we are to believe Peixoto, there should have been deep though silent and sullen discontent at this infamous act of Haidar. He was the one man responsible for it, if ever any one man was. It was his personal direction that encompassed the dire act, though the actual hand that perpetrated it was that of another. The voice was the voice of Esau, though the hand was the hand of Jacob.²¹⁰

What would people—even people closely associated with Haidar—have thought or said of this dark deed of his? To us, who are far removed from it, both in time and relationship, it might seem the act of a man who combined ambition to savagery of a certain kind that made him dead to the finer human instincts. We who have been brought up under different conditions—under conditions which within the past three centuries and more have made us submit to the ever growing sensibility and broadening tolerance of a newer age—are extremely apt to take far more lenient views of the great villains of history than were possible in more crude but not less robust times. Our advance in scientific thinking, with its strong emphasis upon the shaping forces of heredity and environment, compels us to allow so much for even the more violent perversions of character that our judgments are qualified, if not, indeed, warped, by countless considerations which the

210. For the story of Dr. Roderigo Lopez, the famous Jewish physician, who was executed on 7th June 1594, on a charge of being bribed by the king of Spain to poison Queen Elizabeth, whose physician he was, see Sidney Lee, *The Original of Shylock* in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, February 1889. For a handy reference, the reader may be referred to Prof. Hudson's edition of the *Merchant of Venice* in the *Elizabethan Shakespeare* (First Folio Edition), published by Messrs. G. G. Harrap & Co., London, where he will find a suggestive study of the development of Shylock's character. In the English story, the doctor plays a prominent part, while in the Mysore one, the doctor is unjustly blamed for an act for which he was responsible neither physically nor morally.

moralists of the olden time would have simply set aside as altogether irrelevant, if not absurd. What is worse, we have of late—within the past century—so far reconciled ourselves to a certain lowering of moral standards that we are very near realizing the “Heaven and Hell Amalgamation Society,” so much dreaded by Carlyle. Hence, one would think, the careless handling of the ethics of motive and passion common to our times and the easy habit of allowing might to take the place that ought justly to belong to right. The people of Haidar’s days took a sterner view of men and morals. They were not troubled by the abstruse considerations that influence our judgment to-day. They did not gloss over things—though they may not have always risen against an evil-doer and put him down, there and then, as a tyrant and a murderer. They knew what was happening before their eyes. They condemned foul deeds like that of Haidar both publicly and privately, while they waited for the hour when such things could be no more. To them Haidar looked an unmitigated murderer who dared anything to continue in power, but for whom they had no respect except to the extent that it might have been exacted by him because of the very cruelty he practised. That this is how we are to understand the reactions of the people of the time to his wicked deed—the murder of a promising young ruler, his sovereign and master—is made clear by Peixoto’s condemnatory reference to it. The young King was not only promising but also is presented to us, by way of contrast, as the very embodiment of a manly, good and honourable soul who positively did not merit such a hard fate.

There is, however, another aspect of the matter to consider. Haidar, by his cruel and treacherous act, put himself down as one destitute of loyalty and even

Conflicting motives
and passions.

common humanity. He encompassed the murder of an innocent, young king, who had done nothing against him to merit such extreme treachery on his part. To say so is to admit that we have only gone part of our way in understanding Haidar's true character. It still remains for us to trace how much more was in it which did not grow out of what was really native to it, but was really alien to it. In the midst of his savage purpose, Haidar was, we have to concede, a man. He was not a mere monster, who mechanically perpetrated cold-blooded deeds. Despite the tendencies of the times and his own baser instincts, to which he fell a prey sometimes, there is enough in him to show that he was a humanized being. It is this humanizing touch in him that helped to individualize him and made him convincing as a man among men. That explains to some small extent the great hold he had upon the imagination of the men of his time and has even upon those who to-day read of what he said or did, and which goes not a little to account for the kindly good-will he has invariably received both from his contemporaries and from the men and women of later ages. In his case, we do feel that he is a humanized being, because he is not, like other historical characters we might easily quote, a mere personification of evil, but a complex human being, in whom many motives and passions strive for mastery. We have seen in him thus far the play of at least three conflicting motives and passions—his love of money as a means to an end, the end being political mastery; his hatred for every one who comes in the way of his attaining that mastery; and worse than either of these, his personal animosity against Nanjarāja, whom he dreaded far more for his cunning than even for the power that he might, perchance, wield against him to his discomfiture at a moment when he least expected it. In his view, Nanjarāja still had influence

with the Palace party. As one or another of these passions gains the upper hand, we see one or another aspect of Haidar's character coming to the forefront. When his greed and personal ferocity assert themselves—and these predominate in the main in him—then we recognize in him, despite his undoubted individual qualities of intellectuality and mordant humour, the familiar features of the old military adventurer of vulgar imagination. When his personal feelings, however, rise, as now and then they certainly do, superior to these animal instincts in him, then Haidar becomes for the moment a far different person and a truly impressive figure. His directions carry moral weight; his doings assume a mighty purpose; his fights lift him far above the sordid and brutal ideas to which he seems to have been born heir to; in a word, he becomes a sort of symbol, despite his birth, religion and up-bringing, of the national fight that Mysore put up to avert the awful tragedy that the 18th century witnessed in Southern India.

It is because of the nobler traits in his character that Haidar becomes the central figure in the history of the 18th century India.

Haidar beside
himself.

It is because of these very traits that he was and is sometimes reckoned, even to this day, a commanding figure, while the darker aspects of his character tend to be forgotten, if not wholly forgiven him. It is because of these self-same traits that he stands out as an unique historical character, despite the many manifestly cruel deeds perpetrated by himself or through his agents. The interesting question arises, to whom did he owe these nobler traits? Were they a gift of the great Creator, inborn in him? Or, were they acquired by him by his personal contact with his master Nanjarāja, who was undoubtedly his political teacher? There can be no doubt that he owed his idea of the conquest of the South to Nanjarāja. In working out this

idea, Haidar outran himself, simply lost control of himself, without any idea of what he was doing, to the extent even of not matching deeds to the morals of his own time. Unmistakably he was wrong, egregiously wrong, if morality has any meaning; if loyalty has any basis; and if virtue has at all to subsist in the political domain. He did the dark deed because he was beside himself. And as for Haidar, the humanized being, quite apart from the beast in him, well, all one can say is that he should be presumed to have stood apart, and to have made record of the foul deed he encompassed, saying unto himself, after it was done, much like what Thackeray said of some of the characters he created, "How the dickens did he come to think of that." Haidar plainly could not subjugate the baser, fiercer elements in his own character and fell a prey to them. He did not realize that the disappearance of the young king was no more needed for the accomplishment of his personal aims and ambitions, whatever they may have been, than that of an ant in the Royal household. It was not in his nature to seek kingship at any time. While his wicked deed served no purpose whatever, political or other, it only served to blacken his character in the public eye to an extent of which he should have become conscious only when he had regained his balance of mind.

CHAPTER II.

BETTADA-CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VII, 1770-1776.

Birth, accession, etc.—Mysore-Mahratta relations (continued), 1770-1772: The Mahratta advance on Mysore, January-March 1776—Haidar's movements, January-February 1771—The strategic position of the hills of Melkote—The siege of Melkote, February-March 1771—Haidar's retreat, March 5-6, 1771—The action at Chinkurli, March 6, 1771; Haidar's flight to Seringapatam, March 7, 1771—A tough siege: The Mahrattas before Seringapatam, March-May 1771—Haidar and the Mahrattas below the *ghats*, May-June 1771—Developments nearer home, 1771-1772; Bednur, the objective of the Mahrattas—Haidar counteracts, April 1772—Towards Peace, April-June 1772; Peace concluded, and the Mahrattas retire, June 1772—Campaign against Chitaldrug, Harapanahalli, etc., 1772—Expedition to Malabar, 1773-1774—Invasion of Coorg, 1774—Renewed relations with the Mahrattas (down to 1774): A retrospect of affairs—Haidar-Raghoba negotiations, March 1774; the Treaty between them—The Treaty and after; fall of Sira, Maddagiri and Channarayadurg, April-July 1774—Fall of Hoskote, Dodballapur and Gurramkonda, July-October 1774—Insurrection in Coorg, 1774-1775—Further campaigns in the north, 1775-1776: Retrospect of affairs—The combinations against Haidar; Basalat Jang's siege of Bellary; Haidar's forced marches to Bellary, November 1775—His reduction of Bellary—Advance on Kuragodu, Kenchanguda, Adoni, Kurnool, etc., November-December 1775—Haidar vs. Murari Rao of Gooty—Haidar approaches Gooty, December 1775—Siege of Gooty, December 1775-March 1776: Its strategic position; Haidar takes the town and lower fort, January 1776—Pushes through the siege of the upper fort, January-March 1776; Murari Rao sues for peace, March 1776—Haidar sought to be outwitted by Murari—Haidar prepares himself to renew the siege—Capitulation and fall of Murari Rao, March-April 1776—Reflections on the fall—Haidar completes the conquest of Murari Rao's territories, April 1776—Campaign in the Tungabhadra-Krishna *Doab*,



Bettada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar VII, 1770-1776.

May-June 1776; Haidar at Anegondi, July 1776; returns to Seringapatam, August 1776—Death of King Bettada-Chamaraja Wodeyar, September 16, 1776—Poisoned by Haidar.

ON AUGUST 16, 1770, fifteen days after the death of Nanjarāja Wodeyar in the manner described in the preceding Chapter, Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar, his younger brother aged eleven (b. August 27, 1759), was formally installed by Haidar on the throne of Mysore.¹ A lithic record from Bēlūr, dated in 1774, speaks of [Beṭṭada] Chāmarāja Wodeyar as king when Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān Bahadūr was administering the kingdom.² Another document, a private copper-plate grant from Vanavāsi, Salem district, dated in 1775, also belongs to Chāmarāja's reign, although he appears mentioned in the record as "Immaḍi-Vira-Rāja Uḍaiyar at Maisūr."³ A third record, assignable to the reign, is a letter addressed in the name of Chāmarāja Wodeyar to the

1. *Annals*, I. 207: *Vikriti, Śrāvana* ba. 10. The contemporary writer Peixoto, who hardly mentions the name of the successor of Nanjarāja Wodeyar, speaks of him as of "about eight years of age" at the time of his accession in August 1770 (*Memoirs*, 168). The *Haid. Nam.* (ff. 53) roughly places the accession of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar in 1771 (*Khara*); Wilks in 1772 (*p.o.*, I. 705); and Stewart also about 1772 (*Memoirs*, 18). The authority of the *Annals* for the date of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja's accession is to be preferred here, supported as it is by Peixoto's statement. The *Annals*, however, in one place (I. 179), refers to Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja as the eldest son of Immaḍi-Krishṇarāja Wodeyar. But, according to the earlier chronicles *Mys. Raj. Cha.* (44) and *Raj. Kath.* (XII. 490), he was the younger son. Stewart spells the king's name as "Syāma Raiji" and Wilks as "Cham Raj."
2. *E.C.*, V Bl. 65: *Jaya*. The record refers to the construction of a tower and the setting up of a pinnacle (*Kalasa*) thereon, in the Channakēśava temple at Bēlūr, by one Nanjaiya. For a further notice of this inscription, see *Ante* Vol. II. Ch. XII, f.n. 86.
3. *I.M.P.*, II. 1220, Sa. 185: *Manmatha*. There was no earlier king of Mysore by name Virarāja Wodeyar. Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar, the reigning king of Mysore during 1770-1776, was the younger of the two grandsons of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, i.e., son of the latter's daughter Dēvājamma of Kaḷale, senior queen of Immaḍi-Krishṇarāja Wodeyar. Karāchūri's father was Dajavāi Virarāja, and Karāchūri himself had a son by name Virarāja (see *Ante* Vol. II. Ch. XV). It is possible that the name Virarāja Wodeyar, mentioned in the record

Śringēri *math*.⁴ Evidently Haidar, while continuing to exercise himself all real power as the *Sarvādhikāri* of the State, professed outwardly to retain the semblance of royalty of the ancient Ruling House of Mysore.

Haidar had hardly a few months' respite after his late struggle with the Mahrattas, when they again engaged his attention. On the departure of Pēshwa Mādhava Rao to Poona in May 1770, Triambak Rao Māma, his maternal uncle, who was left to prosecute the war in the Karnātak, proceeded to the attack of Gurramkoṇḍa, commanded by Saiyid Sāhib, nephew of Mīr Sāhib. The place sustained a siege of two months and capitulated through the intervention and guarantee of Murāri Rao of Gooty (whose recent reconciliation with Haidar had been followed by an immediate junction with his enemy Mādhava Rao) for the personal safety of the Commandant, who, however, retired to Adoni. After leaving the subāh of Gurramkoṇḍa under Bāji Rao Nāmajāta, Triambak Rao, in January 1771, advanced westwards on Mysore, accompanied by Murāri Rao, the Pālegārs of Chitaldrug, Ratnagiri, Miḍagēśi and other places, and the Paṭhān Chiefs of Savaṇūr and Cuddapah. Reinforced, in February, by a detachment of 4,000 horse under Appa Balavant Rao from Poona, Triambak Rao took in rapid succession Tumkūr, Dēvarāyadurg and the posts and territories to

under reference, was a second name of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Woḍeyar, bestowed on him after his maternal great-grandfather Viruraja. He was probably so referred to in the absence of correct information as to the name the new king took after his accession, in the remoter parts of the kingdom of Mysore.

4. *M.A.R.*, 1916, pp. 72-73, para 132. For the text, see *Sel-Bec. Sringeri Mutt*, I. 56-57, No. 41. The letter is addressed to His Holiness Śrī Sachchidānanda-Bhārati-Svāmi (1770-1814). It acknowledges the receipt of offerings (*Prasāda*) and presents sent through the agent Rāma Śāstri, and informs the Svāmi that cloths, six ornaments and an elephant for bringing water for the sacred bath of the Goddess Śārada had been sent through the same individual, and that orders would be issued for the satisfactory management of *math* villages.

the northward of those which had been occupied in the first instance by Murāri Rao, and marched on towards Seringapatam.⁵

Meantime Haidar, who, exclusively of the main army at Seringapatam, had a considerable force at Bangalore, had made detachments from each of these places, as opportunity occurred, to beat up

the Mahratta quarters, or attempt the recovery of some of the neighbouring places. Already in the end of January 1771, a strong detachment had been sent by night from Bangalore, in the expectation of being able to carry Dodballāpur (twenty-four miles distant) by surprise. The enterprise, however, not only failed in its object but the detachment, exhausted with fatigue, suffered itself to be surprised in its return, and was entirely cut to pieces by Triambak Rao, who from thence moved to the plain immediately north-west of Hutridurg. On receipt of intelligence of Triambak Rao's intentions, however, Haidar, returning rapidly with his troops and artillery, arrived at Seringapatam. Resolved to make a trial of his good fortune and military skill with a force of 12,000 good horse, 15,000 regular infantry, 10,000 peons or irregular infantry, armed with matchlocks or pikes, and 40 field-guns against nearly double the disposable force of Triambak Rao which after the junction of Appa Balavant Rao amounted to about 40,000 horse with 10,000 infantry and some guns, Haidar, in conformity to the plan which he had formed, moved in the direct line by Channapatam and the woody country between it and Sāvandurg (near Māgaḍi) to assume a position to the north-west of that rock, both for securing his retreat to its protection in the

5. Wilks, *o.c.* I. 690-691; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 50; see also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 188-190), who sets down Triambak Rao's invasion to 1768 (A. H. 1182), and erroneously speaks of the event as having taken place after Pēshwa Mādhava Rao's death, etc. !

event of disaster, and for attacking and harassing the rear of the Mahratta, should he venture to besiege Seringapatam. In this situation, Haidar offered battle to the Mahratta army. Triambak Rao perceived at the first glance that no impression could be made on the enemy while he occupied his present ground; and resolved to draw him from it by moving across his front and appearing to disperse his army, for forage and subsistence, over the whole face of the country to the north-west, which was visible from the top of the rock. Haidar was not deceived by this demonstration, but, deeming the reputation of being able to keep the field to be essential to the success of the negotiations in which he was engaged, he determined to move from one strong position to another, in the hope of at length provoking the Mahrattas to attack him at a disadvantage. Triambak Rao, however, soon found himself unable to make headway with his cavalry against Haidar's forces, and was obliged to encamp on a neighbouring plain. At length, towards the close of February, Haidar marched off at night, and having defeated the advanced guard of the Mahrattas, entered the hills of Mēlkōṭe across the plain country to the westward. Thereupon, Triambak Rao, collecting all his detachments and making an unimportant attack on Haidar's rear-guard, moved on to the siege of Mēlkōṭe.⁶

The hills of Mēlkōṭe, which take their name from the celebrated temple of Śrī-Tirunārāyaṇa-swāmi, run in a direction nearly northwest and south-east, extending

The strategic position of the hills of Mēlkōṭe.

6. *Ibid.*, 691-692; *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; Kirmāṇi, o.c., 190-191. As to the strength of the Mahratta army stated in the text above, see Grant-Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I. 568. Kirmāṇi, however, seems sheerly to exaggerate the position when he says that Triambak Māma was despatched by his nephew Nārāyaṇa Rao "with a hundred and twenty thousand horse, and sixty thousand foot, and a hundred pieces of light artillery to conquer that country" (i.e., the Bilaghāt), etc. (o.c., 188-189).

four or five miles in each direction, from the pass by which Haidar descended. Another pass at right angles with this, west of the principal ridge, and parallel to its general direction, leads to Seringapatam; and a rugged table land, overgrown with jungle, extends to about two miles from the summit of these passes to the westward, overlooking the low country, and descending with an easier slope to the plain. The whole of this elevated position may be considered as nearly inaccessible from the east and south, excepting through the two narrow and difficult passes, and the approach from the west, although far from being easy, is the most practicable to an enemy. Haidar's disposition of his force formed nearly a crescent, facing the west, his flanks resting on the portion of the hill which was most inaccessible, and the two passes being in the rear of his left and centre, a strong but most hazardous position, which, in the event of discomfiture, left scarcely the possibility of secure retreat. A detached hill, which formed the winding of the eastern pass where the rear-guard had been attacked, overlooked a part of the bason inclosed by Haidar's position; and this hill, rugged on its western face, had a more practicable slope to the eastern plain.⁷

On the first day of the siege, Haidar, with the whole of his regular infantry and artillery, made an attack on the Mahrattas; and, by a constant fire of artillery and volleys of musketry, drove them off the field of battle. Notwithstanding this, the troops of Triambak still surrounded the fort at a distance; and instead of making their attack from the west, according to Haidar's expectation, attempted to dislodge him from this position by a teasing daily cannonade from the hill, conducted in the usual Mahratta style of withdrawing

The siege of Mēl-kōṭē, February-March 1771.

the guns to camp every morning, about eight o'clock. But during the intermediate time, rocketmen, penetrating in various directions through the woods, near to the skirts of the position, continued, throughout the whole night, to keep the camp in perpetual agitation. The whole number of guns employed was but ten, of large calibre, which necessarily firing at a considerable elevation, plunged shot into all parts of the camp, from a distance which Haidar's light artillery could not reach. The annoyance was without an interval, and however slovenly, was extremely harassing, and not ill-adapted to the single object of driving him from the position, without risking an action, or exposing a point of attack. For eight days Haidar maintained his position, keeping the hill against the enemy and permitting himself to be incessantly insulted without an effort of any kind to retaliate on the enemy, or to relieve his own troops from their discouragement, which the pressure of want began considerably to augment. At length, however, on the 5th of March, his provisions failing him and he being unable to procure hay or corn for his horses, Haidar determined to retreat to Seringapatam, distant about twenty-two miles, by the southern pass and the route of the hills of Chinkurji.⁸

On the approach of night, Haidar cut down the jungle at the back of the hills, and having despatched his artillery under Mīr Alī Razā Khān, he himself with his horse and regular foot (the outposts and rear-guard excepted)

Haidar's retreat,
March 5-6, 1771.

8. *Ibid*, 693-694; Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 191. Kirmāni vaguely speaks of the siege of Mēlkōṭe as having lasted for "fifteen or twenty days" but Wilks, writing from knowledge derived from Haidar's generals, specifically refers to it as an eight days' action. Chinkurji, referred to in the text above, is at present a village, the headquarters of a *hōḷī* in the Krishnarājapet taluk, Mandya district. The hills of Chinkurji are to the south of the lake of Tonṇūr, 10 miles north-west of Seringapatam. Wilks spells Chinkurji as "Chercooles" (*Ibid*, 694) and Kirmāni as "Churkooli" (*Ibid*, 195).

moved silently off at about 9 o'clock to amuse and occupy the Mahrattas. After forming his lines at the foot of the hills and displaying his strength to the enemy, he marched on. Tipū was charged with the care of getting the baggage in motion and the rear-guard was directed to follow at midnight, after beating the *noubat* at that accustomed hour, as an indication to the enemy that the headquarters were still there. The road to the rear of the hills was, however, very bad, the surface being up and down and full of ravines and holes, and the guns and stores were not able to get on, until by the exertion of great labour they proceeded seven or eight miles. At this distance, the jungle ended; the night also closed and morning appeared (the 6th of March). The Mahratta scouts or sentinels now sent word to Triambak Rao that Haidar's artillery and stores were proceeding towards Seringapatam. Whereupon Triambak Rao marched off all his troops, with strict orders to take the artillery and bring it back to him, he himself following. Meantime Haidar, having with the head of the column of infantry cleared the narrow part of the pass, had marched about four miles further and entered on the plain; and had all things gone well, he would have probably realized his plan of finishing the greater part of his march before daylight. Presently, however, Nārāyaṇa Rao, the officer commanding the regular Mahratta infantry, fancying that he saw or heard the enemy in his front, opened a gun, and Haidar heard the report that Triambak Rao had attacked his fire department or artillery and ammunition, and had not only taken the whole but was actually returning with it. This was enough to communicate to the whole Mahratta army intelligence of the march and to that of Haidar, already discouraged by a movement which indicated the fears of its leader, the certainty of being overtaken in its retreat. The infantry cleared the pass

and reached the open country, about six miles from the ground of encampment; but the baggage, embarrassed by the woods, and wandering in the dark, made no progress. Haidar, who had hardly slept off the effects of an excessive drink on the previous evening, gave, in a paroxym of rage, a most unmerciful beating to his son Tipū (who had been ordered to the front but was not to be found during the confusion of the preceding night), so much so that he swore that he would draw no sword that day, and left the division to be commanded by Yāsin Khān Wūnti Koodri, a faithful friend and servant of Haidar. The whole infantry in four divisions had already formed with sufficient laxity the sides of an enormous square, into which not only the baggage but the cavalry of the army was received. Then Haidar galloped off with his cavalry to the main body of the enemy, who being crowded round the artillery, formed as good a mark as a butt on a mound, and attacking and breaking in upon them on one flank, he dispersed them, and reached his guns. And then, without stopping, he marched straight towards Seringapatam, having his horse in the centre, and his right and left wings, and his advanced and rear-guards, formed of his regular and irregular infantry, keeping up a continual fire; and giving no other direction than *Chellaou*, *Chellaou*, get on, get on, the very watchword of panic when retreating in the presence of an enemy. The Mahratta cavalry now covered the face of the country in every direction. They had captured, and dragged on one of Haidar's guns, abandoned near the pass, which, together with some of their own, commenced a brisk fire from the bank of the *Mōti Talāv* (Pearl Tank) and plunged shot into the interior of the square; their rocketmen had also arrived and contributed by flights of these missiles to the general embarrassment. During all this time, no sort of effort was made; no orders were given; and the

commandant of every corps was left to his own measures to keep at a distance the heavy bodies of horse, which hung upon every portion of the square, ready to charge whenever a favourable opportunity should occur.⁹

The Mahratta front, making continual attacks on Haidar, at length arrived near the hills of Chinkurli, about eleven miles from Seringapatam. The direction of these hills was oblique to the route of retreat, the high road doubling round the western end of the range, and leaving it on the left. The left face of the square, which ought to have formed a considerable angle with that range, had become nearly parallel to it; and Haidar was now with this division. Obviously the square was now in a position to secure, by the most simple change of disposition, the free movement of the baggage round the point of the hill at Chinkurli; but now, as in the former part of the march, the army was without any orders: In this situation, day dawned and a severe artillery action followed, during which Triambak Rao was slightly wounded by a bullet shot passing through his ear, and he and Balavant Rao, roused to a pitch of fury, retaliated. In the thick of the fight, however, a shot from one of the Mahratta cannons struck a tumbril within the square, which exploded, and communicating with some camel-loads of rockets, increased the general confusion in Haidar's ranks, while, to add to their misfortunes, a rocket, which had taken fire, fell on one of the boxes of ammunition and blew it up. The followers and those nearest to the left, perceiving themselves to be close to a hill, pressed through the troops of the left face, who suffered themselves to be carried away with the crowd and to ascend the hill. The flight of the left division being seen by the rest of the army, completed the general

9. *Ibid.*, 694-696; Kirmāṇi, o.c., 191-194.

panic, and every one began to press through the crowd to gain the hill. Orders were no longer heard; the confusion was irretrievable, and the Mahratta horse charged in on the three remaining faces of the square. The rest was a scene of unresisted slaughter at the hands of the enemy's Piṇḍāris, who, taking advantage of the disaster, insinuated themselves into the mass, and despite the utmost resistance of Haidar's troops, completely subdued and cut them up. Among those that fell in the tumult were Nārāyaṇa Rao, *Bār-Mutsaddi*, Śrīnivāsa Jivāji of the *Tōshe-Khāna*, and Lālā Mean, son in-law of Haidar's elder brother Śābās Śāhib. Lālā Mean made a most gallant defence at the head of his corps of infantry and refused to receive quarters. He was at length taken after being desperately wounded, in which state a Mahratta horseman ridiculed him and accelerated his death by the fury with which he rushed against him. An English gentleman, afterwards known by the appellation of "Walking Stuart", who commanded one of Haidar's corps, was most severely wounded after a stout resistance, while Mīr Alī Rāzā Khān, Alī Zāmān Kān, Abdul Muhammad Mirde and Yāsin Khān Wunti Koodri, among Haidar's chief officers, were taken prisoners. Yāsin Khān, who was in the command of Tipū's division, and was in some respects like his master Haidar in person, entered the ranks of the Mahrattas and gave himself out for the Nawāb. Being severely wounded, he was lying senseless on the ground and the Mahrattas, thinking that he was Haidar himself, took him up and carried him away to Triambak Rao, in whose camp he was detained and hospitably entertained (until the Mahrattas later came to know his identity and the actual whereabouts of Haidar). Perhaps the only person who was known to have conducted himself with successful judgment and entire self-possession on the occasion was Fuzzul-Ullāh-Khān, who, being in disgrace

at this time, had followed the army by order, without exercising any military command. Fuzzul-Ullāh was within the square, and near to the western point of the hill at the period of the general confusion, and being attended by a few friends (including Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao and Chandra Rao) and surrounded by a considerable number of unattached horsemen, formed those adherents into a compact body, and cutting through the enemy, retired, in perfect order, by the ford of the Cauvery at Kannambāḍi, four miles distant, where he crossed and continued his retreat along the right bank to Seringapatam. Great indeed was the loss sustained by Haidar by the disaster of the day. The whole of his military equipment was plundered and trampled beneath the hoofs of the Mahratta horse and the store department and artillery fell into the hands of the Mahrattas. In this predicament, Haidar personally ascended the hill on foot, and luckily found at the opposite side one of his own led horses (named *Hamsarāj*). Mounting it, he set off

Haidar's flight to
Seringapatam,
March 7, 1771.

at full speed, on the night of the 7th March, attended by a few well-mounted fugitives and escorted by Ghāzi Khān Bēde, a faithful groom, towards Seringapatam, hotly pursued by the enemy as far as Śukravārpēt (a suburb of Seringapatam). By midnight Haidar arrived near the tomb of Khādar Wali at Seringapatam, where Tipū also, escaping from the field with his followers in the guise of a travelling mendicant or a Mahratta Piṇḍāra, arrived not long after by a different route. Thus ended the day at Chinkurli, which, though lost by Haidar, was not won by the Mahrattas.¹⁰

10. *Ibid.*, 696-701; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 194-198; also *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 50-51; *Sel-Pesh. Daft.*, vol. XXXVII, *Letter* No. 326, dated 10th March 1771, and *Fort St. George Records, Mily. Cons.*, vol. XXXIX, 202-207: *Advice from the Mahratta camp*, dated March 11, 1771 (containing a running summary of the entire affair). According to the last mentioned source (p. 205), the following were the details of the plunder

Thereafter, the Mahrattas, more intent on plunder than improving the successes of the day, suffered the unarmed fugitives (including Haidar's Commandant Muhammad Ali) to reach Seringapatam. During the short interval of ten days which followed, Haidar began to recover his position by strengthening the fort on all sides by the erection of new works and the mounting of guns, by arranging to collect through merchants and pioneers (*Kallabāṇṭaru*) arms and military stores lost by him in the late action, and by enlisting and reforming recruits in sufficient number for the defence of the place, which had been left absolutely without the means of resistance. Triambak Rao having in the meanwhile ascertained the identity of Yāsin Khān Wunti Koodri (whom he had mistaken for Haidar) and learnt of Haidar's escape to Seringapatam from the field of Chinkurji, marched forthwith to attack the fort. Raising batteries nearby, he commenced to carry the approaches by cannonading the fort every day, with-

A tough siege:
The Mahrattas
before Seringapa-
tam, March-May
1771.

acquired by the Mahrattas during the panic at Chinkurji (March 6-7, 1771): "guns of large size, 25; elephants, 13; camels, 50; howdahs or silver castles, 3; Ikkēri Pagodas, 150,000; and two chests containing jewels, two camel-loads of rich vests and several kettle-drums (*nagārs*) and banners and a large number of Haidar's horses and bullocks." See also and compare on this head *Cal. Pers. Corres.* III. 206, No. 784, etc. On the affair of Chinkurji, see also and compare De La Tour (o.c., II. 179-184) and Robson (o.c., 96-101), whose accounts are mostly secondhand, and lack in chronological precision. As to Yāsin Khān Wunti Koodri mentioned in the text above, "Wunta Cooderi" was a surname of his, meaning "single or unique horseman," evidently from his personal exploits. Wilks narrates an interesting account of Yāsin Khān, with anecdotes about him, for particulars of which the reader is referred to Appendix II—(1) of this Volume. Regarding the nature of the action at Chinkurji, both Haidar and Pēshwa Mādhava Rao describe it in their official letters to the Government of Madras, of course in very different colours, Haidar as a trifling affair, in which, although he lost some guns, the advantage was on the whole in his favour; and Mādhava Rao as a sanguinary action, in which his own army lost 2,000 horses killed, and many officers killed and wounded, among the latter Triambak Rao (Wilks, o.c., I. 699. f. n.).

drawing, however, his heavy guns at night. For nearly two months, Triambak Rao continued this semblance of what he called a siege, during which period most of the experienced but despondent soldiers who served under him, lured by Haidar's money, enlisted themselves in his service and began to chastise his enemies, led by Muhammad Ali, the Commandant. The Pālegār of Chitaldrug and Murāri Rao of Gooty, who were stationed near the Edgah with 3,000 and 2,000 foot respectively, made good their escape. The Mahrattas, however, raised a large and very strong battery, called *Khās* or Triambak's battery, near the Cauvery on the north of Karighaṭṭa, and mounting some large guns on it, commenced battering the walls of Seringapatam. Whereupon Muhammad Ali, the Commandant, with 3,000 regular infantry and 1,000 Karnātic foot and ammunition, setting out at night, marched by the route of Sōsale and crossing the river there, proceeded above the villages of Kiragāval and Arakere towards the hills of Hirōde (now French-Rocks). Then he advanced steadily straight from the rear to the battery under the pretence of being a reinforcement and relief to the Mahrattas stationed in it. The latter, hearing of the relief of the advanced parties, were anxiously expecting them, when Muhammad Ali marched into the battery, ordering his men to attack. A terrible carnage followed of the Mahratta soldiers, pioneers and men lying in the batteries and trenches. In vain the Mahrattas tried hard to regain the battery and expel their opponents, and Muhammad Ali returned by daybreak to Haidar, levelling the trenches and battery with the earth and setting fire to the materials. The Mahratta troops being by now in a distressed and dispirited state, Triambak Rao, giving up all thoughts of restoring the battery, crossed the river near Karighaṭṭa with 20,000 horse and encamped at Śukravārpēt, plundering and

devastating part of the country which had as yet remained untouched. On receipt of this intelligence, Haidar at the head of 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot surprised them from his station near the *Mahānavami-Manṭapam* and from an ambush at Kirangūr on the other side of the river, and engaging them in a serious contest, pursued them to a distance, acquiring great spoils. At length, the Mahrattas being thoroughly worsted and put to flight, Triambak Rao raised the siege of Seringapatam, and, dividing his army for the purpose of attacking and ravaging the open country above and below the *ghāts*, descended the Gajjalahaṭṭi Pass towards the rich Mysorean districts of Coimbatore, Pālghāt and Diṇḍigal, then considered inexhaustible sources of Haidar's supplies in the South.¹¹

On this, Haidar despatched Tipū with six to seven thousand horse to the Bārāmahal, followed by Commandant Muhammad Ali at the head of 4,000 regular infantry, 2,000 Karnātic foot and six guns, to safeguard the *ghāts* against the Mahrattas. The two divisions joined at the pass of Rāyakōṭe, Tipū encamping in the plain of Caveripatam and Muhammad Ali remaining at Krishnagiri. Here was received intelligence that a body of four to five thousand Mahratta horse with innumerable stores and cattle captured in Mysore, advancing by the pass of Topūr, was proceeding direct to Poona by way of Tirupattūr and Vāniyambādi and the pass of Kaḍapanāttam. Muhammad Ali, with 500 regular infantry, 200 *Chatṭegārs* (Topasses) and 1,000 irregular foot, marching at night by the road of Kangundi Pālayam and descending by the pass of Tubulapalli, took up a position on the road to Kaḍapanāttam, despatching the *Chatṭegārs* to the top of the pass belonging to the Nawāb of Arcot. The *Chatṭegārs* soon took

Haidar and the
Mahrattas belew
the *ghāts*, May-
June 1771.

11. *Ibid.*, 701; Kirmāpi, o.c., 198-209; *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 51-52.

possession of the gates of the passes and the unsuspecting Mahrattas, with their immense quantity of baggage, marched past the gates, when Muhammad Ali with his parties in ambush attacked them and put them to flight. Making his two detachments form a junction and collecting the baggage and stores of the fugitives, he sent them by the pass of Tubulapalli to Krishnagiri, whither he also proceeded, after successfully overcoming, by a musketry action, the attack by a detachment of Mahratta cavalry. On receipt of this news, Triambak Rao, making forced marches from the South and crossing the pass of Topūr, encamped near the town of Ootangerai (Uttankarai). Apprised of this by Muhammad Ali, Tipū, proceeding with his body of horse, surprised the foraging party of Mahratta light cavalry near Dharmapuri, and returned to Seringapatam with the spoils acquired (consisting of horses, bullocks, elephants and camels belonging to Triambak Rao's *Tōshe-Khāna*). Alarmed by this intelligence, Triambak Rao marched on to Caveripatam, when, in another night action, Commandant Muhammad Ali attacked his left wing, capturing the whole of their stores and artillery and releasing several prisoners taken during the confusion of the day at Chinkurli and still confined in the Mahratta camp. Keeping close to the hills, Muhammad Ali marched on to Rāyakōṭe, and from thence proceeded to Ānekal, closely followed by Triambak's light horse. Marching past Kānkāṇhalli in the rear of the Mahratta pickets, he at length contrived under cover of the Māgaḍi jungle to retire to Seringapatam.¹²

Meanwhile, in the Mysore country proper, a section of the Mahratta army under Mahimāji Sindhia, proceeding from Sira, having laid siege to Chēlūr, in Tumkūr, Haider's forces from Dēvarāyadurg, under

Developments
nearer home, 1771-
1772.

12. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 209-218.

Chimnāji-Pant and Timma-Nāyaka of Kālekere, after a strenuous fight for eleven days, succeeded in repulsing the assailants and capturing Mahimāji with several horses in his camp.¹³ On communication of this news, Triambak Rao, already perplexed by the achievements of Muhammad Alī above the *ghāts*, retraced his steps to the Karnātak. Encamping in the Turuvekere region, he took possession of Dēvarāyadurga, capturing Chimnāji-Pant, Timma Nāyaka and others, and strengthening the fort.¹⁴ The Mahrattas continued system-

Bednūr, the
objective of the
Mahrattas.

matically to harass the Seringapatam province throughout the latter part of 1771 and early in 1772, when Triambak Rao, marching by the route of Mandya, encamped again at Mēlkōte. Hoping to turn this opportunity to advantage, Haidar despatched his agent Appāji Rām to arrange the terms of peace with Triambak Rao. Triambak Rao, however, declining to make peace, and detaining Appāji Rām in his camp, prepared to raid and pillage the wealthy and populous province of Bednūr.¹⁵

Alarmed for the safety of this quarter, Haidar, early in April 1772, detached two corps, one under Commandant Muhammad Alī and the other under Tipū, guided by Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao. Muhammad Alī was directed to attempt the recovery, by surprise, of Periyapatam (Piriypāṭṇa), thirty miles to the west of Seringapatam, and if he failed to effect this object unobserved, the movement would serve as a feint to draw off Triambak Rao, and enable the other detachment under Tipū, with 3,000 irregular horse and five battalions of infantry, to get clear off to the woods of Bednūr, to act on the line of the

13. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 52. This work places this event in *Khara, Vaiśākha* (May, 1771).

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Kirmāṇi*, o.c., 219.

enemy's supplies from Poona. The latter part of the plan was successful, and the detachment, among other services, captured, in the neighbourhood of Channarāyapaṭṇa, a convoy of one hundred thousand oxen laden with grain, which they conveyed in safety to Bednūr. The detachment of Muhammad Ali, consisting of only four battalions, was, however, overtaken, on the morning after its march, at about twenty miles from Seringapatam, and attacked with great energy by Triambak Rao, with the whole force which he had been able to bring up. Muhammad Ali took post in a ruined village, made a gallant resistance, and retreated at night by a circuitous route to Mysore, leaving the wounded to their fate.¹⁶

Fighting of a desultory character went on, however, with varying results. Nearly fifteen months had elapsed after the defeat of Chinkurli before Haidar, wearied with a hopeless warfare and mourning over the destruction of his resources, saw any reasonable prospect of being able to effect a peace; Appāji Rām, already in the Mahratta camp, was again his confidential envoy; Murāri Rao had engaged to employ his good offices; while Triambak Rao had also a secret reason—the increasing dangerous illness of Pēshwa Mādhava Rao at Poona—for listening to these advances.¹⁷ Accordingly

Towards peace,
April and June
1772.

16. Wilks, *o.c.*, 701-703; *Mily. Cons.*, XLIV. 45: *Advice from Mahratta camp*, dated April 11, 1772; see also and compare *Haid.Nām.*, l.c.; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 220-227. Wilks speaks of the Commandant Muhammad Ali having "at a concerted signal" got "murdered all the wounded" before his retreat to Mysore (*o.c.*, 703). But, according to Kirmāni, he left all the wounded on the field of battle, assuring them "that he would send Doolies (litters) from Astara, a town on the road to Nuggur" (*o.c.*, 226). The wounded were evidently left to their fate and it is possible the Commandant had, as narrated by Wilks, secretly arranged for their disposal before his own departure from the scene.
17. *Ibid.*, 703; *Mily. Cons.*, l.c.; and *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *o.c.*, Letter No. 233, dated 7th May 1772. See also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 228), who, being evidently misinformed, speaks of the murder of Pēshwa Nārāyaṇa Rao by his uncle Raghōba as the cause of Triambak Rao's being

negotiations were set on foot, Triambak Rao insisting on being paid the expenses of his army, amounting, as he said, to crores of Rupees. The astute Appāji Rām, under instructions from Haidar, returned for answer that Mysore had been despoiled of all her wealth at the field of Chinkurli, to the extent of even the wearing apparel of Haidar having been presented to the Pēshwa's army on the occasion; that the entire country had become a grazing field for the Poona horse; that consequently the State required assistance; that the profits of present peace would be seen in the future prosperity of the Mysore State; that Triambak by any means would be generous enough to return to his own country and that he was to consider the increase of the prosperity of Mysore as an increase of his own dignity.¹⁸ At length, on the 8th of April, terms of peace were settled between Triambak Rao and Haidar by Appāji Rām through the medium of Murāri Rao, Haidar agreeing to pay Rupees sixty-five lakhs to the Pēshwa, besides the "durbar expences" aggregating to above ten lakhs. Out of the sixty-five lakhs, the Sowcārs undertook to meet forty lakhs in certain instalments and Appāji Rām agreed to pay fifteen lakhs in one month besides promising to remain with Triambak Rao until the balance was fully discharged. Also, while the prisoners on either side were to be released, Triambak Rao on his part agreed to evacuate all the countries taken during the war except Gurramkonda, Channarayadurga, Sira, Maddagiri, Hoskote, Dodballapur and Kolar with their dependencies.

Peace concluded,
and the Mahrattas
retire, June 1772.

In June, Triambak Rao, on the final conclusion of the peace, commenced his return march to Poona, under alarming reports of the Pēshwa's health, with-

inclined to make peace with Haidar, etc. The murder of Pēshwa Nārāyaṇa Rao, as we shall see presently, took place in August 1773, about nine months after Pēshwa Mādhava Rao's death.

18. Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 228-229.

drawing his garrisons from the forts dependent on Seringapatam, and appointing Bāpūji Sindhia, son of Mahimāji Sindhia, to the government of the Suba of Sira.¹⁹

Relieved for the time being from the pressure of the Mahrattas, Haidar, during October-November 1772, diverted his arms (under Saiyid Mokhdum) against the Pāḷegārs of Chitaldrug, Harapanahalli and other places, exacting contributions from them (*khaṇḍāṇe*).²⁰

Campaign
against Chitaldrug,
Harapanahalli,
etc., 1772.

19. *Mily. Cons.*, o.c., 45-46; see also and compare Wilks, o.c., 703-704; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 53; *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, o.c., Letter Nos. 234 and 235; and Kirmāni, o.c., 229, etc. Wilks speaks of the amount stipulated to be paid by Haidar as "thirty lacs of rupees, one half in hand, and the remainder hereafter", together with "five lacs" towards "durbar expences", etc. According to Stewart, however, the Mahrattas agreed to retire "on receiving the inconsiderable sum of thirty lacs of rupees in ready money, and the cession of certain districts of no very great value" (*Memoirs*, 22). The *Haid. Nām.* hardly refers to the actual terms of the settlement, though it makes casual mention of the conclusion of a truce through the mediation of Appāji Rām and touches upon the mutual release of the prisoners. Kirmāni, a later writer, speaks of Haidar's settlement with the Mahrattas for "two hundred thousand rupees" or two lakhs (o.c., 229). Among earlier writers, De La Tour, who has no information on Haidar's subsequent relations with the Mahrattas, loosely writes of Peshwa Mādhava Rao making "in July 1771" a one-year truce with Haidar, "who was obliged to open his purse upon the occasion" (o.c., II. 185-186). Robson is silent on this topic, though he refers to the retirement of the Mahrattas northward after two years' ruthless warfare, etc., (o.c., 102). The authority of the *Mily. Cons.* is preferred here as to the amount actually stipulated, though the "thirty lacs of rupees" mentioned by Wilks and Stewart is evidently to be taken to represent a moiety of the sum received by the Mahrattas at the time of their final departure.
20. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 53-54. The event is dated in this work *Nandana-Āsvija, Kartika*. Kirmāni, speaking of a raid on Chitaldrug by Haidar, sets it down to 1771 (A. H. 1185) and mentions an exaction by him of Rupees three lakhs from its Pāḷegār (o.c., 300-301). The reference here seems obviously to the event of 1772. A recent writer places a second siege of Chitaldrug by Haidar in 1774 (see R. N. Saletore in his article *The Conquest of Chitradurga by Hyder Ali* in the *Q. J. M. S.*, XXIX, No. 2, pp. 181-188). Relying as he does on a notice of the Ms. of the *Haid. Nām.*, in the *M. A. B.* for 1930, he seems to identify "Maḍakēri" (the modern Mercara in Coorg), mentioned in that work, with Medekere Nāyaka of Chitaldrug, and makes it appear as if a siege of Chitaldrug took place in 1774, whereas what actually happened in that year was, as we shall see, the reduction of Coorg. His position is hardly borne out by the text of the *Haid. Nām.* itself, according to which Haidar's

Not long after, Haidar was obliged to turn his thoughts to Malabar, where, as we have seen,²¹ affairs were, since 1768, moving in a manner prejudicial to the interests of Mysore in that quarter. At the time of his return from the Malabar coast about the middle of that year, the detached efforts of the Nairs there were beginning to assume a more combined form. Most of the block-houses had been carried or necessarily evacuated. Asad Khān Mehtari, his provincial Commander-in-Chief, had been killed in action, and his successor, with forces very inferior to the service, was doing his utmost to stem the increasing torrent, when Haidar's instructions (from Bednūr) to Mādanna, his fiscal governor, relieved him from the present from these embarrassments. Mādanna opened insidious but skilful negotiations with most of the chiefs, which intimated in substance that Haidar had found his conquest of Malabar an acquisition hitherto more chargeable than advantageous; that if the chiefs should consent to reimburse the heavy charges which he had incurred, he would be ready to restore their possessions, and to aid before his departure in transferring to those who should accede, the territories of those who should decline so reasonable an arrangement. All were forward in embracing the terms. Haidar's provincial troops, whose escape would otherwise have been impracticable, not only retreated in safety but loaded with treasure. It had been made a special condition that Alī Rāja should be undisturbed; Pālghāt was studiously omitted in the negotiations, and remained a Mysorean possession; and two points were thus secured in the south-east and north-west of the province, from whence

renewed raid on Chitaldrug came off in October-November 1772, as mentioned above. The siege and capitulation of Chitaldrug followed in 1777-1779 (see Ch. III below).

21. *Vide* Ch. I.

at any future period Haidar could resume at pleasure his designs on Malabar.²²

Despite this settlement, the Zāmorin, taking advantage of Haidar's wars with the English and the Mahrattas, fell into arrears of tribute, and the Nairs and Moplahs began to show signs of unrest in 1773 (*Vijaya*). Haidar sent thither his agents, *harikārs* Rangappa Nāyaka and Rāmagiri Channarājaiya, to demand the arrears and suppress the trouble. The agents were, however, treacherously slain by the Nairs. Whereupon Haidar, determined on taking immediate possession of Calicut and all the Malabar country belonging to the Zāmorin and the kings of Kaḍatanāḍu, Cotiote and other lesser powers situated between Tellicherry and Cochin, despatched a detachment of 40,000 men under Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao and Saiyid Sāhib. The detachment, marching through Wynād by the Pass of Tāmrachēri, descended at once on Calicut. On receipt of this intelligence, the Zāmorin, on January 12, 1774, concluded with the French at Mahé a treaty agreeing to become a vassal of the King of France and seeking their protection against his enemies. M. Dupart, then French Governor, forthwith set out with a detachment, hoisted his flags everywhere and took possession of the Zāmorin's fort at Calicut, informing Śrīnivāsa Rao "that he had taken the Zāmorin under his protection on behalf of the King of France." Nevertheless, Śrīnivāsa Rao continued his march towards Calicut and forced it to surrender. On the 19th January the French deserted the place and retired to Mahé, while the Zāmorin fled with his family to Travancore. Most of the Nair chiefs who were fit to be acted upon by the skilful application of political division were soon reduced to a state of dependency on Mysore; the entire populace was severely chastised; Śrīnivāsa Rao was left as *Faujdar* of the

22. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 610.

province and Sayid Sâhib returned with the cavalry and disposable troops to Seringapatam.²³

By this time, the Chief of Coorg had turned hostile.

He had remained indifferent to Haidar's requisition for the free passage of convoys of Mysore during the Mahratta invasion of 1771,²⁴ while, in 1772, at the time of Commandant Muhammad Ali's march through Periapatam against Triambak Rao, he had treacherously cut off the heads of the Mysorean garrison stationed in the fort of Mercara and impeded the Commandant's progress through the country.²⁵

In March 1774, Haidar advanced against Coorg. The invasion being entirely unexpected, the chief body of the Coorgs, without any previous arrangement, assembled on a woody hill, which Haidar encompassed with his troops. He proclaimed a reward of five rupees for each head which should be brought before him, and sat down in state to superintend the distribution of the reward. About seven hundred had been paid for, when a peon approached, and deposited two heads, both of them of the finest forms. Haidar, after scrutinizing the features, asked him whether he felt no compunction in cutting off such comely heads; and immediately ordered the decapitation to cease, and prisoners to be brought in. The apparent conquest was of little difficulty, Mercara, Paṭṭēri-nāḍu, Bāle-nāḍu and other places in Coorg being taken in rapid succession. The Chief (Dēvaiya) betook himself to flight; and Haidar, whose chief object was to

23. *Ibid.*, 713-714; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 54; *Mily. Cons.*, XLVI. 1068: William Townsend, Seringapatam, to the Madras Council, December 2, 1773; Moens, *Memo*, 155-156. See also and compare De La Tour (*o.c.*, II, 193-194), who loosely places the event in 1775. The reference to the Nawāb's "General" in Moens' *Memo* is to Barakki Śrinivāsa Rao, which name De La Tour spells "Cina Serrao." For a connected account of Haidar's advance further southwards of Malabar, *i.e.*, on Cochin and Travancore, see Ch. III below.

24. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 52-53.

25. *Kirmāpi*, *o.c.*, 220.

tranquillize the country, erected the fort of Mercara in the most central situation; and confirming the land-holders in their possessions at a moderately increased revenue, returned, in June, to Seringapatam, whither the fugitive Rāja was soon afterwards brought, having been discovered in his place of concealment in the territory of Mysore.²⁶

Meantime, in Poona, the long ailing Pēshwa Mādhava Rao died on the 18th November 1772, and his brother Nārāyaṇa Rao was formally invested with the office of the Pēshwa. On the 30th of August 1773,

Renewed relations
with the Mahrattas
(down to 1774).

A retrospect of
affairs..

Nārāyaṇa Rao was murdered at the instigation of his uncle Raghunāth Rao (Raghōba) and the latter proclaimed himself as Pēshwa. An intercourse of civility had long subsisted between Haider and Raghunāth; it was through his mediation that the peace of Bednūr had been concluded in 1765, and since that period, Haider's envoys at Poona had been directed to conciliate his good offices in the customary Mahratta form. On succeeding to power, Raghunāth Rao had been early in the field against Nizām Alī, who, being overthrown in an action, was obliged to sue for peace, Rukn-ud-daula, his minister, being unable to carry on the war any longer. Mons. Raymond, a French officer, however, fighting the whole way, safely escorted the Nizām to the fort of Bidar. Raghunāth Rao, nevertheless,

26. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 54; Wilks, *o.c.* § I. 712. Wilks dates the event in November 1773 but the earlier contemporary work, *Haid. Nām.*, specifically places it in *Jaya-Chaitra-Jyēṣṭha* (March-June 1774). A letter from Mostyn's *Diary* (1772-1774), quoted in *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, edited by J. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji, refers to intelligence of Haider's reduction of "the Coruck Rajah" (King of Coorg) and his fortification of the "new conquest" in June 1773 (see p. 173: *Letter from Poona*, dated June 18, 1773). Haider first reduced the refractory Chief of Coorg in 1765 (see *Ante* Vol. II. Ch. XIII) and no doubt had had an eye on Coorg during 1771-1773, but its conquest actually took place in 1774 according to the *Haid. Nām.*, whose specific statement is relied upon here.

followed Nizām Ali thither and besieged the fort, compelling him to assign to him the revenues of Bidar, Aurangabad, Berar, etc. Early in 1774, Raghunāth Rao, ostensibly treading in the footsteps of Mādhava Rao, was drawn to the South, (*i.e.*, the Bālaghāt country or Mysore) by the hostilities of Haider, who, taking advantage of the developments in Poona, had not only evaded the payment of balance due under the late treaty with the Mahrattas, but had also put forth his whole force for the recovery of all the territory lost in consequence of the English and Mahratta wars.²⁷

By now, however, the powerful court party at Poona led by Nānā Fadnis had declared Savāi Mādhava Rao, the posthumous son of Nārāyaṇa Rao, as the legitimate Pēshwa, and had not only sought the active support of the Nizām and Haider to put Raghunāth out of the way but also won over to their side all the Mahratta *Sardārs* who had followed him to the field. So that by

Haider-Raghōba
negotiations, March
1774.

27. Wilks, *o.c.*, 710-711, 714; *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; also Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 230-231), who antedates and sets down the events of 1773-1776 to 1769 (A. H. 1183). On the general course of Mahratta affairs (1772-1775), see Grant-Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, II. 1-30, and Kincaid and Parasnis, *History of the Maratha People*, III. 100-111. According to Wilks, Raghunāth Rao was unsuccessful in the action against Nizām Ali. But, as pointed out by Sir Murray Hammick on the authority of Grant-Duff, Raghunāth was successful (see Sir Murray in Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 714, f. n. 1, citing Duff's *Mahrattas*, II. 10). And this position is fully supported by Kirmāṇi also, who, as we have seen in the text above, writes on this topic from direct knowledge. Raghunāth Rao appears to have had an eye on the South, and sought to maintain diplomatic relations with Haider even before his own accession to the Pēshwaship. For, on April 17, 1773 news prevailed to the following effect: "Ragbunath Rao is encamped 150 kos away from Poona on the great road to Seringapatam and Arcot. Haider Naik has agreed to pay him 60 lakhs of rupees on condition that he makes over certain forts to him. Raghunath wants Haider Naik to send him 60 lakhs of rupees immediately, so that, after suppressing the present rebellion, he may renew his attempt upon Hindustan" (*Cal. Pers. Corres.*, IV. 175, No. 973). No wonder, then, that Raghunāth was treading in the footsteps of Pēshwa Mādhava Rao in his projected campaign against the South; and his objective was evidently to check the northern advance of Haider (*Ibid.*, 159, No. 907 also *Haid. Nām.*, l. c.).



Nāna Farnavis.

the time Raghunāth Rao, marching from Bidar by way of Kopal, Bahadūr-Baṇḍa and Kanakagiri, arrived at Rāyadurg, his army had been completely disbanded with the exception of a body of *Kuzzaks* or Piṇḍāris, who chose to remain with him. Perplexed at this state of affairs, Raghunāth Rao, seeking the path of accommodation with Haidar, despatched a *Vakil* to him with a request for aid and for the *Chauth* (or fourth part) of the revenue of Mysore. Haidar, however, urging the ruined state of the country, not only declined to accede to his wishes but also, in March, despatched a mission to Poona headed by Pradhān Venkāppaiya, Harikār Narasappa Nāyaka and Appāji Rām to negotiate an easy peace. The mission met Raghunāth Rao in full march to the south at Saṇḍūr, near Kalyāṇdurg (to the south-east of Rāyadurg). Raghunāth Rao renewed his overtures, offering Haidar the whole of the *Subah* of Sīra. Appāji Rām, among Haidar's agents, was, however, too acute a negotiator to overlook the opportunity which was thus presented, of improving the political relations of his master. He saw that the aid which Raghunāth Rao would require and Haidar would confer, formed the most solid basis of conciliation. He fairly and openly explained the reciprocal interests, which would be promoted by

The Treaty between them.

their union; and a treaty was accordingly concluded, by which Haidar agreed to acknowledge Raghunāth Rao as the exclusive head of the Mahrattā State; to pay him, and him only, a reduced subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees (ten, according to one writer); to be ready, when required, to act with his whole force in support of Raghunāth's pretensions, while Raghunāth himself on his part agreed to cede to Mysore, by means of a *sanad*, the entire country north of Seringapatam up to the banks of the Krishna (extending to Bādāmi, Jālhalli, etc., and including Sīra, Maddagiri, Channarāyadurg, Hoskōte and

Doḍballāpur—places which had been wrested from Haidar by the Mahrattas).²⁸

On the conclusion of this treaty, Raghunāth Rao hastened to the northward by way of Pandarpur, despatching his half-brother

The treaty and after.

Bāji Rao Barve with 300 horse to withdraw the garrison from the fort of the Subah of Sīra. Bāji Rao, accompanied by Haidar's men, soon arrived at Sīra, when he forwarded Raghunāth Rao's letter to the *killedār*, Bāpuji Sindhia, son of Mahimāji Sindhia, requiring the fort to be delivered up. Bāpuji, however, not only questioned the validity of Raghunāth's *sanad* (he being, in his view, but an upstart and murderer, having no power or authority to make such demands), but also, mounting the guns, prepared to defend the fort. Whereupon Bāji Rao quietly retired to Seringapatam and sought Haidar's assistance for the conquest of Sīra. In April, Haidar promptly answered by directing thither a detachment under Tipū, assisted by Sardār Khān, Mīr Alī Razā Khān and others. At Sīra, the *killedār* was soon ready for action. Tipū, however, having thrown up batteries, attacked the works, and the place capitulated after an investment lasting nearly three months. Bāpuji was taken prisoner and sent to Seringapatam. Maddagiri and Channarāyadurg successively fell and the Mahratta lieutenants in charge, Lakshman-Pant and Chimpāji-Pant, were sent on *cowle*

Fall of Sīra, Maddagiri and Channarāyadurg, April-July 1774.

to Poona; and Tipū at length arrived at Hoskōṭe in July.²⁹

28. *Ibid.*, 714-715; *Haid. Nām.*, l. c., Kirmāṇi, o. c., 231-234. See also and compare Grant-Duff, (o. c., II. 13), who generally follows Wilks.

29. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 54-55; Kirmāṇi, o. c., 234-236; see also and compare Wilks (o. c., I. 715), who merely speaks of Bāji Rao Barve being sent by Raghunāth to Seringapatam "to receive and remit the first six lakhs," and of his having "remained for several years, as his confidential agent, under the protection of Hyder."

Meanwhile, letters from Nānā Fadnis having been received at Seringapatam to the effect that Haidar was on no account to move or act on the words of Raghunāth Rao and that he was to consider the punishment of the latter as incumbent on him, after which all arrangements relative to Mysore would be settled by the Chief and Ministers of Poona on a sure footing, etc., Haidar, in compliance with the wishes of the Nānā, marched with a large force from Seringapatam and encamped at Channarāyapaṭṇa. Proceeding from thence by slow marches to Tumkūr, he soon joined Tipū at Hoskōṭe. Hoskōṭe was taken by siege in July, and this was followed by the capture of Doḍballāpur. Then Tipū was despatched to Gurramkoṇḍa and he succeeded in reducing it in September, while Haidar returned to Seringapatam in October after placing Pradhān Venkappaiya in charge of the administration of Sira, Maddagiri and Channarāyadurg, dependencies lately recovered from the Mahrattas.³⁰

An insurrection in Coorg of the most determined aspect suspended for a time the designs of Haidar in other directions. Compared with the revenue raised in the Mysorean territories, that which had been arranged for Coorg was extremely low; but their standard of comparison was not what had been levied from others, but what they themselves had formerly paid. The very highest rate of assessment in Coorg had been a tenth of the produce. In general, it was much lower, and a considerable proportion of the landholders, exclusively of military service, paid an acknowledgment to the Rāja, which was merely nominal. Haidar deemed his own moderation to be excessive in requiring not much more

30. *Ibid.* ff. 55; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 235-236. See also and compare Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 714), who makes a passing reference to the reduction of these places.

than the old Hindu assessment of one-sixth. The impatience of the inhabitants at what seemed to them a detested foreign yoke inflamed their discontent, for, although Haidar trusted no Mussulman in his department of revenue, the Hindus, who were usually employed in the collection of revenue, were held in still greater abhorrence, as the agents of Haidar, by the people of Coorg. They destroyed all the minor establishments, which had been spread over the country for the collection of revenue, and surrounded the new capital of Mercara for the purpose of reducing it by famine. The insurrection in short was universal. Haidar was never in the habit of employing palliatives in cases of this nature. The great mass of the army was at the capital, distant only 30 miles from the frontier of Coorg; and he moved the whole infantry in several columns to penetrate at once into every portion of the territory with a view to suppress the rebellion at a single blow. The operation was successful, and as his intelligence was always excellent, he was enabled among his prisoners to distinguish the leaders. Every man suspected as being above the class of an ordinary soldier was hanged; and for the purpose of overawing the populace, a series of block-houses was erected, pervading every part of the country, and connected with each other, and with the nearest posts in Mysore. These arrangements being completed, Haidar returned to give his army a short repose at Seringapatam, about the beginning of the year 1775.³¹

Raghunāth Rao, disappointed in his expectations of receiving the proffered support from Haidar, and alarmed by the latter's warlike activities in northern Mysore, the treachery of his own Arab troops no

Further campaigns in the north, 1775-1776; Retrospect of affairs.

31. Wilks, o.c., I. 715-716. Wilks refers in the text of p. 716 to the Brāhman employees of Haidar, while in the relative foot-note he takes them to

less precipitating the ruin of all his prospects, fled to Malwa and from thence to Cambay and Surat, the troops of Poona and Hyderabad following him successively to Burhanpur, Khāndesh and Gujerat.³² At Surat, he concluded, on the 6th March 1775, a treaty with the English at Bombay for providing him with the aid necessary to recover his authority on terms of reciprocal advantage. The Government of Bengal, however, under the *Regulating Act* of 1773, soon disapproved and annulled this treaty, which, they commented, was concluded without their sanction; and Col. Upton was sent as the envoy of the Governor-General (Warren Hastings) to treat with the ministerial party at Poona. On the 1st of March 1776, Col. Upton accordingly concluded a treaty, a treaty characterized by the Bombay Council as "highly injurious to the reputation, honour, and interests of the nation, and the Company." The discussion that followed in this connection between the Governments of Bombay and Bengal terminated at length in the renewal of a treaty with Raghunāth Rao in November 1778. Raghunāth Rao, however, shortly after the conclusion of his first treaty with Bombay in 1775, communicated with Haidar through his agent Bāji Rao Barve, pointing out the nature of his alliance, stating his confident expectation of recovering his rightful possession of the *musnud* of Poona, and confirming to Haidar, under his *sanad* of 1774, the possession of the whole of the Mahratta territory up to the right bank of the Krishna, desiring him at the same time to be ready from that advanced position to assist him (Raghu-

mean the Jangamas! Whatever the position, it would be safe to assume broadly that the reference here is to the Hindu as distinct from the Muhammadan officials of Haidar.

32. *Ibid.*, 715-725; Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 236-237.

nāth Rao) in the execution of his designs, with military as well as pecuniary aid.³³

Encouraged by his own successes and by the domestic dissensions of the Mahrattas (since 1772), Haidar, since his return from Coorg early in 1775, was equipping himself for a campaign of some importance in the debatable area covered by the Tungabhadra and Krishna, when intelligence was received that the Chief of Miraj, in concert with the other Mahratta chiefs, having raised disturbances in the neighbourhood of Bādāmi and Dharwar, was, despite the apathy of the court of Poona, marching in the direction of Mysore. At the same time, Haidar's old opponents, Basālat Jang of Adoni and Murāri Rao of Gooty, communicating with the courts of Poona and Hyderabad in a projected invasion of Mysore, had succeeded with Nizām Ali, who, agreeably to their request, despatched thither his Commander-in-Chief Ibrāhim Khān Dhoonsa with a well-appointed force, artillery and warlike stores. Then Basālat Jang directed his troops to the hill-fort of Bellary, a former dependency of his, whose Pālegār, having repulsed Haidar in 1769, had lately refused to pay tribute to Basālat, declaring that he had transferred his allegiance to the former. Basālat's army, accompanied by Safdar Jang, his Commander-in-Chief, Dēvichand Kirtivant (evidently the "Bojeraj" of Wilks), the Dewān of Adoni, and the

33. *Ibid.*, 725-727. On Raghunāth Rao's negotiations with Haidar carried on through Bāji Rao Barve, see *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXXVI, Letter No. 283, dated December 30, 1775. Wilks speaks as if Raghunāth Rao's idea of allowing Haidar to take possession of the Mahratta territory up to the banks of the Krishna originated with him in 1775. But, as we have seen from other sources cited above, Raghunāth Rao had had such an idea already in 1774, when he made out a *sanād* in favour of Haidar. So that Wilks can only be reconciled by taking him to mean that Raghunāth Rao confirmed what he had already ceded to Haidar in 1774.

French corps of 200 under Mons. Lally (styled "Rustam Jang"), forthwith besieged Bellary.

Basālat Jang's
siege of Bellary.

In the beginning, Doddappa, the Pālegār who defended the place, fought manfully and vigorously and repelled the assailants. Haidar received frequent messages from the news-writers of Rāyadurg—acting under the Pālegār's influence—that though Basālat Jang's Commander-in-Chief had besieged the hill-fort for three months, he had effected nothing; that the besieged chieftain had made frequent sorties at night and had killed a great many of his opponents, and that Ibrāhim Khān Dhoonsa from Hyderabad had arrived near Kanakagiri and Kopal. At length, in November, an express informed Haidar that the besiegers had almost succeeded in taking Bellary by storm, and the event being unexpected, nothing but the speedy aid of Haidar could prevent the place from falling into their hands. Thereupon Haidar, who earlier still had detached Commandant Muhammad Ali towards Dharwar with 5000 regular infantry and 7000 horse and the troops of Bāji Rao to attack the combination of the Chief of Miraj, directed the Commandant to oppose the

further progress of Ibrāhim Khān Dhoonsa. And he himself, traversing a distance of about 210 miles from Seringapatam to Bellary by forced marches of five days by way of Ratnagiri, and leaving the heavy baggage, camp followers and artillery under the charge of Pūrnaiya (now *Mutsaddi* of the *Tōshe-Khāna*), with the light horse and the regular and irregular foot, lightly equipped, with only four meals of provisions ready cooked, fell by surprise on the rear of the besieging army while he was still supposed to be at Seringapatam.³⁴

Haidar's forced marches to Bellary, November 1775.

34. *Ibid.*, 719-720; Kirmāṇi, o. c., 297, 311-313, 317-319; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 55-

56. Kirmāṇi speaks of Haidar having conferred on his Commandant Muhammad Ali the title of *Ghoonsa* (meaning the fist, or a blow with

In obedience to his orders, Haidar's troops attacked the camp of Basālat Jang on every side, discharging rockets, matchlocks, arrows and camel-swivels, and loosening and separating his ranks of horse and foot. It was a complete rout, in which Dēvichand Kirtivant was killed, while the commanding officer of Basālat Jang, retreating from the field, sought refuge with the detachment of Mons. Lally, and the gallant Frenchman himself, with the remnant of his men, marched by night to Adoni, leaving the baggage, tents and standards to the advancing Mysoreans. The guns were left in the batteries; the approaches and parallels were complete and Haidar, without giving time for the entrance of supply, announced the object of this timely succour by instantly manning the batteries, assuming the place of the late besiegers, and insisting on unconditional surrender. Doḍḍappa, being in the meanwhile apprized of these developments, and having already revealed the state of his resources for a siege, found further resistance unavailing. Accordingly, descending at night by the back part of the hill-fort, he made good his escape with his family and followers, leaving the accumulated collections of generations to the victorious Haidar, who introduced his garrison into the place on the eighth day after his march from Seringapatam and the 3rd day after his arrival at Bellary. Then Haidar marched on to Adoni, where he not only exacted from Basālat Jang rupees ten lakhs towards two months' salary by accounts of the Mysore military but also reimbursed himself to the extent of a lakh of pagodas as

the fist) in contradistinction to *Dhoonsa* (meaning a rude push or shove), the title of Ibrāhim Khān, the Commander-in-Chief of Hyderabad (Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 313). As Col. Miles observes, "there appears to be some joke, or conceit, in these names" (*Ibid.*, foot-note *d*), of which Haidar was generally fond! Kirmāni, however, antedates and sets down the events of 1775 to 1773 (A. H. 1187).

the condition of his (Basālat's) abstaining from the plunder or attack of the remainder of his *jaghir*.³⁵

Following up this success, Haidar, advancing further, established an outpost at Kuragōḍu on the 23rd of November. Then he marched on, determined to punish Ibrāhīm Khān Dhoonsa, who, having overrun Gajēndragadh and Kanakagiri, had arrived in the vicinity of Kenchangūḍa. Haidar's Commandant Muhammad Alī had also by now arrived in Dhoonsa's rear, by the route of Gadag, Śirahaṭṭi and Dāmūl. Dhoonsa, however, disheartened by intelligence of the fall of Bellary, soon effected his retreat to Hyderabad, followed up to the neighbourhood of Raichūr by Haidar's *Kuzsaks*, who returned with the spoils captured in his camp (consisting of a great quantity of baggage, two guns, forty to fifty camels of the *Toshe-Khāna* and three elephants carrying tents). About this time, Murāri Rao of Gooty, who had left his capital in the charge of his minister Pali Khān, had with his troops taken up his quarters in Dhoonsa's camp and tried to persuade him to attack and subdue the province of Bālaghāt (*i.e.*, Mysore), while Halīm Khān, the Hakīm of Cuddapah, and the Pālegār of Chitaldrug had, at Murāri's instigation, expelled the news-writers of Haidar from their towns and assisted Dhoonsa with their troops and stores. On receipt of news of Dhoonsa's retreat, however, these chiefs retraced their steps to their respective places. Haidar next advanced on Kenchangūḍa itself, levying a contribution from its Pālegār. Adoni and Kurnool were

35. *Ibid.*, 720-721; Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 319-322; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 56. See also and compare *Bellary Dist. Gaz.*, Ch. II, p. 22, and XV, pp. 4-5 (based mostly on Wilks). According to the last-mentioned source, M. Lally went over by Cowle, with his corps, to Haidar. This must have been subsequent to Haidar's reduction of Bellary, which is specifically dated in this work *Manmatha-Kārtika śu.* (corresponding to the early part of November 1775).

successively made to pay a *pēshkāsh* of three lakhs of *varahas* each and Haidar, in December, returned to Bellary, from where, raiding through Pyāpalli, he proceeded eastwards, towards the close of the month, in the direction of Gooty.³⁶

Ever since Nanjarāja's ill-fated siege of Trichinopoly (1752-1755), Haidar had had an eye on Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe, Chief of Gooty, who, by his doubtful allegiance to his own nation, treacherous conduct and shifting alliances, had grossly betrayed the interests of Mysore to her enemies.³⁷ Haidar's first act, on his accession to power in 1761, was, as we have seen,³⁸ the reduction of Murāri Rao's dependencies in northern Mysore. From this time onward, Murāri, viewing with alarm at the growing power of Haidar, systematically espoused the cause of one or the other powers in the country to checkmate his progress. In August 1768, during Haidar's war with Muḥammad Ali and the English, Murāri, joining the latter, opposed Haidar at Hoskōṭe, only to make a narrow escape.³⁹ During the Mahratta war of 1771-1772, again, Murāri played the part of the chief wirepuller, stimulating Triambak Rao Māma to attempt the destruction of Haidar's power. Already about the middle of 1775, Haidar was apprehensive of the close friendship and

36. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 56; Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 322-323. The *Haid. Nam.* specifically places these events between November 28 and the close of December (*Manmatha-Mārgasira da.*).

37. As for the role of Murāri Rao during the Mysorean siege of Trichinopoly (1752-1755), see Vol. II, Chapters VII-VIII and XVI of this work. Kirmāṇi, however, draws only pointed attention to Murāri Rao's ingratitude towards Haidar when he writes: "Although the Nawaub had in every way aided Morar Rao, and had never himself molested him, but, on the contrary, with a view to gain his friendship, had even condescended to call him uncle, Morar had, nevertheless, often exerted his most strenuous efforts to pluck up the tender plant of the Nawaub's greatness and power" (Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 324).

38. See *Ante*, Vol. II, Ch. XIII.

39. *Vide* Ch. I. pp. 75-78.

intimacy that subsisted between Murāri Rao and Basālat Jang, and the late junction of Murāri with Dhoonsa formed a sufficient pretext for Haidar to proceed against him, for "he was convinced", in the words of the local historian, "that, while that incendiary lived, the conquest and regulation or subjection of the Khodadad or Mysore territory would never be fully accomplished." Haidar, therefore, "made the conquest of Gooty and the capture of that dangerous and intriguing man, the object of his conquering energies," and he accordingly marched thither.⁴⁰

By now Murāri Rao, who had returned to Gooty from Dhoonsa's camp without attaining his object, had been in a state of doubt and perplexity. Haidar, on his march, affecting a disposition to compromise with Murāri in the same manner as he had done with the other chiefs, sent to demand a similar contribution from him. On entering the territory of Gooty, he sent for Murāri Rao under pretence of a wish to see him and despatched to him a complimentary message announcing his arrival at his house and adding that they being ancient friends, he would trouble him only for the expenses of grain and forage for his horses, estimated at a lakh of Rupees. Murāri, however, suspecting treachery, not only refused to meet Haidar but also, understanding the Mahratta jargon, replied in plain terms that he also was a *Śenāpati* (General) and was in the habit of levying, not paying, contributions. On Haidar's nearer approach to Gooty, he sent him a final message to the effect that the entire taluk of Saṇḍūr would be given to Murāri Rao as a provision for his support and maintenance, if he would only, without hesitation or demur, deliver up to the agents of the Mysore Government (*Khodādād Sarkār*) the hill-fort of Gooty and its dependencies. Murāri Rao

40. Kīrmāṇī, o. c., 324-326.

refused to listen to this proposal and surrounded by a strong body of troops, prepared to defend himself.⁴¹

Then Haidar with his regular and irregular infantry encircled the fort and sat down regularly before it, directing the guns which Mon. Lally had employed against Bellary, and ordering a battering train for the purpose from Seringapatam.

Siege of Gooty,
December 1775-
March 1776.

Its strategic position.

The fort of Gooty is composed of a number of strong works, occupying the summits of a circular cluster of rocky hills connected with each other and enclosing a space of level ground forming the site of the town, which is approached from the plain by two breaks or openings, forming fortified gateways to the south-west and north-west, and by two foot-paths across the lower hills communicating through small sally-ports. An immense smooth rock rising from the northern limit of the circle, and fortified by gradations surmounted through fourteen gateways overlooks and commands the whole of the other works, and forms a citadel which famine or treachery can alone reduce. At the entrance to the fort, Haidar erected his own battery, while on the posterior side overlooking the hill (extending from the suburb up to the temple of Gautamēśvara) the Chiefs of Chitaldrug, Rāyadurg, Harapanahalli, Cuddapah and other places (who had evidently followed Haidar) had erected theirs. Haidar's *Kuzzaks* (light horse), at the same time, agreeably to his orders, guarded the hill and forest so effectually as to make them impenetrable for men or even birds or locusts.

Haidar takes the
own and lower
fort, January 1776.

Towards the close of January 1776, after a siege of about five weeks, Haidar carried by assault the town and lower fort (*Pāyan-kille*), together with a large booty consisting of 2,000 horse, a considerable number of elephants of state, a vast amount of private property, and a very

⁴¹ Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 721; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 326.

respectable equipment of garrison and field-guns, and military stores.⁴²

Haidar continued for two months the siege of the upper fort, and was repulsed in numerous attempts to establish himself in the lowest division of the works. Meanwhile, Murāri Rao had sought in vain the aid of the Court of Poona, for his communications were intercepted by Haidar's pickets and before intelligence of the siege arrived at Poona—which was at last conveyed only by the letters of Basālat Jang—the garrison at Gooty had been reduced to the greatest extremity, owing to the exhaustion of stores of provisions and ammunition. Murāri Rao had also admitted within the walls of the citadel an immense number of followers, horses, camels and even horned cattle, and although, with ordinary precautions, the reservoirs of water were numerous and ample, the improvidence of Murāri's measure had reduced the besieged to the utmost distress. At length, towards the close of March, Murāri Rao found himself under the necessity of sending an envoy to

Murāri Rao sues Haidar to treat for peace. The conditions were settled after much discussion, for peace, March 1776. namely, the payment of twelve lakhs of Rupees, eight in cash or valuables, and a hostage for the payment of the remainder. The cash amounted to only one lakh, and plate and jewels to the estimated value of the remaining seven were sent by the hands of the hostage.⁴³

42. *Ibid.*, 721-722; *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; *Kirmāṇi*, o.c. 327. The *Haid. Nām.* specifically dates the assault of the town and lower fort of Gooty in *Manmatha-Pushya* bā., corresponding to the close of January 1776. *Kirmāṇi*, however, antedates and sets down the event of 1775-1776 to 1773 (A.H. 1187).

43. *Ibid.*, 722. Wilks, who does not mention the hostage by name, refers to him as "the son of Yoonas Khan, the former Commander-in-Chief (of Murāri Rao), who had been mortally wounded in the affair near Hoskote in 1768." The reference here, however, seems obviously to

Haidar received his hostage with great courtesy, and invited him to dinner. The young man, Haidar sought to be outwitted by considering hostilities to be at an end, Murāri. was induced by the gracious manners of Haidar to be unreserved in his communications. The conversation was purposely turned to the events of the siege, and Haidar took the opportunity of paying some appropriate compliments to the experience of Murāri Rao and the conduct of his troops, not omitting to observe that he frequently noticed the exemplary gallantry of the young man himself. This of course induced some corresponding civilities, and in the warmth of discussing the past, the hostage was so imprudent as to observe that there was no want of troops or provisions, and nothing short of being reduced to three days' water could have induced Murāri Rao to agree to such hard conditions. Haidar heard all this with his accustomed command of countenance; and after dinner referred the young man to the proper department for the delivery of his charge. The description of the valuables had been generally stated in the negotiation, and it was understood that if on a fair valuation the amount should fall short of the seven lakhs, Haidar would still receive it and accept the hostage for the remainder. The period of inspection was designedly prolonged; the appraisers on Haidar's part were duly instructed; he himself testified great impatience for the adjustment, and when the appraisers accompanying the hostage returned to report the total amount, including cash, to be only five lakhs, Haidar affected the greatest disappointment and anger; said that Murāri Rao was trifling and deceiving him; and ordered the hostage immediately to return with his

Pali Khān, the minister of Murāri Rao, elsewhere mentioned by Kirmāni, who, however, is silent in regard to these particulars of the peace negotiations.

paltry five lakhs, and announce the negotiation to be at an end.⁴⁴

Haidar now fitted his operations to the circumstances of the siege, taking more care to prevent himself to renew a single person from descending to the siege. hollows in the rock (which they had been accustomed to risk) for a scanty supply of water than to serve his batteries, or expedite his approaches; and the besieged could not even execute the alternative which he had proposed of prolonging his defence, by secretly dismissing the greater part of his garrison.⁴⁵

On the third day after this mode of warfare had been adopted, Murāri Rao could no longer restrain his men from exclaiming, even from the parapets, to the besiegers, that they were dying of thirst. Entirely helpless, Murāri despatched his minister Pali Khān to Haidar, to tender his submission, and beg the forgiveness of his former offences. Haidar coolly directed the besieged to be informed that there was abundance of water below; and if they desired to quench their thirst, they must all descend unarmed, with Murāri Rao at their head, that he would fire at any flag of truce and reject all advances, except in the form which he had prescribed. Also to Murāri, in particular, he returned through Pali Khān a conciliatory letter with a *Kowl-nāma* or assurance of the safety of his life and property, and invited him to meet him. In the course of the day, Murāri Rao, accompanied by his son and followed by his unarmed garrison, descended from the top of the hill in a palankeen, and threw himself on Haidar's clemency. A separate tent being ordered for Murāri's accommodation, he was placed in it, and every individual, before being passed, was separately searched and plundered of the trifling sum he possessed. Haidar's garrison then ascended the rock,

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 722-723.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 723.

accompanied by a deputation, to take an account of all property, public and private, and even the apartments and persons of the women were plundered of their remaining jewels and ornaments, to the amount of 5,000 Rupees only. The official servants of revenue (including the Gōsaīs, Pūrṇagiri, Mansāgiri, Tulajāgiri, Harināgiri and others) were placed in separate custody, Haidar satisfying himself with levying on them ten lakhs of Rupees, while a heavy contribution was exacted even from the populace. These operations being completed early in the month of April, Haidar received the whole of the prisoners, civil and military (their chief alone excepted), into his favour and service. The departments of the late government were put into immediate activity as a branch of the general administration, Haidar's own men Bālāji Rao and Rōshan Khān being appointed to the Subādāri and Killedāri of Gooty respectively. Orders were issued for the future regulation of the revenues and the command of the subordinate garrisons. Not a man attempted to disobey them and all the possessions of the house of Ghōrpaḍe were transferred with no other ceremony than the substitution of the seal of Haidar. In vain Murāri Rao entreated to be allowed to visit Haidar. He received only the answer that Haidar had then no leisure and that his request would only be acceded to after his return to Seringapatam, whither Haidar, committing Murāri's person to the care of confidential men, sent him with his family for the time being. On Haidar's return to Seringapatam, they were all despatched to the dreadful prison at Kabbāldurg, where Murāri Rao was put to death by Haidar's orders in or about May 1779, many of the family surviving for fifteen years, till the general massacre of prisoners perpetrated by Tipū's orders in 1791.⁴⁶

46. *Ibid.*, 723-725; also Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 328-330, and *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 56-57; also *Anantapur Dist. Gaz.*, 158-160 (quoting from Wilks). According

Thus fell Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe a victim to Haidar's resentment, treasured up since two decades from Nanjarāja's memorable siege of Trichinopoly (1752-1755). If Nawāb Muhammad Ali Wālajah had proved treacherous to Mysore by his failure to cede Trichinopoly to Nanjarāja under the secret treaty with him, Murāri Rao, who, as we have seen,⁴⁷ was first engaged to fight the battles of Nanjarāja against Muhammad Ali and his allies, had proved equally treacherous by the manner in which he went over to the side of Muhammad Ali, thus preventing Nanjarāja from securing what was fully due to him. Haidar, who had followed Nanjarāja to Trichinopoly and was a shrewd judge of men and things, lived too close to the times to forget the bitter memories of this gross betrayal of interests of Mysore on the part of Murāri Rao, and

Reflections on the fall.

to the *Haid-Nām*. (ff. 57), the surrender of Murāri Rao took place towards the close of March 1776 (*Manmatha-Phālguna* ba.), but in the light of Wilks, the entire arrangements connected with the administration of the conquered place and the transfer of Murāri Rao to Seringapatam were completed early in April 1770. Among the spoils acquired by Haidar at Gooty on the capitulation of Murāri Rao were "pearls, and jewels of great price, jewelled ornaments, and other articles becoming the use of a prince, with the arms and warlike stores, and all articles of value" which "the Nawaub took for himself." Several companies of "dancing women of the Telinga tribe", who, attracted by Murāri Rao's liberality, had sought refuge in the Palace (*Mahal*) of Murāri Rao on the top of the hill, also fell to Haidar's share, some of whom "with the consent of their masters or owners, he purchased for his own *Natiksāl* (*Nāfakāsāla*) and consigned them to his women's apartments"; some he sent to Ganjām, in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and some to Bangalore (*Kirmāni*, o.c., 329). Evidently, in the midst of serious political preoccupations, Haidar rarely forgot his keen appreciation of aesthetic values! Wilks hardly mentions the date of death of Murāri Rao in Kabbāldurg, where, he merely says, "Morari Row soon afterwards died" (Wilks, o.c., I. 724-725). This bald statement would also seem to suggest that Wilks believed that Murāri Rao died a natural death. This, however, does not appear to have been the real case. A letter from the *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, dated May 8, 1779, speaks of Haidar having "a few days ago, put to death Murāri Rao and his family, with great indignity and dishonour" (see *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 329, Letter No. 1484, from the Nawāb of Arcot). If this be so, then Murāri Rao must have been put to death in or about May 1779.

47. Vide Vol. II, Chapters VII-VIII and XVI.

was only biding his time to wreak his vengeance on Murāri Rao and remove a thorn from his side, which he had undoubtedly proved to be since then. So deep, indeed, was Haidar's sense of Murāri's injustice to the cause of Mysore at Trichinopoly that even in prison he hardly forgot to cajole him by reminding him of it and even contemplating to send him to capture it for Mysore! It may be hazarded that Haidar eventually put him to death after making him repeatedly feel he was sending him out on such a military errand.⁴⁸

Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe was no doubt a great character, and a typical character too, figuring largely in the history of Southern India during the 18th century. Carving out the principality of Gooty as an offshoot of the

48. According to a *Fort St. George* letter, dated December 1, 1776, "Muraw Row, his second wife and his youngest son are prisoners at Seringapatam and have sentries placed over them. Hyder one day sent for Muraw Row and told him that when he took his country it was his property, and asked him where he had a country to go to. Cawn again said that he would restore him his country and desired him to go. Row told him that whatever country [he] would give him, he should think himself obliged to him and would go there. Cawn said that 'I will send with you my son Tupoo (Tippoo) at the head of my army to Trichinopoly which when you have taken I leave to you'. Row said that 'whatever troops or chiefs you may send there, that country will not be taken without you'. He said, it was right....." (*Fort St. George Records: Count-Corres*, XXV. 216, No. 121, Nawāb Muhammad Ali to Governor of Madras, recording intelligence from Seringapatam). Again, in February 1779, there even prevailed the intelligence that "Morarjee Mama (Murāri Rao) is come by orders from Hyder with 2,000 horse to Caveripatam" and that he with Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao was "ordered to go afterwards to the Gant of Chengum and to divide into four bodies, one to remain there, another to invade Trichinopoly, the third towards Amboor and march into the Carnatic and the other to enter by the Gant of Chengum," etc. (*Ibid*, XXVIII. 88-84, No. 37, dated February 28, 1779, from Muhammad Ali, Governor of Madras, recording intelligence from Haidar's camp). Evidently speculations were rife early in 1779 concerning Haidar's projected march southwards for the recovery of Trichinopoly, which gave colour to the belief that even Murāri Rao, already in prison, was going to participate in it. The truth of the matter was, however, that Haidar had already made up his mind to do away with Murāri Rao, though he never ceased to have his eye on Trichinopoly.

Mahratta Empire, he sought to maintain it in the true Hindu form, on the basis of military power he had built up for himself. Selfishness and greed were, however, fundamental defects of his character. He fought for those who paid him most and seems to have rarely appreciated that the interests of the country demanded a higher type of political morality to preserve it against the sweeping current. His fall is pathetic to a degree but, viewed in proper perspective, forms a telling commentary on the conditions of the times.

The fall of Murāri Rao is tragic in the extreme. To a historical student, it excites sympathy. He was, in one sense, a great man, great not only in the sense that he belonged to a well-known and distinguished Mahratta family, the hereditary *Sēnāpatīs* of the Mahratta kingdom, but also himself distinguished as a military leader of rank, as a soldier of distinction, and as possessing certain soldierly qualities that made him great among the greater men of his period. He was the collaborator of Clive in the famous defence of Arcot. There is something grand about him, dominating as he does the 18th century in the Karnātic wars. He had the genius to see the point of a suggestion made, a request preferred or a military adventure to be attempted. He could see instinctively what a particular position would yield, and how it would advance his own interests while helping the person seeking his aid. He could see through a difficulty and meet it instantaneously, and he could disarm his opponent with equal celerity and address. Such a man to end his last moments, in the manner that fate decreed, as a prisoner with his position and kingdom and personal freedom and independence lost, is something too pathetic, indeed, for words. To be cribbed, confined and gaoled on a desolate hill, rife with jungle fever, away from his kingdom and what he had made his own, divorced from

his daily pastime of military adventure, fresh and stirring, each something better than its predecessor, is, to use no hyperbolic language, forsooth something far too tragic in the case of a soul like Murāri Rao, who was something more than a mere soldier of fortune. He aimed big, though he did not succeed in his objectives. He deserved a better end than the bitter one to which he was condemned by a cruel irony of fate. Haidar could have been certainly more chivalrous in the case of such a man. But chivalry was not in his line of thought. At the same time, he had this fear that he could not trust Murāri Rao for anything from his past conduct. And there is this to be remembered against him. The deception he practised on Daḷavāi Nanja-rājaiya in the Trichinopoly affair demanded punishment not only in another world but also in this mortal one of ours. There was no justification for it; there was no need for it; and all reason and logic was opposed to it. Private and public morality required that he should have stood by the Daḷavāi rather than despoil him of his just reward for the men and money he had spent on the venture and on Murāri himself in maintaining him, true to the letter of his engagement with him, during the whole period of that sorrowful episode. Repentence for wrong may cost very dear, indeed, and may have to be bought at the cost of a kingdom even. At any rate, it did prove so in the case of Murāri Rao, who had yielded to sordid personal ambition. He rated Haidar Ali too cheap and did not reckon with his host when he played foul with the old Daḷavāi, in whose school Haidar was brought up and who had too good a memory to forget easily the deception practised on his master. In his hill confinement, Murāri got a little time to think of the evil he had done to the Daḷavāi and his king. Repentence, as the proverb goes, may be the May of all virtues, but innocence would have been better, for it would

possibly have meant a different end to Murāri, who certainly deserved, considering other aspects of his career, a very different fate than the one that actually overtook him. But as the poet declares :—

And though circuitous and obscure,

The feet of Nemesis, how sure !

Murāri Rao belonged to the well known Ghōrpaḍe Family, represented in South India by the Saṇḍūr Ruling House, in the present Bellary district. It is remarkable that despite the fame attaching to Murāri Rao, we know so little of his early life. Even the exact year of his birth is not known, much less the details of his early career up to the date of his conquest of Gooty. Even modern historical research has so far shed no light on that part of his career. About 1746, we see him secure in the possession of Gooty. We do not know whether he personally took it, or, as some accounts say, it was already in the possession of his family, having previously been taken by stratagem by his paternal uncle, who bore his name and who fell in battle. The Nizām attested to his pretended sway over the fort by countenancing Murāri Rao's occupation of it but Murāri, perhaps, never required, much less desired, such recognition, though he, astute man that he was, made the most of it, to make himself stronger in his stronghold. In 1754, he made it his permanent capital and residence and repaired its fortifications, which date back to the time of the Ganga king Mārasimha II, who bore rule in 973 A.D. and took pride in the alliterative title of "King Ganga of Gutti." Murāri's doings since that time belong to South Indian history generally and some account has been given of the part he played at Trichinopoly and in the wars of Haidar. Orme, who knew him well personally,⁴⁹ has

49. Orme, *Indostan*, I. 363-364. Orme lived between 1728-1801. He entered E. I. Co's service in 1748. He was a Member of Madras Council from

drawn a full-length portrait of him in his *History*, which is too life-like and intimate to be omitted from any sketch of the great Mahratta leader's life or career. It well illustrates Orme's strength as a delineator of the character of the men of his own time, full of word-pictures and touches altogether inimitable. Writing of the qualities that made Murāri Rao and his following such important factors in the politics of the time, Orme, indeed, pays a handsome tribute to Murāri Rao as a born leader. "He soon made himself," he says, "admired and respected by his neighbours, enlisting none of his countrymen but such as were of approved valour, and treating them so well, that they never entertained any thoughts of quitting him : on the contrary the whole army seemed as one family ; the spirit of exploit which he contrived to keep up amongst them by equitable partitions of plunder, rendered them fond of their fatigues, and they never complained but when they had nothing to do. The choice he made of his officers still more discovered his capacity ; for there was not a commander of 100 horse who was not fit to command the whole ; notwithstanding which every one was contented in his particular station and they still lived in perfect harmony with each other, and in perfect obedience to their general. So that this body of troops were, without exception, the best soldiers of native Indians at this time in Indostan. Besides the qualities common to the rest of the Morattoo nation, such as activity, stratagem, great dexterity in the management of their horses and sabres, they had by their conflicts against Europeans surmounted in a great degree the terror of fire-arms, although opposed to them with the

1754 to 1758. He reached London finally in 1760. Murāri Rao's career in South India began in 1746 and ended in 1776, when he was taken prisoner. Orme should have personally known Murāri Rao between about 1754 to 1760 and what he wrote was in part his personal impression of the great military leader.

steadiest discipline; and what is more extraordinary, were even capable of standing against the vivacity of a cannonade from field-pieces: although this terrible annoyance, never made use of in India before the war we are commemorating, continued to strike all other Indian troops with as much terror as their ancestors felt when regular musketry was first employed against them." Such a man truly deserved a better end, but he had made himself possibly the bitterest foe of Haidar, who wreaked his vengeance when he at last got the opportunity in 1776, 'an opportunity for which he had waited so long. Many of his family, Wilks adds, survived him for fifteen years, and were destroyed in the general massacre of prisoners which was perpetrated by Tipū's orders in 1791.⁵⁰ According to tradition and documents preserved in Fort St. George archives, Madras, however, Murāri Rao's adopted son, Śiva Rao, escaped the kindly attentions of Haidar. According to these records, discovered long after Wilks' time, Murāri was the eldest son of Siddōji Rao Ghōrpaḍe, the founder of the Saṇḍūr family who took Saṇḍūr in 1728 and became its first ruler. He was the nephew— younger brother's son—of Śāntaji Rao, who greatly distinguished himself under Śivāji and his son Sambhāji and grandson Sāhu and was granted the title of *Sēnāpati*. The Ghōrpaḍe family claims to be connected with the famous Bhōnsle family of Satara, to which Śivāji belonged. The exploits of Śāntaji are frequently chronicled by Duff who remarks he "was one of the best officers of whom the Mahratta annals can boast, and his eulogy is best recorded when we say he was the terror of the Moghul detachments for seven years."⁵¹ He held the *jaghīr* of Kapsi in the Kolhapur State and was given the title of *Sēnāpati*—Commander-in-Chief—

50. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 725.

51. Grant-Duff, *Mahrattas*, I. 295.

which the Saṇḍūr Chiefs still bear in perpetuity. Murāri Rao is said to have died in or about 1779 at Kabbāldurga, where his tombstone has been searched for without success.⁵² Murāri is said to have had two sons, both of whom died in childhood. He adopted one Śiva Rao, eldest son of Yeswant Rao, great-grandson of Māloji Rao, paternal uncle of Siddōji Rao, Murāri's father. Śiva Rao, the adopted son, is said to have been killed about 1785 in an attempt to recover Saṇḍūr from Tipū, which had been wrested from Murāri by Haidar in 1776. Śiva Rao's paternal uncle, Māloji Rao, had joined Murāri Rao in his defence of Gooty and was killed in action there.⁵³ Māloji's grandson Śiva Rao took possession of Saṇḍūr on Tipū's death in 1799 and surrendered to Sir Thomas Munro in 1817. He was restored by the E. I. Co., who granted him a *sanad* in 1826 and in his family (he adopted his nephew Venkaṭa Rao) the Saṇḍūr State still continues to bear rule over that picturesque valley. The Murāri Rao of history is thus the lineal ancestor of that family and his historic connection with South India is still thus happily perpetuated,⁵⁴ though cut off for ever from Gooty, so

52. During a personal visit to the place, local enquiries failed to elicit any information, though conducted during a prolonged period of time in and around the place.

53. See *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, N. S. iii. 200.

54. See Genealogical Tree of the Ghōrpaḍe Family of Saṇḍūr in the *Bellary District Gazetteer* under Saṇḍūr, which is based on the *Fort St. George* archives and the documents traced in it. See also Marathi Ms. history of the Family in the *Bombay Branch of the R. A. S.*, which was drawn up, from internal evidence afforded by it, by Bhujanga Rao, grandson of Daulat Rao, second son of Siddōji Rao, who took Saṇḍūr in 1728. This Bhujanga Rao succeeded to the Gaḷēndragadh State, which is still held by his descendants. Another Marathi Ms. is a pedigree drawn up, according to it in 1817, the year in which Munro took the State of Saṇḍūr, for the information of Mr. Chaplin, Collector of Bellary, by the Secretary to the then Saṇḍūr Chief, now in the possession of that Secretary's family. That Śiva Rao was Yeshwant Rao's son and was adopted by Murāri Rao is also confirmed by Mr. Chaplin's letter dated 9th September 1822 to the Bombay Government and by a pedigree drawn up in 1875, when the hereditary title of Rāja was conferred on the Saṇḍūr Chief, Munro's report to Elphin-

closely connected with the great leader's life and career.

After the despatch of Murāri Rao to Seringapatam, Haidar directed the Chief of Chitaldrug to annex Murāri's possessions of Pāḡoṇḍa, Madakāsira, Penukoṇḍa and Kōḍikoṇḍā⁵⁵. Meanwhile, intelligence having been received that 40,000 Mahratta horse had been despatched from Poona to assist Murāri Rao and that they had encamped in the neighbourhood of Gōkāk-Peth, Haidar, finishing the arrangements in Murāri's district of Saṇḍūr, proceeded westwards and soon arrived at Hospet. The Mahrattas, however, unable to resist Haidar's arms, retired from the field, and Haidar completed his conquest of Murāri Rao's territories by declaring as duly annexed to Mysore the forts of Harihar (south of Bellary) and Venkaṭagiri (at the head of the Tubulpalli Pass, south-east of Gooty), which had been long in the possession of Murāri.⁵⁶

About this time, Raghunāth Rao from Bombay having, as already mentioned, confirmed to Haidar the possession of the entire Mahratta territory up to the right bank of the Krishna, Haidar, ostensibly

Campaign in the
Tungabhadra-
Krishna Doab,
May-June 1776.

stone, dated 1st November 1817, on the surrender of the State, also mentions that Saṇḍūr formed part of Murāri Rao's principality and that he adopted Śiva Rao, mentioned in the text above (see Gleig's *Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, III. 288-292). Local tradition also makes Murāri Rao succeed to the State as stated above. The pedigree of 1817 adds that Murāri Rao took in adoption a distant relation because Daulat Rao, his half-brother and chief of Gaḷēndragadh, refused to give either of his two sons in adoption (see *Bellary Dist. Gaz.*, chap. XVI, *Saṇḍūr*). One of the two Mss., referred to above, was translated and published by us in the *Madras Christian College Magazine*, January 1909, under the caption *A Marathi Historical Document*, being part of the documentary and other material collected for a history of the Saṇḍūr State in 1901, when the *Bellary District Gazetteer* edited by Mr. W. Francis, I.C.S., was under preparation.

55. *Haid. Nām.* ff. 57.

56. *Kirmāṇi*, c.c., 390. 391. *Kirmāṇi* refers to Harihar as "Hurrial" and Venkaṭagiri as "Vinkut Giri."

in conformity to this arrangement but really in furtherance of his own objective, had collected all the Mysore tributary chiefs on its northern frontier with their respective quotas of troops, and it had for some time been announced that the fall of Gooty would be the signal for their march. In May, accordingly, Haidar moved with the entire Mysore army towards Savanūr. The Pathān Nawāb of that province had been already deprived by the Mahrattas of one half of his former territory. For sparing the remaining half, he offered a military contribution of three lakhs of pagodas, which Haidar rejected and proceeded without distinction of Muhammadan or Mahratta claims to occupy the whole area. The forts and taluks of Kopal, Bahadūr-Banda, Mundurgi-Durga, Gajēndragadh, Navalgunda, Jālhalli, Bādāmi, Śirahatti, Dāmūl, Kittūr and Hāranūr, among others, were successively taken and *Pēshkāsh* exacted from the respective *Pāḷegārs*. Haidar had succeeded in making himself master of about one half of the province between the Tungabhadra and Krishṇa, when the monsoon burst with great violence, and the destruction which it produced among the horses and cattle of the army induced him to break up for the rains. He accordingly left a select corps in Bankapur under Shaikh Ayāz, with directions to watch, and as far as possible, intercept, the supplies of the garrison of Dharwar, not yet reduced. Inclining to the eastward by way of Kanakagiri, he, in July, recrossed the Tungabhadra in basket boats at Ānegondi. The Chief of Ānegondi, Timrāj (Tirumala Rāya), a descendant of the illustrious Kings of Vijayanagar, submitted to Haidar with an offer of "a lakh of rupees." Haidar, in view of "the high rank of the ancestors of Timraj and their former greatness"—"the country of the two Karnatics, and even the Dukhun from the forts of Malabar to the

Haidar at Ānegondi, July 1776.

banks of the Nurbudda being subject to their authority in former times"—“excused him the payment of his Paishkush (*Pēshkāsh*), and sent him an honorary dress, confirming him in all his possessions”. Marching thence by the route of Harapanahalli and Jarimale, Haidar next arrived in the neighbourhood of Chitaldrug, from whose Pālegār he accepted a contribution of Rupees four lakhs. Then, taking the route of Bukkāpaṭṇam, he encamped in the environs of Gulwari (?Gūlūr), whose opium-eating Chief readily submitted to him. Pursuing

Returns to his march from there, Haidar at length
Seringapatam, arrived in Seringapatam in the month
August 1776 of August.⁵⁷

The kingdom of Mysore had thus become practically coterminous with the Krishna in the north. Haidar now sought a short respite at the capital. While he was yet there, on September 16, 1776, the reigning King Bettāda-Chāmarāja Wodeyar passed away in the Palace at Seringapatam in his seventeenth year.⁵⁸

57. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 727-728; see also and compare *Haid. Nām*, ff. 57, and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.* 287, 298-303 (referring to the Ānegondi episode) on pp. 299-300) The *Haid. Nām*, specifically dates the northern campaign of Haidar in May-June 1776 (*Durmukhi, Vaiśākha-Jyēṣṭha*), which is in keeping with Wilks. Kirmāṇi, however, as usual, antedates and sets down the events of 1776 to 1769 and 1771 (A. H. 1183 and 1185). ‘Timraj’ of Ānegondi, referred to by Kirmāṇi, is identical with Tirumala Rāya, who, according to the *Mackenzie Mss.*, succeeded, in 1766, Rāma Rāyalu (identical with Kōdaṇḍa Rāma II or Rāma Rāja VI), and was still ruling in 1801 at Ānegondi. He was evidently the last of the scions of the Ārzuḍu, Dynasty of Vijayanagar that settled down at Ānegondi after the battle of Rakṣas-Tangdi (see *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iii. 2420). ‘Gulvari’ of Kirmāṇi, referred to in the text, is probably identical with Gūlūr, in Tumkūr district.

58. *Annals*, I. 215: *Durmukhi-Niṣa-Bhādrapada śu.* 8 (Monday). The contemporary work *Haid. Nām*, (ff. 58) merely dates the death in *Durmukhi-Bhādrapada ba.* 12. There was, however, an intercalary *Bhādrapada* in *Durmukhi* (1776), and the date of the *Annals* (l.c.) corresponds to September 16, 1776 (see *Ind. Eph.*, VI. 355). While both the sources are agreed as to the occurrence of the event in 1776, the authority of the *Annals* is to be preferred here as the more specific. A *Fort. St. George* consultation records what was apparently a rumour of the king’s death

As to how he died, the available authorities maintain a discreet silence. There is, however, evidence to believe that Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar also was, like his predecessor, poisoned by Haidar, who, in the zenith of his power as the *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore, would not evidently brook any ruling king attaining his majority.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ See, on the subject of the cause of King Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja's death, *Count. Corres.*, XXXI, No. 10, p. 839, *Letter from Lakshmammanni, Dowager Queen of Seringapatam, to Governor of Madras, dated May 28, 1782*, where, referring to the "usurpation and illegal acts of Haidar", she asserts his having "confined me and poisoned my sons." Here the reference to "my sons" is to kings Nanjarāja Wodeyar and Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar. The poisoning of Nanjarāja is confirmed by Peixoto in some detail as we have already seen (*vide* Ch. I), though we have no details as to the poisoning of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja. Again, another document of the *Rāna Correspondence*, the *Rāna Treaty* dated October 28, 1782, speaks of "Hyder Naig" having "usurped all our master's country, destroyed him and his two sons" and of his still keeping the King's widow, "our Rana, in prison in Seringapatam" [See Appendix III—(1) for the full text of the *Rāna Treaty*]. This extract refers in a direct manner to the "destruction" of Immaḍi Krishnarāja and his two sons Nanjarāja and Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja at the hands of Haidar. The reference to Immaḍi Krishnarāja's death having been brought about by Haidar is, however, not substantiated independently, as Haidar was away from Seringapatam when the king died in April 1786. Probably he had been instrumental in some attempt at encompassing his death too. As against this, however, we note that even the Dowager Queen does not refer to such a calamitous event in her letter to the Government of Madras, mentioned above, where she merely refers to her two sons being poisoned by Haidar. Possibly the adherents of the Dowager Queen who negotiated the *Rāna Treaty* seem to have exaggerated Haidar's cruelty towards the Royal Family of Mysore by including even Immaḍi Krishnarāja among the members of the Family put to death by him.

CHAPTER III.

KHASA-CHAMARAJA WODEYAR VIII, 1776-1796.

Haidar's choice of the successor of Bettada-Chamaraja Wodeyar: His motives and objectives—The nominees of Maharani Lakshmammanni; their relative claims for succession—The legal aspect of the matter—The difficulty in Haidar's way; seeks a way out; rules out the Queen's nominees; his artifice of a selection—Wilks' account of it—The version as recorded in the *Annals*—The implications of Haidar's act—Birth and accession of Khasa-Chamaraja Wodeyar—Mysore-Mahratta-Nizamite relations: renewed campaigns in the north, 1776-1779; the formation of the confederacy of the Mahrattas and Nizam against Mysore; a section of the Mahratta army advances on Savanur, October-November 1776—Opposed and put to rout by Haidar's Commandant Muhammad Ali—The confederates vs. Haidar, January-March 1777—Haidar proceeds against and lays siege to Chitaldrug, July 1777—The siege, July-October 1777; Haidar again confronted by the Mahrattas—Tests the allegiance of the Palegar of Chitaldrug—Haidar's diplomacy in the Mahratta camp; the battle of Baravee; the defection and escape of Manaji-Phakde—Hari-Pant's retreat, December 1777—Haidar reduces the Mahratta territory between the Tungabhadra and Krishna, 1778; marks the Krishna as the northern boundary of the Empire of Mysore; invests Chitaldrug a second time—The renewed siege of Chitaldrug, 1778-1779—Haidar's plan to secure the Palegar's person—Haidar tries other means to bring the Palegar to book; corrupts the Muhammadans in the Palegar's service; secures the defection of the sons of the Chief of Jarimale—The capitulation of Chitaldrug, March 1779—Reduction of Cuddapah, March-April 1779—Attempted assassination of Haidar; Haidar's resourceful escape; the capture and end of the assassins—Fall of Sidhout and Ganjikote, and surrender of Abdul Halim Khan, April-May 1779; Haidar levies contributions from Adoni and Kurnool;

and returns to Seringapatam, June 1779—Advance on Travancore (down to 1780): Haidar's objective; his plan of an offensive and defensive alliance with the Dutch, 1766; his demands on Cochin and Travancore; expedition to Cochin and Cranganore, 1773-1774—Renewed demands on Cochin and Cranganore, 1775; Haidar throws off his mask, 1776; Sardar Khan's progress against Cochin and Cranganore; advances further south and blockades Chetwa *en route* to Travancore; demands tribute from the Dutch E. I. Co.—Their reaction to Haidar's progress; surrender of Chetwa to Mysore, November 1776; the lukewarmness of Cochin and Travancore to Governor Moens' proposals; Haidar and the Dutch gain time, 1777: the buffer-state policy of the Dutch—Their fruitless siege of Chetwa and Cranganore, 1778; Governor Moens' attempted mediation with Travancore; Haidar steadily pursues his objective, 1778-1780.

THE death of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar was, as we have seen, occasioned not by any vices of his own but by Haidar's falling a victim to his baser self. For some time Haidar's thoughts did continue to be in "bloody."

Haidar's choice of the successor of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar.

In a short while, he had done to death the two royal brothers. Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja's only fault was he was the grandson of Nanjarājaiya, Haidar's early benefactor, whose political end he had encompassed so systematically. After a short nominal reign of five years, Haidar mangled for Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja the same deadly draught which he had composed for his elder brother and predecessor. From an humble origin, Haidar had raised himself to the command of the Mysore arms; and in the difficulties which resulted from Nanjarājaiya's attempted conquest of Trichinopoly, had succeeded in securing, though he may not have deserved it, the goodwill of the people of Mysore. With a successful army, he had been tolerated as the protector of the

country and the guardian of the princes, the sons of Krishnarāja II. His supreme office of *Sarvādhikāri* was popularly believed to include that of the father of the princes as well. But Haidar, after the madness that had seized him when he got the potion administered to King Nanjarāja, soon disdained the subordinate office of a minister and tried to assume the full independence that was yet lacking in him in the undoubtedly high office he held. His good sense, however, still despised the pomp of royalty. He still recognized the need for a representative of the ancient Royal House on the throne; he still would represent himself as but a servant of his sovereign; he still would act as the chosen commander of his master's armies; and he still would render an account to him of his acts and deeds at the annual festive gathering of the Dasara. He had, however, in the indulgence of a right, both custom and religion had allowed him, married twice and had, by now, two sons. Tipū, the elder of these, had been born to him in 1749 (1753 according to some writers) and was accordingly 27 years of age. He was commanding the troops and was active on the field. Karīm Sāhib, the younger son, who was also known as Safdar Shikoh, was about three years younger; and though yet confined to the domestic circle, had to be put on his feet.¹ Haidar had been blessed with daughters as well, and for them, he was, as we shall see, seeking alliances in well-established ruling houses not far away. The question before him was how best to provide for his growing sons?

1. A Persian news-letter from the Imperial Record Department (made available by courtesy of Dr. S. N. Sen), dated September 6, 1788, mentions Tipū as having, after his advance on Travancore in that year, returned to Bangalore, "after leaving his younger brother with troops and artillery to fight the Rāja of Bayawar" (Travancore). The reference here is to Karīm Sāhib who, as the younger brother of Tipū, had obviously accompanied him during his southern campaign of 1788.

He himself was nearing the sixtieth year², and Nanja-rājaiya, for long cribbed and confined at Seringapatam, had died in about 1774³, and his son Virarāja, though confined at Seringapatam, may at any time regain his liberty. A king that showed any possibility of reaching independent manhood as Nanjarāja had done, would mean danger not only to himself but also to the continuity of the power that he had secured for his lineal successors in the office of *Sarvādhikāri* at Mysore. He preferred an infant to a growing young man with a will of his own; and he preferred after that, an young man of his own choice, who would both be beholden to him and in perpetual fear of him. Towards this end, he first surreptitiously put out of the way Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja, the reigning king, a deed that secured for him just reproach for its folly and ingratitude, apart from the crime and inhumanity of the act. Next, he hit upon a plan of action, by which he wanted to ward off, the great dissimulator he was, popular feeling against himself for this fresh perpetration of treason against the Ruling House. This outrage on his part was intended as a counterblast to a move on the part of Rāṇi Lakshammanni, the surviving widow of King Krishnarāja II, whose influence was evidently on the increase since the death of the old dowager queen Dēvājamanni in 1769.⁴

On the unexpected demise of the reigning King Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja, Lakshammanni made it known that the succession should devolve on the nearest lawful heir. There were undoubtedly several claimants—near

The nominees of
Mahārāṇi Lakshma-
mmani.

2. According to some, Haider was born in 1717, while according to others, he was born in 1722. See *ante*. Vol. II pp. 205, 752, 756.

3. See Chap. IV below.

4. Married in 1746, she appears to have died in or about 1769. See *ante* Vol. II, Chap. XV. p. 615.

and far, real or supposed—to the throne thus rendered vacant by the artful device of Haidar. It was Haidar's desire that in the contest thus brought into being by him, as between these different claimants, his own choice should ultimately prevail. Lakshammamanni's choice centred round two young men, belonging to two different families connected with the Royal House. The first of these was Narasarājaiya, son of her own younger sister, who had been married to Maddūr Kāntarājaiya of the Bhāradvāja-gōtra of the Kaḷale family. The other was one Siddarājaiya, son of her co-wife's daughter. This daughter had been married into the Tagaḍūr family, which belonged to the Haritasa-gōtra. Lakshammamanni herself belonged to the Beṭṭadakōte family, being a daughter of Katti.Gōpālārāja Urs, well known in connection with the Trichinopoly episode.⁵ Having been married to Krishnarāja II, she belonged to the Ātrēya-Gōtra. Presumably she could thus have had nothing but the interests of the Royal House in her mind in suggesting the names of Narasarājaiya of the Kaḷale family or Siddarājaiya of the Tagaḍūr family. He of the Kaḷale family was the son of her younger sister, while he of the Tagaḍūr family was the son of her co-wife's daughter, *i.e.*, Krishnarāja's grandson by his own daughter.⁶ As to the selection from the Kaḷale family,

Their relative
claims for succe-
sion.

5. See *ante* Vol. II. pp. 128, 134-135, 133-139, 142, 248.

6. According to Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 713, f.n.), Lakshammamanni is said to have interested herself in the succession of the grandson of Krishnarāja II. He writes: "Many tales have been related regarding the surviving dowager (*i.e.*, Lakshammamanni) having interposed in favour of this succession (Krishnarāja's grandson's)." And he adds her denial of having ever done so in these words: "I have conversed with her on the subject, and she distinctly stated, that from the period of her husband's death, she never had the opportunity or the privilege of remonstrating on that or any other subject, and never did attempt or wish to interfere, in favour of that rival branch, or any other, for she is also stated in these tales to have proposed a relation of her own." Wilks was evidently dealing with a woman who knew the value of the saying that silence is golden in certain circumstances. As for his

it has to be borne in mind that that family was one of equal rank with the Ruling Family and the union of the two families of Mysore and Kaḷale had been vouched for in the *Bhāshā-Patra* ("deed of promise") issued by Krishnarāja Wodeyar II in 1758. The *Nambuge-Nirūpa* ("order of assurance") issued by the same sovereign in the same year allowed free inter-marriage between the two families.⁷

Brought up in the traditions of both the families, Lakshmammanni may be adjudged right in taking the Kaḷale family into consideration while on the search for a suitable boy for adoption. The fact that that boy was a son of her own younger sister married into the Kaḷale family cannot be deemed to have been the determining factor in the case. According to the strict letter of the Hindu law governing adoption, the adoption of that boy to Krishnarāja II, to whom the succession reverted after the death of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja by his surviving widow, would have been correct. He would have been the true reflection of a son according to the text of Nanda-Paṇḍita.⁸ He was not a boy whose mother the adoptive father could not have legally married. Krishnarāja II, having married Lakshmammanni, could have legally married her sister also. As to the Tagadūr boy, he was, it is true, the grandson of Krishnarāja II by a daughter of his first wife. The legal objection to this adoption would be that he was a boy whose mother Krishnarāja II

statement that the "tales" of his time suggested that she had "proposed a relation of her own," the reference is perhaps to the first of the two boys mentioned in the text above, i.e., he of Kaḷale. She preferred the first because he belonged to the Kaḷale family, who had a special claim in this connection. He of Tagadūr, though descended from the Kaḷale family—being the grandson of Krishnarāja II by a daughter of his first wife, the daughter of Nanjarājaiya—belonged on his own paternal side to an entirely different family.

7. See ante Vol. II. pp. 202, 587. Also E. C., IV (1) Nj. 267-268.

8. *Saunaka-Smṛiti*, as quoted in the *Dattaka-Chandrika*. See J. D. Mayne, *Hindu Law* (1914 Edn.), Chap. V on *Adoption*, para 105, and f.n. (b).

could not have legally married. Though this prohibition, in the case of the three classes of Brāhmanas, Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, would hold good, it is well known that it would be valid, even among them, if sanctioned by custom.⁹ It is the more necessary to state these facts here because Wilks, in his work, after mentioning the existence of the grandson of Krishnarāja II (by a daughter of his first wife, who was a daughter of Nanjarājaiya, the Dalavāi), and after remarking that he was living in his own time, and that "the descendant of Nanjeraj (Nanjarājaiya) asserted the right of succession in favour of this descendant of a female branch," says that they did so "contrary to the rule of Hindoo succession." If they asserted "the right of succession in favour of the descendant of a female branch," it was evidently in pursuance of a custom current in the ruling family or among the Kshatriya caste to which the ruling family belongs, or for both these reasons. Among the Kshatriyas particularly, the adoption of a daughter's son is known in widely different parts of India.

9. The doctrine that the person to be adopted should be the reflection of a true son is based on the fiction "that the adopting father has begotten the boy upon his natural mother"; it is therefore necessary that she should be a person who might lawfully have been his wife. For this reason, a man cannot adopt his daughter's son, or his sister's son, or his mother's sister's son, for he cannot marry his daughter or his sister, or his mother's sister. As has been remarked, "if this prohibition were to be interpreted literally, there would be many other relations that cannot be adopted" (D. F. Mulla, *Hindu Law*, 451). Accordingly this prohibition has been restricted by British Indian High Courts to the specific cases mentioned above. It has also been held that the prohibition does not extend to other relations. It has been specifically held that a Hindu may adopt among others his wife's sister's son (see *Raghavendra vs. Jayaram*, 1897, 20 Mad. 283). As stated above, though an adoption may be prohibited by the strict letter of the law, it may be valid, if recognized by custom. Thus the adoption of a daughter's son is recognized by custom among the Brāhmanas in the Madras Presidency (*Visvasundara vs. Somasundara*, 1920, 48 Mad. 876) as among the Brāhmanas of the Southern Mahratta country, where the adoption of a sister's son is also valid by custom (see Mulla, *o.c.*, 452). Also, among the Khātris of Amritsar (see *Paramanand vs. Shiv Charan*, 1921, 2 Lah. 69, 59, I.C. 256).

Haidar, having despatched two brothers of the Royal Family much like the English usurper Richard III, saw as much difficulty in going backward as in going forward. He smelt a new danger also in the alternative choices of the Dowager Queen Lakshmammanni. Any countenance to either of these nominees may bring support, if not immediately, at least later, for her. Moreover, he was determined to see none but an infant on the throne to suit his own personal aims and ambitions. He wanted to make this resolve of his a matter of absolute certainty. With this end in view, he encouraged in a positive manner all other claimants to put forth and urge their individual causes, so that the rightful claimants may be disturbed. To such a high dignity and honour, there were doubtless many ready to come forward to urge their claims, such as they were, especially when the *Sarvādhikāri* himself had thrown forth a suggestion that they could do so. By one stroke, Haidar pretended to please all, while actually he pleased none but himself. But before he put his design into action, he had to rule out definitely the two nominees of the Dowager Queen Lakshmammanni. As regards the first—he of Kaḷale—he was described by Haidar as “lame” and as such not fit to rule a kingdom! As to the second—he of Tagaḍūr—Haidar characterized him as dull-witted and as afflicted with “leprosy”! These were flagrantly at variance with the actual facts. Wilks, who writes on this subject, while silent as to why Haidar ruled out these selections of Lakshmammanni, of which he had heard, tells us of the existence in his own time of one of these, he of Tagaḍūr, who was a great-grandson of Nanjarājāya, the Dalavāi, and the grandson of Krishnarāja II by his daughter. And the point worthy of note is that he does

The difficulty in Haidar's way.

Seeks a way out.

Rules out the Queen's nominees.

not mention even a word about the "leprosy" he was alleged to have suffered from, according to Haidar. While Wilks suggests that this nomination of the Tagaḍūr boy was "contrary to the rule of Hindoo succession," he being a grandson of Krishnarāja's daughter, he does not urge anything against him from the point of view of his physical qualifications. For Wilks wrote after inquiry not only into the facts which the nominees put forward but also as to the law applicable to their cases. And if he of Tagaḍūr had really suffered from such a dire disease as leprosy, presumably of the kind that would automatically have excluded him under the Hindu Law as a valid disqualification, he would have certainly put it forward with the legal objection he has mentioned after definitely learning of it.¹⁰ Haidar, who appears to have learnt as much of Hindu Law as was necessary for his purposes, thus sought to put aside both nominees, the one connected with the Dowager Rāṇi as well as the one connected with Nanjarājaiya. And he adopted

His artifice of a selection.

the artifice of a selection under a pretended inspiration. A graphic description of the mode of selection adopted is given by Wilks, while a variant of it appears in the traditionary tales of the period, one of which will be found related in Stewart's earlier work and in the *Annals*.¹¹ Whatever the truth contained in these different

10. The legal aspect of exclusion from inheritance, from the point of view of the law governing Hindus, may be stated briefly: (1) Want of any limb or organ—in this case of a leg—if congenital, would exclude an heir from inheritance. This has been held to include the case of a person who has no legs or no nose or tongue; (2) Idiocy, provided it is complete and absolute and congenital; and (3) Leprosy, when it is of such a virulent type that it is incurable, though it need not be congenital. When the last of these disqualifications is of such a type as not to unfit him for social intercourse, it is not a ground of exclusion. This is the gist of the current law, as interpreted by the High Courts in India and the Privy Council. (See F. D. Mulla, *Hindu Law*, 106, and cases quoted therein.)
11. It is clear from the device adopted by Haidar that he was not for the abolition of kingship or the substitution of the Hindu king by himself

versions—and they all alike attribute it solely to Haidar—there can be no doubt that he intended as much to circumvent the Dowager as to avoid any but an infant on the throne.

According to Wilks, Haidar ordered all the children to be collected from the different branches of the Royal House, who, according to ancient precedent, were entitled to furnish a successor to the throne. The procedure adopted, however childish, was in perfect accord with the feelings which he intended to delude, and sufficiently adapted to the impression desired to be created. The hall of audience was strewn round with fruits, sweetmeats and flowers, playthings of various descriptions, arms, books, male and female ornaments, bags of money and every varied object of puerile or manly pursuit; the children were introduced together, and were all invited to help themselves to whatever they liked best; the greater number were quickly engaged in a scramble for the fruits, sweetmeats and toys; but one child was attracted by a brilliant little dagger, which he took up in his right hand, and soon afterwards a lime in his left. "That is the Raja," exclaimed, it is said, Haidar, "his first care is military protection; his second to realize the produce of his dominions; bring him hither, and let me embrace him." The assembly was in an universal murmur of applause, and he ordered the child to be conducted to the palace and prepared for installation.¹²

He was not only against such a revolution, which presumably was beyond him, but also against taking any step that might mean the displacement of the Royal House of Haidar. He was, however, for every step that might mean the continuation of his own authority as *Sarvādhikari* and the continuance of that office hereditarily in his family.

12. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 716-718.

The version given in the *Annals*, though somewhat different, is even more graphic. On the death of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Wodeyar, Lakshmammaṇṇi, we are told, sent for and consulted Haidar, as the *Sarvādhikāri*, in regard to the succession. He agreed that the succession should be provided for, as such an ancient and historic Royal House as that of Mysore, so well known from ancient times, from the Himālayas to the Cape Comorin, cannot go without a suitable sovereign. The sovereigns of Mysore were not only famous as great men of action, as great donors of gifts and as ever engaged in the doing of pious and charitable deeds but also excelled in their personal appearance in as much as they combined to beauty of body many other qualities of head and heart. In keeping with this tradition, Haidar, we are told, addressing Lakshmammaṇṇi, went on to say, "you should examine if the boy you select possesses these qualities and then adopt and install him on the throne." Having laid this broad foundation, he next ruled out her two nominees, as above stated, on grounds both unwarranted and false, and then said, "leaving these two out, boys more beautiful and blessed with better qualities may be sent for and examined, when we will be enabled to choose the one whom Śrī-Chāmuṇḍēśvari, the tutelary deity of the Royal House, will point to as the one, who, by the merits of his previous birth, is best entitled to ascend the throne as the most eligible of all. He should then be tested as to his mental qualities and then adopted and placed on the throne." Haidar thus, by an adroit stroke, tried to put Lakshmammaṇṇi in a dilemma—to reject his proposal and get unpopular or to go without any adoption whatever. He condemned her choice on grounds, which, with the ignorant public, would carry weight; at the same time, he pointed to a manner of selection which

left him the final choice, while the inspired guidance he pretended to would keep out the Rāṇi from protesting against it. Haidar knew the value of publicity better than our modern exponent of that art knows it to-day. He knew that a lie, once given start, could never be overtaken by truth. And he started with a misdescription of the nominees of the Rāṇi, and rounded it off with a mode of selection coupled with the name of the great Goddess, so closely connected for all time with the Royal House of Mysore. What is more, as a man of action, he forthwith gave effect to his words. He left the Palace and gave out that the Rāṇi had agreed to his advice and sent out news all over the city of Seringapatam and the country round it, wherever there were families related to the Royal House, that they should send their little boys to the capital. These he got together in his own house, having assembled a number of people therein. In the large hall where they were collected together, he arranged, as in an exhibition, various things that might interest children. On one side, he had set down attractive eatables, like dates, grapes, sugarcandy, etc.; at another, various kinds of fruits; in a third, other kinds of eatables; in a fourth, cloths and ornaments of variegated colours and sorts; at another, coins of different sizes and value; in another place, toys and other things to play with; in yet another, a mirror and a dagger. In this hall, containing these many different things, he called for the assembled boys, and pointing to the things set down, said, "Don't be afraid; fall to bravely; take whatever you like from these things here." On this, the boys began to pick up whatever they were, as the result of the actions of their previous birth, led to. One of these was Chāmarāja, a child of three years, the son of Arikūṭhāra Dēvarāja Urs and Honnājamma, who was blessed with a beautiful appearance and smiling countenance. When the assembled crowd of people were looking eagerly at

what was going on, this child, Chāmarāja, advanced forward, went to the mirror and the dagger and picked up both of them. Haidar, pointing to him, at once exclaimed to all present, with great glee, "This is our future sovereign." He then directed, in theatrical fashion, the assembled people to get up, and ordering a couch, fit for a sovereign, made him sit on it, at an auspicious moment, and there and then tendered his personal homage with all due solemnity, and next got those assembled to do the same. Presenting next the new sovereign with a garland of flowers and a betel with gifts of clothing and ornaments, he had him escorted with Royal honours to the Palace, with injunctions that Rāṇi Lakshmammaṇṇi should be duly informed of all that had taken place in Haidar's house. Though what she desired had not come about, Lakshmammaṇṇi sent word that she was agreeable to the choice made. Later, Haidar compelled her to formally adopt the boy with due religious rites and had him installed on the throne.¹³ Such is the story told in the *Annals*, which unmistakably shows that Haidar had the predominant hand in the selection and saw to it that it was a mere infant that could ascend, so that his influence and authority may continue.¹⁴

13. *Annals*, I. 217-219. The articles chosen by Chāmarāja, according to Wilks, were "dagger and lime," while according to the *Annals* they were "mirror and dagger." Mirror indicates prosperity and dagger, success in war. The saying goes "*Kapilām darpaṇam bhānum bhāgyavantaṇcha bhūpatim*" etc. The *Annals* adds that Mahārāṇi Lakshmammaṇṇi was against the coronation of the boy thus chosen and was actuated by a spirit of jealousy. There is hardly any evidence for these statements. She was politician enough to understand the position in which she found herself, and acceded to a choice which she could not well prevent from taking effect. Wilks, indeed, suggests that his personal inquiries showed that she had no nominees of her own.

14. Stewart's version is somewhat different and is set down here to indicate the earliest account of the story. Stewart states that, on the death of Chāmarāja, "Hyder Aly ordered eight or ten boys, lineally related to the Royal family, to be brought before him, for the purpose of electing

By this act of his, Haidar set aside arbitrarily the hereditary claim of one family to which the right of kingship belonged; not only that, he also superseded the very idea of hereditary right. But even he accepted that the rite of coronation was essential to the exercise of royal authority. The installation of the new king that followed his choice ended with the homage of all the vassals and holders of dignities and offices, including himself. The new king may not have been king by hereditary right, but Haidar, by this very act of his, became bound to him as a servant. He wanted a mere infant on the throne and he got one of his own choice, which the astute Rāni made her own. But Haidar's choice neither actually prolonged his authority for he was rapidly aging, nor added really to his popularity with the masses, who had seen two kings in succession pass into the everlasting unknown and knew not what may become of the one now so solemnly set on the throne.

Chāmarāja, son of Dēvarāja Urs of Arikūṭhāra by Honnājamma, the heir thus chosen, was born on February 28, 1774.¹⁵ He was formally installed on the throne of Mysore on September 27, 1776, under

Birth and accession of Khāsā-Chāmarāja Wodeyar.

one of them to be Rāja. The boys being accordingly brought to the Palace at Seringapatam, Hyder ordered some fruit to be distributed amongst them; and watching attentively the conduct of the boys, he observed that one of them gave his share to his father, whilst all the others began to eat their portions. Hyder considered him who had given the fruit to his father as the most promising, and immediately placed him, then four years of age, on the throne" (Stewart, *Memoirs*, 25).

15. *Annals*, I. 216, 219; see also and compare *Raj. Kath.*, XII. 450. The date of birth of Khāsā-Chāmarāja Wodeyar, according to the *Annals* (I. 216), was *Vijaya, Phalgunā* *ba.* 2, Monday (February 28, 1774). The *Haid. Nam.* (ff. 58), which baldly mentions the installation of Chāmarāja Wodeyar by Haidar, refers to him as a child of five years of age, and as the son of Dēvarāja Urs of Kārugahalli. Stewart, who hardly mentions the king's name, speaks of him as a boy of four years, as mentioned above; while Wilks who spells him as "*Cham Raj*" is silent as regards his age (*Mysore*, I. 718). The data enshrined in the *Annals*, being more specific, is acceptable here.



Khāsā-Chāmarāja Wodeyar VIII, 1776-1793.

the name of Khāsā-Chāmarāja Woḍeyar, the word *Khāsā* meaning literally *legitimate*.¹⁶ Though the boy chosen was not in the direct line of descent to the late king, Rāṇi Lakshmammanṇi, the wise woman she was, openly acquiesced in this arrangement of Haidar and took a personal interest in the boy-king. Haidar, as was his wont in such cases, took a different view of her, which is well reflected in the *Annals*. That view was both baseless and wrong, for her whole life-history goes against it. Actually she proved a true mother and the one protector of the new king. Haidar, to show his personal resentment and to curb her growing influence in the old Palace at Seringapatam, superseded her in the control of the Palace household by appointing Muddu-Mallājammaiya to it in her place and kept Lakshmammanṇi in close confinement within.¹⁷ An inscription from Bowringpet taluk, dated November 12, 1777, in which Haidar is referred to as the active administrator of the kingdom of Mysore, belongs to Khāsā-Chāmarāja's reign, although the latter appears mentioned in it as "Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar."¹⁸

16. *Ibid.*: *Durmukhi, Nija-Bhādrapada* su. 15. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) roughly places the installation of Khāsā-Chāmarāja Woḍeyar in September 1776 (*Durmukhi-Bhādrapada*). Less reliable in this respect are Wilks, who places the event in 1775 (o. c., I. 716), and the *Mys. Rāj. Cha.* (44), the *Rāj. Kath.* (l.c.) and Stewart (l.c.), who loosely set it down to 1777!
17. *Ibid.*, 219-220. See also, in this connection, *Fort St. George Consultation* dated August 3, 1783, which speaks of Haidar having "proposed to the Rana the adoption of a youth who not being in direct succession, she is said to have refused to acknowledge" (*Mily. Cons.*, XCI. 8421); also *Letter* dated May 28, 1782, where the Dowager Queen refers to her having been "confined" by Haidar (*Count. Corres.*, XXXI. 839); and the *Rana Treaty* of October 28, 1782, mentioning this fact [Appendix III—(1)]. According to the *Annals*, the place of her confinement was the *Nāṭakāle Bokkasāda Toṭṭi* in the old Palace at Seringapatam (*Annals*, I. 220.)
18. *M. A. R.*, 1925, P. 69, No. 76: *Hēvīlambi, Kārtika* su. 12. This inscription in Kannaḍa, recording a *śrōtriyaṃ* grant of 60 *baḷlas* of land in the village of Naḍande in Vijayamangala to Vidyānātha-Śrīpāda of the Śrīpādarāja-Maṭh at the *Sarvamānya* village Gōpanahalli, begins as follows:

Hardly had Haidar settled the succession question, when his attention was again diverted to the north of Mysore, where, since his return from his late campaign, affairs were fast moving in a manner prejudicial to the interests of Mysore.

The powers of the Deccan and the South were identified with the parties which now divided the State of Poona. Haidar supported Raghunāth Rao and Nizām Alī stood for the ministerial party and the posthumous or reputed son of Nārāyaṇa Rao. A plan for the invasion of Mysore by the confederated armies of Poona and Nizām Alī was formed in consequence, the intrigues of the Chief of Chitaldrug with the

The formation of the confederacy of the Mahrattas and Nizām against Mysore.

court of Poona contributing in no small measure to this

Ś r i m a d rājādhirāja-rāja-paramēśvara-rāja-mārtāṇḍa-prauḍha-pratāpapratiṃastira-narapati-M a h i ś ā r a - s i m h ā s a n ā r ā ḍ h a r ā g i r u v a Chikkadēvarāja Voḍeyarāyanavarū Hoyisala dīsada-Kuruwankanaḍu-yeḍatittina Gautama-Kshētra Paśchima Ranganātha svāmī-yavara sannidhānadallā prithvi sāmrajyāṃ gaivuttirālu hajarat Nāvāda sāhēbaravara khuddu paravānikā prakārakke

Dr. R. Shama Sastri, noticing this record, observes:

"Another inexplicable error in the inscription is the mention of the name of Chikkadēvarāja Voḍeyar along with the name of Haidar Alī. They were not contemporaries, the date of Chikkadēvarāja Voḍeyar being 1672-1704" (*Ibid*). The fact that the name of the reigning king of Mysore in this correctly dated record is given as Chikkadēvarāja Voḍeyar, may be explained by taking it as an alternative name of Khāsā-Chāmarāja. A reference to certain other lithic records is necessary here. Arkalgud 62 of 1811 (*Chaitra* *su.1*), after mentioning Khāsā-Chāmarāja Voḍeyar's name, sets down the name *Chikka Arasu*, evidently short for *Chikkadēvarāja Arasu* of this record, which, as suggested above, has to be taken as an alternative name of *Khāsā-Chāmarāja Voḍeyar*, who was the son of *Dēvarāja Urs* of *Kāruḡa-halli*, and was evidently known originally as *Chikka Dēvarāja Urs*, abbreviated as *Chikka Arasu*, after his father. When he was chosen to rule over Mysore, he seems to have been given the name of *Chāmarāja Voḍeyar*, first held by the third king of Mysore. Arkalgud 62 of 1811 does not recognize the *interregnum* caused by Tipū. After (*Khāsā*) *Chāmarāja Voḍeyar* VIII, it sets down *Kaṇṭhīrava Arasu*, and then mentions *Krishṇarāja Voḍeyar* (III). Who was this *Kaṇṭhīrava Arasu*? He would be *Kaṇṭhīrava III*, if he were the king during the *interregnum*. As to the genealogical contents of this inscription, see *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 3074, Appendix B.

result. While the arrangements on a larger scale were in preparation, an army composed of the contingents of four considerable Mahratta Chiefs proceeded, towards the close of 1776, to dislodge Haidar's troops from Savanūr, and to make the necessary progress before the approach of the

main armies.¹⁹

Haidar prepared an adequate force to repel this attack ;

Opposed and put
to rout by Haidar's
Commandant Muham-
ammad Ali.

and conferred the command on Com-
mandant Muhammad Ali, a skilful officer
of his, who was also invested with
authority over the troops at Bankapur.

Muhammad Ali, assisted by Bāji Rao

Barve, a near relation of Raghunāth Rao, came up with the Mahrattas at Saunsi (ten miles north of Savanūr) and found them drawn up to offer him battle. He made his dispositions, and commenced the action with his cavalry by a feint, in which he was repulsed in apparent disorder. The Mahrattas pursued in hopes of a decisive victory, when suddenly the fugitives were received through the intervals of a powerful reserve and a tremendous fire of grape and musquetry poured in on the flank of the pursuers, from an ambush previously prepared. The slaughter was serious, and the confusion irretrievable. Muhammad Ali made a determined charge at the head of his cavalry, and completed the rout. The pursuit was continued for nine miles from the field of battle ; and the combat was terminated by the capture of two out of the four Chiefs, with a

19. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 731-732; see also and compare Grant-Duff, *o. c.*, II-65. As for the details of the intrigues of the Chief of Chitaldrug, see below. The four Mahratta Chiefs referred to were, according to Wilks and Grant-Duff, Pāndurang-Tātya, Lakshman-Hari, Kōnēri-Pant Patwardhan and Śivarām Bhao (nephew of Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe).

considerable number of subordinate officers and three thousand horses.²⁰

Early in 1777, the confederate armies were approaching. That of the Mahrattas under Paraśurām Bhao, estimated at 30,000 men, assembled near Miraj, on the left bank of the Krishṇa, with a view to penetrate by the province of Savanūr, in a south-eastern direction, while the army of Nizām Alī, under Ibrāhim Khān Dhoonsa, estimated at 40,000, moved by Raichūr, and was to follow a course nearly south. Thus, the two armies, by following the respective directions, would be enabled to enter the territory of Mysore, at points varying in their distance from each other from 20 to 150 miles. On receipt of this intelligence, Haidar fixed upon Gooty as a depot and point of support for offensive or defensive operations, and as the rendezvous of all the subsidiary troops, who had followed him in the late campaign. Thither, in March, he also moved, by way of Ratnagiri, with the main body of the Mysore army, reinforcing Muhammad Alī with a respectable corps. Paraśurām Bhao, on reconnoitring the force under the latter, and reflecting on his recent lesson to the Mahratta troops, sought reinforcements from home and after some manœuvring, retired for security behind the Krishṇa. Haidar had in the meanwhile operated on the court of Nizām Alī, and Ibrāhim Khān being under the secret influence of his (Haidar's) gold, was under the necessity of regulating his proceedings by the retrograde movements of the Mahrattas. Ibrāhim Khān had thus

20. *Ibid.*, 732; see also and compare Grant-Duff (l. c.), who briefly refers to the defeat of the troops of Kōṇēri-Pantaud the capture by Muhammad Alī and Bāji Rao Barve of Pāndurang-Tātya, the second in command. Bāji Rao Barve, referred to by Grant-Duff as "Baji Punt Burway," was, according to this authority, "in command of a body of auxiliary Mahrattas" of Haidar on this occasion. Bāji-Pant or Bāji Rao was a near relation of Raghunāth Rao by his first wife, whose surname was Barve (Grant-Duff, *o. c.*, II'65).

advanced as far as Adoni, when the movement of Paraśurām Bhao was reported to him. Declaring it too hazardous under such circumstances to preserve his advanced position, he retired behind the Tungabhadra and subsequently recrossed the Krishna. The periodical floods of south-west monsoon which followed converted these rivers into barriers, relieving Haidar, for the time being, from the formidable confederacy.²¹

Of the tributaries who had been summoned to join the Mysore standard on this occasion, two had failed in their allegiance. One of these was the Nawāb of Cuddapah, Abdul Halīm Khān, who went over to

Haidar proceeded against and lays siege to Chitaldrug, July 1777.

Haidar's Muhammadan adversary, Nizām Ali, while the other was the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug, Medekere Nāyaka. Already during the Mahratta invasion of 1770, Medekere Nāyaka, accompanying Triambak Rao Māma to Mysore, had taken part in the siege of Nijagal and on the fall of Gooty in 1776, had allowed Śivarām Bhao, nephew of Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe, to escape from Madak-sira to Poona by way of Chitaldrug. Prejudiced by the Nāyak's conduct, Haidar, by attaching a news-writer (*anchekāra*) to his place, maintained a close watch over him. Intolerant of this, Medekere Nāyaka despatched his Vakīl Purushōttama-Pant to the court of Poona to persuade the Mahrattas to undertake an expedition to Seringapatam. Influenced by the assurances of his agent at Poona that the first military officer of the State with an immense army would shortly invade

21. *Ibid.*, 782-784; see also and compare Grant-Duff, *o. c.*, II. 65-66, and *Haid-Nām.*, l. c. Grant-Duff's account is brief, based mostly on Wilks, while the *Haid-Nām.* refers only to Haidar's movement against Ibrāhīm Khān Dhoonsa of Hyderabad in March 1777 (*Durmukhi*, *Phālguna* ba.) and the latter's retreat on Haidar's approaching Pyāpalli. Dhoonsa, according to the *Haid-Nām.*, had proceeded with 60,000 horse and 80 field-pieces. Ibrāhīm Khān thus proceeded against Haidar a second time in 1777, after his first ineffectual march and retreat in 1775 (*vide* ch. II. pp. 208-209, 211).

Mysore and permanently relieve him from the interference of Haidar, Medekere Nāyaka remained at home. This was sufficient pretext for Haidar, who had long coveted possession of the celebrated fortress of Chitaldrug and was jealous of the power and distinguished bravery of the Pālegār and his formidable troops. At the same time, Haidar found a useful ally in one, Krishnappa, who was the Minister of the Chief of Rāyadurg. The Chief of Rāyadurg had often, without any just cause, suffered indignities at the hands of Medekere Nāyaka, while his country had often been ravaged and laid waste. Krishnappa now saw his opportunity. He incited Haidar to attack Chitaldrug, engaging to meet the cost of the powder and shot required for the siege. Thus invited, Haidar left Gooty in June, and marched on Chitaldrug, despatching simultaneously Fuzzul-ullah-Khān (Hybut Jang) with a large force to attack the Pālegār of Harapanahalli, who had lately treacherously put to death one of the Mysore officers, appointed to enlist foot-soldiers in that quarter. Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, making a forced march thither, besieged the forts of Ujjini and Kittūr, forcing the Pālegār to pay Rupees 70,000 as a composition for his offences, besides the usual tribute. Haidar, forgiving the Pālegār, confirmed him, by means of a *sanad*, in the possession of his country. On his furnishing his quota of money and troops (2,000 foot and 300 horse) in Mysore's aid, Haidar also permitted him to return to his place. Haidar next took Guḍikōṭa, Jarimale, Kaṇakuppe, Moḷakālmuru and Doddēri, strongholds in the possession of the brothers-in-law of Medekere Nāyaka. This done, the isolation of Medekere Nāyaka was complete. Before launching his attack, Haidar tried mediation. Through friendly Pālegārs, he proposed that Medekere Nāyaka should surrender his capital to Haidar and accept service under Mysore with a jaghīr of the annual value of Rupees 50,000. Medekere Nāyaka

refused, and Haidar, rejecting his offers to atone for his error by a large fine, sat down before Chitaldrug in the month of July.²²

Filling up his hill-fortress with provisions and munitions of offence and defence and the ghâts leading to or belonging to the fort with a body of foot-soldiers and horse he had collected together—amounting to 2,000—the Pālegār prepared to defend himself against the troops of Mysore.²³ The siege continued for three months, with considerable tenacity on the side of Haidar; and on the part of the besieged, with a rare combination of zeal and valour characteristic of the Bēḍar tribe. A temple dedicated to Goddess *Kālī* had been erected on the summit of the *Durg*, whom they regularly propitiated in the belief that their fortress would be inaccessible. On every Monday, after performing their devotions to the Goddess, the Bēḍars made a religious sortie, which was known both in the camp of the besiegers and in the fort. A particular sound of the horn invariably intimated that they had finished their preparatory devotions and were about to sally. Everything was known, except the exact point of attack, and despite the advantages of preparation on the other side, the Bēḍars never once returned without penetrating into the trenches, and carrying off a certain number of heads, to offer at the shrine of *Kālī*. After the fall of the place, the heads were found ranged in rows of small pyramids, in front of the temple of the Goddess, to the number of about two thousand. In every interval, the Pālegār repeated his offers of atone-

22. *Ibid.*, 784; *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; and *Kirmāṇi*, o.c. 332-340. *Kirmāṇi*, however, antedates and sets down the siege and capitulation of Chitaldrug which occurred in 1777-1779, to 1774 (A. H. 1188). Also, as against the details we have in the *Haid. Nām.*, he refers rather vaguely to the intriguing and destructive tendency of the Pālegār of Chitaldrug as the main cause of Haidar's proceeding against him (*Kirmāṇi*, o.c., 332-338).

23. *Kirmāṇi*, o. c., 340.

ment, and every successive sortie evinced increasing ardour, and furious confidence: the point of attack was always judiciously varied; and as the besiegers never once failed, the fury of the assault would frequently fall far from the intended point; because after penetrating, and finding the posts abandoned, the Bēḍars would generally take the trench in flank, and range along a considerable extent, before they could procure sufficient materials for the sacrifice; arrangements, however, were progressively made, by which the batteries being converted into redoubts, and strongly palisaded, inflicted terrible retribution on the Bēḍars in their return. At length, towards the close of the year, a composition was completed, by which Haidar professed to forgive the past and accepted, as a pledge of future obedience, thirteen lakhs of pagodas. Of this sum, five in wrought plate had actually been paid and Haidar had almost received for the balance the hostage (*ōlu*) of the Pālegār's younger brother Paraśurāmapppa Nāyaka, when intelligence arrived that the ministerial Commander-in-Chief Hari-Pant with the Mahratta Chief of 10,000, Mānāji-Phākḍe (the "Manaji Pancra" of Wilks),

Haidar again confronted by the Mahrattas.

accompanied by the Pālegār's agent Purushōttama-Pant, was approaching from Poona with an army of 60,000

horse, and a proportionate number of infantry and guns; that the rivers had fallen, and were already fordable; and that the advance of the hostile army was within a few days' march of the Tungabhadra by way of Śirahaṭṭi and Lakshmēśvar.²⁴

24. Wilks, o. c., 734-736; *Haid. Nām.* ff. 58-59. The *Haid. Nām.* speaks of Haidar having, after a siege of three months, fixed on the Chief of Chitaldrug a composition or indemnity (*tahabandī*) of eight lakhs of *Durgi-varahas* on the hostage of the Chief's younger brother, Paraśurāmapppa Nāyaka. The reference here, in the light of Wilks who has evidently relied on other sources of information, is to the balance of the stipulated sum of thirteen lakhs of pagodas. Mānāji-Phākḍe

Haidar determined to put to a severe and immediate proof the professed allegiance of the Pālegār. The whole transaction was probably a snare, but the ostensible facts are that he destroyed his batteries and trenches in the greatest haste; marched off to the north, and summoned the Pālegār instantly to join the Mysore standard against Hari-Pant. If fortune should declare in favour of the Mahrattas, obedience would obviously be fatal to all the hopes of the Pālegār, and if Haidar should prevail, to obey or to disobey would only leave a choice of ills; namely, to pay the remainder of the ransom, or to stand another siege. To obey was inevitable evil; to disobey presented a chance of good; consequently the Pālegār promised but evaded attendance.²⁵

Haidar was also active in another direction. Through the agency of Bāji Rao Barve, the representative of Raghunāth Rao, he engaged in augmenting the discord which then prevailed in the Mahratta armies attached to either party; and Mānāji-Phākde had been secretly gained by a bribe of six lakhs of Rupees, to separate his forces from those of Hari-Pant in the first action, and afterwards serve Haidar and the cause of Raghunāth Rao, on terms which were stipulated. The Mahratta army, after some delay in the arrival of reinforcements and the vain hope of co-operation from the army of Nizām Alī, at length crossed the Tungabhadra; and was encamped at a place called Rārāvī, preparing to advance for the destruction of Haidar. Haidar,

referred to in the text, was one of the legitimate Sindhias of Kannerkhera, 16 miles east of Satara, to which the Gwalior family belongs.

25. *Ibid.*, 736-737 (who bases his narration on the reminiscences of the Pālegār family by a descendant of the Chitaldurg Chief).

however, as soon as he considered the arrangement with Mānāji-Phākḍe to be mature, advanced to offer battle to Hari-Pant. The armies came in sight of each other, a few miles to the southward of Rārāvī; and reciprocally commenced their operations by a distant cannonade. The corps of Mānāji-Phākḍe had its place on the left flank of the Mahratta army, and was observed to leave an interval preparatory to separation; but in its subsequent movements, there was a wavering, which led Haidar to the groundless suspicion of a double treason. Thus impressed, he sought to retort, by demonstrations which should induce Hari-Pant in his turn to suspect the fidelity of his doubledealer. Light troops were spread abroad, to cover an apparent communication of dromedary couriers, and to exhibit the appearance of frequent messages from Mānāji-Phākḍe. The impression on Hari-Pant was effectual, but it was that of a first and sudden alarm; he looked everywhere over the field with similar suspicion, but everywhere else there was an appearance of firmness. What he saw was, however, sufficient to determine him on a retreat. A general movement was observed to take place, and Haidar paused to ascertain its object, before he should make any corresponding dispositions. In a few moments, an impenetrable cloud of dust arose, both in front and rear of the Mahratta line, which neither decidedly approached, nor decidedly receded. It was evidently the mass of their cavalry in full charge, but not towards Haidar. Some time had elapsed before he perceived that the corps of Mānāji-Phākḍe had been enveloped and swept off the field, and that a powerful rear-guard presented itself to cover the retreat of the whole. The armies had not sufficiently closed to render the pursuit decisive, and two guns only were lost by Hari-Pant, in effecting his retreat behind the Tungabhadra, where a strong position

secured him from insult, and afforded him leisure to investigate the extent of the disaffection in the camp. The troops of Mānāji-Phākḍe had made a tolerably gallant resistance, and attempted to move in mass towards Haidar; the greater part, however, were cut to pieces, and Mānāji-Phākḍe, wounded, and accompanied by no more than thirty select friends, had opened a way through the surrounding mass, and made good his escape to Haidar.²⁶

Though they fell far short of the full accomplishment of the original plan which had been marred by Phākḍe's hesitation and Haidar's impatience, these events proved sufficient to defeat the whole project of the Mahratta campaign. Hari-Pant quitted his position, and continued his retreat; and Haidar availed himself, with alacrity and judgment, of the opportunity which was thus offered of following up the impression. He hung close upon the rear and harassed it with incessant attacks until the whole were driven north of the Krishna in December 1777. Ibrāhim Khān Dhoonsa, in this part of the invasion, pretended to advert to the danger and disappointment which he had once already incurred, by advancing in the faith of a simultaneous movement which had not materialised. This time, he would fain wait for the evidence of facts, while the gold of Haidar kept him inactive, until thus relieved by a second apology, founded on the conduct of his allies. The retreat of Hari-Pant was directed to a position 30 miles to the west of Ibrāhim Khān's encampment, and the utmost endeavours of the party at Poona failed to induce Nizām

26. *Ibid.*, 737-738. See also *Ibid.* *Nām.* (ff. 59), which briefly mentions Mānāji-Phākḍe being bribed by Haidar.

Ali to issue positive orders to gain time to join up and resume the offensive.²⁷

Haidar was now on the point of realizing the plan he had concerted with Raghunāth Rao for the occupation of the Mahratta territory between the Tungabhadra and Krishna. His victorious pursuit of the main army prepared the ground for this final act. The absence of all opposition in the field enabled him to detach Sardār Khān for the siege of Dharwar, where he expected a regular resistance. He next proceeded himself to the reduction of the forts of Kopal and Bahadur-Baṇḍa which fell in April 1778. The sieges of Gajēndragadh, Bādāmi, Jalihal and a number of minor posts followed, though they took some time. Dharwar yielded after a protracted siege, and towards the close of the year, Haidar fixed the Krishna as the northern boundary of the Empire he had helped to build up. The rapidity of the conquest was facilitated by his regard for local circumstances; he found the country chiefly held by hereditary *Dēshāyees*, and he consented for the present to receive from them their accustomed *Pēshkāsh* on the condition of the prompt payment, as a free gift, of a farther sum equal to their annual revenue. On the completion of these arrangements about the close of the year, Haidar returned to the South. He had an account of

27. *Ibid.*, 788-789. See also *Fort St. George Records: Count-Corres.*, XXVII. pp. 7-10, 15-16, Nos. 6, 7 and 12, and *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. pp. 142, 148, 151 and 155, Nos. 890, 905, 920 and 924, referring to the movements of the Mysore, Mahratta and Mughal forces, and the retreat of the Mahrattas, etc. Haidar gave no credit to Hari-Pant for his retreat, and represented it as a victory gained by himself (See Haidar's letter to Bombay Government, January 9, 1778, Forrest, *Selections, Mahratta Series*, I. 908). See also and compare the rather confused, if not contradictory, account of the Mahratta campaign of 1777 as given by Stewart, who calls it "a bloodless campaign" and roughly places it in 1776-1777 (*Memoirs*, 25-27).

disobedience to adjust with the Chief of Cuddapah; in which direction he detached Mīr Sāhib (Mīr Ali Razā Sāhib) with his own corps to make the preparatory progress, while he himself with the main army sat down a second time before Chitaldrug.²⁸

Invests Chitaldrug
a second time.

Medekere Nāyaka, the Chief of Chitaldrug, taking advantage of Haidar's absence from his neighbourhood, and in utter defiance of his authority, had lately plundered Channagiri, Basāvapaṭṇa, Sante-Bednūr and other outlying places, and Haidar had already despatched against him a detachment under Tipū. Whereupon the Chief fell back upon Chitaldrug and Tipū, closely following him, renewed the siege of the fort. Haidar, taking the ghāts in the neighbourhood of the fort and joining Tipū, vigorously pushed through the operations for nearly three months. The Pālegār and his adherents conducted the defence with their accustomed bravery, but the greater part of his relations and trusty chiefs were at length either killed or wounded in the strenuous sallies which he made and which Haidar sought to render destructive to the assailants. In one of these sallies, the Pālegār himself and his brothers Paraśurāmappa Nāyaka were wounded by a bullet-shot and the fort was on the point of surrender early in 1779, when two detachments of 10,000 horse each—one under Śivarām-Ghōrpaḍe (nephew of Murāri Rao) and Pāndurang-Tātya (brother of Gōpāl Rao of Miraj) and the other under Paraśurām Bhao—advanced thither to the Chief's relief. On this, Haidar, pressing the siege hard, directed against them a contingent of 3,000 horse, 4,000 foot and 4,000 irregulars (*ahashām*) under Commandant Muhammad Ali and Rīsāldār Śrīpāt Rao. In the fight which took place at Sirsi, the

28. *Ibid.*, 739-740.

Mahrattas were put to rout, Śivarām-Ghōrpaḍe and Pāndurang-Tātya among other *Sardārs* being captured.²⁹

Meantime Haidar, convinced of the invincibility of the fort and the obstinacy of the Pālegār, had left, under cover of the surrounding hills, an ambuscade consisting of 5,000 foot, 2,000 regular foot and 1,000 horse, giving them orders to look out for an opportunity and all at once to attack and having taken the fort, make the Pālegār prisoner. Then Haidar himself, decamping from the foot of the mountain, pitched his tent four *fursungs* from that place. His plan was this, that if the Pālegār left the fort and presumed to follow him, he might attack him on all sides at once, and destroy him. If, on the contrary, the Pālegār did not follow him, it was his purpose to give to his (Haidar's) tributary or dependent Pālegārs the charge and government of all the towns and villages depending on the Droog, that they, with a view to their own advantage, might use every art to seize him and make him prisoner.³⁰

Nor was this all. The Pālegār had also a number of Muhammadans in his service, Haidar tries other means to bring the Pālegār to book. formed into a corps regularly armed, of about three thousand men. These, Haidar found means to corrupt through the medium of their spiritual instructor, an unsuspected hermit, who resided on the plain below, near to Haidar's encampment.³¹

Corrupts the Muhammadans in, the Pālegār's service. Luckily, however, about this time, the sons of the Chief of Jarimale also arrived in Haidar's camp. This Chief was the father-in-law of Medekere Nāyaka, and during

29. *Haid-Nām.*, ff-59-60; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 740-741; see also and compare Kirmāṇī (*o.c.*, 341-345) referring to strategic details of the siege and defence.

30. Kirmāṇī, *o.c.*, 345-346.

31. Wilks, *o.c.*, I-741.

the siege, was in fort with him; but after the siege was raised, he obtained leave of his son-in-law to pay his devotions at the shrine of an image, situated at the foot of a small hill, at the distance of a *fursung* from the fort, and thither he proceeded with a few horse and foot. The motive of this journey was, however, entirely misrepresented to the Pālegār by interested persons, and he was informed that his brothers-in-law had proceeded with an intention to visit Haidar, and negotiate for the release of their own *Jaghīrs*, that they might be free from being molested by him. The infatuated Pālegār, on hearing this trumpery story, became jealous and suspicious of them, and ordered his executioners to follow them. They accordingly followed, and cut off the head of his innocent father-in-law and plundered his house. This intelligence caused a sudden revolution in the feelings and sentiments of the brothers—the sons of the murdered Chief—who through the medium of the Vakīl of the Pālegār of Harapanahalli, forthwith went over to Haidar, accepting from him *sanads* of the taluks of Chitaldrug on condition of their assisting him in the attack and conquest of that fort.³²

Thereupon, Haidar, acting on their suggestions, again marched to the fort, appointing his chief officers and *Faujdhars* to the points of attack. Haidar's troops, in the course of a week, gave convincing proofs of their power to break down the forts and overcome their enemies; and by a path shown to them by guides, they made their attacks. After a little fighting, the bonds which united the garrison of the fort were broken asunder and they were dispersed and scattered on

32. Kirmāpi, o.c., 347-349. See also and compare *Haid-Nām*. (ff. 59), referring briefly to the defection of the Jarimale house and the corruption of the Pathāns in the service of the Chief of Chitaldrug.

all sides, while the besiegers, mounting the hills, resounded their drums in token of victory. When, however, the Pālegār discovered at last that he was betrayed and was convinced, by the failure of a recent sortie (in which his lieutenant Hombālappa was slain), that Goddess *Kālī* was no longer propitious to his vows, he ascended his palankeen of state, ordered himself to be carried to Haidar's camp, and threw himself on the mercy of the victor, in the beginning of March 1779. The plunder of his stronghold, including cash, jewels and the personal ornaments of the women, amounted to no more than five lakhs of rupees. The whole family was of course secured and sent as prisoners to Seringapatam, and Haidar, after making the requisite arrangements for the occupation of the place, prepared to follow Mīr Sāhib to Cuddapah.³³

38. *Ibid*, 349-350; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 60; and Wilks, l.c. The reference to the "Path" shown to Haidar's troops by their guides (i.e., the sons of the Chief of Jarimale) is evidently to the "*Vanake-kandī-bagilu*", one of the entrances to the Fort extant. The local story connected with this entrance, which, as its name indicates, was as small as to admit of a pestle (*vanake*) being thrust through it, is interesting and bears remarkable testimony to the prowess of a lady Ōbavva. Haidar's forces during the siege of 1778-1779, so goes the story, were unable to effect an entry into the fort and to storm it was next to impossible. Crevices in the walls where a woman was carrying curds into the fortress were discovered and the invading army attempted to march through in single file there. Nearby this passage was a fresh water pond half-way up the hill. One day when a bugler went to dine, Ōbavva, his wife, who went to fetch water from the pond, noticed the enemy marching in single file near this entrance. It was dark and hiding herself behind the entrance, she killed soldier after soldier with her *Vanake* as he marched through the entrance, till her husband returned. Notwithstanding such instances of individual heroism among the besieged, the fort, overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the Mysore military, capitulated at last in March 1779 (see article on the antiquities of *Chitaldrug* by S. Srikantaiya in the *Q.J.M.S.*, vol. XXXI, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 353-354, where he mentions this story). As regards the date of the capitulation of Chitaldrug, *Hevīlambī-Phālgūṇa* assigned in the *Haid. Nām.* is evidently a scribal error for *Vīlambī-Phālgūṇa*, having regard to the context and in keeping with Wilks. Kīrmānī, who, as we have already seen, antedates and sets down the event to 1774, again refers on P. 350, to A. H. 1191 as the date of the capture of the

Mīr Sāhib, who, as we have seen, had been detached towards Cuddapah about the close of Reduction of Cud- 1778, had, agreeably to instruction, dāpah, March-April 1779, recruited his cavalry to 5,000. But a chosen band of 2,000 Pāṭhān horse, commanded by Hussain Mean and Saiyid Mean, nephews of the Chief of Cuddapah, opposed such effectual and determined resistance to all his movements, that he could make no impression of importance beyond ravaging the resources of the country with the customary cruelty. When Haidar had finished his arrangements at Chitaldrug, he put himself at the head of his cavalry and hastened thither by forced marches, rejecting the Chief's overtures—through his agent Muhammad Ghias—to solicit the pardon of his offences. At length Haidar joined Mīr Sāhib to the westward of a small river which passes near to a place called Dhoor, and unites farther south with the Pennār. On the appearance of the advanced guard, the Pāṭhān troops thinking that they had only to reckon

Pāḷegār, corresponding to 1777, obviously an error for 1779 (A. H. 1198) in the light of other sources. Among other authorities bearing on the siege and capitulation of Chitaldrug, De La Tour, who makes a very brief and passing reference to it, places it in January 1779 (*Ayder Ali*, II. 195). Robson is silent on this topic. Stewart loosely assigns the event to 1764-1765, briefly touching on it (*Memoirs*, 17). A recent writer assumes, from an inadequate acquaintance with the authorities, that there were four sieges of Chitaldrug by Haidar, successively during 1762, 1774, 1777 and 1779 (See R. N. Saletore's article on the subject in the *Q.J.M.S.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2 pp. 171-188.) But a close study of the contemporary work *Haid-Nām*, with reference to other sources only goes to show that Haidar's earlier attempts on Chitaldrug during 1761 and 1772—and not 1774 as suggested by the writer—were in the nature of mere raids for exacting the *Peshkash*, and culminated, though as an offshoot of, the Mysore-Mahratta-Nizām relations, in his protracted siege of the place during 1777-1779. Of some interest from the local point of view is an earlier article entitled "Capitulation of Chitradurga", purporting to be based on a Kannaḍa *Bakhar* written by one Bhīmāji-Pant in 1779 (*Vilambī*), soon after the fall of the fort (See in *Ibid*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, pp. 145-153). The Ms., however, seems to evidence a mixing up of details without either a clear chronological perspective or an adequate idea of the general course of affairs relating to the event.

with Mīr Sāhib, crossed the sandy bed of the river, and moved on with confidence into the plain. A very severe action followed, in which the Paṭhāns were victorious. On receipt of this intelligence, Haidar, advancing rapidly with his horse, foot and artillery, ordered them to skirmish at about midnight and retreat to a concerted point. When the Paṭhāns found themselves suddenly encompassed by the whole body of Haidar's cavalry, they commenced their retreat towards Cuddapah, with a determined countenance. And Haidar, eager for the preservation of these troops for his own future service, in hopes of their surrender, at first directed his cavalry to abstain from the use of the Keroolee (matchlock carbine). The Paṭhān horse did not, however, refrain from the exercise of their skill in archery, and Haidar, for the preservation of his own troops, was compelled to revoke his first order. So far no infantry or cannon had arrived; the skirmishing of the matchlock carbines thinned appreciably the numbers of the Paṭhāns, but they continued their retreat followed by Haidar's horse as far as Balsanhaḷli, not far from Dhoor. Day dawned. The Kuzzaks, Sillāhdārs and Dustādārs of Haidar now completely surrounded and hemmed the Paṭhāns. And these young lads, fighting heroically, mounted on elephants, killed nearly 2,000 men on the Mysore side. At length they were forced to throw away their shields and seek refuge in the small fort of Balsanhaḷli. Then Haidar's artillery opened their fire and battering the walls of the fort, soon levelled them with the ground. Unable any longer to fight or retreat, the brave little band of Paṭhāns had now no alternative but to surrender at discretion and were made prisoners with Sidi Hilal and 300 Paṭhāns, while the whole of their elephants, horses and military stores fell into the possession of Haidar's followers. Turning from hence to the south-east, Haidar, in April, captured the town of Cuddapah

at the first assault. Abdul Halim Khān, the Pathān Nawāb, had retired from this his usual residence to Sidhout, a place of inconsiderable strength to the north-east of Cuddapah, whither also a division of the Mysore troops had moved, and invested the place, while another was occupied in rifling the capital.³⁴

Of the prisoners taken at Balsanhalī, Haidar immediately released and took into his service with their horses those who had connections in the Mysore army, these consenting to become responsible for their conduct. But among the detenues were eighty ferocious Afghans (*i.e.*, Pathāns) of the north, whose horses had been killed, and who could obtain no sureties for their release. In the proud spirit of savage independence, they refused to deliver their swords. Haidar, in deference to this feeling, subsequently relaxed and without enforcing the surrender of their swords, placed these men with the weapons in their hands, under the ordinary guard of headquarters, exactly in front of his own tents, which were enclosed within a large square of tent-wall, about eight feet high, to veil them from vulgar observation. Offended and inflamed by the attempt to disarm them, these prisoners had marked, during their march from Balsanhalī, the arrangements of the tents within the square, and secretly concerted their plan of revenge. In the dead of night they suddenly arose, overpowered and slew their guards, and rushed towards the sleeping tent. Haidar, hearing the alarm, penetrated at once into the source of

Attempted assassination of Haidar.

Haidar's resourceful escape.

34. Wilks, *o.c.*, I-743-745; *Haid-Nām.*, ff-62-63; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 351-357. The *Haid-Nām.*, in keeping with Wilks, specifically dates Haidar's campaign against Cuddapah in March-April 1779 (s. 1701, *Vikārī Chaitra*). Kirmāni, however, as usual, antedates and sets down this and other events of 1779 to 1777 (A.H. 1191). Kirmāni refers to Pathāns as "Afghans", the terms being of course synonymous as Wilks elsewhere notices (see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 746, n.).

trouble. With his characteristic presence of mind, he covered with his quilt the long pillow of his bed, so as to resemble a person asleep; cut with his sword a passage for himself through his own tent-wall and that of the enclosure; and escaped to the protection of the nearest corps. Two only of the Afghans entered the sleeping tent, the remainder being disposed according to the pre-concerted plan, to cover their enterprize and retreat. The foremost entering the tent, made a decisive cut at the supposed Haidar, and on finding that he had escaped, was so stupefied at the disappointment as to remain in abject silence. One of Haidar's attendants had as usual lain down to sleep, in a corner of the tent, with his lance of state by his side; he was roused by the blow at his master's bed; and a dubious light discovered to him a stranger and a drawn sword. Without hesitation, he seized his lance and transfixes the Afghan as well as his associate who advanced to his aid.

The capture and
end of the assassins.

By now the alarm was given; and the remainder were in no time either slain or disarmed. On the morning after his escape from this scene, Haidar ordered some of the surviving assassins to have their hands and feet cropped off, and in that shocking state, to be thrown into the highway, at considerable intervals from each other, to announce the terror of his name. The remainder were destined to a death, if possible more horrible, by being dragged round the camp, tied by a short, loose cord to the feet of elephants.³⁵

35. *Ibid.*, 745-748. See also and compare *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 63; and Kirmāqi, *o. c.*, 357-360. The *Haid. Nam.* agrees in the main with Wilks in regard to the attempted assassination of Haidar, his escape and the subsequent punishment of the assassins. Kirmāqi, however, speaks of a rush against Haidar by some of the infuriated Afghans consequent on the failure of one of his officers, Abu Muhammad Mirdah, to enforce disarmament on them; of Haidar's escape to the *Dewān-i-Aum* or tent of public audience, by slitting down the wall of the tent with his dagger; and of Haidar's orders to inflict exemplary punishment on the entire

This, among other incidents, contributed to shorten the defence of Sidhout, which, being weakly garrisoned, fell about the close of April. Attempts to compromise were disdainfully rejected by Haidar, who once went to the extent of demanding from Halim Khān ten lakhs of Rupees and the fort of Ganjikōṭa as the price of his forgiveness. Halim Khān having, however, not even two lakhs of Rupees in his treasury, Haidar, impatient at the delay, directed Mīr Sāhib to attack Ganjikōṭa. That hill-fort was taken after a week's siege and Abdul Halim Khān at last, on the 27th of May, surrendered to Haidar on the simple assurance of personal security, and was sent with his family and connections to Seringapatam, and later imprisoned in the suburb of Ganjām (where he not long after fell a victim to a secret massacre following the discovery of a new plot of assassination among his relations). The rifling of the Chief's family furnished not more than a lakh of Rupees and Cuddapah was conferred as a military dependency or *jaghīr* on Mīr Sāhib on the condition of maintaining for his service, together with the requisite garrisons, three thousand horse of the first order of

Afghan prisoners by cutting off their hands and feet, etc. Kirmāpi being a later writer, seems to give an embellished account of an event which took place in the manner described by earlier authorities like Wilks and the *Haid. Nām.*, whose versions seem not only substantially correct but are also in keeping with the probabilities of the case, namely, the disarmament of the Afghan prisoners. Kirmāpi hardly refers to Haidar's attitude on the subject, while Wilks, who evidently writes here from traditionary sources not available to others, does justice to Haidar as detailed in the text above.

As regards the punishment of being dragged by the feet of elephants inflicted by Haidar on the assassins, Wilks relates the interesting instance of "one of these men left as dead," as having "unexpectedly recovered." The circumstance," he states, "was some time afterwards reported to Hyder, who observed that such was the man's fate; and ordered him to be immediately received into his service. General Close saw this person, twenty years afterwards, a powerful, healthy looking horseman" (see Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 748, *f.n.*).

efficiency.³⁵ Adoni and Kurnool held by Ranmast Khān

Haidar levies contributions from Adoni and Kurnool.

were also about this time laid under a contribution of Rupees eight and four lakhs respectively;³⁷ and with

Cuddapah as the base of his operations in the *Northern Circars* and extending his victorious arms as far as Nellore, Venkatagiri and Chandragiri, the one-time capital of

And returns to Seringapatam, June 1779.

Vijayanagar, and other dependencies in the Karnātic, Haidar returned to Seringapatam in June, after an absence

of nearly three years from the headquarters.³⁸

Meanwhile, elsewhere in the south-west of Mysore,

Advance on Travancore (down to 1780).

affairs were moving in a different manner. Since his first invasion of Malabar (April 1766), it had been the

Haidar's objective.

definite objective of Haidar to push on

his conquests further south in the direction of Cochin and Travancore.³⁹ The Dutch factors who had settled

36. *Ibid.*, 748-751; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 62-64; Kirmāpi, o. c., 360-365; also *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 380-382, No. 1484.

37. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, l. c.

38. *Wilks. o. c.*, I. 751; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 65, referring to Haidar's return to Seringapatam in *Vikāri, Vaisakha-Jyēṣṭha* (June 1779); see also *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 381, 382, 365, Nos. 1484 and 1607. De La Tour and Robson are silent in regard to the events of 1779. Stewart roughly places these in 1778-1779, briefly touching on them (*Memoirs*, 27-28). The reduction of Cuddapah, says he, "gave him (Haidar) complete possession of what is called the Carnatic Balaghat Hyderabad, the gross revenues of which were estimated at forty-seven laes of rupees" (*Ibid.*, 27).

39. See *Ante Ch. I.*; also Moens' *Memo* (1781) in *Dutch Records*, No. 13, p. 153. Moens' *Memo* (pp. 153-164) contains a first-hand account of the relations between Haidar Ali and the Dutch during 1766-1780, the period covered in greater part by his Governorship of Dutch Settlements in Malabar, etc. He drew up his *Memo* for his successor on April 18, 1781, and Haidar concluded his famous treaty with the Dutch on September 4, 1781, about five months later. Moens' account is drawn upon here from the point of view of Haidar's advance on Travancore, in so far as it was favoured, or affected, by the Dutch. Among other writings on the subject, see also and compare Logan's *Malabar* (1887), I. 411-426. Day's *Land of the Perumals* (pp. 149-155), quoted *in extenso* by Logan (*Ibid.*, 422-426), is found on examination to have been based on certain earlier sources including perhaps Moens' *Memo*. Wilks' account of the subject,

in this region, however, soon came in the way and Haidar at first sought to utilise them to the best advantage by inducing them "to make

His plan of an offensive and defensive alliance with the Dutch, 1766.

an offensive and defensive treaty with him," insisting, among other things, "that if he should advance further

south, the [Dutch] Company should provide him with 1,000 men (Europeans)," whom he would himself pay and maintain.⁴⁰ He wrote also, on this head, to Batavia, and, through Dutch mediation, demanded from Cochin

His demands on Cochin and Travancore.

four lakhs and eight elephants and from Travancore fifteen lakhs and thirty elephants "in compensation for his

war expenditure" in Malabar.⁴¹ Both the States evaded the issue, Cochin replying that it left its affairs to the Company and asking the Dutch to procure the restoration of Kolattiri and the Zamorin, and Travancore questioning the propriety of Haidar in demanding the contribution and declaring "that being tributary to Nabob Mahomet Ali [Muhammad Ali of the Karnatic], he could not pay tribute to both sides; that he was, however, prepared to send envoys with a present to the Nabob and at the same time make proposals to him for reinstating the kings of Collastry and the Zamorin for a substantial sum, which these princes should pay him, provided the Nabob should then leave Malabar and return to the north."⁴² The negotiations proved futile and in October 1766, Haidar contemplated an attack on Cochin and Travancore but soon suspended the operations, being obliged to retire to Seringapatam early in 1767 to arrest the advance of the Mahrattas and Nizām Ali.⁴³ In 1773-1774, on the

as we shall see below, is, however, of interest only from the point of view of the origin and development of the *Travancore Lines*.

40. Moens' *Memo*, 151.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*; see also *Ante*, Ch. I.

invasion of Calicut by Haidar's general Barakki Śrīnivāsa

Rao for the recovery of arrears of
Expedition to Cochin and Cranganore, 1773-1774. tribute due by the Zamorin, the latter retired with his family to Travancore,

residing there with the connivance of its ruler.⁴⁴ On this, the Mysoreans marched on, demanding of the king of Cochin two lakhs of Rupees and a few elephants which he promised and later tendered with the knowledge of the king of Travancore, "who not only advised him to do so, but also lent him money for it, in order to induce the Nabob not to come further South than the Zamorin's country."⁴⁵ In March 1774, the king of Cranganore, situated on the confines of Cochin and Travancore, was next asked for a contribution of Rupees one lakh and two elephants, in view of "certain promises which he had made without the Company's knowledge when the Nabob marched up in the year 1766." Cranganore was coerced into paying the sum demanded, the Dutch failing in their efforts to save him. Whereupon Haidar's general despatched armed sepoys to either side of the river of Chetwa, and the Chief of Cranganore accommodated for 50,000 Rupees, to be paid in two instalments.⁴⁶

Haidar, despite the coolness he had lately developed towards the Dutch owing to their delay in the conclusion of the treaty with him, steadily kept his eye on Travancore,⁴⁷ and during the next monsoon (1775), renewed again his demand for tribute

Renewed demands on Cochin and Cranganore, 1775.

44. *Ibid.*, 155-156.

45. *Ibid.*, 156.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Haidar's objective and the actual position of his relations with the Dutch in 1775 are thus reflected in a *Fort St. George Consultation*: " ... Some Dutch ambassadors from Cochin accompanied by Isaac Surgeon have proceeded to Syringapatam and, there is great reason to suspect, have entered into a treaty with the Nabob, greatly to the prejudice of the Hon'ble Company's interest on the Malabar coast, for

from Cochin and Cranganore through his governor at Calicut.⁴⁸ The latter, however, under the influence of Adrian Moens, the Dutch Governor, "refrained from further requisitions of money," leaving the question in *statu quo*.⁴⁹ In 1776, Haidar, at the end of his

Haidar throws off his mask, 1776.

"Kharder Khan"

Sardār Khān's progress against Cochin and Cranganore.

campaigns in the north of Mysore, at last threw off his mask. In August, his new lieutenant, Sardār Khān (the "Kharder Khan" of Moens' *Memo*), "began again and with more pressure to make his claims on the kings of Cochin and Cranganore." The former was asked to pay in Rupees eight lakhs and the latter

Rupees one lakh, and to enforce his demands, Sardār Khān encamped on the northern parts of Cochin, taking possession of the fort of Trichūr. Meanwhile the king of Cochin sent his envoys to Haidar at Seringapatam,

Mr. Adams informs me that a scheme is actually on foot which only waits the approval and support of the General and Council of Batavia, some particulars of which Mr. Adams has secretly obtained and are as follows: 'That the Nabob is to let the Dutch have all the pepper and sandalwood produced in his country, and they, in return, are to assist him in building and fitting out a fleet and to send to Syringapatam two hundred European soldiers and a Dutch Commandant, and they have further engaged to assist by land and sea to make a conquest of the Travancore country.' The ambassadors are to return to Syringapatam in six months, for they conclude, by that time, the ships may arrive from Batavia with all the necessary means to carry the scheme into execution. But whether all this will really end in their junction ..., there is reason to think he has some scheme in view to enlarge his power on this coast as he has lately sent down orders for building and equipping twelve ships and grabs besides gallivats at the ports of Calicut, Mangalore, Cundapore and this place, and they are all actually in hand The Nabob has advanced the Dutch ambassadors ten thousand rupees by a draft on the Governor at Calicut in order to provide artificers for building his ships" (*Mily. Cons.*, LIV. 25-27: William Townsend, Onore, to William Hornby, Bombay, May 8, 1775: on Dutch embassy to Haidar Ali). Evidently Haidar, by his scheme of conquest of Travancore, aimed at the domination of the entire West Coast from Canara in the north to Travancore in the far south.

48. *Ibid.*, 156-157.

49. *Ibid.*, 157.

finally agreeing to pay Rupees four lakhs with four elephants and in future an annual tribute of one lakh and a fifth. The principality of Cranganore was also included under this agreement, to the extent of Rupees one and one-fifth lakhs in the first instance and one-fifth

Advances further south and blockades Chetwa en route to Travancore.

annually in future.⁵⁰ Then Sardār Khān marched back northwards, but soon found a pretext to advance further south. He desired of the Dutch by

letter the accounts of the sandy land of Chetwa, on threat of devastating the country. The Dutch sent him a regular account which only showed that the Zāmorin was still in arrears with the Company. But Sardār Khān, without waiting for an answer, suddenly crossed the river of Chetwa, near Pulicarro, on the 9th of October, and blockaded Chetwa, taking the Company's linguist and sworn clerk—who had been sent to him—prisoners. In vain did the Dutch protest against the hostilities. Sardār Khān, however, replied that he had Haidar's orders to invade the Company's territory, and gave out "that his master desired to live in friendship with the Company, and so desired free passage across the Company's territory and past Cochin in order to attack Travancore, and if not, friendship was out."⁵¹ Governor Moens offered his mediation between Haidar and the king of Travancore. Meantime, on the 11th of October, Haidar's troops advanced on Cranganore and attempted to surprise it. Sardār Khān declared his having taken possession of Chetwa, and included in his demand "the whole region from Cranganore to Chettua," twenty years' revenue from these lands, and the produce

Demands tribute from the Dutch E. I. Co.

of another stretch of land fifteen miles long. He further demanded tribute from the Company, denying that he

50. *Ibid.*, 158.

51. *Ibid.*

had asked for a passage through the Company's possessions to Travancore.⁵²

This entirely changed the aspect of affairs. For Haidar's objective now stood clearly revealed, namely, to advance on Travancore at the expense of the intermediary power, the Dutch, with whom he had hitherto maintained the strictest bonds of neutrality. The necessity of maintaining good relations with Travancore and their own circumstances made the Dutch decide on checkmating "the further penetration of the Nabob's troops" with the help of Travancore and Cochin.⁵³ Accordingly they had the northern extremity of the island of Vypeen (the "Baypin" of the *Memo*), called Aykotta, fortified, to prevent the enemy from crossing over to Vypeen. Some Travancore troops also went thither. On this, Haidar's forces prepared to cross over to Aykotta at the western corner, behind the fort of Cranganore. Thereupon the Travancore troops were about to retire but on the arrival of the Dutch detachments and the battleship "Verwagting" at Aykotta, the Mysoreans retreated. Governor Moens now sent a deputation to the king of Travancore, who, already assured of promises of support from Nawab Muhammad Ali and the English at Madras, declared his willingness "to help in checking with united forces the further advance of the enemy, but could not take the offensive against him, as he had not yet been provoked by the Nabob."⁵⁴ It was therefore decided upon by the Dutch to abide by the plan of united defence until reinforcements should come from Ceylon. In November (1776), the reinforcements arrived, and the Dutch sought "not only to prevent the enemy breaking

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*, 158-159.

54. *Ibid.*, 159.

through any further, but also, if possible, to drive him out of our territory, and so avenge the insult offered to the Company." ⁵⁵ Meanwhile, Haidar's army had entrenched itself behind stockades and fortifications from Chetwa to Cranganore and lay in ambuscades. At the same time, they pressed so hard on the fort of Chetwa that it could not hold out any longer. The preservation of this fort being of the utmost importance to the Dutch, they resolved first to relieve it by sea and undertook an expedition on the 11th of November. The expedition, however, landed a day later, by which time the Mysoreans had managed to come up from Papónetti and had entrenched themselves in pits during the night. So that, when the Dutch troops landed, they were hemmed in and worsted, among the captives being the commanding officer of the expedition. Two days

Surrender of
Chetwa to Mysore,
November 1776.

later, the fort of Chetwa surrendered to Mysore on condition that the Dutch garrison there should be allowed a free passage to Cranganore. But Sardār Khān took them prisoners and sent them to Seringapatam, "where most of them enlisted out of poverty and want in the Nabob's army." ⁵⁶ On this reverse, the Dutch resolved to keep their forces together, to cover only Cranganore at first, to guard the island of Vypeen, and to entrench themselves before Cranganore, till events took a better turn. Governor Moens sounded also the ministers of Cochin and Travancore, communicating to them the

The lukewarmness
of Cochin and Tra-
vancore to Governor
Moens' proposals.

Dutch proposals to march against Haidar's troops, to drive them out of the Chetwa territory and to recapture what had been taken from them (Dutch). The two States, however, soon proved lukewarm in their support, and they wished the Dutch "to do nothing more than they had been doing so far, viz., to

55-56. *Ibid.*

assist in checking the enemy's further enterprises, and no more." Nevertheless, Moens declared that the Dutch should march alone, though he was later prevailed upon by the king of Travancore "not to do so for the present."⁵⁷ Early in January 1777, the Dutch ship "Groenendal" arrived from Batavia, bringing the reply

Haidar and the Dutch gain time, and presents for Haidar. Haidar was informed of this, while there seemed 1777.

prospects of peace and mutual friendship being established between him and the Dutch, there being now "less hope than there would have been otherwise of surprising Travancore."⁵⁸ Accordingly, on the 5th March, Moens resolved not to undertake anything against Mysore, pending the results of his communication to Haidar. Haidar, on his part, put off replying to the letter from Batavia, and began to amuse the Dutch by assuring them of his friendship and keeping his conquests pending against them.⁵⁹ In particular, he had the fort of Chetwa well supplied and fortified, and he kept his forces continually engaged in driving away the warlike Nairs and in systematically devastating the territory of the Zāmorin. Towards the close of the year, however, things began to change for the better. Haidar's troops were still in the north, settling the country. The Nairs again gathered courage and plundered the territory up to Calicut. Desertion in the ranks of Haidar became common; and the inhabitants of the invaded tract turned to the Dutch for support against him. Everything, indeed, seemed favourable for an attempt on the part of the Dutch to drive the Mysoreans out of their (Dutch) possessions and recapture the fort of Chetwa. Hence the Dutch so planned an expedition

57. *Ibid.*, 160.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Ibid.*, 160-161.

against the enemy that if they could not get the fort of

The buffer-state
policy of the Dutch.

Chetwa, "things should be as before the expedition, that is, in a good state of defence at Cranganore and Aycotta." It was thus in their own interests, and no less in those of Travancore, that they persisted in stemming the tide of Mysore arms at this point.⁶⁰

On January 8, 1778, the Dutch undertook the expedition from Cranganore. At the outset, they drove out 400 of Haidar's troops, who lay posted in the palace of the king of Cranganore. The Mysoreans

Their fruitless
siege of Chetwa and
Cranganore, 1778.

beat a hasty retreat northwards, and the Dutch force marched past Paponetti and Ballapattu, arriving at the fort of Chetwa on the 11th. The place was closely invested. It was heavily cannonaded and bombarded day and night. The Mysore garrison, however, held out obstinately, strong reinforcements arriving in time. The Dutch were soon exposed to the danger of being attacked in the rear and cut off, and were at last, on the 19th, obliged to raise the siege and retire to the camp of Cranganore, leaving behind some guns.⁶¹ Nevertheless, they soon put themselves again into a posture of defence, moving their advanced guard even further to the palace of the king of Cranganore, and occupying the palace itself about the end of February. On the 3rd of March, Haidar's army, by now collected in readiness to fall on the Dutch rear across the river, attacked and invested Cranganore with about 3,000 infantry, 150 cavalry and some artillery-men with four cannon. Being overpowered, the Dutch retreated, fighting their way, before the camp at Cranganore, six among them being killed and some wounded.⁶² Thus far, so expensive had become

60. *Ibid.*, 161.

61. *Ibid.*, 161-162.

62. *Ibid.*, 162.

the war to the Dutch, and Haidar had so nearly succeeded in his objective, that Governor Moens sought in vain to bring home to the Prime Minister of Travancore that on the preservation of Cranganore and

Governor Moens' attempted mediation with Travancore.

Aykotta depended the latter's safety or ruin; that Travancore was to meet the Dutch in the expenditure as otherwise they could no longer maintain the necessary force; and that, without this, the kingdom would be exposed to the greatest danger of losing everything while the Dutch would lose only a part of their possessions.⁶³ Meanwhile, the Zāmorin Nairs continued their pillaging activities and this so much annoyed Haidar that it kept him, throughout the rest of the year; engaged in putting them down and effecting the complete subjugation of Malabar.⁶⁴ Nor were the relations between Haidar and the Dutch by any means improved during the next few years (1778-1780). Governor Moens tried his utmost to get Haidar "make things up with the Company." Haidar,

Haidar steadily pursues his objective, 1778-1780.

however, treated with contempt all their overtures. But, he, at the same time, steadily kept his eye on Travancore and was on the look out for an opportunity to attack the Dutch unexpectedly and "force the Company to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with him."⁶⁵ Thus, by 1780, Haidar had,

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*, 162-163.

65. *Ibid.*, 163. The alliance, referred to above, was actually concluded between Haidar Ali and the Dutch Governor Reymer Van Vissengen at Negapatam on September 4, 1781. Haidar aimed by this arrangement at the complete subjugation of the English, who, as allies of Nawāb Muhammad Ali, systematically came in the way of the realization of his scheme of southern advance to Trichinopoly and from thence to Rāmēśvaram. He was thus obliged to seek the help of the very Dutch whom he wanted to crush while pursuing his project of advance on Travancore down to 1780. Haidar was too busy with Muhammad Ali and the English from 1780 onwards to attend to the Travancore issue, which receded into the background till about 1790. For the text of the treaty between Haidar and the Dutch, *vide* Appendix II—(3).

with Calicut as the base of his operations in Malabar, obtained complete possession of the territory between Chetwa and Cranganore, further south; he had kept the fort of Chetwa well garrisoned and was well within reach of Travancore by way of Cranganore and Aykotta bordering it, when his attention was, as we shall see presently, diverted in another direction.⁶⁶

66, *Ibid.*, 184.

CHAPTER IV.

KHĀSĀ-CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VIII, 1776-1796—(contd.)

Internal affairs: Haidar and the Dalavai Family; continued rivalry between Haidar and Nanjaraja (down to 1767)—Nanjaraja lured, August 1767; his machination; Haidar decides on securing Nanjaraja's person—The walling up of Nanjaraja—The walling up and after, 1767-1779—Administrative matters: earlier landmarks, down to 1774—Haidar's financial devices after the peace with the Mahrattas (1772); the spoliation of Fuzzul-ullah Khan—Fire in Seringapatam, May 1774—Later administrative developments, 1775-1779—Anche Shamaiya dominates the administration, 1779; the efficiency of the system; the reign of terror; the torture of civil officials: the example of Appaji Ram—Other examples—Shamaiya's excesses—The case of military men; levy of contribution on bankers—The outcome of the measures—Official changes—Haidar's embassy to Delhi, 1779—Weddings in Haidar's family, 1779.

AT this point we have to pause for a while and see how Haidar, since his usurpation of supreme power in 1761, systematically strove to maintain peace at home as an auxiliary to his policy of force abroad. Reference has been made, in an earlier chapter,¹ to how Haidar, on his attaining to the regency, secured at the very outset the friendship of his old master Dalāvāi Karāchūri Nanjarāja by assigning a territory to him and promising him both in writing and by oath that he would never make any attempt on his liberty, property or life, but would always regard him as his father. Latterly

1. See *Ante*, Vol. II-Ch. XIII, pp. 283-289.

Nanjarāja—who supposed Haidar “would be contented with the post of generalissimo”²—in fond hopes of reinstating himself in the office of Regent with the help of the latter, had left Koṇanūr and taken up his residence in the old town of Mysore.³ In or after 1763, the

Continued rivalry between Haidar and Nanjarāja (down to 1767).

partisans of Nanjarāja saw their opportunity shortly after the conquest of Bednūr, when there were talks of Haidar giving up the Regency of Mysore. They suggested that he should hand it back to Nanjarāja. Haidar, however, in view of the mortal enmity existing between Nanjarāja and the old dowager queen Dēvājamma and his promise to the latter, restrained from taking that step. He so played off the one against the other that he drew enormous sums of money from both, fomenting discord between them.⁴ Again, in 1766, on the death of Immaḍi-Krishnarāja Woḍeyar, Nanjarāja expected in vain his own restoration to power when he wrote to Haidar suggesting that Krishnarāja’s younger son should be chosen king in preference to the elder.⁵ But he found himself deceived when Haidar at last confirmed the accession of the elder (Nanjarāja Woḍeyar). Incensed at this conduct, Nanjarāja soon made himself a source of domestic danger to Haidar, who determined upon putting him out of way. Nanjarāja had been for some time secretly plotting against Haidar’s ascendancy in the State. In August 1767—a short time before Haidar’s setting out on his first campaign against Muhammad Ali in the Karnātic—it was discovered that he had been engaged in secret correspondence with Pēshwa Mādhava Rao and Nizām Ali for the destruction of Haidar, whose power he represented, with truth, to have been founded on the infraction of every bond of gratitude and all the duties

2. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 72.

3. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 89; De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 24; see also Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 562.

4. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 242-243.

5. *Ibid.*, 243.

of allegiance. The object of his negotiations was to subvert the usurpation of Haidar, and restore the Hindu government; or rather, in point of fact, to revive his own previous ascendancy in the State.⁶

To Haidar, this was an embarrassing situation. To entrust Nanjarāja with the Government of the kingdom of Mysore during Haidar's absence or remove him out of it was impracticable. Still less prudent did it seem to leave Nanjarāja discontented and give the Government to another, as that would excite his complaints and occasion fresh troubles at home.⁷ A council was held to consider the position. The general view was to secure the person of Nanjarāja at least during the absence of Haidar and in the meantime to remove him from his brother-in-law, who, it was suggested, gave him evil advice; but to this Haidar opposed the written promise he had made to Nanjarāja never to make any attempt on his liberty, property or life, besides the difficulty of arresting him in his residence at Mysore, a place capable of standing a siege, and where Nanjarāja had upwards of two thousand troops.⁸ At length he hit upon a mode of circumventing him. Haidar was to proceed in state to Mysore to make an honourable visit to Nanjarāja. He was to invite Nanjarāja to come and encamp with his little army in the island of Seringapatam, so that he might be enabled to make his public entry into the capital in his capacity of Regent, Haidar being "desirous of investing him with that dignity before his departure" to the Karnātic.⁹ Accordingly, repeated messages were sent to Nanjarāja, representing that in the actual state of

Nanjarāja lured,
August 1767.

6. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 562; see also and compare De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 241), who briefly and yet vaguely mentions Nanjarāja's having joined the Mah-rattas and the English in a general conspiracy against Haidar.

7. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 241-242, 244.

8. *Ibid.*, 244.

9. *Ibid.*, 244-245.

affairs, his presence and counsel were required at Seringapatam.¹⁰ Then Haidar himself not only visited Nanjarāja in all humility¹¹ but also executed an agreement (*Karār-nāma*) to the effect that he would grant him an assignment of three lakhs territory for the expenses of his *Mahal*, besides arranging for the performance in a grand manner, in Seringapatam, of the wedding of his son Virarāja, and the handing over to him charge of the Mysore Gate and the eastern gate of the Seringapatam fort.¹² Though old and gullible, Nanjarāja saw through the whole game, but, finding that resistance or refusal would prove ineffectual, at length consented to proceed, on the solemn assurance that his own guards should accompany and remain with him; and that no change should be made excepting in the place of his abode. For the performance of these engagements, he exacted the most sacred obligation which a Mussulman can incur; and two of Haidar's confidential friends, Khākee Shah and Ghalīb Muhammad Khān (brother of Fuzzul-ullāh Khān) were sent to confirm and guarantee the promises of Haidar by an oath on the *Korān*.¹³ Then Nanjarāja left Mysore with his family and arrived near Seringapatam. Once in his hands, Haidar tried to secure possession of the person of his old opponent, whom he as much feared as he pretended to revere. On the plea of exercising his troops in their evolutions, Haidar invested Nanjarāja's little camp and surrounded it in the night by detachments of infantry as a preliminary to the pretended arrangements for Nanjarāja's public entry into the capital.¹⁴ Nanjarāja, not to be outmatched, hit upon the removal of his crafty adversary. Perceiving that he was under guard,

10. Wilks, l.c.

11. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 89; also De La Tour, o.c., I. 245.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Wilks, o.c., I. 562-563.

14. De La Tour, o.c., I. 245.

Nanjarāja, under pretence of enquiring about certain drugs from Pondicherry, prevailed upon Mīr Sāhib, Persian writer to Haidar's French officer, "to

His machination. acquaint his master that if he would assassinate Haidar, he (Nanjarāja)

would deposit the value of eight lacs of rupees in gold, silver, precious stones, and elephants". He urged him also to put the project into execution when Haidar "passed the night by the light of flambeaux before the camp of the European, on his return from the excursion he made every two days."¹⁵ Meantime, Haidar was on the point of deciding as to whether Nanjarāja should be arrested during his forthcoming entry into Seringapatam,

Haidar decides on securing Nanjarāja's person.

or if that was deemed inexpedient, in what manner it should be carried out.¹⁶ At this juncture, he got scent of Nanjarāja's machinations.¹⁷ There was no time to lose. Haidar arranged forthwith for securing his person.¹⁸

"On the day appointed", Nanjarāja, in the words of a contemporary writer,¹⁹ "without any mistrust, made a pompous entrance into

The walling up of Nanjarāja.

Syringapatnam (Seringapatam), at the head of his little army, the cannon firing, and the troops beating to arms, and saluting him. Being arrived at his palace, his attention was taken up by the compliments of the great men of the city, who were admitted by few at a time, on the pretended account of not making too great a crowd. Moctum (Saiyid Mokhdum) then entered the city, followed by a number of officers, and made a sign to the troops, not to pay him any honours: he went directly to the palace of Nand Raja, where every one supposed he was going to pay his respects; and dismounting, he caused the first company of the

15. *Ibid.*, 245-246.

16. *Ibid.*, 247.

17. *Ibid.*, 248.

18. *Ibid.*, 248-249.

19. *Ibid.*, 251-253.

battalions of seapoys who guarded the gate, to follow him. As soon as he came into the presence of Nand Raja, who came to meet him, he acquainted him, that Ayder, being informed that he was surrounded by people who gave him bad advice, had sent him to remove them from about him : at the same time he commanded all present to leave the palace, which was done without uttering a word ; the grenadiers followed them ; and Moctum remaining with Nand Raja, his two sons, and some officers, the conversation was carried on with the greatest politeness. Moctum acquainted the two princes that they were to make the campaign ; and that, instead of one father, they would find two in Ayder and himself. During this short conversation, the women and all the family of Moctum were announced. Moctum took his leave, carrying the two princes with him, to whom he represented, that it became their dignity to wait upon the Nabob, and give him an account of all that had passed. These young noblemen departed, accompanied by many of Moctum's officers ; neither they nor Nand Raja expressing the least astonishment or chagrin. After their departure, Moctum spoke a word to Nand Raja's general, who ordered his troop to ground their arms, which was done with great silence. All the gates and windows of Nand Raja's palace, that looked towards the street, were afterwards walled up, except the principal entrance....." Nanjarāja thus found himself shut up in his own palace ; his guards were seized and Haidar's own sentinels placed over his person. Nanjarāja's accomplices (namely, Mallu Anna and others) were punished with heavy fines, while those who helped Haidar in detecting the conspiracy (namely, Ōḷaiya, Kāḷappa and others) were appointed to posts in the *Tōshē-Khāne-Daftar* and other departments. Haidar paid the arrears due to Nanjarāja's troops, enlisting them for the most part among his own.

Nanjarāja's *jaghir* was resumed and valued at Rupees four lakhs, he being thenceforth allowed two lakhs, with the assignment of Kaḷale, for his maintenance as a state prisoner, the remaining two lakhs being set apart for his two sons, who followed Haidar during the campaign against Muhammad Alī (1767-1769). The splendid cover on which the sacred oath of Haidar to Nanjarāja had been confirmed, enveloped no more than a simple book of blank paper; and it was thus by a solemn mockery of the religion which they both professed that Haidar and his religious casuists reconciled to themselves the double crime of a false oath upon a false *Korān*.²⁰ Nanjarāja was thus walled up in his own house by Haidar, much like the seven Christian youths of Ephesus in the cave in which they had made their abode. The only difference was that the seven sleepers were miraculously made to sleep for two or three centuries while Nanjarāja was doomed to final inactivity.

Nanjarāja had no consolation even in prison and notwithstanding Haidar kept a strict vigilance over his movements,²¹ he wrote, about March 1769, to the English at Madras, seeking their support in re-establishing him in the station he formerly held and promising to meet the expenses of the English troops.²² Nanjarāja lingered on till his death in 1773, probably secretly despatched under the orders of Haidar. Haidar confiscated his *jaghir* of Kaḷale about this time, and in 1774, fixed for his *mahal* in Seringapatam a provision of the bare necessities of life.²³ In 1779, Haidar sent for from prison Vīrarājaiya, one of the

20. *Ibid.*, 253; also *Haid. Nām.*, l. c.; see also and compare Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 562-563.

21. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 107; also *Mily. Cons.*, XXVIII. 1252-1253.

22. *Count. Corres.*, XVII. No. 89, pp. 127-128: Nanjarāja to Governor (Charles Bouchier)—Letter received, March 8, 1769.

23. *Haid. Nām.*, l. c. Probably Nanjarāja was put to death under orders of Haidar, in 1773, on the exposure of his correspondence with the English.

surviving sons of Nanjarāja, and rendered him due homage; but Virarājaiya was so indifferent and overbearing in his attitude that Haidar threw him back into confinement.²⁴ Thus disappears from the pages of history the famous Dalavai Family, which was so much responsible for the rise of Mysore and incidentally for the prominence that Haidar secured to himself on the eclipse of Nanjarāja and his brother.

Enough has been said, in an earlier chapter,²⁵ about the military organization set up by Haidar as the *sine qua non* of his policy of aggression. We may now relate how in pursuance of that policy he managed also the civil administration

Administrative matters: earlier land-marks, down to 1774.

of Mysore, during years of peace interspersed by years of war, throughout the greater part of his regime as the Regent of Mysore. Haidar no doubt sufficiently realised that internal security could be best secured by maintaining intact and improving the existing administrative institutions, by frequently changing the *personnel* of the government, and by gradually making the system more rigorous to suit the conditions of the times. He left the fiscal institutions of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar as he found them, adding, however, to the established revenue, whatever had been secretly levied by a skilful or popular Amil, and afterwards detected. This produced a progressive and regular increase and the result of complaints yielded occasional but also tolerably regular augmentations.²⁶ The form of polity he sought to evolve and

The actual circumstances of this event are, however, involved in obscurity. The *Haid. Nām.*, as may be expected, glosses over it. Elsewhere Wilks, referring to Haidar's exactions after the peace with the Mahrattas (1772), speaks of his old benefactor Nanjarāja being "privately compelled to contribute his full proportion"; and adds that "the death of that person in the succeeding year (*i.e.*, 1773), relieved him from the last of his antient rivals" (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 706). This roughly fixes the death of Nanjarāja in 1773.

24. *Ibid.*, ff. 72,

25. *Ante* Vol. II. Ch. XII.

26. Wilks, *o.c.* I. 729.

maintain was unbridled autocracy of the Cromwellian type, dominated by the civil and military elements and entirely subservient to his personal will. Haidar's first *Dewān* or Minister of finance, after Khandē Rao, was one of the same school, named Venkaṭapataiya of Diṇḍigal. He died in 1767, inviting Haidar to receive into the treasury the fortune of 50,000 pagodas he had honourably made in his service. He was succeeded by his son-in-law Channannaiya, who, however, was tortured, plundered and dismissed in 1768.²⁷ His successor was Hāfiz-ullāh Khān, younger brother of Fuzzul-ullāh Khān. Hāfiz-ullāh being unable to manage matters, Haidar called on Pradhān Venkappaiya from Nagar to Seringapatam. With great tact and ability, Venkappaiya detected the fraud of one Vijāpur Timmappaiya—successor of Bokkasada Venkaṭapataiya to the office of Dewān of *Kartara-sīme*—and collected the entire amount misappropriated by the latter. Haidar duly honoured him with the title of *Pradhān* but sent him back to Nagar.²⁸ Not long after, Asad Alī Khān, a Navāyat, and an able and honourable man, was designated Dewān of the revenue or finance department (*Mahalāti-cuchēri*), with Bangalore as his headquarters and a staff of accountants (*Mutsaddiyaru*) to assist him,²⁹ prominent among them being Pūrṇaiya and Krishṇa Rao of the treasury establishment (*Tōshē-Khāne*).³⁰ In October

27. *Ibid.*, 751-752; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 42. The reference to "Venkatapa" of Wilks is to Venkaṭapataiya of the *Haid. Nām.* Wilks speaks of his death in 1766, but the earlier work *Haid. Nām.* specifically dates that event in 1767 (*Sarvajit*).

28. *Haid. Nām.*, l. c. For fuller details of the career of Pradhān Venkappaiya, see Vol. II. Ch. XIII. p. 478-480.

29. *Ibid.*, ff. 43; also Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 752.

30. Pūrṇaiya, according to Kirmāṇi, began humbly as servant to a certain banker named Andān Sheth (the "Annadāna Setṭi" of the *Haid. Nām.*) at an allowance of two *Huns* a month. Being a good accountant in the "Kinhiri" or Kannaḍa language, he was also in some way connected with the *Tōshē-Khāne*. His method of keeping the accounts having pleased Haidar, he was taken from the service of the banker and placed in charge of the *Daftar* of the Kannaḍa accounts, with a

1772, Asad Ali Khān died under the tortures which were inflicted to extort money which he did not possess. Pradhān Venkappaiya was nominated in his place, while Lakshmikāntaiya, son of Krishṇe Urs, was appointed as Bakshi of the militia or police department (*Sime-kandā-chāra-cuchēri*). Lakshmikāntaiya was successively posted to the revenue charge (*amalu, māmale*) of Māgaḍi, Śankhagiri and Ērōḍe, and the headship of the police devolved upon Zainullābidin.³¹ In July 1773, Salāyat Khān, another Navāyat and a man of the purest integrity, was with his younger brother Muhammad Ghouse, appointed to the office of Dewān of the revenue department,³² and in 1774, Venkappaiya was entrusted with the fiscal administration of Sira, Maddagiri and Channarāyadurga.³³

These changes apart, Haidar, for some time after the peace with the Mahrattas (1772), generally resided in Seringapatam. His finances had suffered severely, largely owing to the wars he waged; but he seldom failed in devising extraordinary means to meet extraordinary situations. Many still remained of those who had held offices of trust under the ancient Rājās

competent salary (c. 1768). Krishṇa Rao had charge of the Hindi or Mahratta *Daftar*, and both he and Pūrṇaiya kept in good order the treasury accounts (Kirmāni, *Neshawati-Hyduri*, 242). According to a copy of the Ms. of the *Haid. Nām.*, noticed in the *M.A.R.* for 1930 (pp. 95-96), Pūrṇaiya started his career as a writer (*Gumasta*) under Venkaṭaramanaiya, Kannaḍa accountant (*Mutsaddi*) of *Tosh-Khane* under Asad Ali Khān at Bangalore (c. 1768). He was well-versed in accounts and became the favourite of Asad Ali. After the death of Venkaṭaramanaiya, Asad Ali requested Haidar to appoint him (Pūrṇaiya) in the place. Pūrṇaiya was made the accountant and placed also in charge of the factories (*Karkhane*). Even after Asad Ali's death, Pūrṇaiya continued to be a very prominent man, being given a gold umbrella by Haidar. Curiously enough, our copy of the *Haid. Nām.*, is silent regarding these particulars of the early career of Pūrṇaiya.

31. Wilks, I. c.; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 53.

32. *Ibid*; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 54.

33. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 55.

and had amassed considerable wealth; the exterior appearance of disregard during a period of twelve years had rendered them incautious; and Haidar had taken secret means to ascertain with precision their actual funds, as a resource in the day of exigency. The torture was applied in cases of doubt, and a large sum was realized by this means. His old benefactor Nanjarāja was privately compelled to contribute his full proportion. But the most typical of the cases which contributed to replenish his coffers on one occasion was that of

The spoliation of
Fuzzul-ullāh Khān.

Fuzzul-ullāh Khān, a graphic description of whose spoliation will be found in the writings of the military historian of Mysore. Fuzzul-ullāh, as we have seen, entered Haidar's service, or rather became his associate, at the lowest ebb of his fortune, when he had fled from Seringapatam to Bangalore (1760). He had stipulated for the singular distinction of sitting on the same *musnud* as Haidar and having two honorary attendants standing behind him, with fans composed of the downy feathers of the *humma*. No individual contributed so largely as Fuzzul-ullāh to the subsequent aggrandisement of Haidar by his military talents, and by a genuine zeal for the cause in which he was engaged, Alike by the friends as well as the enemies of Haidar, Fuzzul-ullāh was esteemed the first officer in his service, and continued to be treated with the accustomed honours, until the arrival of the Navāyats from the Arcot country. These persons, envious of the state which he assumed, compared his ancestry with their own; represented the indecorum of treating the sons of Chandā Sāhib with inferior distinction; hinted at the new arrangements of etiquette and consequent new relations, which ought to result from Haidar's rank and title of *Nawāb*; and at length prevailed on him to send a message to Fuzzul-ullāh, intimating that he must discontinue these privileges.

"The morechal" (fan), Fuzzul-ullāh is represented to have said, in reply, "is no more than a handful of useless feathers, but it has been the constant associate of my head, and they shall not be separated; he who takes one shall have both; in the pride of my youth, I stipulated for one of the side pillows of the *musnud*; and I have not disgraced the distinction. Instead of depriving me of that one, it would have been more gracious, as well as more necessary, to prop up my age and infirmities by a second. There is a simple mode of obeying the mandate—I will never again enter a court where ancient benefits are forgotten." Fuzzul-ullāh had his house in the fort, in which his family always dwelt; but his tents, when at Seringapatam, were at all times pitched on the esplanade, and there he himself usually preferred to reside; there he received the order; and although he lived four or five years afterwards, he never after that period entered a house. On the present occasion, Haidar sent to demand from him eight lakhs of pagodas! The requisition was not unexpected; and Fuzzul-ullāh gave the messenger an order to his sister, who presided over his family in the fort, to give up, without reservation, every rupee he possessed. During the remainder of his miserable life, he subsisted by selling the few articles of camp equipage, horses and household furniture, which were not swept off in the general plunder. He died in a wretched pal, or private tent, a patched remnant of his former splendour!⁸⁴

The peace of Seringapatām was disturbed for a short time in May 1774, when the old magazine (*kadīmu maddīna mane*) near the principal granary (*doḍḍa ugrāna*) caught fire, involving considerable loss of life and property.

84. Wilks (*o. c. l.* 705-708), who concludes with the observation: "These hideous examples of ingratitude and oppression are abundantly efficient to the extinction of probity, but not of avarice," etc.

Particularly, the temple of Śrī-Ranganātha sustained serious damage and was repaired and rebuilt in part under Haidar's supervision within a month after the accident.⁸⁵

In 1775, Haidar bifurcated the revenue department (*Mahalāti-cuchēri*) under the designation of *Bālaghāt-cuchēri* and *Pāyanghāt-cuchēri* respectively. The *Bālaghāt-cuchēri* was placed under Nāzim-ud-dīn Khān of Arcot as Dewān, with Jadīr Rāma Rao as chief accountant (*munshi*) and the records (*daftara*) under Puṭṭaiya, Singaiya, elder brother of Anche Timmappaiya, Appāji Rao, son of Nanjappaiya of Karūr, Sōmaiya of the customs service (*pommu*), Kēshava Rao, son of Venkā-Bāvāji, Kōnēri Rao of the French establishment (*farāshi*) and Lālā Lingo-Pant. The *Pāyanghāt-cuchēri* was entrusted to the charge of Mīr Ali Nakīm and his younger brother Muhammad Ghouse, with Kadīm Shāmaiya as chief accountant and the records under Cuchēri Krishṇaiya, Subba Rao and Kushāl-Chand among others.⁸⁶ About this time, however, grave irregularities prevailed in the country in regard to the collection of land revenue. Of the officials, Anche Timmappaiya, Cuchēri Puṭṭaiya and Sammukha Venkaṭa Setṭi had in 1774 executed bonds for the collection of 1,000 *varahas* each, but had actually collected 6,000 *varahas*, allowing the arrears of Government dues to accumulate. Since 1772, Pūrṇaiya had been actively speeding up the collections, but Anche Timmappaiya as his colleague made himself so odious by his unjust exactions from the public that he was at last arrested by Cuchēri Puṭṭaiya with the help

85. *Haid Nām.*, ff. 54. A recent writer in the *Q. J. M. S.* misreads the textual expressions "*kadīmu maddina mane*" as "the house of one Kadīmuddīn Khān" (see *Q. J. M. S.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Article on *Haidar Ali—His Religious Disposition*, p. 454), whereas all that the expressions mean is "the old magazine"

86. *Ibid.*, ff. 65.

of Shānubhogue Shāmaiya (of the *Mysore-Hōbli-Ashta-grām*), Mustafā Ali Khān and Pūrṇaiya. Timmappaiya was not only forced, by means of a bond (*muchchalike*), to make good 3,00,000 *varahas* but was also left in the custody of Anche Shāmaiya, who succeeded to the charge of the intelligence department or the post office (*Anche guritana*) in September 1776, just at the time when Haidar, on his return from his first campaign in the north, made use of his interval of leisure to summon to Seringapatam the whole of the Amils of the kingdom and the tributaries in person, or by their agents, for the purpose of adjusting their past accounts and future revenues, and levied upon the whole country a forced contribution under the name of free gift (*nazarāṇa*) for the support of the war.³⁷ This apart, Nāzim-ud-dīn of the *Bālaghāt-cuchēri*, beyond offering threats and insults to the Amils, proved himself thoroughly unequal to the task of adopting coercive measures (like flogging) against them.³⁸ On this, Haidar³⁹ amalgamated both the *cuchēris*, and, in August 1779, shortly after his return from his renewed campaign in the north, Anche Shāmaiya assumed the management of the districts on his leaving the official records under his elder brother Rangaiya, Shānubhogue of the Narasimhasvāmi temple, and on his undertaking to deposit in the treasury a crore of *varahas* over and above the estimated annual revenue receipts.⁴⁰

Anche Shāmaiya was a Śrī-Vaishṇava Brāhman who belonged to Sūlakunte in the Kolar country. He had known Haidar as an administration, 1779. young man. He so dominated the counsels of the State about this time that he soon, on a representation to Abu Muhammad Mirde, Haidar's confidential adviser, secured to Bokkasada Venkaṭapataiya the charge

37. *Ibid.*, ff. 66; Wilks, *o.c.* I. 728-729.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Ibid.*

of the records (*Daftara*) of the *Mahalāti-cuchēri* and the Dewānship of that *Cuchēri* to Mīr Muhammad Sāḍak, son of Mīr Alī Nakīm, an intelligent and able man, till recently camp *Kotwāl* or head of the police—an office compounded of the functions of clerk of the market, police magistrate, and *prevot martial*—appointing in the latter's place his (Mīr Sāḍak's) brother-in-law Rājā Sāhib.⁴¹ The department of police

The efficiency of the system.

had at an early period been annexed to that of the post office. Haidar had, at different intervals, added to and improved the details of this office. With the aid of his new minister Shāmaiya, who possessed all the cool acuteness necessary for giving efficiency to his plans, and unfettered by any scruples or compunctions that might obstruct the operations of this office, Haidar not only perfected those arrangements for the prevention of crimes, which under all governments are indispensable to a firm administration, but superadded a system of external and domestic intelligence, which pervaded all foreign courts, and penetrated into the inmost recesses of every private dwelling throughout the kingdom. From the union of these two departments of finance and police, Haidar composed a special commission for the investigation of embezzlement, which was not only successful in the detection of actual frauds, but in establishing apparent proof of alleged malversations which had never occurred.

Thus a reign of terror followed.

Thereign of terror. When a public officer of trust was delivered over to the department of torture (a branch of that of police), this was effected without some previous form: for the designation of

41. *Ibid.*, ff. 67. See also and compare Wilks, who seems to speak of the succession of Mīr Sāḍak in or about 1774 (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 752-753). The earlier work *Haid-Nām*, however, is more specific in dating this event in 1779 (*Ṣikārī*). Anche Shāmaiya's descendants still live in and around Sūlakunte Agrahār.

Anche-wālla (Post-master), the idiom of the day had substituted that of *Paṭṭi-wālla* (the man of statements), owing to the well-established practice of making out a fictitious statement, supported by fictitious vouchers, and abundance of witnesses in waiting, and exhibiting a balance against the unfortunate victim, of the sum calculated to 'be extracted. Shāmaiya is said to have excelled all his predecessors in every branch of these horrible duties; his statements were, it is said, so skillfully framed as to bear, in public *durbār*, where they were read, the semblance of truth and accuracy; and his new and horrible contrivances of torture, it is added,

The torture of civil officials: the example of Appāji Rām. spread a terror, which sometimes rendered their application unnecessary. That neither talents nor services, however eminent, shielded their possessor from the reach of this frightful inquisition, may be inferred from the single example of Appāji Rām, the famous wit of the time, who actually did not possess half the sum demanded of him, and borrowed the remainder from his friends. He had executed all his trusts with the most scrupulous fidelity; he had rendered to Haidar an account of all the presents which he received in his missions, and had generally been allowed to retain them. Hitherto he had trusted to the force of probity alone; but on this occasion, he declared to a confidential friend (*Pūrṇaiya*), that he found it to be not only an unprofitable but an impracticable virtue; and should thenceforth avail himself, without limit, of the license to plunder, which the conduct of his master had now proclaimed.⁴²

42. Wilks, o.c., I. 753-54. Shāmaiya's real name was Shāma Aiyangar.

Wilks' picture of him as the master-torturer seems clearly the result of the stories he should have heard in his own time. How much he was an instrument in his master's hands and how much he was himself responsible for his acts, it is difficult to say. But, a Hitler is never a Hitler without a Goebbels or a Goering to carry out his behests. For particulars of the part Shāmaiya played in the subsequent period (i.e., during Tipū's regime), see Ch. VIII below.

Among other instances, Harikār Nāyaka Shāmaiya, an old rival of Anche Shāmaiya and a favourite of Anche Timmappaiya, was heavily taxed, flogged and imprisoned, while his brothers Singaiya and Sēshaiya were severely tortured and his office conferred on Shroff Śrīnivāsiya. On this, the Nāyak's brothers fled for their lives to the jungle in the guise of fakīrs, being eventually reinstated in their office of headship of armed peons (*bīrēdāri*) on their petition to and stipulations with Haidar.⁴³ The two brothers, Salāyat Khān and Muhammad Ghouse, formerly of the *Mahalāti-cuchēri*, were likewise subjected to exaction and torture, the former dying as a result of the wounds inflicted, leaving a sum of Rupees 10,000 with which he had entered Haidar's service; and the latter being restored on a monthly pay of Rupees two hundred.⁴⁴ At the instance of Krishna Rao, son of Rāmāji-Pant and Amildār of Kōpal, Bahadūr-Baṇḍa and Gajēndragadh, a sum of six lakhs of *varahas* was exacted from his old rival Appāji Rām, Amil of Sōde, Ankōle and Panchmahāl, and the revenue charge of that unit transferred to Virabhadra-iyā, a former Dalavāi, on his payment of a present (*nazar*) of 60,000 Kumsi-Savanūr *varahas* through Annadāna Setṭi.⁴⁵ Pradhān Venkappaiya, who was looking after the revenue administration of Sīra, Maddagiri and Channarāyadurga since 1774, had appointed Raghupatai-ya, his son-in-law, to the charge of Sīra. On the ground that Raghupatai-ya had become haughty and overbearing and had failed to escort Haidar during his march across Sīra against Chitaldrug, he was arrested and condemned, and in his place was appointed one Khāji Abdulla. In August 1779, Venkappaiya himself

43. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 67-68.

44. *Ibid.*, ff. 68; Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 752.

45. *Ibid.*, ff. 68-69.

was summoned to Seringapatam and was not only made to yield 60,000 *varahas* but was also publicly disgraced and confined, his office being confiscated and he being left with the bare title of *Pradhān* and an allowance of Rupees one thousand.⁴⁶

Nor was this all. Shāmaiya went further in exacting from Pūrṇaiya a sum of 1,11,000 *varahas*, and in attempting to raise money from the local populace by recourse to violence. Pūrṇaiya was even tortured to prepare false returns (*sullu paṭṭi*) and would have been put to death but for Bache Rao, who prevailed on Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao to represent to Haidar to restrict the punishment to merely keeping him under guard (*pahare*). At length, he was released on *sowcar* security through the intercession of Mustafā Alī Khān, Annadāna Seṭṭi and Narasa Seṭṭi, and reinstated in office.⁴⁷ Among other excesses of Shāmaiya, Venkaṭa Rao, Amīl of Coimbatore, Rangāchāri of Dhārāpuram-Chakragiri, Khāder Sāhib of Nāmakal-Śādaman-gala, Narasaṇṇaiya of Bārāmahal, and others, were heavily fined and the amounts exacted from them by resorting to punishment of various types, such as flogging (*korade*), piercing by means of pack-needles (*dabbaḷa*) and confining in underground cell (*Paṭṇa-chāvaḍi taḷagaṇa giḍangi*).⁴⁸ In particular, Rāmāi, Shānubhōgue of the principal granary (*doḍḍa ugrāṇa*), was tied to the foot of an elephant (*āne kālige kaṭṭi*); Nanjē Urs, son of Kumārāi of the lancers' corps (*ṭṭi uliga*), and the Shānubhōgue of Krishṇarājapura were put to death by

46. *Ibid.*, ff. 69. In regard to Raghupatai, it might be added that he was engaged in a domestic ceremony when Haidar passed through the Stra country, of which he had no notice.

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*, ff. 69-70. Kirmāni and Mirza Ikbal not only speak of Haidar's indulgence to the peasantry and merchants but are also agreed in their general references to the strictness of Haidar's revenue system and the severity of the punishment inflicted on extortionate and dishonest officials (see Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 475-476, 488, 501-503, 511-512).

continual blows (*petṭu*), while Dēvarāja Urs of Mūgūr was branded with (*baregala hākisi*).⁴⁹

Military men alone escaped. Haidar's arrangements

The case of military men.

rendered it difficult for them to be rich. The superior scale of civil allowances was a topic of ordinary animadversion among them; and the officers in Haidar's army did not view with generous indignation this mode of refunding emoluments, of which they were jealous. Indeed, as the military officer Roome Zeree or Romee, the money-finder, a native of Constantinople and a commandant of infantry, one of the most noted instruments of the department of torture, observed, "those who had executed their respective trusts with moderation and were really unable to pay the sum demanded, died under the torture: and those only escaped with life, who had enriched themselves by exaction, and were compelled to disgorge." Some of the unfortunate persons of the first description saved their lives by prevailing on *Sāhukārs* (bankers) to become their securities.

Levy of contribution on bankers.

The judgment of Haidar, true to his interests on most occasions, never seems to have been vitiated by any passion but avarice; he determined for the first time to levy a heavy contribution on the bankers; and thus gave a destructive blow to all future confidence; to the sources of commercial enterprise; and to the means of availing himself, on any future occasion, of the monied interest of the country. Of the sum fixed upon to be exacted from the bankers, a balance remained, for the present unpaid, of 20 lakhs of pagodas; and the consequence of this method of banishment of capital from the kingdom was evinced in the well known fact that all the subsequent tortures inflicted by himself and by his successor, failed to realize this balance.⁵⁰

49. *Ibid.*, ff. 70.

50. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 754-755.

By these and other measures, Anche Shāmaiya rose high in the favour of Haidar, being honoured by him with an umbrella (*koḍe*), medal (*padaka*), pearl necklace (*muttina-sara*) and palanquin (*pālaki*), a cash present (*ināmu*) of 5,000 *varahas*, and an allowance (*daramaha*) of 1,000 *varahas*, with a pair of *shawls* as *khillat*. His elder brother Rangaiya was granted an additional allowance of 30 *varahas*, while his younger brother Apramēya was placed in charge of the records of the treasury (*Tōshē-Khāne*) and cavalry, infantry and other establishments (*savār, bāru, ahashām vagaire*).⁵¹ At the same time, Krishṇa Rao of Shimoga was honoured with *Sirpah* and medal (*Sirpesh Turāyi*) and a cash present of 500 *varahas* with a pair of *shawls* as *khillats*, he being appointed to the revenue charge of Dharwar on the death of the former Amīl Nanjappaiya. And so was Muhammad Mīr Sādak with umbrella, medal and palanquin, a cash present of 3,000 *varahas*, an allowance of 1,000 *varahas* and *shawls* and a signet with the words *Mulki-Haidar baje tane gīna bāda* inscribed thereon.⁵²

Side by side certain official changes also followed.

Official changes.

On the demise of Ujjanappa, officer-in-charge of Nagar, Shaikh Ayāz was posted thither from Chitaldrug and a *Chāla* by name Daulat Khān was appointed in the latter's place. Bhiṣṭōpanth of Śīrahattī was confirmed in the revenue charge of Bādāmi, and Haridāsaiya posted to the Bārāmahal in succession to Narasannaiya. Aḷasingri was placed at the head of the Muzrai department (*Dēvasthānada-chāvaḍi*) and later entrusted also

51. *Haid-Nām*, l. c.

52. *Ibid.* The inscription on the signet means "Let Haidar's kingdom flourish and become famous." Translation by courtesy of Moin-ul-Vizareth Mr. A. K. Saiyid Taj Peeran, B.A., Bangalore, who is of opinion that the language used is Hindi and not Urdu.

with the collection of customs and excise (*sunka, pommū*) in place of Krishnaiya of Mārikaṭṭe, while Chikka-basavaṇṇa of Seringapatam-chāvaḍi was posted to the charge of Pālghāt-cuchēri in place of Murādīl Khān.⁵³

A grand embassy was dispatched by Haidar in 1779 to Delhi for the purpose of obtaining for himself the imperial grants of the *Subādāri* of the two Karnātics of Bijāpur and Hyderabad. Whether this was intended to obtain imperial sanction to certain of his conquests beyond the territorial limits of Mysore or was, as suggested by

Haidar's embassy
to Delhi, 1779.

53. *Ibid.*, ff. 70-72. Shaikh Ayāz, referred to in the text above, was one of the sons or rather nephews of the Rāja of Kolattiri. During Haidar's first invasion of Malabar (1766), he was seized, made a prisoner and "adopted" by him, being converted to the Muslim faith and given the name of Ayāz Khān (see *Ante*, Vol. II, Chapter XIII, p. 575 with f. n. 460-461). Of him we have the following interesting account by Wilks:—"Among the prisoners carried off in the first inhuman emigration from Malabar," he writes, "was a young Nair, from Cherul, who had been received as a slave of the palace, and to whom, on his forced conversion to Islam, they had given the name of Sheik Ayaz. The noble port, ingenuous manners and singular beauty of the boy, attracted general attention; and when at a more mature age he was led into the field, his ardent valour and uncommon intelligence recommended him to the particular favour of Hyder, who was an enthusiast in his praise, and would frequently speak of him, under the designation of 'his right hand in the hour of danger.' Ayaz soon conveyed the impression of an affectionate and trustworthy humble friend in the estimation of Hyder. To the endowments which have been stated, incessant and confidential military service had superadded experience beyond his years; and Hyder selected him for the important trust of civil and military governor of the fort and territory of Chittledroog. But modest as he was faithful and brave, Ayaz wished to decline the distinction, as one to which he felt himself incompetent; and particularly objected that he could neither read nor write, and was consequently incapable of a civil charge. 'Keep a corla at your right hand', said Hyder, 'and that will do you better service than pen and ink': thus assuming a graver countenance, 'place reliance,' added he, 'on your excellent understanding! act from yourself alone! fear nothing from the calumnies of the scribblers! but trust in me as I trust in you! reading and writing!! how have I risen to empire, without the knowledge of either!" (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 741-748). For further reference to Shaikh Ayāz and his subsequent career, etc., see Ch. VII below.

Wilks, "in order that an exterior dignity which still commanded some respect, might accompany the possession of an authority, which he had now an early prospect of conferring on himself,"⁵⁴ it is not quite clear. Haidar was, it would seem, vacillating between setting up elsewhere for himself and continuing as *Sarvādhikāri* at Seringapatam.

From the rigour of the administrative system in Seringapatam, described in the foregoing pages, we turn with some relief to the impressive celebration in that capital city, in the latter part of the same year, of weddings in Haidar's family. Haidar had, in his repeated wars between the Tungabhadra and the Krishna, come into contact with Abdul Hakīm, the ruler of Savanūr. Despite his differences with Abdul Hakīm, Haidar had marked him out for possible marital alliances. Negotiations, which had been opened some time before by Haidar, were conducted skilfully and the arts of persuasion had been tried with success, with the result that the artful Haidar obtained the object of his desire about this time. The ruler of Savanūr saw that further war and greater ill-will would be the result of the rejection of such a solicitous offer, which was eventually accepted by him with a show of willingness that was not unappreciated by Haidar. The talks terminated in a double marriage—Abdul Khire Khān *alias* Khira Mean, the eldest son of that Nawāb, was to wed Haidar's daughter; while Karīm Sāhib, Haidar's second son, was to marry the daughter of Abdul Hakīm. On this occasion, Abdul Hakīm and his whole family visited Seringapatam. Haidar went out to meet them, with every demonstration of respect, and the marriages were solemnised with a degree of pomp and splendour far surpassing all former example. Besides

54. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 755-756.

Haidar's select officers (namely, Anche Shāmaiya, Pūrnaiya, Krishṇa Rao, Mīr Sādak and Mustafā Alī, Khān), persons from all parts of the country assembled to witness the festivity; and the whole capital was a continued scene of exterior joy and revelry. The half of Savanūr, which the Mahrattas had left in Haidar's possession, had after the conquest been restored by Haidar on the payment of an annual tribute of Rupees four lakhs; the remaining half was, on this occasion restored to the Nawāb with the gift of Bankāpur, as Savanūr and Bankāpur always went together, both being inseparable towns to the south of Dharwar. The tribute was also reduced to one half, on the condition that Abdul Hakīm maintained for Haidar's service 2000 select Pathān horse to be commanded by two of Abdul Hakīm's sons. Of the three Pathān Nawābs, who had made so great a figure in the transactions of the south, the troops and the resources of two were now transferred to Haidar; while the third one, of Kurnool, continued to be a doubtful dependent on Nizām Ali.⁵⁵

55. *Ibid.*, 758-759; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 71-72. See also and compare Kirmāni (o.c., 866-871), who places this event in A. D. 1778 (A.H. 1192). The *Haid-Nām* refers in this connection to the exclusion of the ordinary public servants (*ahalekārs*) of Seringapatam from the marriage festivities, while Wilks concludes by stating that "the operations of police were not intermitted (of course, in respect of the ordinary folk eager to witness the festivities); and the groans from the dungeons were not permitted to disturb these unhallowed rejoicings".

CHAPTER V.

KHĀSĀ-CHĀMARAJA WODEYAR VIII,

1776-1796—(*contd.*)

Southern advance: Haidar renews his objective, 1780—Haidar's relations with the English (down to 1780): seeks English help against the Mahrattas, 1770—Negotiates for a treaty with the English, 1771-1775—Further negotiations, 1775-1779: Haidar turns his attention to the French, 1775-1777; and continues diplomatic relations with the English; the English press the conclusion of an alliance with Haidar, October 1778; Haidar evades; the English announcement of an expedition for the reduction of Mahé, January 1779—Haidar retorts, February 1779; fall of Mahé, March 1779—Haidar remonstrates further, April 1779; the English decide on overtures with Haidar; Rev. Schwartz' mission to his court, July-October 1779—Mr. Gray's embassy to Haidar, February-March 1780; the account as recorded in his *Journal*—Affairs elsewhere: Anglo-Mahratta politics—Mysore-Mahratta negotiations, 1779-1780—Anglo-Nizamite relations, 1779-1780: the Guntur circar question—The formation of the Quadruple Alliance, c. June 1780—War with Nawab Muhammad Ali (*The Second Mysore War*), 1780-1784—*First Phase*: June-September 1780: Haidar marches towards the Karnatic, June 1780; holds a council of war at Kilpauk, July 1780—Directs the disposition of his forces; enters the Karnatic, July 20, 1780; lays siege to Arcot, August 21, 1780—The position of Muhammad Ali and his allies—Muhammad Ali's proposal; Lord Macleod *vs.* Sir Hector Munro; Sir Hector assumes the command of the English army; his movements, August 26-29, 1780—Haidar raises the siege of Arcot, August 29, 1780; Sir Hector Munro throws provisions into Conjeeveram—Col. Baillie's movements, August-September 1780; the first engagement at Perambakum, September 6, 1780—Further movements of

Col. Baillie, September 8-9, 1780—Second engagement at Perambakum (The first battle of Pollilore), September 10, 1780—General Munro's movements—His retreat to Madras—His conduct criticised—Baillie's mistake—Madras Government's plan of operations—*Second Phase*: September-December 1780: Haidar's movements; renews the siege of Arcot, September 19, 1780; capitulation of Arcot, November 28, 1780; reduction of the Karnatic-Payanghat, November-December 1780; Tipu proclaimed "Nabob of the Karnatic"—*Third Phase*: January-July 1781: Haidar's further activities—The English reaction—Movements of Sir Eyre Coote and Haidar, January-June 1781—Haidar in the South, April-June 1781; the attempted siege of Trichinopoly, June 1781; Coote's repulse at Chidambaram, June 18, 1781; Haidar decamps from Trichinopoly—His great mistake: contemporary view—Haidar and General Coote at Porto Novo—The battle of Porto Novo, 1st July 1781; description of the battle—Innes Munro's *Narrative*—*Fourth Phase*: July-December 1781: movements of Haidar and General Coote, July-August 1781—Their further movements—The second battle of Pollilore, 27th August 1781—The battle of Sholinghur, September 27, 1781; further activities of Haidar and Coote, September-October 1781—Relief of Vellore, etc., November 1781—Operations in the west and south of Mysore, 1780-1781; Haidar's treaty with the Dutch, September 4, 1781; the siege and capitulation of Negapatam, October-November 1781—The campaign of 1781 ends, November-December 1781—Haidar at Arcot; deliberates on the further conduct of the war, December 1781—*Fifth Phase*: January-July 1782: second relief of Vellore, January 1782—Haidar's reduction of Chandragiri—Affairs in Malabar: the tragic end of Sardar Khan, Haidar's General, January 1782—Affairs in the South: the battle of Annagudi and the defeat of Col. Braithwaite, February 17-18, 1782—The diplomacy of Warren Hastings; Haidar's position critical, February 1782—His reverie—The surrender of Cuddalore, April 4, 1782—Naval action off Trincomalee, April 12, 1782—Surrender of Permacoil,

May 16, 1782—Further movements of Haidar and General Coote—The action at Dhobigarh, May 31, 1782; the distinguished gallantry of Commandant Muhammad Ali—The battle of Arni, June 2, 1782—Arni and after; disaster at Neddingul, June 8, 1782; activities of the Mysore army elsewhere—Attempted negotiations for peace with Haidar, June-July 1782; Haidar's reply to the proposals—*Sixth Phase*: July-December 1782: renewed naval engagements in the South, July-September 1782—Renewed movements of English and Haidar, August-October 1782—Renewed campaign in Malabar, April-November 1782: Col. Humberston Mackenzie's movements; defeat and death of Saiyid Mokhdum, April 7, 1782—Col. Humberston's further movements, down to November 1782: the siege of Palghatcheri, his objective—Haidar counteracts the English design: Tipu with Mons. Lally at Palghat, November 16, 1782; Col. Humberston's retreat, November 20, 1782; Tipu's discomfiture at Paniani at the hands of Col. Macleod, November 29, 1782—Haidar's death in camp, December 7, 1782.

TOWARDS the latter part of June 1780, Haidar, after a year's interval devoted to the establishment of peace and security at home, marched towards Arcot, preparatory to his grand, yet long deferred, plan of advance on the South of India up to as far as Rāmēśvaram.¹ Since his first war with Nawāb Muhammad Ali terminating with the *Treaty of Madras* (1769), Haidar continually kept his eye on the South, despite the reverses he sustained at the hands of the Mahrattas in the north and the attitude of indifference, if not hostility, displayed by Muhammad Ali and his allies, the English at Madras. Indeed, preservation of the political

Southern advance:
Haidar renews his
objective, 1780.

1. See *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 73. This work specifically sets down the commencement of Haidar's renewed invasion of Arcot to *Sarvari*, *Jyēṣṭha* *ba*, (June 1780).

integrity and independence of the South against the encroachments of the Mahrattas, the Nizām and Muhammad Ali on the one hand and the rivalry and intervention of the European nations (like the English, French, Dutch, Danes, etc.) on the other, was the ruling passion of his life and he strove hard to achieve that ambition.² In pursuance of this policy, Haidar, already during 1774-1775, sought to reduce the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt.³ In 1776, shortly after his northern campaigns, he not only made elaborate preparations for an inroad thither but also sent, by way of Dindigal, towards Trichinopoly, cavalry, infantry and ammunition under Saiyid Mokhdum and Tipū.⁴ In 1778, he contemplated the subjugation of Tanjore and the adjoining forts further southwards.⁵ In February 1779, Haidar, while he secured his position in the Bālaghāt, directed a detachment of 10,000 horse under Murārji Māma and Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao to proceed by way of Caveripatam towards the Pass of Changama and to divide into four bodies, one to remain there, another to invade Trichinopoly, the third to march on Āmbūr, and the fourth to enter the Karnātic by the Changama⁶. By his systematic advance on Cud-dapah and the Karnātic dependencies of Muhammad Ali in

2. For an illustration of Haidar's attitude towards the local powers, see *Ante* Chs. I-III. His view-point of the European nations in India finds adequate expression in *Count-Corres.* XVI. 187, No. 112 (Haidar Ali to William Hornby, Tellicherry—received from Bednūr, July 6, 1768); XXVIII. 98 and 129, Nos. 42 and 59 (Haidar Ali to Governor of Madras—February 17 and March 19, 1779); and *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 310, No. 1416 (Haidar Ali to his Vakil Vinnāji-Pant—March 28, 1779), etc.
3. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, IV. 159 and 345, Nos. 907 and 1978.
4. *Count-Corres.*, XXV. 223-226 and 229-231, No. 99; also *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 44, No. 284.
5. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 162, No. 952.
6. *Count-Corres.*, XXVIII. 84, No. 37. The reference to Murārji-Māma here is to Murārī Rao Ghōrpade of Gooty, imprisoned in the hill-fort of Kabbāldurg since 1776. Murārī having borne no small a part in the first Mysorean siege of Trichinopoly (1762-1765), Haidar, as pointed out elsewhere (see *Ante* Ch. II), perhaps sought to amuse him with

the north during March-June, the latter was so hemmed in on all sides that no intelligence could reach Arcot without Haidar's permission.⁷ In September, Haidar was active, collecting war materials on a large scale to commence hostilities against the Nawāb immediately after the monsoon.⁸ During 1779-1780, continual disputes arose on the frontiers of the outlying area from Dindigal to Cuddapah, a ground systematically coveted by the chiefs of Mysore and Arcot.⁹ Haidar, persistent in his demands, wrote at last to Muhammad Ali, requiring him again to deliver up the fort of Trichinopoly to Mysore conformably to his old agreement with Nanjarāja (1752).¹⁰ The Nawāb not returning a proper answer, Haidar, in June 1780, promptly proceeded with the necessary preparations for the invasion of the Karnātic,¹¹ while Muhammad Ali turned as usual to the English for effective aid against him.¹²

prospects of release from prison if he only undertook to recover that fort for Mysore. Murāri Rao's death at the hands of Haidar, in May 1779, as we have seen, has to be assigned in a great measure to his failure to achieve Haidar's objective. The detachment cannot in any case have been commanded by Murāri Rao personally.

7. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 365, No. 1607.

8. *Ibid.*, 367, No. 1608.

9. *Ibid.*, 442, No. 1857, also 399, No. 1706; and *Selections—Foreign Dept.*, III. 886.

10. Kirmāni, *Neshawni-Hydwari*, 379; also *Selections—Foreign Dept.*, (III. 882), which refers to "the Nabob Walajah's letter to the Rajah of Mysore and agreement to give him Trichinopoly, etc., on certain conditions" as the cause of the war of 1780. In keeping with this position is the testimony of the English contemporary George Gray, who visited Seringapatam in February-March 1780, and wrote: "The old claim on the city of Trichinopoly which was promised to the King of Mysore, near 30 years ago, is said to afford a pretence for the Invasion, and it is to open with the attack of that place" (see text of Gray's *Journal* published by D. B. Diskalkar in the *J. I. H.*, XI. 325: Article on *George Gray's Embassy to Hyder Ali*, 311-333). What the English envoy understood as "a pretence" was the real underlying cause of the war in the light of other sources utilised here.

11. *Ibid.*, 379-380; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 73.

12. *Ibid.*, 387.

Haidar's relations with the English at Madras, since the *Treaty of Madras* (1769), it is necessary to note at this point, were fast tending to a crisis. Although, as Haidar once admitted, it was never any wish of his to quarrel with the English and he was on the contrary desirous of continuing upon friendly terms with them,¹³ he soon had his own grounds for grievance against them. In 1770, on the invasion of Mysore by Pēshwa Mādhava Rao, Haidar demanded assistance from them in execution of the *Treaty*.¹⁴ Nawāb Muhammad Alī, meanwhile, chafing under the control of the English at Madras, had, in 1767, on the basis of the sovereignty propounded in the *Treaty of Paris* in 1763, deputed Mr. John Macpherson as his agent to England in his own interests and had received in turn Sir John Lindsay as ambassador to support his pretensions at Madras. Muhammad Alī's own ambitions required the extinction of Haidar as the very first step in the march of his general conquests in the south. He reminded the English at Madras that being no party to their *Treaty* with Haidar, he was not bound to furnish funds for its execution. Muhammad Alī, aided by the Royal plenipotentiary at his court, urged not merely a passive infraction of the *Treaty*, but its active violation without one assignable pretext, by uniting with Mādhava Rao for the destruction of Haidar. The English found themselves pledged to all the evils of an offensive alliance with Haidar, which they had so carefully professed to avoid. They soon realised the impossibility of executing the *Treaty* in opposition to Muhammad Alī and the representative

13. *Selections—Foreign Dept., l.c.*

14. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 768; also *Count-Corres.*, XVIII, pp. 4-6, 90, No. 5 and 90—Haidar Alī to Governor; and *Oal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 443, No. 1857.

of His Majesty, and resolved not to destroy the power which they were bound by treaty to defend. They quietly evaded the whole question by representing both to Haidar and the Mahrattas (who had also sought their assistance) the necessity of waiting for the result of a reference they had made on the subject to their superiors in England.¹⁵

While the English at Madras were thus restrained by insuperable impediments from the performance of their engagements to Haidar, and Muhammad Ali was obstructed by M. Du Prê in his views of uniting with the Mahrattas, the latter power, whose direct object was the entire subjugation of the South, proposed to Haidar to compromise their differences, and unite for the conquest of the lower countries to the eastward. Haidar made known these proposals to the English, stating that he considered an union with the Mahrattas to be directly contrary to his interest, and the conquest of Arcot, through the medium of Mysore, to involve his own inevitable ruin; that he had hitherto opposed their unreasonable demands on Mysore, in the confident hope of receiving from the English the aid stipulated by treaty; and would continue resistance as long as hope should remain; that he was aware of the influence which had hitherto prevented their performance of the compact; and that he was willing to forget the causes of personal animosity towards Muhammad Ali, and to hope that the English would mediate a reconciliation. Also, in October 1771, he authorised his envoys to propose, as the condition of prompt and effectual aid, the immediate payment of twenty lakhs of rupees, and the cession to the English of the provinces of Bâramahal, Salem and Ahtoor; and finally, the ambassadors were

Negotiation for a treaty with the English, 1771-1775.

15. *Ibid.*, 766-769.

directed openly to announce, in the event of the rejection of all these advances, Haidar's reluctant determination to throw himself on the French for support. "To those ingenuous proposals," the English at Madras, in the words of the military historian of the period, "felt themselves unable to make a suitable return; Mahommed Ali admitted the correctness of Haidar's statement regarding the views of the Mahrattas; but 'that the friendship of the English ought not to be purchased with money,' was an effusion of political quixotism, not very advisedly risked by the author of that breach of faith, which produced the sordid substitution of interested motives; and who, in the whole of his connexion with the English nation, had uniformly tarnished their proudest trophies with moral shame and political dishonour." Haidar's ambassadors arrived at Madras in December 1773, and opened their proposals, which were simply for a treaty (renewing the violated conditions of 1769) to be executed by the English, by Haidar and Muhammad Ali, and by the two latter to be confirmed by an oath on the *Korān*. Muhammad Ali repeated his former objections to this alliance and placed in the front of his argument the reason that the Mahrattas, confessedly entertaining views of conquest over the whole South, would be too strong for the united forces of the allies. The negotiations, however, continued, the English Government at Madras, under the *Regulating Act* (1773), finding it necessary to refer, for the sanction of the Supreme Government at Bengal, the proposed alliance with Haidar. Imperfect communications and inexplicable delays protracting their decision, the ambassadors sent by Muhammad Ali to Seringapatam immediately after the return of the Mysoreans, endeavoured to amuse Haidar with successive evasions. But, in May 1775, Haidar, disgusted with procrastination, dismissed the envoys with remarks sufficiently explicit; "you are respectable men," he said,

"and have acted in conformity to your orders; for seventeen months you have practised evasion, till you are ashamed of the part you have to perform: I will relieve you from the embarrassment, for I will no longer be trifled with; your master is desirous of shortening the thread of amity, but the time is not distant, when he will be glad to renew the advances which I have condescended to press upon him in vain: I have sincerely wished for an alliance in that quarter, but I must do without it; and you must return and say so."¹⁶

On the departure of Muhammad Ali's ambassadors in 1775, Haidar reluctantly but finally dismissed from his mind all expectations of an alliance with the English

Further negotiations, 1775-1779.

Haidar turns his attention to the French, 1775-1777.

and turned his earnest attention to their European rivals, the French, who received his advances with marked encouragement. In 1777 he entered into an intimate correspondence with Mon. Bellecombe, the Governor of Pondicherry. Military stores of every description required were furnished to him through the medium of the French fortress of Mahè, on the coast of Malabar, and the plans were concerted of future co-operation at a more convenient season.¹⁷ At the same time a Vakîl or political agent of Haidar continued to reside at Madras

And continues diplomatic relations with the English:

for the purpose of intelligence; and in January 1778, on the occasion of his victory and pursuit of Hari-Pant, Haidar addressed a letter to the Governor of Madras, which was answered by a letter of congratulation in the following month from Sir Thomas Rumbold, who had recently succeeded to the Government, expressing a desire for farther amicable communications.

¹⁶. *Ibid.*, 775-779.

¹⁷. *Ibid.*, 785, 796; also *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, IV. 345, No. 1978; V. 103-104, No. 694.

Haidar was engaged at this time in an arduous service (namely, the reduction of the Mahratta territory between the rivers Tungabhadra and Krishna), which rendered it necessary that he should temporize, and he returned to this communication a letter of great civility accompanied by some presents. He now began to amuse the English with other schemes, and in pursuance of this design, his agent submitted to the Governor the project of a joint operation for replacing Raghoba in the Peshwaship of Poona. This advance was met by the proposal of a personal conference, to discuss the details of a permanent alliance; and Haidar replied by objecting to the great distance of his present situation, and by suggesting that an envoy should be sent to him for that purpose, as soon as his arrangements should be in sufficient forwardness. Meanwhile war having broken out in Europe between England and France (*The American War of Independence*, 1778-1783), Pondicherry, held by the French, was besieged by the English (8th August to 18th October 1778). On the fall of Pondicherry in October, the Supreme Government at Bengal, although the Government of Madras had recently expressed their

The English press the conclusion of an alliance with Haidar, October 1778.

conviction that Muhammad Ali would never consent to an alliance with Haidar, pressed its conclusion, by desiring an explicit declaration of his sentiments regarding the proposed treaty. But the period had passed away for the realization of such a project. Haidar had reluctantly engaged in other connections; and was persuaded that the secret impediments to a sincere alliance with the English continued to be insurmountable. Although, therefore, he replied in terms of cold and formal congratulation on the success of the English arms, he evaded the explicit declaration which was required, by saying that he would write on the subject of a personal

interview with the Governor, as soon as he should have finished an expedition on which he was then engaged (*The Siege of Chitaldrug*). The Governor, however, persevered in his desire of farther communication, by

The English announcement of an expedition for the reduction of Mahé, January 1779.

proposing to send a resident to his court; and in January 1779, concluded with announcing to him his intention of sending an expedition for the reduction of Mahé.¹⁸


Although Haidar had heard with regret of the capture of Pondicherry, his immediate convenience was not materially affected by that event. But if the fortress and port of Mahé should fall into the possession of the English, he would lose the direct source of military supply, and his allies their last remaining point of co-operation: he, therefore, in February, replied to this intimation, that he considered the various settlements of the Dutch, French and English on the coast of Malabar to be equally entitled to his protection as being erected on his territory, and that he should certainly oppose the designs of any one of those powers against the settlements of another. He at the same time directed his agent to announce to the Governor, in the most explicit terms, that in the event of an attack on Mahé, he should not only aid in its direct defence, but retaliate by detaching a body of troops to lay waste the province of Arcot. Notwithstanding these threats, the service went on, and although Haidar's troops assisted in the defence of Mahé and his colours were hoisted with those of the


Fall of Mahé, March 1779.

French to indicate his protection, the place fell in the month of March 1779.¹⁹

18. *Ibid*, 796-798.

19. *Ibid*, 798-799; also *Gal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 309, 310, Nos. 1415-1416; 443, No. 1857, etc.,; and *Count-Corres.*, XXVIII, 312-313. No. 142—Haidar Ali to Governor.





Haidar Ali in Durbar.

Deeply resenting this action of the English, Haidar, in April, wrote to the Governor of Madras, reminding him of the notice he had given regarding Mahè, and concluding with the significant observation that the Governor was the best judge of his own conduct. The reply of the Governor, after expressing surprise at Haidar's partiality to the French in preference to the English, complains for the first time of Haidar's conquest, in 1776, of the territories of Murāri Rao, who was included as an ally in the treaty of 1769; and also of the conquest of Cuddapah, which had been represented by Muhammad Ali to be an ancient dependency of the Karnātīc. The tone of Haidar's last communication being certainly calculated to excite alarm, the Governor

Haidar remonstrates further, April 1779.

The English decide on overtures with Haidar.

Among the Danish missionaries patronized by the English society for promoting Christian knowledge in India was a German clergyman named Rev. Christian Frederick Schwartz, who resided at Tanjore

Rev. Schwartz' mission to his court, July-October 1779.

but frequently travelled in the exercise of his religious function, to various parts of the peninsula. A respectable person of considerable information, of amiable demeanour and purity of manners and simplicity of deportment that he was, the Governor, in July 1779, intrusted to him the secret mission of proceeding to the court of Haidar, to "sound" his disposition, to assure him of the amicable designs of the English Government; and if he should appear to be peaceably disposed, to inform him that a deputation of some principal members of the Council would be sent to him, to adjust the terms of a lasting alliance. On Rev. Schwartz' arrival at Seringapatam in

August, Haidar assured him that "if the English offered the hand of peace and concord, he would not withdraw his." Haidar was gracious and condescending to the envoy, but his two letters to the Governor (the first delivered by Schwartz, and the second transmitted in the succeeding month) were vehement to a degree. He took a review of the conduct of the English as connected with Muhammad Ali from the fraud of Trichinopoly in 1752 to their violation of the treaty of 1769; he enumerated their hostile conduct at Mahè; the attempt to march troops through his territories to those of Basālat Jang; the conduct of Muhammad Ali's officers on the frontiers, and of the Company's servants at Tellicherry, in furnishing protection and aid to his rebellious subjects, as so many evidences of their determination to break with him at all events, and added, "I have not yet taken revenge; it is no matter. But if you henceforth, forgetting all treaties and engagements of the Company, still are intent on breaking with me, what advantage can attend writing to you? When such improper conduct is pursued, what engagements will remain inviolate? I leave you to judge on whose part engagements and promises have been broken. You are acquainted with everything; it is right to act in all things with prudence and foresight."²⁰

In October, Rev. Schwartz returned to Madras and his mission to Haidar was soon followed by another. Six English gentlemen and a lady had proceeded from Europe to Alexandria, and traversing Egypt to Suez, had there embarked on board a Danish ship bound to Calicut on the coast of Malabar, where both ship and cargo were, in December, seized for having English property on board, and all the passengers were

Mr. Gray's embassy to Haidar, February-March 1780.

20. *Ibid.*, 800-802. Re: Rev. Schwartz' embassy, see further in Appendix II—(4).



Rev. C. F. Schwartz (1726-1798),
Danish Missionary.

plundered and sent as prisoners to Seringapatam. Haidar, on their arrival, directed the Governor of Calicut, who accompanied them to the capital, to ascertain how many of them were fit for gunners, but on discovering that there was not one military man among them, he gave an order for their release. There was some hope that their property would also be restored, but unfortunately some of the articles attracted Haidar's fancy, others were probably intercepted in his name without his authority, and the prisoners were dismissed with a very slender wardrobe. On the first intelligence of this capture, the Governor of Madras determined on the mission of an envoy to demand the release of the English subjects, and to embrace the same opportunity of resuming an attempt at amicable alliance. The person selected for this service was Mr. George Gray, formerly of the Bengal Civil Service. On the 3rd of February 1780, he met at Āmbūr on the English frontier (where he had waited for a few days for his passport from Haidar) the prisoners, whose release formed the first object of his mission, but on the 6th, he determined to proceed in prosecution of the second, although limited

The account as
recorded in his
Journal.

by the terms of his passports to a retinue which scarcely allowed him the conveniences of a private traveller.

On his arrival near Seringapatam on the 17th, quarters were assigned to him at the distance of two miles, in a miserable shed half filled with artillery ropes, where (according to his *Journal*) "one of Hyder's *chōbdārs* came and squatted himself by his side and asked a variety of impertinent questions." His own attendants of the same order were not permitted to go with a message to Haidar, according to the ordinary etiquette, and not one of his people stirred from the shed without being openly attended by a spy, to prevent his having any communications, excepting for the purpose of

purchasing what he required in the market. He was, however, admitted to an audience on the succeeding evening, "after (as he reports) being kept in an open veranda two hours to be stared at," and delivered his letter and presents. Of course no business was transacted in his first audience: but on the ensuing morning the presents were returned, with intimation that hostility was not to be inferred from that circumstance. On the 21st, a few days afterwards, Mr. Gray proceeded to the private audience which he had requested; and after being introduced to the public durbar, and waiting about half an hour, without being spoken to by Haidar, a person came to announce that if he wished a private audience, a person in Haidar's confidence would retire with him into an adjoining apartment, report the result to Haidar, and bring his answer. Mr. Gray expressed a wish for a personal audience, but on being informed that this was not customary, he retired with Muhammad Usmān who brought him the intimation, and who frequently passed to the Durbar to refer to Haidar and bring his replies. Mr. Gray announced the main object of his mission to be a closer union of interests, to which Haidar replied that he would be glad of the friendship of the English; but of what avail were treaties? Of the treaty of 1769, they had broken every article: his affairs had been reduced to the brink of ruin, by their refusal to aid him against the Mahrattas; that was the time for friendship, if friendship had existed; after such an example, it was unnecessary to enumerate minor grievances. Mr. Gray adroitly replied that he had not come to speak of grievances under former governments, but to propose a remedy against new ones; and a treaty which should ensure the aid of troops when necessary. To this Muhammad Usmān replied from himself "that Hyder did not want them; the time was when he would have been thankful for them, but now he was strong enough to take care of

himself and do without them". "I have been at Madras", said Usmān, "and have observed how your allies are treated. Mahommed Ali shewed me several letters from the King of England, *but complained of the lacs of pagodas which each of those letters cost him*". To this observation, Mr. Gray gave the turn of expressing his satisfaction that Muhammad Ali had friends at Seringapatam; he desired to be understood that the wish for Haidar's friendship did not proceed from weakness, as the English Government was not in a state to solicit alliances; that he had so far executed his commission, and would either immediately return with the ungracious answer he had received, or wait for orders in reply to his report, as Haidar might think fit. Haidar had now given abundant, repeated and most explicit proofs of his intentions, but he did not wish to precipitate hostility before he was perfectly ready. He, therefore, carelessly answered that the gentlemen might write; but although it had been agreed that his letters were to be sent by Haidar's post, he found himself obliged, after numerous evasions, to send them by special messengers, and during the whole period of waiting for a reply, Haidar was inaccessible to all his advances. At length, on the 19th of March, when Haidar knew that he had received his answer, without desiring or waiting for a communication of its contents, he notified to the envoy that he would on that evening give him his audience of leave. Under these circumstances, Mr. Gray determined that if Haidar should make no enquiry regarding the answer, he would not give him the opportunity of insulting him in public durbar, by speaking on the subject himself. The envoy sat an hour in silence, when betel and *attar* of roses, the usual indications of dismissal, were offered, and presents of the customary description and value were offered and accepted, apparently because the envoy was glad to escape on any

terms, from a country in which he was treated so inhospitably, where (according to his own description) "he had been received and treated as a spy, rather than an ambassador; rather confined than lodged; and in which the trifling civilities of fruits and flowers were delivered by chobdārs, who were uncivil, insolent, greedy and clamorous."²¹

Meanwhile affairs elsewhere too were moving in a manner detrimental to the English.

Affairs elsewhere. On the flight of Raghōba to Cambay and from thence to Surat and Bombay, it may be recalled, Col. Upton from Bengal concluded with the Poona ministers on the 1st of March 1776 the Treaty of Purandhar, which, among other conditions,

Anglo-Mahratta politics.

assigned a provision in a distant part of the Mahratta dominions for Raghōba, who was in return to quit Bombay and not to be supported by the English in any future efforts to disturb the government of the ministers. Meantime the political preparations of the French for the recovery of their lost ascendancy in India having extended in every possible direction, Mon. St. Lubin, whose adventures in the English service in 1768 we have elsewhere noticed, had a mission from the Court of France and was negotiating at Poona a treaty with the ministers for the cession of the port of Choul on the coast of Bombay for the purpose of introducing a body of French troops to unite with that party in their hostile designs against the English power. Towards the close of the year 1777, however, a party at Poona, who preferred Raghōba under the protection of the English to a French force for the support of a minister (Nānā Farnavis), who had made a large stride towards open usurpation, opened their views to the British Resident at Poona, and proposed

21. *Ibid.*, 802, 804-808; also J. I. H., XI. *o.c.*, 319-331.

a plan for the restoration of Raghōba with the aid of an English force. The plan having received the unqualified approbation of the Governor-General (Warren Hastings), the Government of Bombay, who eagerly encouraged the project in hopes of the early reduction of all the French possessions in India, completed their preparations about the close of the year 1778, appointing their Field-Deputies to direct the military operations in the field. On the 1st of January 1779, the army, consisting of about 5,000 men, including a small corps with Raghōba, surmounted the hills and moved forwards. The English losses were severe, but after penetrating to a situation not twenty miles from Poona, the pressure of the overwhelming force, by which they were incessantly surrounded, harassed and starved, suggested the necessity of retreat, which terminated on the 14th, in the disastrous Convention of Wargaum, concluded by Mr. Carnac, one of the Field-Deputies, which provided on the one hand for the safe return of the troops, and on the other for the surrender of Raghōba, the restitution of all former conquests, and the return to Bengal of the English troops on march, two Englishmen being delivered as hostages for the performance of the latter conditions. Meanwhile Col. Goddard, who had succeeded to the command of the detachment from Bengal, having deviated from his course towards Poona by a great and continued exertion, arrived at Surat before the end of February. The means which were thus placed at the disposal of the Government of Bombay for the renewal of the war, and the powers with which General Goddard was invested for the conclusion of peace, disposed the ministerial party at Poona to an acquiescence in the modification of the treaty of 1776. They expressed in a letter to Bombay their earnest desire for an immediate accommodation, informing that Government of the great preparations which they were completing, for marching in full force

against Haidar Ali, at the opening of the ensuing season, when the escape of Raghōba from Cholee Mahēśvar on the Nerbudda to General Goddard's camp at Surat on the 12th of June induced them to propose an union with Haidar, instead of prosecuting military operations against him as they had originally intended.²²

In the midst of the marriage festivities in Haidar's family in October 1779, adverted to in the last Chapter, an envoy named Ganesh Rao arrived in Seringapatam to offer him the congratulations of the infant Savāi Mādhava Rao (the posthumous son of Pēshwa Nārāyaṇa Rao, whom the ministerial party had installed as Pēshwa), on these auspicious events. Then he represented that the English again espousing the cause of Raghōba, now a second time a fugitive, had made war on the Pēshwa; that Haidar, equally with the Mahrattas, had cause to complain of that nation for a violation of their engagements; that Nizām Ali was equally well disposed to the common cause, and that the period had arrived when it was incumbent on Haidar to unite with the powers of the Deccan in taking effectual retribution; that it was necessary, however, as a preliminary measure, that the confederates should have the most perfect understanding with each other; that Haidar owed a balance of twenty-five lakhs under the treaty with Triambak-Māma, besides an arrear of eight years' *pēshkāsh*; that he had levied large sums on the Pālegārs of Harapanahalli and neighbourhood, who were properly tributaries of Poona; and lastly, that he had wrested from the Mahratta State the whole of their territory between the Tungabhadra and Krishṇa; and previously to entering on the offensive league, which was the ultimate object of the mission, it was necessary that he should evacuate the

22. *Ibid.*, 760, 788-786, 788-790.

countries he had seized, and make an amicable composition of the pecuniary claims. On the part of Haidar, it was replied, in the first instance, that the Pālegārs in question were the regular dependants of Sīra; that the grant of the countries between the rivers had been made to him for a valuable consideration by Raghōba, the heir and actual head of the Government; and that the account of the tribute had been adjusted with the same person, and the balance acknowledged to be paid, through the medium of Bāji Rao Barve, his accredited envoy. Ganesh Rao retorted that Raghōba was a murderer and an usurper, who had fled to foreigners for refuge, and that his concessions were notoriously of no validity. To these allegations it was replied that Haidar left it to the contending parties to decide which of them ought to be considered as usurpers, and had no intention to dispute the rights which the ministerial party, by the actual possession of the Government, had for the present acquired, or to acknowledge, or reject, the filiation of the present Pēshwa; but that it was a foul calumny to brand as a murderer Raghōba, who had actually received a wound in the defence of the person with whose murder he was charged; and that it was absurd to question the validity of the acts of the lineal heir and actual possessor of the power of the State.²³

At length, Haidar, who, in his own interests, aimed at "keeping an understanding with the Mahrattas on the basis of existing engagements" and humouring them

23. *Ibid.*, 760-762. See also and compare, on this subject, Kirmāni (o.c., 374-378), who, referring to the embassies from Poona and Hyderabad to Seringapatam about this time, writes of their having "laid deep schemes and plans," lest Haidar "should wrest the whole of the Telingana and Mahratta countries from them", and speaks of "the blood-shedding English who had usurped or made themselves masters (of part) of this country, and taken entire possession of the province of Bengal," and of "the conquest of the Karnatic-Pūyanghat, and even the whole of Hindustan," etc., as their objective in common with Haidar.

“with an outward show of friendship,”²⁴ despatched in turn an agent to the court of Poona, pressing them to continue their enmity with the English, for which, he added, he was prepared to help them in every way, and offering to pay them Rupees forty lakhs in settlement of their accounts, besides promising them a *pēshkāsh* of Rupees eleven lakhs a year, and showing his *inclination* to restore to them the country beyond the Tungabhadra, which he had wrested from them.²⁵ In response to this move, Nānā Farnavis despatched from Poona, early in 1780, his vakīl to Seringapatam with a view to conclude a treaty with Haidar on the following terms: firstly, that the territories conquered from Mysore would be restored to it on the condition that Haidar would pay Rupees twenty lakhs for the year 1780 and Rupees twenty lakhs annually in future; secondly, that Haidar would oppose the English if they attempted to cross the Pēshwa's territories and that he would lend Nānā military assistance against the English.²⁶ The Mahrattas, however, in February 1780, sought the mediation of Nawāb Muhammad Alī to bring about a union with the English against Haidar,²⁷ but in April, they made a treaty with the latter on condition that he should commence hostilities against the English and carry on the war in the Karnātic.²⁸ In May, Haidar was again in correspondence with the Mahrattas for assistance in the Karnātic expedition, and was “waiting only for the Kistna and Tungabhadra to swell,” when he hoped “safely to attack the Carnatic without any fear of reinforcement reaching the English.”²⁹

24. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 442. No. 1857.

25. *Ibid.*, 365-366, No. 1607.

26. *Ibid.*, 399, No. 1706. See also and compare G. S. Sardesai's *Marāṭhi Riyāsat* (I. 217), quoted in *J. I. H.*, XI. o.c., 319.

27. *Ibid.*, 417, No. 1758.

28. *Ibid.*, 441, No. 1857.

29. *Ibid.*, 472-473, No. 1952.

Concurrently with these developments, Nizām Ali was also drifting into relations of war with the English. In the arrangements which were concluded between these powers in 1768 regarding the cession of the Northern Circars, it may

Anglo-Nizāmite relations, 1779-1780.

The Guntūr Circar question.

be recalled, that of Guntūr forming a part of the jaghīr of Basālat Jang was reserved during his life-time; but the Company were declared to possess the full reversionary right to that district, and as a guard against the designs of his brother, the jealous condition had been added by Nizām Ali, of the right of the English to dispossess him at any earlier period, if his conduct should be hostile or injurious. The district of Guntūr occupies a considerable extent of sea coast between the northern boundary of the dominions of Arcot and the river Krishṇa; and Basālat Jang had employed the minor sea-port of Mōtupalli for the introduction into his service of French officers and troops; and the disciplined corps under Mon. Lally had attained a respectable degree of force and organization as early as Haidar's siege of Bellary in 1777. Basālat Jang, however, mediating to render this corps the foundation of retrieving his fortunes, continued to augment and improve it to every practicable extent; and this incessant introduction of French officers and troops into the interior of the peninsula, and the interposition of a French force between the different positions of the English territory on the coast of Coromandel, had caused repeated remonstrances from the English at Madras, both to Nizām Ali and Basālat Jang. The result of some previous negotiations produced, in the early part of 1779, an offer from Basālat Jang to rent that Circar to the English; and subsequently an agreement by which he engaged to dismiss the French corps from his service, on the condition of being furnished with a body of English troops for the defence of his dominions. The improvidence

of Basālat Jang in an augmentation of force, disproportioned to his financial means, had caused the French corps to be ill paid and discontented. He hoped to retrieve his finances by stipulating that the revenues of Guntūr should furnish the payment of his English auxiliary force, and when Lally was about to leave his service, he transferred to the English the possession of Guntūr, and, in April, earnestly pressed the immediate march of their auxiliary troops to Adoni. The tardy arrangements of the English at Madras had not prepared their detachment until August, when orders for its march were issued. Its route by the districts of Cuddapah and Kurnool was through the most difficult passes of the peninsula, and across the territories of two powers, namely, Mysore and Hyderabad, which were directly interested in preventing its progress. No previous notice, however, was given or permission requested to pass a military force through these foreign territories, the officer commanding being merely furnished with a letter from the Governor to Haidar's manager of the district, requesting him to allow the troops to pass. Col. Harper, the officer commanding, was allowed to proceed without molestation, until the whole body was fairly entangled in a deep winding rugged vale, between two precipitous hills, when a breast work of felled trees, lined with musquetry, was seen in front; troops were observed to be in motion in the hills on both flanks, and a larger force to close up the rear, when Col. Harper determined on an immediate retreat, which was permitted without serious hostility. The English at Madras, on receiving this report, determined to reinforce the detachment, and remonstrate with Haidar, assuming in their letter, as an axiom in the law of nations, that friendly States were always at liberty to march troops through each other's territories. Haidar not only resisted this novel doctrine, but announced to Basālat Jang his fixed determination

not to suffer an English corps to pass to Adoni, nor the district of Guntūr to pass into the hands of his most inveterate enemy. His declaration was quickly followed by a body of light troops, who laid waste the territory of Adoni up to the gates of the capital; and by the time that Col. Harper was reinforced and had recommenced his march (in November), he was stopped by letters from Basālat Jang, stating that he was threatened with destruction both by Haidar and Nizām Alī, if he should continue his connection with the English; and requesting that for the present the Colonel should desist from the attempt to advance. Another letter to the English at Madras implored their restoration of Guntūr as the only means of saving him from the vengeance of his enemies. But they were determined to keep possession of the territory in conformity to the treaty, and to announce that the troops which they had agreed to maintain for his service were ready to perform their part of the stipulation. Nizām Alī resented, as an act of hostility against himself, the stipulation of the English for the unconditional defence of his brother and most formidable rival, and despatching ambassadors to Seringapatam, entered with the utmost zeal into the confederacy of the other States.³⁰

It was not, however, till about June 1780 that the long pending negotiations between the courts of Poona and Seringapatam terminated in an agreement that the grants of Raghōba to Haidar should be confirmed, with regard to the territory between the rivers Krishna and Tungabhadra; that all past demands should be declared to be discharged; and that eleven lakhs of rupees should be fixed as the amount to be annually paid henceforth by Mysore for the whole of its possessions (that for the

30. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 791-795; Kirmāni (*l.c.*), referring to Nizām Alī's embassy to Seringapatam.

current year to be paid in advance).³¹ On these conditions, Haidar engaged to put forth his whole force, to combine with the confederates for the expulsion of the English nation from India, Nizām Ali invading the Northern Circars (including Masulipatam and Rajahmundry); the Mahrattas of Berar, Malwa and the more northern parts of Hindustan (under Mudhōji Bhōnsle) attacking the territories of Bengal and Bihar; those of Poona and the South (under Mahadāji Sindhia and Tukōji Holkar) operating on the side of Bombay; while Haidar, accompanied by 2,000 chosen Mahrattas, rather as a guard of observation than an aid, was to direct his whole force towards Madras. The details of these negotiations were adjusted at Seringapatam. At their conclusion, Noor Muhammad Khān and Nārāyan Rao accompanied Ganesh Rao to Poona as the *vakils* of Haidar, who commenced the most active preparations for the serious performance of the compact.³²

31. *Ibid.*, 762; also Grant-Duff (*o.c.*, II. 130), who evidently relies on Wilks. A recent writer, contradicting this position, tries to show that Haidar far from being granted away lands south of the river Krishna, himself agreed to surrender all Mahratta lands south of that river, etc., citing, in support of his view a letter from the *Historical Papers of Mahadāji Sindhia*, giving a summary of the terms of the original treaty between Haidar and the Mahrattas (see article entitled *Haidar Ali and the First Mahratta War, 1779-1782*, in the *Q. J. M. S.*, Vol. XXXI. pp. 416-417). This is not, however, the right view to take, if we bear in mind that Haidar was the last to give up *in toto* the objective which he steadily fought for, namely, the extension of the northern boundary of the kingdom of Mysore up to the banks of the Krishna. Read in the light of the *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, cited in f.n. 25 *supra*, the document, referred to by the writer, has to be interpreted as pointing only to Haidar's *inclination* to restore the country beyond the Tungabhadra in view of the exigencies of the times, and not as disclosing any *serious intention* on his part to finally part with it. Wilks (and, following him, Grant-Duff) has evidently based his statements on authorities to which he had direct access, but which, unfortunately, he does not cite. And it is hard to ignore him here, whatever the sidelights from other sources.

32. *Ibid.*, 762-763; also *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 476, No. 1956; Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 378-379; and *Memoirs of Late War in Asia* (1788), I. 134. Among contemporary writers, the author of the last-mentioned work, referring to "the quadruple alliance", observes: "Whether the quadruple alliance was first proposed by Nizam Ally Cawn, Soubah of the Deccan,

War with Nawāb
Muhammad Ali (*The
Second Mysore War*),
1780-1784.

Thus, to gratify his inveterate resentment against Nawāb Muhammad Ali, to revenge former hostilities and infractions of treaties and recent injuries as well as acts of contempt on the part of the English at Madras, encouraged by hopes of military succour from the French and seeking to avail

as has been here stated, on the Prince's own authority, or that it originated, as has been affirmed by others, in the court of Hyder Ally, certain it is that a negotiation for that purpose began to be carried on so early as the siege of Pondicherry (1778). At this time it was generally believed throughout India that Hyder meditated an attack on the Carnatic. But that political warrior suspended the execution of his design until a treaty was framed and ratified (in 1780)," etc. (*Memoirs*, I. 134-135). Another writer, Captain Innes Munro, referring to "the grand confederacy" formed against the English East India Company, writes in the following vein, in July 1780: "From what has already been said, we may readily conclude that Hyder Ally took an active part in forming the grand confederacy against the Company; and nothing confirms it more than his artful conduct towards them, ever since it was first in agitation. He has oftener than once, as well as the Marrattas, experienced English treachery and infidelity, which determined him, in league with the other members of this famous compact, to renounce all future connexion with our nation. But, although this association had been just projected as far back as the year 1778, Hyder thought it prudent to suspend the execution of his designs upon the Carnatic until a binding treaty should be ratified and signed by all the confederate members, that each might perform his part in concert with the rest; for he had reason to suspect that some of them, from private motives, did not act with quite so much candour and zeal in the general cause as he himself did. Meanwhile he used every endeavour and sacrificed many private advantages, to keep his countrymen united in the same sentiments. No longer an implacable enemy to the Marrattas, he courteously solicited their friendship and alliance; and sent circular letters, couched in the strongest terms, to those whom he thought most hostile to our interests, exhorting them at once to form a league (in which he engaged to lead the van) and fall unanimously upon all the English settlements from the Ganges to Cape Comorin. He represented to them that, by this conduct, they should not only be the means of emancipating themselves and their unhappy countrymen from an humiliating state of tyranny and oppression, but have their names commemorated by all future ages as the glorious deliverers of their country". (Innes Munro, *Narrative of Military Operations on the Coromandel Coast*, 1789, pp. 123-124). De La Tour briefly touches upon Haidar's project of attacking the English in concert with the Nizām (*Hyder Ali*, II 195). Robson merely speaks of Haidar's "principal intent to extirpate all Europeans from the peninsula" as "his motive for undertaking this war" (*Hyder Ally*, 104-105).

himself of the scattered state of the Company's troops, the reduction of the Nawāb's army and the impoverished state of his finances and country, Haidar was drawn into an inevitable war with the Nawāb in 1780.³³ The war which thus broke out (popularly referred to by English writers as "*The Second Mysore War*") was essentially a struggle which was to decide the mastery of the South of India as between two Indian powers, represented by Haidar Ali and Nawāb Muhammed Ali Wālajah, a struggle in which the European nations of India, the French and the English, still bore the part of the *allies* of the respective parties, though the latter, about this time, "were extending their views from the drudgery of traffic to the unbounded aim of universal empire."³⁴ The English having come in the way of the realization of his supreme objective, the formidable combination which was formed against them encouraged Haidar to persevere in his part of the general plan, "which had for its avowed object the extermination of the British power in India."³⁵

On Haidar's part, every branch of preparation was

First Phase: June-September 1780.

Haidar marches towards the Karnātic, June 1780.

arranged with the most scrupulous care; no department escaped his personal inspection; and although ample preparation was made for the military occupation of all the posts in every part of Mysore, he moved from Seringapatam towards the latter part of June, with a force—estimated at about a lakh—which had probably not been equalled, and certainly not surpassed, in strength and efficiency, by any Indian army that had ever been assembled in the South of India. Prayers for the success of the expedition were ordered to be offered up in the mosques and

33. *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia*, I. 129-130. As to the authorship of this work, *vide* Appendix II—(5).

34. Innes Munro, *Narrative*, Pref. XI.

35. Wilks, *o.c.*, I-795.

the *japam* to be performed in the Hindu temples. And proceeding by slow and cautious stages by way of Maddūr, Channapaṭṇa and Bangalore, he crossed the frontier at Hosūr, and traversing Mādandahaḷḷi, Pālu-koda (Palakode), Caveripatam (Kāvēripaṭṇam) and Uttangerai (Uttankarai), descended by the Pass of Changama (*Singarapettar*), finally encamping in the environs of Kilpauk about the close of the month.³⁶

Holds a council of war at Kilpauk, July 1780.

Here, early in July, Haidar called a council of war to know the general sentiments of his chiefs (*Khāns*) as to whether he should immediately enter the Karnātic or wait till another season when he should be strengthened by additional forces from France. The chiefs attempted to dissuade him from war, but his eldest son Tipū, haranguing the assembly in a heroic strain, pointed towards the fertile plains of the Karnātic as an ample reward for their resolution and toils, urging the spirit of the troops, the advantage of surprize, the defenceless state of the Karnātic, the difficulties attending the English in assembling their army and the power of the Mahrattas as points in their favour. That there was difficulty and danger in the path they were about to tread, he readily conceded. "But when," he asked, "were they to wage war with their enemies if they avoided danger?" Animated by the sentiments expressed by Tipū and the assurances of Haidar, all were soon unanimous that the troops should proceed.³⁷

36. *Ibid*, 812-813; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 73; and Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 380-381), who dates Haidar's descent by the Pass of Changama "about the middle of the month of Rujub, A. H. 1194" (A.D. 1780). For a detailed notice of the military resources of Haidar in 1780-1781, *vide* Appendix II—(2). Kilpauk, referred to above, is identical with Kalasapākam, Nort Arcot district, 20 miles south of Arni, on the railway line from Villupuram to Vellore.

37. *Memoirs, o.c.*, 186-188; also Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 133.

Then Haidar, splitting up the army into two parts and retaining with himself the major portion comprising of the entire force, directed the smaller division (consisting of 20,000 horse) to raid simultaneously the entire country running from Masulipatam (*Machli Bandar*) in the north to Arcot, Chingleput, Vellore, Pondicherry, Kumbakōṇam, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Madura and Rāmēśvaram in the South. Also a detachment of 500 horse under Balavant Rao, son of Shāma Rao, was directed to be stationed at Karūr, to intercept the passage of the English forces from Trichinopoly, while an order (*paravāna*) was sent to Sardār Khān at Calicut to bombard and take possession of Tellicherry. Individual bodies of troops under Haridāsaiya of Bāramahal, Lālā Chubeela Rām of the Savār-cuchēri, and Karīm Sāhib (Haidar's younger son), assisted by Mīr Ali Razā Khān from Gurramkoṇḍa, were next despatched towards Kumbakōṇam, Nellore, Sarvāpalli, Chittoor and Porto Novo (*Muhammad Bandar*) respectively.³⁸ And Haidar himself advanced, on the 20th of the month, to the heart of the Karnātic.³⁹ While the detachment under Karīm Sāhib, proceeding by night, marched to Porto Novo and took it at the first assault on the 22nd, plundering the houses of all the wealthy merchants, bankers and traders "of bales on bales of merchandise and bags on bags of gold and jewels,"⁴⁰

Directs the disposition of his forces.

Enters the Karnātic, July 20, 1780.

38. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 75-76; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 381. Wilks speaks only of Haidar having detached "a select corps of five thousand horse, under his second son Kurreeṃ Sāheb, to plunder Porto Novo, a sea-port, about 40 miles south of Pondicherry" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 10).

39. Wilks, *l.c.*; Innes Munro, *l.c.*; see also and compare *Memoirs*, I. 138.

40. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 382. Kirmāṇi further speaks of Karīm Sāhib having "collected in one place" the entire spoils, laden them "on elephants, camels, bullocks and carts" and sent them to Haidar, "with the merchant to whom they had belonged," namely, "a certain Muhammad

the rest of the Mysore horse, rushing through the *ghāts*, rapidly dispersed themselves all over the country, overrunning Changama, Mōlūr, Gingee and Chidambaram among other places, penetrating the length of the Choultry Plain and the environs of Madras (24th), and possessing in less than fourteen days a chain of English frontier garrisons that completely secured the safety of all the convoys of Haidar from the Mysore country.⁴¹

Haidar, on his part, marching on, took the small hill-fort of Tiruvannāmalai. Then he besieged the fort of Chetput, which fell after a three days' heroic defence, in which its commandant, a Sikh, named Guru Buksh, was killed. From here, after leaving a detachment at the fort of Dhōbigarh, he despatched Tipū, with a strong body of troops, to reduce Ārni and Timri. While Tipū took without much resistance

these places and reduced in rapid succession the small forts of Tiruvatoor, Gulwa and Kāvēripak, Haidar, turning his victorious standards towards Arcot,

Lays siege to
Arcot, August 21,
1780.

Mokrim, a man of the Bohra tribe, the Chief of all the merchants, and the owner of three or four merchant ships," etc. (Kirmāpi, o. c., 332-333).

41. Innes Munro, o. c., 133-134; see also and compare *Memoirs*, I. 133-140; Robson, o. c., 104-105, and *Haid. Nām.*, l. c. Wilks' account of Haidar's entry into the Karnātic is less detailed, though he refers to "the conflagration of the surrounding country" (o. c., I. 816), and "the work of desolation" allotted to "a larger body of cavalry" (*Ibid.*, II. 10); and speaks of "the advance of the main army" as having been "only retarded by the embarrassing numbers of places to be occupied" (*Ibid.*). Also he regards as erroneous "the prevalent impression that Hyder, on his first descent, perpetrated the wanton and indiscriminate destruction of the *whole country*, a measure directly subversive of his ultimate views of permanent conquest," and observes: "He calculated on the lapse of a long interval, before the operations of war and the aid of a French corps should put him in possession of Fort St. George; and around that centre of the British power, and its maritime communications, he certainly drew a line of merciless desolation, marked by the continuous blaze of flaming towns and villages," a line which extended inland, from thirty to fifty-five miles, from Pulicat in the north to Pondicherry in the south (*Ibid.*, 2).

encamped near Nimukpeth and Ghalībpur, and on the 21st of August, invested the fort and town of Alumpunah, against which he ordered batteries to be raised.⁴² The chiefs of the fort, namely Achanna-Paṇḍit, a Brāhman (otherwise called Raijee Naib Suba, and who had also the title of *Rājā Bīrbal Bahadūr*, the founder or builder of Alumpunah), and Nujīb Khān and Sālār Jang Bahadūr, with 5,000 regular infantry, 2,000 horse, and 400 dismounted *Ashraf* (i.e., men of good families), held themselves in readiness to repel their enemies, and filled the place with stores of provisions, arms and ammunition, and materials for defence, and then arranged themselves for action. Two or three thousand *Ashraf* inhabitants of the place, of all tribes, who rose in arms merely to defend their families and preserve their honour, were conciliated by a daily allowance in money, and the show of a great deal of deference and respect; and the gates and bastions of Alumpunah also being confided to the inhabitants of the *Mahals*, they fought desperately.⁴³

42. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 381, 383-384; also Wilks, *Ibid.*, 10. Kirmāṇi refers to Tiruvaṇṇāmalai as "Turnamul" and Chetput as "Jeet Peeth". See also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, l. c.; *Memoirs*, l. c.; Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 184; and Robson, *o. c.*, 105-106. *Alumpunah*, referred to above, is probably identical with *Alamparva* (from *alam*, Tam. water, and *Paravai*, Tam. expanse), now a Shrōtriān village in Madurāntakam taluk, Chingleput district; a coast village near the southern limit of the district, midway between Pondicherry and Chingleput. The Muhammadan fort passed into the hands of the French in 1750 as a gift from Muzaffar Jang, Subādār of the Deccan. In 1758 a severe naval engagement between the French and English squadrons was fought opposite this village. It was a French depot and fort during the siege of Madras and was reduced by Sir Eyre Coote in 1760 on the collapse of the French power in that part of India. Formerly noted for excellent quality of drinking water and its cisterns, and for its oyster-beds; the ruins of the fort still remain; it was square, of stone, and had towers at the angles (see *Madras Manual of Administration*, III, 16). Kirmāṇi speaks of Alumpunah as the capital of Arcot, though, according to the context, it was only a place leading to and dependent on Arcot.

43. *Ibid.*, 381-382. As to Achanna-Paṇḍit, *vide* Appendix II—(6).

About this time, Nawāb Muhammad Ali, who, as usual, pretended he had no money for public purposes, having imprudently disbanded his own army, had retained a few militia (including a small body of matchlockmen) in his service, of whom one regiment of cavalry at St. Thomas' Mount mutinied in consequence of an arrear of nearly two years' pay. His allies, the English, on the appearance of black columns of smoke at the Mount caused by the irruption of the Mysore horse, had effected a disposition of their forces, and realising "that not one native officer intrusted by Mahommed Ali with the defence of a fortress, would be faithful to the general cause," had, in their own interests, committed the defence of important places in the Karnātic to officers of their own choice. Thus, the corps under Col. Harper in Guntūr, afterwards commanded by Col. Baillie, was directed to move southwards by the route of Kālahasti and Tirupati; Col. Braithwaite, who commanded at Pondicherry, was ordered to move northwards to Chingleput, a fort within two marches from Madras, and ultimately to the latter place; a select corps of nineteen chosen companies of sepoys, two regiments of Muhammad Ali's cavalry, and two light guns from Trichinopoly under Colonel Cosby, was destined to act on the enemy's communications through the passes, but was afterwards ordered to join the main army; a reinforcement from Vellore was despatched to Arcot, the reputed capital of Muhammad Ali's dominions; and to Udaiyarpālayam, Gingee, Karnātakgarh and Wandiwash, Ensigns Allan and Macaulay and Lieutenants Parr and Flint were sent respectively, either alone or with one or two companies as a guard of example and a rallying point to the disorderly rabble of Muhammad Ali.⁴⁴

44. Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 3-7; also Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 386-387. Wilks gives details

On receipt of intelligence of Haidar's siege of Arcot, Muhammad Ali dismissed the Mysore Vakīl Vinṇāji-Pant from his counsels,⁴⁵ and pressed the English to relieve the place "with what troops were then collected," proposing "that the rest should form a junction at Conjeeveram,"⁴⁶ to oppose and drive back Haidar.⁴⁷ In the state of divided counsels which now prevailed in the Government of Madras (under Mr. Whitehill), the Council, eagerly adopting and determined to pursue this advice, urged that the command of the field army should devolve upon Lord Macleod, who had recently arrived from England in command of H. M. 73rd Regiment at Poonamalli. No local experience was necessary to demonstrate that the order which he received to assemble the army at Conjeeveram, an open town forty miles in advance, through a country everywhere occupied by the enemy, was contrary to the ordinary suggestions of military prudence, as risking

Lord Macleod *vs.*
Sir Hector Munro.

without an adequate object the safety of all its detachments and equipments. He objected to the removal of the European battalion from Vellore and concluded by saying that a proper regard to his reputation would not permit him to adopt a responsibility in the execution of plans which did not coincide with his own judgment. Also in a judicious letter he recommended the vicinity of Madras as the only safe point of junction until the army should be in sufficient force by the union of its detachments to meet the enemy in the field. Major-General Sir Hector Munro, the Commander-in-Chief, was, however, of a different opinion: he pledged himself

(o. c., 3-10), which may prove interesting from the English point of view.

45. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 76.

46. Innes Munro, o. c., 140.

47. *Kīrmāṇi*, o. c., 387.

to form the junction at the place originally proposed (i.e., Conjeeveram), and accordingly Sir Hector assumes the command of the English army, assumed the command of the army, with which he was to march from St.

Thomas' Mount to Conjeeveram, where Col. Baillie, with the detachment under his command, from Guntūr, was to join him. On the 26th of August,

His movements, General Munro with a force 5,209 strong, and accompanied by Lord Macleod, Cols. Braithwaite, Fletcher, Harper and other field officers, began his march by way of Chingleput, arriving at Conjeeveram on the 29th; Col. Baillie, with a force 2,813 strong, reaching Nellore on the 16th August, had encamped on the 24th at the village of Gummadi-pundi, about 27 miles from Madras; and there was no probable impediment to his junction by one forced march on the 25th or by two easy marches at the General's encampment near Kunnattūr on the 26th, but he was directed to pursue an independent route of upwards of fifty miles to Conjeeveram by Periapālayam and Tri-pasore.⁴⁸

Apprized of the movements of the English army, Haidar, for the time being, raised the Haider raises the siege of Arcot, August 29, 1780. siege of Arcot,⁴⁹ and collecting his whole force, marched towards Conjee-

48. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 10-13; Wilson, *History of the Madras Army* (1882), II. 3-5; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 140-144; *Memoirs*, I. 140-144; *Haid-Nām.*, l.c.; and Kirmāpi, l.c. Kirmāpi speaks of General Munro's march from Madras by way of Chingleput "with 6,000 regular infantry, 1,500 regular cavalry, and 2,000 European soldiers"; Innes Munro refers to the General's army as having consisted of "1,000 European infantry, 800 artillery, with 30 field-pieces and howitzers, and 4 battering guns (twenty-four pounders), 3,250 sepoys, 80 European dragoons, and about the same number of (Indian) commissioned and non-commissioned officers." Kirmāpi, again, mentions the force under Col. Baillie as consisting of "3,000 regular infantry, 400 Europeans, and 8 guns." Wilks' figures, adopted in the text above, agree in the main with Wilson's (*o.c.*, II. 4-5).

49. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 144; *Memoirs*, I. 145; also Wilks (*o.c.*, II. 13), who speaks of Haidar having "broken up from Arcot" on the very day

veram, and encamped in the neighbourhood of the English army, disposing of his advanced parties to prevent the latter from foraging.⁵⁰ Sir Hector Munro, who had marched from St. Thomas' Mount with eight days' provisions for his own corps only, for the relief of Arcot distant seven ordinary marches, finding on his arrival at Conjeeveram that the remaining four days' stock for his own corps would furnish little more than two for the army which he expected to unite at that place,

Sir Hector Munro applied to Muhammad Ali's agent for throws provisions succour. And, on being refused further supplies by him, he was, on the

fourth day of the campaign, left to live by the contingencies of the day, and continued fixed to the spot, gradually collecting from this large but ruined town a small supply of food, which he deposited within the walls of the Hindu temple, a place capable of being rendered in two days defensible against a *coup-de-main*.⁵¹

Meanwhile, on the 25th of August, Col. Baillie, in compliance with the ill-advised order, arrived on the bank of the river

Col. Baillie's movements, August-September 1780.

Kortalaiyar (near Vungul), then nearly dry, but liable to be swollen by the rains; and unluckily encamped on the northern instead of the southern bank. The floods, however, descended on the night of the 25th and prevented his crossing until the 3rd of September. On the 3rd he crossed the river with a corps consisting of 207 Europeans, 2,606 sepoys, 6 six-pounders and 4 three-pounder guns, and marched towards Conjeeveram.⁵² Haider, on receiving intelligence

that Sir Hector Munro arrived at Conjeeveram (i.e., 29th August 1780). See also and compare Kirmāṇi (o.c., 389), who speaks of Haider having "quitted the siege of Arcot" on intelligence of Col. Baillie's night halt during his march from Perambākum to Conjeeveram (September 9, 1780).

50. Innes Munro, l.c.; *Memoirs*, l.c.

51. Wilks, o.c., II. 13-14.

52. *Ibid.*, 14; Wilson, o.c., II. 5-6.

of this deviation to the south-west of Col. Baillie's corps, detached a select corps of 5,000 infantry (*paigah*), 6,000 horse (*sillahdārs*), 12 light and 6 heavy guns under Tipū, with the whole of the irregulars (*Kuzzaks*) and rocket-men under Sidi Hilāl Bakshi, to intercept its approach and endeavour to destroy it,⁵³ while he himself with the rest of his army advanced towards General Munro's camp at Conjeeveram.⁵⁴ In the neighbourhood of Tripasore, about five miles south of the Kortalaiyar river, Tipū, on the 4th and 5th of the month, fell in with and engaged the force of Col. Baillie, who, harassed by continual cannonading of the enemy, and reduced to great difficulties (including that of food and forage), marched on fighting towards Takkōlam.⁵⁵ On the 6th, in the morning, Tipū appeared making dispositions for an immediate attack on Col. Baillie, who now took post in the vicinity of Perambākum, distant fourteen miles from the ground occupied by General Sir Hector Munro on the same day near Conjeeveram. In the engagement which lasted from 11 A.M. to 2 P.M., nearly 100 Europeans and sepoys were killed and wounded by the guns of Tipū, who however, never, came near enough for

The first engagement at Perambākum, September 6, 1780.

53. *Ibid.*, 13; see also and compare Kirmāni, o.c., 388; *Memoirs*, 1, 146, and Innes Munro, o.c., 146. The *Memoirs* refers to the detachment under Tipū as "the flower of Hyder's army," consisting of "thirty thousand horse, eight thousand foot, and twelve pieces of artillery" (o.c., I. 145-146). Innes Munro speaks of Haidar having detached Tipū "with no less than forty thousand horse and foot with twelve guns" (l. c.). Wilson also gives this figure (o.c., II. 6), probably following Innes Munro. Kirmāni does not specify the numerical strength of the detachment, though he refers to the artillery as "four light guns." Wilks' figures seem most acceptable; but he is not quite correct when he says that Haidar broke up from Arcot after having detached the corps under Tipū against Col. Baillie. The detachment of the corps took place only after Haidar had left Arcot and encamped near Conjeeveram.

54. Innes Munro, l.c.

55. Wilks, o.c., II. 15; also Kirmāni (o.c., 388-389), who refers to Tripasore as "Sutweer or Sutohur", Takkōlam as "Tukool" and Perambākum as "Purimpauk."

musketry. On the same evening, Col. Baillie, who by now had exhausted his ammunition and provisions, wrote to General Munro that on a review of his corps after the action, he found it was not in his power to join but hoped to see the General at Perambākum, while Tipū, who had suffered much more severely in the cannonade, reported to Haidar that he could make no impression on Baillie without a further reinforcement.⁵⁶

Col. Baillie's note having been received at Conjeeveram on the 8th, Sir Hector Munro, being of opinion that it was necessary for him to remain there with the main body for the protection of his stores and provisions, contented himself with sending a detachment composed of the flank companies of the army under the command of Lt. Col. Fletcher. This detachment left camp on the night of the 8th, but Col. Fletcher, having skilfully evaded the enemy, joined Baillie at Perambākum early in the morning of the 9th. About 8 o'clock that night, Baillie, in conformity with orders, set out for Conjeeveram. He had, however, hardly cleared the precincts of Perambākum when he was harassed on all sides by Tipū's division, who opened fire upon his rear. But this was soon silenced and the detachment, though attacked again on the right flank, was prepared to resume the march, when the Colonel suddenly resolved to halt until daylight, contrary to the orders received and against the opinion of Col. Fletcher, his second in command, who urged him to push on to Conjeeveram, then distant only 8 or 9 miles. To this Baillie would not assent, and the troops lay on their arms all night unmolested.⁵⁷

56. *Ibid*; Wilson, l.c.; see also and compare *Memoirs*, I. 146-147, and Innes Munro, o.c., 147.

57. *Ibid*, 18-19; Wilson, o.c., II. 6-7; see also and compare Innes Munro, o.c., 148-150; *Memoirs*, I. 147-148, 151-154; and Kirmāpi, o.c., 389.

Second engagement at Perambākum (The first battle of Pollilore), September 10, 1780.

At daylight on the morning of the 10th, the detachment recommenced its march and had proceeded about two miles when the enemy began to fire from four or five guns in the plain at a considerable distance from the left flank. This was followed by a charge of Tipū's select horse, which was repulsed with heavy loss (one account puts it at 1,200). Captains Rumley and Gowdie, with the sepoy grenadiers, were then sent against the guns, and succeeded in taking three or four, but the sepoys had lost their order during the advance, and being charged in flank by a large body of cavalry, they fell back in some confusion, and with some loss. Meantime Haidar, who had sent off his infantry and guns towards Perambākum on the previous night unobserved by Munro, having suddenly decamped about midnight, and making a forced march, had followed with his cavalry before daybreak and formed a junction with Tipū, laying his whole force in ambush behind the woods and village of Pollilore, a commanding spot of ground intersected by deep ravines and water-courses situated on the only road for guns leading to Conjeeveram. Col. Baillie, perceiving a formidable force collecting before him, made a disposition of his troops in the form of an oblong square, placing the field-pieces at proper intervals, with the followers and baggage in the centre. Presently, however, Haidar gave orders for the attack and the officers of his regular infantry and artillery took up their positions. Col. Baillie soon found himself beset upon all quarters by Haidar's whole army and completely surrounded by Tipū's division. And Haidar, reconnoitring the position through his telescope (*durbīnu*), charged the English camp. Then a cross fire from 50 or 60 pieces of artillery was opened on the detachment, Commandant Muhammad Ali, Shaikh Oonsur and others and the

regiment of Chattegārs (Topasses) playing a conspicuous part on one flank and on the other Mon. Lally, the French Commander, exerting his utmost. This caused a havoc in the ranks of Col. Baillie and so straitened him that notwithstanding his best exertions it was impossible for him to join the main army. Nevertheless the Colonel with his ten guns persisted in returning the unequal fire, he and his followers standing firm until midday under cover of a grove of palm trees, close to the town of Perambākum. At length his ammunition was exhausted, this being hastened by the blowing up of two or according to some accounts three tumbrils of fixed ammunition in his camp, which laid open the entire face of the column, destroyed the English artillery and threw the whole into irreparable confusion. Tipū, taking advantage of this accident, made a rapid charge at the head of his *paigah* or household cavalry, on one of the flanks, and they, penetrating the broken square of Col. Baillie's camp, and plying the bow and arrow and the keen sword, made short work of their opponents. On the other flank, Tipū, being followed by the French corps, the infantry of his first line and the Sillahdārs, completed the overthrow of the English force, wounding the Colonel and cutting his sepoy to pieces. Late in the day, Col. Baillie rallied his European troops and once more formed them into a square under the fire of the whole of Haidar's cannon. With this handful of men, he gained a small eminence on the plain, where, without ammunition and most of his men grievously wounded, he resisted and repulsed thirteen separate attacks. The sepoy, who had become mixed up with the camp followers, no longer preserved any order. Baillie, worn out at last and hoping to save the lives of his men, ordered them to lay down their arms, which had no sooner been done than the enemy with fresh bodies of horse

continually rushed in, and commenced indiscriminate slaughter which lasted until stopped by the French officers with Haidar's army. Of eighty-six European officers, including those on the staff and the surgeons, thirty-six were killed or died of their wounds, and fifty, of whom thirty-four were wounded, were taken prisoners, among them Col. Baillie himself, whose whole corps, with all its equipments of every description, was irretrievably lost. Thus ended the second action at Perambākum—otherwise called the first battle of Pollilore—which assumed such an importance in Tipū's mind that he subsequently got the details of the action caricatured on the walls of his well-known residence, the *Dari-a-Daulat*, at Seringapatam.⁵⁸

General Munro, having arrived at Conjeeveram on the 29th of August, had moved on, on the 6th of September, to an elevated spot about two miles on the road to Peram-

General Munro's
movements.

58. *Ibid.*, 20-23; see also and compare Wilson, *o. c.*, II. 7-8; Robson, *o. c.*, 111-121; Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 151-160; *Memoirs*, I. 154-162; *Haid. Nām.*, l. c., and Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 389-392. Robson and other English authorities cited here give admirable accounts of the battle from the English point of view. Only such of the details have been drawn upon here as serve to supplement the account contained in Wilks, *Haid. Nām.*, and Kirmāṇi. The battle-scene is thus depicted in the contemporary coloured paintings on the west wall of the *Dari-a-Daulat* (1784) at Seringapatam:—One of the panels shows Haidar on an elephant in the midst of his troops marching forth for the battle. We see his army composed of swordsmen on horseback and footmen with spears, the former wearing cloth, helmets, long coats, breeches and slippers, and the latter wearing jackets, breeches, sandals and turbans, held in position with handkerchiefs. The second panel shows Tipū riding on horseback and similarly proceeding to the battle. The third shows the victory of Mysore at the battle. Haidar and Tipū guide their troops from their elephants, and the Mysore cavalry charges the British both in front and the rear. The French gunners and the commander of the Mysore forces play their part in the battle. The red-coated English soldiers are seen forming a phalanx to protect their ammunition and their leader, Col. Baillie. The latter who is carried in a palanquin sits with his finger on his lips in dismay. And a ball from the French gunners explodes the English ammunition, foreboding the certainty of their defeat (see *M.A.R.*, 1935, pp. 63-64, for a detailed account of the paintings).

bākum, where he encamped. Haidar's camp was then on the left at a distance of two miles. On the 8th, Baillie's application for assistance arrived, and the General, after some consideration, determined, as we have seen, to send a detachment instead of proceeding in person with the whole army. The reasons which influenced him, as explained by himself in a letter to Government, were his own highly critical situation at Conjeeveram, his only hopes of provisions being from the paddy he had collected in the *pagoda*, his proximity to Haidar's camp, his fear that, if he moved with his whole force, Haidar would most certainly possess himself of his (the General's) ground and Conjeeveram and thereby cut him off from all provisions. In that case, he said, he must have starved. He, therefore, resolved, with the concurrence of his principal officers, to send a strong detachment and to remain with the rest of the troops to watch the enemy's movements. He flattered himself that so strong a detachment as he had sent would enable Colonel Baillie to join him, the more so as he had sent word to him to begin his march on the 9th September and march all night towards him—which was the one thing which, despite Fletcher's admonition, Baillie failed to do. After sending off the detachment, General Munro ordered the tents to be struck, and the men lay on their arms all night. Firing was heard about midnight, but it soon ceased, and no alarm was occasioned thereby. About daybreak, heavy firing was heard from the direction of Perambākum, and the army marched immediately. After proceeding about 4 miles, smoke was seen on the left. The line of march was altered accordingly, but after going a short distance, the direction was again altered towards the right (Sir Thomas Munro, who was present, records that it was obvious to every one that the guides were leading the army away from the scene of action), and was so maintained for

about 2 miles, when a wounded sepoy brought intelligence of Baillie's defeat. Upon this, the army retreated to Conjeeveram, where it arrived at about 6 o'clock in the evening.⁵⁹

Sir Hector Munro, finding himself without provisions and having no hopes of assistance, determined to retreat to Madras. The heavy guns and all stores which could not be removed were thrown into the large tank at Conjeeveram, and the retreat commenced early on the morning of the 11th. The army was harassed all the way to Chingleput by a numerous body of cavalry and lost a large quantity of ammunition and military stores, besides camp equipage and private baggage. It arrived at Chingleput on the morning of the 12th and was there joined by a detachment from the south under Colonel Cosby, who had tried to carry Chetput by escalade but had been repulsed with loss. The casualties, according to Innes Munro, were heavy, as many as 500 sepoys being killed or wounded between Conjeeveram and Chingleput. The rear-guard of the retreating army was wholly made up of sepoys, who behaved splendidly, despite the fact that several of them had fought on two consecutive days in the advances of Baillie and Munro and had been physically worn out with fatigue and exhaustion. The army resumed the march from Chingleput on the 13th September, and encamped at Māmbālam (the "Marmalong" of History), between St. Thomas' Mount and Madras, on the succeeding day.⁶⁰

As Wilson points out, different views have been taken regarding the course adopted by General Munro in detaching Fletcher to Baillie instead of proceeding himself.

His conduct criticised.

59. *Ibid.*, 29; Wilson, *o. c.*, II. 8-9; also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2520-2522.

60. *Ibid.*, 29-30; Wilson, *o. c.*, II. 9-11; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 168-172; *Memoirs*, I. 164-166; and Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 392.

His subsequent action—after despatching Fletcher—shows what he thought of his own decision. Although considered unwise by most, it was defended by some, amongst them by Innes Munro and Lieutenant Lindsay, H. M. 73rd Regiment. In other respects, however, the conduct of this short campaign has been universally condemned, more especially the selection of an unsafe point of junction for Baillie's detachment, and the failure to support it on the morning of the 10th September. The Court of Directors were so much dissatisfied that, in January 1782, they sent out orders for General Munro's removal, offering him, at the same time, the option of submitting his general conduct while in command to the judgment of a Court of Enquiry or Court Martial. These instructions, however, were not received at Madras until Sir Hector Munro had sailed for England.⁶¹

Baillie's mistake in not keeping up to Sir Hector Munro's injunction has been severely
Baillie's mistake. censured by Innes Munro, who writes in his *Narrative*⁶² :—

"While I profess my admiration of the enterprising spirit of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, and lament his unhappy fate, yet, as the melancholy period of his expedition will probably become the topic of general conversation in many circles of your acquaintance at home, it may be proper to point out to you, who are unacquainted with the nature of military operations, two circumstances which appear to have materially contributed to the accomplishment of this fatal disaster. His halting so long in the night, contrary to the instructions sent to him from the General by Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, was unquestionably an imprudent measure. The speedy union of the two armies was essential to the preservation of both; and had he continued his route, this must have been effected early in the morning, in despite of

61. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 11. As to General Sir Hector Munro, see further in Appendix II—(7).

62. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 158-160.

every obstacle, which would have put the General in a condition to execute his intended plan of giving battle to the enemy, and opening a passage to Arcot, the only place where provisions were to be found. It seemed also a great omission in Colonel Baillie not to take possession of the village of Pollilore, which was not then above eight hundred yards from his right, in place of indulging Tippoo in his views of procrastination until his father should arrive by drawing up his army on disadvantageous ground, and sending out detachments to seize guns that could render him, though successful, no material advantage. Even after Haidar's division appeared clearly to be in possession of the village, it may with reason be supposed that the detachment of grenadiers which marched from our army, led by an officer of such intrepidity and judgment as Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher (supported by the rest of Colonel Baillie's command under his own gallant direction, having their flanks properly secured by the British artillery as they advanced), would have put him in safe possession of the village, where he might have made a successful stand until joined by the main army then rapidly marching towards him, nor ought the water-course intervening to have been considered on such an occasion as any material obstacle. Human nature, however, is never infallible. Events are deduced by means which at the time are not equally perceptible to all: misconception, therefore, particularly when it leads to unparalleled suffering and disaster, is not surely to be imputed as a fault. The gallantry of Colonel Baillie was undoubted; his virtues were acknowledged by all; and his calamitous end must excite the sight of pity in every bosom not wholly unassailable by the accumulated misfortune of another."

That is just criticism. But Baillie's mistake seems less censurable than that of those whose plans he executed.

The original mistake, indeed, lay in the plan of operations adopted by the Madras Government, which shifted the field of battle from near Madras to Conjee-

Madras Government's plan of operations.

veram. What Innes Munro says 'seems right, when he observes⁶³ :—

"In a review of this melancholy and fatal event, that no imputation may fall on any individual, it is necessary to recur to the origin of the ill-concerted expedition. It was first suggested, as has been already observed, by the Nabob of Arcot (who was very naturally solicitous to save his capital), and eagerly embraced by the Council. The only plausible reason which they could adduce in support of a measure of such singular hazard, was the impossibility of supporting the army, when reinforced, in the vicinity of Madras. No provisions had been laid in by them, nor the smallest preparation made for the support even of a force so inconsiderable. They, therefore, without any consideration of probable contingencies, resolved upon sending out the army to forage for themselves, who were to be joined by another still worse provided than they were. Had Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie's detachment been ordered to repair to St. Thomas' Mount, as proposed by Sir Hector Munro and Lord Macleod, it is probable it would have accomplished the junction without molestation, as Hyder's whole army was then before Arcot. When united, they might then have had the ability to execute any judiciously concerted plan which might have tended to the relief of the settlement."

On the retreat of General Sir Hector Munro to Madras, Haidar followed him, in the darkness of the night, to Sewram, but finding that no advantage was to be obtained, he detached his horse to surround the General's army, appointing at the same time one of his confidential servants to take possession and charge of the Girgit-Pālayam.⁶⁴ Then returning from the pursuit, he encamped at Conjeeveram, from which place he at length broke up on the 19th

63. *Ibid.*, 157-158.

64. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 392-393.

of September to resume his ground before Arcot (*Dar-ul-Amareh*). Muhammad Ali had expended a considerable treasure in surrounding this populous and extensive town

Renews the siege
of Arcot, September
19, 1780.

with a regular rampart, bastions and ditch, some miles in circuit, constructed under the direction of an European Engineer according to the most approved principles of modern science; and the citadel was defended by two companies of Europeans and three hundred recruits lately arrived from Rai-Vellore. Haidar's approaches and batteries were formed under the guidance of French officers,¹ and on the 31st of October, after six weeks' open trenches, having effected two practicable breaches, he ordered a simultaneous assault by two columns, one under the direction of Tipū and the other under Maha Mirza Khān. The former was repulsed with considerable loss, Haidar's son-in-law, Saiyid Hāfiz Ali Khān, among other officers, being killed, in the western battery, by a cannon ball. But the latter penetrated and enabled Tipū's column to rally and succeed in a second attempt, Saiyid Farid-ud-dīn Khān, the Krōri of the city, being likewise slain by a cannon ball during the defence. The entrance effected by the investing troops at two separate and distant points made it necessary for the European defenders to retire to the citadel. Achanna-Paṇḍit, Muhammad Ali's Brāhman minister, Arshed Bēg Khān, Chisthiyār Khān and Saiyid Hamīd, among the officers in the fort,

Capitulation
of Arcot, November
28, 1780.

were taken prisoners during the assault; and the place, with its arms, stores and ammunition, finally capitulated on the 28th of November 1780, after a stiff siege for nearly two months and a half.⁶⁵ Nujeeb Khān, one of the

65. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 34-35; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 12; Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 393-394; *Haid. Nam.*, i.e. Wilks speaks of the capitulation of Arcot on November 3, 1780 (*o.c.*, II. 35); Wilson also follows him. Innes Munro refers to the

commandants of Muhammad Ali, who sought to secure himself by shutting himself up in the citadel, was sent under the escort of a small party of light cavalry to Madras,⁶⁶ and Haidar remained in winter quarters at Arcot, his flying irregulars penetrating into the South as far as Tanjore, and successively taking possession of and

Reduction of Karnatic-Pāyānghāt, November-December 1780.

establishing outposts in Chambārgarh, Dhōbigarh, Kailāsgarh, Karnāṭakgarh, Sātgarh, Mahimandalgarh, Shōlingur, Kāvēripak, Tripasore, Tindivanam, Tirukkāṭṭu-puttūr, Dūrvāchalam, Venkata-peth, Bhuvanagiri, Chidambaram, Mannārgudi, Gingee, Chetput and other places in the Karnāṭak-Pāyānghāt.⁶⁷ Practically master of a greater part of what was alleged to be the territory of Muhammad Ali, Haidar, towards the close of the year, fixed a contribution (*khaṇḍane*) of seven lakhs of *varahas* on Arcot, restoring Achanna-Paṇḍit, with the other officers, to the administrative charge of the Subah on an allowance of 1000 *varahas*,⁶⁸

Tipū proclaimed "Nabob of the Carnatic."

and ordering his own son Tipū to be solemnly proclaimed in Arcot "Nabob of the Carnatic".⁶⁹


capitulation of the place "after a faint resistance of six weeks" (o.c., 174), and the *Memoirs* mentions the surrender of Arcot on the last day of October 1780 (o.c., I. 171). Kirmāṇi, however, writes of the gallant defence of Arcot "for three months" (o.c., 393), and the *Haid. Nām.* also refers to the stiff siege of the place for two or three months, specifically dating the capitulation *Sārvari, Mārgasirā su. 2*, Tuesday, which corresponds to 28th November 1780.

66. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 394-395; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 76-77.

67. Innes Munro, o.c., 176; Wilson, l. c., *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 77; and Kirmāṇi, o.c., 401-402, 405, 407, 408, 412. Robson makes a passing reference to Haidar having, with impunity, "traversed the southern part of the Carnatic" (o.c., 121).

68. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 77; see also and compare Wilks, o.c., II. 35; and Kirmāṇi, o.c., 395-396.

69. Innes Munro, l.c. The *Memoirs* speaks of Haidar having been "proclaimed Nabob of the Carnatic", indicating in a foot-note that, as others affirm, "it was Tippoo Saib who was proclaimed" (o.c., I. 171). Haidar's proclamation in favour of Tipū was quite in keeping with the spirit of the treaty he had concluded with Nizām Ali in May 1767 (see *Ante* pp. 31-32).





Warren Hastings,
Governor-General of India, 1774-1785.

Early in January 1781, Haidar was engaged in the siege or investment of five different places, commanded by English officers, namely, Āmbūr, Vellore, Wandiwash, Permacoil and Chingleput. Āmbūr, one of the principal keys to the Karnātic, having held out for over a month under Captain Keating, capitulated owing to want of ammunition on the 13th of January to Tipū and General Lally, who invested it with a large force; but sieges of the other forts were raised on the approach of the English garrisons.⁷⁰

Haidar's successes and the failure of Sir Hector Munro's campaign had by now led the Supreme Government at Calcutta to interfere in the affairs of the Karnātic. To the financial pressure resulting from the extensive military operations of the Mahratta war on the establishments of Bengal and Bombay, was now added the still more serious weight of a new war on the Coromandel coast and a general confederacy of the principal states for the final extermination of the British power in India. The emergency was met by corresponding energies and new resources on the part of the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, who by a master-stroke of diplomacy succeeded in detaching from the confederacy Nizām Ali by the prompt restitution of Guntūr (in October 1780), and sent out with a detachment Sir Eyre Coote, then occupying the situation of Commander-in-Chief in India and Member of the Supreme Council. At the same time Mr. Whitehill, Governor of Madras, was suspended from office, he being succeeded by Mr. Smith, Senior Member of Council. The new administration gave an early pledge of zealous co-operation with the measures of Bengal by investing Sir Eyre Coote with the sole

70. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 35, 41; see also and compare Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 35, 41; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.* 408.

direction of the war. Sir Eyre Coote, though advanced in years and oppressed by precarious health, obeying the honourable summons to the scene of his early glory, arrived at Madras on the 5th of November, and immediately took the field, reinforced by two or three thousand musketeers, three hundred troops or regular horse and two hundred dismounted cavalry of Nawāb Muhammad Alī, who, having left Tirumalgarh, was now residing in Mutyalpet, Madras.⁷¹

On the 17th of January, Sir Eyre Coote marched for the relief of Chingleput, Wandiwash and Permacoil. Chingleput was relieved on the 19th; on the 21st Carangooly was taken by assault; and

Movements of
Sir Eyre Coote and
Haidar, January-
June 1781.

71. *Ibid.*, I. 795-796; II. 82-83; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 413-415, and *Memoirs*, I. 177-181. The detachment with General Coote consisted of 830 men of the Bengal regiment, two companies of artillery and 630 lascars, and a corps of volunteers numbering 45, mostly Irish (see Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 33, f.n. 1). Kirmāni speaks of the detachments as having consisted of "600 Europeans and two battalions of Bengal sipahees (sepoys)" (Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 414). The following conversation recorded by Kirmāni to have taken place between General Coote and Nawāb Muhammad Alī, the day after the former's arrival in Madras, will be found interesting not only as a sad commentary on the military position of an 18th century Indian potentate relying blindly on the advantages of European discipline, but also as an admirable contrast to the position evolved in Mysore under Haidar, who, in the words of an English contemporary, "united the military discipline and skill of Europe with the subtlety and craft of Asia, and freely ranged over the whole land at the head of an army flushed with success, daily increasing in numbers as well as courage" (*Memoirs* I. 177-178):—"What have you done with your troops?" General Coote asked Muhammad Alī. Muhammad Alī replied: "I have been deceived in putting too much reliance on the aid of your troops; and, in consequence, have fallen in rank and respectability. The reason of this is that certain English gentlemen strongly asserted and insisted that one European or man of their country was equal to twenty men of this country....., and why should money be thrown away in employing such useless men. Relying on deceiving words like these, I have disbanded my troops, and their monthly pay I hand over to you, and consequently I expect you to provide for my defence." The General smiled at hearing this story, and said, "Some wag has told you this out of fun or in a joke; but it is necessary that princes should maintain forces and state, to the extent of their means; otherwise they may soon expect to become beggars" (Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 414-415).



General Sir Eyre Coote.

on the 23rd, Haidar decamped from Wandiwash. A French fleet having appeared off Madras on the 25th, General Coote instantly retraced his steps towards Madras, but on further intelligence, relieved Permaccoil on the 28th, and from thence moved southwards, arriving at the Red Hills of Pondicherry on the 5th of February. Meanwhile, Haidar having by forced marches threatened Cuddalore with the view of occupying it as a depot for the troops expected from France, General Coote moved to cover that place. Here, from the 8th of February till the 16th of June, the English army, in expectation of supplies from Madras and Masulipatam, remained in a state of stress and inactivity, with the exception of the taking of the fort of Tiruvadi, 16 miles from Fort St. David, in April, and an ineffectual demonstration of a single march to relieve Tyāgadurg, a hill-fort fifty miles to the westward, commanded by Lieutenant Roberts, which fell on the 7th of June for want of ammunition. But Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, being off the Western coast with a British squadron, reducing the French fort of Mahé and destroying Haidar's infant navy in his own ports of Calicut and Mangalore, the French fleet made off for Mauritius; and Haidar, who had avoided every opportunity of coming to close quarters with Coote, withdrew rapidly from Cuddalore, leaving a sufficient force there under Mīr Alī Razā Khān, Sidi Hilal and Ghāzi Khān to make head against the General and intercept all supplies to the English camp.⁷²

In April, Haidar, after reducing and occupying all the intermediate posts between the English army and the southern provinces, proceeded with the main army to

Haidar in the South, April-June 1781.

72. *Ibid.*, II. 35-44, 46; Wilson, o.c., II. 20-22; also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. IV. 2525-2526. See also and compare Innes Munro, o.c., 207-208, 212-217, 219, 220; Robson, o.c., 121-122; *Memoirs*, I. 181-189, and Kirmāni (o.c. 416-418), who refers to Pondicherry as "Phoolcheri" and Cuddalore as "Kootoor."

Porto Novo (*Muhammad Bandar*) and the northern bank of the Coleroon, from whence he sent large detachments into Tanjore, ravaging that district, and sending off to the upper country all that was movable, including immense herds of cattle. On this occasion, "weavers and their families," adds Wilks, "were collected and forcibly sent to people the island of Seringapatam. Captive boys destined to the exterior honour of Islām were driven to the same place with equal numbers of females, the associates of (then) present and the mothers of a future race of military slaves." One of the detachments, led by Tipū, passed by Tirukkāṭṭupalli and Shahgota, and after garrisoning the forts of Ariyalūr and Uḍaiyar-Pālayam, overran Śrirangam and Jambukēśvaram, situated between the Cauvery and the Coleroon, finally marching off in the direction of Trichinopoly itself in June. At the same time, Haidar also, with his irregulars (*kuzzaks*), proceed-

The attempted
siege of Trichinopoly,
June 1781.

ing thither, surrounded the fort. At first, he was repulsed by a charge from Mr. Hall, officer commanding the place. Retiring to Churgul-Pālayam to the east of the fort, he next recommenced the attack assisted by his *ahashām* foot and *risālas* or regiments of musketeers. Thereupon the English officer effected his escape to the fort, most of his men being put to the sword and some being made prisoners. Haidar, packing the heads of the slain in twenty large baskets, sent them to the fort frightening the garrison with a message directing them "to give up the fort to his officers immediately," else he would cut off their heads in a similar manner. Further, with Churgul-Pālayam as the base of operations, Haidar pitched up his tents there, displaying his victorious standards and obtaining the materials for the siege and assault of Trichinopoly, and piling them up in heaps near the gate. Likewise, Tipū, with the troops of Mons.

Lally posted to the western gate of the fort, began collecting materials for the batteries and the assault from the Uḍaiyar-Pālayam side, and piling them up near the tomb of Nathar Wali. Everything was ready for a night attack on Trichinopoly. In this extremity, Col. Nixon, Hall and other English officers in the fort, who had not more than two or three hundred men under them, had set about enlisting the entire civil population of the city on daily and monthly pay and placing them on duty in the bastions, etc., while the Pālegār of Tore-yūr-Pālayam with 200 foot sought to assist them by undertaking to strengthen and defend the gates of the fort. Meanwhile, the fortified pagoda at Chidambaram, midway between the river Vellār the Coleroon, about 26 miles south of Cuddalore, “the first of

Coote's repulse at
Chidambaram, June
18, 1780.

Haidar's conquests in the Carnatic,” having been strengthened by Haidar for the double purpose of arresting his enemy's progress to the southward and serving as a depot for provisions for the eventual use of his own army and that of his French allies, Sir Eyre Coote determined to reduce it; and he accordingly marched from Cuddalore on the 16th June. He arrived near Chidambaram on the 18th, and being misinformed as to the strength of the garrison, he put himself at the head of three battalions of sepoy, and a party of artillery, and advanced against the place shortly after dark, in the hope of carrying it by a sudden attack. The town was speedily taken and the detachment pushed on against the works of the pagoda. The first and second gates were forced, but the third or inner gate had been rendered secure by throwing a bank of earth against it from the inside, and while the stormers were delayed by this obstacle, a number of thatched huts in the space between the second and third gates were set on fire by combustibles from the ramparts, and the assailants being thereby thrown

into confusion, were repulsed with considerable loss. Fresh regiments of troops were immediately ordered into the town with the view of renewing the attack but Sir Eyre Coote, relinquishing the idea, returned, in order to procure battering guns, to Porto Novo, where Admiral Sir Edward Hughes had just arrived with his squadron. On this, Jehān Khān, Haidar's commandant at Chidambaram, wrote to him a pressing letter, urging him in the strongest terms to hasten down from Trichinopoly and give a total defeat to the English. Immediately after receipt of this intelligence

Haidar decamps from Trichinopoly. in his camp, Haidar decamped with his entire army and artillery, followed by Tipū. Haidar's long contemplated siege of Trichinopoly was for the time being abandoned, Tipū setting fire to the materials for forming the batteries.⁷³

"The repeated checks sustained by the Company's troops in the South, the corps that Haidar had cut off and the forts he had reduced had spread so general a consternation that," in the words of a reputed English army officer of the period ⁷⁴, "the important and defenceless garrison of Trichinopoly seemed ready to surrender,"

73. *Ibid.*, 44, 51-55, see also and compare Kirmāpi, o. c., 418-426; Innes Munro, o. c., 220-223; *Memoirs*, I. 189-191, and Robson, o. c., 122-123. For Coote's repulse at Chidambaram, see Wilson, o. c., II. 22-23; also *South Arcot Dist. Gaz.*, 266-267. Wilks speaks of Haidar having, in expectation of drawing Sir Eyre Coote from Cuddalore by his proceedings to the southward, "abstained from the regular siege of Tanjore or Trichinopoly, as an operation which might embarrass the rapid movements essential to his future plans" (o. c., II. 54.) The accounts given by Kirmāpi and other writers cited above, however, show that Haidar had not altogether lost his eye on Trichinopoly, which he attempted to take during the period of Gen. Coote's inactivity at Cuddalore. Haidar's prolonged stay in the Trichinopoly-Tanjore country, in 1781, is also referred to in *Desp. to Eng.* (XVI.4) and in Lt. Col. Fullarton's *View of English Interests in India* (1787), 96-97.

74. Fullarton, l. c., see also *Memoirs*, I. 191-192. Wilson speaks of Haidar having "overestimated" the effect of Coote's repulse at Chidambaram (o. c., II. 23). Haidar's mistake could not be better stated.

in which case, "the southern provinces in the peninsula that acknowledged subjection to the English" would have "submitted to Haidar's power." Haidar, though he was thus conscious of the importance of Trichinopoly, was flushed with the news of Coote's repulse at Chidambaram and "hoped that he would be able by a close engagement to defeat the only force that could engage either the provinces south of the Coleroon on the one hand, or that of the Deccan on the other." This induced him "to renounce the more solid though less brilliant prospects" before him and proceed against General Coote.

Making a forced march of a hundred miles in two days and a half by way of Samaya-
Haidar and General Coote at
Porto Novo. varam, Haidar reached Muttaiya-
Pālayam (*Mooteapolliam*), four miles
west of Porto Novo, on the 27th June
and placed himself between the English and Cuddalore. Completely hemming the English army nearly into an equilateral triangle, formed by his camp, the sea and the Porto Novo river, he occupied a ground entirely composed of sand-hills and deep nullahs, intersecting each other; erected large masqued batteries on every commanding hillock, and sent constantly bodies of cavalry to reconnoitre the English camp, taking care to possess himself of every advantageous spot. This position was taken with the view not only of frustrating the intended operations against Chidambaram, but of covering his own against the fort of Cuddalore. In these critical circumstances, Sir Eyre Coote discontinued the preparations for the siege of Chidambaram, embarked the battering guns, and directed the English force to march against Haidar's position with only four days' rice carried on the soldiers' backs, Admiral Hughes being requested to cover Cuddalore with a portion of his squadron. The English camp was pitched a short distance in front of

the town of Porto Novo, having the sea in the rear and the river Vellār on the front.⁷⁵

On the 1st of July was fought the battle of Porto Novo, in which, Haidar with an army eight times that of the English under Coote, was, after a severe engagement, completely beaten from the field. A little before day-break that day, Coote drew up his army on a large plain which lay between the two camps. On his right was a chain of sand-hills which ran along the coast at a distance of about a mile from the sea; in the rear and on the left were woods and enclosures, but with an open space between; two miles to the left ran another chain of sand-hills parallel to the former and behind these lay the principal part of Haidar's army. At 8 o'clock, the Mysoreans opened fire from eight guns in two batteries which they had raised among the sand-banks; but they proved

Description of the battle.

75. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 55-56; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 23; also Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 224-226; *Memoirs*, I. 192; Robson, *o.c.*, 123; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 425-426. *Porto-Novo*, known in Tamil as *Farangipettai* ("European town") and called by Muslims *Muhammad Bandar*, now a union situated on the north bank of the mouth of the Vellār river, on low lying and very sandy soil, in Chidambaram taluk, South Arcot district, 15 miles south of Cuddalore, 32 miles south of Pondicherry, its name being apparently given by the Portuguese, who were the earliest European settlers there. It is the fourth largest place in South Arcot, with good maritime connections. The Portuguese having first occupied the place, perhaps about the end of the 16th century, they were followed by the Dutch, who first obtained a cove from the Bijāpur Governor of Gingee in 1643, quitted the place temporarily in 1678, returned to it in 1680, and thenceforth maintained there an establishment till as late as 1825. The 'Porto-Novo pagoda' which they coined during this time became well known. In 1745, the Dutch transferred to Porto-Novo their factories at Cuddalore and Fort St. David and thenceforth the town became their only important establishment in the district. In 1778, Haidar Ali sacked the settlement and captured the Resident; in 1781, war having broken out between the English and the Dutch, the former seized the latter's territories all along the coast, including Porto Novo; in 1785 the place was restored by treaty; in 1795, it was again taken; in 1818 it was once more restored; but by a treaty of March 1824 it was finally handed over to the English in the following year, with the rest of the Dutch possessions in India (see *South Arcot Dist. Gaz.*, 276-277, 279-280).

too distant to do much execution. Coote, having reconnoitred their situation, saw that it was their wish that he should advance across the plain under the fire of their batteries, so that their cavalry might be able to take advantage of the impression made by the guns. He, therefore, made no change in his disposition, but kept his ground, offering them battle until 11 o'clock, when, finding that they did not choose to make the attack, he moved to the rear of the sand-hills on his right. The English army marched in two lines, the first commanded by General Munro, the second by General Stuart. In the first, were all the European infantry, with six battalions of sepoys equally divided on the flanks; in the second, four battalions of sepoys. One-half of the cavalry formed on the right of the first; the other on the left of the second line. The baggage, guarded by a regiment of horse and a battalion of sepoys, remained on the beach near Porto Novo.

The English army, after marching a mile between the sand-bank and the sea-shore, again defiled by an opening into the plain where Haidar's artillery and infantry were drawn up awaiting its approach, with their horse still behind the sand-hills. In an hour the whole of the first line got into the plain, where they formed under the fire of 40 pieces of cannon. Not a shot was returned; the guns were not even unlimbered, but everything remained as if the army was going to continue its march. The Mysoreans, encouraged by this, which they attributed to an intention of escaping, brought their artillery nearer, Mīr Alī Razā Khān ("Meer Saheb") being appointed to act on the rear of the English army, Tipū and Mons. Lally, with a very large body of troops, being stationed to block up their retreat, and the regiments (*risālas*) of the commandants Saiyid Hamīd, Shaikh Oonsur, Shaikh Omar and others forming the advanced guard. Every shot now took effect. General

Coote rode along the front, encouraging everyone to patience and to reserve their fire till they were ordered to part with it. He was only awaiting accounts from the second line. An aid-de-camp at last told him that General Stuart had taken possession of the sand-hills. He immediately gave orders to advance and open fire from all the guns. The artillery-men, who had been so long restrained, now exerted themselves and kept up a heavy cannonade, slackening the fire of Haidar's artillery and throwing his ranks into disorder. Haidar's infantry only stayed to give one volley and large bodies of his horse, attempting to charge, hovered from flank to flank under Mīr Alī Razā Khān, ostensibly to break the English line but really to keep it at bay while they themselves should accomplish the retreat of their own guns. But so vigorous and constant was the discharge of the English musketry, and so fatiguing was the ascent of Haidar's horse up the sand-hills that before they could reach the line and be screened from the English view, they were broken, their legs stuck fast in the sandy bed of the river, and in a quarter of an hour his whole army was dispersed. While the first line of the English was thus engaged with Haidar, the second was attacked by a force under Mons. Lally; but this was repulsed by General Stuart in all its attempts to drive the English from the sand-hills, and when the main army fled, it followed. Haidar's defeat was thus complete; and he gave orders that the guns should be withdrawn to the rear and that the troops should occupy the plain in as wide or open an order as possible. At this juncture, Mīr Alī Razā Khan was galloping at the head of his cavalry along the beach, intending by an attack on the English army to throw them into confusion, when, of a sudden, a shot from a cannon on board of one of the ships struck him down. Haidar's loss in killed and wounded during the day was heavy, among them many of his principal

officers, including Sidi Hilāl, eldest son of Mīr Alī Razā; Mons. Lally was wounded; and a Portuguese officer deserted to the English. Haidar himself, who was watching the operations seated on a stool (*chowkee*) on a gentle eminence in the rear of the centre of his line of works, was near being taken prisoner. He was, however, conveyed out of danger by a faithful groom, who made bold to force the slippers on his master's feet, saying "we will beat them to-morrow; in the meanwhile mount your horse." He reluctantly left the field, pouring forth a torrent of abuse.⁷⁶

Innes Munro, who was present at the battle, regrets that the enemy was not pursued, and blames Innes Munro's *Narrative*. Coote for not giving the order for pursuit. He writes in his *Narrative*:⁷⁷

"Upon the conclusion of this hard-contested business, how mortifying was it to find that no other advantage had

76. *Ibid.*, 56-62; also, Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 23-28; *South Arcot Dist. Gaz.*, 281-288 (based on Sir Thomas Munro's letter and Coote's despatch, etc.); Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 226-230; *Memoirs*, I, 192-200; Robson, *o.c.*, 123-125; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 78; and Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 447-430. As to the numerical strength of the armies of Haidar and the English during this action, *vide* Appendix II—(2). The contemporary English writer, Innes Munro, estimates the loss at Porto Novo on the English side at 17 European and 20 Indian officers, besides 50 European and 500 sepoy killed and wounded, and on Haidar's side as "at least 4,000 Misorians" (Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 229-230). Robson also, another contemporary writer, speaks of Haidar's loss in killed as 4,000, and of the English as having lost "very few officers," having between them "three and four hundred men killed" (Robson, *o.c.*, 124). The *Memoirs* refers to Haidar's loss in killed as having amounted to 3,000, and the loss on the English side as not having exceeded 400 (*Memoirs*, I. 199). Wilks, however, while he refers to the loss in the English army as "comparatively trifling, being 306 killed and wounded," grossly exaggerates Haidar's loss when he estimates it "at ten thousand men killed and wounded, at the lowest amount" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 62). Referring to the importance of the battle from the English point of view, the *Memoirs* records thus: "Although notrophies were gained or progress made, the first of July 1781 will ever be accounted an important day to the eastern branch of the British Empire. It broke the spell which was formed by the defeat of Col. Baillie and destroyed that respect which the name of Hyder Ally Cawn had obtained . . ." (*Memoirs*, I. 200).

77. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 231.

been gained by us after such extreme fatigue than the simple possession of the field?—a compensation very inadequate to the loss of so many gallant soldiers. This might have been one of the most glorious and decisive victories ever obtained, had the General permitted the line to advance at an earlier period of the day. There cannot be a doubt but it would have finally terminated the war, as most of the enemy's guns must have inevitably fallen into our hands; for it was with the utmost difficulty they got them reconveyed across the *nullah* during the pursuit, a labour in which, by Meer Sahib's gallantry, and our own tardiness, they were singularly favoured. It was also a matter of surprise to many in the army that the British cavalry were not ordered to pursue the fugitives, there being, with Mahrattas and others, a thousand in the camp, a number that might have done considerable execution against a flying enemy if properly conducted, particularly as they had eight light three-pounders dragged by horses constantly attached to them."

Following this reverse at Porto Novo, Haidar with his army fell back on Chidambaram and moved off to the westward, turning his line of march towards Venkatapeth (Venkatampettai), 14 miles south-west of Cuddalore, while

Fourth Phase:
July-December 1781.
Movements of Haidar
and General Coote,
July-August 1781.

Sir Eyre Coote, a few days after the battle, quitting the sea-side, marched to the north in the direction of Permacoil and Carangooly, to effect a junction with the detachment of Bengal troops under Col. Pearse. Meanwhile Tyāgadurg having surrendered to Tipū, he had been ordered by Haidar to resume the siege of Wandiwash and afterwards intercept the Bengal detachment. Sir Eyre Coote, however, arrived at Carangooly on the 18th of July, when Tipū precipitately raised the siege of Wandiwash and proceeded to join the main army under Haidar. Then the English General, making an expeditious march northward, arrived at St. Thomas' Mount about the end of July; and on the 3rd August

formed a junction with Col. Pearse at Pulicat.⁷⁸ Haidar, who with his son remained about this time at Conjeeveram, set about steadily pursuing his objective. Saiyid Sāhib was promptly despatched to reattempt the conquest of Tanjore and Trichinopoly in the South, while he himself began to settle contributions due from Toreyūr and other places and establish outposts all over the South. Haidar was thus, about the middle of August, in actual possession of the entire Karnātic-Pāyanghāt—the alleged kingdom of Nawāb Muhammad Alī—with the exception of Masulipatam, Nellore-Sarvāpalli, Madras, Chingleput, Vellore, Nagar-Tagada, Wandiwash, Porto-Novo, Javāhir-Bandar, Tanjore, Trichinopoly and Madura. And it became the avowed ambition of the English to dispute with Haidar every inch of this debatable tract as much in the interests of Muhammad Alī as in their own.⁷⁹

General Coote, with the reinforcement from Bengal, which added nearly one-third to his numerical strength, and taking with him one of the sons of Nawāb Muhammad Alī, marched, on the 16th August, for the siege of Arcot and the relief of Vellore. Finding it, however, impracticable to attempt either of these objects, he soon turned his attention to Tripasore (Tirupassūr), a fort situated about thirty-three miles to the westward on one of the roads leading to Arcot and Vellore. Arrived at the place on the 19th, he laid siege to it, and on the 22nd, a breach having been effected, the fort surrendered on terms of capitulation.⁸⁰ By now, Haidar with Tipū,

78. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 63-66; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 28-29; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 232-234; *Memoirs*, I. 200-201; Robson, *o.c.*, 125; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 430, 439.

79. Kirmāṇi, *l.c.*; *Haid. Nām.*, *l.c.*; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 234.

80. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 66, 69-71; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 31; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 237; Robson, *o.c.*, 134-135 *Memoir* . I. 201; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 439-440.

leaving Conjeeveram and marching by the route of Tiruvadi and Belpur, and encamping at Tindivanam, had stormed and taken possession of Permacoil, directing at the same time Mons. Lally, Saiyid Hamid and Shaikh Oonsur to take the fort of Wandiwash. These officers advanced thither, and after an unsuccessful siege of the place during which Mons. Lally attempted a ruse on the commanding English officer by arraying a body of his troops as English soldiers, completely put to rout an English contingent from Madras under Col. Macleod, taking the Colonel prisoner.⁸¹ Haidar, however, in the meantime, apprised of General Coote's approach, moved towards Arcot, Tipū taking the route by Gingee. Haidar was soon in full force at the distance of sixteen miles, to dispute the roads with the English, which being close and woody, favoured his design. General Coote now resolved to march towards Haidar, and having drawn some rice from Poonamallee, marched, on the 26th, to engage him. As the English army advanced, Haidar's irregulars took every opportunity of obstructing its march, and on the morning of the 27th, exactly upon the same grounds where Col. Baillie had been defeated a year before (i.e., on the 10th September 1780), he appeared with his troops strongly posted behind the woods and the village of Pollilore, 17 miles south-west of Tripasore, where, influenced from a notion of its being a lucky spot, he had determined to try his fortune in a second battle.⁸²

On the same morning General Coote also moved towards Haidar, and about eight o'clock discovered the latter's army drawn up in order of battle, and in full force to receive him, and in possession of

The second battle of Pollilore, 27th August 1781.

81. Kīrmāṇi, o.c., 430-433; and *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. The *Haid. Nām.* mentions the name of the English officer as Col. Macleasor. The reference is obviously to a Col. Macleod.

82. Robson, o.c., 185-186; *Memoirs*, I. 201-202; Innes Munro, o.c., 238; also Wilks, o.c., II. 71-72, and Wilson, l.c.

many strong and advantageous posts, rendered the more formidable by the nature of the country lying between, which was intersected by very deep water-courses. To present a front to them, the General was obliged to form the line under a very heavy cannonade from several batteries, which galled his army exceedingly. The action lasted for eight hours from nine in the morning till near sunset, when he had driven Haidar's people from all their posts and obliged them to retreat with precipitation, leaving him in full possession of the field of battle. Coote, in his description of this battle, states that "had not Hyder Ally from a principle of superstition which we know regulates in a great measure the actions of the natives, chose to have met me at the ground on which he had formerly been successful, I could not have moved one mile further to the westward in quest of him, but must have been, for want of provisions, reduced to the necessity of returning without an action."⁸³

Coote's information was that Haidar had on the day of action in the field 150,000 men, with 80 pieces of cannon. He calculated Haidar's loss at near 2,000, and adds: "Haidar Ally's army was strongly posted. His troops, covered in hollow ways and ranged just behind the summit of the rising ground in our front, would not stand when pushed. Their loss consequently (was) not so considerable as it would have been had they waited the decision of the day from our musketry, but this they in general avoided, always drawing off their guns, and retiring before we can bring them to close action".⁸⁴

The English forces numbered about 11,000, Europeans and Indians included, the casualties being Europeans

83. Robson, *o.c.*, 186-187; also Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 81-42; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 72-76; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 238-239; and *Memoirs*, I. 202-209, for detailed accounts of the action from the English point of view. Kirmāni and the *Haid. Nām.* are silent on this topic.

84. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 42.

killed 28, wounded 28, and Indians killed 105, wounded 207, and missing 58. Wilks describes the action as a "drawn battle" and a "dubious victory," while Mill takes much the same view and greatly exaggerates the English losses. Sir Thomas Munro, who was present as a subaltern at the battle, says that the Mysoreans were forced from all their positions before sunset, and after standing a cannonade on open ground for a short time, fled in great hurry and confusion beyond Conjeeveram.⁸⁵

On the 29th of August, Sir Eyre Coote fell back for fresh supplies on Tripasore, where he encamped on the 30th. Early in September, the General went to Madras in order to confer with the Government. He returned in a few days; on the 21st of the month he moved to Tiruttani and a day or two later he took the small fort of Poloor in that neighbourhood. While there, he received an urgent application for assistance from Col. Lang, commanding at Vellore, who represented that the place must fall if not speedily relieved. By now Haidar, determined to obstruct the farther approach of the English army towards Vellore, was strongly posted near the pass of Shōlinghur, on the direct road between Poloor and Vellore. Coote marched against him on the evening of the 26th and fought the battle of Shōlinghur on the 27th. Both the armies were closely engaged before 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Haidar commanding in the centre, the left wing under Tipū and the right being led by Grenadiers under Mons. Lally. There was heavy cannonading on either side and by evening victory again declared for the English. Haidar's forces precipitately fled from the field of action towards Kāvēripak. The whole of Haidar's army was in the action and his losses

85. *Ibid*, 42, f.n. 1; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 76-77.

exceeded, according to Coote, 2,000; while Wilks mentions it as being upwards of 5,000. The English losses were only 100 killed and wounded. The Pālegārs of Chittoor (*i.e.*, those of Kālahasti and Venkaṭagiri, and Bomrāj) now came over to the English, and Haidar, indignant at their defection, detached a select corps to burn their villages and lay waste their country. Sir Eyre Coote, fearing that his supplies might be cut off, left his camp on the 14th of October at the head of a light corps, and after an absence of thirty-eight hours, during thirty-two of which he had never dismounted from his horse, returned to camp, having completely surprised and defeated these troops, capturing all their equipments.⁸⁶

The relief of Vellore had by now become an object of most anxious attention to Lord Macartney, who had taken over charge of the Government of Madras from Mr. Charles Smith on the 22nd June and assumed the direction of the war. Accordingly, about the 16th of October, General Coote, already reduced to extremities for want of adequate succour from Madras, prepared to march thither and detached a strong force under Lt.-Col. Owen about twenty miles in advance, to throw in a fresh store of provisions to Vellore and distress Haidar by blocking up his supplies from Chittoor. About daylight on the 23rd, Haidar, who had encamped

86. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 76, 78-87; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 48-50; also Iunes Munro, *o.c.*, 243-246, 248; Robson, *o.c.*, 187-188; and *Memoirs*, I. 209-212 (for detailed accounts of the action from the English point of view). See also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 61-82; and Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 440-442), who refers to Shōlinghur as "Sool Nuggur" and roughly dates this and connected events in A. H. 1196 or A.D. 1781-1782. The *Memoirs* refers to the place as "Chillangur". *Shōlinghur*: 15 miles west of Pōlūr, a town containing about 7,000 inhabitants. Near it is a steep hill with a temple at the summit. The town is 8 miles north of the railway station of the same name, on the line from Madras to Calicut, and Madras to Bangalore.

on the Timory plains, making a forced march at the head of nearly all his regular infantry, the whole of his best cavalry and his light guns, suddenly attacked this detachment, posted near Veracundalore at the southern end of the Devalampettah pass, about twelve miles north-east of Chittoor, obliging the Colonel to return with loss and join the main army at the village of Madowaddy. On the 26th, General Coote marched on to Pollipet, where, having discovered a large quantity of grain hidden underground, he at last set out for Vellore on the 1st November and relieved the place on the 3rd. Reinforced by Col. Lang's division here, the General returned towards the Pālayams (*Pollams*). On the 6th, the English army came before Chittoor, which surrendered on the 10th.⁸⁷

Meanwhile, the war was being actively waged in the west and south of Mysore. On the West coast, Major Cotgrave twice beat Haidar's forces, Lieutenant Close (afterwards well known as Major General Sir Barry Close, Bart.), distinguishing himself in one of the actions. And in November, Col. Braithwaite assumed command of the troops in Tanjore, from which time there was constant fighting in the southern provinces with varied results. Reference has already been made to Haidar's reduction of Tanjore and his attempted siege of Trichinopoly in the early part of 1781. Since Haidar's departure from these countries in June, considerable exertions had been made to collect a field force at Tanjore. In August, Col. Braithwaite attempted to storm the fortified pagoda at Tirukkāṭṭupalli but was repulsed; on the 3rd of the same month,

87. *Ibid.*, 87-93; see also and compare Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 50-54; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 246-251, 259-260; Robson, *o.c.*, 188-189; and *Memoirs*, I. 212-220. Wilks speaks of the capitulation of Chittoor on the 11th of November, but other authorities like Wilson, Robson and the *Memoirs* are agreed that this event took place on the 10th.

he was again repulsed at the fort of Puttoocottah, being wounded. On or about the 8th of September, Col. Nixon from Trichinopoly attacked and took the fort at Mannārgudi; on the 16th of the same month, the Colonel attacked the fort at Mahadevapatam (5 miles south-west of Mannārgudi). Col. Braithwaite resumed command immediately after, and on the 30th September, he defeated the Mysoreans at Alangudi, about 10 miles south of Kumbakōṇam, after a severe struggle. Meantime, the English having commenced hostilities against

Haidar's treaty
with the Dutch,
September 4, 1781.

the Dutch, a defensive treaty was concluded (on the 4th of September 1781), between Haidar and the Governor of Negapatam, by which the English district of Nagore and other places were ceded to the Dutch, and measures of reciprocal co-operation were concerted—on the one part for the security of Negapatam; and on the other, to procure for Haidar any aid from that garrison which might be necessary for maintaining his ground in the province, or eventually for the reduction of the capital. In October, preparations were made for the siege of Negapatam, the principal settlement of the Dutch in

The siege and
capitulation of
Negapatam, Octo-
ber-November 1781.

Southern India, and operations were commenced by the advance of Col. Nixon against Nagore. The southern army, under Col. Braithwaite, had been ordered to conduct the siege, but nothing effectual had been done owing to misunderstanding between the Colonel and Lord Macartney. On the 20th of the month, Sir Hector Munro, who had obtained permission to return to England for reasons of health, having been prevailed upon by Lord Macartney to take the command of the army, arrived off Nagore in the fleet of Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, and assumed command on the 21st. On the 29th, the outworks in front of Negapatam were assaulted and carried; trenches were opened on the 3rd

of November, and the place surrendered by capitulation on the 12th, despite the arduous efforts of a large detachment of Haidar's troops under Saiyid Sāhib to assist and relieve the Hollanders under the treaty. The reduction of this place put into the hands of the English "a very important key to the Tanjore country and other southern provinces" (*i.e.*, Trichinopoly and Madura).⁸⁸

About the time that General Coote was engaged on the siege of Chittoor, an English detachment from Trichinopoly, marching in the direction of Karoor, was repulsed by Balavant Rao, a general of Haidar.

The campaign of
1781 ends, Novem-
ber-December 1781.

Another English detachment advanced on Nellore-Sarvāpalli, only to retrace its steps at the approach of Lālā Chubeela Rām aided by Tipū.⁸⁹ Towards the latter part of November, Haidar himself, by way of diverting the attention of the English from Chittoor, directed the siege of Tripasore, despatching Tipū for the purpose. On the 20th, however, General Coote marched back thither, and on the 22nd, crossing the Kortalaiyar river, relieved Tripasore. Thereupon Tipū raised the siege of the place and retired to Arcot. The monsoon having now fairly set in, and General Coote also being lately confined to bed, the English army received orders, on the 2nd December, to break up their camp on the Cocolore plain and march into cantonments at Poonamallee. And Haidar having done the same in Arcot, the campaign of 1781 ended with the loss of Chittoor, which was retaken by Haidar on or about the 26th of December.⁹⁰

88. Wilson *o.c.*, II. 14, 57-62; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 98-101; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 251-255, 258; Robson, *o.c.*, 125-131; *Memoirs*, I. 225-227; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 448-445. For the text of Haidar's treaty with the Dutch, *vide* Appendix II—(3).

89. *Haid-Nam.*, ff. 80.

90. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 93-94; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 55; also Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 260-262; *Haid-Nam.*, ff. 82; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 448.

During this period, Haidar at Arcot, alarmed for his own safety, prepared to safeguard the place by palisading it with rows of cocconut and palmyra stumps, the enclosure being filled up with pieces of wood, and the entire structure (*lakāḍi-kōṭe*) being intended as a bulwark against cannonading by the enemy. Thus far, Haidar, despite his best efforts, had not completely chastised the English, who had come in the way of the realization of his grand objective, namely, the domination of the whole of Southern India. Accordingly he summoned an informal meeting of his important officers, attended by Tipū, in which he consulted them on the issue. Tipū ventured to assert that Haidar himself was responsible for making the English so powerful. Upbraiding him, Haidar retorted by saying that he had defeated Col. Baillie and had several times put to rout the English army. Nevertheless, the English were coming again and again at the head of their officers. He had hardly taken Madras from them, while Bengal and Bombay were constantly sending in reinforcements. Even if he succeeded in putting these down and established his sway there, there was no end to the arrival of resources in men and ships from England to their succour. This being so, if by chance he himself was slain by a shot on the battlefield, he had his own misgivings, he added, about his son and successor (*i. e.*, Tipū) tackling the problem. Thereupon the councillors begged him to forgive Tipū's offence, and Haidar, before dispersing the audience, brought home to them that the only effective method of keeping the English at bay was to so manouvre as to continually involve them in relations of war with the French on the continent; to set up the people of Irān and Kāndahār against the English possessions in Bengal; and prevail

Haidar at Arcot.

Deliberates on the future conduct of the war, December 1781.

upon the Mahrattas to engage them in Bombay, while he himself was with the help of the French to cut off supplies to and harass the English at Madras. In furtherance of this plan, Appāji Rām, Haidar's *Vakil*, was forthwith invested with powers to enlist fresh recruits to the army—to the extent of 50,000 cavaliers—from Dharwar, Bādāmi and other places in the heart of the Karnāṭak.⁹¹

Early in January 1782, General Coote, despite his illness, marched *via* Tripasore and Shōlinghur for the relief of Vellore, which was again in distress for want of provisions and had been constantly

*Fifth Phase: ,
January-July 1782.
Second relief of Vellore,
January 1782.*

blocked up by Haidar. Haidar, on receipt of this news, assembled his whole force on the western banks of the Pennār ("Poni") river. On the English drawing near, on the 9th, he decamped and retreated towards Lālpēt, leaving the General to take up his grounds at a distance of about twelve miles from Vellore. Haidar sought in vain to impede General Coote's progress thither by the Shōlinghur road, being repulsed with great loss, and the garrison of Vellore being relieved by the General on the 11th, with provisions sufficient for three or four months. At length, after an ineffectual attempt to ensure and cannonade the English army while crossing a swamp near Mahimandaldurg on the 13th, Haidar retreated under the walls of Arcot, and the General returned to Poonamallee, arriving there on the 20th.⁹²

Meantime Abdul Wāhab Khān, younger brother of

Haidar's reduction of Chandragiri.

Nawāb Muhammad Alī, after committing the fort of Chittoor to the care of his Dewān Rai-Bhujanga and the Pālegārs of Mugli, Venkaṭagiri, Kālahasti and other places, had retired to the hill-fort of Chandragiri, and

91. *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 82-84.

92. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 192-195; Wilson *o.c.*, II. 64; also Robson, *o.c.*, 189-141; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 263-266; *Memoirs*, I. 281-283; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 449. Robson writes as if the second relief at

after preparing it for defence, had been enlisting horse and foot to assist the English against Haidar. On receipt of this intelligence, Haidar had detached thither Saiyid Sāhib, nephew of Mīr Alī Razā Khān, one of his generals. Saiyid Sāhib succeeded in reducing Chandra-giri. Abdul Wāhab Khān capitulated on the condition of being permitted to retire with his property to Madras. But a previous breach of faith on the latter's part being considered by Haidar an apology for disregarding his own, Abdul Wāhab Khān was with his family despatched prisoner to Seringapatam.⁹⁸

The commencement of the year 1782, unpropitious as it was to Haidar on the Coromandel coast, was attended with events still more unfavourable to his interests in Malabar, where the Mysoreans under Sardār Khān, Haidar's general, were busy, since November 1781 (*Plava, Kārtika*), laying siege to Tellicherry, the only possession of the English on the West coast. The English troops here were entirely inadequate in numbers for the defence, but a timely reinforcement conveyed from Bombay by Sir Edward Hughes and the zeal of the inhabitants and adjacent chiefs obliged them to continue a protracted defence till 8th January 1782, when the arrival of reinforcements under Major Abingdon enabled them by a determined sortie to raise the siege, capturing all the Mysorean cannon, amounting to sixty pieces, with the whole of their baggage equipments. During this operation, Sardār Khān with his detachment made an obstinate stand from a fortified house, which being at last set on fire, obliged them to quit it. Then, not bearing defeat, he secreted himself in a part of

The tragic end of
Sardār Khān,
Haidar's general,
January 1782.

Vellore took place in December 1781, but he is corrected by other English writers, cited above, who invariably place it in January 1782.

93. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 896-401; Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 97-98. Kirmāṇi places this

the enclosure, which was bomb-proof, and cut into the hill, where he and his family were found, himself wounded by a musket-ball in the ankle. He was taken prisoner with about 1,200 men (1,500 according to one source) who failed in effecting their retreat, while the remaining forces, fugitives who had taken post at the dismantled French settlement of Mahé, surrendered at discretion. To avoid disgrace, however, Sardār Khān, not long after, committed suicide by tearing off his wound, desiring as the last favour that his family might be sent to Seringapatam. Major Abingdon remained in command of the West coast till the arrival at Calicut of Lt. Col. Humberston Mackenzie on the 18th of February, when the same devolved on him.⁹⁴

Meanwhile, on the 5th of January, Trincomalee, another Dutch fort in the South, was stormed by Lt. Orr, with his company of Grenadiers landed by Admiral Sir Edward Hughes. Early in February, the Dutch settlement at Tuticorn surrendered to an English detachment from Palamcottah; and a French squadron commanded by Chevalier de Suffrein anchored off Pulicat, and appeared on the Coromandel coast, on the 15th, to effect a junction with Haidar. On the 17th, a hot and yet well fought out naval action ensued off Sadras between the French and the English fleets, commanded by Sir Edward Hughes and Admiral Suffrein⁹⁵. Elsewhere, the command of the southern army since the capture of

event in 1780 (A. H. 1195); Wilks, who writes from direct knowledge, correctly assigns it to January 1782.

94. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 107-108, 158-159; see also and compare Robson, *o.c.* 131-133; *Memoirs*, I. 252-265; Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 267-268, and *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 79. Wilks speaks of the capitulation of Sardār Khān on 18th January 1782, but Robson and the *Memoirs* are agreed that this took place on 8th January 1782. Robson refers to Sardār Khān as "Saddos Cawn," and Innes Munro and the *Memoirs* as "Surdar Cawn."

95. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 256, 269-271; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II, 123-124; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 67; and *Memoirs*, I. 263-275.

Negapatam (November 10, 1781) having again devolved upon Col. Braithwaite, he had been enabled to demolish its fortifications (the citadel excepted), and march to Karikal and Tranquebar to reestablish the Rājah's government over the territory of Tanjore. Apprised, however, of the arrival of the French fleet, he had, in February, come to Tanjore, and with a design to cover Cuddalore, in case the French should land there, marched, on the 17th of the month, to the vicinity of Pantanellore and encamped in a cocoanut grove near the village of

The battle of Annagudi and the defeat of Col. Braithwaite, February 17-18, 1782.

Annagudi, about six miles north-east of Kumbakōṇam and three miles south of the river Coleroon, with a detachment consisting of 2,000 infantry, 300 horse and 13 guns. Col. Braithwaite, trusting to a system of intelligence actually conducted by Haidar's agency, continued to disbelieve the approach of an enemy as announced to him by an intelligent Indian, until he perceived himself to be surrounded by superior numbers under Tipū, accompanied by Mons. Lally, who had just entered the Tanjore country to raise contributions. The English detachment was furiously attacked on all quarters, and first endeavoured to make good their retreat to Tanjore, but, finding this measure impracticable, a desperate battle ensued. In this, Lt. Sampson, who commanded the little corps with Col. Braithwaite and was popularly known to the Mysoreans as *Brathwaite-Sampson*, greatly distinguished himself. He charged Haidar's *Kushoon* (brigade of infantry) in flank and cutting his way through them, took the road to Tanjore. The action lasted for the space of twenty-six hours, when the English detachment was completely defeated by fresh numbers of Mysoreans continually pouring in upon them, and a dreadful carnage took place in the English ranks, which was, however, put a stop to by the timely interference of Mons. Lally.

Saiyid Gafoor, Subādār, among the Mysoreans, was taken prisoner by the English. At last Col. Braithwaite surrendered at discretion at 12 o'clock on the 18th. Of twenty officers belonging to the detachment, twelve were killed and wounded, Col. Braithwaite himself being among the latter, he with the rest being sent to Seringapatam. The southern army of the English became so weakened by this disaster as to be incapable, for some time afterwards, of appearing openly in the field. Tipū, taking possession of their baggage and stores, marched on to Lālpēt⁶⁶.

The energy of Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, never more conspicuous than at this period—when England, at war with America, France and Holland, was engaged in a life-struggle in India with the Mahratta hosts in the west and Haidar's armies in the south—having triumphed over the mischievous opposition of a Council which had frustrated every public measure, had succeeded in withdrawing the active opposition of Nizām Ali and in detaching Mādhōji Bhōnsle from the Mahratta confederacy by attacking from the side of Bengal the seat of his resources in the centre of the peninsula. He next concluded a treaty with Mahadāji-Sindhia on the 13th October 1781, by which the mediation of the latter was to be employed in bringing about a peace between the English and Haidar and also between the English and the Poona Mahrattas under Nānā Farnavis. The nature of the treaty with Sindhia was soon

96. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 109-110: see also and compare Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 67-70; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 254, 271-273; Robson, *o.c.*, 141-148; and Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 445-447), who refers to Pantanellore as "Puna Nelore". The Mysore army in this action consisted, according to Innes Munro, of "20,000 horse and foot, and 20 guns, with Mons. Lally and 400 French soldiers" (Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 271-272). Wilson, quoting from Lt. Charles Salmon's report, refers to the numbers under Tipū Sahib and Lally as "600 horse, 12,000 infantry, and 20 guns" (Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 68).

discovered by Noor-ud-dīn, the Mysorean vakīl at Poona, who, late in 1781, apprized Haidar that the Mahratta territories north of the river Tungabhadra occupied by Mysore, by virtue of his connection with Raghōba, having been confirmed to it in 1779 by the Poona Government, the Mahrattas would unite with the English in compelling Haidar to make a reasonable peace, unless the latter would immediately evacuate those territories and abandon his claims on the Pālegārs to the south, in which case they undertook to continue the war with the English and bring back Sindhia to the confederacy. Noor-ud-dīn had been given time to receive his master's instructions on this overture and Haidar, though he protracted the negotiations—which, as we shall see, ultimately led to the conclusion of the *Treaty of Sālbaī* (May 17, 1782) between the English and the Mahratta States—was thus, in February 1782, openly threatened with the embarrassing danger of a Mahratta invasion from the north, and felt himself in a critical situation⁹⁷. He had been foiled

Haidar's position
critical, February
1782.

in every battle with Sir Eyre Coote; disappointed, and, as he thought, deceived by the French; assailed in a vulnerable part of the Western territory, where a detachment was destroyed, and farther reinforcements threatened; and a general insurrection of the Nairs in Malabar aggravated by a rebellion in Balam and Coorg added to his misfortunes, while the late defeat inflicted by Tipū on Col. Braithwaite's corps at Annagudi had had no permanent effect in improving his prospects. Deeply reflecting on this unprosperous aspect of affairs, he determined to concentrate his force, to abandon his scheme of conquest on the Coromandel coast, and to direct his undivided efforts, first, for the expulsion of the English from the


97. *Ibid.*, 110-112, 120-121.


Western coast, and afterwards for the preservation of Mysore, and for watching the course of events. He accordingly commenced the destruction of most of the minor posts of Coromandel in his possession; mined the fortifications of Arcot; sent off by large convoys all the heavy guns and stores, and compelled the population of the country to emigrate with their flocks and herds to Mysore⁹⁸. It was about this period that Haidar, being much indisposed, was, either by accident or design, left entirely alone with his Minister Pūrṇaiya. After being for some time apparently immersed in deep thought, he addressed himself to Pūrṇaiya in the following words (related to Col. Wilks by Pūrṇaiya)⁹⁹:

“I have committed a great error. I have purchased
 a draught of *seandee* (*śēndi*, fermented
 His reverie. juice of the wild date tree), at the
 price of a lakh of *pagodas*. I shall pay
 dearly for my arrogance; between me and the English
 there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction,
 but no sufficient cause for war, and I might have made
 them my friends in spite of Mahommed Ali, the most
 treacherous of men. The defeat of many Baillies and
 Braithwaites will not destroy them. I can ruin their
 resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea; and I
 must be first weary of a war in which I can gain nothing
 by fighting...I have been amused by idle expectations
 of a French force from Europe, but supposing it to
 arrive, and to be successful here, I must go alone against
 the Mahrattas, and incur the reproach of the French for

98. *Ibid*, 120-121, Wilks—and following him Wilson (*o.c.*, II. 64)—speaks of Haidar's destruction of his posts in Coromandel, etc., in 1781, an error for February 1782 in keeping with the context.

99. *Ibid*, 121-122. Such laments, exclamations and outbursts occur in the story of mankind; Cf. Cromwell's exclamation and Danton's lament. Danton, in his prison, said, "Oh, it were better to be a poor fisherman than to meddle with governing of men." Cromwell exclaimed: "I do dissolve the Parliament, and let God judge between you and me."





Admiral De Suffrein's Interview with Haidar Ali, March 1782.

distrusting them; for I dare not admit them in force to Mysoor."

Haidar should presumably have been in a mood entirely unknown to him to have given expression to these sentiments. But such is human nature that however strong-minded a man may be, however settled in his conditions, however determined in his plans, and however resolute in carrying them through to achieve his mind, the cumulative effect of successive reverses shakes him to his foundations. We find the following pathetic utterance in *Julius Caesar*¹⁰⁰:

I cannot tell what you and other men
Think of this life; but, for my single self,
I had as lief not be, as live to be
In awe of such a thing as I myself.

Haidar, however, did not sit long in dark despair regretting the passing of "vain empires". The next moment we see him up and doing, deliberating with others, and uplifting himself as he alone could have done.

Preparatory to his own ultimate movement, a force under Saiyid Mokhdum was appointed for the restoration of Haidar's affairs in Malabar, and another under a Woffadar (Chēla) to Coorg, while Shaikh Ayāz,

The surrender of
Cuddalore, April 4,
1782.

another Chēla, was ordered from Bednūr for the recovery of Balam. The spoliation of every movable property in Coromandel was in rapid progress; and a few days only remained before he should have completed his arrangements for springing the mines at Arcot and evacuating the country, when, at last, on the 10th March, intelligence was received of the actual arrival and landing at Porto Novo of the long expected succours from France, amounting to about 3,000 men including a regiment of Africans. Tipū, whose corps still operated in the southern countries, was immediately ordered to

100. Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, Act I. 2.

proceed thither and confer with the chiefs. Haidar had soon afterwards a personal interview with Mons. Cossigny and Admiral Suffrein and being entirely satisfied of the expected arrival of Mons. Bussy at the head of a larger division, it was agreed that while waiting for the junction of these troops, the fort of Cuddalore should be reduced and prepared as a French depot, and that on the arrival of Mons. Bussy, the united forces should seek a decisive action with the English army. In pursuance of this resolution, the French appeared before Cuddalore on the 2nd April, and summoned the Commandant to surrender, offering at the same time favourable terms of capitulation. The place being weak and incapable of holding out any longer, was accordingly given up on the 4th without a shot being fired.¹⁰¹

Meanwhile, of the troops Mons. Bussy had originally embarked for the prosecution of his plans in India, the first division had been captured by Admiral Kempenfelt in December 1781, and the second in April 1782. Several naval engagements also took place at this time in Indian waters, in which the English uniformly gained the advantage. On the 12th of April, however, a sanguinary naval contest ensued off Trincomalee between the French and English fleets commanded by Admirals Suffrein and Hughes, which terminated without any decisive result; and both the fleets, crippled to the extent of being unable to renew the contest, continued at anchor, in sight of each other, until the 19th, when they sailed off to Baticolo and Trincomalee in Ceylon for repairing their damages.¹⁰²

101. *Ibid.*, 122-123, 133-134; see also and compare Wilson, *o. c.*, II. 64-65; Robson, *o. c.*, 148; Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 273; *Memoirs*, I. 277; and Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 447.

102. *Ibid.*, 123-124, 131-132; Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 274-276; *Memoirs*, I. 277-279.

On the surrender of Cuddalore to the French (April 4), they disembarked at the place, when Tipū, who had almost simultaneously encamped there, earnestly sought their support "to destroy and root out" Haidar's enemies. The French General (Admiral Suffrein), however, pleaded the discomfort and length of the sea voyage, and the want of preparation in his military equipment, as reasons for a short delay. About this time, Haidar also, hearing of the arrival of the French at Cuddalore, according to agreement, their meeting with Tipū, etc., marched down from Arcot, in great hopes, to the Red Hills of Pondicherry, from where, joined by the French troops, he suddenly appeared on the 11th of May before Permacoil, a hill-fort situated about twenty miles north-west from Pondicherry. Sir Eyre Coote, on receipt of this intelligence, instantly marched for its relief; but his progress thither having been arrested by a violent monsoon-storm which broke out at this time, the place surrendered by capitulation, on the 16th, from the mutinous state of the garrison and the scarcity of provisions and water.¹⁰³

Nagar-Tagada (?Tyāgadurg) was next taken and the united forces marched towards Wandiwash. Meantime the main English army, which had lain in a state of inactivity at St. Thomas' Mount for full three months, was joined by the 78th or Seaforth's regiment of Highlanders, and, early in May, proceeded in two detachments to checkmate Haidar's progress. The smaller of these detachments marched on with convoys towards Vellore, while the bigger one commanded by General Coote advanced south by way of

Further movements of Haidar and General Coote.

103. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 448; see also and compare Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 134; Wilson, *o. c.*, II. 65; *Memoirs*, I. 279-280; Robson, *o. c.*, 148-149; Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 278; and *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 84.

Carangooly and Wandiwash towards the confederates, encamped upon the Red Hills of Pondicherry. On the 24th of May, the united armies, which had been for four days in sight of Wandiwash, withdrew, on the approach of the English, towards Pondicherry and encamped at Kilyanūr, about 14 miles north-west of Pondicherry. Thereupon General Coote, to make a diversion and if possible to draw the allies from their commanding position to a less advantageous situation, suddenly changed his route to the west and halted before the fort of Chetput. Haidar came quickly to its relief, leaving the French behind him. Then he returned towards Arcot. On the 30th, General Coote marched off further to the west towards Vellore, under cover of the forest of Nāgalāpur and the territory of Bomrāj, the Pālegār, with the avowed object of effectually checking Haidar's supplies and attacking his principal magazine and depot at Ārni.¹⁰⁴

Haidar instantly put his whole army in motion thither.

The action at
Dhōbigarh, May 31,
1782.

Saiyad Hamīd, Shaikh Oonsur and Mons. Lally, with their divisions of troops, were sent to defend Arcot; while Karīm Sāhib, Haidar's younger son, was with Lāla Chubeela Rām and other sardārs despatched with 4,000 horse and 2,000 foot towards Madras to obstruct the passage of troops and convoys proceeding to join the English army. Detaching Tipū with orders to proceed by forced marches, and throw a strong reinforcement into Ārni, Haidar himself marched on and encamped near Dhōbigarh, towards which place General Coote also, leaving Vellore, advanced by way of Chambārgarh, his convoys being

104. Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 134-137; Wilson, *l. c.*, Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 278-281; Robson, *o. c.*, 149-150; *Memoirs*, I. 280-281; *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 84-85, and Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 449.

constantly attacked and intercepted by Tipū's pickets in the rear.¹⁰⁵ On the 31st, an action took place at Dhōbigarh. Haidar, who got his troops in readiness, gave the command of the right and left wings and the main body of his army to his faithful officers, and separating his baggage and followers, with a select body of men and his artillery, remained formed for action. It happened, at this time, that Haidar was seated on his chair, in a garden beneath a banyan tree, and was viewing the various evolutions of the troops, when the disgraced Commandant Muhammad Ali (who had lately been displaced from his regiment for alleged wilful neglect of duty and restricted to the charge of only one horse in Haidar's suite), who was standing among Haidar's body-guard, immediately climbed up the tree in a manner unknown to Haidar. It chanced, at that very moment, that the fortune of the battle turned or was reversed in favour of General Coote, so much, indeed, that at one charge he drove all the advanced parties before him, and rushed straight to the garden. Haidar, on seeing this attack, ordered his officers and the Bukshees to draw the artillery from under the cover of the garden, and bring the guns to bear on the rear of the General's army; and the musketeers and archers to keep up a well-directed fire and discharge from both flanks; and these orders were immediately put in execution. At this time, Haidar sent for his horse, to stand near him, when the Commandant called out aloud, from the top of the tree, "this is the moment for a man to show his manhood." Haidar, looking up to the top of the tree, smiled, and put off his mounting on horse-back. The cavalry of the body-guard and cuirassiers were now put in requisition,

105. Kirmānī, *o. c.*, 449-451; also *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 84; and Wilks, *o. c.* II. 137.

to arrest the progress of the enemy. The elephants also, armed in all ways, were drawn up along the front, while the troops plying their swords, bows and spears, slew a great multitude. Despite this, the English troops, perfectly steady and unshaken, withstood all attacks, and with their muskets, bayonets, galloper-guns and howitzers, raining fire, killed several of their opponents. In this state of the contest, Tipū and other officers, however forcibly they represented and urged that this was not a place in which Haidar could remain; that the English had arrived near and that most of Haidar's troops after fighting hard to stop their progress had been killed and wounded, still Haidar would not stir from the place, but ordered another line of musketeers, archers and riflemen to cover the front of his position, and there he remained. Haidar's faithful servants, being now without resource, thronged under the tree, and having, by signs and threats, disturbed and alarmed the brave Commandant, they induced him to come down from the tree, and with his hands tied, to fall at the feet of

The distinguished
gallantry of Com-
mandant Muhammad
Ali.

Haidar, whom he thus addressed: "Huzrut, mount your horse; this is a dangerous place, and not proper for you to remain in. Leave this deserted garden, and to-day plant your victorious standards in the plain of Arni. Please God, to-morrow we will give our enemies a telling defeat." Haidar, after this, mounted his horse and rode towards Arni. Then the Commandant, alone, putting his horse to speed, charged straight into the ranks of the English troops, and despite the showers of balls falling around him, he with his sharp sword cut down a drummer and a standard bearer; and notwithstanding he himself was wounded by a ball in the forehead and had received a bayonet wound in his side, he brought off the English flag, and returned to Haidar, saying "this is a proof of

what cowards can do". And then was the Commandant restored to his rank and command in the army.¹⁰⁶

On Haidar's march to Ārni and his encampment there, General Coote halted at Dhōbigarh and on the 1st June, proceeded to Aliabad, vigorously attacked on all sides by Haidar's troops. Haidar now, perceiving that the General's views lay towards the Pass of Changama and the Bārāmahal or that he was preparing to march to Trichinopoly under cover of hills and forests, marched from Ārni towards Bagmar Peth, heavily cannonading the English army and throwing them into confusion to seek the cover of the river Anumangalam, at a distance of five miles from Ārni, where they encamped till the evening. During the night, they marched on to the front of Haidar's outposts—who with several regiments of musketeers and some pieces of cannon had been posted near Ārni to command the road—and made a sudden attack on them, taking two of the guns. The battalion of Haidar Alī Bēg, Risāldār, who was then advancing, met and mixed with the troops of the English and a furious battle followed. A great number of men were killed and wounded, while the remainder drew themselves off to one side from the contest. The English General pressed on and surrounded the fort of Ārni, while Haidar, having divided the Mysore army into four parts, the biggest led by himself and the rest by the Pālegārs, Mons. Lally and Commandant Muhammad Alī and Tipū, respectively, planned to attack the English from all sides and rode off thither. Meantime, the

106. *Ibid.*, 451-455; also 449-450. Col. Miles, the translator of Kirmāni's work, says, in a f.n. at p. 451, that the description of the action at Dhōbigarh is "designedly obscure." It is obvious from the context that the action took place about two days prior to the battle of Ārni, *i.e.*, on the 31st May 1782. Kirmāni, without doubt, was of the opinion that Haidar's treatment of Commandant Muhammad Alī was unjust.

English army, having erected a battery before the fort, had begun to storm it, the Killedār Sidi Imām heroically beating back his assailants. At daybreak, on the 2nd June, Tipū with his contingent appeared in one direction and fought his opponents, who formed their forces into three divisions. At about 8 o'clock in the morning, when General Coote after a short march was preparing to encamp near to the fort of Ārṇi, he found himself surprised by a brisk but distant cannonade opened on his rear by the Pāḷegār levies in another direction. The English were about to repel them by organizing themselves into four battalions, when, by 10 o'clock, about three miles from the fort, they came up with the advanced parties of Haidar's own detachment approaching from a third direction. A day of severe fatigue and varied cannonade, accompanied by a succession of skilful manouvres, followed, during which General Coote, exposed to the heavy fire of Haidar, attempted to reduce the latter's various attacks into one settled point, advancing at a quick pace. At length the operations terminated at a little before sunset, Haidar losing a gun, eleven tumbrils and ammunition carts while covering the retreat of his artillery across the dry bed of the river of Ārṇi—a loss highly priced by Haidar, and which was ascribed to the misconduct of Lutif Alī Bēg, who at this critical juncture, had been ordered to make a desperate charge, with a large and select body of cavalry, on the enemy's rear, but suffered himself to be checked by an active and well-directed fire from the horse artillery attached to the English cavalry. Nevertheless, Haidar soon regained his lost ground and at night attacked his opponents while still encamped on the field, throwing them into utter confusion before they could even think of reassembling their scattered regiments. Then he delivered a brisk cavalry charge, forcing the English army to retreat with great loss towards

Vellore and capturing nearly 2,000 soldiers in their ranks.¹⁰⁷

On the ensuing day (3rd June), General Coote again sat down before Ārṇi, but, after a few evolutions, was, owing to scarcity of provisions, the presence of a powerful garrison and the vicinity of Haidar, obliged to abandon his object, and moved against Haidar, on the 4th, in a south-western direction. Haidar retreated as he advanced and returned to Ārṇi. On the 6th, Haidar having moved to the eastward, General Coote again pursued on that day and on the 7th, without any other effect than the tantalizing view of an easy retreat and the capture of some stragglers. On the 8th, the General, while encamped at Neddingul—near

Disaster at Neddingul, June 8, 1782.

Tiruvettore—between Ārṇi and Wandiwash to refresh the cattle and troops, found his grand guard drawn up into an ambuscade of 6,000 of Haidar's chosen horse and totally cut off before any succour could arrive—a disaster which was wholly due to the imprudent conduct of Lt. Cruitzer, the officer in command, who was taken prisoner. Then he proceeded to Wandiwash, arriving at St. Thomas' Mount on the 20th.¹⁰⁸ Meantime, Haidar having moved towards Timri, near Dhōbigarh-Chambārgarh (about twelve miles from Ārṇi), cantoned his troops there for the rainy season; and elsewhere hostilities continued. An English contingent from Madras proceeded to attack a detachment of the Mysore army under Haridāsaiya at Kumbakōṇam, but retraced its steps on the advance of Tipū to the latter's

107. Wilks, *o.c.*, II, 137-138, 142; Wilson, *l.c.*; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 281-283; Robson, *o.c.*, 150-153; *Memoirs*, I, 281-286; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 456-458 and *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 86-87. Wilks and other English writers cited here speak of the battle of Ārṇi as ending with Haidar's "retreat". But in the light of the *Haid. Nām.*, it seems to have eventually ended with the retreat of the English, following Haidar's night attack and cavalry charge. The battle of Ārṇi was thus "a drawn battle", as Haidar always claimed it to be,

relief. Karīm Sāhib having returned with his detachment after an unsuccessful attack on Mutyālpēt (near Madras), another detachment under Lālā Chubeela Rām,

Activities of the
Mysore army else-
where,

also assisted by Tipū, marched towards Masulipatam and Tanjore respectively, and engaged itself in serious conflict with the English troops. A third, under Tōshekhāne Krishṇa Rao, was on the point of coming into rupture with an English force from Madras, while stationed at Valadavūr. Krishṇa Rao was, however, promptly recalled, and he, making rapid marches through Gingee, Chetput and Ārṇi, joined the main body of the Mysore army towards the close of the month.¹⁰⁹

About this time the fortunes of Nawāb Muhammad Ali and the English in the South of India were at a low ebb. In this state, intelligence arrived in Madras of the conclusion of the *Treaty of Sālbai* (May 17, 1782) between the Mahrattas and the English. By this treaty, the Mahrattas, while cautiously avoiding any notice of the territories north of the Tungabhadra, stipulated that within six months after the ratification Haidar should be obliged to relinquish to the English and their allies all territories taken from them since the date of his treaty with Pēshwa Mādhava Rao (February 10, 1767), and that Haidar with his whole force should immediately evacuate the Karnātic, failing which both the parties were to unite for his expulsion from thence.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, Nawāb Muhammad Ali

108. *Ibid.*, 142-143; Wilson, *o. c.*, II. 65-66; Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 263-265; Robson, *o. c.*, 154; and *Memoirs*, I. 286-287. See also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 458.

109. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 87-88; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 458-459.

110. Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 112-113; *Memoirs*, I. 403; Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 291; and Robson, *o. c.*, 154-155; also Grant-Duff, *o. c.*, II. 146-147. This refers to Article IX of the *Treaty of Sālbai*—see text of this Treaty in Kincaid and Parasnis *A History of the Marāṭha People*, vol. III, App. B, pp. 143-144.

and the English, on the plea of ¹¹¹ an expedition to Wandiwash, sought to make peace with Haidar by deputing to his camp two officers of the rank of Colonel.¹¹² The latter, in the course of an interview, insisted on an agreement (*Karār-nāme*) being executed between Muhammad Alī and the English on the one side and Haidar on the other, urging as the basis of settlement the relinquishment to Haidar of Karnātakgarh, Sātgarh and places yielding ten lakhs of *varahas*; the payment of the expenses of his army; the offer of future military assistance to him only at the cost of the allies, and the avoidance of friendly relations with the

French. Haidar, however, began by drawing pointed attention of the mediating officers to the deliberate

Haidar's reply to the proposals.

violation by Muhammad Alī of his solemn engagement to cede Trichinopoly to his master Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya despite the latter's substantial help to him in men and money during the war with Chandā Sāhib (1752). Under the circumstances, he gave out as his ultimatum not to accede to any treaty with the Nawāb and his allies, which would not guarantee for Mysore the cession of the fort and country of Trichinopoly under the old agreement; the reimbursement of the actual expenses of the Mysore army during Nanjarājaiya's expedition to Trichinopoly (1752-1755) together with interest on the amount; the repayment of the loan raised by Muhammad Alī from Nanjarājaiya with up-to-date interest thereon; the surrender of Vellore; the payment of the cost of the present expedition, and the exclusive possession of all the places taken by Haidar.¹¹³ The negotiations, however, which were carried on for over a month,

111. Innes Munre, l.c.

112. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 88.

113. *Ibid.*, ff. 88-90.

proved fruitless, and the English officers returned to Madras in July.¹¹⁴

Sixth Phase : July-December 1782.

Renewed naval engagements in the South, July-September 1782.

By now the importance of acquiring the fort of Negapatam as a depot for the future operations of the French having induced Admiral Suffrein in concert with Haidar to attempt the siege of that "principal key to the Tanjore country" in the South, Admiral Sir Edward Hughes sailed thither from Madras. On the 6th of July, a naval engagement ensued in the Negapatam roads between the French and the English.

114. Innes Munro, l.c.; also *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 90. Innes Munro maintains a discreet silence regarding the details of the English proposals of peace with Haidar, though he piquantly observes: "Hyder Ally, finding himself well supported by his French allies, spurned at our proposals; and after a month being wasted in this fruitless negotiation, we returned to Madras exasperated with the haughty presumption of this politic barbarian" (*Ibid.*). Wilks, writing casually on this topic, is in general agreement with the *Haid. Nām.*, when he says: "During this campaign some advances to negotiation through Colonel Brathwaite, a prisoner in Hyder's camp, were no otherwise remarkable than in assuming as the grounds of the present war the fraud practised by Mahommed Ali on the State of Mysore, in 1752, without noticing the treaty of 1769, which terminated all preceding differences: these advances were followed by the mission of an envoy to the English camp, charged with no definite proposals and instructed merely to feel the dispositions and probable demands of that nation upon Hyder, in the event of his finding it expedient to abandon his French allies....." (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 151). Wilks, however, does not sufficiently appreciate the position that independently of the treaty of 1769, Haidar had his own grounds for the [war] of 1780-1784—and his own objectives to realize—which is adequately reflected in the *Haid. Nām.*, cited above. The *Memoirs*, referring to General Coote as having been invested with powers of peace or war with Haidar, after the conclusion of the *Treaty of Salbāi*, records thus: "The Generalleft Madras on the 1st of July and on the business of peace, approached to Hyder. The Khan, grown old in Asiatic arts, amused and detained him in the neighbourhood of Wandiwash, till our army had consumed not only their own rice, but that also which was for the use of the garrison. Having gained this point, he suddenly required some time for the better adjustment of preliminaries, and withdrew his vakeel, leaving the General wholly in the dark concerning his intentions" (*Memoirs*, I. 408-404). The *Haid. Nām.* forms an admirable supplement to our knowledge of the Anglo-Mysore negotiations about this period.

squadrons, which terminated without a capture, and the French Admiral was forced to withdraw and push for Cuddalore, while the English fleet returned to Negapatam (which the Government of Madras ordered to be destroyed later, in January 1783). On the 1st of August, shortly before his departure from Cuddalore, Admiral Suffrein caused his English prisoners to be delivered to Haidar, by whom they were marched, chained two and two together, to Mysore, on the 12th. On the 24th of the month, the Admiral, sailing from Cuddalore to Baticolo (Batticaloa), about 70 miles to the south of Trincomalee, was joined by two line-of-battleships and a formidable body of French troops. With these reinforcements, he laid siege to Trincomalee, now defended by Capt. Macdowell (the "Macduel" of Innes Munro), forcing it to capitulate on the 30th. This was followed by a hard contested action between the French and the English fleets off Trincomalee on the 3rd September, which terminated as before without capture, and the fleets returned respectively to Cuddalore and Madras, Admiral Hughes arriving at the latter place on the 20th.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile Vellore having been relieved by Ensign Byrne on the 14th June, General Coote, making an excursion thither, relieved it for the fourth and last time by throwing seven months' provisions

Renewed movements of the English and Haidar, August-October 1782.

115. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 144-147, 152; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 285-291; *Memoirs*, I. 404-408, 410. Wilks adversely comments on Admiral Suffrein's handing over of the English prisoners to Haidar as a "diplomatic subterfuge," adding "that the whole civilized world must unite in its abhorrence of delivering to the custody of a barbarian, notorious for his contempt of those laws, prisoners of war entitled to honourable treatment from an honourable enemy," etc. (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 153). The author of the *Memoirs*, quoting the Admiral's correspondence, observes "that if the conduct of Suffrein, in giving up his prisoners to the barbarians, was not wholly excusable, his offence was attended with circumstances of extenuation," etc. (*Memoirs*, I. 423). For the latest detailed treatment of the subject, the interested reader is invited to Sir Murray Hammick's Note in Vol. II. pp. 153-154 of Wilks'

into it on the 5th of August, and then retired to Madras on the 20th. Induced to avail himself of the interval between the two last naval actions and the absence of both fleets from the coast, to concert the means of attempting the recapture of Cuddalore, the General, on the 26th, marched thither, and arrived at the Red Hills of Pondicherry on the 6th of September.¹¹⁶ Haidar also, on the intelligence of the march of the English army southwards and of the arrival of expected French reinforcements from overseas, despatched from Dhöbigarh a detachment towards the Pass of Changama, and himself moved on Cuddalore. From here he was soon forced to retire towards the pass of Tiruvannāmalai to replenish his supplies and recall Tīpū, away in the Tanjore country, to watch the progress of the English against Cuddalore. General Coote's stores of provisions, however, being inadequate and he being disappointed at the arrival of rice ships from Sadras, was forthwith compelled to drop the siege and retire to Madras, on receipt of news of the fall of Trincomalee and the return to Madras of Admiral Hughes after the action of 3rd September. Elsewhere in the South, after varied successes for English arms under Col. Nixon since Col. Braithwaite's defeat by Tīpū (February 1782), Col. Ross Lang was appointed to the command of the southern army at Tanjore on the 23rd September. The health of General Sir Eyre Coote requiring change of air, he embarked for Bengal on the 28th and was succeeded by Major General James Stuart, Sir Hector Munro having previously resigned. Early in October, General Stuart beat a hasty retreat from Pondicherry, his flanks being closely pressed

Mysoor, where, on an examination of all the available literature, he concludes that "it is impossible to justify Admiral Suffrein's conduct" on the issue.

116. *Ibid.*, 144, 148-149; see also and compare Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 66-67; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 292-293; and *Memoirs*, I. 408.

upon and a greater part of his baggage being taken by the Mysorean hussars (*Looty-wāllahs*). The monsoon having set in, a most violent storm broke out in Madras on October 15th. On the 19th, General Stuart arrived at St. Thomas' Mount, where the English army cantoned for the rains. Haidar also selected for the same purpose an elevated ground on the left bank of the river Poní, about sixteen miles to the northward of Arcot, while the French cantoned in Cuddalore and its vicinity.¹¹⁷

In Malabar, on the West coast, shortly after the death of Sardār Khān, the Mysore General, Renewed campaign in Malabar, April-November 1782. in January 1781, the Nairs and Moplahs having risen in rebellion against Haidar's authority, Haidar despatched thither Saiyid Mokhdum, his brother-in-law and Governor of the country south of Seringapatam, armed with full powers and resources to put them down and restore order in the country. Early in April, Lt. Col.

Col. Humberston Mackenzie's movements. Humberston Mackenzie, who, as we have seen, had succeeded Major Abingdon to the command of the West

coast in February, being joined by a body of Nairs, moved about twenty miles to the southward, and close to Tricalore, and on the 7th of the month, came in

Defeat and death of Saiyid Mokhdum, April 7, 1782. contact with Haidar's detachment under Saiyid Mokhdum. The latter, confident in superior numbers estimated at

seven thousand, waited the result of an action, in a strong but most injudicious position, with a deep and difficult river in the rear of his right. From this position he was dislodged, and the retreat by the left being interrupted by a judicious movement of the English troops, a large portion of the Mysorean right was driven into the river, with a loss in killed alone estimated at

117. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 90; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 148-149, 151-155; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 72; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 293-297; and *Memoirs*, I. 408-409.

between three and four hundred men, among them Saiyid Mokhdum himself.¹¹⁸

Col. Humberston then endeavoured to draw Haidar's attention from the Karnatic by taking the fort of Tricalore and marching to Calicut. Reinforced by troops from Bombay and those sent by the king of Travancore, the Colonel, following the routes of the fugitives as far as Andicota, made a bold, though hazardous, attempt to penetrate into the Mysore country to the east, but finding pursuit unavailing, he resumed his plan of proceeding by the river Paniani to the attack of the important fort of Pālghātchēri, "the key to the only pass to general communication between the

Col. Humberston's further movements, down to November 1782.

The siege of Pālghātchēri, his objective.

east and west coasts". The monsoon having, however, broken, about the 17th of April, the Colonel was induced to march to the towns of Tanūr and Paniani. During these movements, the Mysoreans rallied at Rāmagiri, a place situated about half-way from the coast to Pālghātchēri, whence detachments of cavalry were advanced for the usual purpose of causing annoyance. Col. Humberston being seriously indisposed, directed Major Campbell to advance towards the enemy, who again waited the attack in an injudicious position, and were defeated with the loss of two guns on the 18th of May. Then the Colonel, seeking for better cover to shelter his troops during the monsoon, returned to Calicut, from where he was again in motion for the prosecution of his design. On the 21st of September, he obtained possession of Rāmagiri, and leaving, under the protection of a battalion of sepoy there, the whole of his battering train and heavy equipments, he marched, on the 11th of October, with six-pounders, two one-pounders, and the remainder

118. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 157-159; see also and compare *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 79, 90 and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 458-460, 466-468.

of his force "to reconnoitre the country and fortress of Palgautcherry, before he should undertake to attack it." The remains of the Mysorean troops appeared to make a stand in a position not far from the place, but suffered themselves to be easily dislodged, and retreated into the fort, on the 18th. The Colonel proceeded, under cover of his troops, to reconnoitre the southern and western works; he moved on the 19th to the northward of the fort, and after finding that it was stronger than he had reason to apprehend, he returned on the 21st to his first ground to the westward of the place, but in this movement, a judicious and well-timed sortie produced the loss of nearly the whole of his provisions, and the discomfiture of all his Nairs, who seem to have gone off in a panic, in consequence of being attacked in a morass during a thick fog. On the 22nd, he fell back to a little place named Mangaricota, eight miles distant, where he had left some provisions. An attack in force upon his rear repelled with judgment and spirit was of less importance than the distress sustained by violent rains which fell from the 21st to the 24th, and rendered impassable a rivulet in his rear. Having, however, on the 10th of November, received at Mangaricota orders from Bombay to return to the coast, he commenced his march thither on the 12th. On the 14th, he was at Rāmagiri, about half way from Pālghāt to the coast. On the 19th, Col. Macleod, who had been sent by Sir Eyre Coote to assume the command, landed at Paniani.¹¹⁹

Haidar, since the defeat of Saiyid Mokhdum, had made all the necessary arrangements to repair that misfortune as soon as the season should permit. Tipū's usual command, including the corps of Mons.

Haidar counter-acts the English design.

119. *Ibid.*, 159-163; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 300-301; and *Haid-Nām.*, ff. 90.

Lally, had been reinforced and improved, and towards the close of the rains in Malabar, affected to be meditating some blow in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, in order that Tipū might be enabled by a few marches to come unexpectedly upon Col. Humberston from the West coast. Accordingly, Tipū commenced his forced marches from the vicinity of Karoor, in the

Tipū with Mons:
Lally at Pālghāt,
November 16, 1782.

confidence of finding Colonel Humberston at Mangaricota, advancing his stores for the siege of Pālghāt, overrunning the south-west, and occupying outposts as far as Calicut. Tipū arrived at Pālghāt on the 16th, when Col. Humberston had receded to Rāmagiri. Though at first determined upon carrying the siege of Pālghāt, the Colonel, on the 20th, being

Col. Humberston's retreat,
November 20, 1782.

overtaken within two miles of Paniani, retreated with his whole force from the field, incessantly harassed and cannonaded at the defiles and swamps by multitudes of Mysorean matchlock infantry and cavalry, who hung heavily upon his rear the whole way and stripped his army of all its baggage and cattle. Col. Macleod having in the meanwhile succeeded Col. Humberston to the command at Paniani, began to strengthen the place by some field-works, and on the 25th attempted to surprise Tipū's camp by night. On the morning of the 29th, before daybreak, the field-works being still unfinished, Tipū attempted the strong but weakly occupied position of Col. Macleod by a well designed attack in four columns, one of them headed by Lally's corps; but such was the vigilance, discipline and

Tipū's discomfiture at Paniani
at the hands of
Col. Macleod,
November 29, 1782.

energy of the English troops that the attempt ended in total discomfiture and confusion, Tipū himself being wounded in the thigh and all his troops being dispersed. Tipū, after this ineffectual

attempt, retired to a further distance, to wait the arrival of his heavy equipments, in order to resume the attack on the position at Paniani.¹²⁰

At this juncture occurred an event of the utmost consequence to Mysore. The health of Haidar had begun perceptibly to decline during the latter part of the year, and in November he developed an abscess, or cancer, in his back, known as the *Rāj-pora* or *Surtan*, the royal sore or boil. The united efforts of Hindu, Muhammadan and French physicians were of no avail, and the disease proving fatal, Haidar breathed his last in his camp at Narasingarāyanpet, near Chittoor, on the 7th of December 1782, at the age of sixty.¹²¹

120. *Ibid*, 163-166; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 301-302; *Haid Nām.*, l.c., Kirmāṇī, *o.c.*, 458-466 (referring only to Tipū's raids in the southern country before his march towards Pālghāt).

121. *Ibid*, 166-167; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 72; and *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 90-91, referring to Haidar's death on *Śubhakṛit*, *Mārgasīra* śu-3, corresponding to Wilks' date, 7th December 1782. See also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 302; Robson, *o.c.*, 155; *Memoirs*, I. 425; and Kirmāṇī, *o.c.*, 469-473. Kirmāṇī speaks of General Sir Eyre Coote's death before Haidar's, and of the latter being informed of the same (see Kirmāṇī, *o.c.*, 470). This is incorrect, for, we know, the General died, after his arrival at Madras, on the 27th April 1783, nearly five months after Haidar's demise (see Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 75).

CHAPTER VI.

KHASHA-CHĀMARAJA WOPEYAR VIII, 1776-1796—(contd.)

Character and personality of Haidar Ali—His characteristics and modes of business—Varying European views: Innes Munro's opinion—The testimony of the *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia*—Wilks' view—some Indian views: Kirmani's characterization—The *Haidar-Namah* (1784)—Haidar's work for Mysore: *a.* As a strenuous political builder—*b.* As a benevolent administrator—*c.* As a tolerant man—*d.* As a "King-maker"—Haidar's supreme objective: "Greater Mysore"—His death: what it meant for Mysore—Reflections on Haidar's policy—The reaction to his internal policy—His external policy: Haidar and the combination of the English, Nizam and the Mahrattas—Haidar as a diplomat—Treaty rights—Haidar's limitations—Why he failed—What he should have done—A parallelism and a contrast: Haidar and Oliver Cromwell—Other comparisons—Haidar, an efficient but not a lovable administrator—Blots in the character of Haidar—Some anecdotes illustrative of Haidar's personal characteristics: Kirmani and Mirza Ikbal—Other writers: Wilks—De La Tour—The story of Khākee Shah—Concluding observations.

WAR first brought Haidar Ali to notice, and engaged in war he died. War was his element. In war, he commanded a division always and he handled it with a blend of skill, caution, imagination and courage. Sometimes he failed as in the Mahratta wars of 1764 with Pēshwa Mādhava Rao and at Porto Novo, but he probably never would admit that they were successes to his enemies. The brief periods of repose between one warlike expedition and another were consumed in repairing the losses of the last, or providing the means for the next. The arts and products of peace he valued as they

Character and personality of Haidar Ali.

furnished the sinews of war. But it is impossible to withhold homage from the great natural talents which raised an unlettered adventurer to the supreme control of a powerful kingdom, or the indomitable energy and fertility of resource which found in the most desperate reverses but fresh opportunities of rising. We have explained at some length, in an earlier part of this work,¹ the psychological background and the physical and intellectual make-up of Haidar, which to a great extent contributed to his success. He could neither read nor write any language, though he spoke fluently Hindustani, Kannada, Marathi, Telugu and Tamil. The sum of his literary attainments consisted in learning to write the initial of his own name, *H*, to serve as his signature on public occasions; but either from inaptitude to learn, or for the purpose of originality, he inverted its form, and signed thus, *hh* (copied from a grant in the Inām office). In person he is described as robust and of medium height, of dark complexion, with an aquiline nose and small eyes. Contrary to the usual custom of Mussalmans, his face was clean shaven, even the eyebrows and eyelashes being removed. The most striking article of his dress was a scarlet turban, flat at the top, and of immense diameter. His uniform was flowered white satin, with yellow facings and yellow boots, and a white silk scarf round his waist. He was fond of show and parade on great occasions, and at such times was attended by a thousand spear-men, and preceded by bards who sang of his exploits in the Kannada language. He was an accomplished horseman, a skilful swordsman, and a dead shot. He had a large harem of six hundred women, but his strong sensual instincts

1. See *Ante*, Vol. II. 256-281. Compare articles on *Haidar Ali—His Religious Disposition Character, Personality and Private life, And Relation with the Crown*, in the *Q. J. M. S.* (Vol. XXIX. 452-465- and XXXI. 25-35) and *Proc. I. H. R. C.* (Vol. XVIII. 301-304), being a recent attempt at a rather diffuse exposition of the subject.

were never allowed to interfere with public business. From sunrise to past noon he was occupied in public durbar; he then made his first meal, and retired to rest for an hour or two. In the evening, he either rode out or returned to business. But frequently the night was enlivened with the performances of dancing girls or of actors of comedies. He took a second meal about midnight and retired to rest, sometimes having drunk freely.²

The following extracts from accounts by the Rev. W. Schwartz, who was sent by the English in 1779 to Haidar as a peace-maker, contain a graphic description of his characteristics and modes of business:³

His characteristics and modes of business. "Haidar's palace is a fine building in the Indian style. Opposite to it is an open place. On both sides are ranges of open buildings, where the military and civil servants have their offices, and constantly attend. Haidar can overlook them from his balcony. Here reigns no pomp, but the utmost regularity and despatch. Although Haidar sometimes rewards his servants, yet the principal motive is fear. Two hundred people with whips stand always ready to use them. Not, a day passes on which numbers are not flogged. Haidar applies the same cat to all transgressors alike, gentlemen and horse-keepers, tax-gatherers and his own sons. And when he has inflicted such a public scourging upon the greatest gentlemen, he does not dismiss them. No, they remain in the same office, and bear the marks of the stripes on their backs as public warnings, for he seems to think that almost all people who seek to enrich themselves are void of all principles of honour.....

"When I came to Haidar, he desired me to sit down alongside of him. The floor was covered with exquisite tapestry. He received me very politely, listened friendly and

2. *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv, 2586-2538 (based mainly on Wilks, o. c., II. 754-756; also Kirmāni, o. c. 477).

3. *Ibid.*, 2538-2539 (quoting from Wilks, o. c., I. pp. 846-847). As to Schwartz, see also Appendix II—(4).

with seeming pleasure to all I had to say. In reply, he spoke very openly and without reserve.....When I sat near Haidar, I particularly observed in what a regular succession, and with rapid despatch, his affairs proceeded one after the other. Whenever he made a pause in speaking, an account was read to him of the district and letters received. He heard it, and ordered the answer immediately. The writers ran, wrote the letter, read it, and Haidar affixed his seal. Thus, in one evening, a great many letters were expedited. Haidar can neither read nor write, but his memory is excellent. He orders one man to write a letter and another to read it to him. If the writer has in the least deviated from his orders, his head pays for it. What religion people profess, or whether they profess any at all, that is perfectly indifferent to him. He has none himself, and leaves every one to his choice."

English and French writers widely differ in their estimates of the character and greatness of Haidar. Captain Innes Munro of the 73rd (or Lord Macleod's) Regiment of Highlanders, who took an active part in the military operations on the Coromandel Coast against the combined forces of the French, Dutch and Haidar from the year 1780 to the peace concluded in 1784, has left on record a view of Haidar's talents, which, besides being a contemporary one, is also fairly just to him. Writing in July 1780, he said :⁴

"Many have compared the military genius and character of Hyder Ally to those of the renowned Frederick the Second, King of Prussia; and indeed, when we consider the distinguished abilities of that prince amongst his contemporaries in this country, and the intrepid manner by which he had established himself upon the throne of Mysore, and extended his dominions, one cannot but allow the simile to be exceedingly just.

"Hyder Ally first placed himself at the head of the Mysore army entirely by his military prowess. A great part

4. *Ibid*, 2539-2541 (quoting Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 119-123).

of that kingdom borders upon the Mahratta states, which occasions a constant enmity betwixt two powers. The Mahrattas, being in former times the most powerful warriors, were always making unlawful encroachments upon the Mysore territories; but when Hyder Ally came to head the troops of that nation against its enemies, he soon convinced the Mahrattas that his countrymen only wanted a proper leader to make ample retaliation; for, by his prudence and conduct in the art of war, he not only drove them back to their own country, but considerably extended the Mysore Kingdom by acquisitions from the Mahratta frontiers, which all the efforts of the latter have been ineffectual to retrieve. By these exploits, he ingratiated himself much into the favour of his countrymen; and was particularly admired and respected by the soldiers under his command, for his singular address and intrepidity, although he was at the same time reckoned austere and arbitrary in his deportment. Hyder soon afterwards availed himself of this attachment in the usual Asiatic manner; for, upon the demise of his sovereign, the old King of Mysore, he immediately usurped the throne under the title of regent and guardian to the young prince (who was then an infant); and has ever since assumed the supreme authority and titles of Navob of Mysore, keeping the real heir confined within the walls of Seringapatam, the capital of the Mysore country, who is occasionally exhibited to the public by way of show or form, as Mahomed Ally, the Navob of Arcot, is at Madras by the Company, who, excepting empty titles, has in like manner been divested of every prerogative in the Carnatic.

"Hyder now became a terror to all his neighbours; for, having united the talents of a profound politician to those of an able warrior, he showed uncommon abilities in forming such judicious establishments, both civil and military, in his dominions, as in course of time rendered him the most formidable and potent prince in Hither Hindostan.

"As all great acquisitions in this country are made by force of arms, the first object with Hyder Ally was to establish a good army; and experience taught him, in the course of his frequent conflicts with the English, that European disci-

pline was absolutely essential to that end. He therefore endeavoured, by every possible means, to allure to his standard military adventurers of all nations and tribes, but particularly the European artificers and sepoys that had been trained up in the Company's service, to whom he held out the most tempting rewards; nor did he ever want emissaries for this purpose in every battalion in the Company's service, as appears from the words of command which are now given in English throughout his whole army.

"By this means he soon brought his established forces to a perfection in European discipline never before known amongst the black powers in India; and his progress in tactics has been matter of astonishment and terror to all those who have ventured to encounter him in the field. But what at once show the extended ideas and ambition of this prince, are his surprising endeavours to become formidable at sea. No art has been left untried to entice into his pay our ship-carpenters and dockyard-men from Bombay and other places; and in this attempt the French and other European powers have been induced to assist him; so that the progress which he has already made in constructing docks and equipping a naval force is almost incredible.

"The surprising energy of this man's uncultivated mind (for he is totally ignorant of letters), when compared to the rest of his contemporaries in power, is truly worthy of admiration. Who, but an hero born to conquer, would at once relinquish all the prejudices and ill-founded habits of his country, so foreign to ours, and so readily adopt whatever European improvements appeared most essential to secure his Government, to extend his empire, and to render his name immortal? He is not only sublime in his views, but capable of seeing them minutely executed. His ends are always great, his means prudent, and his generosity unbounded, whenever proper objects offer; nor can any prince be more watchful over the intrigues of his enemies both abroad and at home; by which means he knows well where to anticipate hostile designs, and where to take advantage.

"It is not then to be wondered at, if a prince possessed of so many great qualities, and so ambitious of fame and high

honours as Hyder Ally Cawn, should behold his powerful neighbours the English, and their ally the Navab of Arcot, with an eye of jealousy and hatred. It can only be from political motives if ever he is at any time induced to show them a fair face; for I have been told from good authority that he secretly entertains an implacable aversion to all Europeans, which he takes as much care to instil into the mind of his son Tippu, as Hamilcar, the famous Carthaginian general, did when he caused Hannibal to take the oaths of perpetual enmity against the Romans. Need we then have doubted that he would openly declare those sentiments whenever an opportunity offered? No; his reasons were too well founded ever to admit of a deviation from them; nor can he be blamed for breathing a spirit of patriotism, which is natural to every native of Hindostan."

Equally valuable is the almost contemporaneous testimony of the anonymous work *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* by an officer of Col. Baillie's Detachment. Recording for the year 1780, it states⁵ :—

"Hyder Ally Cawn was regent of the Kingdom of Mysore, a dignity to which he had raised himself by abilities and by crimes, by valour and policy in arms, by intrigue, by treachery, and by blood. He was the son of a Mahommadan soldier of fortune, who commanded a fort on the confines of Mysore, and followed, of course, the profession of arms. When he first entered into the Rajah of Mysore's service, he was distinguished by the name of Hyder Naig or Corporal Hyder. He rose by degrees to the command of the Rajah's army; and, on the death of that Prince, he seized the reins of government, under the title of Guardian to the young Prince, whom he confined in Seringapatam, together with the whole royal family; exhibiting them only at certain stated seasons, in order to soothe and please the people. He possessed great vigour of body and mind: but his manners were savage and cruel; and he frequently inflamed the natural ferocity of his temper by intoxication. Like many other chiefs in India,

5. *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* (1788), I. 121-127. Also Appendix II—(5), on the authorship of this work.

with whom it is not accounted any disgrace to be ignorant of letters, he could not either read or write; so that he was obliged to make use of interpreters and secretaries. The method he contrived for ascertaining whether his interpreters made faithful reports of the letters they read, and if his secretaries expressed in writing the full and the precise meaning of what he communicated, displays, at once, that suspicion which was natural to his situation, and that subtlety which belonged to his nature. He confined three different interpreters in separate apartments, who made their respective reports in their turns. If all the three should make different reports, then he would punish them by a cruel death. If two should coincide in their report, and one differ from these two, then that one would suffer death. But the interpreters, knowing their fate if they should depart in one single instance from the truth, explained, as might be expected, the letters committed to their inspection with the utmost fidelity. As to the method by which he discovered whether his amanuenses were faithful or no, he placed three of them, in like manner, in three separate places of confinement, and to each of them apart he dictated his orders. Their manuscripts he put into the hands of any of those that were about him who could read, from whom he learned whether his clerks had faithfully expressed his meaning. When he passed sentence of death, he was on some occasions, like the Dey of Algiers and other barbarian despots, himself the executioner, for though he affected to consider his army as his guards, he well knew that he reigned in their hearts not from love but fear, mixed indeed with an admiration of his singular address and intrepidity. The force of this man's mind, such is the advantage of nature over art, burst through the prejudices of education and restraints of habit, and extended his views to whatever European improvements he deemed the most fitted to secure his government, to extend his empire, and to render his name immortal. He invited and encouraged every useful and ingenious manufacturer and artisan to settle in his dominions; he introduced the European discipline in his army, and laboured,

not altogether without success, for the formation of dock-yards, and the establishment of a navy.

"At the same time that he was sublime in his views, he was capable of all that minute attention which was necessary for their accomplishment. His ends were great; his means prudent. A regular economy supplied a source of liberality, which he never failed to exercise, whenever an object, which he could render in any shape subservient to his ambition, solicited his bounty. He rewarded merit of every kind, but he was particularly munificent to all who could bring important intelligence. He had his eyes open on the movements of his neighbours, as well as on every part, and almost on every person within his dominions. Hence he knew where to anticipate hostile designs, and where to take advantages; where to impose contributions without drying up the springs of industry; and where to find the most proper instruments for his purposes, whether of policy or war. He inspected, in person, every horseman or sepoy that offered himself to his service: but with every officer of any note, he was intimately acquainted. He made a regular distribution of his time: and, although he sacrificed to the pleasures of life, as well as to the pomp of state, in business he was equally decisive and persevering.

"With regard to the person of Hyder Ally, for every circumstance relating to so distinguished a character becomes interesting, he was of a middling stature, inclining to corpulency, his visage quite black, the traits of his countenance manly, bold, and expressive: and as he looked himself with a keen and piercing eye into every human face that approached him, so he judged of men very much from their physiognomy, connecting in his imagination a bashful, timid, and wandering eye, with internal consciousness of guilty actions, or pravity of intention; but a bold and undaunted look, on the other hand, with conscious innocence and integrity.

"With such qualities and by such arts as these, Hyder Ally Cawn raised a small state into a powerful empire; and converted into a race of warriors, an obscure, peaceable and timid people. By alluring to his standard military adventurers of all nations and tribes, but chiefly Europeans, whenever it was in his power, and by training through their means his

Mysorean subjects to the use of arms, he extended his dominions, which were bounded on the east and the south by the Carnatic, and the plains of Coimbatore, and on the west and north by the Malabar regions and the country of Ghutta and Bednore, across the peninsula to the territories of Palnaud and Ganjam, on the coast of Coromandel, and, on the Malabar sea, as far north as Goa."

Lt. Col. Wilks, writing early in the 19th century
mainly from a knowledge of sources to
Wilks' view. which he had direct access, records⁶ :—

"On the conquest of a new country, it was his invariable habit to inflict some memorable severities, not only for the purpose of extorting money, but with the avowed object of impressing his new subjects with a salutary terror of his name. On the same avowed principle, of inspiring terror into all descriptions of men, whether absent or present, he availed himself of a police too horribly perfect to punish with boundless cruelty the slightest levity of observation, made in the confidence and seclusion of domestic intercourse, that had any reference to his public or private conduct; and thus, where it was worse than death to blame, unqualified applause became the necessary habit of public and of private life.

"In spite of this reputation, and the notorious system of exaction and torture applied to every individual who had to render an account, men of almost every country were attracted to his court and standard, by brilliant prospects of advancement and wealth; but a person, once engaged in his service and deemed to be worth keeping, was a prisoner for life: he would hear of no home but his own, and suffered no return; but the summary severity, cruelty, and injustice of his character were directed rather to the instruments than the objects of his rule; official men had cause to tremble; but the mass of the population felt that the vigour of the Government compensated for many ills, and rendered their condition comparatively safe.

"In action, Hyder was cool and deliberate, but enterprising and brave when the occasion demanded. In his early

6. *Mys. Gaz.*, II. 2542-2545 (quoting Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 757-760).

career, and in his wars with the native powers, he was far from sparing of his person, but opposed to Europeans, it was observed that he never personally encountered the heat of action. His military pretensions are more favourably viewed in the conduct of a campaign than of a battle; and if the distinction can be allowed, in the political, than in the military conduct of a war. In the attack and defence of places, he and his son were equally unskilled; because in that branch of war, no experience can compensate for want of science.

"In Council he had no adviser, and no confidant; he encouraged, on all occasions, a free discussion of every measure suggested by himself or by others, but no person knew at its close, what measures he would adopt in consequence.

"Hyder was of all Mohammedan princes the most tolerant, if, indeed, he is himself to be considered as a Mussulman. He neither practised, nor had ever been instructed how to practice, the usual forms of prayer, the fasts, and other observances. He had a small rosary, on which he had been taught to enumerate a few of the attributes of God, and this was the whole of his exterior religion. It was his avowed and public opinion, that all religions proceed from God, and are all equal in the sight of God; and it is certain that the mediatory power represented by *Rangaswamey*, the great idol in the temple of Seringapatam, had as much, if not more, of his respect, than all the Imaums, with Mohammed at their head.

"In common with all Sovereigns who have risen from obscurity to a throne, Hyder waded through crimes to his object; but they never exceeded the removal of real impediments, and he never achieved through blood what fraud was capable of effecting. He fixed his steadfast view upon the end, and considered simply the efficiency, and never the moral tendency of the means. If he was cruel and unfeeling, it was for the promotion of his objects, and never for the gratification of danger or revenge. If he was ever liberal, it was because liberality exalted his character and augmented his power; if he was ever merciful, it was in those cases where the reputation of mercy promoted future submission. His European prisoners

were in irons, because they were otherwise deemed unmanageable; they were scantily fed, because that was economical; there was little distinction of rank, because that would have been expensive: but beyond these simply interested views, there was by his authority no wanton severity; there was no compassion, but there was no resentment: it was a political expenditure, for a political purpose, and there was no passion, good or bad, to disturb the balance of the account. He carried merciless devastation into an enemy's country, and even to his own, but never beyond the reputed utility of the case; he sent the inhabitants into captivity, because it injured the enemy's country, and benefited his own. The misery of the individuals was no part of the consideration, and the death of the greater portion still left a residue, to swell a scanty population. With an equal absence of feeling, he caused forcible emigrations from one province to another, because he deemed it the best cure for rebellion; and he converted the male children into military slaves, because he expected them to improve the quality of his army. He gave fair, and occasionally brilliant encouragement, to the active and aspiring among his servants, so long as liberality proved an incitement to exertion, and he robbed and tortured them, without gratitude or compunction, when no farther services were expected; it was an account of profit and loss, and a calculation whether it were most beneficial to employ or to plunder them.

"Those brilliant and equivocal virtues which gild the crimes of other conquerors, were utterly unknown to the breast of Hyder. No admiration of bravery in resistance, or of fortitude in the fallen, ever excited sympathy, or softened the cold calculating decision of their fate. No contempt for unmanly submission ever aggravated the treatment of the abject and the mean. Everything was weighed in the balance of utility, and no grain of human feeling, no breath of virtue or of vice was permitted to incline the beam.

"There was one solitary example of feelings incident to our nature, affection for an unworthy son whom he nominated to be his successor, while uniformly, earnestly, and broadly predicting, that this son would lose the empire which he himself had gained."

The *Neshauni-Hyduri* (*History of Hydur Naik*, by Kirmāṇi, translated from the Persian by Colonel W. Miles), written in the early years of the 19th century, says⁷:—

"In all the cities and towns of his territory, besides news-writers, he appointed separately secret writers and spies to patrol the streets at night, and from them he received his intelligence. From morning to night he never remained a moment idle. He was a slave to the regulation of his working establishments..... All the operations or measures undertaken by Hyder's government, small or great, were superintended by himself in person; insomuch that even leather, the lining of bullock-bags, tent-walls, and strands of rope, all passed under his inspection, and were then deposited in his stores."

The *Ahwāli Hydur Naik* (by Mirza Ikbāl, printed as supplement to Kirmāṇi's *Neshauni-Hyduri*) thus describes the state of the country in Haider's time⁸:—

"By his power, mankind were held in fear and trembling; and from his severity God's creatures, day and night, were thrown into apprehension and terror. Cutting off the nose and ears of any person in his territories was the commonest thing imaginable, and the killing a man there was thought no more of than the treading on an ant. No person of respectability ever left his house with the expectation to return safe to it."

The contemporary local view of Haider's character is perhaps best reflected in the anonymous Kannada memoir *Haider-Nāmah* (1784), which, though written by a Hindu admirer of his, is singularly fair to him. It sums up thus⁹:—

"Haider's regime (1761-1782) has been no less remarkable for his display of qualities of skill, courage, mercy

7. *Ibid.*, 2541-2542 (quoting Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 474-475). For further references to Kirmāṇi and Mirza Ikbāl re: Haider's character, etc., see *Ante*, vol. II, l.c.

8. *Ibid.*, 2542 (quoting from Kirmāṇi's work, *o.c.*, 510-511).

9. *Haider-Nām.*, ff-109-110.

and charity than for his vigour and wisdom in the acquisition and use of wealth, and tact and discipline in the handling of men. Never before was there a ruler, or perhaps will be one in future, who, coming to the forefront by sheer good luck coupled with personal prowess, wields the sceptre of political power which eschews hatred to Gods and Brāhmans (*dēva brāhmaṇa dvēsha rahita rāja-drōha*). In short, it is not far from truth to say that Haidar is a man perfect in all the qualities (*sakala guṇābhirāma*). Nevertheless there were some defects in him which were like poison mixed up with milk. One such is noteworthy, namely, the capture by force of beautiful damsels wherever they might be found. A second one was that he was treacherous, broke promises, and teased and punished men summarily (without due enquiry). Had he only been free from these defects, there is no doubt that he would have been considered the noblest of men in this world (*satpurusha*). But, alas, just as a thousand paintings are marred by a blot of ink (*sāvira chittāra ondu masi nungidante*), the regime of Haidar could not last long."

These gleanings apart, the sources utilised thus far enable us to go into the larger question of Haidar's work for Mysore. Though cut off at the most important period of his life, Haidar, as the *Sarvādhikāri* or "Regent and Generalissimo" of Mysore, had, by his strenuous exertions for over two decades (1761-1782), extended the kingdom up to the Krishnā in the north, and had very nearly succeeded in making her southern frontier coterminous with Rāmēśvaram in the south, with a tendency to advance further in the direction of the Northern Circārs and Travancore respectively. And all this, despite the chronic pressure of the Mahrattas on the one hand and the persistent opposition and hostility of Nawāb Muhammad Ali and his allies the English on the other, an achievement which was nothing short of the great Mediaeval Vijayanagar Empire. Indeed it might be said without fear of contradiction that within a century

Haidar's work for Mysore: a. As a strenuous political builder.

after the extinction of that famous power, Mysore had practically stepped into its place as its sole Hindu representative in the land, and, with Seringapatam as the centre of political gravity, her scheme of expansion in the north and the south was but a counterpart of the old Vijayanagar policy, inherited by the early rulers of Mysore in the seventeenth century, sought to be developed by the Dalavāis about the middle of the eighteenth century and consistently followed by Haider in the latter part of that century. Thus was Haider a fitting heir to the rich Imperial tradition of the Karnāṭak, and, viewed on this footing, his political work for Mysore acquires supreme significance.

By 1782, the kingdom of Mysore, thus built up, extended over a circumference of about 480 miles (40 *gāvudās*)¹⁰, while her coast-line on the West coast covered about 600 *kōś* (i.e., 1350 miles), running from near Goa in the north to below Calicut in the south.¹¹ Haider improved and consolidated the ancient system of government, civil and military, on a solid basis.¹² In particular, he reformed the local taxation, abolishing certain taxes, like "*Iraḷu tappina terige*" (tax on offences committed during nights) and "*Bāla terige*" (tax on tailed animals), which gave revenue officers ample opportunities to tease the subjects and cheat the Government.¹³ The annual revenue of the kingdom was estimated at Rupees nine crores,¹⁴ and the local biogra-

b. As a benevolent administrator.

10. *Haid-Nām*, ff. 98. Compare Fullarton, who speaks of the extent of the kingdom as "400 miles in length from north to south and near 300 miles in breadth from east to west." [*View of English Interests in India* (1787), 61].

11. Gray's *Journal* (1780)—see J.I.H., XI. o.c., 323.

12. *Haid. Nām*.. ff. 101-102, 106-107, etc.

13. *Ibid*, ff. 101.

14. *Ibid*, ff. 98. According to this work, the aggregate revenue of the kingdom of Mysore in 1782 amounted to three crores and twenty lakhs of *varahas*, one crore and ten lakhs from the territory north of Seringapatam up to the banks of the Krishnā and two crores and ten lakhs

pher of Haidar perhaps not unjustly styles him a *Maṇḍalādhipati* ("governor") wielding the supreme power,¹⁵ although, as we have seen,¹⁶ Haidar never presumed to claim such a position for himself. Referring to his work as a benevolent administrator, particularly during 1769-1780, records a contemporary¹⁷ :—

"The improvement of his country and the strictest executive administration formed the constant objects of his care. Under his masterly control, they attained a perfection never heard of under any other Indian sovereign. The husbandman, the manufacturer and the merchant prospered in every part of his dominions; cultivation increased, new manufactures were established, and wealth flowed into the kingdom. But against negligence or malversation he was inexorable. The renters, the tax-gatherers and other officers of revenue fulfilled their duty with fear and trembling, for the slightest defalcation was punished with *chaubuck* or with death. He employed spies and intelligencers in every corner of his own dominions, and in every court of India; and he had other persons in pay, who served as checks upon them and watched all their operations.

"The minutest circumstances of detail, the produce of a crop, the cultivation of a district, the portion paid to the circar, and that reserved to the inhabitants, were accurately known to him. Not a movement in the remotest corner could

from the territory south of Seringapatam as far as Rāmēśvaram (including Calicut, Koḍiyāla, Nellore, Mylapore, etc., places in the Karnāṭak-Pāyāṅghāt, captured during the war of 1780-1782). This comes to Rupees nine crores and sixty lakhs, taking one *varaḥa* as equivalent to Rupees three. The approximate figure, nine crores, is adopted in the text above. And in keeping with this is a lithic record (of c. 1790) echoing Haidar's sway over the three crore kingdom of Mysore (*mūru kūṭi rājyavālida Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān Bahādur*) (*E.C.*, XII Si-98). Here the reference is to three crores of *varahas* or Rupees nine crores. Compare Fullarton (*l.c.*), who roughly estimates the annual revenues at five million pounds or Rupees seven and a half crores.

15. *Ibid.* The actual expressions are: *Maṇḍalādhipati annisikonḍu mahā sāmrajya padavi alutta idduru.*
16. See *Ante*, Vol. II. Ch. XII. pp. 280-290.
17. Fullarton, *o.c.*, 62-65.

escape him, nor a murmur or intention of his neighbours but flew to him. It will hardly appear exaggeration to say that he was acquainted with every person in his empire, when we consider that he was in a continued round of inspections. In his Durbar, during the hours of business, reports from all corners were received; his secretaries successively read to him the whole correspondence of the day; to each he dictated in few words the substance of the answer to be given, which was immediately written, read to him, and dispatched.

"On his right and left hand, during these hours, were placed bags of gold and silver, out of which, those who brought him intelligence were rewarded by one or more handfuls of coin, proportioned to their deserts. He was accessible to all; every horseman or sepoy that wanted to enter his service was inspected by himself; every Jemadar or officer of any note was intimately known to him. His troops were amply paid but not a fraction was lost. Those who supplied his camps, garrisons and cantonments were all under such contribution that almost the whole military disbursements reverted to his treasury. There was no contractor bold enough to hazard a public imposition. There was no commander ingenious enough to screen inability or disobedience nor a defaulter that could elude detection. He possessed the happy secret of minuteness of detail with the utmost latitude of thought and enterprise. As his perseverance and discipline in business were only equalled by his pointedness of information, so his conciseness and decision in the executive departments of a great government are probably unprecedented in the annals of men....."

The key to Haidar's success in these directions is to be found, as elsewhere noticed,¹⁸ in the tolerant policy he adopted towards all classes of people of Mysore.¹⁹ Brought

c. As a tolerant man.

18. See *Ante*, Vol. II. Ch. XII. pp. 290-293.

19. There are, however, some exceptions to be noted in this connection: In 1762, Haidar had the two sons of the Hindu Chief of Chikballapur circumcised and converted to Islām by force (Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 123-124; also Robson, *o.c.*, 35). In 1766, during his first invasion of Malabar, he "re-established in all their rights and privileges such Nairs as should embrace the Mahomedan religion" (De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 127). These

up as he was from the beginning in the atmosphere of a Hindu Kingdom, Haidar, in this regard, generally followed the traditions of its early rulers and Dalavāis, basing his government itself on respect for Gods and Brāhmans, as the *Haidar-Nāmah*, quoted above, so significantly puts it. He maintained intact the earlier grants and gifts (like *inām*, *sarvamānya*, *agrahāra*, etc.) to Hindu institutions and individuals,²⁰ while his coinage (*Haidari Varaha*), issued from Bednūr, associating the initial letter of his name "Hai" with the figures of Hindu deities and symbols (like Śiva and Viṣṇu, the conch and discus) on the obverse, points to the continuance of the old system to suit the conditions of the times.²¹ In one of his letters to His Holiness Śrī-Narasimha-Bhārati Svāmi of Śringēri, dated April 29, 1769, Haidar, sending the paraphernalia, gifts to the Goddess and Rupees 10,500 for the expenses connected with the Svāmi's visit to Poona, addresses him as "a great and holy personage," and adds, "it is nothing but natural for any one to cherish a desire to pay respects to you"²². In another (c. 1770), he acknowledges the Svāmi's benedictory letter (*āśīrvāda-patrike*) and pre-

instances only go to show that Haidar was, in regard to them, guided more by considerations of expediency, or rather "political policy", than religious fervour. Haidar's formation of the "Chela" battalion from out of the Bēḍars of Chitaldrug captured by him on its capitulation in 1779 (Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 743), and his enslavement of the civil population of Arcot, on its surrender in November 1780, to train them up in arts and useful manufactures—a measure adversely commented upon by Innes Munro as a "cruel policy," (*Narrative*, 177)—were governed by similar considerations. Foreign writers occasionally attribute to Haidar the desecration and destruction of Hindu temples (see, for instance, Adrian Moens in 1776, *Memo*, 172-173; and Robson in 1781, *Hyder Ally*, 122), evidently acts of individual soldiers in his army, which had not his sanction. Such excesses on the part of the soldiery are not infrequently met with in the *Haid. Nām.* itself (see ff. 79-80, 87-88 *et seq.*).

20. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 101.

21. Henderson, *Coins of Haidar and Tipu*, 1.

22. *Sel. Rec. Śringēri Mutt*, I. 58-59, No. 42: *Virōdhi*, *Chaitra ba-* 8 [see also *M. A. R.*, 1916, p. 73, para 133].

sents, and assures him of the continuity of the *ināms*, etc., to the *Maṭh*.²³ In a third letter, addressed to Śrī-Sachidānanda-Bhārati Svāmi, dated August 23, 1777, Haidar expresses his pleasure at the return of the Svāmi after a long sojourn in Poona, wishing him at the same time to make a happy stay in Śringēri continuing the exercise of his spiritual functions.²⁴ And, in a *nirūpa*, dated February 8, 1780, he directs the officers concerned to see that the representatives of the Śringēri *maṭh* are helped in every way in collecting the usual contributions (such as *śrī-charaṇa-kāṇike*, *dīpārādhane*, *āchāra*, *vyavahāra*, etc.).²⁵ Again, we are told,²⁶ how, once on the failure of seasonal rains in the local parts, he called upon the Zamindārs to ask the Brāhmans holding the *Sarvamānyams* to perform the customary ceremony (*japam*) for bringing down rain. A *Fort St. George* letter refers to his sending, in 1779, an elephant and a palankeen as a *nazar* to the temple at Tirupati.²⁷ Fullarton mentions how, in 1781, when the Mysore army invested Trichinopoly, Haidar awaited in person on the Brāhmans of the temple at Śrīrangam with a propitiatory acknowledgment of Viṣṇu, the deity of that sanctuary.²⁸ We have records referring to his occasional grants and gifts to his Muhammadan co-religionists,²⁹ although Kīrnāni depicts Haidar's indifference to Islām.³⁰

23. *Ibid*, I. 59, No. 43 : ? [See also *Ibid*]. The record is undated. It may be of about 1770, judging from the context.

24. *Ibid*, I. 59-60, No. 44 : *Hēvilāmbi*, *Śrāvāṇa* ba. 5.

25. *Ibid*, I. 60, No. 45 : *Vikāri*, *Māgha* śu. 3 [See also *M. A. R.*, I. c.].

26. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, V. 367, No. 1608 : *Letter* dated September 21, 1779.

27. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, XXVIII. 176-177, No. 784 : *Letter* dated May 14, 1779—Nawāb Muhammad Alī to Governor.

28. Fullarton, *o. c.*, 7.

29. See, for instance, *E. C.*, VIII (2) Sb. 355, where Haidar orders the construction of a Friday mosque in the Ānavāṭṭi village in 1768 (*Sarvadhāri*). Also *M.A.R.*, 1918, p. 60, para 132, recording Haidar's *sanads* ordering a cash and land grant to a *fakir* by name Yādulla Shāh Pādshāh Husēni of Sira in 1769 and 1775 respectively.

30. *Neshawani-Hydari*, 478-485.

The Christians too had their due share of attention at his hands, the Jesuit Fathers being ordered to be treated with every mark of respect and allowed perfect freedom in the exercise of their spiritual functions,³¹ and individual Christians being permitted to be judged by their own law in law suits.³² Peixoto narrates an interesting instance of how Haidar, on learning that five of the European ecclesiastics (*Padres*), captured during his first war with Muhammad Ali (1767-1769), were Portuguese and French missionaries, received them "with much delight" and sent them safe to Madras, assuring them that "he would not meddle with the churches".³³ And Rev. Schwartz, who performed the divine service along with Haidar's European officers, in 1779, testifies to the absolute freedom of religious conscience in Mysore, when he observes, "we sang, preached, prayed, and nobody presumed to hinder us."³⁴ "What religion people profess, or whether they profess any at all, that is perfectly indifferent to him [Haidar]. He has none himself, and leaves every one to his choice".³⁵ The truth was that Haidar never subordinated politics to religion; he divorced the one from the other, and paved the way for the rapid evolution of Mysore as the only important local power in the South of India.

Haidar systematically played the role of "King-maker" in bringing about the accession to the throne of Mysore of Nanjarāja Wodeyar, Bettāda-Chāmarāja Wodeyar VII and Khāsā-Chāmarāja Wodeyar VIII in 1766, 1770 and 1776, respectively.³⁶ His intolerance, nay dread, of

31. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 159.

32. *Ibid.*, I. 160-161.

33. *Memoirs*, 94-95, 100.

34. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. App. viii. 848.

35. *Ibid.*, 847.

36. The *Haid.* *Nām.* itself bears ample testimony to this, as we have seen in the Chapters above, though it maintains discreet silence as to the actual fate that befell the minor princes chosen as sovereigns.

princes of the Royal House of Mysore attaining or about to attain majority was so great that he made up his mind to despatch them by secret assassination. But in his madness to be rid of them, he forgot that the princes that he allowed to succeed had to attain majority and had to be tolerated. But fear is worse than anything in the political arena and Haidar was a bad victim to it. During the last years of the reign of Immaḍi-Krishṇarāja Wodeyar (*i.e.*, 1761-1766), he retained for the latter's personal use the three lakh *jahgīr*, but, during the reigns of Krishṇarāja's successors, he reduced the *jahgīr* to one of one lakh.³⁷ Haidar also regulated his own ceremonious behaviour towards the reigning sovereign during the annual *Dasara* durbar;³⁸ and instituted a regular system of rent-free village grants (*umbali-grāma*), in the case of dependent Ursu families, varying in value from 30 to 600 *varahas* according to their rank.³⁹

Thus Haidar rose, lived and died in the service of the kingdom of Mysore. A product of the times as he was, he saw clearly the need of his own strong hand in controlling her destiny at a critical period in the history of Southern India. He sacrificed everything for her political integrity and independence. He saw the collapse of Nanjarāja meant the collapse of his ideas of advance and the collapse of his country, a collapse all the more regrettable because it befell it when it was really in the ascendant. He realized that the forces between which he was placed would soon jeopardise the country's very existence. He understood that by one supreme effort, and under one gigantic force, the country could be united and enabled to help itself. With a soldier's aim

37. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 106-107. Compare Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 597.

38. *Ibid.*, ff. 107.

39. *Ibid.*, ff. 101.

he applied his mind to the task before him. He knew it would be a hard task for him but he steeled his heart to it. But he was no iconoclast. He did not seek to destroy any of the old symbols and ideas, nor seek to create new ones. He built on what he found at hand. Both in the military and civil departments he was a resuscitator, a re-organiser, and a re-maker rather than an innovator. He was against annihilation, as he was sure that as annihilator he would be only adding to his existing troubles and not resolving any of them. He sought to combine the new with the old; otherwise, he feared not only the country would be lost but also he would be ruined. Revolutionary though he was in one sense, he was not a destroyer. He did not seek to hurt any; nor did he seek to deprive any of what he regarded as right and as even sacred. He did not ride roughshod over the thousand and one traditions that had been cherished for ages. He did not reject the dynasty to which he was attached and under which he and his brother had risen to official heights. In religious matters, he discountenanced actively all interference. He prevented Muslim priesthood from all audience as a public administrator. His policy internally was one that was bound to make for peace and help forward unity in action and unity in leadership for the work that awaited outside. The application of that policy in successive stages was to end in the realization of the final, and, indeed, his life-long, objective—an extended Mysore or rather a united South Indian Empire dominated by Mysore. That was a struggle for the soul of the people in the South of India to once again realize their unity and make it inviolate against the attacks threatening from the rebel Mughal provincial officers or foreign merchants who had gained a foothold in it as mere traders and merchants. He aimed, in short, at a "Greater Mysore", much like what the Imperial Chōlas and the Imperial Vijayanagar

kings had done during their times for building up a greater Tanjore and a greater Vijayanagar. That was his supreme objective, if not, his lasting contribution to the making of Mysore. And before that pale into insignificance the many serious shortcomings in his public character, such, for instance, as the confinement of his master and patron Karāchūri Nanjarāja, though his laying unholy hands on the ruling sovereigns can never be forgiven him, being both treacherous and against his oath of office. Morality of this type may have been a common feature of the court life of the period, but Haidar's act was both deliberate and traitorous to a degree, being against innocent sovereigns to whom he owed dutifully loyal allegiance.

Haidar died without fully realizing his objective or finally winning the victory he aimed at. That was so ordained and he could not possibly help it. But he must be reckoned to have done his duty towards his country in pushing the question that Nanjarāja so manfully put forward. And he must be accounted a brave man to have fought so spiritedly and in such single-minded fashion to attain victory. It is not only true that he worked for victory but also took care to see that every necessary step, civil and military, was taken to retain the good results when once he secured them. But he was not destined to see the end of the war he was engaged in. It is impossible to say how the war would have ended if he had lived. In any case, he would have made a treaty of peace which would have proved not worse than the one with which his son Tipū concluded the war which he had begun. The death of Haidar, in fine, ended the tremendous transition. Mysore sought a solution of her own for the problem presented by the collapse of Vijayanagar. It failed because it was partly foiled by the Mahrattas ;

His death : what it meant for Mysore.

partly by Haidar who failed to grasp the fact that his prime duty was towards the Sovereign House which had befriended him; and partly by the active interference of the European Settlers in India who supported the rival Karnātic Nawābs.

With the aims and objectives he had, Haidar could not help preparing in the manner he did for attaining them. To have expected him to do otherwise would have been unnatural. Though unlettered, he saw instinctively that a new policy was needed, if the country was to be saved. He chalked out a programme for himself. He worked it out in a manner that meant the immediate unification of the country. This was intended to be the prelude to the unification of the South of India as a whole. His scheme of army reform proved popular. To the efficiency of a *Sarvādhikāri*—literally a dictator—he added the popularity of a soldier who had risen from the ranks. He was helped—after his success over Khanḍē Rao—by a cabinet of ministers who were all Hindus and in whom he placed implicit trust, at least in the earlier stages.

Discontent was natural and to be expected, especially as the principal old aristocratic families had suffered as the result of his usurpation. They were against the changes effected by Haidar in the army and the civil administration. Brought up in the traditions of the old army and administration, restlessness was natural among them. They had their own sympathisers. Haidar weeded out to some extent older officers, both in the army and civil administration. His army was built up most carefully, however, though hurriedly, and those who were steeped in the old traditions could not be entirely removed. Hence the rebellions. There were frequent trials of strength between the old order and

Reflections on
Haidar's policy.

The reaction to his
internal policy.

the new headed by Haidar. One thing seems clear, that the army was not involved in them—the army of Haidar, as built by him. Military policy as of old was in Haidar's hands and the pay and promotion of individual officers was also under his personal control. As in the Germany of Frederick the Great, in Mysore, since the early days, the management of the army was vested in a few, the leadership being vested in the *Daḷavāi*. It was really an *imperium in imperio*. Mysore developed a dual State policy—the State in its civil relations subject to the ministerial cabinet and the army under the *Daḷavāi*. Both worked together. This was a remarkable dualism evidenced by the *Bhāshāpatra* of 1758 in unmistakable terms. The army chiefs tried to develop a policy as far as possible in keeping with the ministerial cabinet but they did not always believe in the latter's ability to keep peace by diplomacy. Modern German and Japanese military policy bears a striking resemblance to this dualism in State policy observable in Mysore under the *Daḷavāis*. The *Daḷavāis* became the arbiters of the Mysore destiny for years and they made way for a military autocracy under Haidar in a worse form, if anything. But those who were responsible for the civil administration even under Haidar took a different view. They would not take Haidar's domination lying down. Their chagrin must have been all the keener when they realized that Haidar was an unknown man and how much he had owed to themselves for the powers he presumed to wield so automatically later.

Haidar found, on the other hand, his dependence on these old friends somewhat irksome. His military and political policy developed along lines they could not understand or follow. They were with him in the conquest of Trichinopoly; in the keeping out of the Mahrattas; in extending Mysore on its natural lines of advance, east, west and south. But bred up in the old

traditions, they were against him, in his developing an attitude wholly inimical to the Royal House; in his hasty and almost delirious decisions to raise a quarrel everywhere and on every side; and in his increasingly cruel and arbitrary modes of action. They supported him as long as he served the purposes they had in view. But they were not to be brushed aside by him as inconsequential. Hence the repeated occasions in the twenty years he exercised authority, when the two sides violently disagreed. Hence the successive conflicts that arose between them and his son after him.

To put it briefly, Haidar went beyond the power that the traditional ruling class in Mysore—represented by the Dalavāis—claimed or aspired to, and tried at last even to snatch, if he could make up his mind, even the Royal dignity. But he knew what it would have meant and stopped short of that last act of treachery to the House that had done so much to make him great. He knew that and he realized that—and held fast to the principle of obedience to his King and Master. He understood that any other policy would mean trouble to him. The ministers may be set at naught but not the populace which stood by the Royal House steadfastly. It is here that he compromised with himself and respected the feelings of a nation which had not been either unkind to him or unmindful of his remarkable talents.

Haidar decided not to be overthrown. He resolved upon to continue his efforts at mastery of the situation. He had to choose one of two roads: either to be overthrown or enable himself to continue his efforts at mastering the situation. He chose the latter. He was responsible for his own ideas and actions and he determined not to yield. He said to himself: "There is no going back; to retreat now would be cowardice. I will put my ideas into action. I will not be deterred from doing that". He favoured the creation of a large army. He took in

foreigners into his army, but the position was such that they could not get the upper hand. He was for closer relations with them for definite purposes—for disciplining his own troops and modernising his army system—but for the defence of his country and for invading the enemy's, he depended first and foremost on his own countrymen. He realized that he could not win his objective without a strong army: the making of an army was not, with him, the offering of mere threats to those who had beguiled his late master (Nanjarājaiya) with empty promises, but a question of work. He would have preferred peace with the English if they had shown an attitude more in keeping with the justice due to his nation. When he understood how he and his country had been deceived over the Secret Treaty, he made up his mind that only a fighting policy would serve the purposes. But his policy of war abroad dictated prudence as well, especially in the treatment of domestic matters. He saw instinctively that situated as he was, force abroad would be impossible without peace at home. And so the dual policy of peace at home and force abroad came to be evolved by him.

Haidar was pursuing a strong policy whenever he felt strong from the military point of view. His *political* policy was also proportioned to his *military* strength. Nanjarāja could not win through because he had no army to back his claim; Haidar had an army to back him. But he should not have tried to remedy his *grievance always by force*. Negotiation would have brought him what he desired, for he had the backing of the army. He should have realized that if *diplomatic negotiations* were always to be conducted under the threat of force, the world would scarcely be worth living in. The English saw that beyond Haidar, there was a new tyranny threatening them, with which they were not familiar. And they desired that, in so far as lay in their power, this new

autocrat menacing their rise should not freely indulge his desires. For Haidar to succeed there should have been justice in the method employed by him as well as in the grievance which he desired to get remedied.

He created a military machinery for use, which he could start with smoothness and perfection. It would be ever ready to write pages of success. This done, he thought it necessary to establish a precise basis for a political *entente* with Pondicherry—which though fallen for the time was sure to rise again Phoenix-like—and create organs of military *liason*. He arranged further to negotiate with other European powers in India and tried to bring into being a system of realistic agreements on the basis not of equality of rights as between them and the country he represented but on the footing of their recognizing his power to dictate, if they did not yield peacefully to what he desired.

So far as his external policy was concerned, Haidar, in the preparatory years, concentrated
His external policy: on unification at home. For revenge
Haidar and the combination of the on those who had done ill to Mysore,
English, Nizām and he could afford to wait. He was,
the Mahrattas. indeed, prepared to bide his time. Nor
was he in a position to disturb them all at once. He wanted, besides, time to enlist men, prepare his army, recuperate his position, fill in the war-chest and study the position across the border. He had also to reckon with the Nizām, whose ill defined rights could only be dealt with in a delicate manner. As events showed, he was a greater master in intrigue than even Muhammad Ali. He had also to keep his eyes on the Mahrattas, always a difficult matter. Haidar, after his first experience of Nizām Ali in 1767, altogether shunned him. Nor could he hit off the Mahrattas. The result was he became isolated. He tried to counterbalance—by seeking

the aid of the French and of the other two European nations, the Dutch and the Portuguese. France since 1761 had been in a poor way. And he had come into conflict with the other two in their own territorial areas with the result he could get no material help from them. The Dutch played a waiting game and Haidar's attempt to get into direct touch with their Home authorities proved unsuccessful. The Portuguese could not help, even if they had the mind to do so. He thus stood by himself. But he was increasingly aware of his own strength. He felt he was safe so long as he had strength to rely on—kept his defences safe, his treasury full, and his army at a high pitch of efficiency. He knew the ominous character of the political situation, but he felt that those who were inimical to him were the first to be afraid of him and his efficiency. His confidence was based on the conviction that his army was strong and equal to all emergencies. Then, he recognised that none of his enemies—the English, the Nizām or the Mahrattas—would be able to offer a serious threat to him. He did not contemplate a combination of all these against him. He would not trust the Nizām, and he treated his army with contempt. He knew the aims and objects of the Mahrattas. He felt he could buy them up, if the worst came to worst. But he did not contemplate the possibility of the combination of all these three parties against himself. Yet he was not becoming isolationist in the sense that he was withdrawing behind his own borders or abandoning his conquests. He held to his conquests; he strengthened his defences; and he strengthened his army and its equipment to the highest degree possible. His external policy was that of a strong, self-reliant country, anxious to obtain justice for itself by peaceful means and not afraid of its enemies. Failing redress, he was ready to use force in a manner at once strikingly effective. Thus,

he was ready to stand alone if it came to striking a blow for his country. Peace at any price was undoubtedly no part of his policy. If war was inevitable, he was ready for it. His whole policy was one based on the idea that Muhammad Ali was a non-entity and that the English used him as a puppet. If they would not yield, then war is an ever present danger and cannot be avoided. Haidar, it is said, never forgot and never forgave. He would not commit a mistake twice. He acted with characteristic swiftness and ruthlessness.

Haidar committed certain fatal mistakes in adopting the policy he did. First he did not realize that peace is indivisible and that war in any part of the world is a threat to all the powers in that area. The combination of the powers against him was thus a foregone conclusion, a combination that did not seem even distantly possible to him. Secondly, he was wrong in thinking that war was the sole remedy in his case. It is to be feared that he laid more store by force, or threat of force, as a working policy than was at all necessary. If its use was justifiable in the last resort in the political game of give and take as something that could not be avoided, the flouting of it again and again was wrong. In his case, there is ground for the belief that the English were too closely identified with Muhammad Ali to make good with him. Still, he never appears to have moderated his demands nor made an effort at securing what he definitely desired by peaceful means. He was obsessed by the belief that the English were obdurate. He was driven by his self-confidence into a position of aggression. From 1761 to the end of his life, he showed no sign of degeneration, either in his policy or in his preparation. His army was gaining strength daily and his equipment was being increasingly added to. His treasury was being filled in daily and his country was second to none in its productive capacity. And he showed himself

personally capable of decisive action in any emergency. Who could say that he was not justified in his robust optimism?

Despite his cunning, Haidar was a poor diplomat.

Haidar as a diplomat.

He was, as we have seen,⁴⁰ never an attractive negotiator. He had no flair for managing men. His weak diplomacy disabled him from seeing things in their true perspective. When Rev. Schwartz saw him, he failed to grasp the English point of view. He misconceived the visit, which meant no more at the bottom than that the English Government at Madras, while faithful to its friendships and its principles, would devote new energy to a thorough test of what may be done by more positive diplomacy for the elimination of the causes of mutual suspicion and hostility. The conversations proposed through the kindly religious teacher were neither intended to cloud the immediate issue nor to postpone its consideration. They were rather to allow of a mutual test of fundamental intentions. Haidar wished to obtain concrete evidence of English goodwill before they had begun. Entry into the conversations would have implied on either side no obligation but to converse. Haidar failed to see that it was wrong in principle to reject an offer of parley or to state in advance conditions that would amount to rejection of the conversations themselves. That would be barring all thought of the morrow, which was sure to dawn. Haidar mistook the mission. The English, who knew the position, were frank though bent on business. Haidar thought they were trucking to him and his dictatorial methods. There he missed much for which he had to repent later.

Haidar was one of the bluntest and frankest administrators of his time. His diplomacy consisted in saying in forcible language whatever was on his mind. He

⁴⁰. See Ch. I, pp. 110-111, 140-144, *supra*.

was not the ideal man at the moment most decisive for his country's future. He was *not* both a soldier and a politician. He was a soldier for more than 15 years before he came to politics. He could neither be a brilliant nor a very skilful diplomat. He had not acquired a wider knowledge of the world than most of his Indian contemporaries to deal with trading politicians of the European type—the Dutch, the French and the English—and he had no small contempt for men of the West. He was brave as a soldier and his exploits in war fill many pages of his life; but dissimulator though he was, he was poor as a politician, a diplomat and a negotiator. The true diplomat is he who sees things coming. He must be able to perceive, warn himself, and prophesy to himself. A purblind man cannot prove a good diplomat, much less a man blind to the realities of a situation. He showed the way to Hastings to make a combination against himself. It was his biggest mistake. It meant a British-Mahratta-Nizām combination for the redistribution of South India and then the way for building up the Pax-Britannica. Such a combination could not be defeated by him much less by his son.

Haider was desirous of working out a system of military service which would take the place of haphazard effort in such a way that when the crisis came, forethought would have been found to have banished the need for hapless improvisation. His policy was to secure for Mysore a number of neutral friendships with a view to ultimately isolate the English and of course their allies, whoever they may be. The "Bullet" diplomacy of Haider was characteristic of the man. His exhausted patience sometimes exploded in this particularly drastic manner. But it was not diplomacy but running away from it. "Bullet" diplomacy reduces all treaties to scraps of paper.

A treaty may have been signed but the decision of a new question depending on it may not necessarily be entirely in accordance with its words. It may be a case that might mean injustice to one party—a case for radical revision of the Treaty for that very reason. Such a question may not be capable of solution in conformity with justice and perfect harmony with the requirements of a new situation created by world or even local causes. *Per contra*, if the inviolability of clauses in Treaties is not guaranteed, the sacred character attaching to Treaties would be lost. Confusion would follow and fights between nations would be inevitable. If old treaties were to be broken with impunity, there would be no reason to conclude new ones. The conquest of various states leading to the West coast from north to south in Mysore's interests, extended, in Haidar's view, beyond the frame of the old boundaries of Mysore State. Her interests, in his opinion, were to reach as far as Cape Comorin and from east to west coast lines.

There was fault attaching to his policy. He believed too much in himself. This led to his isolation being easy and complete. He was ready for the defence of the country he represented to the outside world. That was to his credit. He did not cultivate friendships steadfastly. He demanded too much from his friends. He despised them far too much to work in unison with them. Ideally, politically and militarily, he was poles away from them. He believed too much in coercion to trust anything to diplomacy. The one idea that permeated his policy and coloured his views was the complete purging of the South of the influence of Muhammad Ali and its corroding effects. He would not rest until the whole of the South was thoroughly cleared of that influence, where the English had help to organize it and

Treaty rights.

Haidar's limitations.

made it obtain a safe asylum. But he failed to note that diplomatic pressure was as necessary for it as military operations on a large scale. With him defence and diplomacy did not march together. They should have furnished a dual policy to him, if he had only thought it out carefully. Such a policy would not have meant a contradiction of peace. His scheme of arming on an extensive scale would then have proved the true key to the solution of his problem—the problem of an Empire in the South. He failed to work out by diplomacy, well in advance, a policy of joint action as between himself, and his sought for allies, the Dutch, the Mahrattas and the Nizām. He should have invited them to join a combination. He would then have forestalled the English and even confronted them with such a formidable army that it would have deterred them from designs against him or at least moderated their determined project of cutting him down.

Haidar committed one rather serious mistake. He thought a strong and big army on the "New Model" would enable him to succeed in winning his objective. The making of such an army by itself led him into a false sense of security. The more he reorganized his army and the more he recruited for it, the greater the false sense of security he created for himself. His external policy, based on force, made him lose friends. No amount of recruitment could compensate the loss of the moral support of good neighbours, apart from the man-power they would have brought to his side. He also did not note that he neutralised the smaller principalities and powers around him. He failed to realize that the first essential of a strong military policy is a good external policy. He saw—as Nanjarāja did before him—that the South would, if he did not act, pass away into alien hands. There were others too who read the situation as it presented itself then in the same manner

as he did. These were the Mahrattas and the Nizām. The Mahrattas, like Haidar, attempted to stem the tide of foreign occupation. The Nizām also saw it but he did not actively attempt anything on the lines the Mahrattas or Haidar did. He never sought to organize for defence or offence. He waited on events and on foreign aid. The Mahrattas, already organized for military action, tried on an even larger scale than Haidar. They aimed at replacing the Mughal throughout his dominions—North, South, and East and West. They did not seek foreign aid except in a qualified sense. Of all the three, Haidar chalked out a new policy, built up a new organized army, and tried to fight for what he thought just and right—first with the aid of the other two and then by himself.

Haidar's second mistake was he did not confront his real enemy with the vital issue already in dispute. He continued to drift in uncertainty regarding it. The Trichinopoly question he allowed to remain an open sore—kept open by Muhammad Ali occupying it with English troops and English ammunition stored in it. He was not prepared to say straight out that English intervention and active aid must end, and that Muhammad Ali should be allowed to fight his own battles, if he desired or dared to keep Trichinopoly. He allowed Muhammad Ali to stir up trouble in Tanjore, in Madura and in Tinnevely. And he failed to make it clear that he would not hesitate to take strong action to end this English technique of making war by proxy. If he had tried to end the drift in his external policy, his policy of a strong army, of a new army, and a numerically large army, well disciplined on new lines, would have helped him. As it was, it proved of little purpose. He grew weaker through the loss of friends, while he made greater sacrifices to grow strong by incurring heavier expenditure on his army and his

unnecessary wars on certain of his neighbours whom he could well have befriended. He did not perceive the patent contradiction that existed between his external policy and his military policy. Before he put forth the enormous effort involved in his "New Model" army, he must have seen to it that he had a correspondingly good diplomacy abroad. He was, however, not a realist on the political side. A soldier, born and bred up, he was actuated by a narrow conception of duty. He failed—utterly failed—to work out a co-ordinated plan which would have meant much both for Mysore and for the rest of the South of India. His failure was in a large measure due to lack of elasticity in method and lack of persistence in fundamental objects. For a man who built up a new army under extraordinary conditions, and for one who fought with splendid vigour all his campaigns, he showed a singular incapacity to pursue the chief objectives he aimed at. He knew the dispute over Trichinopoly and he knew how Mysore had been despoiled of what was due to her. Yet he did not evolve definite plans to avenge the insult heaped on Mysore. His policy of expansion led him away sometimes from the immediate objective before him.

While Haidar thus sought to achieve much, he did not meet with all success. One of the reasons why he failed was that he centralized all authority in himself and set aside his cabinet of ministers and never cared for advice from anybody. Seated on the throne of absolutism, the most palpitating of hearts turns tyrannical and even Dictators have to hedge themselves with dignity. So it is no wonder if for long Haidar, at the head of affairs, struck, and struck ruthlessly down, at the enemies within. Having attained to absolutism, Haidar, though not wholly destitute of feeling, became tyrannical and tried to hedge himself with dignity. It

is not surprising that before long, he, in the exercise of his high authority, could not tolerate any one superior to himself. Those who came or attempted to come in his way, simply ceased to exist. He struck them down one by one—cruelly and ruthlessly—with the result that he came to believe that he had no enemies within. That, however, was an impression that was largely false. Haidar's policy did not reckon with the difficulties of the new situation. In trying to expand, he went beyond what was actually possible or attainable. He departed from the plan of Nanjarāja in extending beyond the intended expansion of the South. At home, by his hostile attitude towards the Royal Family, by increasing autocracy and terrorism he alienated friends and the people, and imperilled the security of the State. He ill understood the Mahratta position; and alienated the Nizām. He miscalculated the English and their capacity. He did not understand their mind and diplomacy any more than his master Nanjarāja. He placed too great reliance on the French and organized the army on foreign model but the French failed him. His diplomacy went wrong; the people grew restive under his strong regime; and his wars proved futile, despite the fact he was definitely not defeated in any of them. Nor had he any opportunity to develop the sea-power, though all his actual conquests were on the West coast (*i.e.*, Bednūr, Mangalore, Calicut, Cannanore, etc.). Lastly, the change in the political map of India, about 1780-1782, brought about by the rivalry between the English and French East India Companies, the succession of strong Governors of the English Company and the change of the latter from a commercial to a territorial power seriously affected his pretensions to supremacy in the South of India.

What Haidar should have done, so far as his external relations were concerned, was: (1) he should have

adopted a firm policy towards Muhammad Ali and the

English and prosecuted it with vigour
What he should have done. and constancy; (2) to attain success

in such a policy, he should have promptly developed a spirit of friendly co-operation with those on the Malabar coast, setting up an active community of interest with the country powers there, so that he might avoid simultaneous trouble from all sides at once and from the English from both Madras and Bombay, as his son was actually attacked later. Haider proved, however, a mere tyro in the game of Empire-building. He lacked experience in diplomacy. He was heavy-handed as an Imperialist, and showed little finesse in his dealings with the English and the other European powers. Where he could have befriended, he threatened. He carried the threat of war far, and a threat miscarried, perhaps, does more damage to one than ill-success in actual warfare. All through the period 1767-1782, there was one weakness in Haider's external policy and this destroyed him in the end. He never could believe that the English could develop resources which the French had failed to do. Nor did he conceive the possibility of the timely changes that the English effected in their diplomacy. When too late, he saw he had a little overshot the mark. He found he had isolated himself in his own country, where his overweening methods had created enemies for him. Of the English he was ever suspicious, the more so because of the influence of Muhammad Ali over them. It proved an obsession, and it clouded his vision. He never would allow diplomacy its due weight in the settlement of disputes. A fighter, inured to the view that everything should be put to the test of the sword, he never could be brought to argue or to arbitrate.

Diplomacy, indeed, had no place in his political creed. His doctrine of force was for him all-embracing and

invulnerable. With Haidar, offence was the oldest form of defence. Common sense and the lessons of the past suggested to him generally the right course of action. Of course, experience comes to the aid of most people when they least suspect it: they do not struggle through the years without acquiring some weapons of defence even for unaccustomed assaults or sudden emergencies. So it was with Haidar, who learnt as he went on. Much earlier than Signor Mussolini, the Italian Dictator of to-day, he proved the truth of the statement that the best defence is the offensive. His offensive against the English at Madras galvanised his forces, and made it feel its strength. He did not seek co-operation with the Mahrattas. He never could think of avoiding conflict once he made up his mind. He could not think in terms of normal relations with his neighbours and even with those whose friendships would have meant something of value to him. His concept of war precluded diplomacy from it and his concept of peace excluded friendships on any basis except that of master and servant, sovereign and feudal vassal. What could have enabled him to succeed? That is a question worth some consideration especially as he had all but succeeded in achieving his object in 1767. If he had revised his policy, if not replaced it, by a more moderate one, probably he would have attained to part at least of his objective. Realizing as he did that combination for organization was the only policy that would pay, he should have seen to it, that if he did not secure a combination—of himself, the Mahrattas and the Nizām against the English—he at least did something to prevent the formation of such a combination against himself—of the English, the Mahrattas and the Nizām. It should have been his major interest to see that no State or group of States in South India became omnipotent against him to repeat what he had done—on a minor scale—with

the Nizām against the English. He should have directed diplomacy to that end. He should have evolved a formula compatible with the political integrity of Mysore and its status as a major power in the South of India and applied his doctrine of force only in aid of such diplomacy. The idea of overlordship would have been realized, in fact if not in form, if he had changed his mode of attack. He failed to do this—he could not see the need for it because of his blind faith in the theory of force—and the result was he was forced in to isolation. The rest followed with the advent of his son, who had, as we shall see, neither his military talents nor his administrative skill. Haidar failed to avoid the catastrophe that was slowly but steadily descending on him. He did exactly the opposite of that which should have been done by him: a policy of courage instead of resignation, resistance in place of abandonment of his chosen ideal. If he failed, it was because he failed to appreciate the change that was coming over the land. War alone cannot win an objective; diplomacy has its place in the relations of men.

Haidar should have associated himself with his neighbours in a manner profitable to himself. He really gave himself no chance for association, after he failed to gain over the Nizām. He gave the chance to the English to isolate him. In trying to isolate them, he ended in isolating himself. He did not back-pedal to his previous position and try to win back the Nizām or the Mahrattas. His external policy was really one opposed to the Nizām; but he compromised with him. When he lost him, his defeat became inevitable. He did not take the warning against the danger of his being pushed by the Nizām or Muhammad Ali or by them both against the English. Friendship with the English being thus out of the question, he leaned more and more on the French.

His policy in the West coast did not conform to the general orientation. He tried to pick up a quarrel with the Dutch, who, though they were declining, were yet showing a resisting power not to be neglected. During 1773-1780, he worked up a clandestine attack against Travancore and kept in touch with the discordant elements among the Malabar Chiefs. For the time being, permeation in the West coast and preparation in the Calicut and Coimbatore area were the order of the day. The Dutch held to the view that the conquest of Travancore would be likely to entail breaches of treaties. In the Madura region, Haidar set up Mahfuz Khān, more a diplomat than a warrior, and tried to influence Yusuf Khān. He could back up the latter, but the French partisans proved treacherous. If he had been a diplomat, he should have made the Dutch work for him as against the rest on the West coast and Muhammad Yusuf and the French partisans fight the English on the East coast. If he had done this, he would have reduced his external policy to the simplest possible form and made it a workable one too. By a judicious expenditure of men and money, such a policy would have ended in the attainment of his ambitions.

Haidar cannot to any extent be described as a laughing diplomat. He was too active, too energetic and too strongminded a man to brouse through life, observing things with a detached and objective air and deriving as much benefit as instruction from them. Made of sterner stuff, he was up against any and every deviation from the promised word. Though a dissembler himself, he would not allow others the privilege of dissembling. He reveals his true personality here—when we see him acting the stern exacter of things promised. The letter of a treaty became as important to him as its very spirit. No foreign office interpreter would have excelled

him in this. But he forgot that a foreign office interpreter has another side to him ; he is also a diplomat. When it did not suit, the foreign office diplomat never would look into the treaties and the terms and conditions that bind him down. He forgot the very existence of the Treaty! Haidar knew not diplomacy—not even the elements of it. He made no effort to see the other fellow's view. He never thought he could make something of it to his own benefit. He could not bring himself to the idea that time may be saved or even the objective gained by a little temporizing, by a little kind word or gesture made. He lost wholly the aid of diplomacy in his dealings with his opponents. Warfare unsupported by diplomacy can never prove successful. That seems almost fundamental in practical politics, but Haidar never grasped it throughout his career. He never therefore reaped the full benefit due to him from his military successes. To the last, he never could understand the naivete of a diplomatic conversation or what a dull-eyed diplomatic corps stood for in the evolution of political aims and ideas. He sang for ever one song—the bold anthem of “Mysore for ever.” His treatment of Schwartz was characteristic. From that specimen, we can judge of the rest: *Ex uno disec omnes*. For what could be gained by words—sweet words—there was no need to appeal to arms. But his too ready appeal to force proved an obsession. *Furor arma ministrat* (Rage provides arms, and we have an Illiad of ills). He never looked to the end; nor did he remember that it is the end that crowns the work. He refused to bend down, but allowed himself to be broken.

Haidar could have talked the language of western diplomacy with westerners and yet retained a tenacious grip of Indian individualism. He could have been firm and suave. It is here we seem to perceive in him the

absence of the culture produced by wide reading. A widely read man of letters is something different from a self-trained man used to the culture that is produced by a knowledge of those who have preceded him. He essentially could not see the way to compromise: the militarist in him was not softened by the liberality of the cultivated mind. He had no diplomatists about him; and those he had, he had no regard for. At a critical moment in Anglo-Mysore affairs he failed, because he had no diplomatic talent in him. If he had had trusted diplomats, he would have fared otherwise. They would have helped him to represent the better mind that was really in him—but for the moment had been superimposed by vanity, ferocity and even cruelty. He thus lost the opportunity to expand his country's true policy without fear or embarrassment to himself. Never was the treaty of 1769 so inauspiciously signed, and Haidar only paved the way for his English adversaries to counteract him eventually. His policy sought simultaneously to weaken and encircle the English at Madras. But in trying to isolate them, he isolated himself. He showed the way to Hastings and after him to Wellesley. He rendered himself open to joint attacks at the hands of his opponents. After 1767 his confidence in the British vanished and his position became perilous.

Haidar offered hegemony to the whole of the South. His plan was to obtain hegemony over all the Southern States and to develop them into a military alliance. Under the friendly guise of one who was proposing an informal alliance—offensive and defensive—he plainly sought to make a territorial invasion and with it establish an economic supremacy over the whole of the South. He desired access to sea on all sides but he did not realize that he was also trying to grab wholesale states and countries allied or subordinate to them for ages under this pretext. That was abusing natural

facts in order to satisfy his own political aspirations. He was soon to see that these states and countries did not yield for the asking. Conflict was a foregone conclusion. He had no hatred against any of the states or the peoples he wanted should go under. He did not try any conciliatory attitude; he did not try to find a reasonable and just solution. He planned, in a word, an immediate expansion to wreak his vengeance against those who had despoiled Mysore and her just ambitions and her just dues. Thinking of Trichinopoly, he thought of other states and countries which would help him to make the English at Madras submit. That is why he looked in the direction of the West coast States. He searched around South India for lines of least resistance, and he thought Mysore should spread westwards as much as southwards. Why not West, when the way was being blocked in the South? Why not West as a preparation against the South? But he did not convince himself of the possibilities of his schemes and ideas. Early successes made him feel more and more that the same successes would be repeated everywhere and every time. He came to think that lines of least resistance were everywhere visible and available and that he could have his own way, but he failed to note that actually his imposing power and reputation hid many growing weaknesses. His methods abroad were direct and based on force; but this policy brought him soon—despite his desire—into new entanglements and unrelenting toil on his part to get clear of them. The more he tried to spread himself out, the more he became isolated and the more he failed to keep his eye on his home country.

Haider aimed, it may be conceded, at "An United South Indian Front" against the new tendency of foreign merchants to become ambitious of territorial aggrandisement in India. It may be added that that was the outstanding feature of his policy. There is

reason to believe that the Nizām was in hearty agreement with him in this objective and even joined him to give effect to it actively. He wanted to maintain the *status quo*: India for Indians. But he mixed up two things, a just complaint against the English at Madras and a territorial aggrandisement all over the South, which made him the declared enemy of all in the South. If he had tried to create a peaceful organization to win through his objective of keeping merchants to their trade avocation, he might have probably succeeded better. But his doctrine of force led him into uncalled for vicissitudes. By instinct, by birth and by profession a soldier, peace seemed foreign to him, being only a means to an end, the end being further war. But there can be no doubt that he meant the establishment of a peaceful South India but a South India rendered strong and able to resist foreign aggression and able as one vast State to stand out under the ægis of Mysore. He desired to link Mysore with South India as a whole; and he could see peace in it only when it was linked with a partly Indian—and in that a Mysorean—system. His great defect was lack of diplomatic insight. He depended on force too much and he too candidly appealed to arms for decisions. He did not realize adequately the difficulties of interstate adjustments unless concessions were reciprocal. If he had done so, his work on the West coast would have been a greater success and a greater help to him in his dealings with the English in the South.

If Haidar had been spared, what would he have done on the civil side? Would he have, like Charles the Great after his successes, devoted himself to the welfare of the people or proved himself as great in administration as in war and patronised letters and established schools? Whether he would have done all this or not—for one he was not a lettered man and did not appear to view

education as anything more than an art which taught or ought to teach one how to acquire a kingdom and how not to lose another—he, like Charles the Great, kept himself in touch with everything over the vast domain he commanded.

The nearest parallel to Haidar in certain respects is, perhaps, to be found in Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), the 17th century Protector of England. The two, of course, began their epoch-making careers under different environments: the one born of humble parents but left an orphan and seeking his livelihood as a soldier of fortune, and eventually rising to the dictatorship of the kingdom of Mysore; the other inheriting the solid wealth of his father and soon rising to become the leader of the Great Rebellion, the author of King Charles I's death, the master for a few years of all Britain. Both realized the supreme importance of the army as the arbiter of the destiny of State in times of crisis and impressed their contemporaries as military geniuses with sharp limitations, not as strategists nor even as general tacticians but as cavalry leaders of the first order. Both possessed in an uncommon measure the capacity for dissimulation and intrigue, and revelled in cruelty. Both sought to maintain peace at home and used force abroad. The domestic policy of both was grounded in fear of assassination on the one side and an excellent system of police and espionage on the other. In the sphere of foreign relations, both were patriotic to a degree, the one desiring the independence and integrity of the kingdom of Mysore and her dominance over the whole of Southern India to the exclusion of all her rivals—both Indian and foreign; the other aiming at the greatness of England and her reputation for strength both by sea and by land. Both were overambitious and grasped at things greedily. But while Cromwell, as a Puritan, admitted in his

conduct quite a remarkable degree of buffoonery and was chaste, excellent in his life as a husband and father and devoted to his children, Haidar was voluptuous and indifferent in matters relating to religion and morals, though his attachment to his family was that of a stern soldier inured to the rigours of camp life.

While, however, Haidar, as we have seen, throughout his period of office in Mysore, never went beyond retaining for himself and his successor the position of the Regent or *Sarvādhikāri* and steadily strove to maintain the semblance if not the substance of the sovereignty of the ancient Hindu Dynasty of Rulers by keeping *intact* the succession of minor kings, Cromwell, immediately after his accession to power (in 1653), went one step further. Having named himself dictator, he proceeded to limit his own power by one experiment at restricted election after another. He aimed at further councils to share and support his responsibility. He called one such assembly - also named a Parliament—in 1654. Because it showed signs of action, he destroyed it in 1655. Yet, in the autumn of 1655, he tried again and summoned a *third* body, more ridiculously restricted than even its predecessors. He none the less chose that moment to attempt the title of king and to found a dynasty. Having done so, he ran away from his own proposal and fell back on his original—and precarious—office of "Protector." The whole process was, indeed, "a bewildering sequence of false start, blind alleys and sudden decisions and counter-decisions, when the last appears." After erecting this *third* so-called Parliament on the distant model of the old assemblies, he suddenly destroyed the whole affair in February 1658. He would not act without a new small body to share responsibility with him. It was short-lived. He broke it in July—immediately before his last illness. His death in September ended what promised

to be an endless series of vacillating and futile experiments and he failed altogether to provide for the future! The *contrast* is obvious. While Haidar set up no new dictatorship in Mysore, beyond stepping into the position of the *Sarvādhikāri* or Regent occupied by his masters and predecessors, the Dalavāis, and his diplomatic allegiance to the Ruling Family is striking to a degree, the inconstancy of Cromwell's constitutional position and the subtle working of his mind have called for explanation. Indeed, as one recent writer puts it significantly enough,⁴¹ "for generations the simple answer was given that the whole process was one of secret tenacious overmastering ambition served by an incomparable power of deception and unrivalled duplicity. That Cromwell enjoyed such a power and practised such duplicity is, after his military qualities, the most obvious truth concerning him. But that this remarkable talent for intrigue was at the service of mere personal ambition to rule is not tenable. It is a facile hypothesis to account for no more than the main fact that he did indeed rise to, and maintain, headship in the State and arbitrary power. But tested by detail, it will not work. Cromwell did not set out to become head of the State. He became so in spite of himself, under successive necessities of self-preservation." While Haidar as the *Sarvādhikāri* sought to achieve much for the kingdom of Mysore for over two decades down to his death in camp in 1782, Cromwell, during his short but meteoric career as the Protector of England, had his own limitations. "In a word," to quote again,⁴² "the end of his life was a blind alley. He was like a man who climbs a cliff to avoid a peril below and must perpetually go up because it is impossible to go down. He arrived, he knew not how, at a complete executive power, which he felt to be

41. Hilaire Belloc, *Oliver Cromwell* (Benn's Six Penny Library, No. 252), p. 59.

42. *Ibid*, 56.

beyond his capacities, which he disliked, but of which he was the prisoner. To maintain it confused him; to abandon it would be ruin, not only to himself but to all. Without extrication from this maze he died." Happily for Mysore, the dictatorship evolved by Haidar ran along lines congenial to himself and the kingdom he represented. Even when he tried to found for himself a kingdom—that of old Bednūr, as told in a preceding Chapter, he gave it up wisely when he saw the impossibility of it.⁴³

Among other comparisons are the references in the writings of Haidar's European contemporaries, whom he impressed essentially as the leading Asiatic military character of the 18th century. Thus, writing in 1780, Captain Innes Munro, the English writer,⁴⁴ admits, as we have seen, the justness of the contemporary comparison of the military genius and character of Haidar to those of Frederick II of Prussia, and regards the "implacable aversion to all Europeans" instilled by Haidar into the mind of his son Tipū as akin "to the oaths of perpetual enmity against the Romans", which Hamilcar, the famous Carthaginian general, caused Hannibal to take in respect of the latter. De La Tour, the French officer serving under Haidar, also writing about the same time, compares him to "Philip of

43. See *Ante*, Vol. II, Chap. XIII.

44. *Supra*, p. 397. Frederick II, king of Prussia (1740-1786), referred to above, was surnamed "the Great." As administrator he was eminently efficient, the country flourished under his just, if severe, rule; his many wars imposed no debt on the nation; national industries were fostered, and religious toleration encouraged. Accounted the creator of the Prussian monarchy, he was, says Carlyle, "the first, who, in a highly public manner, announced its creation; announced to all men that it was, in very deed, created; standing on its own feet there, and would go a great way on the impulse it got from him and others." (See *The Nuttall Encyclopædia*, 259). Though Haidar was only a dictator and not a monarch or king of the type of Frederick II of Prussia, the comparison of the military and civil achievements of the two is striking to a degree.

Macedon, who formed the troops that procured the numerous victories of his son, and subdued the Greeks his neighbours, who were the enemies that were the most difficult to conquer."⁴⁵ Captain Francis Robson, who refers to De La Tour's *Ayder Ali* in certain places in his *Life of Hyder Ally* (1786), is more interested in narrating the sufferings of the British prisoners of Haidar and Tipū during the war of 1780-1784 than in comparing them with any historical characters. "I have foreborne," he says,⁴⁶ "to compare Hyder Ally to Philip of Macedon or his son Tippoo Saib to Alexander the Great. On the contrary, to form a fair estimate of the characters, I have subjoined to this work a genuine narrative of the sufferings of the British prisoners taken by their troops at Biddenore and other places in the late war, in which those who have already perused the French account and those who may hereafter meet with it, may see the character of Hyder and his son in their true light." Evidently Robson differed from De La Tour in his presentation of Haidar. To De La Tour, who had been closely associated with Haidar as his Commandant of French troops, Haidar had approached the ideal of a hero of classical history; to Robson, who belonged to the English detachment that fought against Mysore, Haidar was less a hero than a barbarian general revelling in his coarse treatment of British prisoners. While there is on

45. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, II. 198. Philip of Macedon (382-336 B.C.), referred to above, was the father of Alexander the Great. He usurped the kingdom from the infant king Amyntas, his nephew and ward, in 360 B.C.; having secured his throne, he entered on a series of aggressive wars, making expeditions into Thrace and Thessaly, and by the defeat of the Athenians and Thebans at Chaeronea (338 B.C.), he eventually placed all Greece at his feet. His last project was an expedition against Persia, but while preparations were on foot, he was assassinated at Aegae. A man of unbridled lust, he was an astute and unscrupulous politician, but of incomparable eloquence, energy and military skill (*Nuttall*, 500). The comparison of Haidar with Philip of Macedon from the military point of view is significant.

46. Robson, *Life of Hyder Ally*, Preface, VI.

the part of the French writer genuine appreciation of Haidar almost reaching up epic heights, in the account of the English military biographer is discernible a certain amount of bias from which he could not easily dissociate himself. Major Charles Stewart, who published his *Memoirs* in 1809, is somewhat critical in his comparative view of Haidar. "Hyder Aly Khan", he observes,⁴⁷ "was doubtless one of the greatest characters Asia has produced; and if his success cannot be compared with that of Tamerlane or Nādir Shah, it must be attributed more to the competitors with whom he had to contend, than to any want of ability on his part." Among recent writers, Lt. Col. L. H. Thornton compares Haidar to Ranjit Singh, while we also find in Haidar a nearer counterpart in certain respects of Allaudin Khilji of Mediæval Indian History.⁴⁸

If the supreme test of an efficient government is to be ever ready and prepared to meet an emergency, Haidar created one such in Mysore during troublous times and what is more important, even maintained it intact in a large measure for many years. If the other and more modern test of a good government is to advance the happiness of the people, Haidar's administration may be said to have been a fair success, having regard to the perpetual wars and other serious drawbacks of the period. Public order was maintained vigorously; malefactors were put down; oppressors of the cultivators were made to know that their tactics would not pay, and trade was given an impetus too, subject again to the troubles of the times. If, however, the old Hindu ideal that a ruler should be a "father" to his people be applied, it is a question if Haidar, with his love of lucre and plundering of even those who worked

47. Stewart, *Memoris of Hyder Aly Khan*, 42.

48. *Vide* Appendix II—(8) for a detailed notice of these comparisons.

honestly under him, can be said to have come up to it. He was more feared than loved, more respected for his capacity for organization than for his capacity for appreciation or affection, and more avoided than applauded. Haidar, with his free use of the *corla* (whip) and the peculiar passion he cultivated for it for maintaining discipline among the rank and file, was not undoubtedly the man who invited exactly love unto himself from the generality of the people or even from his higher associates. They naturally suspected him and suspicion repels rather than attracts.

That Haidar committed many mistakes—both in policy and in administration—is only too true. But he always saw to it that the army was efficient, that the internal governance was safe and secure, that the country's peace and order was maintained, that disturbers of peace were not allowed any sway, that the roads were safe for traffic and trade, that the general well-being of the country was duly cared for by protecting the cultivator against the revenue officials and collectors of revenue, and that the religious communities did not come into conflict in any part of the kingdom. That excesses occurred in his money levies, in his treatment of even his old associates, ministers and his old master, Nanjarāja, is also equally true. All this only shows that he was a human being and not being above or below humanity was not a monstrosity. As he had reached the summit of power in the country and giddy heights of authority that enabled him to control the resources of a vast kingdom, he could have afforded to have been less personal and less severe, less cruel and less vindictive, less revengeful and less inimical to the Royal Family, if not more grateful. But that was not in his character, upbringing or make up. That, taken all in all, he held to Mysore and served it well during a difficult period of transition has to be admitted even by the most adverse of his critics.

There are certain blots in the character of Haidar which a historian has to address himself to, in order that his work and worth as an administrator may be properly evaluated. First and foremost of these was his attitude towards successive kings of Mysore and the Royal House of Mysore, against which he went beyond, to say the least, the conventional limits he had at the start set down for himself. Nothing but fear of the most unreasoning kind could have induced one in his power and authority to get sovereigns assassinated at or before their coming of age. He proved the worst regicide known to Mysore History. There was absolutely no justification for this conduct, namely, faithlessness towards the Royal House which had befriended him and put him willingly into the position of *Sarvādhikāri*, and which did nothing against his interests, personal or State. By his impolitic, unwise and ungenerous conduct, he alienated the sympathies of the Royalists who set up secret rebellions against him and effectively prevented a peaceful administration for his son, for whose success he was so anxious and presumably to secure which he yielded to the temptation of turning a regicide. He was coward enough, despite his personal bravery and high military valour, to get the assassinations canvassed secretly through third parties, thus doing things that his conscience did not evidently permit. That he was temporarily beside himself in perpetrating such traitorous acts is plain enough to any thinking individual. Barring this mono-maniacal tendency, he was manly and right in his ordinary dealings with the Royal House and those with whom he came across during the whole period of his career. He failed to remember the simple fact that his son's succession to the office of *Sarvādhikāri* and that of his successors depended more on himself, his capacity and conduct, and less on what Haidar could do for

Blots in the
character of Haidar.

him during his own life-time. As events proved, Tipū fell a victim to his overreaching ambition, to his faithlessness to those beside him, to his religious rancour and hatred, and to his personal bitterness towards the British. Haidar committed the great mistake of involving and in fact dragging Mysore into new wars which probably no Mysorean of his time wanted—as, for instance, against Coorg, the West coast powers, etc.—and which were not warranted either by his own necessity or that of Mysore, and which resulted in dislike, if not hatred, of Mysoreans as an aggressive race. Haidar committed the worst political blunder of forgetting that the king and the Royal House are the expression of the will of the people; that they had not any part or lot in the doctrine of force as evolved by him and acted upon by him, to the detriment of the State; that the army he commanded had sworn, like himself personally, loyalty to the king, renewed every year at the Dasara, and to obey him and serve his interests exclusively; and that he forgot that the State would survive him, as it was organized for peace and war for ages.⁴⁶ The only redeeming

49. Haidar belonged to people of that type who are, in the words of Maxim Gorky, to be compared to Lazarus, whom even the magic of art is unable to resurrect. One does not strike a man—a rule obligatory on every honest fighter in boxing—when he is down, even if he is stirring. In this particular phase of his character, he may be justly described as being worse than Richard III of England, who usurped the crown from his nephew, Edward V, whom, with Edward's younger brother, the Duke of York, he is believed to have murdered. He, like Haidar, met his death fighting, on August 22, 1485, against Henry VII at Bosworth Field. Such is the story as told by Shakespeare in his famous play Richard III. But the chronicles of the reign of Richard III are wholly Lancastrian in origin and the traditional character of Richard III is not borne out by modern historical research, while the exact reverse is the case in regard to Haidar Ali. Modern research establishes pointedly the conclusion that he perpetrated the successive murders of ruling princes to maintain himself in the position of *Sarvādhikari* of Mysore. Haidar's murder of the ruling king cannot be brought under the head of "memorable murder" deserving the wonderful power of narrative of a De Quincey but a cowardly deed done in a cold-blooded manner to perpetuate his personal ends.

feature of his administration was—and it was the main source of the success he attained in the supreme office he held—that he did not depart from the civil and military administration that had been evolved in Mysore for ages but continued to build on the original foundations, which was wholly wise of him, for it meant not only continuity of action but also success in warfare for himself, whatever his objective, personal or other.

Haidar projected an unprecedented external policy and expansion of it could not but lead to war. While the recurring wars had made Dalavāi Nanjarāja's predecessors participators of power in the kingdom, Nanjarāja became nearly fully possessed of all power. His successor Haidar not only made war his chief aim but also war helped him to make his dictatorship one not only for life but also tried to continue it in favour of his son Tipū. He mobilised the State into a military dictatorship, while an enforced succession of infant kings helped him to continue this indefinitely. One result was that when he died, the perpetration of the dictatorship became inevitable. The monarchy could not emerge out of the military dictatorship to which it had been subjected, though it was intended to be by Haidar only for a special purpose though not for a particular period, as he intended the perpetration of the Sarvādhikāriśhip in perpetuity in his family. But Haidar's policy had one evil effect. If it involved only the suppressing of monarchy for a while to save the State, it would not be too great a price, for monarchy would be eventually saved; but it meant also the other thing, as it proved later during his son's time, the abolition or suppression of monarchy, which bordered on that of high treason towards one who had been deemed in so many ways and for so many years the master and sovereign of the State. Haidar's military dictatorship meant, to confess the fact, that it began with the slow suppression of monarchy and ended with

the open betrayal of monarchy. That is where the people drew the line and refused to give way. They recognised that monarchy should be saved and not destroyed. Haidar's cardinal error was there. He recognized the infant kings - so long as they were infants—as kings and became *Rector regis et Regni*, but superseded the old cabinet of Chikkadēvarāja which would of necessity have kept him under wise restraints and checks. Such a cabinet existed from a period anterior to the days of Chikkadēvarāja in one form or other, and before then there was the parental control which had been customarily exercised for ages. These restraints were in the nature of approval of acts sought to be enforced by an external body like a Council of Regency, of which, in England, constitutionally governed, even the infant king is a member even in modern days.⁵⁰ There Haidar transcended the limits of action and as one error leads to another, others followed in its wake. By slow yet sure degrees, he came to adapt his domestic life to regal standards, and assumed State paraphernalia in marching through the country, and generally in copying the details of court life, which are referred to in De La Tour's account of *Ayder Ali* (1784). All this, as we have said above, bears only the truth of the observation that no man can climb beyond the limitations of his own character. Haidar tried to maintain by the sword what he won by it. The result was what followed as the consequence of his death.

It would be idle, indeed, to deny that the whole basis of Haidar's external policy disappeared with his death. His son neither understood it nor followed it as a policy. Lack of leadership marked the whole period of Tipū's regime. Nor was there any clarity of purpose. He squandered away his enormous military and political strength on mere trivialities. Lack of knowledge, lack

50. See Medley, *English Constitutional History*, p. 89.

of foresight and lack of common understanding prevented him, as we shall see in the sequel, from making the most of the first Treaty of Seringapatam he had entered into with the English. Haidar, from this point of view, dug by his own hands the foundations for the destruction eventually of the greater Mysore which he built up, for he was followed by a son who could neither understand nor follow up his policy with the requisite intelligence. So far as he was concerned, his barren hatred of the English ended in his downfall, a hatred visibly made known by the exhibition of a model of a Musical Tiger at the doors of his residence, which kept tearing the vital parts of an Englishman's body!⁵¹ The hatred became a disease of the mind, and, it is to be feared, affected his thinking powers even, as some have rightly suggested.⁵²

The second blot in Haidar's character was his ungenerous treatment of Nanjarāja, his master, who had befriended and advanced him so much. That argues, whatever his motives, even granting they were high and unsullied and conceived from altruistic and impersonal ideas, and even entirely in the interests of the State of which both, in the last resort, were servants, lack of gratitude towards his benefactor. Nanjarāja trusted in him, being gullible, and he failed him. But Nanjarāja's main personal fault was he did not see whom he was trusting: *fide, sed cui vide*. Muhammad Ali was the last man worthy of being trusted. Nanjarāja trusted him and he never succeeded in securing what he had been promised. For a second time, he trusted Haidar, who utterly ruined him. A feature of his negotiations was he went from disappointment to disappointment until he was driven to gloomy despair. Nanjarāja no doubt failed in his attempt to secure

51. See Appendix IV—(2).

52. See Appendix IV—(8).

Trichinopoly. But he deserved to succeed. And as a matter of fact he succeeded, but was foiled in his attempt to gather in the fruits of his victory. Nanjarāja's aim and objective was the adoption of the Vijayanagar ideal of one State, one people, one king for all India south of the Tungabhadra, if not the Krishna; to create a new status for the South; bring unity to it; and save the South from incursions from outside and dissensions within itself; in a word, to keep the South for itself and prevent Muhammadan north extending its influence in the South. Though he stood for the territorial expansion of Mysore—not aggrandisement—he sought, as his chief ambition, the unification of the South in one grand confederacy, but was defeated in this noble aim by the jealousy of the Southern rulers. He put down all rivalry, however, in Mysore itself, and established himself as absolute master, despite the opposition he met with from certain parties and his colleagues. The prosperity that had attended Mysore as the result of good rule under Chikkadēva did but enhance the envy of the Southern rulers, particularly Madura and Tanjore. Before Nanjarāja died, he had the satisfaction of seeing Haidar following up his policy with a vigour and determination that would have satisfied him but for the harsh and ungenerous personal ill-treatment meted out to him by his servant and successor. Haidar was deliberate and what is worse callous to a degree in what he did against him, especially in walling him up in his own house. Whatever the lengths he might have gone to, that was too much, too bad, and too ungenerous towards his benefactor, to whom he owed much, if not everything he had become in course of time. After all, Nanjarāja could not have done much harm, if he had come to power again. But Haidar's fear was that history would repeat itself and his resuscitation would mean his own downfall. He failed to recognise he had become too strong at the

time for even Nanjarāja, in his old age, to attempt that idea, much less achieve it, even if he attempted. When Nanjarāja returned to Mysore from Trichinopoly, he was the unhappiest in all Mysore. And years had elapsed since then. The dream of his life had been shattered. His long and weary battle for the extension of Mysore down South had failed of its purpose.

Daḷāvāi Nanjarāja was in his fifty-second year, and he possessed neither the charm of the professional politician nor the dash of the military general. He was neither; he was possessed of the scholar's simplicity, if not rectitude. His outlook was human, indeed, but he lacked fire and the common touch. His protests were models of academics. All this partly explains his failure. Born in the purple, he had been brought up in a devout atmosphere of religious sanctity and later became apprenticed to life at the king's court, and then became assistant in the Sarvādhikāri's office. When he took the helm in Mysore politics as a staunch Mysorean of the old school (which since the days of Chikkadēvarāja stood for expansion down South), and began the advance to extend his country's influence and keep the country safe from outside domination, despite the pressure of the French and English Companies and their allies, tragedy fell on him and his family. But disillusionment did not come yet to him. He yet believed in his old, unalterable theme—"Trichinopoly must belong to Mysore"—and trained Haidar in that policy of expansion which had taken such strong hold of him. But Haidar, in trying to carry it through, put down his own master and teacher and the real inspirer of his policy. If that was not ingratitude, what may be described by that term? Haidar forgot what promises he had made to Nanjarāja when he assumed power. When he displaced Nanjarāja, Haidar had made due submission to him and had tried to appease him. "He gave him a considerable territory,

and made a promise, both in writing and by oath, that he would never make any attempt on his liberty, property or life, but would always regard him as his father."⁵³ This he broke in 1767, when he confined him in his own palace.⁵⁴ Nanjarāja died a prisoner in 1773.⁵⁵

Why did Haidar tear himself off from Nanjarāja? How did he come to develop a mentality which ended in his dropping his whole set of colleagues in the time-honoured ministry? For what purpose did he assume all the offices of Sarvādhikāri, Dewān and Dalāvāi? The failure at Trichinopoly, which made Nanjarāja lose the confidence of the king and country, had made a deep impression on him. The events connected with the departure of Mysore troops from Trichinopoly, the manner in which Mysore had been put off by Muhammad Alī and the English at Madras, and the losses in men and money that Mysore had sustained during the protracted war, in which he had taken a personal part, had made plain to him that a change in methods was needed if Mysore was to make any impression on its opponents. Nanjarāja had failed; his method had failed; and he had lost credit. Haidar saw his opportunity. He tried to seize it, not only for gaining his own personal ends, but also to gain the country's ends. He did not differ from Nanjarāja in his objective. But he differed from him in his method. Haidar was, in essence, a revolutionary and his method was, in fact, revolutionary. To dethrone Nanjarāja from his position, if that was necessary; to surmount every obstacle in the way; and to make himself and his country respected by those who had stood in the way of its advance—that was his objective, for attaining which he was ready to go any length. Even the breaking of personal

53. See *Ante*, Vol. II. p. 389, citing De La Tour.

54. See pp. 279-283 *supra*.

55. See p. 283 *supra*.

loyalty and the severing of the links binding him to his colleagues and friends was not too great a price for achieving the end in view. His political conviction seemed to override all considerations—personal and other. Haidar was becoming increasingly conscious of the gulf that separated him from his late master, Nanjarāja. He would not recommend to himself the giving up of the country's cause in regard to expansion in the South. He would not agree to any impossible compact between himself and his colleagues for resolving the country's difficulties. He would not get himself to believe that it was in the country's interest that those who are called on to direct its affairs should try to work an uneasy partnership, fully conscious of the differences that divide them, yet all the while hoping that they might be able somehow to bridge them. For these reasons, Haidar, while he always dissimulated friendship and even respect for Nanjarāja, made up his mind to separate himself from him and try to mould affairs in his own way. Nanjarāja, it may be noted, knew Haidar only partially. He did not suspect him either of treachery towards him or towards the king and the country. His easy yielding to him is inexplicable except on this footing, more especially as he twice befriended him, each occasion being in fact a crisis in the affairs of Haidar. It is the fashion to say that Haidar deceived Nanjarāja on each of these occasions and that Nanjarāja was foolish enough to be gulled into belief of what Haidar put to him each time. But the fact is that Haidar had unbounded confidence in Nanjarāja. He knew that there was no difference in their outlook or objective and he would agree to anything that would favour its realization. That was where Haidar's deep knowledge of human nature helped him in working out his policy. Haidar used the knowledge of that secret to his utmost benefit. Where he wronged Nanjarāja and by that means wronged

himself in the world's eyes was when he made him believe in what he himself did not actually believe. There he was venal to a degree and there he has to stand castigation at the bar of history.

While Nanjarāja and Haidar agreed in their ultimate aims and the fundamentals of their policy, they parted company when it came to their execution. Haidar believed rightly or wrongly that Nanjarāja would prove a drag on him. He was both unpopular and undiplomatic. He was further unequal to the demands of the new situation that was developing apace by the prominence that the Anglo-French relations were assuming in Karnātic politics. He was, besides, slow in his decisions and diffident in his deliberations. He had lost faith in himself and what is worse, people had lost faith in him. Haidar impressed where Nanjarāja depressed people. Haidar's quick understanding, resolute action, vigorous attitude and general behaviour that indicated self-confidence made him popular and gave him a standing and position which was reflected in the high office he, despite the tremendous odds against him, came to occupy and carry through during a period of twenty-two years.

The next blot in Haidar's character was his leaning on the French, despite his ardent desire, at first, in the earlier part of his career, for an amicable understanding with the English and even a defensive and offensive alliance with them, which made his less intelligent son depend more and more on them, even after they ceased to be a political power (by 1799) in India. If the French had been already battered and destitute of prestige in South India in 1761, when he himself rose to personal power, they may be said to have been politically extinct in India in 1799. Yet Tipū leaned on them ardently and vanished out of existence. Haidar's example in this respect proved destructive to Tipū. Haidar's usual political vision was slowly clouded by the

blind hatred he developed, after 1769, against the English in this respect.

Haidar's zeal for religious conversion of the Nairs outran his wisdom and must be reckoned a further blot in his character. He never ordinarily yielded to passion in religious matters but in Malabar, he was overmastered by the instinct for conversion. His conversion of the son of the Chirakal Rāja—Ayāz of Mysore History—was a wanton and perverse one. His custom of driving into his harem hordes of captured Hindu women has perhaps to be judged as non-moral having regard to the conditions of the age, though Haidar, from his general outlook in such matters, may be expected to have risen slightly higher and opened a new course to himself in adopting and perpetuating this obnoxious custom of Muslim rulers of old. No doubt old customs die hard and man is a creature of his own times and often cannot rise high enough even to please posterity.

The fifth blot in Haidar's character was his cruel treatment of his own officers, even honest and loyal officers. He plundered them of their honourably acquired savings and what is worse, his whole disposition suddenly changed towards them when it suited him. Instances of this lack of common honesty on his part are too numerous to need quoting here, and the more so as they have been detailed already in the narrative part of this work. Another serious weakness of Haidar was he never allowed willingly any officer to leave his service, with the result that it came to be disliked.

Though Haidar had many admirable traits, both as a man and as a soldier, he could not fix himself to a policy which while providing for a reasonable territorial expansion would be legitimate, avoid wrong alliances, and provide for the peace of the country under his charge. With the continued rule of infant kings he brought about, supported by the army, he grew in power as

Regent and Sarvādhikāri. During his period of power, twenty-two years or so, the army really got the upper hand. Internal consolidation was secured, and peace prevailed in the land, despite the wars indulged in by him, which indeed proved the inevitable result of his policy of force. But later, especially during the period of his son, who was politically less wise (1782-1799), crisis followed crisis; revolts spread; the country was torn up by rebellion, in which both Hindus and Muslims made common cause and the country was thrown into a turmoil. That seems the only result that could follow the lack of a more tolerant policy on the part of both Haidar and Tipū.

Some well-authenticated anecdotes illustrative of the personal characteristics of Haidar, the man, may be referred to in this connection. Though to be judged with care, anecdotes form literally unpublished history. Many more are current in the country, but those detailed here are vouched for by Kirmāni and Mirza Ikbal, the Persian annalists, and may be depended on as testifying to the truth.

"On most occasions," Kirmāni narrates,⁵⁶ "Hydur used patiently to bear with the petulance and coarseness of the brave men in his service. As, for instance, one day, in the Nawaub's court, or assembly, some recollections of the battle of Churkoli [Chinkurali] were introduced. The Nawaub said, that on that day his whole army had followed the path of cowardice; that they had run away before his face; that no one with his sword in his hand had exerted himself faithfully; and that they (the officers), to save their own lives, had sacrificed those of their men. Among those who were present there, was Yaseen Khan Wuntī Koodri, who had followed the path of faith and honour in that battle, and who had there devoted, as a charitable donation to the sword and fear, the whole of his body, and one eye; and he said, in answer, 'Yes,

56. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 479-482, 483-487. Haidar broke his proverbial abusive and controversial mentality with Wuntī Kudare and entered into long discussions with him.

Sir (Huzrut), what you say is true; for such occurrences arise from fate, and depend on the will and power of no man. Yet, this eye of mine, for what was it put out?—and for what man did I lose the blessings of sight, the pleasure of beholding the lights and shades of this many coloured world, the object and delight of life?—The Nawaub smiled at this, and said, 'I did not mean you'.

"One day, also, he gave the Commandant Muhammad Ali some orders relative to a military movement; and the Commandant, to complete his charge, required a sum of money, or a military chest. The Nawaub, at this request, became very angry, and said, 'By this account thou takest monthly a large sum in gold, as much as thy mother's dower, or marriage present, and spendest it in all manner of ways, and now, the time having arrived when there is something to do, thou demandest more money from me. Every piece of gold thou hast received up to the present day, I will recover from thee, and, after putting thee in irons, thou shalt be added to the chain of thieves or felons deserving death, for thou hast spent much of the public money in worthless matters, and now, in time of need, thou wishest to reduce me to poverty'. The hard featured and impudent Commandant, at this, turning his face from the Nawaub towards the Clerks of the Treasury, and, while speaking to them, alluding to the Nawaub, said, 'The depth of the Sirkar's (Nawaub's) understanding is evident! The old man is merely giving himself airs on his penetration and knowledge. In this matter, money is indispensable, and, if not given, the measures of the government will be ruined.' This impudent address was heard by the Nawaub; but he, with the indifference of a great man, and the indulgence he was accustomed to allow his servants, took no notice of the impertinence of his insolent though faithful officer, and merely told the people of the treasury to give that vulgar, greedy fellow, what he wanted. Occurrences similar to these happened frequently.

"One day, a religious quarrel took place between the Shiabs and the Soonnis, and the dispute had advanced, from the tongue and words, to hands and daggers, when the Jasoos, or spies, of the Government reported the whole to Hydur.

The Nawaub ordered both parties to be brought before him, and then said to them, 'what foolish dispute is this; and why do you bark like dogs at each other?' The Soonni here replied, 'Protector of the *World*, this spiteful man was presumptuous, in speaking of the successors of the last of the prophets, Muhammad (on whom, and on his family and companions, be peace); the stars of the firmament of religion; and he even went so far as to use abusive language towards them, and your slave, at hearing him, felt as though a thorn had been broken in his heart.' The Shiah was next asked, in the same way, and he, according to the tenets of his false religion, said, 'Abubukr Sideek, the first Khalif, did so and so, to Moortuza Ali and Omr, the second Khalifah, did so and so, in regard to the lovely Fatima, and frequently ill-treated her. Knowing this, therefore, why are the descendents of the sons of Hussein to speak respectfully of such men'. The Nawaub, in his wisdom, not wishing to hurt the religious feelings of either party, asked the Shiah, 'Are those persons whom you reproach, alive?' The Shiah answered, 'No.' The Nawaub then, with the anger natural to his disposition, said to him, 'He is a man who declares his opinion of the good, or evil, of another before his face, not behind his back. Do you not know that back-biting is unlawful? And I should think that, as you act in this manner, you must also be base born. If you ever again waste and destroy your time and that of the Sirkar in such an irreverent, wicked dispute, you may rely on it a camel bag and a mallet will be ready for you' [alluding to some kind of punishment].

"One day, in Hydur's court or assembly, people of both these sects (Soonnis and Shiahs) were present; and one of the Soonnut Jumaut related an anecdote of a traveller, who was proceeding on a journey on horse-back. It happened that the road was very miry, and, all at once, the hoofs of the horse sunk in a quagmire, and he stuck fast. The horse-man, therefore, dismounted, and, seizing the bridle, began to pull him out; saying, 'Come forth, by the truth of the Sideek Abubukr.' The horse, however, did not move. He then said, 'By the established justice of Huzrut (Omr), Farook, come forth.' But the horse made no movement. He then said,

'By the strength of the understanding of Huzrut Osman, step forward.' The horse, however, still remained stock still. At length, he exclaimed, 'By the might and valour of the great Moortuzvi or Moortuza (Ali), step on!' The moment he said this, the horse, plunging, came out of the mud. The horseman, now drawing his sword, said, 'O horse, thou art become a heretic! (Rafizi), thou art of no use to me,' and with one stroke of his sword he cut off his legs. On hearing this story, the Nawaub smiled, and said, 'A wonderful fool this man must have been! Did he not know that he who was the strongest brought the horse out of the mire?'

"Sometimes he was fond of sporting his wit, or of joking, with his associates or companions, particularly with Ali Zumān Khān. At the time the Souba of [Sira] was conquered, the Nawaub one day mounted his horse to look at the city, and rode through the streets and lanes. Now it is the fashion of the city, that there are many tombs in front of the doors of the houses, and also in the streets or roads. The Nawaub, therefore, asked those who were with him, how these tombs became placed in the middle of the town. Those persons replied that apparently, the whole space had been formerly waste land; but now, men seeing that God's people were protected, and the peasantry encouraged, by His Highness, they had assembled from all parts and had built the city. The Nawaub said, 'A truce to your compliments! Do you not know that these men and women died fighting for their houses?'

"The word Lowndika, which means the son of a slave girl, a term much in use among the Dukkanees, was also continually on the tongue of the Nawaub, and, if he was angry with any one, he called him by this name; but, it was also used as an endearing, fond, appellation, to which was attached great favour; until, one day, Ali Zumān Khān, by inferences and hints represented to him that the word was low, discreditable, and not fit for the use of men of knowledge and rank. The Nawaub smiled, and said, 'O friend, you and I are both the sons of slave women, and the two Husseins only, on whom be good wishes and Paradise, are the sons of a Bibi or lady.' These words highly pleased those who were

present, and they fully agreed with him, for this reason, that the title of the illustrious mother of those great men is the lady or Queen of both worlds. 57"

"In his (Haidar's) Durbars or levees," Mirza Ikbal narrates,⁵⁸ "no one dared converse, or even whisper. If any one had a wedding in his house, he could not invite any friends; except through the Nawaub, and the agency of his servants; and, even then, he gave his Wordi Hurkaras orders to go and see and hear what was said and done. These men, therefore, were in general bribed not to tell the truth; but he believed all they told him. If he had advanced any one of his servants money, the third part of his pay was stopped until the amount was refunded; and if any one paid the debt on demand, he was accustomed to demand interest, under the pretence that he had borrowed the money from a banker for him. But, when he had obtained the interest, he said, 'this man is rich, why did he borrow money from me? Seize his goods,' and, accordingly, his property was sometimes confiscated, or stolen by thieves set on by Hydur's authority.

"When he was on the field of battle, contrary to his former custom, when all he required was done by the influence of kindness and friendship, now, he looked steadfastly at the enemy, and said to his own horsemen, 'Do you see that man, standing yonder with his soldier? That man is your Father—

57. Haidar's humour, as recorded instances show, lies close to irreverence. Irreverence, when reverently used, is, as Stephen Leacock, one of the world's most favourite and prolific humourists, puts it, a splendid instrument of human progress. Such humour is, in reality, looking for truth, a sudden twist of thoughts, which gives a new way to truth. In its essence, such humour may be compared to correct American humour, which sticks after actuality and its reproduction. American humour works at institutions and people as they are in the clear light of actuality and through the mists of traditional associations of historic reverence. American humour, with reverence for nothing, sounds vulgar to English ears. In reality, it was looking for truth. When the English want to draw character, they don't make up the figure out of their heads; they go out and take a photograph. Haidar's use of slang—whether Kannada or Hindustani—was an attempt to remake a language for himself by applying towards the questioning process.

58. *Ibid.*, 495-502, 507-509 (from the Supplemental Note on Mirza Ikbal's *Ahwāli Hydur Naik*). As to Yāsīn Khān, see further in Appendix II—(1).

you must kill him, or be killed ; for, if you come back without killing him, I will certainly put you to death myself in this very place ; as, indeed, to inspire terror, he had before often done. And when stimulated and forced on by the abuse he gave them, the horse had charged the enemy, he sent for the sauses (grooms or horsekeepers) of the cavalry, and, giving them bamboos and shoes, he placed them in line, himself taking post in the rear of the whole, and giving orders to them to strike and beat any one who retreated. The poor horsemen, forced on by the disgrace of the stick, and the torrent of abuse following them, gave themselves up to death uselessly. He never, however, took the pains to bury them after they were slain. As an instance of this neglect ; one day, that a great battle had been fought between him and the English General Coote, the General, after the battle was over, despatched a message to Hydur, stating that his (Hydur's) horsemen had done their duty, and fulfilled the condition of their contract with him, by sacrificing their lives in his service, and that it was now time he should perform his duty, as their master, and direct some one to bury their bodies. Stung by the sharp reproof conveyed in this message, he immediately sent for Meer Muhammad Sadik Khan, his Dewaun or Minister, and ordered him to bury them. In reply, however, to General Coote, he merely said, that he did not want any of his advice.

“ If any one was sent in command of an expedition, and was delayed or unsuccessful, he was on his return sent for to the presence, and severely reproached by Hydur himself. If, on the contrary, he did his work soon and was successful, still, on his return, he was abused for having (as Hydur said) sacrificed the lives of his best men in rash and profitless attacks. In fact, in his life he was never known to praise any one. In all his measures he availed himself of the aid of threats and violence, to instil fear into men's minds.

“ He was accustomed to have a party of Bayaderes, dancing women, early every night at his tents. If the woman who danced was a Hindu, she was required to wear a white dress ; if she was a Mussalman woman, a dress embroidered with gold. In her dancing, however, she was not

permitted to laugh or smile, or display any wanton steps or gestures; she was required to dance and sing slowly. Let there be ever so many men present, the attention and eyes of all were to be fully occupied, and absorbed, in the beauty of the Nawaub himself alone. If any of the men present cast his eyes towards the dancing girls, God preserve us! the Nawaub would immediately call out 'Look! look well! for your mother (meaning the dancing girl) has left her house, and is occupied in dancing in the midst of her husbands.' If it was any one of his friends, however, he was more civil.

"In the taking of towns, it was his custom, after the plunder of the inhabitants, to allow them to remain in peace. After a short time, however, he was used to assemble the Dullalah [women who beat the Dohul (a small drum) at marriages] and, as they are free to enter all houses, he required them to point out where the handsomest maidens resided. To those houses he sent, and seized the girls, and had them brought to him; and among them those who were remarkable for their bloom and delicacy, elegance of form, length of hair, and complexion, he placed among his own women; and, in general, these women were most in request by him. They had also salaries, or establishments, and were placed under the Jamaudar of the women, one of his senior wives; as for the rest, he never sent for them again, but either returned them to their parents, or partitioned them among his followers. In this way he collected a great number of women, but his old wives were the chiefs of all the new ones.

"On the day that was fixed for the Nawaub to visit the Mahal, or women's apartments, every Chief lady had her division of women, dressed in a different colour, and standing apart; the red party, the green, the violet, the yellow. Some wore rose-coloured dresses, others orange, the Nafurmani or purple, the spotted, white, gold, sandal, and Moky-yush. On these occasions they sat down near him, but he seldom spoke to them; nor did they speak, except his first wife, the sister of Meer Ali Ruza Khan, the mother of Tippoo. He was always very fond of her, and compelled the rest of his women to pay their

respects to her every morning. Sometimes, however, she and Hyder used to quarrel. On these occasions, he bore the violence of the lady's tongue with great resignation and patience; until, at length, rising up, he would say, 'It is from fear of your tongue that I have given up entering the women's apartments.'⁵⁹

"When he came out and sat down in his private room, he was accustomed to tell his friends, such as Ghoolaum Ali Khan, Bahadur, and Ali Zuman Khan, that Tippoo's mother had treated him very harshly indeed, that he had not the courage to answer, or argue with her; that, when she complained, he had no choice but to leave the apartment; but that still he was fond of her, because she undertook, in her own person, the management of everything in his house, and laboured for his welfare; but that she had a long tongue and a high sounding voice, and that he was afraid to listen to her. However, that she should do as she pleased.

"Every time he entered the women's apartments she was the first person he called; desiring her to come to him. She, in reply, would say, 'What do you want with me?' But he never entered the Mahal without taking some valuable presents to her.

"His eating and sleeping was always outside the Mahal, but every night two or three of the ladies of his family were in attendance on him.

"He was very steadfast in his word to his Talookdars (or revenue officers) and merchants, and with these two classes of men he was never known to break his faith. And this was the mode of his agreements. If any of his revenue agents farmed a district from him, although he strove to raise the amount to be paid as high as possible, yet, if any profit was

59. It is difficult to say why she behaved like this towards Haidar. Possibly she was a shrew, a born shrew and no more. Possibly she was jealous of the other wives and turned to the most successful mode to retaining Haidar's goodwill and affection for her in this rather queer manner. In any case, she did not want to allow Haidar to prove the unreliable Philander so well known in harems. Haidar's behaviour towards her shows that he really loved her. He put up with her. He behaved admirably in every possible difficult situation; he was tender, unselfish, thoughtful, considerate and even intelligent. She was in love with him and he was in love with her.

derived beyond the government money, he never took more than the precise sum stipulated; indeed, many persons have offered him the surplus: but he, in reply, said, 'If the amount contracted for with government had been short, I should have exacted the deficiency; and, therefore, if the farmer gets more, I have no right to interfere between him and his good fortune.' If he confided to any one the charge of a district, God protect him, if he took to the value of a blade of grass, besides the dues assigned to him by Haidar! he was sure to be flayed alive. Whenever information arrived that so much money was due from the farmer of the revenue, he first sent for him and demanded the money, and, if it was not paid, he prepared to compel him by oppressive and cruel means ...

x x x x

"On Tuesdays and Fridays, from the morning to mid-day, no one could enter his presence; for on that day he was shaved. . . As an instance of his plainness approaching to folly, it is related that there was in his service a one-eyed man, named Yasin Khan, whose nick-name was Wunti Koodri, Wunti, in the Canarese language, signifying one, and Koodri a horse, or the master of one horse. This man always served singly; and, notwithstanding he was asked to accept a Risāldāri (the command of a regiment), he constantly refused, and for that reason assumed or acquired this name. Between him and Hydur there was frequently a great deal of wit bandied about, in the public Durbar, until, sometimes, it degenerated into abuse. This man at first shaved his beard and whiskers like those of the Nawaub Bahadur; but, when he became old, he allowed his beard to grow very long. One day, using an indecent expression, the Nawaub asked him why he allowed his beard to grow so long. In reply, he said, 'Men call those eunuchs who shave their beards and moustaches.' This was in allusion to Hydur's custom of shaving his beard, and also to the cause of Yasin Khan's following his example, by shaving his.

"In the battle fought between the Nawaub and Trimuk Mama, the army of the Nawaub was totally defeated, and his baggage plundered. After the battle, the Mahrattas searched about everywhere, that they might take Hydur prisoner; and

they were all impressed with an opinion that any man who had his beard and moustaches shaved must be Hydur Naik. In these circumstances, Yasin Khan Wunti Koodri, keeping his eye on the faith and gratitude he owed his master, immediately shaved off his beard and whiskers, and folding a turban round his head, after the manner of Hydur Ali, mounted a large horse, and with three or four horsemen ranged over the field, as if they were men of rank seeking to escape. As soon, therefore, as the Mahrattas saw them, they made sure that Yasin was no other than Hydur Ali Khan himself; and they seized him and carried him to their officer. In the meantime, however, Hydur Ali, by stripping off his clothes, had escaped, and had reached Seringaputtun, the distance being about three Kose (four miles and a half). When the Mahrattas found that Hydur Ali Khan had escaped, and that the man they had taken was Yasin Khan, they released him from confinement, and, from that day, he used in jest to say, that he was the true, or original, Hydur Ali Khan."

Elsewhere we have had occasion to notice anecdotes about Haidar from other writers as well.⁶⁰ We may here take the following ones from Wilks, who had had opportunities of collecting them from first-hand sources :

"Hyder," Wilks narrates,⁶¹ "was addicted to drinking, but these excesses were so prudently managed as to be known to few; the time was soon before his usual hour of retiring to rest, and he slept off the effects. Whether the use of strong liquors at the time of retiring to rest was intended exclusively as a sensual indulgence, or partly as a soporific, is a question on which his old associates are not agreed. Abbas Ali relates (on the authority of Gholaum Ali, one of the most familiar of his companions) that he was frequently in Hyder's tent, when after fatigue he would lie down in the day and take a short repose; on one occasion, he observed him to start, and be much disturbed in his sleep; and on his waking,

60. See, for instance, Viscount Valentia's narration of the anecdote about Haidar's indulgence towards the Hindus (quoted at *Ante*, Vol II. P. 291, n. 91).

61. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 695, n.

he took the liberty to mention what he had observed, and to ask of what he had been dreaming. 'My friend,' replied Hydur, 'the state of a Yogee (religious mendicant) is more delightful than my envied monarchy; awake they see no conspirators; asleep they dream of no assassins.' "

"Hyder, from the earliest youth of Tippoo," Wilks relates further,⁶² "made no secret of lamenting that his intellect was of an inferior order, and his disposition wantonly cruel, deceitful, vicious and intractable. Among the pranks which he practised about this period, two gave particular offence to his father. 1st. In taking his exercise on horse-back, it was his particular delight to hunt the sacred bulls of the Hindoo temples (the Indian apīs) wounding them, and sometimes destroying them with his lance . . . Hyder was shocked at these wanton and unprofitable outrages on the feelings of the great mass of his subjects. 2d. An English soldier, who had been made a prisoner during Colonel Smith's war, had remained in Mysoor, on the liberation of his associates. Tippoo one day took the opportunity of having him suddenly seized, and causing the outward and visible sign of Islām to be inflicted in his presence. Hyder was at the time particularly anxious to conciliate the English; he abused his son in the grossest terms, put him in solitary confinement, and when released, forbade his courtiers to speak with him; an interdiction which was frequently repeated, as the consequence of subsequent offences. On this occasion, as on many others, he predicted that this worthless successor would lose the empire which he had created; he observed, that in order to indulge a silly prejudice, he had insulted and injured the soldier, in a manner which could answer no one rational purpose, and might one day bring the vengeance of the English nation on his house."

Referring to the second article of a compact which Haidar is said to have exacted from his son about 1771 to the effect that "if in the affairs of the *Sircar*, I should commit theft or be guilty of fraud, great or small, let me, as the due punishment thereof, be strangled," Wilks continues,⁶³ "On the

62. *Ibid.*, 841 (App. VII).

3. *Ibid.*, 840-841. As to Ayāz and the connected anecdote about Haidar's advice to him, *vide* P. 297, n. 53 *supra*.

subject of the second article of the compact, it may be necessary to explain that Tippoo never returned from a detachment, without attempting secret embezzlement of the plunder. Hyder on such occasions would lose all patience, and in plain terms call him a thief, and a blockhead; observing that he had not the common sense to perceive that he was stealing from himself; for, unhappily, said he, 'you will be my successor; would that I had begotten *Ayāz* instead of you!'

It is always interesting, in the case of men reckoned commonly great, to know how they affected the women round about them. Haidar, as we have seen above, tolerantly submitted himself to the gross abuse poured on him by his favourite wife, the mother of Tipū. He received the virago's torrent of hot words coolly, for he knew she was in action kind to him and looked after his needs and wants and his general welfare was safe in her keeping. That, to him, mattered more than the meaningless words she uttered. He took them as her familiar mode of greeting him as he entered her apartments. Haidar's treatment of the Portuguese widow Madam Mequinez narrated in an earlier part of this

work⁶⁴— referred to by De La Tour— was typical of him. He did justice to the revered Provincial head of the

De La Tour. Jesuits in Coimbatore, though he had been unjustly slandered by her of misappropriation of her deposit of money and jewellery. It must be said, while he advanced his own reputation for fairness and mercy to the memory of her husband, a military officer in Haidar's employ until his death when he fell in the Mahratta war, Haidar had given the widow the regiment of Topasses her husband had possessed, with the appointment of Colonel, till an adopted son of her husband's was of age to command the regiment. She, however, accompanied her regiment everywhere; the colours were carried to

64. See *Ante*, Vol. II. pp. 346-347.

her house; she had a private sentinel at the door; she received the pay, and caused the deductions to be made in her presence from each company. When the regiment was collected, she inspected it herself as well as all the detachments that were ordered out; only she permitted the second in command to exercise the troops and lead them against the enemy. But Haidar could be impartial too when she tried to impose on him. She preferred a charge on the Jesuit Father of Coimbatore that he had refused to give back her deposit of jewels and money. Haidar directed the French Commander of his European troops to enquire into the matter with the aid of a few of his officers. When the Commander and his co-adjutors reported its utter falsehood, he let her off without doing anything detrimental to her but simply admonishing that she should behave better. "Her conduct is such," remarks De La Tour, "as, if she does not take care, will finish by bringing no small mortification upon herself." Understanding her nature, as if by instinct, he tried to get her remarried to a Swedish officer, but he, a young man of twenty-eight years, absolutely refused the offer. When she later married a mongrel Portuguese serjeant, Haidar ordered her salary to be reduced to a serjeant's pay, because she had dishonoured the name of her former husband, whose services had demanded that the woman who bore his name should not be without the means of subsisting respectably.⁶⁵

Another anecdote recorded by De La Tour is to the effect that Haidar could mete out condign punishment even to his highest officers who misbehaved with women. In 1767, Āga Muhammad, chief usher, became enamoured of a beautiful damsel. He abducted her and ravished her. Haidar was prayed for by the girl's mother for justice. He at once ordered an officer of his Abyssinian horse-guard to repair immediately with the woman to the

65. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 157-169 (n.).

country seat of Āga Muhammad, where he was then staying for a month with the girl. If he found the girl, the officer was to deliver her to her mother and return with the head of Āga. But if she was not found, he was charged to conduct Āga to Coimbatore, where Haidar was then halting. The girl was found, and the head of the criminal was brought to Haidar! Āga was then sixty years of age and had been chief usher for many years. (De La Tour says twenty-five years but this seems an exaggeration). It should be added that Haidar Shah, who had succeeded Āga in his post, tried to screen him and save him by representing that the complainant and her daughter were both of infamous repute and lived in a disgraceful manner. Haidar refused to take notice of Haidar Shah's plea. He also refused to take notice of the special intercession of the Commandant of European Troops in this connection: Āga had been for his services granted a *jāghir* but all that did not matter when it came to justly punish him for his iniquity. Nobody would perhaps blame Haidar for the sharp punishment meted out, which was in keeping with not only his own right and ready methods but also in consonance with the ideas of the times. The punishment of death was also one prescribed by the *Korān* which condemns the ravisher of a girl or woman to death. As regards Haidar Shah, he was punished with 200 stripes on the parade! That was, indeed, setting an example to malefactors of a peculiarly odious kind.⁶⁶

Though Haidar was himself cruel on occasions, sometimes unjustly too, he hated others being cruel. When Alī Rāja of Cannanore took, with his fleet, the king of the Maldives, under the pretence of some injustice done to his people, he had the cruelty to put out his eyes. The conquest having been accomplished in Haidar's name,

66. *Ibid*, 29-30 (n.). This story is also reported in Michaud's *History*.

the blinded Sultān was led a prisoner to Haidar's presence at Nagar. Haidar was so irritated at the barbarity that he instantly deprived Alī Rāja of the command of the fleet and appointed another, an Englishman named Stanet, to it. Haidar also consoled the Sultān of the Maldives and asked him to forgive Alī Rāja for the outrage he was guilty of. He also gave one of his own palatial residences for a retreat and a revenue sufficient to procure all the pleasures his situation permitted him to enjoy. Though Haidar could improve on a situation like this, still there is every reason to believe that he was wholly sincere in his sympathies with the unfortunate king of the Maldives.⁶⁷

Though Haidar himself fleeced his own officers and openly treated them with contumely to get even their honestly earned savings, he could see the injustice of it when indulged against the cultivators in the bulk. When Alī Rāja took possession of Cannanore from the Dutch, he levied heavy exactions by asking the poor Portuguese cultivators to make good their title to the lands in their possession or pay for them. As most of them had had them without any formal grants of title from the Dutch, they had nothing but long possession in their favour. When Haidar heard of this kind of fleecing, he quoted the *Korān* against Alī Rāja, which says : "Thou shalt not take from the infidel his house, his field, etc., because they were given him from God ; but thou shalt be content with causing him to pay tribute." Haidar fixed this tribute at a rupee per head. Alī Rāja had to meekly yield and his fleecing ended with that.⁶⁸

As a sagacious man, Haidar could easily see through a complex game of intended fraud and order suitable restitution. Once, while at Coimbatore, shortly after the fall of Pondicherry in 1761, a merchant of that place

67. *Ibid.*, 98-99 ; also *Ante*, Vol. II. p. 356.

68. *Ibid.*, 101-102 (n.).

had long been indebted to the French East India Company. He having received a large quantity of wood from Haidar, the French factor stationed there agreed with him to pay off his debt in that commodity, the same being wanted at Pondicherry for rebuilding the whole of that city after the late war. The wood arrived, but the English factor prevailed on the local chief to seize it on the false plea that the English East India Company had a prior claim on the same merchant. The local chief adjudged the matter in favour of the English factor, who transported the wood to his factory. The French Commandant of Haidar appealed to the latter. On this, the local chief ordered matters to remain in their then state until Haidar's directions were made known. Haidar appointed the chiefs of the Portuguese, Danish and Dutch factors to adjudicate in the matter. Their judgment, he added, may be put into execution. They decided in favour of the French. With the connivance of the local chief—who failed to place a guard on the stock of timber removed to the English factory as he should have done pending the appeal—the English factor, to prevent the French factor taking it, got the whole of it sawed up, so that it could be used for no better purpose than firewood! This rendered the judgment in favour of the French factor wholly illusory. This disgraceful manoeuvre was reported to Haidar, and he ordered the local chief to his presence at once. The local Mysorean Governor also sent for the parties—the wood merchant and the French factor—and made the French factor pay up his dues. The local chief duly arrived, and Haidar asked how the matter had terminated. He laughingly said that the English had lost their suit and that the merchant had paid the French factor his dues. Haidar, who was not the dupe of the chief's artifice, at once ordered an account of his income, and condemned him to pay Rs. 3 or 4 lakhs into

the Mysore Treasury! When he complained of the heaviness of the fine imposed on him, Haidar placed a strong guard at his residence, thus preventing him to get water, a great necessity for ablutionary purposes, the chief being a Brāhman. The matter ended with the prompt payment of the heavy fine imposed.⁶⁹

Haidar could thus use his knowledge of common things—need of water in every household, more especially in high class Hindu households—for the settlement of disputes between contentious parties. A French surgeon, who had cured the same chief, on not being paid his dues, reported to Haidar. "Do as I did," said Haidar, "let no water come into his house till you are paid." "But I have no soldiers," replied the surgeon. "But you have friends that have," rejoined Haidar. A few French soldiers were placed at the gate of the local chief, who had behaved thus, and he was soon brought to book.⁷⁰

Haidar could sometimes make what he did as the effect of policy adopted by him in a particular matter look like the rendering of justice. One instance ought to do. After the return of Mokhdum Ali, his brother-in-law, from Pondicherry, he ordered his reduction from that of a commander to that of a simple cavalier, for he had failed to raise the siege of Pondicherry! This treatment had been mortifying to the military as it was without the needful inquiry. Many intercessions followed. At last, Haidar ordered an army council (of his officers) who extolled the merit of Mokhdum. On this, Haidar, duly convinced, went in procession to Mokhdum's house. He found Mokhdum in the bazaar walking like a common soldier. Whereupon he descended from his elephant, approached Mokhdum and embraced him cordially several times and acknowledged

69. *Ibid.*, 172-176.

70. *Ibid.*, 176.

his own error of judgment in the matter. He got him mount the elephant he was himself riding, so that the whole public may know that cordiality had existed between himself and his brother-in-law and that justice had been done in the case to an ample extent.⁷¹

Haidar, who enjoyed a joke, delighted in the company of one Khākee Shah, who fell at Āmbūr. Khākee Shah was reckoned the wittiest man of the time and the two friends enjoyed each other's company. The Shah was closely related to many in Haidar's harem, which gave him liberty of communications by message. In the intercourse of unreserved raillery, says Wilks, he had occasionally ventured on messages in Haidar's name, which had produced certain mischievous disappointments in the harem, and had been afterwards the subject of broad mirth between the two friends. On the occasion of some reciprocal raillery regarding their domestic arrangements, Haidar adopted the coarse and cruel trial, of causing a letter to be written to the wife of Khākee Shah, then at Sīra, announcing the sudden death of her husband. The lady, who was passionately attached to him, swallowed poison, in her first despair; and the husband, on receiving the intelligence, made a vow to renounce the world. It was on this occasion that he assumed the name of *Khākee Shah*, meaning literally *King of the dust*, intimating spiritual sovereignty and temporal humility. The unhappy event did not dissolve, though it interrupted, the intimacy of the parties, which speaks highly of both. When he resumed his former relations with Haidar, the latter treated him with increased confidence and regard. Khākee Shah had been an emissary to Nanjarāja, Haidar's old master, and had deceived him by profaning the holy *Korān* by a fraud and

71. *Ibid*, 65-67.

perjury.⁷² The manner of his death was popularly cited as showing Divine judgment in the matter. Haidar and Khākee Shah, after inspecting the works of Āmbūr, alighted among certain scattered rocks, and seated themselves behind one which completely covered them from the direct fire of the fort; and in this situation Khākee Shah was cut in two by a cannon shot, close to the side of Haidar, who was unhurt. Though the shot must have reverberated from the other rocks was admitted, it was commonly held to indicate Divine vengeance on a person who had falsely sworn on the *Korān*.⁷³

Haidar may have been illiterate but he was not unintelligent. On the other hand, he was shrewd, carefully calculating, hard-thinking, always with an eye to turning transactions to his own profit. He was also deep-seated, cunning, with a thorough understanding of mundane matters, never yielding to mere sentiment, appeal or importunity. He could be in turn kind, friendly, dissimulating and cruel. He could enjoy a joke and indulge in one too. He was, in a word, perfectly human, with an understanding of men and things that surprized those round him and made them fear him and his artful ways and sudden turns of disposition. To describe him either in uniform black paint as a hard, rapacious person bent on plundering his neighbours or to represent him in so dazzling a light that he becomes almost indistinguishable is hardly correct. He was extraordinary in the sense that history, ancient or modern, affords no exact parallel to him. If to the people of the 18th century he was a terror and his name was associated always with war—indicated popularly throughout the whole of Southern India by such phrases

72. See Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 592-594.

73. *Ibid.*

as *Haidarana hāvaḷi* and *Haidar kalāpam*—to the people of the 20th, he is still continuing to be something of a marvel. That is where he is interesting yet as a unique historical personage. As the greater characters of universal history—Alexander, Napoleon, Frederick the Great, the Duke of Wellington and the like—what he thought, what he did, and what he failed in will always demand study at the hands of historians interested in human progress.

CHAPTER VII.

KHĀSĀ-CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VIII,

1776-1796—(contd.)

Haidar, the man—His mental make-up—The nature of the Sources on the internal state of his period—The extent of the kingdom—The administrative divisions—The Mughal terminology—The reforms of Chikkadevaraja Wodeyar in Mysore, c. 1700—The reforms under the Bednur Chiefs, etc.—Haidar's adaptation in practice—The administrative system—the *Subah*—Mysore and its capital—Rev. Schwartz on Haidar at work, 1779; Schwartz's early career, etc.—The circumstances leading to his embassy to Haidar—Aims and objects of the embassy; his journey to Seringapatam—Haidar's residence; his fierce methods for putting down official corruption and extortion—Schwartz's interview with Haidar—Haidar's rapid despatch of business—His religious toleration—The embassy ends; its failure—The underlying causes—Haidar, an apostle of force—His ideals of life and conduct—Taxation, revenue and resources of the kingdom—Seringapatam, the capital; the ruling sovereign; the *Kartar's* position; the *Sarvādhikari*—Provinces and towns—Spread of Kannada literature and culture—Muslim arts and culture during the period—Seringapatam, the local centre for Dravidian architecture and its influence—The lighter side of Haidar's life; De La Tour on—Glimpses of internal conditions of the country—Coinage and currency—Mirza Ikbal on Haidar's failings—The 18th century Haidar, a review—Contemporary pictures and portraits of Haidar—Embassy from Louis XVI of France, 1782.

THUS passes out of history Haidar, the man. With him disappeared all chance of Mysore expanding on the lines Chikkadēvarāja and Sarvādhikāri Nanjarāja and in their wake Haidar himself had resolved upon. He appears before us as essentially a man of action. He was unique in his many-sidedness. During the twenty-one years he

was practically in supreme power as Sarvādhikāri in the State, he proved himself equal to all emergencies. Born in the State, he was bred to arms in it and he served it all the years of his life. He was a son of the soil and worked for it whole-heartedly through his own peculiar way. He rose from the ranks to eminence and retained to the last the prime characteristics of an active man. He was in turn soldier, administrator, negotiator of military alliances and treaties of peace, politician bent on getting the best out of a difficult situation, thinker out of programmes and schemes and conspicuous for canvassing personal ends, arbitrator of disputes, and in fact everything that was in the least connected with the practical affairs of the State. In all matters that came up before him, he brought a freshness of mind into play, a vigorous manner of his own.¹

Though unlettered and destitute of the benefit of the discipline of any kind of education, Haidar possessed a mind of the first order. The very original manner in which he dealt with the case of Madam Mequinez shows this trait in him. As Schopenhauer somewhere says, "the characteristic mark of minds (*Geister*) of the first order is the directness (*unmittel barkeit*) of all their judgments. All that they bring forth (*verbringen*) is the result of their own thinking." That was undoubtedly the case with Haidar, as is inferable from several of the anecdotes which we have set out above, notably in the

His mental make-up.

1. The following previous references may be usefully noted here as to Haidar: Vol. II. Chaps. XII and XIII; Vol. III. Chaps. I to VI. According to the *Neshauni-Hyduri* of Kirmāni, Haidar's full style of address was:—*Shums-ul-mulk Ameer-ud-Dowlah Nawāb Haidar Ali Khān Bahadur, Haidar Jang, Nawāb of the Karnatic Bālaghat* (see title page to Kirmāni's *Neshauni-Hyduri*). Of these titles, he discarded that of *Haidar Jang* which was conferred on him by Basālat Jang, brother of Nizām Ali, and cherished "Bahadur", conferred on him by his own sovereign, the King of Mysore, as evidenced by its use in inscriptions. (See *ante*, Vol. II. p. 403, n. 36).

Mequinez case and in the settlement of the dispute between the English and French Companies' representatives at Coimbatore, touched upon elsewhere. It is a truism, in the administration of justice, that not only should the parties have justice dispensed to them by impartial judges but also that they should feel conscious, by the steps taken to do so, that they are getting such impartial justice actually meted out to them. Haidar did this in both these cases, he only confirming the decisions arrived at by the parties appointed to inquire into the respective matters after due hearing with the aid of witnesses and other evidence. Similarly, in the case of the Europeans in his service, delinquents were allowed to be tried by their own compeers according to their own military laws. He did this invariably, even in the case of traitors like that of Turner. Haidar seems to have grasped this essential fact as by instinct.

If his life is a wonderful record of active work, mainly led in the open air, if he achieved all that he did, in a short period of time, comparatively speaking, if he inspired fear and even respect for Mysore during his period of office as *Sarvādhikāri*, we have to seek the reason for it in the vigorous mentality he brought to bear on the work before him throughout his career.

One result of the utter illiteracy of Haidar is we have nothing direct from him on anything relating to him or to his period. Even his son Tipū has left something in his own handwriting.² But our entire knowledge of Haidar, his conduct, his affairs, and his times is derived from indirect sources. From the *Fort St. George* records of the period, from the narratives of the Dutch, from French writers, and from Indian sources we learn sufficiently of him. But even these do not light up many dark corners of the history of his

The nature of the Sources on the internal state of his period.

2. See *ante*, p. 450, n. 52.

period. The *Haidar-Nāmah* which may be expected to throw some light fails to unfold the state of the country, both in peace and war. We have no distinct idea of the life led by the people, of their occupations, government and religious life, of the advance made by alien faiths like the Christian and the Muslim, of their different feasts and fasts, of their sacred ceremonies and secular habits of life. Nor have we any accurate survey of the different parts of the large kingdom built up by Chikka-dēvarāja, which had been enlarged by the large territorial additions during the period of his successors up to the reign of Khāsā-Chāmarāja. Fortunately for us, our indirect sources do not fail us wholly. Of the system of military tactics followed, the discipline and order of the troops and the military operations by land and by sea of the period, we have a fair idea. Of the administration of the kingdom, we have glimpses from these sources of the secrets of Haidar's policy, in friendly or hostile intercourse with the neighbouring kingdoms or chiefs, or foreign trading nations. Much of our knowledge is undoubtedly derived from traditionary sources, not always exact or even wholly reliable, while a good deal of it is certainly only inferential. But the traditionary sources are capable of being tested by what was said to be actually in existence in the last quarter of the 18th century as observed by European civil and military officers who have recorded what they saw in force or in existence. *Mahratta Bakhars* still available throw light on this part of our history but they await examination by careful workers.³ The Rev. Schwartz,

3. The late Prāktanavimarsa Vichakshana Rao Bahadur R. Narasimbachar used to speak highly of this source.] From our personal knowledge, we can testify to the truth of this statement. One such *Bakhar* coming from Tumkur District has been examined by us for the I. H. R. C., *Proceedings* for 1942. The *Local Tracts* in Mackenzie Mss. may be expected to throw some light on the administrative and other details of the period. But they are still not accessible (see Wilson, *Mackenzie Mss.*, pp. 460-466).

the Protestant Missionary, has painted for us what he saw at Seringapatam and the way up to it, while on his mission of peace to Haidar. His words are few but his description is lively and his style glowing, while his observation of Haidar's active habits is keen, and his references even to the all-supreme Sarvādhikāri's passions and prejudices are stamped with an original mark of freedom and genius. From these somewhat scanty sources, local and foreign, we have to glean some idea of the form and substance of the Mysore kingdom; its internal governance and wealth; its civil government and military force; and its literature and architecture for the obscure period of Haidar's office of *Sarvādhikāri* (from Krishnarāja II to Khāsā-Chāmarāja).

Politically, the State was divided broadly into the sovereign part (*Kartar's*) and what was personally under Haidar's own control. The extent of the kingdom. The whole of the Mysore kingdom together with all accretions of territory to it, far and near, up to the Krishna on the one side and Fort St. George and Cape Comorin on the other when taken as projected by him, fell under the former denomination, while Bednūr, called *Haidar-Nagar*, after himself, fell exclusively under the latter. Thus, when the Treaty of 1769 was drawn up between himself and the Madras Government, it was specifically stated to be between "the English East India Company and the Carnatic Payanghat, and Nabob Haidar Ally Cawn Behauder, for the country of Mysore, Hyder Nagur, and his other possessions, of the other part."⁴ What exact distinction he made between the two revenues derived from Mysore proper and Bednūr as such, and whether he differentiated between them in the Treasury accounts of the State is not known. Ayāz was

4. See Appendix I-(4); also *Records of Fort St. George*, Pub. Dept., Sundry Bk. 1759-1771, Vol. No. XIII, No. viii, pp. 27-29, opening and concluding portions of the Treaty.

appointed Governor of Bednūr, after his adoption by Haidar, beyond which we are not on sure ground as to anything like Haidar's intentions in regard to its being separate except probably as a place of retirement for himself if his position should at any time prove precarious at Mysore. However this may have been, it was, so far as could be made out, despite this possible contention, part of Mysore, and we may take it we are on firm ground when we treat it as part of Mysore for all practical purposes. At any rate, later events do not actually make any differentiation between it and the other conquered areas added to Mysore or lost to Mysore by reconquest by neighbouring powers like the Mahrattas, the Nizām and the English E. I. Company at Madras or Bombay, including Bednūr itself in Pēshwa Mādhava Rao's time. In 1766, five years after Haidar's gaining of a firm foothold in the State, the territorial limits of the Mysore State extended to Bednūr and far beyond it in the south and Cochin in the south-west. In 1782, the last year of Haidar's period of office in Mysore, the kingdom extended up to the Krishna in the north while its southern frontier was co-terminous with Rāmēśvaram in the far south, with a tendency to push further in the direction of the Northern Circars and Travancore respectively.

Though the extent of the kingdom varied with the fortunes of the wars waged, still at all times it extended over a vast territory.

The administrative divisions.

Its boundaries touched Travancore in the south-west and Krishna in the north-east, including the inland districts now known as the Ceded Districts, while Haidar carried his arms up to Pulicat and Fort St. George at Madras. This territory was divided into a number of *Subahs* (Provinces), whose exact number is nowhere stated specifically. That the *Subahs* existed in name and that they formed the larger units that went to

make up the entire State is inferable from the tradition that still lingers in the interior of the State of calling the local chief executive officer Amildar or Amīla, a later name which we owe to an imitation of Mughal administration as prevalent since the introduction of the land revenue reforms of Akbar (*Soubahdār*, *Subādār*). Before then other changes had come into vogue with the Bijāpur conquests of the Vijayanagar parts of Mysore and after them with the Maharatta representatives in charge of parts* of Mysore. The denominations given by the latter were readjusted with the old designation of *Soubahdār* adopted from Akbar's administrative system. Thus, when Randhulla Khān's conquests came about, *Parganas* had been formed in the *Subahs*, with the subordinate divisions of *samats*, *tarafs*, *manje* and *mujare* of each *pargana*, with *Jamādārs* or collectors of revenue appointed to them in suitable numbers. During Vijayanagar times, the village accountants had been called *Sumpratis*, but when the Mahrattas took over the reins of administration under Bijāpur, or in their own name later, they introduced the different offices of *Dēshpānde*, *Dēshkulkarṇi*, *Sar-nād-gaud*, *Dēshmukhi* and *Kanungo*, who were charged with the keeping of the accounts. The Mahrattas also appointed *Sheristedārs* to all the *parganas* when *jaghirs* were granted to *Killedārs* and *Mansabdārs* by the State, the revenue accounts of the *Subah* for the last few years being previously examined and the new revenue rated annually on the *jaghir* to be granted. In fixing the revenue, the *ināms* or free-gift lands, land customs, etc., were discontinued or deducted, and the net revenue, more or less than the former, ascertained through the agency of the *Jamādārs*.

When the Mughals formed the *Subah* of Sīra, twelve *Parganas* were annexed to it and the other districts were permitted to be still held by the *Pālegārs* on condition

The Mughal terminology.

of paying an annual tribute. Officers for collecting and managing the revenues were appointed in the *amāni* districts only.⁵ At the same time the offices of *Dēshmukhi*, *Dēshkulkarni* and *Sar-nād-gaud* were formed into one office. *Dēshpāndes*, *Majumdārs*, *Kanungos* and *Kulkarnis* were maintained on the long established *Vijayanagar* model. The *Dēshmukhi* was to settle the accounts with the village *Patels* (heads); the *Dēshpānde* to check the accounts of the *Shānbhōgues* or *Karṇams*; the *Kanungo* to register the official regulations and to explain the ordinances and regulations to the inhabitants and public officers to prevent mistakes. In the *Majumdār's* office, the accounts of the settlement were made out and issued. Accounts of all kinds had been, since ancient days, kept in *Kannāḍa*, the language of the country. But after the *Mahratta* Chiefs attained power in the State, many *Dēshastas*, natives of the *Poona* open country (country above the *ghāts* as opposed to *Konkan*), followed them, who introduced *Marāthi*, their own language, and written character (*Mōḍī*) into the public accounts.⁶ Even in the territories of the *Pālegārs*, where the revenue and military accounts had been kept in *Kannāḍa* only, some of them, beginning then to entertain large bodies of *Mahratta* horse, employed *Mahratta* accountants to check the pay accounts in that language for the satisfaction of the horsemen of that nation. After the *Mughals* came into the country and established the *Subah* of *Sīra*, the *Persian* language superseded *Marāthi*.

5. *Amāni*: (i) Lands or other sources of revenue under the direct management of Government officials, as opposed to those rented out.
(ii) Anything held in trust or under official management.

6. *Dēshastas*: Grant-Duff, in his *History of the Mahrattas* (I. 10-11), says: "Independent of the two *Mahratta* divisions of *Concanist* (*Konkanasta*), or those who belong to the country below the *Ghāts*, and *Deshist*, or those of the territory above, there are in the *Mahratta* country eight classes of *Brahmins*, who differ from each other in some of their usages," etc. Also *Madras Review*, VI. 282-294, on *Karnāṭakas and Desasthas* by O. H.

In Mysore itself, the southern part of the kingdom, Chikka Dēva's reforms took shape, in or about 1700, in organizing the business of government into the *Aṭhārā-cuchēri* (or 18 offices or departments), a practice that had contributed to efficiency and centralization of control under the personal eye of the king himself of the affairs of the State.⁷ The revenues had been realized with greater regularity and precision under this system, Chikkadēva, so long as he lived, being his own Treasurer. He is said to have established a separate Treasury to meet extraordinary and unexpected expenditure. At his death, his annual revenue demand from his territories is said to have amounted to Kaṇṭhi-rāyi Pagodas 13,23,571. Chikkadēva took one-sixth share of the crop, the share prescribed by Manu, calculating its equivalent in money. But he augmented his revenue by a number of minor imposts⁸ under different heads, which distributed the sources of revenue over the whole population.

The reforms under
the Bednūr Chiefs,
etc.

In the Bednūr territory, the Western part of the country, the most distinguished ruler, before its conquest, had been Śivappa-Nāyaka, who reigned from 1648 to 1670. His *Shist*, or land assessment, and *prahar patṭi*, or rules for collecting the *halat*, an imposition on the areca-nut crop, etc., are frequently referred to in proof of his financial skill. He is said to have framed a scale of expenditure, including every contingency for each day of the year for the Śringēri *mutt*. During twelve successive years, he caused one field of each description of land, in every village, to be cultivated on his own account, and an accurate record kept of the seed sown, the expense of culture, and the

7. See *ante*, Vol. I. pp. 355-358.

8. *Ibid*, 353-354.

quality and value of the produce. He then struck averages of the produce and prices, and taking the value of one *Khaṇḍuga* (candy of 50 seers) at one *faṇam*, and the Government share as one-third of the gross produce, fixed the rates, land being divided into five classes, with two rates for each class. Gardens were measured with a rod, the length of the stone steps at Ikkēri Aghōrēśvara temple (18 feet 6 inches, English, exactly). This rod was the space called *dāya* allowed for one tree. The *Shist* was fixed on 1,000 such *dāyas* at various rates. These are not given, but they appear to have varied from 7 to 25 *Bahadūri pagodas*. The *Shist* continued for thirty-nine years from 1660. The following additions were afterwards made to it: in 1700, one anna in the pagoda, called *dāsōha*, by Channammāji, for the support of an establishment for providing food to all who applied for it; in 1736, one *faṇam* 4 annas per pagoda, called *pagudi*, by Chikka Sōmasēkhara, when the Mughals threatened an invasion; in 1753, one *faṇam* 4 annas per pagoda, called *paṭṭi*, by Basappa Nāyaka, to pay the Mahratta *Chauth*.

Under the Basavāpaṭṇa Chiefs, the Bēḍars offered higher rents for some villages than the old *gauḍas* who belonged to the Kurubar caste. These higher offers being accepted, the Kurubar *gauḍas* also agreed to pay an addition to the *Kuḷavāra* of from two to six *faṇams* in the pagoda. This was the origin of the *biruda*, which is found in the east of the Shimoga District.

Such were the systems of revenue when Haider Ali came to power. When he subjugated the ancient Pālegārs, he reinstated several of them on condition of their paying an annual tribute. In fixing the amounts, he followed generally the regulations formerly established, and the peculiar customs and laws of the different provinces. He was at all times accessible to complaints,

Haider's adaptation in practice.

and never failed to pursue to its source the history of an irregular demand, and to recover it with additional fines from the exacter. It is true that the irregular amount collected was never returned to the complainant, but it frequently produced the dismissal of the offender, while the certainty of investigation tended to restrain oppression. As Haidar was accustomed to say, rapacity in this case was nearly as good for his subjects, and did much more for the public coffers than scrupulous dispensation of justice would have achieved. For, though he wisely left the fiscal institutions of Chikkadēvarāja as he found them, he added—somewhat unscrupulously—whatever had been secretly levied by a skilful or popular *Amil* and afterwards detected.⁹ This produced a progressive and regular increase, while the result of complaints gave occasional, but also tolerably regular, augmentations. Two Brāhman official reporters—styled *Harikāras*—were stationed in each taluk. Their duty was to hear all complaints and to report these to the office of the Revenue Department at the head-quarters of Government. They also reported all waste lands within their areas. They were found to be a great check on local oppression and defalcations of revenue. In Bednūr, after its conquest in 1763, Haidar at first attempted to conciliate the principal landholders. After the discovery of the conspiracy against him,¹⁰ in which the landholders had also joined, he promptly disarmed the landholders, and commuted their military service for a money payment, holding the country in subjection by means of an establishment of 25,000 foreign peons. This assessment of lands continued until the peace concluded by Tipū with the British in 1792.

9. *Amil*: *Amal*, work. *Amil*, one who works. *Amildar*, from Arabic *Amila*, office or establishment, hence *Amildar*, one who has got an office or establishment; later, denoting an officer whose duty was to collect revenue.

10. See *ante*, Vol. II. pp. 470-475.

The territory of Mysore, during Haidar Ali's time, is described as a three-crore country in an inscription of c. 1790,¹¹ the three-crores referring to the revenue derived from it.¹² Territorially, this area fell into two broad divisions from the nature of the situation: (i) Pāyan-ghāt, containing the provinces below the ghāts, including the *Bārāmahals*,¹³ the country of the 12 fortresses, and Salem and Erode. When Arcot was taken in 1782, it became part of this area. (ii) Bālaghāt, above the ghāts, including Mysore, Seringapatam, Bangalore, Kōlār, Bednūr or *Haidar-Nagar*, and Chitaldrug, on their respective conquests.¹⁴ The whole kingdom was cast into a new mould owing obedience to the ruling sovereign.¹⁵

The government of a *Subah* was vested in a *Subēdār*. He was assisted by a *Dewān* or Finance Minister, and a *Faujdār*, or head of local militia. *Kāzis* administered civil law among the Muslims, while *Panchāyats* dispensed civil justice among the Hindus. The *Kotwāls* carried out police duties and kept order in towns. In the village, the village community system prevailed. The *Subēdār* had complete civil and criminal control

11. See *E.c.*, XII, Sira 98, cited at p. 409, f. n. 14 *supra*.

12. Rice, *Mysore and Coorg from Inscriptions*, 174.

13. Under Akbar's system of administration, adopted by Chikkadēvarāja in Mysore, *mahal* was the alternative name for *Pargana*. The *Bārāmahals* thus meant *twelve Parganas*, the name being applied to the tract of country included in the present taluks of Dharmapuri, Krishnagiri, Tirupattūr and Uttankarai and the Kangundi Zamindāri. From Vijayanagar, it passed under Mysore in 1668; then under the Nawābs of Kurnool who were ousted from it by Haidar Ali on behalf of Mysore in 1759.

14. These later, in Pūrnaiya's time, came to be called the *Faujdārs* of Ashtagrām, Bangalore, Mēddagiri (now Madhugiri), Chitaldrug, Nagar and Manjerabad, after its reduction by Arthur Wellesley.

15. This is true even as regards Bednūr, for Haidar never pretended to more than his personal authority over it, always far away from asserting royal dignity over it or any other conquered area.

over the *Subah* and maintained a court modelled on that of his sovereign.¹⁶ Haidar himself had been Faujdār of Dindigal and taken part in local administration and knew its merits. If anything, when he became *Sarvādhikāri*, the *Subēdār* came to be overshadowed by the Faujdār, who became virtually military governor of the whole area, though the revenue and police administration continued to be in the *Subēdār's* hands.

The successors of Chikkadēvarāja, ending with Krishnarāja II and Khāsā-Chāmarāja (1704-1796), might have asserted with dignity and truth, that of all the kings of India, they possessed the greatest city in their capital—Mysore and its capital. Seringapatam—the most ample revenue, and the most flourishing and popular State. With the growing decline and fall of the Mughal Empire and the disappearance of Bijāpur and Golkonda, the cities of northern, central and eastern India had decayed and vanished. Nor could the disappearing glories of Delhi or the ruined walls of Fatehpur-Sikri or narrow precincts of Agra and Ahmadnagar prepare the stranger from these once great places to contemplate the situation and content of Seringapatam, her stately palaces, magnificent temples, extensive fortifications, and the arts and luxuries of a teeming population. Her treasures might attract the French, the English, the Nizām and the Mahrattas but her native strength had always repelled, and still promised to repel the audacious, if repeated, attempts at invasion. The outlying provinces, especially those included under the *Bārāmahals* and those contiguous to it—the Erode and Coimbatore countries—were undoubtedly less fortunate and more vulnerable, and few districts and few cities could be discovered in them, or in the area between the Tungabhadra and Krishna, which could not be attacked by one or other of these,

16. See V. A. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghal*, 379-380.

impatient to despoil, because it was hopeless to occupy. Yet the subjects of Mysore were still the most dexterous and diligent in the whole of the South of India; their country was blessed by nature with every advantage of soil, climate and situation; and in the prosecution and practice of the peaceful arts, their patient and peaceful temper was more useful than the warlike spirit and conquering will of aggressors, far and near. Some of these, more especially the Muslim and the Mahratta, who settled themselves in arms in the Kingdom, were gradually absorbed into its general papulation, and as they have been separated from their parent stocks, their posterity have been continuously supplying generations of faithful and obedient soldiers¹⁷.

The scanty and confusing materials of the times will not afford any just estimate or reliable picture of Haidar. But fortunately for us we have a picture of Haidar at work from the Rev. Schwartz, who paid a visit to him in 1779 as secret envoy sent by Sir Thomas Rumbold, then Governor of Madras. Born in Prussia in 1726, Schwartz was then in his fifty-second year and in the prime of his manhood. He had received his early education at Sonnenburg and Kustrin and finished it at the University of Halle. Ordained at Copenhagen, he had come out as a Danish Missionary, sent out by the Government of Denmark to Cuddalore and to the Danish settlement at Tranquebar in 1750. Besides the three European languages of German, Danish and English, he soon mastered Persian, Hindustani and Tamil, in which he preached and taught the Christian religion. He was undoubtedly the greatest of the Tranquebar evangelists.

Rev. Schwartz on
Haidar at work, 1779.

Schwartz's early
career, etc.

17. Among those who have thus settled in the Mysore kingdom, we may mention the Muslims and the Mahrattas, who both figure largely in the Army list of Mysore to-day.

After eleven years' work at Tranquebar, where he helped Schultz, the Danish Missionary, to edit the Tamil Bible, he visited Tanjore in 1762, and in the same year he founded the mission at Trichinopoly. He was at the siege of Madura in 1764, where he founded a church in 1766 and opened schools. He joined, in 1768, the English missionary society—the S. P. C. K.—and it was as a member of that body that his chief work was done¹⁸. In 1778, he founded, on behalf of his Society, the English Mission at Tanjore. Great success attended his efforts, he initiating, it is said, as many as 6,000 into the principles of the Christian religion. He was universally beloved and trusted as much by the people as by the Rājas of Tanjore and the Madras Government and military officers of repute and distinction. It was while at Tanjore, in 1778, that he was called upon to go on the mission to Haidar. He was fired with the missionary zeal, and truly devoted to peace and religion. The circumstances under which he had come to be chosen are narrated by him, in letters written by him to one of His Majesty's Chaplains and another friend of his in 1779 and 1780 and published about 1810.¹⁹ In 1771, the Madras Government, with a view to support the authority of Nawāb Muhammad Ali against Tulsaji, the Rāja of Tanjore, under the directions received from the Court of Directors, sent out General Joseph Smith, then Commander-in-Chief, to invade Tanjore. He took Vallam, close to Tanjore, and laid siege to Tanjore. Immediately a breach became practicable, the Rāja came to terms. A treaty was concluded between Tulsaji and the Nawāb, without the consent of the English at Madras, providing among other things for the payment of a large sum of money within a specified time and for an offensive and

18. See J. F. Fenger, *History of the Tranquebar Mission*, Tranquebar, 1863. Also Rev. M. A. Sherring's *History of Protestant Missions*, Trubner and Co., London, 1875, Chaps. I and XV.

19. See Wilks, *Mysoor*, I. App. viii, for the extracts above referred to.

defensive alliance. In June 1773, Tulsaji still owed over Rs. 10 lakhs and was suspected to have applied to Haidar Ali and the Mahrattas for help. His backwardness in meeting his so-called debts was in itself no *casus belli*, but the Madras Government's suspicions of Tulsaji's lack of loyalty weighed rather heavily with them. They, again, directed General Joseph Smith to invade Tanjore. He reduced it with ease and Muhammad Ali was put in possession of the country and Tulsaji and his family were taken prisoners. All these steps taken against Tulsaji were, however, a year or two later, rendered ineffective, as the Court of Directors disapproved of all the transactions of the Madras Government both of 1771 and 1773 and ordered the restitution of the kingdom to Tulsaji. These orders were duly carried out by Lord Pigot, who had come out a second time as Governor of Fort St. George, to the great annoyance of the Nawāb, who had already exacted large sums of money from his new acquisition. Tulsaji was reinstated with great ceremony on April 11, 1776, when a new settlement was arrived at with him. The English agreed to protect him and his country on the condition that the Rāja paid an annual subsidy of Rs. 4 lakhs. Tanjore thus became a protected State and the Rāja the direct ally of the E. I. Company. The tribute of the Nawāb was also before long come to be assigned to the English in the settlement of accounts between the English and the Nawāb.²⁰ No doubt, Lord Pigot sought, as Schwartz

20. The reasons which led the English to interfere in Tanjore affairs in 1771 will not bear examination. The Rāja was indeed an independent ruler in 1771, except for the wholly unfounded claims put forward by their dependent ally Nawāb Muhammad Ali. But in their own personal interests, they really did not wish to have an independent ruler close to them to join either the French or Haidar Ali. They saw the danger of his acting, as he wished, in his own interests, owing to the evident animosity towards him on the part of the Nawāb. In 1772, the French seem to have assisted the Rāja to fortify Tanjore (see Sewell, *List of Antiquities*, I. 277). That Tulsaji sought for some aid against the Nawāb in 1773 of the Mahrattas at Poona was confirmed by

laconically but suggestively puts it, "to reclaim the Nabob, for he clearly foresaw the whereabouts it would end: but he was soon rendered incapable to act." Referring to his arrest and imprisonment by George Stratton and the majority of his own Council and detention at St. Thomas' Mount on 24th August 1776,²¹ Schwartz briefly comments that "probably his intentions were laudable, but he began not with God."²² When the Tanjore fort was occupied by the Nawāb in 1773, he spent large sums in strengthening it. The Rev. Schwartz, who had built a church in it for the use of his congregation, lost it. The Nawāb, when applied to, as the revered Father pathetically puts it, "amused us with empty promises." "When we were quite at a loss where to assemble for Divine service," he adds, "my pious friend Major (William) Stevens built us a fine mud wall church at his own expense, which cost him upwards of an hundred star pagodas. But the congregation increasing rapidly, and a fresh covering with straw being requisite from time to time, we began, in January 1779, to think of building a spacious and permanent church. A subscription was set on foot, but the amount was shamefully insignificant. At Madras, about 10,000 pagodas were cheerfully contributed towards erecting a *playhouse*. But to build a *prayhouse*, people have no money. Major Stevens, who could have effectually promoted the subscription and superintended the building, and who intended to return to Europe and make a faithful representation of what might promote the true interest of the Company, and the welfare of this country, chiefly of youth, was killed on the 14th of October 1778, before Pondicherry. General (Sir Hector) Munro (the

advice from Poona, though Mill, the historian, thinks it not unlikely that they were forged by the Nawāb's agents.

21. He was allowed to go to the Garden House for change of air on 24th April 1777, and there died on 20th May 1777.

22. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. App. No. viii. 848.

hero of Buxar, 1764), who knew, as well as everybody, that Major Stevens and I lived together as brethren, condoled me in the kindest manner, saying, 'you will not so soon get a Stevens again; however, I request you'll consider me as your friend'. Although we are bid not to place our reliance upon man, and although their promises are seldom anything more than compliments, yet I praise the Lord, whenever he makes anyone's heart willing to further the work of God, even in the smallest degree. At a visit which General (Sir Hector) Munro paid the Rajah (Tulsaji), the General observed that Christianity is far to be preferred to paganism: 'I am convinced', said the Rajah, 'that the Christian religion is an hundred thousand times better than idolatry; but the conduct of the Europeans makes a bad impression on my mind'. In full reliance on the help of God, I set about the building of the Church in the little fort, which was to be 90 feet long and 50 feet wide. On the 10th of March, the General (Sir Hector Munro) laid the foundation stone, 9 feet deep, and I held a short sermon on Psalm LXVII." ²³

23. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. App. viii, pp. 843-844. Schwartz refers to this Church again in the last para of his letter and says it is the one "in the little fort or Siwengi cotah (Śivaganga Cotah, so called from the ancient Śivaganga tank situated in it, which the Chōja king Rājārāja I, 995-1018 A. D., is said to have rivetted throughout with stone steps). This tank occupies the north-west portion of the enclosure of the fort. Adjoining it in the east is the Śivaganga garden laid out in 1871, but no longer maintained as such. The Church, known to-day as the S. P. G. or Schwartz's Church, also in the north-east corner, is the Church referred to by Schwartz in his letter. It was, he says, consecrated in the beginning of 1780 and called Christ's Church. It is a plain substantial building, measuring 90 feet by 50 feet, containing a few graves and inscriptions and a sculpture by Flaxman of Raja Sarabhōji's visit to Schwartz in 1797, during his illness a few months before his death. Standing by the side of the bed in the sculpture is Guerike, who had been Sarabhōji's guardian and tutor at Madras, and was with Schwartz when he died in 1798. Service is performed here every New Year's Day. Schwartz himself used to live in a small house at the north-west corner of the big fort at Tanjore, which has been in recent years converted into a secondary school (see Hemingway, *Tanjore District Gazetteer*, p. 272). Schwartz lies buried in Christ's Church itself thus founded

Sir Hector Munro was thus not only a great admirer of Major William Stevens who had been Chief Engineer at the siege of Pondicherry, at which Sir Hector had commanded the British troops, but also even a great admirer of Schwartz.²⁴ Schwartz too

The circumstances leading to his embassy to Haidar.

by him in 1779 and consecrated in the following year. It was intended for the Indian congregation as the one in the big fort was for the Europeans and the garrison. When originally built, it faced north and south and occupied only the middle portion of the present building. At present, owing to successive improvements, it has been extended both on the east and the west and its present greatest extent lies in these directions. It was not long ago considerably heightened, nearly the whole of it above the doors being new. All the graves inside are those of missionaries (*Ibid*, p. 172).

24. Sir Hector was appointed Commander of the forces on the Coromandel coast on June 25, 1777. Lord Macartney succeeded him as C.-in-C. as well as Governor on January 5, 1781, assuming command on June 22, 1781. Sir Hector, who had laid siege to Pondicherry on 8th August 1778, was with an army of 10,500 men, of whom 1,500 were Europeans. Major Stevens was wounded in the advanced batteries of the south-west attack by a cannon-ball on 14th October 1778 and died the same evening. On the 10th August, Admiral Edward Vernon had fought with four ships an indecisive battle in the roads with five French ships under M. Troujoly, who some days later sailed away, leaving them to their fate. After a gallant defence, M. de Bellecombe, the Governor, surrendered the town on the 18th October, just four days after Stevens fell. He was allowed the honours of war. Among those who took part in the defence was the Breton sailor of fortune, Madee, whose life and adventures are narrated in Emile Barbe's book "le Nabab Rena Madee." Another who took part in the defence was Barras, who was then a chasseur in the regiment de Pondicherry. Chasseurs ranked below sub-lieutenants. Born on 80th June 1775, he entered the Langaedoe Regiment at the age of 16. He then received a commission in Regiment de Pondicherry. On his way to Isle de France where a kinsman of his was Governor, he met Captain Cook at the Cape of Good Hope, who received him so kindly that he "came very near accompanying him to ancestral lands." He then repaired to Pondicherry to join his regiment. On the fall of the town, he was prisoner on parole at Madras and Poonamalli. His subsequent rise during the French Revolution is well known. On 28 Thermidor l'an II, he had been named Commandant General of the armies of Paris. Sir Hector put up, in token of his regard and esteem, a monument to the memory of Major William Stevens at Pottanur, which is 4 miles west of Pondicherry, and close to the French frontier. The inscription on it describes Stevens as "a gallant soldier and an honest man, justly esteemed while living, sincerely regretted now dead" (see Cotton's *List of Tombs and Monuments in Madras*, No. 828, p. 158).

had rendered Sir Hector some little services and thus won his admiration and goodwill. He had translated the letter which the Court of Directors had written to king Tulsaji; he had also done Chaplain's duty in camp (evidently at Pondicherry) during the siege for a short time and otherwise. In recognition of these services, Sir Hector had requested the Government of Madras to make a present to Schwartz for his trouble. Instantly he heard of this recommendation, Schwartz wrote to Madras, declining any present to himself; but if they would do him a favour, he requested that they would make a present of bricks and lime, of which the Company had at Tanjore a quantity in store, towards the building of the projected Church, as he had not even money enough to pay the labourers, much less to purchase materials. Sir Hector, who then went to Madras, promised to support and promote this request. At last, after a great deal of waiting, in May 1780, Sir Hector sent word to Schwartz to repair instantly to Madras, because the Governor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, had something of importance to communicate to him. He accordingly went out to Madras, where, to his astonishment, he was desired to make a journey to Seringapatam, and to assure Haidar Ali that the British Government at Madras had no other thoughts but of peace. Sir Thomas addressed him as nearly as follows: "It seems Hyder Ally Cawn meditates upon war; he has in some letters expressed his displeasure, and even speaks in a menacing tone. We wish to discover his sentiments in this weighty affair with certainty, and think you are the fittest person for this purpose. You'll oblige us if you will make a journey thither, sound Hyder Ally, and assure him that we harbour peaceable thoughts. The reason why we have pitched upon you is because you understand Hindustanee, consequently need no translator in your conferences. We are convinced you'll act disinterestedly

and won't allow any one to bribe you. In particular, you can travel privately through the country, without external pomp and parade, and thus the whole journey will remain a secret (which is of great importance to us) until you shall speak with Hyder Naik himself. You will have nothing else to do than to refer Hyder to his own letters, and to some dubious circumstances; and if you perceive him to be peaceably disposed, inform him that some principal members of Council will come to him to settle the business finally. As the intention of the journey is good and Christian, namely, to prevent the effusion of human blood and to preserve this country in peace, this commission militates not against but highly becomes your sacred office; and therefore we hope you will accept it."

Sir Thomas couched his request in such an agreeable fashion that it carried conviction to the Reverend Father. A confirmed pacifist—as we should call him to-day—in advance of his times, he still hesitated. "I requested," he says, "time to consider of the proposal, prayed that God would grant me wisdom, and thought it my duty not to decline it." The grounds that determined him were categorically recorded by him in these considered terms:—" (1st). Because the mission to Hyder was not attended with any political intrigues. To preserve the blessings of peace was the only aim. I had in view, and at that time I really believed Sir Thomas' intentions to be upright and peaceable. I considered that if God, according to the riches of his mercy, would vouchsafe to employ poor me, as an instrument to establish the happiness of British India, I durst not withdraw myself, nor shrink back on account of the danger of the undertaking, whereof I was fully aware, but ventured on it in firm reliance upon God and his fatherly protection. (2d). Because this would enable me to announce the Gospel of God, my saviour, in many parts, where it had never been

Aims and objects
of the embassy.

known before. And (3d). As the Honourable Company and the Government had shown me repeated kindness, I conceived that by this journey I might give them some marks of my gratitude." "But at the same time," he adds, "I resolved to keep my hands undefiled by any presents, by which determination the Lord enabled me to abide; so that I have not accepted a single farthing of presents, save my travelling expenses. These were given me." He left Madras thereafter for Tanjore, where, after leaving instructions with his Indian teachers as to how they should act during his absence, he set out on 5th July 1779, from Trichinopoly, on

His journey to
Seringapatam.

his mission. He seems to have chosen the Karūr-Madenamuley-Mysore-Seringapatam route, all of which places are mentioned by him in this connection. He must have proceeded from Karūr, his first halt, to Erode; from there to Danaikankote; from there to Gajjalahatti; from there to Terakanambi; and from there to Nanjangud, near where is Madenemuley (Mallanamüle in Nanjangud Taluk), described by him as "a fine town where there is a strong bridge (on the Kapini river, built by Dalvai Devaraj Urs about 1735) of twenty-three very substantial arches." This bridge has to be identified with that at Nanjangud, where the Kapini is spanned by a broad but rudely constructed bridge, built, as mentioned in the *Mysore Gazetteer* (V. 686), by Dalavai Dēvarājaiya in the middle of the 18th century. Incidentally, Schwartz bears eloquent testimony to the perfect order and peace that prevailed during the time in the Mysore Kingdom and how officials attended to their normal duties of administration within its far-flung limits. He says that "after each rain, the magistrates of the place must send people to replace any earth that may have been washed away. Hyder's economical rule is to repair all damages without losing an instant, whereby all is kept in good condition and

with little expense." "The Europeans in the Carnatic leave," he adds by way of comparison, "everything to go to ruins." At Karūr, the frontier Mysore garrison, which he reached in the evening of the 6th July 1779, he tarried for a whole month in expectation of Haidar's answer to his letter, which he does not say he received. He went about among the people and preached the Gospel with the aid of the Indian catechists whom he had taken with him. At the end of the month, he had the satisfaction of baptizing some servants of his landlord, who, by the way, it is interesting to note, was a German officer of Haidar's. On the 6th of August (1779), he left Karūr and reached Madenamuley on the 22d following. Being Sunday, he halted according to his custom. On the 24th August, he arrived at the fort of Mysore. Here he mentions a social reform carried out by Haidar. "An high mountain," he says, "with a pagoda on its summit," perhaps identifiable with the Chāmundi Hill, "was formerly dangerous to travellers. The Pagan inhabitants of that mountain, imagining that their idol was highly gratified with the sacrifice of noses, etc., used to rush out upon travellers, cut off their noses, and offer them unto their idol. But Hyder most rigorously prohibited it." Schwartz says that the glacis of the Mysore fort had the appearance of the finest green velvet. Here also he observed that, wherever some earth had been washed away by rain, the people instantly repaired it. On the 25th of August, he arrived at Seringapatam, the whole journey, with his Sunday halts, occupying a period of one month and twenty days (from 6th August 1779, when he left Karūr, to 25th August, when he arrived at Seringapatam). As there was an epidemic of fever raging in the fort area, he had a tent pitched for him on the glacis of the fort. "I had full liberty," he hastens to add, "to go into the fort at all times, nobody preventing me."

Haidar's place of residence—called his "palace" by the Rev. Schwartz—was a fine building in the Indian style, superimposed by a balcony. Evidently, it was something after the Mughal palace at Sira or the one in Bangalore fort, of which a portion still stands. The balcony should have been in wood, and reached by a wooden or other flight of steps. Opposite to it was an open place. On both sides there were ranges of open buildings, where the military and civil servants had their offices, and constantly attended to their work. Haidar could overlook them from the balcony. "Here reigns," writes the Reverend Father, "no pomp, but the utmost regularity and dispatch." His audience hall was, however, covered with the most exquisite tapestry. Evidently Haidar had developed a high sense of aesthetics in this regard. Schwartz adds that

His fierce methods
for putting down
official corruption
and extortion.

"although Hyder sometimes rewards his servants, yet the principal motive is fear. Two hundred people with whips stand always ready to use them. Not a day passes on which numbers are not flogged. Hyder applies the same cat to all aggressors alike, gentlemen and horsekeepers, taxgatherers and his own sons. And when he has inflicted such a public scourging upon the greatest gentlemen, he does not dismiss them. No! they remain in the same office, and bear the marks of the stripes on their backs, as public warnings; for he seems to think that almost all people who seek to enrich themselves are void of all principles of honour." He quotes an instance of what he actually saw of the sort of force applied, which is even more impressive of the real cruelty inflicted even in the extortion of revenue. "Once, on an evening," he says, he went to Haidar's residence, "and saw a number of men sitting round about; their faces betrayed a conscious terror. Hyder's Persian Secretary told me they were collectors of districts (They

had been assembled at the capital on official business—see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 751,755). To me they appeared as criminals expecting death. But few could give a satisfactory account; consequently the most dreadful punishments were daily inflicted. I hardly know whether I shall mention how one of these gentlemen was punished. Many who read it may think the account exaggerated, but the poor man was tied up; two men came with their whips and cut him dreadfully; with sharp nails was his flesh torn asunder; and then scourged afresh; his shrieks rent the air.” Evidently the caning was not regulated as in modern days but left to callous professionals who outshone each other in its application. “But although the punishments are so dreadful, there are people enough who seek such employments, and outbid each other, adds the Reverend Father.” The reason for such outbidding evidently lay in the miserable salaries paid them for their work during long hours and the plunder that Haidar indulged in when even they made some honest savings, so that they tried to make more by illicit means, and, if possible, escape all detection and punishment. Haidar did not, any more than his contemporaries, realize that honest labour was worthy of reward and recompense in an adequate manner. Hence, as the worthy Father records, “when they have obtained a district, they flay the people with unrelenting and inhuman cruelty, and the most philosophical *sangfroid* (*i.e.*, coolness). At last they pretend to be poor, receive Hyder’s chastisement, and return into their district.”

In regard to what took place at the interview with Haidar, the Rev. Schwartz does not state as to what *he* said actually to him in regard to what he had been commissioned. We may take it, he represented his case fully as required by Sir Thomas Rumbold. Sir Thomas had said, his “whole journey” was “to remain a secret”

Schwartz's interview with Haidar.

and he literally treated it as a "secret" one, speaking only of Haidar's reaction to his representations on the peaceful intentions of Sir Thomas and the rest of his colleagues at Madras. Haidar, he says, received him "politely, listened friendly and with seeming pleasure to all what I had to say. He spoke very openly and without reserve, and said that the Europeans had broken their solemn engagements and promises, but that nevertheless, he was willing to live in person with them, *provided* x x x.²⁵ At last he directed a letter to be wrote, had it read unto me, and said, what I have spoken with you, that I have shortly mentioned in the letter. You will explain the whole more at length." This letter should have been presumably delivered by Schwartz to Sir Thomas Rumbold, but neither this letter nor any report of his mission of peace is at present traceable among the *Fort St. George* records. At a later stage of this same letter to his missionary friends, the Rev. Father gives an outline of the reasons which induced him to go on the mission of peace to Haidar as detailed by him. It may be of interest to note here what he says there. On the last evening of his stay at Seringapatam, when he sought to take leave from Haidar, Haidar requested him to speak Persian before him as he had done to his officials and others. (Schwartz adds that Haidar understood Persian but does not speak it, which statement is corrected by Wilks as a misconception easily accounted for. "The words," Wilks says, "*God, peace, war, friendship, two Governments*, and several others, are the same in Persian and colloquial Hindustanee and enabled Hyder to com-

25. The three asterisks indicating some omission on the part of the Missionary compiler of the Rev. Father's letters occur in Wilks' printed text. What they stand for may be gathered from the Missionary compiler's note at the end, which runs as follows:—"But the Nabob at Madras, i.e., Muhammad Ali, and others found means to frustrate all hopes of peace."

prehend the general scope of the Father's Persian speech, and to make an appropriate answer"). "I did so," says Schwartz, "and explained the motives of my journey to him." And this is what he said in Persian:—"You may, perhaps, wonder, said I, what could have induced me, a priest, who has nothing to do with political concerns, to come to you, and that on an errand, which does not properly belong to my sacerdotal functions. But, as I was plainly told, that the sole object of my journey was the preservation and confirmation of peace; and having witnessed, more than once, the misery and horrors attending on war, I thought within my own mind how happy I should deem myself, if I could be of service in cementing a durable friendship between the two Governments, and thus securing the blessings of peace to this devoted country and its inhabitants. This, I considered, as a commission in no wise derogatory to the office of a minister of God, who is a God of peace." He (Haidar) said, with great cordiality—"Very well! Very well! I am of the same opinion with you; and wish that the English may be as studious of peace as you are. If they offer the hand of peace and concord, I shall not withdraw mine."

The Rev. Father Schwartz bears testimony to the almost uncanny faculty that Haidar possessed for simultaneity of action in the despatch of public business.

Haidar's rapid despatch of business.

"When I sat near Hyder Naik," he says, "I particularly observed in what a regular succession, and with what rapid despatch his affairs proceeded one after the other. Whenever he made a pause in speaking, an account was read to him of the district, and letters received. He heard it, and ordered the answer immediately. The writers ran, wrote the letter, read it, and Hyder affixed the seal. Thus, in one evening, a great many letters were expedited. Hyder can neither read nor write but his

memory is excellent. He orders one man to write a letter and read it to him; then he calls another to read it again. If the writer has in the least deviated from his orders, his head pays for it."

Wilks has described, as we have seen, Haidar as "half a Hindoo." The Rev. Schwartz

His religious
toleration.

is even more explicit of his utter religious neutrality. "What religions people profess, or whether they profess any at all, that is perfectly indifferent to him. He has none," he adds, "himself, and leaves every one to his choice." What is more remarkable is the Reverend Father was allowed freely, without any the slightest let or hindrance, to talk over religious matters with the four Army Chiefs (Bakshis) of Haidar, who may be described as Paymasters and recruiters to the Army. Indeed, he says he had frequent intercourses with them, with some in Persian and others in Hindustāni. They appear to have asked him what was the right prayer and to whom we ought to pray. He explained the Christian doctrines on these points. To others, he seems to have explained the same principles in Tamil as well. He also had frequent conversations on religious topics with the ministers of Haidar, who were, he adds, mostly Brāhmans. Some answered, he adds, modestly; others did not choose to talk on so indefensible a subject, and only meant that their noble pagodas were not built in vain. Outside of the Seringapatam fort, there were some hundred Europeans commanded by a Frenchman, and a squadron of hussars under the command of one Capt. Budene, a German. Part of the troops were, he adds, German; others, Frenchmen. There were, besides, Malabar Christians. Every Sunday he performed divine service in German and Malayalam (he calls it Malabar), "without asking anybody's leave, but I did it, being bound by conscience to do my duty. We sang, we preached, prayed,


and nobody presumed to hinder us." In Haidar's residence, high and low, he says, came to him and asked him what his doctrine was, so that he could speak as long as he had strength! Haidar's "youngest" son (not Tipū)—he so speaks of him—saw him and saluted him in the hall of audience. (This must be the "younger" son, Karīm Sāhib, Haidar having only two sons, as we know). He sent word requesting him to go to his apartment. The Reverend Father very discreetly sent him word that he would "gladly go to him, if his father permitted it; without such leave he might be hurting both his father and himself. Of this, he was perfectly sensible." The good Father significantly adds that "the most intimate friends (of Haidar) do not speak their sentiments freely. Hyder has his spies everywhere. But I knew that I might speak of religion night and day, without giving him the least offence." The Rev. Schwartz was glad of the training given to the battalion of orphans, but he would have greatly qualified his praise in this connection if he had known that they were, as Wilks points out, *Chēlas*, captive slaves, consisting of forcibly converted Nair youths of good social position.

After the Rev. Father took leave of Haidar, he found he had sent Rs. 300 into his palankeen, to defray his travelling expenses. He wanted to decline the present. He was told by Haidar's people, that it would endanger their lives if they dared to take it back. He wished to return it in person; but he was told by one of Haidar's ministers that it was contrary to etiquette to readmit him into Haidar's presence since he had had his audience of leave, or to receive his written representation on the subject. He was also informed that Haidar, knowing that a great present would offend the revered Father, had purposely confined it only to the lowest amount of travelling expenses, etc. The Rev. Schwartz produced the money

to the Government of Madras, but was desired to keep it. The amount was a mere bagatelle considering "the dangerous journey" undertaken by him, as described by himself. The greater point for satisfaction to him was that "this journey was likewise—apart from the opportunity it gave him to preach the Gospel in new parts of the country—an occasion that both the English and Tamilian Church (at Tanjore) could be finished, which might otherwise hardly have been the case." On his return, the Madras Government resolved instantly that he should not only have the desired bricks and lime, but also Rev. Mr. Pohle (his associate in the mission at Trichinopoly) as well as himself at Tanjore "should henceforth receive from the Honourable Company each an hundred pounds sterling, as Chaplains of the English garrison." Of these 100 pounds which he received, he gave half to the Rev. Kholhoff, another associate of his in the work of the mission, while the other half went to maintain the Indian teachers. The Rev. Mr. Pohle made use of his 100 pounds for the benefit of the congregations and schools in his charge at Trichinopoly. So ended infruc-

tionously the Schwartz secret mission of peace to Haidar.²⁶ Its failure was due neither to Schwartz's incapacity to put the case for peace cogently and impressively before Haidar; nor to Haidar's want of capacity to grasp the case put before him; nor even to the lack of earnestness or want of sincerity on the part of Sir Thomas Rumbold in sending the mission. It was in part due to the fact that Nawāb Muhammad Ali was in the way of peace and his influence dominated the situation. More than all, Sir Thomas Rumbold stands vindicated as

26. See *ante* Chap. V, pp. 311-312. Also Appendix II—(4), *re*: Schwartz.





Sir Thomas Rumbold, Governor of Madras, 1778-1783.

never man or administrator was or would be in a similar situation.²⁷

The causes lay deeper. Not only Muhammad Ali Walājah was in the way. Not only would Sir Thomas Rumbold have overcome Muhammad Ali's opposition and his instigation, open and secret, if it had been required. Haidar could not get the peace at home or abroad—the peace that he wanted—because he lacked the sense of proportion. This was the direct result of the lack of a disciplined mind. Haidar lacked even the discipline of common education, though he made good a great deal by acquiring experience. Education in those days was undoubtedly haphazard, as it has been always in the past. It was traditional and consisted in the acquisition of knowledge. But it has gradually come to be realized that the earlier years have an enormous importance for the whole of the rest of life. But Haidar missed even the traditional methods developed by it, though by no means the best. Circumstances moulded, therefore, his destiny as a man, and as often as he succeeded to get the better, there is reason to believe as often—if not indeed more often—circumstances got the better of him. Though wholly illiterate, shrewdness, experience, and his keen sense of perception gave him almost the power of a man possessed of a highly cultivated mind. Of course, there were exceptional reasons when he absolutely forgot himself and lapsed into barbarity. That is where education instinctively helps a man to reason out to himself the rights and wrongs of one's proposed or intended action, unless he is lost to himself. If Haidar was not wiser than he proved to be, and used his powers for his own destruction, the beauty of his otherwise

27. See Appendix III—(1) *re*: Sir Thomas Rumbold and his career.

successful life—his great career—would not have ended in smoke and ashes.

He did not reflect that war always breeds war.

Haidar, an apostle
of force.

Milton, who was not only a great poet
but also Political Secretary to Oliver
Cromwell, wrote :²⁸

“ For what can war but endless
War still breed ?

“ In vain doth valour bleed,
While avarice and rapine
Share the land.”

“ Guided by faith and matchless
Fortitude.

Peace hath her victories
No less renowned than war.
Help us to save free conscience from the paw
Of hireling wolves, whose
Gospel is their maw ”.

Haidar developed a consuming passion for war and for destruction, and this had the effect of helping towards the destruction of a civilization that had been laboriously built up through the ages in South India. That seems a tragedy, for he had the genius to be an organizer of civil life as well. But that was not to be. He believed himself to be always sane and did not want a keeper ! That keeper was the old Cabinet of Ministers which unhappily he neglected in his later years so much that it was not practically allowed to function as a normal part of the State constitution as it had done before him. There were, as a result, bickerings in secret, and risings against him, as there is always when those in authority and even saints make themselves too supreme as practical dictators. If he failed to secure peace at home and

28. Milton, *Sonnet* : To Lord Fairfax ; To Cromwell.

abroad, peace of the kind he wanted, this was the reason. His quiet revolt against his master Nanjarāja began as a revolt of personal consciousness that he could stand by himself. It meant undoubtedly his personal emancipation from tutelage to supreme power, but unlike Nanjarāja, he did not carry on his shoulder the culture of the ages and the civilization of the centuries, which by his learning he had become heir to. His narrow-minded outlook developed in him a mere petty type of man. That seems the greatest pity of it all. Freedom from restraint, from control, meant for him a new kind of thralldom, of which he was wholly unaware. He became the slave of routine—a life contrary to the law of the spirit. He failed accordingly to mark progress on the lines he desired in his dealings with his neighbours. He failed, in a word, to achieve the success he aimed at.

If his Persian biographers describe him as engaged in carrying out his daily routine from morning till night-fall, they also

His ideals of life
and conduct.

describe him as passionately devoted to work. The whole meaning of earthly existence to him was viewed in the opportunity it provided for him for struggle with his neighbours and conquest. That meant for him the opportunity for his own growth. This is the reason why work for him—incessant work—was not only a necessity—a dire necessity—but also the only privilege that God had granted him. This was the reason why he put forth incessant effort, in order to lead only the life that was possible for him, the only life worth living too, why difficulties meant blessings in disguise, why he shunned inertia, Nature's law. Though a Muslim by birth and faith, Haidar was, as Wilks well puts it, "half a Hindoo" in upbringing, ideals and thought. He was a split personality or person, more precisely speaking, a double one, in the fields of social life and politics. He was happily a Muslim and a Hindu, the

one by birth, the other by contact. His ideals were the current Hindu ideals of the 18th century. Muslim theology did not affect them to any extent adversely. The Hindu ideals worked well enough for him, whether for ordinary purposes or for purposes of governance of the country as *Sarvādhikāri*, especially in Mysore where settled order and peace had prevailed under its kings during the centuries. A greater percentage of people had been happy and contented under these ancient ideals current in the land. There was still a chance for everybody and therefore the belief in indefinite prolongation of his administration under their almost unconscious control and guidance. But this apparent possibility to go on living in the frame of mind of olden days really meant a most terrible danger, of which he was not aware. It meant the death of his own individuality, of real freedom of thought, of initiative on all times except that of war enterprise. It meant a conventionalized life, a standardized life, a normality that meant deadening of all progress. That was the greater danger that confronted him, but he was wholly unaware of it. That only proves the fact that even a Dictator—a *Sarvādhikāri*, a tyrant—who is inwardly bound by the belief in definite forms, in routine, in conformity to custom and usage, is unfortunately less free from the point of view of the spirit than the man in the street! Haidar was undoubtedly exceptionally endowed, he was even creative in spirit, but even he had his limitations set for him by Nature and upbringing and lack of education. Education develops unusual talent and the interdependence of the inborn talent on the unusual talent thus developed is too obvious to need development here. But it deserves to be duly appreciated if we are to clearly understand Haidar's character and greatness as well as his failings. From that point of view, Haidar's character and career will always afford points for deep

study, unforeseen and unforeseeable by generations of students of history.

The vague and scanty records of the period—both literature and inscriptions fail us largely during the period of Haidar—do not afford us any just estimate of the taxes, the revenue and the resources of the Mysore kingdom. The territorial limits too were varying from time to time, owing to the conquests made or conquests lost, territory occupied by neighbouring enemies or territory lost by them to Mysore. The income from Pālegārs also varied from time to time according as they owned allegiance to Mysore or to its enemies. But the system of revenue collection, the taxes levied, the departmental control under the working of the *Athāra-cuchēri* initiated by Chikkadēvarāja were continued in force in uninterrupted fashion, as Haidar was not for innovations and abolitions of any kind in such matters which affected revenue or administration or were likely to affect them in the least. The monopolies—in iron, tobacco and sandal-wood (*Śrīgandha*), for instance—continued in force; the duties and customs levied likewise were continued; similarly, the sixth, the lawful share of the crop, was levied as usual, and its money equivalent collected from the raiyats, together with the other taxes (*terige*) that had been customary to collect since the olden days—house-tax, tax on looms, transit duties, tax on caste heads, etc. One and all of such minor imposts were neither forgotten nor did they omit to bring in their income to the Treasury. If anything, the total of the revenue collected could have been only greater in extent than ever before, including the days of Chikkadēva himself. The mass of treasure thus collected and paid out to the Mahrattas from time to time to get rid of their incursions, of the further sums spent on the army, on the incidental charges, including the main-

tenance of well-equipped Commissariat, would suggest a splendid, indeed indefinite, idea of the supplies and resources of the kingdom as a whole, whatever its territorial extent. Haider, there is reason to believe, always believed in accumulations of gold and silver to meet sudden demands. His avarice—personal or in behalf of State—is not less renowned than his valour and fortune; his victorious armies were paid and rewarded even without breaking into the mass of treasure he had accumulated in the subterranean vaults of the Treasury he had absolute control of.

Seringapatam, the capital, ran its flourishing course of life, war or no war outside its limits. The kings lived in the old Palace—marked by the present site bearing the Memorial to H. H. Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar III—a place that had descended to the Mysore kings from the days of the Vijayanagar representatives at Mysore.²⁹ It was surrounded by gardens and descended by many a terrace to the banks of the rapidly flowing sacred river Cauvery. It was after the model of the Palace which, according to tradition, stood at Vijayanagar, the Imperial capital on the Tungabhadra, whose site is still pointed out at that far-famed place. It was in the crowded part of the town, the king disdaining to live away from his subjects but always preferring to live with them and amidst them, and not far away was the celebrated temple of Śrī-Ranganātha, conspicuous by its lofty towers and enclosure walls, and famous by its sanctity. The apartments in the Palace, if tradition is to be believed, were adapted to the seasons, and decorated with marble and porphyry of colours, with sculpture, paintings and a sprinkling of precious stones and gold and silver. The

As to the location of the site of the old Palace in Seringapatam, *vide* Appendix II—(9).

skill of patient and famous artists had been expended on it for generations but the most precious part in it was the aperture through which the king and his ladies could espy the great and holy temple and pray for the prosperity and happiness of all subjects—*sarvējanō sukhinō bhavan-tu*—three times daily before retiring to bed finally after the day's labours and avocations. In monarchies,

The ruling sovereign: the *Kartar's* position.

however, whether in the West or the East, the king reigns, while the ministers govern. The all-powerful *Sarvādhikāri* in Mysore had between the times of Dalavāi Dēvarājaiya and Nanjarājaiya and Haidar Ali become practically independent even of the sovereign, though everything—every single act—was transacted in his name and authority and he was recognized as sole authority vested with power in the land. Though originally the power of government—during Chikkadēva's days—was divided and exercised by the ministers of the Palace and treasury and the army, in

Haidar's time, the *Sarvādhikāri* had virtually become the sole power in the land, in keeping with his name and

title, the Cabinet being domineered over by him and its decisions overpowered for all practical purposes. To say that Haidar was the sole Dictator of his time would be no exaggeration. Haidar controlled the Palace, the Treasury, the Army and infant fleet which he had begun, whether under the English Admiral (Stanet), or through the agency of the Ali Rāja of Cannanore, or at Daria Bahadur-Gur, Mangalore and other places. The old Cabinet of Ministers became in every way titular heads of Departments, who had to act as they were told to do, and neither possessed initiative nor could control their own departments, of which they were supposed to be in charge. Even in these nominal positions, they had the sword of Damocles always hanging over their heads in

the shape of deposition, degradation, dismissal and despo-
 liation of the hard earnings of a life-time. Haidar's place
 of residence became now "palace" and his marches
 "*savāries*" in imitation of those of the sovereign Ruler
 himself. As Wilks puts it, "he established a regular
 order in forms of procession, a new splendour in the
 equipments of the retinue, and a more dignified, eti-
 quette in the ceremonials of public audience"³⁰. Such
 was the *Sarvādhikāri*, though Haidar laid himself low
 and prostrate at the Dasara festival before his sovereign
 and owned his loyal allegiance to him. The king no
 doubt possessed nominally all the powers of his position.
 The legislative and executive powers were centred in
 his person, but by virtue of the existence of the
Sarvādhikāri, they were more attributes than realities.
 As we have seen, even their domestic life—their very
 very foods and drinks—were priced out and controlled
 with murderous intent and design! At the nod of the
Sarvādhikāri, anything could be done, life and death
 not excepted. The better mind of the populace secretly
 condemned what it could not yet prevent or forbid effec-
 tively.

In the provinces, his powers were equally supreme.
 He had general command of the armies
 Provinces and towns. there and on their resources he had full
 power. Over the frontier provinces,
 he exercised special control and posted the more trust-
 worthy of his commanders as Faujdārs and civil officers.
 They were both Hindus (like Śrīnivāsa Rao) and Muslims
 or *Chēlas* specially chosen (as Ayāz at Bednūr). Among
 the provincial towns were the following: Salem, noted

30. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 514. Like Augustus, Haidar became "Prince" of his
 Cabinet. See Gibbon, *o.c.*, Chap. III.

then as now as a flourishing weaving centre;³¹ Coimbatore, Tirupattūr, Krishnagiri, Kōlār, Muḷbāgal, Madhugiri (Maddagiri), Bednūr, Mangalore and Calicut. Mysore city stood, as the historic capital of the kingdom, by itself, with its old fort and its famous temple on the hill close by. Of these cities, some were ancient and had a respectable history to boast of. Others had come to prominence during a period not far removed from about the rise of Haidar himself. Some others had had even personal attention paid to them by Haidar himself. Bangalore, which, according to an epigraphical record, was in existence about 900 A.D. (see E.C., IX, Bangalore 83), had, under its Muslim killedār Ibrāhim Sāhib, been rebuilt in 1761, the first year of Haidar's regime. Oval in shape and strengthened by round towers at proper intervals, it was surrounded by a good ditch and covered way without palisades, though blessed only with an imperfect glacis in certain parts. It had two gateways, the Delhi and the Mysore. The former, which opened towards the *Pēṭe* (*Pettah* of English writers), city proper, was a handsome structure in the best style of Muslim and military architecture, remnants of which may still be seen, and consisted of several gates surmounted by traverses. Like Chikkadēvarāja, Haidar perceived the importance of Bangalore, from its situation, and kept its fortifications and defences always in a state of preparedness. He posted to its charge only those in whom he had personal trust and confidence. But there was one defect

31. The English at Madras were keenly interested in the prosperity of the Salem weavers, as the success of their "investment" in their cloth depended on it. They traded with them in the Salem cloth through their Fort St. David Settlement at Cuddalore (*Diary and Consultation Book*, 1755, *Fort St. George Records*, 144). The Mahratta invasions sometimes interfered with this trade and cloth was damaged on occasions in storing and the weavers were asked to pay back the advances in regard to them and make good the balances of cloth to be tendered as against advances made (*Ibid.*, pp. 144, 195).

in the construction of the fortifications. There being no ditches between the gates, an enemy taking possession of the works over the first gateway had a ready communication with all the others. The British troops who stormed the fort at this point (in March 1791), took advantage of this cardinal defect. Kōlār, which saw so much of the fighting in Haidar's time with the British, goes back as the capital of the early dynasty of the Gangas in the 2nd century A. D. They styled themselves "the lords of Kōlār or Kuvalala." Futte Muhammad, the father of Haidar Alī, controlled its fortunes, after its Mughal conquest (1689), as Faujdār of Sira, with Būdikōte as his Jaghir. Basālat Jang, the brother of Nizām Alī, ceded it to Haidar in 1761. Haidar regarded it with special interest, as it was, according to some, his birth-place and in any case closely connected with his family. Mulbāgal was another provincial town of importance. The capital of an old Vijayanagar province and the seat of a local viceroy, its glories had not entirely departed from it. It was the eastern gateway to Tirupati, (*mūḍla-bāgihū*) and it enriched that famous temple-city and pilgrim-city from the numbers of young and old it sent out to pay homage at the far-famed shrine. The welcome name of the lord of Tirupati was propagated throughout the Mysore Kingdom even during Haidar's time, without let or hindrance, and the highways were thronged with a swarm of pilgrims who sought to expiate their sins by a pious journey, however costly or laborious, which was not exempt too from its perils, though the roads were kept clear. The calculation of their numbers would not be easy nor accurate, but tradition relates that Mysore contributed annually at least 2 to 3 lakhs of pilgrim visitors from its area. A trifling oblation from each individual would add to the fortunes of the sacred shrine and make its total collection vie with the Royal treasury itself. While the priests gathered in the heaps

of gold and silver that were poured into its coffers at its entrance, there was none even to count them. Such was Muḷbāgal, which became the scene of the famous fight between General Wood and Haidar (October 1768).³² Madhugiri—Maddagiri of old—in the Tumkūr District, was another important provincial town during Haidar's time. It was the place where Vīrammāji, the Bednūr Rāni, was imprisoned by him. He added to its fortifications greatly. It became a seat of valuable trade as well, there being over a hundred weavers in it, who added to its prosperity. Mysore city itself was treated by Haidar always with consideration. With its intimate connection with the Royal household, it inspired memories of special respect and reverence. Haidar, unlike his son, never thought of laying profane hands on it, however much he coveted powers very near regal. Another town in which Haidar was personally interested was Bednūr, in modern Shimoga District, called after himself, *Haidar-nagar*. In 1640, it had become the capital of the Keḷadi Chiefs, who transferred the seat of their government to it from Ikkēri. Being in the direct course of trade by the Hosangadi-ghāt, it rapidly increased in size and importance until there was a prospect of the houses reaching the number of a lakh, which would entitle it to be called a *nagara* or city. The city was eight miles in circumference and had ten gates, named the Delhi, Koḍiyāl, Kavaledurga, etc. The palaces were on a hill in the centre, surrounded by a citadel, and the whole city was encircled by woods, hills and fortified defiles extending a great way in circumference. In pursuance of the intention to make it a *nagara*,³³ Haidar gave it, it is said, the name of *Haidar-nagar*, and greatly increased its trade. He built a palatial residence outside the fort,

32. See *ante*, Ch. I. pp. 84-85.

33. See *ante*, Vol. II. p. 470, n. 206.

established in the town his principal arsenals, which employed many hands in the manufacture of arms and ammunition, and continued the old mint of the Keladi Chiefs and struck coins in his own name—*Haidari Pagodas*. He gave great encouragement to merchants and even encouraged, with but little success, the cultivation of the mulberry and the rearing of silk-worms. After its capture, Chitaldrug became an important provincial town during Haider's time. The present formidable stone-fortress there dates from his time. He also constructed the immense granaries in it. Coimbatore, Salem, Mangalore and Calicut were other towns in the territories then forming Mysore and they were places of note and importance both from their position and the trade attaching to them.

With the conquest of Bednūr, Chitaldrug and the cities up to the banks of the Tungabhadra and the Krishna, beyond them, the Kannada language, both spoken and written, spread. Already known there, and largely in vogue, its influence grew in the Southern Mahratta country and Ceded Districts of Madras Presidency and in the Bārāmahals. Research is still to unearth the literary activity covered in these vast territories but we have no indication as yet whether the troublous times of Haider proved productive or prolific from the literary point of view. The authors Venkāmātya and Katti-Gōpālārāja were the subordinates, no doubt, of Krishṇārāja II (1734-1766).³⁴ They seem to have written their respective works long before they came to prominence and from a place far from the capital city of Seringapatam. Singarāchārya is said to have written the *Śrīranga-Māhātmya*—always a live religious topic—under

34. See *ante* Vol. II. p. 481 (for Venkāmātya or Venkappaiya's works) and pp. 614-615 (for Katti-Gōpālārāja's works).

the patronage of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja (1770-1776). But a closer examination makes the work assignable to c. 1600.³⁵ Dēvachandra wrote his *Rājāvalī-Kathe* by order of Dēvīrammaṇṇi, the queen of Khāsā-Chāmarāja (1776-1796). But he wrote his work in 1838 and is hardly helpful as regards the state of the capital city during Haidar's time. The distractions of the times did not, and could not, evidently foster any literary activity worth the name. Haidar's main preoccupation being war, everything centred in it. Whatever did not pertain to it, seemed alien to life and living. Even the *Haidar-Nāmah* (1784) is silent on the social and kindred aspects of life. So far, though research has been active and the search for the manuscripts has been in vogue, not a single composition of literature, philosophy or history has been discovered relating to the period. Though the melody of Vālmiki was yet sounding in the ears of young and old, its appeal lay mute and dumb. In the Salem country—then part of Mysore—its local Pāḷegār Chief, Krishṇarāja of Salem (*Śālyada Krishṇarāja*), wrote the *Vivēkābharāṇa* (about 1774).³⁶ The language and idiom of Mysore set the standard for all Kannaḍa-speaking countries in and out of old Mysore, and thus laid secure foundations for the unification of a greater Mysore in time to come, while the incursions of Haidar and his associates, from the days of Nanjarāja, helped to leave the customs of Kannaḍigas in distant places like Uttam-pālayam in the Madura District of to-day and in the Red Hills area, not far away from the City of Madras itself, straggling memorials to people who adventurously strayed with armies in Haidar's days and whose descendants speak the Kannaḍa language to this day and speak it too with the Mysore accent and Mysore grace.

35. See *ante* Vol. I. 72, n. 156-157.

36. See *Kar-Ka-Cha.*, III. 122-124

The existence of an all powerful Muslim *Sarvādhikāri* at Mysore, whether he himself believed in religion or not, and whatever his political predilections and the co-existence of Muslim rulers at Hyderabad, Cuddapah, Kurnool, Gurramkonda, Savaṇūr and other places, small and big, helped to keep up Muslim culture, literature and arts. Haidar, who lamented more deeply than we will ever be able to discern or measure, the lack of education in himself, not only encouraged *Mullahs* for teaching the elements of Persian and Hindustāni, but also, what is more interesting, entrusted the care of Tipū, his son and successor, to a duly qualified Muslim teacher. His attempt at educating Tipū in the traditional mode is a chapter of history by itself. It is said that Tipū's teacher was never questioned by Haidar as to the progress made by the boy for many years, at the end of which period, he one day conducted a public examination of Tipū. This showed that the boy had not obtained the training required for a soldier's son ; instead he had had everything that would be requisite to turn him into a good Moulvie. Haidar's displeasure knew no bounds and he exclaimed, much in the strain of Aurangzīb, that his boy had not been taught the things that would make him a great and good ruler. He had not been taught, he thundered forth, the modes of warfare he should know, the manner of conquering countries or conducting diplomacy with the surrounding nations, or even the duties of kingship. Instead, Haidar protested, everything requisite for converting him into a religious zealot had been done and his mind filled with notions and fancies which had made him hate everything not connected with Islām. Everything indeed had been done, concluded Haidar in his anger, to ruin his family and his kingdom and nothing to advance either. And Haidar proved a true prophet in uttering this condemnation of

learning imparted to his son. Tipū, we are told by Kīrmānī, his historian, "built a *musjid* (mosque) in every town, and appointed a Muezzin, a Moula and a Kāzi to each, and promoted the education and learning of the Mussalmans to the utmost of his power. He himself also spent his time in prayer, reading the *Korān* and counting the beads of his rosary." Kīrmānī comments rather bitterly on the disastrous effects of Tipū's preference to his religious devotions and to those who were not trained to the positions to which they were appointed. "The old Khāns and faithful servants of the State were now cast down from confidence and power, and low men, and men without abilities, were raised to high offices and dignities; men of rank, also, who had always been employed in the highest duties and services, were reduced to the lowest and humblest offices, for this reason, that it was the wish of the Sultān that every Mussalman should derive benefit, or reap all advantages from his kindness alone, in order that the lower classes of people should not despair of obtaining rank and office. From this cause, however, it was that disorder and disaffection forced their way into the very foundations of the State, and at once the nobles and Khāns, being alarmed and suspicious, became the instigators of treachery and rebellion". A stronger indication than this we do not read of in the writings of the annalists of the time of the sort of training Tipū had himself received to befit him for his later position in life or he himself expected from those he appointed to offices of trust and responsibility requiring certain previous training. Though not lacking in a knowledge of Persian, Tipū proved a mere pedant and an innovator and not a true reformer. Tipū's aversion to those who did not belong to his own religion—Kīrmānī says that "he did not consider any but the people of Islām his friends"—was not intelligible even to his own contemporaries, not excluding his own

officers, civil and military. "Therefore, on all accounts," Kirmāni adds, "his chief object was to promote and provide for them (Mussalmans). He accordingly selected a number of Mussalmans who could scarcely read and write and appointed them Mirzas of the treasury departments and placed one over each of the other accountants, to the end that the accounts might be submitted by them to him in the Persian language." This ended in a short time in administrative slackness, as the system was extended to the whole kingdom, and eventually led to its break-up and destruction. The story of the effects of the unsound education received by Tipū seems too pathetic for words and there is nothing in the dignified castigation that Haidar administered to Tipū's Mullah Sāheb to induce disbelief or doubt in it.³⁷

Seringapatam became the seat of the local Dravidian style of architecture, which came to be practised as the leading type of temple architecture by the Mysore Royal Family in the State. Though the Seringapatam temple with its imposing towers belongs probably to the 15th century, if not possibly older still, the one of the Chāmundi Hill dates from 1827, while the Nanjundēsvara temple at Nanjangud belongs to 1845. Though the Dravidian style has locally been influenced largely by Hoysala features in other cases, in these the latter are absent.

From the strenuous life lived by him through a long period of time, it should not be understood that Haidar either totally neglected the lighter side of life or forgot the common pleasures incidental to human existence. He was man enough to remember these aspects and did not, indeed, make light of them. De

The lighter side of
Haidar's life.

37. *Vide*, on this subject, *Mys. Gaz.* (New Edition), IV. 491-493.

La Tour is at pains to write at length on this aspect of his life, even almost to create a sense of tediousness in the reader, in the opening pages of his work. The Persian annalists, Kirmāni and Ikbal, dilate on it briefly but pointedly, evidently seeking to provide us with pictures of the life led by him as derived from the sources depended on by them. Of these, De La Tour is not only full but also the most useful as giving a picture of the lively life led by Haidar. His account is the more valuable to us coming as it does from a careful foreign observer. There are internal touches to believe that he is writing from notes taken by him *in situ* in person while he stayed in Mysore. De La Tour tells us³⁸ that

De La Tour on.

Haidar rose daily with the sun, about six o'clock. Immediately thereafter, the military officers—corresponding to adjutants-general in attendance on duty overnight and those who relieved them—entered and made their reports and received orders for transmission to the ministers and generals. The couriers then entered next, the couriers who had come in the night or at daybreak, and presented their despatches. Meanwhile he finished his toilet, which took him two or three hours. The toilet, however, was given up, when any military operations required his attention. Between 8 and 9 A.M., he arrived at his assembly room (De La Tour calls it *saloon*), where the officers (called *Secretaries* by De La Tour) waited for him. He passed the letters received by him, with instructions as to the replies to be sent. Then, he met here his sons and other near relations, besides friends. At 9 A.M., they also had refreshments served to them with himself. Next, he appeared at a balcony and received the salute of his elephants and horses (in imitation of a royal practice). Next, tigers passed by led by the hand and were fed by

38. *Vide*, on this section, De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 26-45.

him with sweetmeats. At half-past 10 A.M., the repast ended; he entered the audience-hall, or the grand tent, if at the army. He seated himself on a *sofa* beneath a canopy, not infrequently in some balcony, fronting an open space. Some relations, sometimes, sat by him here. Many came to seek audience, those who had business to transact being introduced by *Chōbdārs* (or macebearers) and accompanied by the officers concerned, so that immediate relief may be granted to the party. At this audience, De La Tour says that thirty or forty secretaries were seated along the wall to his (Haider's) left, who were writing continuously. "Couriers arrive almost every instant, and are conducted with great noise and bustle," he adds, to Haider, "where they lay their dispatches. A secretary kneeling takes the packet, and sitting on his hams, opens it and reads the letter. Ayder immediately dictates the particulars of the answer, and the letter is carried to the office of a minister . . . Ayder signs the dispatches in order as they are completed, as well as a number of private orders . . . The orders that issue from the offices of the ministers have no other significance than that of the great seal, of which they are the depositories; and the dispatch is closed with the private seal of the minister. The letters signed by Ayder are closed (De La Tour significantly adds) by the seal of the sovereign, of which the principal secretary is guardian." There were special letters written by him, to which were affixed "a particular or private seal,"⁸⁹ which he always wears on his finger, and

89. De La Tour makes always and keeps up the distinction between Haider and his "Sovereign", the Ruling King, whom he always styles "sovereign" (This has also been duly noted elsewhere in the course of this work—*Ante*, Vol. II. p. 281, n. 64). In contradistinction, he styles Haider as merely "prince", evidently by way of courtesy. Similarly he terms Haider's residence his "palace" and Dalavāi Nanjarāja's as his "palace." Probably he was merely copying the usage of the times. Pālegār chiefs in South India call their residences "palaces." The impression on Haider's seal bore the verse

in that case he himself carries the packet," says De La Tour, "to one of his couriers who conveys it as far as the first station. To the packet is joined a paper, denoting the hour it was sent off; and at every station the time of its arrival is marked." The audience closed at 3 P.M., when Haidar returned to his apartment "to sleep or make the siesta, as it is called in Italy." He returned to the audience hall at 5-30 P.M., from whose balcony he saw the troops exercise or the cavalry exercise, or the cavalry defile before him, surrounded by friends or relations, while the secretaries kept themselves again busy in reading letters or in writing them. At 6-30 P.M., when the day closed in, a great number of *mussalchys*, or bearers of flambeaux, appeared in the courtyard and saluted Haidar as they passed on the side of the apartment where he was.⁴⁰ Haidar's apartments were all illuminated in a moment with tapers in chandeliers of exquisite workmanship, ornamented with festoons of flowers of the utmost lightness and delicacy. The chandeliers were, to protect them from the wind, covered with large shades of English glass. There were also large lanthorns, painted with flowers of all colours. Great men, ministers and ambassadors now began their visits. They usually perfumed themselves with the most costly perfumes.

in Persian, which might be rendered as follows :—

"Futteh Hydur was manifested, or born, to conquer the world;
There is no man equal to Ali and no sword like his."

(Kirmāni, o.c., 491). Kirmāni refers also to the pocket seal of Haidar (i.e.), inscribed thus: "Futteh Hydur" (victorious Haidar). Translation by courtesy of Moin-ul-Vizareth Mr. A. K. Syed Taj Peeran, who adds that *Haidar* means *tiger* and that it was the title of Hazrat Ali, the fourth Caliph, who was a great warrior and conqueror. He won many great fortresses in the wars between Mussulmans and pagan Arabs, under the leadership of Muhammad, the Prophet.

40. This was an old-world Vijayanagar custom, which had descended to Mysore and extended to the executive heads of every grade and even to *gurus of maths*. Relics of this still persist in the case of the latter as in the Vyāsārāya-Math.

The "young nobility" also visited him then.⁴¹ Everybody assumed the most polite and engaging manners. They saluted Haidar first and then his sons and relatives in an easy and unaffected manner. There were, among the young nobility, some who were called *Arabsbequi*, corresponding to chamberlains in Germany. There were ordinarily four in waiting each day; they were distinguished by their sabre, which they carried in their hand in the sheath, using it nearly as a walking-stick. All the others left their arms in the hands of their pages and other attendants, who were very numerous and filled the avenues. The pages alone were permitted to enter; they followed their master, bearing his train into his apartments, till they quitted their slippers at their stepping on the carpet, when the pages let fall the train, and put the slippers in a bag.

Haidar's apartments were commonly covered with white muslin, spread upon the most superb Persian carpets. He had such a predilection for white, adds De La Tour, that he caused the wainscotting, that is painted, gilt, and varnished, to be covered with white muslin; and even chairs and sofas of embroidered velvet or gold stuff. About nightfall, at 8 P.M., there was, according to De La Tour, "for the most part," an entertainment (called by him a "comedy"), lasting till 11 P.M., intermixed with dances and songs. During its progress, the *Arabsbequi* (*i. e.*, chamberlains) continued near the strangers, and politely informed them of everything they may desire to know, as, "the subject of the comedy, the

41. De La Tour later refers to "the young nobility" as the "*baras a demi*" (*o.c.*, I. 89), which stands for *Bada-admi*, *i.e.*, "the big men", the reference being probably to the bigger men about Haidar, whom De La Tour misunderstood as the "young nobility" round about him. They probably belonged to the confidential inner cabinet of Haidar, to whom he confided matters of secrecy and moment.

news of the day, etc." They were careful to ask, if any chose to drink or eat; in which case, they caused *sherbet*, fruits or confectionary to be presented to them, though they seldom ate. If any present chose to play chess, they played it with them, or proposed a party. Haidar, to whom entertainments of the stage were "very indifferent", discoursed with his ministers or ambassadors, sometimes passing into a cabinet to speak with more secrecy; and continued, as in the morning, "to dispatch business, without seeming to be busy". Almost always before the end of the performance, flowers were brought to him in a basket of filigram, out of which he himself gave a few to those who were about him; and afterwards the basket was carried into the apartments of the theatre, every one of those present taking a small flower from it and returning a profound obeisance to him. When he desired to show his particular personal esteem towards anybody, he himself made a collar of jasmine flowers, and knotting it with silk as he conversed, adjusted the same round the neck of the happy mortal concerned. This honour had been several times shown to the Chief Europeans in his service, knowing well that the French, above all nations—De La Tour adds—esteem themselves well paid by such courtesy. He who received this honour was visited the following day by the first people of the State. If a battle had been won or any glorious event had occurred in favour of Haidar, the court-poet announced it on his first entering the apartments with due pomp and in courtly language. As he uttered his words of praise, everybody present became silent and attentive. The entertainment would go on uninterrupted, though Haidar himself carried on his conversation with his relatives, generals and ministers as usual. "We cannot speak of their public entertainments," adds De La Tour, "without mentioning the Bayaderes, of whom the Abbé Raynal has drawn so advantageous a portrait

in his *Histoire Philosophique*.”⁴² De La Tour says that in his time—and he knew India as he had lived and served at the Mughal court at Delhi—the court of Mysore was “the most brilliant in India.” Haidar’s “company of performers is without contradiction the first,” he adds, “as well on account of its riches as because the Bayaderes are the women to whom he gives the preference.”⁴³ Being successor to Bijāpur in certain of its conquests in Mysore, Mysore had every facility in Haidar’s time for procuring this class of dancers, who, De La Tour says, “are the most remarkable for their beauty and talents.” The entertainers were all women, who were all specially trained to their work by the directress, who was likewise manager.⁴⁴ The comedies they enacted were all pieces of intrigue. They personated either women who leagued together to deceive a jealous husband, or young girls who conspire to deceive their mother. Their songs were gay and agreeable. It was impossible to play—De La Tour adds—with more art or with more natural ease. “The dancers are,” he says, “superior in their performance to the comedians and

42. The *Abbé Raynal*: French philosopher (1713-1796); wrote *Histoire des Indes*, and edited the *Philosophic History*, distinguished for its “lubricity, unverity, loose, loud, eleutheromaniac rant”; saw it burnt by the common hangman, and his wish fulfilled as a ‘martyr’ to liberty. Gibbon mentions him in his *Roman Empire*.

43. *Bayadere* or *Bayaderi*: From Fr. *bailadeira*, from *baila*, to dance. In the East Indies, a professional dancing girl; a dancing girl in India, dressed in loose eastern costume. In regard to *Bayaderes* in Mysore during Haidar’s period of office, see also Mirza Ikbal’s memoir (*Kirmāni*, *o.c.*, 498), where he refers to them. Haidar was accustomed, he notes, to have a party of Bayaderes, dancing women, early every night in his tents. If the woman who danced was a Hindu, she was required to wear a white dress; if she was a Mussulman woman, a dress embroidered with gold, etc., etc., (see pp. 462-463 *supra*, for details *in extenso* from Mirza Ikbal). *Kirmāni* also mentions dancing girls being employed “every Monday night” by Haidar, “whether marching or halting” (*o.c.*, 489).

44. De La Tour gives a long account of their beauty and the training given to them (*o.c.*, I. 40-41).

singers: it may even be affirmed that they would afford pleasure on the theatre of the opera at Paris." No one of them was more than seventeen years of age; at this age, they were dismissed and they attached themselves to the *pagodas* in the country, who always maintained a number of them. Entertainments by *Bayaderes* were also given in the town in private houses and in the army, at which the troupe engaged by Haidar never appeared. At 11 P.M., or about midnight, the entertainment broke up and every one retired, except those who stayed over to sup with Haidar, who, barring grand festivals, supped only with his friends and relations. "This mode of life pursued by Ayder," De La Tour says, "is, as may be easily imagined, interrupted in the army. It is likewise occasionally interrupted by hunting parties, by excursions on foot or horseback, or by his attending to assist at the exercises and evolutions made by considerable bodies of troops." When he was obliged to remain a month in camp, or in any town, Haidar usually followed the chase twice a week. He hunted the stag, the roebuck, the antelope, and sometimes the tiger. When news arrived that the tiger had been observed to quit the forests and appear in the plain, Haidar mounted his horse, followed by all his Abyssinians, his spear-men on foot, and almost all the nobility armed with spears and bucklers. The traces of the beast being found, the hunters surrounded his hiding place and contracted the circle by degrees. As soon as the creature, who was usually hid in some rice ground, perceived his enemies, he roared and looked everywhere to find a place of escape; and when he prepared to spring on some one to force a passage, he was attacked by Haidar himself, to whom the honour of giving the first stroke was yielded, and in which he seldom failed. Thus the pleasures of Haidar were, to use the language of De La Tour, "varied to infinity."

We may miss entirely understanding the man Haidar, if we did not have some account of the internal conditions of the country during the period covered by him as *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore. It would, in any case, be a gross error to think that it was one of perpetual military activities, or of incessant unbroken warfare, which was not really so, or of all exaction and extortion, of concussion and tyranny, of blood and iron, unrelieved by the progress of the people undisturbed in their daily occupations. While Haidar seems to have cared for personal glory, one of the marks of power, he seems to have attached due importance to public happiness, the other attribute of its possession in a public functionary. The man who could evolve and perfect a new army organization, fixing up all details, including the form of the uniforms to be worn by generals including himself, and establish regular order in regard to forms of procession and dignified etiquette, devise methods or systems for the payment of the balances and perquisites due to the military, could also provide for the safe conduct of the daily routine of the ordinary life of the people and for the uninterrupted progress of trade and commerce.

It was the invariable rule of Haidar, immediately after the conquest of a country, to appoint intelligent agents and despatch them to its different parts to study its resources and report to headquarters.⁴⁵ Similarly it was his rule to appoint trustworthy and able Killedārs to different parts of the country, so that not only the population may be brought under control but also be reconciled to the new regime in a peaceful manner. His appointment of Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao to Malabar was a typical one in this respect;⁴⁶ of Ayāz to Bednūr was another such, it raising the jealousy of Tipū. Haidar also

45. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 124.

46. *Ibid.*

appointed intelligence officers, who sent news (*akhbar*) to him by means of news-letters addressed directly to him from far and near, of information about the doings of local Rājas, Chiefs, Zemindārs, Pālegārs, etc. Such news-writers were appointed to new areas conquered or continued as of old—from the days of Chikkadēvarāja—at the capitals of the Nizām, Muhammad Ali, the English, the Pēshwa, etc., who despatched the latest political news of the day at their centres. Before going to rest in the night, he was thus in possession of all the current news of the land.⁴⁷ It is said that in regard to the execution of measures undertaken by him in the administration of the country, small or great, the details were superintended by him in person, so much so, that even leather, the lining of bullock-bags, or tent-walls, and strands of rope, all passed under his inspection, and were only then deposited in the Government stores.⁴⁸ He kept, it is said, all merchants, traders and bankers in good humour and well pleased with him, by providing for the safety of the roads and means of communication and keeping thieves out of the way, and making handsome—it is described really as “kingly”—presents to them.⁴⁹ He also bought up their goods, in some cases, with the greatest avidity, and at high prices. Steps were taken to keep cities clear of pick-pockets, thieves, robbers, etc. The name of the cut-purse, thief or highway robber, was erased, we are told, from the records of the cities, towns and villages. If, by accident, any highway robbery, etc., was committed, the *Kāvalgār* (local police guard) was impaled without delay and another promptly appointed to his place and one who feared God and had a tender heart.⁵⁰ His encouragement of horse-dealers has already been noted, and was

47. *Ibid.*, 125-126, 308-309.

48. *Ibid.*, 475.

49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*, 487.

in keeping with the traditions of the Mysore Royal House since the Vijayanagar days.⁵¹ His loans and advances of money were well and discreetly scattered, if not exactly "like sand over the face of the earth," as described to us by one of the annalists.⁵² His estimate of the value of the brave and experienced soldier, of whatever nationality, race, tribe or caste he might be, was very high.⁵³ Any man who had distinguished himself by his bravery, he heartily cherished and entertained into the service of the State. While he used his endeavours to promote and exalt him, he would not be willingly paid disproportionately for his services or for the help he offered. The story of how he reduced the promised emolument of Lally, when he left the Nizām and entered Haidar's service, has been told already.⁵⁴ Only experienced persons acquainted with his views were appointed as Amīls, Fauzdārs and Amīns. One can easily form some idea of Haidar's greatness from his ability to keep together a body of men of different nationalities who cheerfully underwent inconveniences and troubles even, on account of him. There were Germans—as commanders of troops—Frenchmen, Irishmen, Nevāyats, who stood high in the social scale, even Englishmen in his service, and they all worked under him both willingly and well. He managed them through special agents, one for French affairs and so on. Believing in hard work himself, and devoted to his daily routine, he was the enemy of the indolent and the luxurious; and, as one of the annalists puts it, in his poetic language, "the backs and sides of negligent and extortionate servants were frequently softened by stripes of the whip."⁵⁵ A rule with him was that a man that

51. See *ante*, Vol. II. pp. 277-280.

52. Kirmāṇī, *o.c.*, 476.

53. *Ibid.*

54. See *ante*, Vol. II. p. 343.

55. Kirmāṇī, *l.c.*

had been removed from the post occupied by him was, after proof of neglect or maladministration of his charge, by official witnesses, never restored to his office. There was, however, one notable exception to this rule. This was in favour of revenue collectors, whose experience and knowledge counted. They were scourged and left to improve. The idea of improving their emoluments, so that they may be induced to give up extortion, never crossed the mind of Haidar, as it did not his contemporaries, so that rural happiness might be secured on an intelligible footing. But, generally, it must be said to his credit, he placed all offices of responsibility in the hands of wise and honourable persons. In all the service departments of the State, territorial and fiscal, news-writers, *harikārs* and secret writers, were maintained, each of whom reported, without being acquainted with the others, of every action of the subordinate servants of government, good or bad, to him. Sometimes, it has been said, Haidar, secretly, and covered with a blanket, went out, alone, into the streets and lanes of the city, to ascertain the condition of the people, the poor and the strangers who had come into it. In camp, it is vouched, he did the same.⁵⁶ Apart from the time spent on his military marches and expeditions, Haidar considered his life and the success of his administration as dependent on his continual movements through the country. It is said, he could not even forego the delight given by new scenery, or a new ground of encampment, fresh springs and the grateful shade of the tent.⁵⁷ He acted up to the Korānic injunction "go, walk forth in the earth," which, we are told, plainly inculcates the necessity for travel.

56. *Ibid.*, 477.

57. *Ibid.*

Troops were kept contented and happy. Insurrections were avoided scrupulously by their being kept in good humour, by timely gifts and favours. Haidar was indulgent to military officers when they lost their temper. Certain anecdotes already quoted make this clear.⁵⁸ The peasantry were likewise pleased by favourable assurances and agreements, and by keeping a constant eye on the collectors of revenue, checked with the aid of the confidential information supplied by *Harikārs* (information officers) and the *Akhbarnawāz* (news-writers).⁵⁹

There is reason to believe that Haidar sought to promote social peace by actively discouraging acrimonious disputes between Shiah and Sunni. Certain anecdotes make this absolutely plain.⁶⁰ Not only he personally decided such disputes and differences, but also he discouraged them positively by ruling that those wasting "the time of the *sirkar* in such irreverent, wicked dispute.....would be appropriately punished."⁶¹ As regards Hindus, not only did he countenance everything religious but also looked upon private worship as beyond the purview of governmental control, except to provide the usual conveniences for the same as of old. Though he was imbued with the spirit of due veneration for his own religion, and even took some pleasure, in certain extreme cases, in the conversion of Hindus of both sexes to his own religion, he was not fanatic to any extent in this matter. He was, according to Mirza Ikbal, comparatively liberal to his friends, the prize-fighters, wrestlers, etc., though he did not give, he adds, much

58. See *ante*, pp. 457-458 *supra*.

59. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 489.

60. *Ibid.*, 488-485.

61. "A camel bag and a mallet" is mentioned in this connection. It was evidently, as Col. Miles remarks, some kind of punishment (see Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 484 n.) Col. Miles also suggests from the story recorded that Haidar was a Shiah. See Appendix II—(10) on Haidar's religion.

to them. He, however, never allowed any reductions, he notes, of any of the allowances of the Hindu temples.⁶² During the Dasara, it is also on record, the Id festival, or on the occasion of a popular Mahratta festival (like the Ganapathi festival), though these belonged to the Hindus exclusively, to gain the affection of the people of the country—as the annalist says—⁶³ and his Cabinet of Ministers, mostly made up of Hindus, he held, we are told, “a banquet of ten days” and invited all the dignitaries of State, including the sons of his old master Dalavāi Nanjarājaiya and the like. On occasions of this kind, he also amused himself by witnessing fire-works, the fighting of stags, the fierce attacks of buffaloes and the charges of elephants, like mountains in size, on each other, and the boxing and wrestling of strong prize-fighters, who belonged to the Jetṭi caste.⁶⁴ He even joined the show and took a personal pleasure in exhibiting, in the true manner of a sportsman, his remarkable skill in marksmanship at one of the day's performances.⁶⁵ A circular enclosure, called *Ghīrbul*, was formed, in front of the *Jetṭi-mahal*, as the theatre for prize-fighting was known, a chained tiger being placed therein. Asses, to which strong spirits had been given instead of water, were let loose on the tiger. On seeing the bounds and leaps of the tiger, and the kicking and the braying of the asses, Haidar joined in the general laugh, being himself evidently much amused. Abyssinians also, dressed in woollen armour, with staves of sandalwood, were set to fight with bears. Some of the bravest of Haidar's servants, at their own request, were also selected and placed in the circle against a fierce lion or tiger. In the midst of the circle was fixed a plantain tree, and the man who was fighting

62. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 504-505.

63. *Ibid*, 489.

64. *Ibid*, 489-490.

65. *Ibid*, 490.

with the lion was ordered to attack him round or under cover of the tree. If, in the event, the brave man conquered and slew the lion or tiger, he, with presents of gold, dresses and increase of pay, was, we are told, rendered independent of all worldly want, but, on the contrary, if the lion or tiger proved the conqueror, and had cast the man on the ground, Haidar took up his matchlock, and fired with such unerring precision that the ball passed through the animal's head and the man rose up uninjured. In firing at a mark, with a musket or matchlock, there was not in the world of that day Haidar's equal.⁶⁶

Haidar's appreciation of talents was not limited by race or nationality. His respect for the military leadership of Col. Joseph Smith and the desire he expressed for meeting him, and how he was presented with a portrait of his, at his own request, have already been narrated.⁶⁷ Mysore attracted and absorbed soldiers of note of all nationalities and creeds.⁶⁸ He cherished great respect for Sir Eyre Coote. When, in his last illness, he was told that this distinguished General had left this transitory world,⁶⁹ Haidar, it is recorded, sighed deeply, and said, "he was a wise and an able man," and he should "by his experience have kept on equal terms with us." Walking (John) Stewart was in his service for some time, rising from Interpreter to General. His appreciation, however, of the services of foreigners in his service, sometimes seems to have exceeded fair and legitimate limits. Mirza Ikbāl, one of the annalists, records the fact that as he never gave

66. This is confirmed by Mirza Ikbāl, the annalist, who, referring to the same lion-fight, says that Haidar was "so good a marksman with his matchlock, that he did not suffer the lion to kill the man" (Kirmānī, o.c., 504).

67. See *ante* p. 135, n. 172.

68. Kirmānī, o.c., 17.

69. *Ibid*, 470.

leave to them to return to their own countries, they, pining to visit their homes, clothed themselves like religious devotees, and ran away secretly with horse-dealers who visited Haidar to sell their horses.⁷⁰

At the time Haidar assumed office as *Sarvādhikāri*, there was only one mint in existence and that was at Seringapatam, the capital. It had been established by Kanṭhīrava-Narasarāja Wodeyar I, who ruled from 1638 to 1659.⁷¹ It issued *fanams* only, known as *Kanṭhīrāyī-haṇa*, weighing 6 to 8 grains. Ten of these were taken to be equal to a *varaḥa* or pagoda, which had, however, no real existence. Even after the coins struck by him had become obsolete, the accounts continued to be kept in *Kanṭhīrayī-varaḥa* and *haṇa*, the "Conteroy" pagodas and *fanams* of English treaties with Mysore and of the official accounts down to the middle of the last century. The *Kanṭhīrāyī-haṇa* was current in Haidar's time as also *Chikkadēvarāya-haṇa* and *Chikkadēvarāya-varaḥa*, which must have been coined by that famous king. That king adopted the monogram *Dē*, which continued to be the Mysore Government mark down to quite modern times. The *Ikkēri-varaḥas* were, however, in general circulation. These had been coined and issued by the *Ikkēri* rulers of Bednūr, whose coinage followed the Vijayanagar model. After the conquest of Bednūr, in 1763, Haidar established a mint at that place, and issued the *Ikkēri-varaḥa* under the name of a *Bahadūri-hun*, retaining the old (Vijayanagar Sadāśiva Rāya) obverse of Śiva and Pārvati, but putting on the reverse his own Persian monogram or initial surrounded with a circle of dots. A coinage of it at Bangalore was known as the *Doḍḍatale-Bengalūri*, or the light-headed Bangalore pagoda. Judging from its comparative abundance

70. *Ibid.*

71. See *ante* Vol. I. pp. 160-162.

at the present day, it may be inferred that it must have had an extensive circulation at one time. Haidar's *half-varaha*, which followed the Durgi pagoda, based on the Vijayanagar Krishṇadēvarāya model, is rather rare. Either its issue was limited, as it has, since its issue, largely gone underground. The "new Muhammad Shahi" pagoda struck by Haidar at Gooty was simply a copy of an earlier Mughal pagoda of the same mint, the same being first coined during the reign of Muhammad Shāh and later reissued by Murāri Rao of Gooty, when in possession of Gooty. Haidar issued two types of gold *ḡanam*, one resembling the *Bahadūri* pagoda and half-pagoda, and the second dated. The dated half-*ḡanams* bear on one side his initial and on the other the Hijira date. The *Bahadūri* pagoda is still a common coin, while the corresponding half-pagoda is rare as also the Gooty pagodas. The half-pagoda with a seated figure of Viṣṇu is also a rare coin. A well-known numismatist has suggested that "there was probably a pagoda of a similar type, though no examples are known to numismatists." The *Bahadūri-ḡanams* are not rare but the other gold *ḡanams* are seldom met with. Two things are clear from this short statement of coinage of Haidar's time: (1) that he was against violent changes in coinage matters; (2) that he went along traditional lines, introducing as few changes as possible, and that his religion was not permitted to obtrude into this region. The mint towns active in his time were Seringapatam (Puttun), Bangalore, Gooty (after its capture from Murāri Rao), and Nagar or Bednūr (after its conquest).⁷²

The financial transactions were, as of old, put through as between neighbouring countries and powers, through the agency of financiers, who were rich bankers, and commonly known as *Sowcars* (*Sāhukārs*). These were

72. See *Mys. Gaz.* II. i. 94-96; J. R. Henderson, *The Coins of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* (1921).

either of local origin or foreign bankers resident for generations at the various capitals of the State, including Bangalore and Seringapatam among them. The foreign bankers belonged generally to Gujerāt, hence the name *Gujerāti* attaching to them in popular parlance. They probably belonged to Sindh and financed mainly on the personal credit of individuals. Their integrity and credit, as well as skill in business, was much esteemed even in those days. Their business was properly that of bankers, lending money, accepting deposits of cash for interest, furnishing or taking letters of credit on all places, not excepting even those at which they had no agent or correspondent. In the last of these cases, even in the 18th century, they made use of money-porters, who carried money any distance, taking all the attendant risk during transit, charging for carriage at a fixed rate per league travelled. It might not be known as generally as it should be that letters of exchange are far more ancient in India than in Europe. They are not, here in India, drawn to order, which creates a difficulty in case of the death or absence of the persons in whose favour they are drawn. This is obviated by naming several persons in the same bill, so that the letters of exchange drawn by an Indian banker runs, "Pay to John, or in his absence to Peter; in his absence to James," etc. Besides dealing in money, these bankers carried on a brisk traffic in precious stones, coral, pearls, gold and silver plate. Some of them were very rich and carried on their immense business at great profit to themselves and to the general convenience of the trading community generally. There were many insurance companies of great credit in the 18th century at Surat, Madras and Calcutta, composed entirely of these opulent Gujerāti bankers.⁷³

73. See De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 73-74, *f. n.*, for an instance quoted to prove the extreme fidelity of these *sowcars* of the Gujerāti community of bankers.

Kirmāni, the Persian annalist, mentions as an innovation introduced by Haidar on the *hun* issued by him—his monogram on one side and on the other the dots we have referred to above; and on the copper coins, the currency of the country, the figure of an elephant on one side. The reason for the latter innovation, he says, was that Haidar's war elephant, called *Poon Guj*, an extremely handsome animal in its form and proportions, and very steady in its paces, so much so that Haidar prized him above all his other elephants, died suddenly; and Haidar, being much grieved at his death, "to perpetuate his name, had his figure stamped on this copper coinage."⁷⁴ Kirmāni also details the story how, when Haidar was in angry mood, being cross at some of his civil officers who had spoiled some work committed to their charge, the master of the mint asked what device he would have him adopt for his new copper coinage under issue. Haidar, in a violent passion, told him, it would appear, "to stamp an obscene figure on it; and he, agreeably to these orders, struck that day four or five thousand of these coins, and they passed among the currency for some time. At length, certain learned men made a representation...on the subject, and the coins were called in and melted down."⁷⁵

Haidar's love of money was admittedly great. His private income seems to have included his share of plunder in enemy country; what he derived from confiscation of other people's wealth, including his own officers and generals; that derived from his personal jaghirs and assignments; and that which he took from the public treasury. His influence and credit with the bankers in the enemy's camp always stood high, with the result that adjustments between enemy countries and himself were always rendered feasible and practicable on easy terms and as quickly as may be required.

74. Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 488.

75. *Ibid.*, 488-489.

His expenditure seems, on occasions, to have been lavish, while his early training made him shun all unnecessary show and pomp.

Mirza Ikbal, the rather unfriendly annalist, mentions that if Haidar happened to advance money to any one of his servants, "the third part of his pay was stopped until the amount was refunded; and if any one paid the debt on demand, he was accustomed to demand interest, under the pretence that he had borrowed the money from a banker for him. But, when he had obtained the interest, he said, "this man is rich, why did he borrow money from me? seize his goods," and accordingly, "his property was sometimes confiscated or stolen by thieves set by Haidar's authority." ⁷⁶ The same writer, Mirza Ikbal, says that "notwithstanding the great riches which God from his hidden treasures had granted to him," Haidar "was at times so avaricious that even the pen is ashamed to write an account of his meanness. Sometimes, however, on the reverse, he became very generous; but, in fact, amassing appeared to him as the renovation of his faculties. Indeed many men followed him to the field, and lost their lives there, to whom or to whose children or relations he never gave a single farthing. He never gave his dancing girls, who every day danced before him, anything beyond their yearly allowance, except, perhaps, a trifle on very rare occasions. On those days, when before the balcony . . . a lion net was suspended, and a man and a lion were placed in the area, to fight together; if the lion killed the man, nothing was given; but if the man killed the lion, he received the present of a golden chain or necklace." ⁷⁷ Apart from this version being different from Kirmānī's, not only should we be careful before we accept Ikbal's estimate

76. *Ibid*, 496.

77. *Ibid*, 504.

but also have some idea of his conception of generosity and magnificence in cases of this kind. These are not only ideas of propriety but also of individual preferment, if not judgment. Moreover, we should not forget, Ikbal was always too critical in matters pertaining to Haidar, if not exactly inimical to him, and lacking, sometimes, in charity.

Though Ikbal is more critical than informative, he is also to be taken more as a corrective. On many points, he confirms Schwartz's shrewd observations about Haidar as well as those of Kirmāni. He is, in some respects, too, far different from Kirmāni, who, though informative, is generally poetical and flamboyant to a degree on occasions. Hence the value to be attached to Ikbal is naturally high and ought to be so, the more so as he not infrequently puts us on our guard and makes us pause before we believe any statement about Haidar, not fully vouched for. Of all annalists, he is the one who tells us that Haidar was "accustomed to assert that he was derived from the kings of Bejapore,"⁷⁸ and that his ancestors served first the Nawābs of Cuddapah and Kurnool.⁷⁹ He is also the only one who tells us that, according to information gathered by him, Haidar was born at Sira;⁸⁰ that when he rose in fortune in the Mysore service, he, at his levees "assumed no distinction between himself and one of his private troopers" and that he made no deductions "from the pay of his soldiery,"⁸¹ these being done later, as he rose in power and authority. He suggests Haidar then became proud and "by degrees, he became strange and forgetful, asking the name of his former friends, and requiring from them sundry obeisances and respectful observances."⁸² Haidar's wanton cruelty to his soldiers was seen when they did not obey his arbitrary orders,

78. *Ibid.*, 493.

79. *Ibid.*, 494.

80. *Ibid.*

81. *Ibid.*

82. *Ibid.*

sometimes asking them to kill people by firing at them, substituting his power and authority for his former friendly request or personal influence.⁸³ Ikbāl notes also Haidar's failure to bury his own dead after a fight, and his use of abusive language against those who were unsuccessful in war, or if they succeeded, for having sacrificed the lives of his best men, alleging rash and profitless attacks of enemy against them.⁸⁴ "In fact," Ikbāl roundly charges Haidar, that "in his life he was never known to praise any one". "In all his measures," he adds, "he availed himself of the aid of threats and violence, to instil fear into mens' minds."⁸⁵ Haidar's customary raid of houses—through the aid of women—to search out handsome maidens—after the capture of towns after their plunder had been accomplished—for his harem or for partitioning them among his followers is also mentioned evidently with disapproval by him⁸⁶.

Ikbāl, at the same time, confirms what Wilks states about the injustice done to the soldiers by Haidar so managing the pay roll as to avoid all payment for the intercalary month, the stony month, as the army called it, the month lost in adjustment between the lunar with solar calendars.⁸⁷ He also confirms the cruel use of the whip, referred to by Wilks and Schwartz; also how no one was allowed to converse or even whisper at his levees; how he inflicted death on his old associates, how he abused them on occasions; how weddings were spied out by his "wordy hircarrahs," a phrase borrowed by Haidar from the English—so Col. Miles records,⁸⁸ and how people bribed the hircarrahs to suppress reporting the truth and how he believed all that they told him and the like. He also mentions his great partiality to

83. *Ibid.*, 496-497.84. *Ibid.*, 497.87. *Ibid.*, 494-495; also *anté*, Vol. II. p. 341, n. 218 (citing Wilks).88. *Ibid.*, 495.85. *Ibid.*, 498.86. *Ibid.*, 499-500.

merchants and more particularly to horsedealers, which Kirmāni also notes, and how he never dismissed farmers of revenue of districts and taluks but continued them, despite their collecting more and making a profit out of the district or taluk farmed. "If," Haidar said, it seems, "the amount contracted for with government had been short, I should have exacted the deficiency; and therefore, if the farmer gets more, I have no right to interfere between him and his good fortune." That was so in the case of a farmer of revenue. But it was far different in the case of the Amil. "If he confided to any one the charge of a district", (i. e., Subādār or Amildar in the case of a taluk), to an officer of government as such, in government employ and in government pay, "God protect him," says Ikbal, "if he took 'to the value' of a blade of grass, besides the dues assigned to him by Haidar, he was sure to be flayed alive," which is what we glean from Schwartz's narrative.⁸⁹

Nobody gives so much information as Ikbal, indeed, does of the darker side of Haidar's character, of his failings and drawbacks in his deportment towards his old friends and confreres. That is certainly a side of his nature that we ought to know, for it shows to us Haidar as he really was as a man, what contributed to his success in life and what contributed to his failure also in life, as success and failure go in one's mundane existence.

It is Haidar as a man, with all his virtues and vices, his excellences and failings, his strength and weakness, his greatness and pettiness, that we are here interested in. What attracted him to people far and near, what dispelled them from him after their function was over, what repelled them from him

⁸⁹ The 18th century
Haidar, a review.

89. *Ibid*, 502; see also Schwartz in Wilks, o.c., I. 846-847.

sometimes, what made him interesting and what made him unwelcome in certain quarters, these are the aspects that really help to make us realize the causes of his rise and his failure in winning through his aims and objectives and perhaps also what proved contributory to the ruin of his family eventually.

In the apprehension of modern writers, Haidar Ali is an "upstart,"⁹⁰ a soldier of fortune who suddenly shot up to power and fell like a stick after a short while; a parvenu who rose to authority for a time and then disappeared; an adventurer⁹¹ whom fortune favoured for a time and then deserted him; and a commander of a body of freebooters and thieves.⁹² But in the eyes of Haidar Ali and in those of his graver contemporaries, his love of adventure was a sin and his love of power for his own purposes a frivolous amusement. His sacrifices for Mysore's cause for establishing its position in the South of India as the supreme arbiter of authority throughout its length and breadth in succession to a decaying imperial power, and the great and many wars he waged for it, establish his serious reputation, which has been diffused from the banks of the Cauvery over South India and what is to-day the Madras territories on the one side, the presidency of Bombay on the other, and the presidency of Bengal and the province of Orissa on the third and as far as Imperial Delhi on the fourth. His admirers increased at each capital city; he attracted friends to his administrative capital in proportion to the

90. V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, 469.

91. *Ibid.*, 488.

92. E. Thornton, *History of British India*, I. 525. Among other writers, J. C. Marshman describes Haidar as "an extraordinary chief," son of a "sirdar of peons or head constable". (*History of India*, I, 820). L. B. Bowring mentions him as "one of the most daring and successful adventurers recorded in the annals of the East" (*Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*, p. 1). And Lt. Col. L. H. Thornton refers to him as "the son of a Mohammadan soldier of fortune" (*Light and Shade in Bygone India*, p. 37). Wilks styles him "mighty adventurer" (o.c., I. 261).

growth in his power to provide for them; and as for his relations, they outnumbered both admirers and friends, running from tens into hundreds.⁹³ Our gratitude must applaud the man, who, by precept and example, revived or tried to prosecute the aims and objectives of Chikka-dēvarāja and the Daḷavāi brothers, and who vigorously followed them out with a view to find for Mysore a higher destiny. From his earliest youth, Haider aspired for a military career and found it at last at the Mysore Court, to which he by birth—in whatever place he was born—belonged. In its service, he rose to rank by degrees. The example of Nanjarāja and the belief that his attempt should have been crowned with success, inflamed emulation on his part; and the qualities of the tiger became endeared to him by the verbal resemblance of his name with the name for the Royal beast. In the thirty-ninth year of his age, he came to attain the object of his wishes. He became *Sarvādhikāri* in succession to Nanjarāja and was invested with the seal and emblem of office, which he received in solemn Durbar from his sovereign Lord, the king of Mysore. He knelt before the throne and received the title, a reward of merit, in humble fashion as became a loyal and dutiful subject.⁹⁴ From that day he had the perpetual privilege of completely arming himself and causing a gilt mace to be carried before him, and appearing thus in the august presence of the king, his sovereign master. The people,

93. When Śrī-Kṛṣṇarāja Wodeyar III ascended the throne in 1799, the Marāṭhi saying went: *Mysore rājāla rājyala svayare nighāle*: the Mysore king got his kingdom back and relations cropped up everywhere, i. e., every one claimed kindred with him. So was the case with Haider after he became *Sarvādhikāri* and grew in power with his wars and conquests.

94. See, for instance, the traditionary story as recorded in the *Annals* (I. 194-196), according to which Haider received the office of *Sarvādhikāri* from the king, with a written order and khillats and betel (*doregalavaru...buddhi nirūpavannu uḍugore vīḷeyagalodaṇe appaṇe dayapaḷisi*).

usually moved more easily by deeds than by words; signified assent to the Royal decree; and character was the recompense of his affection for the Mysorean name and cause. The title did him honour, and more than honour, it did him justice. In the familiar service of Dēvarājaiya and Nanjarājaiya, he had imbibed the ideas of an old patriot; and his ardent fancy had kindled every idea to a sentiment, every sentiment to a passion; and passion soon led to action. The aspect of every bend and every twist of the Cauvery and the majestic temple on its banks, whose tower rose tier upon tier, confirmed there these lively impressions; and he came to love the country, whose great and kind sovereign had so liberally adopted him as one of his own subjects, nay an adopted son (*kṛita putra*). The degradation and debasement to which Mysore had been subjected by Muhammad Ali Wālajah and his English allies at Madras had excited the indignation and anger of her grateful son. Seringapatam could still become the lawful mistress of the South of India; her sovereign lord occupy the vacant Imperial throne, and if he could attain that dignity, the South might again vindicate her unity and dominion and continue her independent existence unhampered. Nourishing such ideas, or rather dreaming such dreams, Haidar soon astonished India by a revolution which promised to realize for him for a moment his most splendid visions.

In the part of Mysore which had been in ancient times ruled over by the famous Ganga Kings, with Kōlār as its capital, in an old, immigrant family of Mussalmans, was born the man who made Mysore's name resound all over India and the continent of Europe for over two decades from the year 1761. His parents were of respectable origin and followed the profession of arms. He could, however, inherit neither dignity nor fortune from them. Nor had he in his favour a prepossessing appearance or even a fine complexion to

boast of. Of education, he had not even the advantage of the traditionary type. But his innate love of warfare, his genius for military leadership and his ambition for political distinction made him an instrument for the glorification of Mysore's cause. His attachment to the Daḷavāis, whose service he had entered through the influence of his elder brother, made him reflect, if not, indeed, exclaim, "Why did Nanjarāja fail in its cause at Trichinopoly and Madras? What to do to attain success in Mysore's behalf with the English at Madras, the allies of Wālajah? How to get to a stable understanding with the English at Madras and keep them to their trade, the trade in the investment they so passionately loved?" But his aspiring hopes were foiled by his own aggressive spirit and ungrateful attitude towards his benefactor. His fortune, however, favoured and his vigilance won for him more than he even could have wished for. His eloquence—in different languages—won him friends and adherents; his capacity for organization built up an efficient army on the new model, while the example of the French and the English made him imbibe not only their modes and methods but also their system and discipline. He even recruited commanders and generals from among the European nations to serve his country's purposes. The assertion by word and deed of the destiny of Mysore and of her supremacy over the South became the leading thought with him and the restoration of one sovereignty, one nation and one government became a desirable, a possible, and at last as an approaching event. His sense of loyalty to the sovereign made him feel the importance of justifying the position he had won by the supersession of the Daḷavāi, by the adoption of the constitutional title of *Sarvādhikāri*. He chose this as the ancient, natural and right appellation and in this character and with this title he worked for the realization of his ideas, the ideas of his master

Nanjarāja. A standing army was created ; people were allowed the freedom to pursue their occupations unhampered ; trade was allowed to run its even course. He still held fast to his Cabinet of Ministers, though they were being eclipsed by his authority and soon became a vanishing figure. Never perhaps in the history of the country had the energy and effect of a single mind been more tellingly felt—not even during the thrilling times of Chikkadēvarāja or the Daḷavāi brothers than in the sudden, though transient, twenty-one years of Mysore by the *Sarvādhikāri* Haidar. Drill and discipline reigned supreme ; men felt sometimes as if they were living in a military camp. Patient to hear, swift to redress, inexorable to punish, his *Sarvādhikāriship* was always accessible to the poor and to the stranger. The same impartial rigour was available against all malefactors or oppressors, subordinate taluk Amīl or territorial Subādār. The destiny that he, with his predecessor, dreamed of for Mysore, inspired Haidar with the vast, perhaps, somewhat visionary, idea of uniting all Southern India into one great kingdom, of which Serin-gapatam should be the ancient and lawful capital and the rest of the provinces and states obedient members. That was an idea that did not cross even the greatest of Vijayanagar sovereigns of old, who left the West coast States to themselves without laying hands on them. His scribes were not less eloquent with their pens than he was with his tongue ; they corresponded with the Dutch, with the Portuguese, with the English ; and he sent his vakīls to the capital cities to urge his view-points and to make them acceptable to them. He had trusty, swift and witty messengers whom he employed for this purpose. They were followed by the ambassadors of the countries corresponded with and to these foreign messengers and ambassadors and envoys the humble Naik of old, on all occasions, could find it easy to assume the

familiar or majestic courtesy of a sovereign ! All respect to Nanjarāja, who lived through a good deal of the period, all gratitude to him was lost in the superior duties of the ardent *Sarvādhikāri* working the destiny of Mysore, as he had come to steadfastly believe in it.

While, however, Haider was dreaming this dream and indulging his prophetic vision, he was unfortunately fast declining from the meridian of his fame, if not of power. In the height of his happiness, he contracted vices which stuck to him; justice was marred by acts of cruelty; economy by parsimony; eagerness for fame by puerility; and true greatness by ostentatious vanity. He assumed, besides the title of *Bahadur* conferred on him by Royal authority (1755), other sonorous and pompous titles.⁹⁵ He showed himself in public with the pomp and signs that belonged to royalty alone; his ambition for the honours of regal power showed the humbleness of his origin and brought down the high status that pertained to his office of *Sarvādhikāri*; his disregard of old friends and associates demeaned him in their eyes; his levity made them look down upon him; his insolence of behaviour to hate him and encourage those jealous of him and his power. He failed to disregard his true status and his foes multiplied, while he seemed unaware altogether of what was happening. Drunk with power, he was regardless of consequences. He repeatedly contrived to plot against the Sovereign Rulers of the State and thus despatched them to perpetuate for ever, as he thought, his own position in the land. Thrice he repeated this act of his and was guilty of the blood of his Master and the rightful Ruler of the country. In his private life, he soon unconsciously deviated from the strict rule of frugality and abstinence; used the wars he waged for effecting additions to his harem; the populace, who were accustomed to put up

95. See f. n. 1 *supra* for his other titles.

with the splendour of local chiefs, were provoked by the luxury of one who desired to emulate and eclipse them. In the excess of power he wielded, he failed to realize the dangerous position he was creating, not so much for himself but for his son and successor, for whom he was anxious beyond measure; other Khaṇḍē Raos were in the making in the land and were bound to appear and re-appear in the conditions that were bound to continue after him. He forgot that for every king he plotted against, another was bound to take his place; that local chiefs were bound to foregather and counterplot; that people were notoriously liable to take sides as occasions demanded; and that the reproaches of the world are bound to create an atmosphere that can favor the growth of irreconcilable enemies. Memories of the sad fate that overtook Khaṇḍē Rao⁹⁶ may check for a while all show of visible action on the part of would-be insurrectionaries but time was bound to blur such memories and lead to action that might prove fatal to those for whom he most cared for. Such was the terror that inspired his name that action did not seem feasible. But the time was bound to come when the country would turn against him as the proverbial worm would. His successful wars against his neighbours, the English, the Mahrattas and the Nizām, brought him name and fame and the country the glory of a greater reputation. But in the full blaze of his

96. Kirmāṇi says (o.c., 94-95) that, according to the most solemn covenant he had entered into with the Raja, he spared the life of Khaṇḍē Rao but kept him in the most cruel of imprisonment. He put him in an iron cage and sent him under guard to Bangalore, there to be kept as a parrot would be most securely, according to the letter of his promise that he would treat him as he would his parrot. Here he was confined, according to Capt. Robson, who records his eking a miserable existence there. This story has had a long vogue. The cruel punishment was not evidently unknown to the ancient rulers of the land. The English at Madras kept in a similar cage the rebel Pāyaka Rao a Pāyakaraopet in the Vizagapatam District (see W. Francis, *Vizagapatam District Gazetteer*, Ch. XV, pp. 312-313, under *Pāyakaraopet*).

prosperity, he was struck down by mortal illness⁹⁷, which prevented him for ever from reviewing his past or repenting for his conduct towards the country that had adopted him or the Sovereign House that had shown so much honour and courtesy to him. The last war he waged against the English had dragged him out of the country in which he grew great and rose to power, and there, 200 miles off his home, his kith and kin, he lay many days unconscious, without voice or motion; unconscious, beyond reach of his son or wife, upon whom he doted and for whom he cherished a true affection; and there at last he passed away, his death being kept a dead secret until his body was removed to its last resting place at the city he loved best to the end of his life. This is the Haidar of the 18th century; the Haidar who will be studied by historians; the Haidar who has been presented to the reader in the preceding pages. Posterity will compare the virtues and failings of this last extraordinary *Sarvādhikāri* among the *Sarvādhikāris* of Mysore, who, during the most troublous of all periods it saw in its history of many centuries, dreamt of its true destiny and all but won it.

Contemporary writers give descriptions of Haidar's personal appearance and being. These are also reproduced in the pictures and portraits of the period, some of which have come down to us. "The most formidable Asiatic rival the British ever encountered in

Contemporary pictures and portraits of Haidar.

Also, George Russell's *Report of 1832 on the Agency Tracts: Disturbances in Ganjam and Parlaktimidi*, printed in the *Selections from the Madras Records*, No. XXIV, Madras, 1856).

97. Kirmāni says, the disease he suffered from was reported to be "Surtan" and that as soon as Haidar heard of it, "he became certain that his last hour had arrived" (o.c., 470). Col. Miles translates "Surtan" as "a cancer seemingly" (*Ibid.*, f. n.). "Its best remedy was," he adds, "the application of a sheep's liver", and that "stimulating medicines, by dispelling the vapours of the body and cleansing the blood, were the most likely to cure it" (*Ibid.*). Accord-

India", as he has been called, looked different at different periods of his life and on different occasions of his public career as *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore. There are authentic pictures and a few words may appropriately, perhaps, be devoted to them. These pictures and portraits have been, wherever possible, reproduced in these pages, and there is, therefore, the greater reason why something should be said of them here.

There are but four portraits of Haidar Ali known to us. The first of these, which was first given publication to by his grandson Prince Ghulām Muhammad, in his edition of De La Tour's *Ayder Ali*, was engraved by C. Morrish. In the second one, he is shown in his military uniform, as invented by himself—as De La Tour informs us—for his generals. "It is an uniform," he adds,⁹⁸ "composed of a vest of white satin, with gold flowers, faced with yellow, and attached by cords or strings of the same colour: the drawers are of the same materials; and the boots of yellow velvet. He wears a scarf of white silk about his waist; and, with the military habit, his turban is of a red or aurora colour." His turban is a cross-band one and is probably of what is called the *Kottadi* type. In the picture, Haidar looks the rough Afghan he looked generally in the army in his uniform. This is the picture commonly found reproduced in the school and college history books. In the third one, illustrating Admiral De Suffrein's interview with Haidar in 1782, he appears as in his later years. In the first of these

ding to tradition, confirmed by Wilks, Haidar is said to have died of carbuncle (*Rājpora*). Fantastic oral tales are current widely, in the countryside particularly, attributing to the physicians attendant on him of despoiling pregnant women of their tender babes (*in ventra sa mere*) and applying them by way of poultices to the carbuncle to get him cured. The nature of the disease is such and involves such heavy unconsciousness on the part of the patient that Haidar may not have been aware of what was being done for him, even if oral tradition is true in this instance. The stories are too incredible of serious belief.

98. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 28.

three pictures, Haidar is seen comparatively young and it is undoubtedly, in point of time, the earliest. He is seen, in the manner portrayed by De La Tour, in his light fitting costume. De La Tour, writing of his physical appearance, says that "his features are coarse, his nose small and turned up, his lower lip rather thick; and he wears neither beard nor whiskers, contrary to the custom of the Orientals, especially the Mahometans. His habits, like those of all the natives of India, are of white muslin, with a turban of the same. His robe is fashioned nearly the same as those of the European ladies, which are called *à l'Angloise*. The body and sleeves fit neatly, and are drawn close by strings; the rest of the robe being ample, and in folds, so that when the Indian great men walk, a page supports their train, from their first stepping off the carpet to their entering into their carriages"⁹⁹. A little later on, De La Tour adds that Haidar "never wears jewelry either on his turban or his clothes; and never uses either necklace, ear-pendants, or bracelets. His turban is very long, and flat at the top. In this particular, he follows the ancient mode; as well as in his slippers, which are very large, and have a long point turned back, resembling the roofs of the buildings in some countries up the Levant; or those slippers anciently worn in France, and called *Souliers à la poulaine*"¹⁰⁰. This portrait may be taken to represent Haidar as De La Tour saw him and served him. We may approximately date it in 1768, when Haidar was in his 47th year (born in 1722). Haidar, somewhat at variance from De La Tour's description, appears in a Mysorean turban of what is known as *Kottadi* cross-band type, with the dress ornamented and jewelled. The portrait depicting Haidar at his interview with the French Admiral De Suffrein belongs to the

99. *Ibid.*, 22-23.

100. *Ibid.*, 23-24.

year 1782, when Haidar was 59-60 years of age. He is represented in his long flowing robes, flat turban and waist band, etc. He appears advanced in age, being a portrait which belongs to the last year of his life. In this picture, Haidar is seen in the flat head-gear but not so flat as indeed to earn that description. This, however, is the exact flat one referred to by De La Tour in the next picture which depicts Haidar as he sat in "Durbar" i.e., to receive people in audience (from the *European Magazine*). In this portrait, he is shown bare-footed, and in flying long robes, with the *chakri mundas*, rounded flat head-dress with a bracelet on his left wrist. Haidar is represented as clasping the hands of De Suffrein, who is in his military dress with his decorations and equally flowing uniform, and head uncovered, advancing with both hands extended and bending low and leaning forward. Haidar's group of officers are behind him looking on, while the Admirals, officers and others, including the French officer Boudenot, are close behind him. This picture evidently belongs to the hey-day of his life and may be dated in 1780 or so, as he looks vigorous, strong and manly to a degree. We may take this picture as representing him as he normally looked for a good part of the ten-year period preceding his death. He is seen here as resting on a pillow—called *Load*—with his right arm on it, left foot forward and his left arm resting on his left knees, with his fore-finger pointing to the grave complaint he was evidently referring to, probably against the English at Madras. This may probably belong to the period of Schwartz-Gray missions to him.¹⁰¹

101. This Chapter will have shown, it is hoped, the importance of the Persian annalists and De La Tour for a proper understanding of Haidar, the man. It is from De La Tour, indeed, that we learn the various little things that went to make up the character of Haidar or furnish us a first-hand picture of him. Wilks, who was obsessed to

Just before Haidar's death, an embassy from Louis XVI is said to have arrived to evince evidently French interest in Mysore and the regard of the famous French king for Haidar and his friendliness to the French. As he was in his camp then (1782), the embassy could have waited on him as he was moving. French tradition says that a portrait of Louis XVI was presented in his name to Haidar and that Haidar received the same. There is no tradition current in Mysore as to this embassy and there is no portrait of Louis XVI in the collection of pictures—historical and other—known at present in the Jagan Mohan Palace at Mysore. But the embassy referred to may have come out and seen Haidar, especially as we shall see later that Tipū kept up relations with Louis XVI and sent a letter to him through a French officer who waited on him just as he was leaving Travancore.¹⁰²

see the mere adventurer in him (o.c., I. 261), was too prone to identify him with Mysore itself and could not clearly distinguish him from either its sovereign or his subjects. Wilks had the supreme advantage of learning from eye-witnesses of the events he records, and for that very reason missed learning from the historians of the times. The pointed distinction that De La Tour is always at pains to make between the sovereign and his executive head is therefore all the more important for the historian of the times. His narrative, incorrect and even artificial as it is, is one of the many instances of the inestimable value, for historical truth, of even the meanest contemporary record. Oral tradition, always important in history, may also be mentioned in confirmation of this observation. See, in this connection, traditional stories about Haidar in and about Mysore, referred to in *Madras Review*, XI. No. 41 (1905), pp. 151-155, article on *Haidar and the Astrologer* by C. H.

102. See Ch. XII. below.

CHAPTER VIII.

KHĀSA-CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VIII, 1776-1796—

(contd.)

War with Nawab Muhammad Ali (*The Second Mysore War*), 1780-1784 (continued): *Seventh Phase*: December 1782-December 1783; news of Haidar's death kept in secret—An attempted conspiracy to overturn the Government—Tipu joins the army and succeeds Haidar as the *Sarvadhikari* or Regent of Mysore, January 2, 1783—Madras affairs—Change in the political position of Nawab Muhammad Ali and the English: the assignment of the Karnatic revenues, 1781—Lord Macartney's plans foiled—Movements of Mysore and Madras armies, January-February 1783—Movements of the Bombay army, December 1782-March 1783: General Matthews on the West coast, December 1782; reduces Rajahmandrug, Honavar, etc., January 1783; reduction of Cundapore and Haidargarh, January 15-27, 1783—Advance on Bednur; Shaik Ayaz vs. Tipu; Shaik Ayaz surrenders Bednur to General Matthews, January 28-29, 1783; Reduction of Anantapur and Mangalore, February-March 1783—Tipu marches on to Bednur, March 1783—Lays siege to the place, April 1783—Bednur capitulates to Tipu, April-May 1783; Tipu establishes himself there—And advances on Mangalore, May 1783—Lays siege to Mangalore, May 1783—Tipu presses the siege, June-July 1783—His further operations, July-August 1783; agrees to an armistice with the English, August 2, 1783—The situation hardens; Tipu left off by Mons. Cossigny—Tipu continues the siege, August-December 1783; his violation of the armistice; his proposed peace negotiations with the English, August 1783; Tipu throws off the mask and reduces Mangalore to straits, October-December 1783.

WHEN the recovery of Haidar became improbable, the minister Pūrṇaiya had sagaciously planned that his death should be concealed from the army until the arrival of Tipū; and Krishṇa Rao, his official colleague, and other officers (notably Muhammad Ali Commandant, Badr-u-zamān Khān, Maha Mirza Khān, Ghāzi Khān and Abu Muhammad Mirdah) acceded to the adoption of this

War with Nawāb
Muhammad Ali
(The Second
Mysore War),
1780-1784 (contd.)


Seventh Phase:
December 1782-
December 1783.


that this was

News of Haidar's
death kept in sec-
ret.

course. It is a high testimony to the order and discipline of the army and the influence and ability of Pūrṇaiya, successfully carried out. The body of Haidar, deposited in a large chest filled with aromatics, was sent off to Kōlār under escort, as if a case of valuable plunder, with orders to deposit the charge at the tomb of his father there. Successive couriers were at the same time despatched to Tipū, to apprise him of the event, and of the consequent measures, and to recommend his joining with all possible dispatch. The whole of the arrangement of the army, the weekly relief of the 2,000 horse which constantly hung round Madras, the issue of pay, the adjustment of military accounts, the answers to letters received from the envoys of different courts, and all the business of the state, went on as usual. The principal officers of the army and foreign envoys were separately and quietly taken into confidence, and all inquiries were answered to the effect that Haidar was better but weak.¹

1. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 168-169; see also and compare Kirmāni, *Tipū Sultān*, 1-2, referring to the coffin (containing Haidar's body) as having been sent to Seringapatam. The body was at first sent to Kōlār and afterwards removed by Tipū's orders to the superb mausoleum at *Lal-Bāg*, south of Shahar Ganjām, near Seringapatam, specially got built by Haidar during his own life-time (see Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 168, *f.n.*, and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 2).





Karim Shah or Sāhib, younger son of Haidar Ali.

The most trusty chiefs of the army were successively, and without any circumstances to excite suspicion, admitted into Haidar's tent for the purpose of communicating the plan which had been adopted. All on their return to their respective corps made the concerted reports of the state of his health, and all were faithful to their trust, excepting Muhammad Amīn, the son of Ibrāhim Sāhib, and cousin-german to the deceased. This chief, who commanded 4,000 stable horse, formed a project with Shums-ud-dīn (Bakshi) to cut off the persons provisionally exercising the powers of Government, to seize the treasury, and proclaim Abdul Karīm (better known as Karīm Shah or Safdar Shikoh), Haidar's second son, as a pageant who would permit them to exercise the Government in his name. It was necessary for the execution of this design that it should be communicated to certain *risāldārs* (officers commanding battalions), and a French officer named Boudenot, who commanded a troop of 100 French cavalry, attached as an honourable guard to head-quarters, associated himself in their plans. The intelligence of this conspiracy was not long concealed from Pūrṇaiya, who sent for the French officer to Haidar's tent, where being confronted with some of the *risāldārs* who had spontaneously revealed the plot, he confessed the whole design on the previous promise of personal security. Muhammad Amīn and Shums-ud-dīn were then sent for, on pretence of consultation, and finding it in vain to equivocate, confessed the whole plot. The disposal of these persons was managed with corresponding address; they were put in irons, and sent off publicly under a strong guard, as if by Haidar's personal orders, for having entered into a conspiracy to overturn the Government in the expectation of his death.²

2. *Ibid.*, 169-170. See also and compare Kirmānī (o. c., 2-5), who speaks of Karīm Sāhib (the brother of Tipū) as having been temporarily appoin-

A courier on a dromedary, travelling 100 miles a day, conveyed the intelligence to Tipū at Paniani by the afternoon of the 11th December. Next morning, he was in full march eastward, abandoning for the present all operations in Malabar, and ordering Arshed Bēg Khān (who, a short time before Haidar's death, had been sent to assume the government of Malabar) to remain on the defensive at Pālghāt. Dispensing with all ceremony calculated to excite inquiry, he marched forward as rapidly as possible, and after performing the funeral ceremonies at Kōlār, joined the army in a private manner between Ārni and Vellore about the end of the month. Arrived at his father's tent on the 2nd of January 1783, Tipū, now in his thirty-fourth year (born at Dēvanhalli, 1749), made the most ample acknowledgments to all the public officers, and especially to Pūrṇaiya, for their prudent management of affairs during this critical period, and succeeding Haidar as the *Sarvādhikāri* or Regent of Mysore, took peaceable possession of an army of 88,000 men, and a treasury containing three crores of rupees in cash, besides an immense amount of jewels and valuables.³

ted, "by the well affected Khans, to the office of Dewan, as the Naib of his father" till Tipū's formal accession to that office on his arrival in the Karnātic, etc. Kirmāni is evidently glossing over details narrated by Wilks, an earlier authority, who, as usual, writes from direct knowledge on the affairs of the period down to 1793.

3. *Ibid.*, 171-173; *Desp. to Eng.*, XVIII. 64-65: *Despatch* dated January 29, 1783; see also and compare *Memoirs of Late War in Asia*, I. 426; Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Aly and Tippoo Sultan*, 46-47; and Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 5. Kirmāni dates Tipū's accession to power in A. H. 1197, i. e., A. D. 1783, omitting, however, specification of the exact month. The *Despatch*, above cited, refers to no more than Tipū's succeeding to his father's position as the *Sarvādhikāri* or Regent of Mysore, when it records: "Tippoo Saib succeeded to the command of the army and to all the authority of his father without the least opposition" (*Desp. to Eng.*, *o. c.*, 65). So also the contemporary English writer Innes Munro, when he writes: "Without a single opponent, or the least symptom of the commotion usual upon such an occasion," Tipū "was proclaimed Nabob of Misore and Generalissimo of their armies" [*Italics ours*] (Innes



Tipū Sultān.



He next found time to ingratiate himself with the troops by paying off their arrears and taking away the duties on provisions sold in the camp, to conciliate the commanders of forts, farmers and collectors of revenue by

Munro, *Narrative*, 302). Innes Munro, however, refers to the date of this proclamation as the 7th December 1782 (i. e., on the very day of Haidar's death), though Tipū's actual accession to office took place, according to Wilks, on 2nd January 1783. In keeping with this date, the *Memoirs* also speaks of Tipū having taken charge of the army in the Karnātic "twenty-seven days after his father's death" (II. 121), of his assuming only "*the title of Regent*" for the young prince, the legitimate Hindu Sovereign of Mysore (i. e., Khāsā-Chāmarāja Wodeyar) (II. 149), and "anticipated the formation of any hostile faction by the authority of his presence, and an immediate exercise of the powers of government" (I. 426). Kirmāṇi, however, though he is conscious of Tipū's actual succession to his father's "high office of the Dewani" or Regent of Mysore (o. c., 4), yet, with his usual bias, exaggerates the event as Tipū's accession to the "throne of dignity and majesty," "the throne of the Mysore kingdom" etc. (o. c., 5). This is not to be taken as literally correct. The reference here is only to Tipū's accession to power as "the Dewān", "Regent" or "Sarvādhikāri" of Mysore. Even Wilks records that when Tipū on the evening of the 2nd January 1783 gave audience to all the principal officers of his army, he seated himself "on a plain carpet," "declining to ascend the musnud, from an affectation of grief, by which no one was deceived" (Wilks, o. c., II. 172). Wilks too, who lived close to the times of Tipū, makes mention of him, in certain places in his work, as "Prince," "Sovereign," etc. Tipū's constitutional position in Mysore was at first, as we have shown from references cited above, that of a *de facto* authority or power in the State, though he afterwards arrogated to himself the attributes of a *de jure* sovereign, as we shall see later. The transition from the position of a *Sarvādhikāri* or Regent to that of a *Sovereign power* was gradual, and, in Tipū's case, governed by considerations of Islāmic ideals of sovereignty. Wilks is, it may be added, particularly defective in regard to Haidar and Tipū, more especially in regard to the nature of relationship they bore to the ruling sovereign—the *Kartar* of Mysore, as he was distinctly entitled—because their periods were too proximate to his own. While this proximity allowed him to converse fully and closely with many eye-witnesses, it made it impossible for him to benefit from written histories and annals, except narratives written by eye-witnesses of the events known to them culled together by Pūrṇaiya at his instance, or accounts like that of Robson, etc.

As to the date of Tipū's birth, authorities differ. Kirmāṇi dates it November 19, 1749 (*Neshāmi-Hydrī*, 26-29); Stewart roughly places it in or about 1749 (*Memoirs*, 5, 48); Wilks in 1753 (o. c., II. 760); according to Capt. J. A. Kirkpatrick, translating a Persian Ms. written in 1790, it would be 1747 (see *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1799, pp. 1-6), while

issuing *firman*s, and to retain in authority officials of the old regime by securing their goodwill by liberal presents of money and promises of favour⁴.

the *Haid. Nam.* would refer it to 1762 (ff. 21). Kirmānī's date is adopted in this work as the more specific and reliable. As elsewhere pointed out and detailed (see *Ante*, Vol. II. pp. 267-268 of this work), Tipū, who is generally referred to by contemporary European writers as "Tippoo Saib", was actually named "Tipū", after the Muslim Saint of Arcot, Tipū Mastān Āulia. The affix "Sultān" cannot thus be taken as part and parcel of a proper name. Tipū was the eldest son of Haidar by his second wife, who was the sister of Mir Ali Razā Khān of Gurramkouḍa (*Ibid.*). The statement of the *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* (I. 426) that "Tippoo, though the first born of Hyder, was the son of a concubine", is thus incorrect. In the pedigree of the Nāwabs of Mysore, as he calls them, Mr. L. Bowring shows against Haidar Ali the following entry: "married 1. Fakhr-un-nissā, daughter of Moin-ud-dīn, 2. Daughter of Makdum Sāhib." And he sets down two sons to him, without mentioning to which of the two they were born (see Lewin Bowring, *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*, p. 10, Pedigree Table printed with *Frontispiece*). At p. 117, he states that Tipū's mother was Fakhr-un-nissā and adds that "she was a daughter of Mir Moin-ud-dīn, for some years Governor of Kadapa" (*Ibid.*). At p. 225, while writing of Kumr-ud-dīn Ali Khān, who was sometimes placed at the head of a body of troops by Tipū, during his time, he speaks of him as the son of Ali Razā and a cousin of Tipū and that Haidar had married a sister of Ali Razā. This is no doubt in keeping with the authority of the *Haidar-Namah* cited above, but in the light of the latter work the sister of Mir Ali Razā was the *second*, and the daughter of Mokhdum Sāhib the *first*, wife of Haidar. Mr. Bowring has to be corrected accordingly.

We have no clear numismatic evidence in support of Tipū's accession to office in January 1783. Capt. Edward Moor speaks of a gold *Mohar* of 1791 referring to the "joy diffusing year of his accession" (*Narrative*, 469-470, App. fig. 4, Plate I). Col. W. Kirkpatrick, noticing the figure of a double silver rupee (*Ibid.*, 468-469, fig. 3) repeating the inscription on the *Mohar*, would approximately place the "*Juloos* or enthronement" of Tipū on the 10th May 1783, "more than five months subsequent to the death of Haidar" (*Select Letters*, 99). Tipū's great Seal of State, the earliest of his numismatic records, merely refers to his accession subsequent to his father's death in December 1782 (see Moor's *Narrative*, 466-468, App. fig. 2, Plate I; also Dirom's *Narrative*, Plate IX, facing p. 286). His next coin, the double silver rupee, above referred to, belongs to A. H. 1199 or A. D. 1784. From this year onwards, we have a regular series of his coins. It would seem that although Tipū's formal accession to power took place early in January 1783, as mentioned above, he consolidated his position only on his return to Seringapatam after the *Treaty of Mangalore* (March 11, 1784).

4. *Desp. to Eng.*, XVIII. 65; *Memoirs*, l.c.; and Kirmānī, o.c., 6.

By about this time, a change had come over the East India Company in India. From a trading corporation, it was steadily, though only unsuspectingly, becoming a sovereign power in India. Their Governors and Agents at Madras were still full of the trading instinct and were not conscious of the change that was nearly transforming the Company's position in the country. A masterful Governor-General was, however, acutely aware of what was occurring and directing the affairs of the three Presidencies in a co-ordinated manner, superseding Governors if necessary and acting as the Chief Executive for the Company's affairs in the East Indies. When Lord Pigot, second time Governor of Madras, was placed under arrest, on 24th August 1776, by order of George Stratton and the majority of the Madras Council, and died subsequently at Madras on 20th May 1777, George Stratton, as the Senior Member of the Madras Council, assumed office, on 23rd August 1776, but was suspended from service, within a year of office, on 31st August 1777, for his part in the revolution he effected. He was followed, on the same date, by John Whitehill as acting Governor, and he made over charge on 8th February 1778, within less than six months, to Thomas Rumbold (later Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet). He resigned office and made over charge and embarked for England on 6th April 1780. He was Governor during the period that Haidar was preparing for his war of 1780-1782. He sent out Rev. Schwartz as envoy and tried to secure the continuance of peace. He is even represented to have secretly arranged, it has been suggested, for the deposition of Haidar by means of an internal revolution in Mysore itself. That he resigned within about two years of assumption of office seems to indicate closer knowledge of what was coming and the peculiarly corrupt atmosphere that was prevailing in Madras at the time.

The fact that the Court of Directors passed an order of dismissal against him after he resigned voluntarily and left for England shows that he had studied the situation and was prepared against it. The further fact that the Court had to withdraw its order and that Parliamentary proceedings against him had eventually to be withdrawn would seem to indicate that he had been more sinned against than a proved sinner by himself. After Rumbold left Madras, John Whitehill, then Senior Member of Council, became once again Governor, assuming charge of office on April 6, 1780. But he was suspended by Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, and his Council, for alleged disobedience in the matter of the Guntur question. He made over office on 8th November 1780, just after seven months' office. Charles Smith, then senior Member of Council, succeeded him, taking over charge on the day the order against Whitehill took effect. He was acting Governor for about seven months, till 22nd June 1781, when he embarked for England, making over charge to Lord Macartney, who arrived at Madras on that day, being appointed Governor of Madras. With him Madras began a new career as it were, as he set a high example in private and public morality and a vigorous rule of action as the Chief Executive head. He was jealous of his position and status and asserted his rights even as against the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, who had, under the Regulations then in force, power even to supersede and suspend provincial Governors. The fact that Madras had had a succession of five short-lived Governors within less than a period of five years beginning from 24th August 1776 (between the arrest of Lord Pigot by Stratton and his Council and the succession to office of Lord Macartney on 22nd June 1781), a period too marked by incessant activity on the part of Haidar Ali, indicates the vicissitudes of both the Government and



Nawāb Muhammad Ali Wālajah—Another view.

the people of Madras. The politics of the time was heavily charged with venality, and meant personal adventure and overreaching on the part of public servants, both civil and military, in Madras and Bengal, with Muhammad Ali, the Nawāb, whose impecuosity was only matched by his capacity for influencing the very highest in the land in his favour, whoever they may be. The main point to note is that up to the advent of Lord Macartney, the position of Nawāb Muhammad Ali was not understood and if understood by some of the Council, they found it convenient to use him for their own benefit. Almost every one in the services desired to figure as his creditor and what this exactly meant can be only understood when we realize the huge debt accumulating in his name. Against his tactics, Lord Macartney proved a perfect proof. He was both unapproachable and irreproachable.

By now a perceptible change had been brought about in the political position of Nawāb Muhammad Ali and his allies, the English. As a consequence of Haidar's invasion of the Karnātic, the Madras Government were forced to apply to the Nawāb for an assignment of his revenues to meet the cost of the war, for after all it was his country—as he himself claimed—that they had been called upon to defend. The Nawāb at first made a number of excuses, and then, reflecting on the frequent changes in the composition and policy of the Madras Government,

Change in the political position of Nawāb Muhammad Ali and the English.

The assignment of the Karnātic revenues, 1781.

decided to approach Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, direct, in order to make a permanent arrangement with him. He sent his *Dewan* Saiyid Khwāja Hashim (Asim) Khān, along with Richard Joseph Sullivan, a Madras civil servant, who acted in the

capacity of the Nawāb's representative, without the authority of the Madras Council, offering the assignment of the whole of his revenues to the English East India Company during the continuance of the war, reserving one-sixth only for his own expenses. In return, he was to be recognised as the legitimate hereditary sovereign of the Karnātic, possessed of full authority over his dominions, his family and his servants. An agreement was accordingly concluded between the Supreme Government and the Nawāb on the 2nd April 1781 and notified by the Governor-General to the Council at Madras. Under it Mr. Sullivan was appointed to reside at the court of the Nawāb as the agent of the Governor-General. When this intimation arrived, Lord Macartney had assumed charge as Governor of Madras and he did not like that the Nawāb should have direct dealings with the Bengal Government and tried to cancel this arrangement, in a representation made on 8th September 1781. The Nawāb, on the other hand, was equally anxious to retain this status. The representations of Lord Macartney were successful in so far as Mr. Sullivan was directed to advise the Nawāb to come to an understanding with the Governor. The dispute was settled for the time being. By an agreement dated the 2nd December 1781, the Nawāb accordingly assigned all his revenues (except one-sixth part reserved for his personal expenditure) to the Company for a period of five years. The Governor was given full control of the collection and administration of revenue. By virtue of this agreement, Nawāb Muhammad Ali remained practically the titular sovereign of the Karnātic, while power was completely transferred into the hands of his English allies. Lord Macartney openly assumed the Nawāb's authority and conducted all affairs as if the English were the *principal factors* in the situation, to the bitter

resentment of the Nawāb. At the same time, Lord Macartney arranged for the administration of the revenue of the surrendered country by a carefully selected Board of Commissioners.⁵

It was part of the policy and plan of Lord Macartney to prevent the easy return of Tipū to the Karnātic and effectuate his defeat before he joined his main army. That the health of Haidar had been for some time on the decline was well known at Madras. That Haidar's increasing indisposition induced Tipū to deem his presence absolutely necessary in the Karnātic at a period so critical and big with his future fate was also equally well known. It had been Haidar's ardent desire for some time before his death—a desire communicated later to Tipū by Pūrṇaiya and Krishna Rao—that Tipū should not bring disgrace

5. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, VI. *Introdn.*, pp. xiv-xv, and *Letter* Nos. 450, 543, 631, etc.; see also Wilks, who refers to Sir Eyre Coote's animadversions on "the duplicity and iniquity of the Nabob Mahomed Ali's Government," to the Governor-General's strongly impressing on Lord Macartney "the necessity of assuming the direct management of what remained of this misgoverned country," and to Muhammad Ali's skilfully anticipating the event about the close of the year (1781), "by most graciously assigning a country, which if assumed on undisguised grounds, might not have been so easily restored by the baneful influence so often deplored" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 94-95, with *f.n.l.* on pp. 95-96, where Sir Murray Hammick also notices at some length the Nawāb's assignment of the Karnātic revenues). See Mill, *History*, Book V, 512-516, and Barrow, *Life of the Earl of Macartney*, Appendix, where the full correspondence will be found printed. Regarding Lord Macartney, see further in Ch. IX below.

As to Richard Joseph Sullivan, referred to in the text above, he entered the Madras Service as writer in 1770, became a Factor in 1776, when he returned home and while still there, was promoted, in 1778, Junior Merchant. He was appointed Senior Merchant in 1782, when he became the intimate friend of Nawāb Muhammad Ali, which enabled him to serve under and for him in his negotiations with Hastings. Princep in his *Record of Services of Madras Civil Servants* (1885), states that there is no trace of him in the E. I. Company's records after 1782. That is accounted for by our noting that he was on duty with the Nawāb Muhammad Ali from about 1782. Contemporaneously with two other Sullivans served in the Madras service, evidently his brothers. These were John Sullivan (1765-1783) and Stephen Sullivan (1778-1788). See Princep, *o.c.*, 137-138.

upon his name, nor place too much reliance on assistance from the French, but that he should effect, on whatever terms he could, a peace with the English and return with his army to Seringapatam and establish himself in the Government.⁶ Haidar also, in view of his illness, had made some overtures of peace to the English at Madras with seeming sincerity as he then seriously anticipated his own dissolution, in consequence of which he was apprehensive of some fatal commotions.⁷ What transpired actually in Haidar's camp confirmed the truth of his apprehensions and the news that had filtered down to Madras. The anxiety, therefore, of Lord Macartney to prevent Tipū's return to the Karnātic was both natural and real. As soon as the death of Haidar became known, he urged Major-General Stuart, who had lately succeeded Sir Eyre Coote in the post of Commander-in-chief, to take the field before Tipū could return from the West coast, but the General at first professed his disbelief in the report and afterwards threw other difficulties in the way, so that Tipū was enabled to join his army, as above stated, about the end of December 1782, before the English troops had moved from the Mount.⁸ The first important act of Tipū's Government was a proposal of peace to Lord Macartney, on terms that were rejected by his Lordship without submitting them to his Council.⁹ No sooner, therefore, had Tipū found himself at the head of the army than he dropped the negotiation, and gave every assurance to the French of his fidelity and attachment to them, and of his fixed determination to prosecute a vigorous war against the English.¹⁰

6. *Desp. to Eng.*, XVIII. 66-67: *Despatch* dated January 29, 1783; also *Mily. Cons.*, LXXV. 8-4, *Consultation* dated December 29, 1782.

7. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 302-303.

8. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 174-175.

9. *Memoirs*, I. 427.

10. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 303.

Accordingly Tipū marched on with the army towards Kāvēripak.¹¹ The rains having soon abated in the Karnātic, Tipū encamped his forces upon the plains of Ārṇi, where he was joined by about one thousand French auxiliaries from Cuddalore towards the close of January.¹² On the 15th of the month, the English army also, from St. Thomas' Mount, under Major-General Stuart, made its first march for the purpose of advancing provisions to its first intermediate depot at Tripasore, not far away from Tiruvallūr, about 25 miles off Madras, and from thence moved, on the 4th of February, for the reduction of Wandiwash and Carangooly, reaching the latter place on the 6th. The walls of Wandiwash were next blown up and on the 13th, the English troops advanced to Nidingul, on the banks of the Pālār river, where the united forces of the Mysoreans and the French had encamped, awaiting with sanguine prospects the arrival of Mons. Bussy to decide on the plan of the campaign. General Stuart offered them battle, which they declined to accept, although Tipū, having formed his right and left wings and the main body (the reserve) of his army, and posting his artillery in front, held himself in readiness for action. After menacing each other for a whole day by a mutual exchange of some random shot across the stream, General Stuart gave orders for the line to lie that night upon their arms in the same order of battle in which it had been drawn up; but they all retraced their steps early next morning to Wandiwash, closely pursued by vast numbers of the Mysorean horse and rocketmen. From Wandiwash the English army retired to Carangooly, which was likewise demolished, and on the 23rd

11. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 7.

12. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 306. Kīrmāṇi, a later writer, refers to the number of French troops as "two thousand" (*i.e.*).

cantoned at Poonamallee, while Tipū encamped at Turvatoor.¹³

Meanwhile, since the conclusion of peace with the Mahrattas (*The Treaty of Salbai*, May 17, 1782), the Government of Bombay, by way of exerting in favour of the English at Madras, were engaged in planning a diversion on the West coast of Mysore, with a view to draw Haidar from his offensive operations in the Coromandel to the defence of Mysore proper, and alarm him with the threat of relinquishing to the Mahrattas that country which they were known to covet. The intelligence received at Bombay of the rapid retreat of Col. Humberston to Paniani and the presence of Tipū in full force before that place (in November 1782) determined that Government to send their provincial Commander-in-chief Brigadier-General Matthews for its relief, with about four hundred European infantry and artillery and twelve hundred sepoys, and to reinforce him as speedily as possible with other troops for the general purposes of the service.¹⁴ In his progress down the coast, the General, being apprized at Goa of the circumstances which had lately removed the danger from Paniani, resolved on making a landing at Rājahmandrug, in north Kanara, commanding the entrance into the commodious estuary and navigable river of Mirjee, reputed to afford the best access to Bednūr, and when connected with the possession of the fort and river of Honāvar (Onore), a few miles to the southward, and the fertile territory between those rivers, to furnish not only security to his rear, but also an abundant supply of

13. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 177-179; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 74; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 306-308; see also and compare *Memoirs*, *l.c.*; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 7-8.

14. *Ibid.*, 179, 200, 208; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 309.

provisions for the future necessities of the army. Early

in January 1783, Rajahmandrug was
Reduces Rajah-
mandrug, Honāvar,
etc., January 1783. carried by assault, and almost by
 surprize, with little loss; and the ships

were immediately despatched to Col. Macleod, at
 Paniani, with orders to transport his force to Rajahman-
 drug. Honāvar soon fell, with all its dependent posts, and
 Col. Macleod, who had arrived, was preparing for the
 capture of Mirjee, higher up the river, which would have
 completed the first part of the plan for the safe ascent of
 Bednūr by the passes of Bilgi. In the meantime, the Gov-
 ernment of Bombay, having received intelligence of the
 death of Haidar, had sent on the 31st of December 1782
 positive orders to General Matthews, that if the intelligence
 were confirmed, he was "to relinquish all operations
 whatever upon the sea-coast, and make an immediate push
 to take possession of Bednore". On the 12th of January,
 General Matthews, declaring his deliberate conviction that
 the operations in which these orders found him engaged,
 of securing by a strong occupation of the country in his
 rear, a secure and easily defensible communication with
 the sea-coast, constituted the only safe plan for the inva-
 sion of Bednūr, instantly countermanded the operations
 which were destined to lead him thither by the longer
 route of Bilgi. Accordingly about the

Reduction of
Cundapore and
Haidargarh, January
15-27, 1783.

15th of the month he landed at
 Cundapore, the point of the coast nearest
 to Bednūr, and carried the place,
 experiencing considerable resistance from a field force of
 500 horse and 2500 infantry, a part of the reinforcements
 which had been detached by Haidar from the Coromandel
 for the protection of the western parts of Mysore. On the
 17th, Col. Macleod with the 42nd regiment from Paniani
 effected a junction with him. Ascending the ghāts to a
 distance of 25 miles, opposed by increasing numbers of
 the light skirmishing and the incessant annoyance of

rockets of the Mysoreans, the General was, on the 24th, before Hosangadi, a well-built barrier with two flanks, but entirely open in the rear. Preparations were made for attacking the place on the 25th, but although furnished with 15 pieces of excellent cannon, it was found abandoned. On the 26th, General Matthews, proceeding further, took the extensive fort of Haidargarh, on the top of the ghât, losing about fifty killed and wounded.¹⁵

The fort and town of Bednür (Haidarnagar) was still 14 miles distant.¹⁶ Here, about this Advance on Bednür. time, commotions of an alarming nature had been stirred up by some discontented chiefs of Mysore, and particularly by Shaik Ayâz, the Chêla and adopted son of Haidar, formerly appointed to the Government of Chitaldrug (in 1779) and now Governor of the Bednür country. Shaik Ayâz, on the death of Haidar and the accession to power of Tipû, obstinately refused to swear allegiance to the latter, urging as a reason for his conduct that Tipû had done him injustice in the distribution of his conquests.¹⁷ Also Shaik Ayâz, while a youth, had rendered himself unacceptable to Tipû by the independence of his character, and had, in consequence, been treated by him with gross and repeated indignity. In mature age, Haidar's extravagant praises of his valour and intellect, and the habit of publicly contrasting the qualities of his slave with those of his son, perpetually embittered all the feelings of former enmity, and rendered the death of Haidar a

15. *Ibid.*, 200-203; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 310-311; see also and compare *Memoirs*, I. 475-477; and Robson, *o.c.*, 155-156. Innes Munro refers to Râjahmandrug as "Rajamundray."

16. *Ibid.*, 203-204.

17. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 309-310. Innes Munro spells the name of Shaik Ayâz as "Hayet Sahib"; the *Memoirs* as "Hyat Sahib" (I. 478); Wilks as "Sheik Ayâz" (*o.c.*, II. 205); and Kirmâni as "Iyaz Khan" (*o.c.*, 8). As to further details about this personage, see *Ante*, p. 297, f. n. 53.

crisis which Ayāz must necessarily have contemplated with alarm. Immediately after Tipū's junction with his army, after his father's death, he detached Latif Alī Bēg, with a light corps of cavalry, by the shortest route, to supersede Woffadar at Coorg; and after making the requisite arrangements in that quarter, to assume the government of Bednūr, with a larger and heavier corps detached about the same time by the ordinary road. He had, however, considerable doubts whether the fears and ambition of Ayāz might not induce him to resist, and had accordingly sent orders to the officer next in authority to put him to death and assume the government. Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Ayāz at this period, it is certain that apprehensions of treachery were mixed with all his deliberations. He had taken the precaution of ordering that no letter of any description from the eastward should be delivered without examination; and being entirely illiterate, this scrutiny always took place, with no other person present than the reader and himself, either in a private chamber, or if abroad, retired from hearing and observation in the woods. About the 24th of January—just before General Matthews' attack on the ghāts—while Ayāz was occupied near Haidargarh in giving directions regarding their defence, the fatal letter arrived, and was inspected with the usual precautions. Without a moment's hesitation, the unfortunate Brāhmin who read it, and to whom the letter was addressed as second in command, was instantly put to death to prevent discovery. Then Shaik Ayāz put the letter in his pocket, and returning to his attendants, mounted, and went off at speed to Bednūr, before which place General Matthews, advancing from Haidargarh, stood on the 28th of the month. Apprehensive of his own safety, and abandoning his charge, Ayāz retired into the fort with no more than 1,350 men, of whom 350 were English sepoys taken in

the Coromandel, who had enlisted in the service of Haidar, Captain Donald Campbell, a prisoner in irons, who was released on the preceding day, was sent to General Matthews to propose terms, which were to deliver the fort and country, and to remain under the English as he was under the Nawāb (Haidar). To

Shaik Ayāz surrenders Bednūr to General Matthews, January 28-29, 1783.

these conditions, General Matthews immediately assented. On the 29th morning the General moved forward, and Shaik Ayāz opened the gates of Bednūr to the conqueror without firing a single shot, although it mounted upwards of seventy guns and contained an immense store of riches. General Matthews was received without hesitation into the fort, and to the acknowledged command of the capital and territory of Bednūr, without farther treaty or capitulation. Ayāz, however, stipulated that his own private property should be secured, that he should be continued by the English in his former station and dignity, that he would surrender all public monies and property to the captors, and would give instant orders for all the dependencies of Bednūr to open their gates to the English troops. These terms being accepted, the English General took possession of the city. Proceeding further, he assaulted and carried after a practicable breach the fort of Anantapur (the modern Ānandāpur in Shimoga district)

Reduction of Anantapur and Mangalore, February-March 1783.

on the 14th of February. Mangalore, commanded by Tipū's general Rustum Alī Bēg, was next attacked and surrendered by capitulation on the 9th of March, and General Matthews returned to Bednūr leaving Major Campbell to the command at Mangalore, at just the time when he was practically in possession of the whole country westward of the range of mountains from Sadāśivagarh to Mangalore, with Bednūr, Anantapur and the fort of Kavaledurg (15 miles east from Bednūr) and their

dependencies beyond the passes, while a detached body was seeking to obtain possession of the distant province of Sunda.¹⁸

Thus far Latif Alī Bēg, who had been sent towards Bednūr in January, had achieved nothing. Since his arrival at Shimoga, he was arranging for the capture of Anantapur (reduced by General Matthews in February), when he received orders from Tipū to proceed with all expedition by the pass of Subrahmanya, to prevent if possible the fall of Mangalore. But before he could arrive, the place had, as we have seen, surrendered by capitulation.¹⁹ Alarmed by developments in this quarter, Tipū, heedless of the entreaties of the French, resolved to crush the revolt of Shaik Ayāz, check the progress of General Matthews, recover the valuable possessions of Mysore in the Bednūr country and restore his authority there. Arcot and all the other forts he had garrisoned in the Karnātic were destroyed; the defence and security of the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt was entrusted to regiments commanded by Saiyid Sāhib (Mīr Moin-ud-dīn), the Sipāhsalār, who was ordered to attend the French at Cuddalore with 2000 horse; and Tipū himself, with 12,000 horse and foot, a large train of artillery and a corps of 600 Europeans under Mons. Cossigny (1,000 Europeans, according to one source), marched through the Changama Pass. Taking the route of Dēvanhalli, Maddagiri, Sīra and Chitaldrug, he arrived within forty-five miles of Bednūr towards the close of March.²⁰

18. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 204-206, 208-209; see also and compare Innes Munro *o.c.*, 311-313; Robson, *l.c.*; *Memoirs*, I. 478-479; and Kirmāṇi, *l.c.*

19. *Ibid.*, 206-208.

20. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 312-313; *Memoirs*, I-427 (referring to Saiyid Sāhib as "Sid Saib"); Robson, *o.c.*, 156-157; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 10-11. Kirmāṇi places this and other events of 1788 in 1782 (A.H. 1197).

On receipt of this intelligence, Shaik Ayāz took to flight, embarking for Bombay.²¹ On the 7th of April, Tipū, approaching Bednūr, divided the army into two columns, one of which took the southern route of Kavaledurg and Haidargarh, which fell without opposition, and cut off all communication with the coast. The other column, proceeding by the most direct north-eastern road and leaving a force to retake Anantapur, completely invested Bednūr. The English troops were found in possession of the extensive lines surrounding Bednūr, and after some skirmishing to ascertain the most vulnerable points, a disposition was made on the 9th for a general assault and escalade in several columns. Tipū started cannonading, and General Matthews, reinforced by a detachment under Captain Fetherston early in the action, directed the English army to retreat under the walls of the fort. On the third day, the English force, having sustained considerable loss in men and powder and grain, and set ablaze the Rāja's palace and other public buildings, kept up a steady fire against the besiegers. On the fourth day, Tipū's French officers erected batteries close to the fort and its commandant made a show of surrendering. The streets and houses of Bednūr were soon full of Mysore troops and there was heavy and incessant firing on either side. On the fifth day, the English garrison, rushing from a concealed place, attacked Tipū's intrenchments. The Mysoreans, being on their guard, repulsed them at the point of the sword and bayonet. Captain Fetherston was killed in the action and the English army fled in confusion to the fort, leaving their wounded behind. Thereafter, Tipū pushed on his approaches before the gate of the fort, keeping a heavy fire of musketry. The English detach-

Lays siege to the place, April 1783.

21. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 211; Kīrmāpi, *o.c.*, 8.

ment made altogether three sallies in considerable force but were repulsed each time with great loss and compelled to retire to the citadel. General Matthews, who with inadequate numbers of troops had thus far defended Bednūr with every energy, spirit and bravery, found further resistance unavailing, for the place had become a heap of ruins. The General, on the surrender of forts on the Malabar coast in the early part of the year, instead of destroying them immediately, had imprudently dispersed a greater part of his army for the defence of them, "without ever anticipating the least bad consequence from such a hazardous measure." What little garrison he had with him in Bednūr was in great distress, due to scarcity of water, provisions and ammunition, and there was no hope of succour and still less of effecting a retreat to the coast before the numerous and well provided army of Mysore, already in possession of all the passes and the country around them. Also, General Matthews, about this time, on allegations from his fellow officers of unfair distribution of plunder and money—taken at Bednūr and other places—among the military, had been superseded by the Government of Bombay, and Col. Macleod, advanced to the rank of Brigadier-General, had been appointed to succeed him in the command of the English army. Under these circumstances, General Matthews, towards the close of April, in conformity to the opinion of a council of war, sent out a flag of truce to Tipū, proposing to capitulate.²²

22. *Ibid.*, 211-212; *Memoirs*, I. 480-481, 485-487, II. 240 (App-B); Innes Munro, o.c., 313-315; Robson, o.c., 156-158; Kirmāni, o.c., 14-15; and *Tārīkh-Khodādādy*, quoted in extract in Col. W. Kirkpatrick's *Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan*, App. B. iv-vi; see also and compare, on this section, Stewart, o.c., 47-48. The work *Tārīkh-Khodādādy*, i.e., the *Khodādādy Annals* or *History of the Khodādād Sarkār*, referred to here, is the same as *Sultān-u-Towareekh* or the *King of Histories*, dictated by Tipū Sultān and composed by Zain-ul-abidin Shoostry (see Kirkpatrick, o.c., *Preface* XVIII; also Wicks, o.c., I.

The draft of the terms sent to Tipū consisted of seven articles, providing for permission for the English to evacuate Bednūr honourably; security of private property after piling their arms upon the glacis; surrender of public property (including goods, money or cattle) belonging to the *Sarkār*; grant of a safeguard to the sea-side; lending of ships of the *Sarkār* (for conveying the Englishmen home), furnished with grain and other articles of provision to be paid for at a fixed price on reaching their destination; permission to despatch by land to Bombay under an escort those who might not consent to embark on board the ship; and retention of two *Sardārs* of the *Sarkār* with the English, and *vice-versa*, as hostages, until the embarkation of the English. Tipū, in view of the short interval which remained for the recovery of Mangalore before the rains, having acceded to these proposals, caused two treaties, one in Persian and other in English, to be drawn up, offering his own terms, namely, that the forts of Bednūr, Anantapur and Kavaledurg, with all the arms, ammunition, stores and *Sarkār* property, should be delivered to him; and that the English should go to Bombay by way of Goa, they being furnished with *doolies* and everything necessary for their conveyance. At last, early in May, General Matthews, accepting

Preface XXX). Wilks, however, does not seem to attach sufficient importance to this work, evidently in view of "the most inflated exaggeration of his (Tipū's) own exploits and affected contempt of his enemy," etc. (Wilks., *o.c.*, II. 212). The work is utilized here, making due allowance for these and other limitations. The English are referred to throughout the text as "*Nazarenes*". The *Tārīkh* (*o.c.*, vi) places the capitulation of Bednūr on the 11th day from the siege. Robson (*o.c.*, 156) and Kirmānī (*o.c.*, 15) are agreed that it took place on the 18th day, Robson specifically dating it 27th April 1783. Stewart also writes that the event came off "after seventeen days' hopeless defence" (Stewart, *o.c.*, 48). The *Memoirs of Late War in Asia* (II. 240) assigns to the siege a period of seventeen days, referring to a cessation of arms on the 24th of April and General Matthews having come to a resolution of capitulating on the 26th of the month.

these terms as being advantageous in his situation, marched out with the garrison to the encampment outside the city. Here the troops laid down their arms but on the very next day found themselves surrounded by Tipū's army. General Matthews, the field-officers and captains were sent for and, on the pretext that they had forfeited their claim to be set at liberty by a breach of the articles of capitulation in embezzling and secreting the property of *Sarkār*, were searched and stripped of everything and with the rest of the garrison marched off in irons to different destinations in the country (*i.e.*, Seringapatam, Chitaldrug, Kabbāldrug, Gooty, Bangalore and other places). Then Tipū took possession of Bednūr, where, for the first time since

his accession, he gave public audience
 Tipū establishes himself there. seated on a *musnad* and ordered a salute to be fired for this his first

victory. After putting the troops in order and settling the country affairs, he marched on to the Malabar coast, to reduce the places garrisoned by the English and recover Mangalore, from where a body of English troops under the command of Major, now Colonel Campbell, was advancing to the relief of Bednūr with supplies of all kinds.²³

Previously to the surrender of Bednūr, Tipū had despatched his *paigah* horse with the
 And advances on Mangalore, May 1783. Kuzzaks and Sillāhdārs, who were to attack this force and appear before Mangalore with the intelligence of that event, in the hope of

23. *Ibid*, 218; *Memoirs*, I. 487-490, II. 240-250; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 315; Robson, *o.c.*, 159-160; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 15-16; and *Tārīkh*, *o.c.*, vi-ix; see also and compare Stewart, *o.c.*, 48-49. Robson dates the surrender of General Matthews, April 28, 1783, immediately after Tipū offered his own terms to the English (*i.e.*, on the 27th *idem*). And so does Stewart, probably following him. The narrative appended to the *Memoirs of Late War in Asia* (II. 242) also follows the same date, while in another place in this work the event is dated 2nd May (I. 487). Innes Munro places the event on the 2nd May and

rendering his own approach unnecessary. This corps, however, was attacked and defeated with the loss of its guns; in consequence of which Tipū, on the 6th of May, proceeded thither with his whole army, in the expectation that the appearance of such an overwhelming force would terrify the English garrison into an early surrender. Tipū, accompanied by a select few and his body-guard, made desultory charges and attacks on the main body. Col. Campbell, however, steadily kept the ground until his ammunition having failed, he sustained a severe defeat with great loss in his ranks. Tipū, after some reverses on his side early in the action, took possession of the stores and equipment of the English army, and, marching on, appeared before Mangalore by the 19th of the month, at the head of 60,000 horse, 30,000 disciplined sepoy, 600 French infantry under the command of Col. Cossigny and Mons. Lally's corps, composed of Europeans and Indians, many thousands of irregulars and nearly 100 pieces of artillery, the whole of the army amounting to 1,40,000 fighting men. The front of the encampment extended from right to left three miles; and parties were stationed upon and behind the adjacent hills. They were commanded by Tipū in person, accompanied by his brother Karīm Sāhib and Muhammad Alī Khān, one of Haidar's most trusted commanders and confidential friends. Mangalore being the principal sea-port of Mysore, its recovery became Tipū's foremost objective. Accordingly, he began operations by a vigorous siege, breaking his ground on the north side of the fort and taking the *Pettah* or suburb of the fort at the first assault.²⁴

Wilks on the 3rd. An interval of a few days must be allowed between Tipū's offer of terms and the eventual surrender of the English garrison.

24. *Ibid.*, 214; *Memoirs*, I. 491-495; Robson. o. c., 160; Kirmānī, o. c., 16-18; and *Tarikh*, o. c., ix; see also and compare Stewart, o. c., 49. Of the topography of Mangalore about this time, we have the following account

An outpost on an eminence commanding the principal access to the place, distant upwards of a mile, and although of some strength, requiring two battalions for its occupation, continued to be maintained three days after the place had been invested, and after positions had been taken which enabled Tipū to intercept the retreat of the troops. The consequences of this first and only error were perceived on the morning of the 23rd, when a sudden and simultaneous attack commenced of several heavy columns of infantry supported by batteries previously prepared, and the discharge of an incessant shower of rockets: the sepoy appointed for the defence of the post broke in spite of the efforts of their officers, and were driven in the utmost disorder down the hill; a reinforcement consisting of the 42nd, supported by a sepoy corps, was too late for the defence of the post, but arrested for a moment the progress of the Mysoreans, and afforded time for the fugitives to escape; but the panic soon extended to the sepoys of the reinforcement also, and even the veteran 42nd did not altogether escape its influence. The casualties of this day amounted to four officers, ten Europeans and two

in the *Memoirs of Late War* (I. 492-493): "Mangalore is the chief place of strength, and commands the best harbour in Canara. It is situated in the thirteenth degree of north latitude, at the conflux of rivers, which disembogue themselves into the sea under the muzzles of its guns, at which place it is about half a mile wide, and within the bar forms a spacious harbour for ships of 500 tons. The fort is nearly square, and is built of stone. It has three towers, with very thin and weak battlements, and artillery is mounted on each of its sides, which face the four cardinal points. On the west side, next the sea, there is an oblong addition to the fort, on very low ground, reaching the whole length of that side, with four circular turrets and guns. The fort of Mangalore has a pretty good ditch, except to the eastward, where about sixty feet of the rock was not cut through; and round the covered way there are eight towers, with artillery mounted on each of them. The ditch is not wet towards the north-east and south-east quarters; and in summer even the western part of the ditch becomes very dry....."

hundred Indian soldiers, including three officers and two companies of sepoy, whose retreat was entirely cut off. All outposts not under the complete cover of the body of the place were in consequence withdrawn, and all the arrangements necessary for a long siege adopted. Tipū did not permit himself to doubt that the impressions arising from this first success would produce an immediate surrender; he had, however, the mortification to find opposed to him a commander who viewed his mighty hosts with the most perfect composure, and considered the driving in of his outposts, however early and unfortunate in its circumstances, an event in the ordinary course of the service. He dismissed, without condescending to give an answer, the flag of truce bearing a summons for the immediate surrender of the place, as he valued his life; and Tipū, perceiving a regular siege to be indispensable and the thunderstorms preceding the monsoon to have already commenced, thought proper to send above the ghāts and beyond the influence of its greatest severity, the whole of his stable horse; they were, however, overtaken at the bottom of the ghāt by its full violence, and not more than half the horses survived, to reach their eastern cantonments.²⁵

Nevertheless Tipū, with all his virulent energy regulated by the professional science
Tipū presses the siege, June-July 1788. and experience of Mons. Cossigny, pressed on the siege of Mangalore, opening the trenches, carrying the approaches, erecting batteries well supplied with cannons and manned with French gunners, and keeping up a continual fire of guns, musketry and rockets from the north-east and the south. Three regular attacks embraced the faces of the fort, accessible by land. The excessive violence of the monsoon was unfavourable to rapid

25. *Ibid.*, 214-215.

progress; a proportion of the faces attacked, rather exhibited masses of continuous ruin; mortars for projecting stones attached to plugs prepared for the purpose produced constant annoyance and numerous casualties throughout the night. As operations advanced, a great extent of lodgment on the crest of the glacis and of covered sap for filling the ditch, brought the assailants and defendants into incessant contact, and attempts to penetrate by assault were repeated and repelled in every quarter, until they became almost an affair of daily routine. Meantime, some English ships were siezed and the passage to supplies by sea blocked up. On the evening of the 4th June, the whole north face of the fort with its towers was entirely dismantled. A few days after, a practicable breach was effected in the wall. Col. Campbell with the 42nd regiment of Highlanders and several battalions of sepoys put up a gallant defence. In vain did they repel with the bayonet the repeated attacks on batteries constructed on commanding ground without, but near the fortress; in vain did they silence the batteries of the Mysoreans, and spike their brass mortars and guns. New touch-holes were drilled with incredible expedition. The machines were opened anew in triumph; and the approaches of the assailants were brought so near that they threw fascines on the covered way and the edge of the glacis, until the fortifications were reduced to a mere heap of ruins. On the 4th July Tipū determined to storm the breach which had been practicable since the 7th June. On the 6th, however, he was dislodged by the English, whereupon he made a general attack on the north covered way, which was resolutely assaulted and defended against fresh troops and superior numbers, with the loss of about 40 men on the English side. By the 15th, the Mysoreans had wrought themselves along the whole of the northern covered way of the English

and begun to fill up the ditch opposite to the breach. The gates of the fort, being much damaged, were shut up and two sally ports cut, to supply their place. New batteries were raised by the assailants and in one of their assaults, they scaled the walls of a fort situated at the junction of the river with the sea, called the "Octagon," the English garrison being meanwhile forced to contend for want of subsistence and other inconveniences within.²⁶

At length, about the 19th of July, after fifty-six days'

His further operations, July, August, 1788. open trenches, intelligence was received in camp under a flag of truce brought in by Mons. Peveron, the French en-

voy of Tipū, of the general pacification in Europe and the cessation of arms on the Coromandel coast (*i.e.*, at Cuddalore). Thereupon Mons. Cossigny refused to co-operate any longer with Tipū in reducing Mangalore, Mons. Lally and Boudenot also following his example, to the bitter rage and astonishment of Tipū. Mons. Peveron was politely received by Col. Campbell, who had a long conference. Tipū, however, even while the flag of truce was flying, persisted in carrying on his operations against the fort, which, no longer capable of a long defence, surrendered on terms after a practicable breach was made in its walls. On the 22nd, Mons. Peveron came into the fort a second time, and in order to favour a negotiation for peace, a suspension of hostilities was agreed on for two days. Under cover of the arrangements made for the Monsieur's reception, and even while some of Tipū's principal people were in the fort, troops were landed for the attack of a detached work which covered the entrance of the harbour, in consequence of which

26. *Ibid.*, 217-218; *Memoirs*, I. 495-499; Robson, l.c.; Kirmāṇī, o.c., 18; *Tārīkh*, l.c.; and Stewart, l.c. The strength of the English garrison at Mangalore about this time was as follows: "696 Europeans, including 91 officers; 2,850 black troops, amounting in all to 3,546 fighting men, besides pioneers and camp followers" (*Memoirs*, I. 494).

it was taken; every operation was continued with augmented vigour, under the reiterated simulation of abstaining from hostility; and the admission of the French envoy, as a mediator, became the occasion for springing a mine under the outer eastern gate, which almost smothered the whole of the guard with rubbish but wounded several soldiers and sepoys and buried others in the ruins. The English lost no time to fill up the opening made in the wall. Tipū, who professed his entire ignorance of this disaster, erected, during the short suspension of hostilities, towards the south-east quarter of the fort, a battery of ten guns; upon which the English troops, exasperated at the appearance of treachery, brought all the guns they could to bear with uncommon fury. After frequent, though short suspension of hostilities and a great deal of correspondence, Tipū, apparently convinced of the utter hopelessness of farther

Agrees to an armistice with the English, August 2, 1783.

efforts to reduce the place by force, agreed to an armistice on the 2nd of August, extending in its application to the garrisons at Mangalore, Honāvar and other English posts in Malabar.²⁷

By now the loss by disease and the sword on either side had become considerable and the troops were worn down with constant fighting in the day and hard duty at night. Their short intervals were interrupted by the noise of stones thrown from mortars and several were cut off by large and heavy muskets called *janjāl*—very long in the barrel, larger than a common musket in the bore and fledged on a rest for the purpose of taking a steady and sure aim. At different intervals,

The situation hardens.

27. *Ibid*, 218-220; *Memoirs*, I. 500-503. See also and compare *Tarikh*, o.c., 374-375; and Stewart, l.c. On the subject of cessation of hostilities between the English and the French at Cuddalore, see Chapter X. below.

very thick planks were posted, musket-proof, and pierced with several eyelet-holes, through which the assailants shot at every one of the defenders they could set their eyes on. About this time, the English garrison enjoyed a degree of liberty under the truce and walked out occasionally and conversed with French officers under Col. Mons. Cossigny.

Tipū left off by Mons. Cossigny.

This latter, after resigning his command under Tipū, demanded a passport for his detachment to Māhe with provisions, draught cattle and boats for crossing certain unfordable rivers, all which Tipū refused, "provoked at his forbearance to act any longer against the English". Thereupon, the commander marched off, despite Tipū's remonstrances and threats to the contrary.²⁸

Meanwhile, the armistice was being more honoured in the breach than in its observance.

Tipū continues the siege, August-December 1788.

His violation of the armistice.

One of the articles (Article 3rd) provided for the establishment of a bazaar where the English garrison might buy its provisions to the extent of ten days' stock at a time and stipulated that such articles as the bazaar did not afford might freely enter from other places, to an amount not exceeding one month's supply at a time, thus allowing the garrison to remain, during the armistice, with regard to provisions, as in all other respects, in the same state as at its commencement.²⁹ Tipū began by a systematic violation of this article. A bazaar was furnished but every commodity was so exorbitantly dear that there was scarcely anything which the men could purchase. The prices were daily raised. "till a fowl sold from nine to twelve rupees, a seer of rice for four, a seer of salt for three and a frog for six pence." Seven boats laden

28. *Memoirs*, I. 508-505; see also and compare *Tārīkh*, l.c.

29. Wilks. o.c., II. 220-221; see also and compare *Memoirs*, I. 509.

with provisions from Bombay were seized and the articles they contained were sold by Tipū's people in the bazaar at these rates.³⁰ Nor was this all. Tipū also erected a new work on the southern harbour and sought to keep Col. Campbell and Gen. Macleod (who had landed at Mangalore on the 20th August, invested with the chief command on the coast of Malabar and Kanara) in good

humour by talking to them of proposed peace negotiations with the English. His proposed peace negotiations with the English, August 1783. The record of some of his conversations on the occasion contains, among other matters, a prominent recurrence of the demand for reparation for the fraud at Trichinopoly in 1752, which, notwithstanding the peace of 1769, had also formed the basis of the last propositions made by his father. Tipū, however, exhibited some knowledge of secret history, in adding that Muhammad Ali was the true cause of the war; that he had poisoned the minds of the English against his father and him, and had even deputed persons to England to injure them in the opinions of the king and people of that country; that he was equally false to the English and to him, and had even recently proposed to him a negotiation to unite for their expulsion from India. The French, he said, had mediated the armistice, but he would not have them or any other to mediate the peace. "You shall make the peace," he added, and expressed surprise when General Macleod pleaded his want of powers. "Why cannot the military officers make peace? they are the proper persons to do it. You shall go with me to Seringapatam; you shall send my propositions to Madras; you shall make peace, and in the meanwhile, I will gratify you and Colonel Campbell, by complying with your request for the release of all your prisoners; they shall be delivered into your own hands

30. *Memoirs*, l.c.

at Seringapatam".³¹ At length, in October, the stores being considerably reduced, Tipū, conceiving the object to be secured of compelling the English garrison to surrender for want of food, threw off the mask, openly

Tipū throws off the mask and reduces Mangalore to straits, October-December 1783.

avowed the deception of his proposed departure for Seringapatam, declared that the garrison should not be supplied with provisions, and finally told the General that he was at liberty to depart. General Macleod accordingly sailed for Tellicherry to collect the means of relieving the garrison, which was now reduced to twenty days' stock. From this period, Tipū, who had broken the cessation of arms in every possible manner, was openly and actively employed in repairing his old works, erecting new batteries in every direction and converting the siege to a blockade. General Macleod, after attacking and carrying Cannanore (in November)—under Tipū's jurisdiction—in retaliation for the detention of some sepoys shipwrecked on the coast, proceeded to Bombay, while Colonel Campbell, reduced to great extremity for want of provisions and almost on the point of starving, held out against Tipū.³²

31. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 221-222.

32. *Ibid.*, 222-223, 227-228, 230; see also and compare *Memoirs*, I. 509-511; Robson, *o.c.*, 160-161; Stewart, *l.c.*; and Kirmāṇi, *l.c.*

CHAPTER IX.

KHĀSĀ-CHĀMARĀJA WOPEYAR VIII, 1776-1796—(contd.)

Haidar's invasion, 1780: Effects on Madras; War measures adopted; Governor Whitehill paralysed; his suspension, and Mr. Charles Smith's succession as provisional Governor of Madras (8th November 1780)—Provides for defence, and against famine; Lord Macartney's arrival: takes charge of the Governorship of Fort St. George (22nd June 1781)—His early career—The position in Madras, 1781; change in the constitution of Government—Operations against Dutch Settlements in India, etc.,—Administrative measures, 1781-1783: Finance—Famine relief—Relations with Sir Eyre Coote, 1781-1783—Relations with General Stuart, 1783—Relations with the Council—Duel with Sadleir, September 24, 1784—Further changes in the constitution of Government, February 1785; Lord Macartney, first "Governor of Madras"—Relations with Nawab Muhammad Ali Walajah (down to 1785); the surrender of the assignment of the Karnatic revenues, December 1784; Lord Macartney resigns, June 1785—His official integrity.

HAIDAR'S second invasion of the Karnātic, which we have noticed thus far, had had far-reaching effects on Madras, to which it is necessary to turn our attention. The invasion took place during the period of office for the second time as Governor of Madras of John Whitehill in succession to Sir Thomas Rumbold who embarked for England on the 7th April 1780. Entering the Karnātic on the 21st July, Haidar with fire and sword devastated the country for fifty miles round Madras and fifteen about Vellore. Though his attitude had long been a threatening one, the Government found themselves wholly unprepared to meet the situation. In

Haidar's invasion,
1780.
Effects on Madras.

War measures
adopted.

vain did James Anthony Sadleir, one of the members of the Fort St. George Council, in a Minute dated 29th July, charge the Select Committee with inaction, urging the adoption of adequate measures of resistance.¹ The Company's troops were scattered over the Presidency and there was no compact force to oppose the Mysoreans,

Governor Whitehill paralysed.

so much so that Governor Whitehill seemed paralysed. At length, after Haidar's cavalry had raided the suburbs of Madras (10th August), Sir Hector Munro took the field. A force under Col. Baillie, which was marching from Guntur to join Munro at Conjeeveram, was, as we have seen, intercepted by Haidar when on the point of junction at Perambākam, and annihilated (10th September). Munro was compelled to retreat to Madras. A pressing appeal was made to Calcutta; Sir Eyre Coote was promptly sent to Madras to retrieve the disaster (5th November), and Whitehill was suspended for

His suspension, and Mr. Charles Smith's succession as provisional Governor of Madras (8th November 1780).

alleged defiance of the orders of the Governor-General in holding Guntur. Whitehill sailed for England, and Mr. Charles Smith, a civil servant of twenty-seven years' standing, who had spent a considerable part of his career as Chief at Ganjam, succeeded as provisional Governor of Madras (8th November).²

His brief term of office (1780-1781) was devoted to military preparations and protection against impending famine. Whitehill had raised for the defence of Madras a force consisting of Fort Militia, Black Town European

Provides for defence, and against famine.

1. *Fort St. George Records: Pub. Cons.*, CXXIV, 29th July 1780; also Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, III 194-200.
2. *Mily. Cons.*, LXX, 11th, 16th and 17th August 1780; LXXI, 13th, September 1780; *Pub. Cons.*, CXXIV, 7th November 1780; also Love, *o.c.*, III. 200-209. As to the details of the action against Col. Baillie, *vide* Ch. V.

Militia and Portuguese Militia. Governor Smith added a marine corps. To cope with the prevailing scarcity, he imported foodstuffs from Bengal and suspended the collection of import duty on grain. It was not, however, until the middle of January 1781 that Eyre Coote was able to open the campaign in the south. By a succession of brilliant movements, already narrated elsewhere, he at length moved to Cuddalore, where, for want of transport and supplies, he was compelled to remain inactive until the middle of June 1781.

Lord Macartney's arrival: takes charge of the Governorship of Fort St. George (22nd June 1781).

On the 22nd of that month Lord Macartney landed at Madras and took charge of the Government from Mr. Smith.⁸

The only son

of George Macartney of Lissanoure, near Belfast, George Macartney was born in 1737. He matriculated at Trinity College, Dublin, and took his

His early career.

Master of Arts Degree in 1759. With an outlook enlarged by a knowledge of foreign countries and foreign languages, he soon made friends with Stephen Fox, elder brother of Charles James Fox, and came into contact with their father Lord Holland, through whose influence he in due course entered the Diplomatic Service. Made a Knight Bachelor, he was in 1764 appointed as Envoy Extraordinary at St. Petersburg to negotiate a commercial treaty

8. *Mily. Cons.*, LXXI, 2nd October 1780; *Pub. Cons.*, CXXV, 31st March 1781; also Love, *o.c.*, 195-196. As to the details of Sir Eyre Coote's activities in the South, *vide* Ch. V. At p. 196 of his work, Col. Love speaks of the landing of Lord Macartney at Madras on 22nd June 1781; at p. 221 again, he speaks of the arrival as on 22nd April 1781. This is clearly an error for 22nd June 1781, which is in keeping with Sir Charles Lawson, who bases his account of Lord Macartney largely on Barrow's *Life of the Earl of Macartney* (see Lawson's *Mémoires of Madras*, 68). Wilks merely refers to the "intelligence of the arrival of Lord Macartney to assume the Government of Madras," etc. (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 54). His account is unfortunately conspicuous by the absence of particulars relating to the early life and career of Lord Macartney, and of his administrative and other measures at Madras.

between England and Russia, and occupied that post with distinction for three years. Offered the high position of British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in 1767, he declined it, preferring to enter Parliament as Member for Cockermouth. Not long after, he married Lady Jane Stuart, a younger daughter of the Earl of Bute, the guide, philosopher and friend of King George III. Between 1769-1772 he acted as Chief Secretary for Ireland, leading the Ministerial side of the Irish House of Commons. He resigned, and being made a Knight of the Bath, became Captain General and Governor of the Caribbee Islands in 1775. A year later he was raised to the Peerage of Ireland as Baron Macartney of Lissanoure. On the capture of Grenada after a vigorous defence in 1779, Macartney was carried a prisoner of war to France, but he was soon exchanged. He re-entered Parliament for a short while, when he was, in 1780, chosen by the East India Company to be President and Governor of Fort St. George.⁴

On his arrival at Fort St. George on the 22nd June 1781, Lord Macartney found the The position in Madras, 1781. Karnatic overrun by Haidar Ali's troops, the Madras population famished, and the treasury empty. Eyre Coote and Hector Munro were in the field, and the only Councillors present were Charles Smith, Samuel Johnson, James Anthony Sadleir and Morgan Williams. Smith and Johnson resigned almost immediately, and Alexander Davidson, returning from a special mission to Tanjore, protested against Sadleir's sitting in Council before being relieved by the Directors from the suspension he was under since August 1780. Under orders from home a change was now made Change in the constitution of Government. in the constitution of Government by reversion to the earlier system of appointing eleven councillors, including

4. Love, *o.c.*, 221; Lawson, *o.c.* 67-68.

the Military Member. The President, whose salary was fixed at 40,000 pagodas, was prohibited from commercial dealing; the Commander-in-Chief received 16,000 pagodas as heretofore, but the civilian members returned to the old scale of salaries with liberty of trade. Under this scheme, five additional members were appointed, namely, J. H. Casamaijor, John Turing, Edward Saunders, C. B. Dent, and William Maitland. Of these, only Saunders was present at Madras, the others remaining at their out-stations.⁵

Lord Macartney, on his arrival at Madras, brought with him news of war with the States General and authority to operate against the Dutch Settlements on the Coromandel Coast. Preparations were made independently of Sir Eyre Coote, who was at the time fully occupied in the interior with Haidar Ali. Captain George Mackay, Commandant at Chingleput, appeared before Sadras on the 29th June (1781), and James Peter Deneys, its chief, surrendered without resistance, as his sepoys deserted in a body and his whole European force was a garrison of fifty-four, besides ten civilians. Three days later, Pulicat yielded to Major Elphinston of the 73rd Regiment. Negapatam was next besieged by Sir Hector Munro, the fleet co-operating, and the place fell on 30th October.⁶ While the details of these and other operations of the English army and navy during Lord Macartney's period of office as Governor of Madras will be found dealt with in the proper places in the course of this work,⁷ it is necessary to go in here to the administrative and other aspects of his regime.

5. *Pub. Desp. from Eng.*, LXXXIV, 11th January 1781; also Love, *o.c.*, 221-222.

6. *Mily. Cons.*, LXXV, 29th June 1781; *Macartney to Eng.*, XVI, 26th January 1782; also Love, *o.c.*, 227; Lawson, *o. c.*, 95.

7. *Vide* Chs. V, VIII and X.

The want of money was severely felt at the outset.

Administrative measures, 1781-1783. The Nawāb of Arcot (Muhammad Ali Wālājah) and the Rāja of Tanjore

Finance. could render no aid while their territories were held by Haidar. The supply from the Northern Circars was inadequate. Bills on England being forbidden, Macartney tried in succession a local loan, application to Bengal, and even a lottery, but with little advantage. What money could be raised was sent to the army, the pay of which was six and a half lakhs of pagodas in arrear. Even the Members of Council suffered.⁸ Writing to the Court of Directors in 1782, Macartney's Government observed :⁹ " We cannot avoid taking this opportunity of mentioning to your Honors the peculiarly hard situation of the Members of Council ; and ever since the receipt of your commands..... they have been executing the duties of their station without receiving any emoluments from the Service at a time when the expence of keeping up an appearance suitable to their rank is double what it heretofore has been." The capture of the Dutch Settlements, following the declaration of war with Holland, afforded some relief. But Macartney was ultimately driven to the expedient of drawing bills on England. A silver currency of Arcot rupees was established at the fixed exchange of Rs. 375 per 100 Star Pagodas, and 12 single *fanams* per Arcot rupee.¹⁰

Declining from the very beginning to accept anything but his authorized salary, Macartney delivered into the treasury the customary valuable gifts made by the Nizām and Nawāb. An inquiry having been ordered by the Company into the conduct of certain of their late servants at Madras in respect of alleged bribery, the

8. *Pub. Desp. to Eng.*, XXIX, 28th October 1781 ; also Love, *o.c.*, 222.

9. *Ibid.*, 26th January 1782.

10. *Ibid.*,

Governor-General, Warren Hastings, deputed Charles Newman, practising in the Supreme Court of Judicature, to conduct the investigation. Arriving in Madras at the end of 1781, Newman sought the aid of Government in eliciting information from the Nawāb of Arcot, the Rajah of Tanjore, and the Renters of the Northern Circars regarding illegal payments said to have been made by them. Newman drew up a notice setting forth that refunds would be given to all persons proving that they had made unauthorized gifts, as soon as the amounts could be recovered from the recipients. Lord Macartney's Government approved the issue of the notice. But the response not proving helpful, Newman ultimately relinquished the inquiry as hopeless.¹¹

The scarcity from which Madras had suffered since 1780 was due mainly to scanty rainfall but aggravated latterly by Haidar's devastations. As early as March 1781, the situation was regarded as serious. In May, three civil servants—Robert Hughes, George Moubray and William Webb—were nominated to a 'Grain Committee' to superintend the distribution of rice and other foodstuffs. They estimated that the stock might last until the end of June. In October 1781, Macartney informed the Directors that, while there was little prospect of obtaining grain from either the Karnātic or Tanjore due to Haidar's ravages, a considerable quantity had been received from Bengal, both from the Governor-General and through private traders, and he was hopeful that acute famine might be staved off. Yet, early in 1782, the people of Madras were in great distress and public subscriptions were flowing in for their assistance. Breaches of the Grain Committee's regulations were

11. *Pub. Cons.*, CXXVI, 9th November 1781; 7th December 1781; and 28th December 1781; *Pub. Desp. to Eng.*, XXIX, 26th January 1782; also Love, *o.c.*, 222-225.

promptly punished, and the famine became more acute as the year advanced. A second contribution, amounting to Rs. 30,000, was received from Bengal in October. The deportation of part of the Indian population was advocated by the Famine Relief Committee, and approved by Government. Deportation was begun late in September, and entertainments were organised to provide funds for the relief of the poor. With the departure of the English fleet on the approach of the monsoon, apprehension was felt of an attack by the French on Madras. A public meeting was held at the Town Hall (11th October), at which it was resolved to ask the Government, in view of 'the want of grain and provisions, and the prospect of a superior force of the enemy' (*i.e.*, the French), to modify the grain regulations and deport the poorer inhabitants. The Council had, however, already assumed entire control over grain, notice being given to importers that, for the next months, Government would receive all supplies of rice. By the end of October, the outlook was very dark.¹² "Although we may . . . avert the desperate necessity of surrendering or abandoning this fortress to the enemy," Macartney wrote home,¹³ "it is not in our power to prevent the fate which the certain and immediate prospect of famine presents to the miserable inhabitants of this settlement. . . . The re-establishment of peace, whenever it may happen, will therefore only give us the possession of a desolated and depopulated country, without the means of cultivation, and of course, without the capacity of yielding much revenue for many years to come". Though the records of 1783 contain few references to famine, there is no doubt that scarcity continued until the conclusion of peace with Mysore in March 1784, when the bazaars

12. *Pub. Cons.*, CXXV, 31st March 1781; CXXVIII, 28th September 1782; 4th and 9th October 1782; and 15th November 1782; *Pub. Desp. to Eng.*, XXIV, 28th October 1781; also Love, *o.c.*, 229-236.

13. *Macartney to Eng.*, XVIII, 31st October 1782; also Love, *o.c.*, 235.

were suddenly flooded with foodstuffs, and prices dropped 50 per cent.¹⁴

Though the military achievements of Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander-in-Chief, do not come within the scope of this chapter, the civil administration of the period in relation to the military claims our attention. While Lord Macartney, on his assumption of office in Madras, rendered all the assistance in his power for securing the capture of Dutch settlements on the Coromandel Coast, he worked harmoniously with General Coote, who was occupied with the war against Haidar Ali and the Mahrattas.¹⁵ But, as we shall see, he did not succeed in inspiring Warren Hastings and the Government of Bengal with confidence. The somewhat independent attitude that was assumed by Lord Macartney in the Southern Presidency was out of tune with the ideas of fitness of things entertained by Warren Hastings and shared by Sir Eyre Coote. Lord Macartney may have been, as Sir Charles Lawson suggests, "insensibly influenced by a comparison between his own experiences and those of the Governor-General." He, as we have seen, had occupied an important position in Russia; had sat for several years in the House of Commons; had filled high office in Ireland; and was acquainted with the West Indies; whereas the experience of Warren Hastings was confined to Madras (where he was at one time Deputy-Governor) and Bengal. Perhaps also Hastings, on his part, was a bit "jealous of the handsome young nobleman in Madras, who had influential friends at his back, especially Hastings' remorseless enemy Charles James Fox." Whatever it was, there was no love lost

14. *Pub. Desp. to Eng.*, XXX, 5th June 1784; also Love, *o.c.*, 226.

15. Lawson, *o.c.*, 95; also Wilks (*o.c.*, II. 128), who speaks of the prevalence of "an intercourse full of reciprocal courtesy and respect" as between Lord Macartney and Eyre Coote for some time after the former's arrival in Madras.

between the two and their official relations were naturally strained to a degree.¹⁶

For a time Lord Macartney and Sir Eyre Coote remained on good terms. But after a while—on the latter's last return from Vellore (January 1782)—differences of opinion arose, partly, perhaps, because the General was impelled by the exigencies of a fierce and costly war against Haidar Ali to make demands upon the treasury at Fort St. George, that were in excess of the power of the Government to meet. He complained with the greatest asperity of the neglect of the department of supply during his absence; declared that experience had shown he could place no reliance on the proper attention being paid to the wants of the army; formally absolved himself from all responsibility; announced his intention of immediately resigning a command which his honour and reputation would no longer allow him to retain; and, in a subsequent dispatch, intimated that he accordingly awaited the arrival of General Medows from Bombay. Also, the General maintained that in virtue of his position as Commander-in-Chief in India and member of the Supreme Council he should not be subject to any interference by the local Government in the conduct of the campaign, every such interference having "a direct tendency to obstruct and

16. *Ibid*, 95-96. Wilks speaks of the Governor-General (Warren Hastings) having had "motives of displeasure and distrust, exclusive of the mere imbecility of this subordinate government (i.e., Madras)" since the receipt of first intelligence of Haidar's renewed invasion of the Karnatic. But, as Sir Murray Hammick observes, from the papers referred to in *A Vindication of the Character and Administration of Sir Thomas Rumbold* (1868) by his daughter, Elizabeth Anne Rumbold, "it is clear that the Governor-General, as early as June 1780, must have been aware from the information transmitted to him from Madras, that the position was critical. No attention was paid to the warnings sent to Bengal by Whitehill, and no assistance was sent until the news of Baillie's defeat arrived." "It seems not impossible," as Sir Murray further remarks, "that Warren Hastings himself aided Wilks by his advice, and may have induced Wilks, as the *Vindication*

defeat military plans of a wider range, of which that local Government had neither information nor control." Lord Macartney, on the other hand, contended that since Sir Eyre Coote, by virtue of his status in the Governor-General's Council, became, *ex-officio*, a member of the Council of Fort St. George during such time as he remained in the Presidency of Madras, he was considered to be constitutionally subject to or governed by the orders of the majority of the Madras Council. Lord Macartney, without admitting the justice of General Coote's demand, allowed him a free hand, but Coote complained to Hastings of interference with his powers. Macartney wrote home that the sole occupation of his Government consisted in devising means for the support of Coote's army and obviating to the utmost of their ability "the difficulties and distresses which were the general subject of his letters to this Government." The more the matter was discussed the more did each disputant think that he was right and his opponent wrong. Lord Macartney was not too strong in his own Council, for Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, who was a member of it, was somewhat unfriendly, and Major-General Stuart, second-in-command of the Madras Forces, made no attempt to disguise his sympathy with the views of his military chief. Moreover, the moral support accorded by the Governor-General and Council to that chief weighed in the balance against the Governor, for General Coote had applied to the Supreme Government of Bengal to restore his authority. Their interposition first by temperate advice and ultimately by command

suggests, to make the strong defence of the Governor-General" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 81, with Editorial Note by Sir Murray Hammick). Wilks' treatment of the affairs of Lord Macartney's period of office (1781-1785) bears also traces of a veiled bias in favour of Warren Hastings, leading to the ignoring, if not suppression, of certain material facts in the relations between the two. On this subject, see further Ch. XI below.

led to a farther distraction in public councils, where unanimity was so urgently required.¹⁷

A consequence of these dissensions was the employment by Lord Macartney (in February 1782) of the Company's troops on the West Coast, which were intended by Sir Eyre Coote to reinforce the army, under his own command. Mr. John Sullivan, the Political Resident at Tanjore and charged with a general superintendence of all the southern provinces, had, from his situation and the confidence reposed in his talents, been made the medium of communication between the two coasts. He was authorised by Lord Macartney to open all his dispatches and make all the communications in duplicate. In the exercise of his discretionary power, he was induced to open dispatches addressed to the naval and military commanders-in-chief at Madras from the officers commanding the English reinforcements. Unsuspicious of the existing disunion among the higher authorities, and having regard to the exigencies of the situation, he ventured also to address letters to the naval and military officers on the West Coast, regarding the most advisable plan of operations in that quarter. Sir Edward Hughes, on first receiving from Lord Macartney the dispatches of Mr. Sullivan, expressed his approbation of the whole proceeding and its consequences. Yet, later (on 13th March 1782), he, with Sir Eyre Coote, addressed a joint letter to Lord Macartney, treating the conduct of Mr. Sullivan as an unauthorised violation of their official dispatches, and an illegal assumption of authority which they had not delegated and could not transfer to any person, and this unfortunate incident was considered by Sir Eyre Coote as an aggravated invasion of his lawful authority, branching from the head of the Government to its

17. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 126-128; also Lawson, *o.c.*, 96-97; Love, *o.c.*, 238-239 (quoting from Macartney's letter to England, 5th April 1782).

subordinates. This unhappy controversy, as Wilks shrewdly observes, "resulted infinitely more from the defective system of the government than from the eminent men who were entrusted with its execution; and although this estimable veteran (Coote) could not fail to discover through the fullest drapery of Lord Macartney's compliments, many intelligible insinuations that much more might have been done than was actually accomplished by the army, it must, with whatever reluctance, be allowed that the temper evinced by Sir Eyre Coote on this and other occasions, exhibited mournful evidence of his having outlived some of the most attractive qualities of his earlier character."¹⁸

Lord Macartney, however, held his own and defended Mr. Sullivan's action in a letter to the Court of Directors. He so firmly refused to yield to Sir Eyre Coote's demands that the latter became disgusted and resolved to take the earliest advantage of a pause in the war which resulted from the enfeeblement of Haidar, to return to Calcutta. Coote, whose health had also suffered from the hardships of a long and difficult campaign in Southern India, sailed for Bengal in September 1782. His death, on his arrival at Madras for the second time, on the 27th April 1783, terminated the tension between him and Lord Macartney.¹⁹

The command of the Madras army had devolved upon General James Stuart even as early as Sir Eyre Coote's embarkation for Bengal in September 1782. After his long-delayed trial and restoration to the service as second-in-command of that army, General Stuart did duty in the field under Sir Eyre Coote. Losing a leg by a

18. *Ibid.*, 126, 128-130. As to the official career, etc., of Mr. John Sullivan, *vide* next Chapter.

19. *Ibid.*, 130 (n.)-131; also Lawson, *o.c.*, 97-98; Love, *o.c.*, 240, 247-248. Lawson's reference to the date of Coote's death on 27th March 1783 is a mistake for 27th April 1783 in the light of the *Calcutta Records* quoted by Love.

cannon ball at the battle of Pollilore in August 1781, he made a good recovery and a little later was eager to succeed Sir Hector Munro. On Munro's departure for England in September 1782, Stuart succeeded him as provincial Commander-in-Chief, and at the same time received from Sir Eyre Coote the actual command of the field army. Lord Macartney was not, however, disposed to grant General Stuart the same liberty of action as he had given Sir Eyre Coote, though General Stuart regarded his command of the King's troops as exempting him from the Company's control. In June 1783, about two months after Coote's death, he was recalled to Madras for systematic disobedience of orders, and in September received his dismissal. The fascinating story of his subsequent arrest and deportation to England, which will be found dealt with elsewhere, is of importance as showing how Lord Macartney was always anxious to maintain the supremacy of the civil authority over the military in all matters pertaining to the successful prosecution of the war.²⁰

Though Lord Macartney's relations with his Council were generally friendly, an occurrence to the contrary, proving as usual the general rule, once took place. Macartney proposed to his colleagues an increase in the allowances of Mr. Hudleston, then Military Secretary to Government.²¹ They all, it would appear, formally approved of the proposal, but when the matter was actually brought up before the Select Committee, in view to confirmation, Mr. James Sadleir, one of the

Relations with the
Council.

20. *Pub. Cons.*, CXXVIII, 28th September 1782; *Mily. Cons.*, XCII, 17th September 1783; also Love, *o.c.*, 240-241, 253-254; and Lawson, *o.c.*, 74-75. Regarding the arrest and deportation of General Stuart, *vide* Ch. XI below.

21. This is probably John Hudleston of the Civil Service. He joined as Writer in 1766; Factor, 1771; Junior Merchant, 1774; Junior Merchant and Fifth in Council at Ganjam, 1776; Senior Merchant, 1778.

colleagues, took objection to it. Though the other members sought to bring to his recollection that he had concurred with them in the matter on a previous occasion, Sadleir denied having expressed such approval. And he was so positive and exasperating in his denial that Macartney, ordinarily the most courteous of men, not only lost his temper by impugning Sadleir's veracity but also directed that the incident should be recorded in the Minutes of Consultations. Macartney, while holding that he was justified in his action by absolute necessity, sought to mend matters by a suitable expression of regret, but the aggrieved member, Sadleir, being persuaded by his friends, demanded of his Lordship private satisfaction by means of a duel. Lord Macartney accepted the challenge, Mr. Davidson acting as his second, and Major Grattan as the second to Sadleir. The meeting took place in the precincts of Fort St. George on Friday the 24th September 1784.

“The time of the meeting, as settled the evening before by Mr. Sadleir and Mr. Davidson”, narrates Sir John Barrow, the biographer of Lord Macartney, “was seven o'clock in the morning. However, about thirty-five minutes past six, all the parties were on the ground: Lord Macartney and Mr. Davidson were the first. It being agreed upon by Mr. Davidson and Major Grattan, who had retired to the particular spot intended, that the distance should be ten paces, Major Grattan loaded Mr. Sadleir's pistols, Mr. Davidson's being loaded before they arrived.....Lord Macartney and Mr. Sadleir were then conducted to the spot, and took their proper distances as already marked out. The right of the first fire was determined by chance between the seconds, and fell to Mr. Sadleir who accordingly fired: the ball struck Lord Macartney on the ribs of the left side, which however was not known to any of the other gentlemen

Duel with Sadleir,
September 24, 1784.

till after his Lordship had given his own fire, which missed Mr. Sadleir.....Lord Macartney, who did not quit his ground, called out, 'Go on'. Mr. Sadleir, remaining also on his ground, prepared to take his second fire. Mr. Davidson, having come up to Lord Macartney, first perceived that his Lordship was wounded, and declared it to Major Grattan.....His Lordship said, 'I came here to give satisfaction to Mr. Sadleir and am ready to do so'. His Lordship's waist-coat being now unbuttoned, and the effects of his wound as well as its dangerous position becoming visible, Major Grattan, with the concurrence of Mr. Davidson, declared that in his Lordship's present condition Mr. Sadleir should rest satisfied, and that under such circumstances the matter could not well be pursued further. This declaration, being heard by Mr. Sadleir while remaining on his ground, was adopted by him, and he, declaring he was satisfied, then quitted his ground."

A formal statement of the facts of the duel was drawn up by the seconds the following morning, at a meeting held for the purpose, at which Col. Fullarton and Col. Dalrymple were present, and it was "mutually admitted to be just and true, and was accordingly subscribed to by" them. As Sir John Barrow further observes, "this was the only dispute and almost the only difference of opinion, that Lord Macartney had to encounter in the Select Committee in the whole course of his difficult Government." ²²

By the Regulating Act of 1784, the constitution of the Government was again changed. Further changes in the constitution of Government, February 1785. The Governor, who received as before 40,000 Pagodas per annum, together with emoluments from mintage and consulage, was assisted by the Commander-in-Chief on

22. Love, o.c., 225-226 (quoting from Barrow's *Life of the Earl of Macartney*); also Lawson, o.c., 83-87.

15,000 Pagodas, sitting as Second Member, and by two civilians as Third and Fourth Members, with salaries of 15,000 and 14,000 Pagodas, respectively. This system,

under which Lord Macartney became the first "Governor of Madras," came into operation on the 12th February 1785.²³

Reference has been made in the preceding chapter to Lord Macartney's earlier relations with Muhammad Ali Wālājah, Nawāb of Arcot, resulting in the latter's assignment of the Karnātic revenues to the Madras Government for a period of five years under an agreement dated the 2nd December 1781, about six months after Lord Macartney's assumption of office in Madras. Since then, the relations between the Governor and the Nawāb were far from harmonious. Hardly a few months after the assignment, the Nawāb, thinking that the powers assumed by Fort St. George over his territory exceeded those which he had consented to relinquish, desired to resume control.²⁴ Writing to England in August 1782, the Government observed that "His Highness the Nabob has thought proper to address two letters to the several Members of the Board, full of invective against the Right Honourable President, and reviling his conduct towards His Highness in the most indecent language."²⁵ In April 1783, a letter addressed to the Nawāb having arrived from the Company, Macartney enquired whether it would be convenient for the Nawāb to receive the Governor and Council, who would present the document. Wālājah, to whom an advance copy had been handed, declined to meet the

23. *Pub. Cons.*, CXXXV, 12th February 1785; *Desp. from Eng.*, LXXXVIII, 11th April 1785; also Love, *o.c.*, 225; and Lawson, *o.c.*, 68.

24. *Pub. Cons.*, CXXVII, 22nd April 1782; also Love, *o.c.*, 814-816.

25. *Pub. Desp. to Eng.*, XXIX, 31st August 1782; also Love, *o.c.*, 816.

Members of the Government. In August, the Bengal Government decreed a surrender of the assignment. But Macartney, believing that such a step would involve a financial disaster to the Company, refused to execute the order without confirmation from England. After some hesitation, the Company, in December 1784,

The surrender of the assignment of the Karnatic revenues, December 1784.

resolved to relinquish the assignment "from motives of moderation and attachment to the Nabob." The Court accepted the Nawāb's offer of an annual contribution of twelve lakhs of

Pagodas, and issued orders as to the mode of its application to the gradual extinction of his debt. They directed that accounts should be made up to the end of 1784, interest being charged at specified rates ranging from six to twelve per cent. Consequently, in June

Lord Macartney resigns, June 1785.


1785, Lord Macartney resigned. His health being also by now much broken by severe and repeated attacks of gout, he proceeded to Bengal, on his way to England, to communicate his views on the Karnatic question to Sir John Macpherson who had succeeded Warren Hastings as the provisional Governor-General.²⁶

With a wide experience and an independent outlook, which were not always viewed with favour by his esteemed contemporaries,

His official integrity.

Lord Macartney was destined to wield the affairs of Madras at the most critical period in the history of the English East India Company. He was a thoroughly honourable man. Breaking through the atmosphere of official laxity and corruption which prevailed in the Madras administration of the time, he set an example of personal integrity and honesty. He not only declined the present of a sum of money

26. *Pub. Desp. from Eng.*, LXXXVIII, 9th December 1784; also *Love, o.c.*, 226-227, 316-318; and *Lawson, o.c.*, 87-88.



Earl Macartney, K. B., Governor of Madras, 1781-1785.

equivalent to £30,000 said to have been offered by the Nawāb during a visit immediately after his assumption of office as Governor, but also, on June 1, 1785, a few days before his embarkation, swore before the Mayor of Madras an affidavit that during his term of office he received nothing from any source besides his legitimate allowances.²⁷

Such was Lord Macartney, who pushed through and concluded the war with Tipū, and with whose Government the Mysore Royal Family came into friendly contact during 1782-1783, as will be shown in the sequel.

²⁷. LAWSON, *o.c.*, 68-74; also LOVE, *o.c.*, 227-228.

CHAPTER X.

KHĀSĀ-CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VIII,

1776-1796—(contd.)

War with Nawab Muhammad Ali (*The Second Mysore War*), 1780-1784 : *Seventh Phase* : December 1782-December 1783 (continued) ; Operations in the East ; the English and the French at Cuddalore, June-July 1783—Operations in the South, 1782-1784 : the general plan ; the Royalist reaction (down to 1782) ; the *Rana Treaty*, October 28, 1782—The contents of the *Treaty*—The leading figures in the movement—Movements of the Southern army ; Activities of Col. Lang, September 1782-May 1783—Activities of Col. Fullarton, May-August 1783—His further activities : Diversion against the Palegars of Madura and Tinnevely, August-October 1783—Seringapatam, the ultimate objective of Col. Fullarton, October 1783—Reduction of Palghat, October-November 1783 ; its strategic importance—Reduction of Coimbatore and the intended march to Seringapatam, November-December 1783—The Royalist Revolution, July 1783 : the objectives of the Royalists—The story of the Revolution—Its failure—The identity of the leaders, Shamaiya and Rangaiya—The role of the Maharani and Tirumala Rao—Tipu's position at Mangalore—The execution of Muhammad Ali, Commandant, November 1783.

DURING the course of affairs of Mysore narrated in a preceding chapter, Mons. Bussy with reinforcements

War with Nawab Muhammad Ali (*The Second Mysore War*), 1780-1784 : *Seventh Phase* : December 1782-December 1783 (continued).

Operations in the East.

from France, having joined Admiral Mons. Suffrein at Trincomalee, arrived off Cuddalore in March 1783. And General Stuart with the main English army, following Tipu's departure for Bednūr, moved for the relief of Vellore and took possession of Arcot. Then he marched back to Madras where Sir Edward Hughes with a squadron of eighteen ships of the line had just returned from Bombay. Sir Edward soon

sailed to Trincomalee and it was not until the 21st of April that General Stuart commenced his march towards Cuddalore for recovering it from the French. His movements were so dilatory that he did not arrive there until the 7th June, having taken 48 days to accomplish 126 miles, and thus given the French time to supply themselves with provisions and ammunition, of both of which

The English and the French at Cuddalore, June-July 1783. they had been in want, as shown by intercepted letters. The General was severely censured for his procrastination

(though a good part of the censure was ill-deserved, as there was hardly any use in arriving at the place before the ships which carried the entrenching tools and guns and stores arrived there), and also for the mismanagement by which the carriage of the army, equal to the transport of provisions for twenty-five days, had in a few weeks been so reduced as not to be able to carry more than what was deemed sufficient for nine days' consumption. This result was contrasted with that effected by General Coote in January 1782, when he threw three months' provisions into Vellore in the face of the Mysoreans, and returned to Madras in fifteen days without any particular diminution in the carriage. Just about this time (24th April) Sir Eyre Coote returned to Madras from Bengal, but died there on the 27th of April to the grief of the army, especially to the Indian part of it, by whom he was regarded with a degree of attachment never manifested towards any other European officer. At Cuddalore, General Stuart was not able to produce any impression, though, on his arrival, he took up his position about two miles to the south of the fort with his left resting on the Bandipālayam ("Bandapollam") hills, and his right on a back-water close to the sea. On the night of the 7th April, Mons. Bussy, with Tipū's horse under Saiyid Sahib in the rear, quitted the north side of Cuddalore and fixed himself in the southern hedge,

where he began to throw up strong redoubts and lines of entrenchment, advancing his guards and pickets close up to the English sentinels. Both the armies remained watchful of each other until the 12th, when Gen. Stuart resolved on driving the French from all their outposts into Cuddalore or under their guns. On the 13th morning, Lt. Col. Kelly got possession of the French posts on the Bandipālayam hills with their guns, Lt. Col. Cathcart at the head of the grenadiers commanding the advance pickets on the left. A severe artillery action followed, in which though the General was successful so far as his objective was concerned, the loss on either side was considerable. On the 14th, Gen. Stuart advanced near the fort of Cuddalore and pressed on the siege. On the 25th, after a hard contested naval action between Sir Edward Hughes and Admiral Mons, Suffrein, advancing to the relief of the respective combatants, the French made a sally, which was repulsed, among the prisoners taken being Bernadotte, afterwards king of Sweden, who was then a Serjeant. Despite this success, the position of the English now became critical, their number having been diminished by casualties and disease, whereas the French had been considerably strengthened from the fleet, and were concerting an attack of a far more formidable and alarming nature. Fortunately, at this juncture, intelligence was received of the conclusion of peace in Europe, in consequence of which hostilities ceased on the 2nd July, and the English army returned to St. Thomas' Mount in August.¹

In the South, the idea of retrieving the disaster which overtook Col. Braithwaite's corps at the hands of Tipū (February 1782) by an efficient diversion on the coast of

Operations in the
South, 1782-1784.

1. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 108, 178-181, 184-197; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 74-81; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 817-398; Robson, *o.c.*, 161-168; and *Memoirs*, I. 427-440.

Malabar and a combined operation on Seringapatam by the route of Pālghāt originated with

The general plan. Mr. John Sullivan, Political Resident at Tanjore. Mr. Sullivan, while he thought such a plan would relieve the pressure and liberate the provinces committed to his charge, obtained the approval to it of Lord Macartney's Government at Madras, and sought to strengthen it by means of such political support as circumstances might admit.² For

some time past the idea of uprooting the usurpation of Haidar and assisting in their restoration to power the Mysore

Royal Family who had been gradually put into the shade since 1761, had also been engaging the attention of the English at Madras. As early as 1767, when Charles Bouchier was Governor, the latter seemed

The Royalist reaction (down to 1782).

2. *Ibid.*, 227-229. See also and compare, on this section, *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2553-2556 (quoting from Wilks). John Sullivan (1748-1839): The second of the three brothers who served in Madras. The eldest, Benjamin, arrived in India as a Barrister in 1777 and was appointed successively Government Advocate, Attorney-General and a Judge of the High Court. The last, Richard Joseph, becoming Writer in 1770, as elsewhere referred to (see p. 567, f.n., 5), rose afterwards to be Secretary in the Military Department at Fort St. George and was created a Baronet in 1804. The second, John, the person mentioned in the text above, entered the Civil Service in 1765, at the age of 17; served on the E. I. Co.'s Establishment at Masulipatam, 1778; Persian Translator and Secretary, 1780; Resident at Tanjore, 1782; Under-Secretary for War in England, 1801-1805; survived till 1839 (see Sir Murray Hammick's Note in Wilks' *Mysoor*, II. 237, f.n., based on Love's *Report on the Palk Manuscripts*). Princep, as already noted, speaks of the two Sullivan brothers, John and Stephen Sullivan, without clearly indicating their official career, etc. That the person actually connected with the politics of Southern India between 1780 and 1783 was John Sullivan is clear from the *Rāna Correspondence of the Fort St. George Records* for the year 1782, where he figures prominently as "John Sullivan, Esq." (see *Mily. Cons.*, LXXX. 1470, 1814-1815; LXXXIII. 8686, 3711; LXXXIV. 9395; *Count. Corres.*, XXXI. 840, etc.). Wilks throughout refers to the name as John Sullivan, and this double "l" occurs also in the signature appended to the text of the *Rāna Treaty* (October 28, 1782) as published by Aitchison [see Appendix III—(1)]. Probably John Sullivan, in contradistinction to the other brothers bearing the same name, signed his own as Sullivan. This spelling is adopted in the present work also.

inclined to view with favour the idea, "provided the King's Family will exert themselves and contribute all in their power to shake off Hyder Naigue's yoke", the English army entering the Mysore country "not as enemys to the inhabitants or to ruin the villages but with a view only to accomplish the overthrow of Hyder Naigue".³ Since the death by poisoning of Nanjarāja Woḍeyar encompassed by Haidar in 1770, a powerful party in Seringapatam, under the guidance of Mahārāṇi Lakshmamanni, the Dowager-queen of Immaḍi-Krishnarāja, had also been, it would seem, active, concerting plans to get rid of the usurper and regain the kingdom for the ancient Ruling Family. Haidar's usurpation had indeed hardened into a reality, and he had overstepped the bounds of restraint on the death of Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja Woḍeyar under similar circumstances and the forced succession he brought about of Khāsā-Chāmarāja Woḍeyar in 1776. In that year, the Mahārāṇi deputed her Pradhan Tirumala Rao to Lord Pigot, then Governor of Madras for a second time, on a secret mission. A person of considerable talents and acquirements, Tirumala Rao shewed himself to possess extensive information regarding the government and resources of Mysore. He had served in a subordinate capacity in some of the departments of Haidar's government, at first as a writer in the office of Asad Alī Khān, minister of finance, who died in 1772, and afterwards in the department of the post office and police, under Timmappa (the predecessor of Shāmaiya), by whom he was patronised and employed on several missions. While absent on one of these, he heard of the intended disgrace of his patron, and apprehensive of being involved in its consequences, fled from Mysore. Tirumala Rao, however, on hearing of Lord Pigot's revolutionary supercession at Madras, by George Stratton

3. *Mily. Cons.*, XXVIII. 1254 : Consultation dated November 16, 1767.

and the rest of his own Council, in August 1776, returned to Tanjore, where he, with his brother Nārāyaṇa Rao, took up his residence and ingratiated himself with the local Rāja, Tulsāji. Introduced by the latter, through the medium of the Rev. C. T. Schwartz, to Mr. John Sullivan, Tirumala Rao, during the next six years, as the accredited agent of the Mahārāṇi, opened communication with the English at Madras.⁴ Thomas Rumbold, during his Governorship (1778-1780), seems to have lent a helping hand in the prosecution of the idea of the deposition, but nothing appears to have come of the attempt for the time being. In May 1782, the Mahārāṇi also addressed a letter to Lord Macartney, the then Governor of Madras (1781-1785), offering "to pay one crore or ten millions of Arcot Rupees for the expence of the camp, and grant to the Company a *jaghir* to the amount of fifteen lacks of Rupees per annum, and thirty-six lacks more annually for the payment of the Company's troops to defend the kingdom," if his Lordship would condescend to comply with her agent's (Tirumala Rao's) request and help to restore the kingdom to those to whom it rightfully belonged.⁵ After a voluminous correspondence, Mr. Sullivan was, on the 27th September 1782, authorised to conclude a treaty with Tirumala Rao, in behalf of the Mahārāṇi, the main purport of which was, on the one part, the eventual restoration of the ancient family of Mysore, and, on the other, the payment of stipulated contributions, as the English army should advance into the province of Mysore, with other ulterior considerations reciprocally

Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 239-240. Wilks spells Tirumala Rao as "Tremalrow" and refers to the Mahārāṇi as "Ranee." For further particulars about them, see below.

5. *Count-Corres.*, XXXI. 339-340, *Letter* No. 10, dated May 28, 1782. Mahārāṇi Lakshammammaṇi is referred to in this letter as "Latchumama." We find her generally mentioned in the *Fort St. George Records* as the "Rana."

advantageous, but cautiously guarding the English Government against any inconvenient pledge.⁶ The

treaty, known as "*The Rāṇa Treaty for the Restoration of the Hindoo Dynasty of Mysore*," was concluded at

The Rāṇa Treaty,
October 28, 1782.

Tanjore on the 28th of October, and ratified by the Government of Madras on the 27th of November, "subject to the approbation of the Governor-General and Council."⁷

Copies of this Treaty, in fifteen articles, which was attested and authenticated by the Rev. Schwartz, were "interchanged with Tirumal Row, the Agent of Her Excellency the said Rana" and with Mr. John Sullivan "as representative of the Honourable Company." In the very first article, the Company acknowledge that they "are well acquainted with the usurpation of Hyder Ali and the misfortunes which he has brought upon the family of the Rajah of Mysore, whose servant he was." The article then states: "They (the Company) are willing to assist with their troops in reducing Hyder Ali, and in re-establishing the Rajah in his hereditary dominions upon the conditions proposed in the first, second, third and fourth Articles." In these articles, a successive scale of payment is prescribed as each place is taken over from the usurper and handed back to the Mahārāṇi. Thus, on the taking over and delivery of the Coimbatore country, three lakhs of *Kaṇṭhirāyi Pagodas* was to be paid; on the English army ascending the Bālaghāt and taking Harādanahalli and other forts, a further sum of one lakh of *Pagodas* was to be paid; on "the surrender of the fort of Mysore and the government of the country being given over to our Rana or whoever she may adopt,"

6. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 240.

7. *Ibid.*, 241. For the text of the *Treaty*, see Appendix III—(1).

another one lakh was to be paid; and finally, upon the fall of Seringapatam, another five lakhs was to be paid, "in all the sum of ten lakhs of *Pagoda*" was to be paid. The English were also to maintain an army in the Mysore country, whose expenses were to be paid for by the Rāṇa's government. The Company agreed not to interfere in the internal management of the country nor "in the business of the Polygars, in the collection of the revenue, or in the nomination of Killedars, etc., but will support and assist all officers who may be appointed by the Government of Mysore." If the Company failed to "reduce Hyder Naig," and were "obliged to make peace with him," the Company were to take over the protection of the loyalists and reimburse them of the money advanced to them "on account of our Rāṇa for the purposes before mentioned." In the event of success, the Company engaged to put the Rāṇa in possession of "all conquests made by Hyder Ali and protect her and her successors in the same," except the territories taken by Haidar from the Mahrattas and the Nizām, in regard to which the Company were to retain liberty "to enter into such engagements with those powers relative to those countries as they may think proper."⁸

In regard to those who took part in this attempt, the Mahārāṇi Lakshammamanni and Tirumala Rao, her Agent, deserve a few words. The Mahārāṇi was the daughter of Katti Gōpālarāja Urs, who had been at one time nominated Killedār of Trichinopoly. She was

The leading figures
in the movement.

8. See Appendix III—(1); also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2556-2558 (referring to the contents of the *Treaty*). The stipulated contributions, according to the outlines of the plan originally proposed by Tirumala Rao, were as follows: "Three lakhs of pagodas by instalments, as the English advanced in the reduction of Coimbatore and other districts on the side of the hills; one lakh on the fall of Haradanahalli; one upon that of Mysore; 75,000 pagodas

the widow of the late Rāja Chikka Krishnarāja Wodeyar and survived the whole of the subsequent revolutions and signed the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam in 1799. Wilks describes her as living in August 1808 "in the perfect possession of her faculties, a sensible and amiable old lady, whose observations on the incidents of her eventful life are highly interesting and intelligent." Many accounts of her distinguished career have appeared in recent years, of which the most notable ones will be found in the publication entitled *Mysore Heroes*. She seems to have signed her letters—at any rate to her agent and envoy—as "Sree Ranga," apparently after the name of the famous god at Seringapatam, of whom she is known to have been a great devotee. From a careful consideration of all the relevant facts, the opinion might be hazarded that she was the inspirer of the loyalists, if she was not, indeed, at their head. She was not merely astute; she was brave, diplomatic and energetic to a degree in the prosecution of the great desire that seems to have taken possession of her at this period of her life. She was a doggedly persevering lady and was endowed with patience and powers of endurance quite past understanding to mere men. Tirumala Rao, her Agent, belonged to a respected Śrī-Vaishṇava family long resident in the State. His real name appears to have been Tirumala Aiyangār, a descendant of the minister of that name who served under Chikkadēvarāja. He traced his descent from one Gōvindāchāri, the hereditary *guru* of the ancient kings of Vijayanagar. The story of his endeavour on behalf of his sovereign at Tanjore and Madras is told in a

monthly from that event to the fall of Seringapatam and five every year for the protection of Mysore; or fifteen lakhs for the whole of Hyder's possessions, with a *jahgīr* of six lakhs wherever the Company preferred . . . " (see *Mily. Cons.*, LXXX. 1814-1815, Consultation dated June 13, 1782; also *Desp. to Eng.*, XVII. 42, *Despatch* dated September 5, 1782).

pamphlet privately issued some forty years ago by a descendant of his, under the title of the *Mysore Pradhāns* (1902). Tirumala Rao was undoubtedly a man of resource. He was not only capable of interesting others in the cause he believed in but also made them do their utmost for it. From authentic documents made public—documents vouched for by General Harris, Fallofield, etc.,—it is clear that he spent large sums from out of his private purse for the good of the Mysore Ruling House and the East India Company. The Company too were generous in recognising his worth and services, and not only reimbursed him of his expenses to some extent but also provided him with an allowance to meet his daily wants. Tirumala Rao was assisted in his arduous and dangerous labours by his brother Nārāyaṇa Rao. Their reward in case of success was to be ten per cent of the revenues of the restored districts and the office of *Pradhāna* (or Chief Minister) to be held hereditarily in their family. They got into touch with successive Governors of Madras and through their aid they made the position of the Royal House of Mysore better known. The sympathy they won for the cause they believed in and worked for did not end in words. They actively associated themselves in the English campaign of 1783 described below.⁹

Already in September 1782, during the progress of the *Rāṇa* negotiations and in pursuance of the general plan then adumbrated, a reinforcement of Europeans and artillery was detached from Madras under Col. Lang, appointed to the command of the southern army in

Movements of the
Southern army:
Activities of Col.
Lang, September
1782—May 1783.

9. *Vide*, on this section, *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2558-2560. The reference to Fallofield in the text is to Ernest William Fallofield (?-1816), who began as Writer in 1767, became Chief of Cuddalore, which office he held at its capitulation in 1783, and subsequently rose to be Member of Council, Fort St. George, and President of the Board of Trade.

Tanjore. He was to assist Col. Humberston, then at Paniani preparing to proceed against Pālghāthēri, and penetrate into Coimbatore with a view eventually to attack Seringapatam, the capital of Mysore.¹⁰ Col. Lang, on his arrival in the South, commenced to demolish the fortifications at Negapatam, after which he proceeded to Trichinopoly, there to prepare to effect a diversion against the Mysorean possessions in Dindigal and Coimbatore; but the want of sufficient carriage and other difficulties prevented him from moving until the middle of March 1783, shortly after which the army, accompanied by Tirumala Rao, arrived at Karūr. Fire was opened on the Pettah on the night of the 21st, and a breach having been made, the place was assaulted the next day. The Mysoreans in possession of it having retired into the fort after three successful attacks, were driven out of the covered way by a storming party (composed of 40 Europeans and four companies of sepoys) who effected a lodgment on the glacis on the night of the 2nd April. The Mysoreans abandoned the place during the same night and Col. Lang obtained possession of it after a defence which cost about one hundred and thirty killed and wounded. The Hindu colours of Mysore were hoisted on the ramparts of this frontier post in Coimbatore and the management of the district entrusted to Tirumala Rao, with a view to collect the stipulated payment in part of one lakh of rupees, which, it appears, Tirumala Rao was unable immediately to accomplish. Col. Lang then marched on to Aravakurichi, which was taken by storm on the 10th. Dindigal next surrendered on the 4th May, and the Colonel was active on the track between Negapatam, Tanjore and Trichinopoly till about the middle of the month, when he, being superseded, was recalled to join

10. Fullarton, *A View of the English Interests in India* (1787), 101-102, *et seq.*

the main English army before Cuddalore and Col. William Fullarton, a talented officer, was invested with the southern command.¹¹

About this time General Matthews with the Bombay army being engaged with Tipū on the West Coast, Lord Macartney, with a view to co-operate with him, sought to distract Tipū's attention by reinforcing the detachment in Malabar under Cols. Macleod and Humberston, by forming a considerable force in the *Northern Circars* under General Jones, and by directing Col. Fullarton to penetrate into the richest possessions of Mysore in the South, with Seringapatam as the ultimate goal.¹² Col. Fullarton, augmenting his field force by battalions from Tanjore, Trichinopoly and Tinnevely, proceeded at the head of an army of 500 European soldiers (H.M.'s 98th Regiment) and 16,000 sepoys, with 22 pieces of cannon, managed by a good train of artillery.¹³ By the 25th of May, he advanced from Dindigal towards Dhārāpuram, which fell on the 2nd June; he was within six days' march of Pālghāṭhēri, and hopes were entertained of the reduction of Seringapatam and of the dismemberment of the kingdom of Mysore, when he received a positive order from General Stuart to march towards him at Cuddalore, with the utmost expedition. Arrived on the opposite bank of the Cauvery at Trichinopoly, he received further instructions from the General to march without delay to Cuddalore, and orders no less explicit from Lord Macartney to recross the river and continue to the southward. The Colonel, however, risked the responsibility of marching towards Cuddalore, but on his arrival within three forced marches of that place, was apprized of the cessation of hostilities with the French.

11. Wilson, *o.c.*, II 85-86; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 241-242; Fullarton, *o.c.*, 102, 107; and Robson, *o.c.*, 167.

12. Fullarton, *o.c.*, 105 n, 107, *et seq*; also Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 316.

13. *Ibid.*, 107; *Memoirs*, I. 500.

The termination of the French war and the absence of Tipū's army from the Coromandel, rendered disposable a large portion of the army assembled at Cuddalore, and Col. Fullarton was ordered to return to the southward, reinforced to an extent which nearly doubled his numbers. He soon reoccupied Karūr and Dhārāpuram and was intending to advance against the forts and magazines of Satyamangalam, Nāmakal and Śankaridurg on the north of the Coleroon and from thence to cross the river and besiege and strengthen Erode with a view to moving eventually against Seringapatam, when, on intelligence of the negotiations on foot for peace with Tipū at Mangalore, he was enjoined to abstain from farther hostilities against him, unless a violation of the armistice or farther instructions should authorize the measure.¹⁴

Thereupon Col. Fullarton, with a view to re-establishing the Company's authority in the southern provinces, attempted a diversion against the refractory Pāḷegārs, Kallars and other tributaries settled therein. He commenced a series of successful operations, which continued until the

His further activities: Diversion against the Pāḷegārs of Madura and Tinnevely, August-October 1788.

close of the war and formed a striking contrast to the unsatisfactory result obtained under the other leaders of the time, Coote only excepted. He began by marching to Mēlūr, in the Madura district, where he left a strong garrison. Next he reduced Sivaganga, about twenty miles further east. Here he exacted the tribute due from the Rāja and compensation for the ravages committed by him in the Company's territory. Next he took Panjālamkurichi, distributing the large sums of money found in it to the troops, who had been ten months in

14. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 242-244; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 86; Fullarton, *o.c.*, 110-112, 114-116, 145; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 316, 318, 337-339; *Memoirs*, I.c., and Robson (*o.c.*, 167-168), who refers to Dhārāpuram as "Darampore."

arrears of pay. Having arranged for garrisoning this fort, he moved on to Śivagiri, which was evacuated. The Rāja, who had fled to a mountain stronghold, had been joined by several other Pālegārs. Their united resistance was, however, broken and the stronghold taken. With its reduction, all the Madura and Tinnevely Pālegārs submitted and the Company's authority re-established over a tract extending more than 300 miles from Trichinopoly. At Dindigal, which he reached on the 23rd September, two detachments from the main army joined him. This accession raised his force to 13,600 men, of whom 2,050 were Europeans. He brigaded the troops and changed the usual march order to facilitate easy communication between distant parts of the line, and then recommenced his march. Early in October, he proceeded towards Palni, about thirty miles south of Dhārāpuram, in order to put the renter of Dindigal and his family in possession of their inheritance, the petty Rājāship of Palni.¹⁵

About the 16th of October, intelligence was received from Tellicherry of the infraction of the armistice and the recommencement of hostilities by Tipū against Mangalore, which had induced General Macleod to depart from that place on the 9th of the same month, and determined him on moving to the westward. Col. Fullarton, who had all the while never lost sight of an eventual movement to the capital of Mysore, had by now collected guns, shot and stores from the southern garrisons. He had also solicited the

15. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 86-91; Fullarton, *o.c.*, 116-154; also Wilks (*o.c.*, II. 244), who briefly refers to these activities of Col. Fullarton by saying, "Some intermediate operations against dependent chiefs who had exhibited a refractory spirit, during a period of public pressure, occupied the force under his command for some months." The *Memoirs* (I. 512) rounds off the number of men in Col. Fullarton's army at 14,000, "a great proportion of whom," according to it, "were Europeans, with a suitable train of artillery."

Rāja of Travancore for an advance of stores and kept up a constant correspondence with the Zāmorin of Calicut and other Rājas of Malabar who had suffered at the hands of Haidar and Tipū. He had thus no less an objective in view than the conquest of Seringapatam, and had to choose between obliging Tipū either to suffer the English to proceed unmolested in the prosecution of operations, the ultimate object of which was the overthrow of his government, or compel him, in the obstruction of these proceedings, to afford them the wished for opportunity of a close engagement in the field. Accordingly, on the 18th of October, he resolved upon moving in full force to the westward, the immediate object of which being the relief of Mangalore and the ultimate object the reduction of Haidar's family, or at least the attainment of a respectable accommodation. The English expectation of relieving Mangalore, about this time, by an actual appearance before the place was very remote, the distance to be traversed over the Mysore country being not less than 500 miles. There appeared, therefore, only two practicable movements of sufficient importance to make Tipū raise the siege of Mangalore: the one was to move to Coimbatore, Satyamangalam and the pass of Gajjalahatti, leading up the Ghāts directly to the forts of Mysore and Seringapatam; the other was to move against Pālghatchēri. Pālghatchēri, being a strong place situated in a fertile and extensive tract covered with thick teak forests and overlooking the river Paniani, held forth every advantage, strategic and other. Menacing the possessions of Tipū on the West Coast and towards Mysore by the route of Coimbatore and Gajjalahatti, it commanded the only practicable communication between the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, while magazines of grain established there would bring the military resources of Madras and Bombay into one point of union and effect. It promised the English possession of all the

countries from Trichinopoly by Dhārāpuram; opened the means of supply from Travancore, Cochin and other places on the Malabar coast; afforded confidence to the Zāmorin and other disaffected Rājas, from Cochin to Goa, who had been struggling to shake off the yoke of Haidar; and left the English free to disguise their movements and proceed either by the route of Coimbatore and Gajjalahatti, or by Calicut and the pass of Dāmālcēri, to the siege of Seringapatam. Besides, the possession of Pālghātchēri was of such intrinsic consequence to Mysore that its reduction could not fail to weigh essentially in the negotiations for peace then said to be in agitation, and promised to make Tipū raise the siege of Mangalore in order to oppose the further progress of the English.¹⁶

Marching from Palni on the 22nd of October, Col. Fullarton reduced the forts of Cumalum, Pālghāt, October-November 1783. Chuckligiri and Ānamalai, and moved on Pālghāt, with the view of uniting his forces to those of Gen. Macleod, and marching in force for the relief of Mangalore. After a difficult and tedious route, cut through the centre of the stately teak forests of Ānamalai, which covers the immense break in the Alpine chain of the Peninsula, and securing supplies from Kollengode on the way, the army, keeping close to the stupendous hills on their left, penetrated to Pālghāt, and the main body encamped about two miles from the place on the 5th November. The Pettah or open town on the east and north faces of the fort was taken possession of two or three days later, and an attack was carried forward on each of these faces, the besieged keeping up a continuous fire on the covering and working parties of the English. The battering train and stores arrived on the 9th and the place was closely invested till the 13th, when fire was opened on it from two batteries at the

16. Wilks, *o.c.*, II-245; Fullarton, *o.c.*, 146, 152, 155-159, 167, 296-299; and Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 340.

distance of 400 yards, by which the defences were nearly destroyed before sunset. Heavy rain then commenced, which was taken advantage of by Captain Maitland (on duty in the trenches) to make a sudden attack with the flank battalion. The covered way, which was not palisaded, was taken possession of without loss and pursuing the fugitives through the two gateways, he struck such a panic into the garrison as to cause its immediate surrender during the night. Thus, after a short but active and meritorious siege, the place was carried, and the treasure found in it (50,000 pagodas or $1\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees) was divided amongst the troops in consideration of their necessities.¹⁷ After garrisoning the fort and reinstating the heir-apparent of the Zāmorin in the territory of Pālghāt, Col. Fullarton carried on an active correspondence with Gen. Macleod, Col. Campbell and the Residency of Tellicherry, intimating his intention of approaching the West Coast and assuring Gen. Macleod of his earnest wish to co-operate with him in every measure that could tend to advance the English in full force against Seringapatam. He also wrote for supplies of battering guns and military stores from Tellicherry, offering to move down to Paniani or Calicut, and to proceed to Seringapatam, either by the pass of Dāmalchēri, through the country of the Nairs, or else return from Paniani or Calicut to Pālghātchēri, and

17. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 91-92; Fullarton, *o.c.*, 159-166, 296-299; see also and compare Wilks, *l.c.*; *Memoirs*, I. 512; and Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 340-341. Fullarton gives the following description of the fort of Pālghāt as he saw it on its surrender on the 18th of November 1783: "We found the fort covered by a respectable glacis, with a good covert way; a very broad and deep ditch, completely reveted; a large berme, and a very strong commanding rampart. The figure of the fort was nearly quadrangular; the dimensions of its faces were 528 feet by 492: each angle was defended by a capacious round bastion with nine embrasures, and a bastion of similar construction on the centre of each curtain. It had only one entrance, passing through three gateways, mounted a great number of guns upon the works, and contained a garrison of 4,000 men" (Fullarton, *o.c.*, 165, 297).

from thence by Coimbatore as might be judged most eligible.¹⁸ So optimistic was Col. Fullarton about this time that, as he put it, "should these requisitions be complied with, and the war with Tippoo be continued," he had "little doubt of being able to march to Seringapatam in hopes of deciding this destructive contest at the gates of his capital."¹⁹ Gen. Macleod assured the the Colonel that in the event of the latter's moving towards him, he would unite in prosecuting the movement to Seringapatam.²⁰ But, after communicating with Tellicherry, it was found that it was incapable of furnishing the expected provisions and stores; that the troops under Gen. Macleod could not be provided with a field equipage in less than two months; and that the whole extent of 500 miles to be traversed, like every narrow strip of low country, interposed between an elevated range of mountains and the sea, was intersected by a succession of rivers, ravines and other impediments, which rendered hopeless a rapid advance in that direction.

Its strategic importance.

The possession of a respectable post of communication like Pālgāt, between Malabar and Coimbatore, was, however, in itself an important acquisition. Provisions were furnished in profusion by the Zāmorin and his Nairs, eager to be emancipated from alien yoke; and not only on this account, but with reference to the alternative of ascending towards Seringapatam by the pass of Gajjalahatti, the occupation of Pālgāt was, if not indispensable, at least of eminent utility. On a comparison of all the routes presented to Col. Fullarton's choice, the Colonel, assigning his preference to the last stated, resolved to rely for supplies on Cochin and to prosecute his measures by a march on Coimbatore,

18. Fullarton, *o.c.*, 167-170, 301.

19. *Ibid.*, 301-302. App. IV: Letter from Fullarton to Lord Macartney and Select Committee, Fort St. George, dated November 15, 1783.

20. *Ibid.*, 170.

preserving the utmost union of operation with the Malabar army.²¹

On the 26th of November, the Colonel arrived before Coimbatore. A battery was immediately constructed, but, before a breach was effected the place surrendered with a large quantity of ammunition, stores and grain.²² With the fort and pass of Pālghāthchēri on the western flank, the possession of Coimbatore belonging to Mysore in the Pāyanghāt now assured to the English an immediate access to Seringapatam, commanding a communication with the new acquisitions on the one side and the Company's southern provinces on the other.²³ Col. Fullarton could also now rely for the success of his project on the adherents of the ancient Ruling House of Mysore, who, despite a late premature attempt at the overthrow of Tipū's government and the re-establishment of the legitimate sovereign of Mysore, described in the sequel,²⁴ had now before them unequivocal proofs of his (Colonel's) earnest zeal "to support their interests and favourite family."²⁵ Accordingly the troops were forthwith provided with ten days' grain, the carriages repaired, the departments arranged, and the Colonel made preparations to advance by the Gajjalahatti pass against the forts and magazines of Satyamangalam and Haradanahalli, and from thence to Seringapatam, in the hope of attacking that place at a disadvantage during the absence of Tipū, then before Mangalore with a considerable army, or to force him to raise that siege. These preparations had been completed, and Fullarton was about to march, when, on the 28th November, he received

21. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 246; Fullarton, *o.c.*, 170-171.

22. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 92-93; Fullarton, *o.c.*, 171.

23. Fullarton, *o.c.*, 172, 174-175.

24. See below—section on *The Royalist Revolution*, July 1788.

25. Fullarton, *o.c.*, 177.

instructions desiring him not only to suspend his intended operations, but unconditionally restore all the places he had taken (excepting the fort of Dindigal) and retire within the limits possessed by the English on the 26th July preceding. These instructions emanated from the English Commissioners (Messrs. Sadleir and Staunton), who, at the suggestion of Tipū, had been deputed by Lord Macartney to proceed to Mangalore, there to negotiate a treaty, and who had been invested with plenary powers. Col. Fullarton remonstrated strongly, pointed out the great advantage of his position and intended operations, and intimated his intention to remain at Coimbatore until further orders. His reasoning, however, was of no avail, and, about the middle of December, he was directed by the Madras Government to obey the instructions of the Commissioners. He accordingly left Coimbatore, and returning towards the South, he broke up his army into three divisions, one of which was sent to Karūr, another to the neighbourhood of Dindigal, and the third to Kovanūr on the borders of Madura. Scarcely had he finished these cantoning arrangements, when the Government, beginning to doubt the sincerity of Tipū, sent orders desiring him to reassemble his army, and to retain possession, until the conclusion of the negotiation, of all places taken by him which he had not already given up in conformity with their previous instructions. Thereupon he reluctantly fell back on Trichinopoly, where he remained in a state of suspense for a considerable time.²⁶

During the early part of Tipū's siege of Mangalore and

The Royalist Revolution, July 1788.

Col. Fullarton's stay in the Coimbatore country on his march back from Cudalore, narrated above, an event of outstanding importance took place in the capital city of

26. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 93-94; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 252, 258-261; Fullarton, *o.c.*, 177-179; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 341; and *Memoirs*, l.c.

Seringapatam, to which we may now advert. The adherents of the Mysore Royal Family, who were for long, as we have seen, actively interested in the uprooting of Haidar's usurpation and the restoration to power of the Hindu dynasty, ventured to achieve their object. The earlier attempt in this direction had been unsuccessfully made in 1760-1761 but the ardour of the Royalists had not been damped. The time appeared, indeed, propitious for a fresh attempt. Haidar had died ; his son Tipū, who had succeeded to his power and authority,

The objectives of the Royalists.

generally unpopular and disliked by his own father on occasions, was absent in Mangalore; and some of Tipū's own party were inimical to him. Added to these pre-disposing causes was the intensity of feeling among the dispossessed *pālegārs* and others for the losses of territory sustained by them and the indignities they had suffered. Very similar was the feeling among the immediate adherents of the reigning family, both Hindu and Muhammadan, who made up their minds that the usurpation should cease and the Royal House of Mysore restored to its ancient position of dignity and independence. The attempt appears to have been carefully planned, steps having been taken to time it opportunely with the expected arrival of British troops at the capital. The scheme accordingly consisted of two parts. One was, as already noticed, the obtaining of British aid by getting the English at Madras interested in the restoration idea, as much in their own interests as in the interests of the loyalists; and the other was, by taking advantage of Tipū's absence from Seringapatam and the proximity to it of the English army in the southern parts of Mysore, to make the necessary arrangements at the capital by getting the loyalists act together and subvert on a day fixed the Killedār's authority in the city and thus obtain the key position as it were to the Government of

the State. Once this was done, the idea seems to have been the English army would occupy the fortress and the return of Tipū effectually prevented.²⁷

Anche Shāmaïya, head of the post office and police since 1779, who had accompanied Tipū to Mangalore, played the leading role in the movement. Shāmaïya, while he aimed at nothing less than the destruction of Tipū and his men at Mangalore, communicated his further plans to his brother Rangaiya (Rangiengār), whom he had placed at the head of the department at Seringapatam during his absence. At this period, Singaiya (Singariengār), the provincial head of the department at Coimbatore, was also on business in Seringapatam, and with Narasinga Rao, pay-master and town-major, was called to the deliberations. Two subādārs and nine headmen, Hindu and Muhammadan commandants of corps, were also gained over, one of the subādārs commanding one hundred men, the other being an officer of that rank in Capt. Keating's battalion and taken prisoner on the fall of Āmbūr (1781). These persons assembled together several times and were sworn to secrecy. The Hindu Rāja, it was resolved, was to be nominally restored and Shāmaïya, Rangaiya and Narasinga Rao were to form the administration; the Killedār, the Head-Major and Asad Khān, the Commandant, were to be captured and put to death; all the prisoners, European and other, were to be released and placed under the command of Gen. Matthews, and the whole of Asad Khān's battalion was to be destroyed, and the gates of the capital to be seized, together with the magazines and treasures. Narasinga Rao undertook the

27. *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2552-2553. The statement in this work (at p. 2552) that "two attempts had already been unsuccessfully made," etc., is to be understood to refer to the Royalist movement of 1760-1761, which aimed at nipping in the bud the usurpation but failed (see *Ante* Vol. II. ch. XI. pp. 242-251).

actual execution of the material part of the plot. Letters were then despatched to the English army in the Coimbatore country, and to the Mahrattas and the Coorgs, seeking their assistance. To convince the English of the nature and extent of the Royalist movement, seals and signatures of sufficient authenticity were obtained of the principal persons above named, of the commandants of corps, and particularly of Subbarāja Urs, ostensibly the representative of the imprisoned Royal Family, but in fact a descendant by the female line of the late Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya. Rangaiya, through the medium of Singaiya at Coimbatore, kept up communication with the English army which was to ascend the ghāts leading to Seringapatam at the period agreed. And intelligence from Singaiya gave assurances of that army being ready to advance at the concerted notice whenever it should be given. Everything promised success. Rangaiya, however, considering further delay to be hazardous on account of the number of persons entrusted with the secret and the danger of treacherous or accidental discovery, pressed Narasinga Rao to strike the blow, and everything was prepared for nine o'clock on the 24th of July 1783, when the whole party were to meet at the general rendezvous.²⁸

28. Wilks, *o.c.*, II-247-249; *Memoirs*, II. 133-134; see also and compare Fullarton, *o.c.*, 177; Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 359; James Bristow, *Narrative of Sufferings* (1794), 73; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 9, and *Mys. Gaz.*, II-iv. 2560-2552 (quoting from Wilks). Innes Munro speaks of the whole event "as a feasible plan of insurrection, in favour of the right king of Misore, concerted at Seringapatnam" (*l.c.*) Wilks refers to Subbarāja Urs as "Souberaj". The *Memoirs of Late War in Asia* (Vol. II), publishing the *Narrative of Sufferings of English Prisoners*, has been drawn upon here by way of supplementing Wilks. It was first published in 1788 and is accordingly of great value, being the first account we have of the insurrection. It, however, hardly mentions the Royalist leaders by name, and merely speaks of the "Inchivala [Anchevāla], head post-master to Tippoo Saib and keeper of the privy seals," and of the "Prime Minister of the old King of Mysore", among the principal persons concerned in the affair. The reference here, of course, is to Anche Shāmaiya and Subbarāja Urs. It is not, however, clear from

It was the pay-day of Asad Khān's and some other Muhammadan corps, when he would be present to superintend its distribution to the corps in waiting and without arms at the Cuchēri, where the Killedār usually attended before the appointed hour. The treasury attendants, the corps of pioneers employed in moving the treasure, a body of *jetties* (professional athletes) who had the guard of that part of the palace, were all provided with daggers to commence the work with the destruction of the Killedār and his attendants, while large bodies of Hindu peons were ready to fall, in every direction, on the unarmed Muhammadans. Matters being thus arranged, the Killedār Saiyid Muhammad Khān, while returning from the hall of business to his house on the night of the 23rd, was accosted in a whisper by the Subādār commanding one hundred men, who betrayed to him the whole plot. Forthwith, a dispatch prepared for transmission to the English army was seized, guards were ordered and the whole party secured and thrown into prison. Narasinga Rao made a full disclosure in the hope of pardon, and all the minor agents confessed to the degree of their actual information. By way of intimidation, most of the conspirators were immediately done to death by the process of "being stripped naked and dragged through the streets of the capital at the heels of elephants"; some, "with their noses and ears cut off and ridden on jack-asses", being hanged at the north gate of the fort. Tipū's orders were sought for the disposal of the perpetrators of the plot, and on the arrival of these orders, Narasinga Rao,

the *Memoirs* whether Anche Shāmaiya was actually in Seringapatam at the time of the event. According to Kirmāṇi, as we shall see below, Shāmaiya was in Seringapatam at the moment. According to Wilks, however, who had access to all the available literature on the subject, Shāmaiya had accompanied Tipū to Mangalore. The *Memoirs* further refers to Asad Khān as "Asoff Cawn".

Subbarāja Urs, the commandants of corps and the *jetties* were executed. Shāmaiya was sent in heavy irons from Mangalore and with his brother Rangaiya was exposed to every contumely in separate iron cages—fed on “low diet,” occasionally “publicly flogged” near the English prison, and “his back rubbed with chilleys, or cayenne pepper”—where they are said to have persisted to the last in denying their participation in the crime, although the torture extracted considerable treasures. Shitab, the former Killedār of Seringapatam, who had been superseded by Saiyid Muhammad, was seized on the first alarm, on mere conjecture; and was released later on a perfect conviction of his innocence. Order was restored in the capital, the inhabitants being forbidden by *tom-tom* to appear in the streets after nine o'clock at night, on pain of losing their noses and ears. The subādār who was responsible for the betrayal was soon made a commandant of Kallars (“Collieries”), with many other favours from the Nawāb.²⁹

29. *Ibid.*, 249-251; *Memoirs*, II. 184-185, 187, 152-154, 163, 174-175, 180; Fullarton, l.c.; Bristow, o.c., 73-74; and Innes Munro, o.c., 359-360; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, o.c., 9, 11, 14; and *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2562-2567 (quoting from Wilks and Kirmāṇi). Kirmāṇi, a later writer, who places the event *just before* Tipū's investment of Bednūr (i.e., somewhere in March 1783), narrates the following story:

“Anchi Shamia, a Brahmun, who was at the head of the intelligence department at the capital (Seringaputtan), having united in heart and hand with the Governor of the fort, planned and concerted to effect the destruction of his master's (Tipū's) house, and had excited a great disturbance. Muhammad Ali, the brave Commandant, with his division of troops, was sent to the capital to restore order, to remove the disaffected, and replace them with faithful and loyal servants. He proceeded by forced marches from Chengama by the route of Bangalore, and encamped on the Karighat hill, on the bank of the river, and after the fashion of wolf courtesy, began (following the path of intimacy) to show great regard and friendship towards the rebel Governor of the capital, and sent a message to him to the effect, that if permission were accorded, he would enter the fort alone and sleep one night at his house, that he might have the pleasure of seeing his family and children, and that the next morning, according to the orders of the Sultān, he would proceed by the route of Coorg to the attack of Nuggur. The Killedār lent a willing ear to the deceiving words of the Commandant, and gave

Thus failed the attempt. It is only necessary to add, by way of explanation, that Shāmaiya, who is mentioned above as the leader of the insurrection, was a Śrī-Vaishnava Brāhman of Sūlakunṭe, in the Kōlār district, and that his real name was Shāma Aiyangār, his brother being Ranga Aiyangār. Though Wilks describes him as a human monster, there is reason to believe that he was an active loyalist from the moment the usurpation hardened into a fact, *i.e.*, from the time that Haidar began to consolidate his position from a *de facto* administrator of his master's (Kartar's, *i.e.*, Sovereign Lord's) kingdom, as he called it, into his own *de jure* rule of it. When Haidar virtually dispossessed the Rāja and displaced him in the public eye, Shāma Aiyangār fell away from him and joined the band of Hindus and Muhammadans in the State who desired to

orders to the guards of the fort that he should be admitted; and he seeing all things favourable to his views and hopes, at night held his detachment in readiness, and crossing the river, placed his men in ambush near the walls of the fort, and gave them orders that when he should enter the fort, and his Turee or trumpet sound the charge, they were immediately to enter and man the walls, bastions and gates. Accordingly he, accompanied by fifty brave and experienced men as a guard, immediately after entered the gate of the fort and sounded his trumpet, and having seized and bound the guard, posted his own men at the gate. In the meantime, at the sound of the trumpet, the troops in the ambush swiftly advanced from their concealment, and entered the fort and extended their guards and sentinels on all sides. The brave Commandant now quickly advanced to the houses of the Killadār, and his deputies, and to that of Anchi Shamia and his colleagues, and before they could open their eyes from the sleep of neglect and folly, they were dragged out of their beds and put in prison. The next morning, with the sanction of the Sultān's mother, some of the rebels were blown from a gun; the companions of Shamia impaled, and he himself loaded with irons and confined in an iron cage, a fit punishment for his villainy. The office of Governor of the capital was now transferred to Syud Muhammad Khān Mehdivi, a friend of the Sultān's, and the defence of the city was entrusted to the care and responsibility of Assud Khān, Risāldār, a brave and very able man, and who was also an old servant. Muhammad Ali having effected this, immediately marched with his troops by long stages,

end the unnatural state of affairs set up by Haidar, and, what is worse, which Haidar tried to perpetuate in an aggravated form in his own family.³⁰

Though the entire scheme thus miscarried, we have no means of ascertaining to what extent the Mahārāṇi and her Pradhan Tirumala Rao, who, as we have seen,

taking with him the letters of the Sultān's mother, and his report of the arrangements made at the capital, and arrived in camp at Nuggur, and detailed all the circumstances to the presence. The Sultān was well pleased with his services and presented him with a gorget and a Khillat or dress of honor" (Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 9, 11-14).

It will be obvious from the foregoing account that Kirmāṇi is in general agreement with other sources in regard to the main fact at issue, i.e., the plot organised by Anche Shāmaiya for the overthrow of Tipū. But in respect of details, it is hard to reconcile his version with the writings of contemporaries and of Wilks, who, as he tells us, bases his account on "a secret narrative," obtained by him "under circumstances which precluded the ordinary means of scrutiny," checked by such principal sources of information as the "written and personal narratives" of Saiyid Muhammad Khān, the Killedār of Seringapatam, who discovered the conspiracy and directed the executions; "the published journals and oral information of English prisoners;" and "conversations with numerous witnesses of the overt facts" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 247). The Killedār of Seringapatam, according to Kirmāṇi, was in league with the Loyalists and he was not the person—as mentioned by Wilks—whom they aimed at. It is, however, difficult which Killedār Kirmāṇi had in view in writing his account. As he gives no name, it is possible that it was Shitab, the previous Killedār, on whom suspicion had fallen, and who was among those thrust into prison by Muhammad Ali, the Commandant. Kirmāṇi's account, compared with Wilks, is incomplete; he seems on the whole to be embellishing a traditionary tale which had come down to him, without any attempt at scrutinising its contents or chronological sequence.

According to Innes Munro, the person who betrayed the whole plot was one Richard Hegan. "Just as the plan was ripe for execution, one Richard Hegan," he writes, "who had deserted from the Company's service, being led into the plot, made a discovery of the whole to the Governor on the very night before it was to take place." "The fellow's treachery, however," he continues, "was the means of saving his life, as two soldiers of the 73rd regiment, suspicious of his fidelity, determined that night to put an end to his existence. He was afterwards made Commandant of the five hundred slaves as a recompense for his attachment to the interests of the Nabob" (Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 360). The Subādār of one hundred men, referred to in the text above, seems evidently to be identical with the Richard Hegan of Innes Munro.

30. *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2565.

played an important part in the execution of the *Rāṇa Treaty* of October 28, 1782, participated in it. Indeed, as Wilks, who had access to all the available records on the subject and who, "on a fair consideration of all the authentic facts," ascribes to the revolutionaries at Seringapatam "a precipitancy rendered necessary by circumstances, and a more confident assertion for the encouragement of their friends, than they were justified in making regarding the immediate advance of the army" from Coimbatore, observes :³¹ "Neither evidence, nor the unlimited use of the torture, had directed the slightest suspicion towards the imprisoned Rane; it is just possible that she might afterwards have been induced... ..to assume a disguise in her confidential conversations with the late Sir Barry Close, and with the author; but the absence even of suspicion, when so strongly excited by circumstances, added to her uniform and consistent assurances, convinced them both of her entire ignorance of every part of the correspondence conducted in her name." As regards Tirumala Rao, Wilks continues :³² "but that conviction must not be understood to impugn the reality of Tremalrow's projects for the subversion of the actual government," for in the executions which followed the betrayal of the plot, "seven hundred" of Tirumala Rao's "caste people and relations," as he himself tells us,³³ were put to death on the orders of Tipū, on the latter's hearing of these proceedings. Wilks, again, is far from ascribing to Tirumala Rao, who was at this time away from Seringapatam, "the imprudence and impolicy of having encouraged" the expectation of English help from

31. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 251.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Fort St. George Records: Rev. Cons.*, XLVII. 2008, *Consultation* dated August 17, 1792, recording Tirumala Rao's petition to Charles Oakley and Council, Madras. The reference here is to an event which took place in Seringapatam, in 1784, after Tipū's return from Mangalore.

Coimbatore, "at the particular period when he knew the English to be restrained from action by the armistice of Cuddalore, when Col. Fullarton was preparing to march from Trichinopoly (as he did on the 4th of August), in the opposite direction of Sevagunga."³⁴ In any case, "it may not be necessary to conjecture," as Wilks further rightly observes,³⁵ "in what manner the conflicting pretensions of Tremalrow and Shamia might, in the event of success, have been adjusted."

This attempted revolution at home apart, Tipū's position at Mangalore, since the truce of August 1783, was gradually becoming critical. His whole power, assisted by the science of his French auxiliaries, could not force a breach that had long lain open and he was repulsed by the troops of Col. Campbell in every attempt to carry it by storm. His army, particularly the cavalry, which was in a sickly state, had suffered greatly by a perseverance in the siege during the whole period of the rainy season."³⁶ The interior affairs of Mysore being unsettled since his accession, great confusion prevailed everywhere. His failure against Mangalore so far had encouraged the Coorg Rājah to assert his independence and lately defeat a party of Tipū's troops at Periapatam, 19 miles west of Seringapatam, while every other ancient Rājah on the Malabar side of India, from Goa to Cochin, supported by Gen. Macleod at the head of the Malabar forces, was eager to repel the tyranny of the Mysorean usurper, "to which the whole of that extensive coast no longer owned subjection."³⁷ At the same time, the Cuddapah country, where Tipū's power was ill-established, was being penetrated into by the northern English army acting under

34. Wilks, l.c.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Fullarton, o.c., 172-173; also Robson, o.c., 161.

37. *Ibid.*, 173; also *Memoirs*, II. 163.

Gen. Jones,³⁸ while the southern parts of Mysore were, as we have already seen, being systematically assailed by the southern English army under Col. Fullarton, who had no less an objective in view than the eventual reduction of Seringapatam.

While Tipū was thus circumstanced, an incident occurred in the Mysorean camp at Mangalore, to which we have to turn our attention. Tipū, who had had his own doubts of the conduct of Rustum Ali Bēg, the former Killedār of Mangalore, who had surrendered the place to Gen. Matthews in March 1783, had enquired into the affair. Tipū himself, along with the committee of investigation, at first admitted the apology of Mangalore being *an untenable post* against a regular siege. When, however, he found himself and his French allies completely foiled by the English garrison at this untenable post, he began to question the fact on which the apology was founded and to declare his suspicion of the treachery of the Killedār. When, again, after the expiration of six months, the appearance of relief, under Gen. Macleod from Malabar, on the 22nd of November, seemed to give further proof that the English garrison was neither to be starved nor beaten, Tipū became convinced "that either Rustum Ali Beg had been a traitor, or himself but a bungling soldier," and ordered him with all his principal officers to be instantly executed. Muhammad Ali, the faithful Commandant of Haidar and Tipū and an old and intimate friend of Rustum Ali, who, presiding at the investigation of the latter's conduct, had made the most favourable report, repeatedly but unsuccessfully interposed his good offices to effect his restoration to favour. On the occasion of his friend being led out to execution, he, instead of marshalling his own command, merely paraded a single battalion,

³⁸. *Ibid.*, 173-174; also Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 816.

rescued the prisoner from the guard, and openly declaring that he would not suffer him to be executed, remained on the spot, crying out "justice, in the name of God," without marching direct to the fort, which he might suddenly and safely have effected. Immediately on receipt of this intelligence, Tipū put himself at the head of several battalions of *chēlas* and proceeded to the spot. He sent frequent messengers to Muhammad Ali to dissuade him from his attempt, among them Burān-ud-dīn, the Commandant of rocket-men and one of Muhammad Ali's most intimate friends. Burān-ud-dīn, however, instead of returning with the acquiescence of Muhammad Ali, remained with him. At the same time, while Muhammad Ali was conversing with Rustum Ali, some hundred soldiers gathered round him, and it was reported to Tipū that he was collecting his troops. Tipū made a disposition for surrounding them. Only seventy-two persons remained to be surrounded, and they were secured without the least resistance. Burān-ud-dīn was led on with Rustum Ali to public execution on the hill overlooking Mangalore, while almost every officer of reputation, in view of the eminent services of Muhammad Ali, pleaded for mercy and interposed the most earnest entreaties for the preservation of his life. Tipū openly declared his consent to their appeal and on the ensuing day Muhammad Ali was sent off in irons to Seringapatam. Shaikh Hamīd, a young officer of cavalry, was charged with the escort of the prisoner. Before his departure, he was called into Tipū's tent of private audience, where he was furnished with a written order to dispatch Muhammad Ali on the road and with verbal instructions for his guidance. Apprized of the order on the second day, Muhammad Ali, after a short interval spent in devotion, quietly submitted to the ordeal of being strangled to death by means of the common groom's cord for leading a horse. Shaikh

Hamīd returned in conformity to orders, surrendered his credentials and reported that Muhammad Ali had destroyed himself. Tipū, however, affecting the most violent grief and indignation, accused Shaikh Hamīd of having connived at his taking poison and ordered him into strict confinement. Muhammad Ali had, shortly before Haidar's invasion of the Coromandel (1780), rather too prematurely combined with Tipū himself for the dethronement of his father. Although their plans had not been sufficiently matured, and were frustrated by the activity of the subsequent campaigns, the preservation of such a secret was very necessary to Tipū's own security. The life of Shaikh Hamīd was, however, spared and he was released, on powerful intercession, after some weeks.⁸⁹

39. Wilks, *o. c.* II, 280-285. Wilks spells the name of Burān-ud-dīn as "Booden Deen." (see p. 282). The *Memoirs* (I. 479-480), which refers to the surrender of Mangalore by Rustum Ali Bēg to Gen. Matthews on the 9th March 1783, places his execution "on the hill in sight of Mangalore" on the 22nd of November 1788. This is obviously an error for 22nd November 1783, with reference to the context. The *Memoirs* further spells his name as "Rustan-Ally-Beg." Fullarton merely speaks of the execution of "Mahomed Ally and other distinguished leaders in the camp of Tippoo [at Mangalore] for exciting disaffection" (*o. c.*, 177). Robson gives a very brief though slightly different version. According to him, during the siege of Mangalore, Muhammad Ali, being dissatisfied, resolved to go over to the English with 5,000 of his best men. Tipū, becoming acquainted with this by some means, brought about the death of Muhammad Ali by treachery during the latter's visit to him in the evening, and by this means prevented the desertion of the 5,000 men (Robson, *o. c.*, 161). Innes Munro too briefly refers to the event thus: "Some commotions also arose at this period in Tippoo Sahib's camp, excited by Kirham (Karim) Sahib and his adherents, which terminated in the death of Mahomed Ally, his principal general, and many others of the conspirators" (Innes Munro, *o. c.*, 348). Evidently this has reference to an alleged attempt on the part of some adherents of Karim Sahib, the brother of Tipū, to make him succeed Haidar, in preference to Tipū. An earlier attempt in Karim Sahib's favour was discovered by Pūrṣaiya and dealt with by him. (See ante. Ch. VIII). Kirmāni, however, a later writer, who places the event immediately after the surrender of Bednūr by Gen. Matthews (*i. e.*, somewhere in May 1783), has an entirely different account of the end of Muhammad Ali. According to him, Kāsim Ali, Governor of Bednūr, intrigued with Shaikh Ayāz

Khān to surrender that fort to Gen. Matthews. On its recapture by Tipū, he was sentenced to death. Muhammad Ali interceded to prevent his execution. Tipū then sent for Muhammad Ali and argued with him, whereupon Muhammad Ali became disrespectful and Tipū repeated his orders. Muhammad Ali again interceded and took Kāsim Ali with him on the road to Seringapatam. One Saiyid Hamīd, an officer from Arcot, was sent after him. He brought them back to Tipū, who ordered Kāsim Ali to be instantly impaled and Muhammad Ali to be placed in a palankeen and sent to Seringapatam. Tipū punished the followers of Muhammad Ali by mutilating them, and they then followed Muhammad Ali, reproaching him for having brought about their ruin. Thereupon Muhammad Ali, struck with remorse, killed himself by cutting his own tongue or swallowing a diamond, and he was found dead in his palankeen. Muhammad Ali is represented as having been universally known for his liberality and having died a very poor man, having given away all his wealth to religious mendicants and numerous poor who lived on his bounty (Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 19-28). The version of Wilks, based as it is on the testimony of many persons who knew the facts, is followed here as the more probably correct one, recording what actually happened. It is corroborated too in essentials by the references in contemporary sources mentioned above.

CHAPTER XI.

KHĀSĀ CHĀMARĀJA WOḌEYAR VIII,
1776-1796—(*contd.*)

War with Nawab Muhammad Ali (*The Second Mysore War*), 1780-1784 (continued): *Eighth Phase*: December 1783-March 1784: Progress of the siege of Mangalore; the arrival of Commissioners for peace from Madras, December 25, 1783—The peace negotiations: Lord Macartney's move, February 1783; Tipu's response; demands reparation for Muhammad Ali's fraud of 1752 in regard to Trichinopoly; return of Tipu's *Vakil*; Tipu's silence on the peace question, July-August 1783—Tipu's breach of the armistice of August 2, 1783; solicits *sanads* for the *Subadari* of Arcot, September 1783; sends Appaji Ram to Madras (October 1783), with reply to Lord Macartney's letter of July 2nd; Tipu's demands how far acceded to; Appaji Ram suggests the deputation of two English officers to Tipu's court—The Commissioners depart to Mangalore, November 1783; their progress through the Karnatic; discussion of preliminaries of peace; differences between the Commissioners; appointment of the third Commissioner; the Commissioners resume their journey to Mangalore—The surrender and evacuation of Mangalore, January 1784—The difficulties in the way of the Commissioners, January-February 1784: their cold reception by Tipu; Tipu's acts of hostility—The position of the Madras Government—The attitude of the Supreme Government—Tipu signs the *Treaty of Mangalore*, March 11, 1784—The contents of the *Treaty*—Reflections: the change in the position of the parties in the war of 1780-1784: the omission of Nawab Muhammad Ali's name in the *Treaty of Mangalore*; its implications for Mysore; the omission, a great blow to the Nawab; the attempted modification and its failure—Contemporary English opinion as to the peace with Tipu: the *Treaty of Mangalore* criticised—Innes Munro's observations—His position analysed—In defence of Lord Macartney—Difficulties in the way of Lord Macartney—Lord Macartney and the Supreme Government

of India—Lord Macartney's political prescience—Criticism of Tipu's conduct of the war.

TOWARDS the close of the year 1783, Tipū, eagerly bent on the reduction of Mangalore by

War with Nawāb Muhammad Ali (*The Second Mysore War*), 1780-1784 (continued).

Eighth Phase: December 1783-March 1784.

Progress of the siege of Mangalore.

famine, had, notwithstanding the heavy odds against him, so far succeeded in his attack that he carried his guns to the brink of the ditch. He had attempted storming the fort twice but was repulsed with great loss. In some places his men were so close upon the English that the latter threw fourteen inch shells over the breast-work upon his French auxiliaries. Col. Campbell with the English garrison, by now reduced to the necessity of living upon frogs, etc., resolutely held out against him. A place of contemptible strength had thus, for nearly nine months from the capture of Bednūr, locked up the services of Tipū's main army. He had, for nearly seven months of that time, wantonly and unnecessarily neutralized its efforts for the continuance of war, or the promotion of peace. He had invited also, by the same means, the invasion of one of the richest provinces of the State. The revenues of Kanara, Malabar and Coimbatore, for the greater part of the year, were either totally lost, or suffered great defalcation; and Tipū appeared to propose to himself the further object of shewing to the powers of India that he could dare to treat the English power with open contempt and derision; and ultimately exhibit them as humble supplicants for peace. In this

The arrival of Commissioners for peace from Madras, December 25, 1783.

posture of affairs, the English Commissioners, despatched by the Government of Madras to negotiate peace with Tipū, arrived in the camp at Mangalore (December 25th)¹.

1. Wilks, o.c., II. 229, 230; *Memoirs*, II. 185; and Innes Munro, o.c., 348.

Since Tipū's resumption of war with the English, the negotiations for peace actively engaged the attention of the latter. The preliminaries in this connection had commenced as early as the 12th of February, before Tipū's departure from the Coromandel, when Lord Macartney had, with the concurrence of his Council, engaged a

The peace negotiations.

Lord Macartney's move, February 1783.

Brahman named Sāmbāji (an agent at Madras on the part of the Rāja of Tanjore), proceeding on his devotion to Conjeeveram, to communicate with some of his friends in the Mysorean service and endeavour to obtain, through their means, a better treatment of the English prisoners, and through the same medium to sound Tipū's disposition regarding a separation from the French allies, and a treaty of peace with the English nation. On Sāmbāji's appearance in a public *durbār*, Tipū, glad of an opportunity to provide against unfavourable contingencies and

Tipū's response.

to ascertain the grounds on which he could command peace, directed a *vakīl* of his, Śrīnivāsa Rao, to accompany Sāmbāji on his return to Madras, at first without any written powers, but afterwards furnished with an equivocal letter, addressed to himself under Tipū's seal, authorising him to confer on the subject of peace². Śrīnivāsa Rao waited on Lord Macartney, with "assurances of his master's humane attention to the British prisoners," whose "effective relief could be alone accomplished by a peace, which the miseries of people on every side, to which Tippoo was fully sensible, rendered a most desirable event."³ The conference was opened by Śrīnivāsa Rao with a demand of reparation for the old and unredressed grievance of Muhammad

Demands reparation for Muhammad Ali's fraud of 1752 in regard to Trichinopoly.

2. *Ibid.*, 254-255.

3. *Desp. to Eng.*, XVIII, p. 164: *Despatch* dated August 13, 1783, reporting the proceedings of March 9, 1783.

Alī's fraud at Trichinopoly in 1752; and answered by a reference to the subsequent treaty of 1769⁴. "Then the Agent," in the words of a *Despatch*⁵, "proceeded to mention the grounds of the war on the part of Hyder, which were, the break of the express and solemn engagements that had been made by Mahomed Ally Cawn (Nabob of Arcot) to deliver to the Mysorean, Madura and Trichinopoly, besides a large sum of money lent to Mahomed Ally for which he had given his bond still due and bearing interest, with other grievances against him for encroachments and violences on the limits dividing the Carnatic and Hyder's territories, and suggested the justice of a redress of such grievances and a compliance with engagements which Mahomed Ally neither fulfilled nor adjusted by any subsequent agreement. The President (Lord Macartney) in answer informed the Agent that the treaty between the Governor and Council of Fort St. George and the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn Bahaudre made in the year 1769 was in behalf of the Honorable East India Company expressly for the Carnatic Payanghaut, and that such treaty was therefore a final adjustment of all claims relative to the country whether upon the Company or Mahomed Ally Cawn who had the Government of it under their protection, and that therefore all demands founded on transactions prior to the year 1769 were absolutely inadmissible." Lord Macartney forgot that Haidar's complaint was that the English did not keep to the terms of the Treaty of 1769 when called upon to do so by him and so, with justice on his side, held that that Treaty was not binding on him, because of its repudiation by the English themselves. Haidar, and with him his son Tipū, would have pleaded, as indeed they did, through their envoy Sēshagiri Rao, that the *status quo ante* had been

4. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 255.

5. *Desp. to Eng.*, *o.c.*, pp. 164-165.

long back restored immediately the English failed to respond to Haidar's demand for English aid against his foes, the Mahrattas. Moreover, he seems to have always suggested that the question of Trichinopoly is not referred to either implicitly or explicitly in the Treaty of 1769. Further, that Treaty had nothing to do with Muhammad Alī and was only with the English and Mysore's relations with Muhammad Alī remained to be adjusted in regard to Trichinopoly, the English never having assented to the position that they were principals in the Trichinopoly war of 1752. That the English were fully conscious of the fact that their breach of the Treaty of 1769 became a "pretence"—as they said to Haidar for initiating the present war—will be evident from the talks they subsequently had with Appāji Rām, who saw Lord Macartney as Tipū's envoy, as we shall see below. The principle of mutual restitution seemed likely to be the basis to which each would ultimately assent. At the same time the difficulty of Tipū's separation from the French and abandoning them to be overwhelmed by the superior power of the English, was met by the proposition of returning them in safety to the Isle of France.

Return of Tipū's
Vakil.

In this state of the negotiation, Śrīnivāsa Rao returned to his master for further instructions.⁶ Tipū having, in the meanwhile,

Tipū's silence on
the peace question,
July-August 1783.

adopted an attitude of studied silence on the subject, Lord Macartney, on the 2nd July, on the cessation of hostilities between the French and the English at Cuddalore (under *The Treaty of Versailles*, sometimes called also *The Treaty of Paris*), addressed a letter to him inviting him to accede to the conditions provisionally fixed for his acceptance and announcing a suspension of all hostility on the part of the English, until his answer should be obtained.⁷ Tipū,

6. Wilks, l.c.

7. *Ibid.*

however, started putting off the issue, although he never ceased to stress the Mysorean case by taking advantage of the situation caused by the armistice of August 2nd, especially during the informal meeting that took place between him and Gen. Macleod and Col. Campbell in the latter part of the month.⁸

All the while Tipū's attention was, as we have seen,⁹ concentrated on reducing the English the armistice of to straits rather than seem to agree August 2, 1783. to a treaty of peace. He would prefer a breach of the provisions of the armistice relating to the supply of provisions to the English garrison at Mangalore rather than yield to Lord Macartney. It was not till about two months later that Gen. Macleod, who at first seriously believed in Tipū's professions of peace, became aware of his real intentions.¹⁰ Meantime,

Solicits *sanads* for the *Subādāri* of Arcot, September 1783.

in September, Tipū was active in soliciting in his favour *sanads* for the *Subādāri* of Arcot, offering lakhs as *nazarāna*.¹¹ At last, on the 5th of

October, at just the moment when Tipū's plans for starving Mangalore were approaching maturity, Appāji

Sends Appāji Rām to Madras (October 1783), with reply to Lord Macartney's letter of July 2nd.

Tipū's demands how far acceded to.

Rām, his envoy, arrived in Madras, charged with Tipū's reply to Lord Macartney—full of amicable profession—and the customary credentials.¹² Tipū's demands were, as usual, at first extravagant, but gradually sunk into an apparent assent to the principle of mutual restitution of prisoners and places. The English had no prisoners on their side but Tipū, treating as such

8. See, for details, *Ante* Ch. VIII—Section on siege of Mangalore, August-December 1783.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Wilks, l. c.

11. *Selections, Foreign Dept.*, 111. 1024: *Advice* dated September 10, 1783, from Mudjud-ud-daula.

12. Wilks, o. c., II. 256.

Shaik Ayāz, the *Chēla*, late Governor of Bednūr, specially demanded of them to deliver him not only as a prisoner, but as his domestic slave and private property. Though Appāji Rām could be easily satisfied as to the hopelessness of such a demand, he could not, on this point, decide, in opposition to official instructions, without reference. Appāji Rām next attempted the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance between Tipū and the English. This proposition was, however, rejected by the latter on the ground of past experience, regarding the treaty of 1769 as having furnished to Haidar "a *pretence* for the present war." Difficulties purposely created were made to prolong the time occupied in the negotiations, until Appāji Rām suggested that as frequent references to his master would only continue to protract the negotiations, he saw no mode so likely to accelerate the

Appāji Rām suggests the deputation of two English officers to Tipū's court.

conclusion of peace as the deputation to Tipū's court of two gentlemen of character, well acquainted with the views of their government.¹³

This proposition, which fully met with the wishes of the Government of Lord Macartney, was no less acceptable to Tipū, whose sole object was "to exhibit the English to the powers of Hindustan in the posture, studiously assigned to them in his work, of *suppliants for peace*."¹⁴ Accordingly Mr. Anthony Sadleir, second in Council, and Mr. George Leonard Staunton, Private Secretary to Lord Macartney, were appointed Commissioners, and, with a guard of cavalry under Captain Thomas Dallas, they set out from Madras on the 9th of November, with prospects of success materially improved by intelligence received prior to their departure of Tipū's declared accession to

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, 256-257.

the treaty of Sālbāi, signified by himself in his letters to the Pēshwa and Sindhia.¹⁵ On the 19th

Their progress
through the Karnā-
tic.

they arrived in the camp, near Ārṇi, of Saiyid Sāhib (Mīr-Moin-ud-dīn), still commanding Tipū's forces in the Coromandel.¹⁶ On the 20th, while on their way between Ārṇi and Āchārpākam, they directed Col. Fullarton—who had by now reduced Pālghāthēri—to abandon his conquests in the south of Mysore and retire within the limits possessed on the

Discussion of preli-
minaries of peace.

26th of July.¹⁷ Meanwhile, Saiyid Sāhib, who had professed to evacuate the Coromandel *en route* to Seringapatam, stopped ostensibly for the celebration of a festival at Kalāspākam, about twenty-five miles from Ārṇi. Here, a discussion intervened, which in the main centred round the early release of the numerous English captives in the prisons of Mysore. The Commissioners further desired to stipulate that all places to the eastward of the *ghāts* should first be reciprocally restored and both parties be satisfied on these points before ascending into Mysore; that the release of all the English prisoners should then ensue; and finally that on the English being satisfied regarding the execution of this condition, the restoration of all places taken by the English on the West Coast should close the process of reciprocal restitution. To the last condition, the plenipotentiaries of Tipū raised a variety of objections, demanding that the surrender of Mangalore should precede the release of the prisoners, and offering to pledge their faith that the delivery of the prisoners

15. *Ibid.*, 267; also Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 348, and Fullarton, *o.c.*, 178.

16. *Ibid.*; also Fullarton, *o.c.*, 179. Wilks refers to Saiyid Sāhib by his abbreviated name "Meer Sahib." Fullarton refers to his original name *Mīr Moin-ud-dīn* as "*Mudeen-ul-Deen-Cawn*."

17. *Ibid.* The order actually reached Col. Fullarton on the 28th of November (see Fullarton, *l.c.*; also *Ante* Ch. X, for further reference to Col. Fullarton's activities in the South down to December 1783).

should immediately follow the evacuation of Mangalore.

Differences
between the Com-
missioners.

To this proposal the first Commissioner, Mr. Sadleir, declared his readiness to assent, observing that he deemed further security to be unnecessary, beyond that pledge on which the Commissioners themselves had committed their own persons to the disposal of Tipū without hostage. The second Commissioner, Mr. Staunton, however, positively declined his assent to the surrender of Mangalore and the other western conquests, until perfectly satisfied of the release of every prisoner to be determined by the certificate of their existence by the first Commissioner in the form of an official message to Saiyid Sahib.¹⁸ These differences in opinion could not otherwise be decided than by reference to their superiors, who determined in

Appointment of the
third Commissioner.

favour of Mr. Staunton, and to provide against their probable recurrence, a third member, Mr. John Huddleston, was added to the Commission, to act with them as "Umpire" in their disputes.¹⁹ Thereupon the

The Commissioners
resume their journey
to Mangalore.

Commissioners resumed their journey to Mangalore to adjust the definitive details with Tipū. It was now distinctly agreed that in traversing Mangalore, they were to have personal intercourse with the English prisoners and an opportunity of delivering to them stores of clothing and other requisites, while arrangements were made for a regular and speedy transmission of letters to and from the Commissioners in all directions. They had, however, scarcely passed the frontiers, before they discovered all communication to be cut off. By way of avoiding the common route within sight of Bangalore, containing a considerable

18. *Ibid.*, 257-259.

19. *Ibid.*, 259; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 348-349.

depot of prisoners, they were led over routes, impenetrable to ordinary beasts of burden, in which several of the camels were destroyed. Advancing further, they were met by a letter from Tipū, assuring them that all the prisoners had, with a view to the arrangements for their liberation, been removed to the frontiers from Seringapatam, and inviting them to continue their route to his camp at Mangalore. Submitting to a violation of the preliminary evidence of sincerity, stipulated to be evinced in a free communication with the prisoners, they were permitted to proceed as fast and no faster than the progress of famine at Mangalore, where they at last arrived and encamped on the 25th of December, after a journey retarded throughout on various pretexts.²⁰

By now Tipū had found means to accomplish his own wishes by the systematic infraction of the armistice. Col. Campbell, often tantalised by the frequent appearance of a supply and reinforcement which, however, never reached him, saw that the hopes and exemplary patience of his soldiers were completely exhausted, and being reduced to their very last ratio of provisions, was forced to surrender Mangalore upon the condition of his troops being sent with arms, accoutrements and all the honours of war to join Gen. Macleod's division at Tellicherry (January 29, 1784).²¹ Thus ended the siege of Mangalore. The fatigues of a tedious and harassing service had exhausted all that was mortal of Col. Campbell, who was at last compelled by illness to quit the associates of his sufferings on the 15th of February and died at Bombay on the 23rd of March.²² Even as the Commissioners were within twenty miles from Mangalore, the evacuation of the town took place and

The surrender and evacuation of Mangalore, January 1784.

20. *Ibid.*, 261-262; *Memoirs* (II. 185), which last work definitely dates the Commissioners' arrival at Mangalore, *the 26th December 1783*.

21. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 349; see also and compare *Memoirs*, I. 512.

22. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 229; Innes Munro, *l.c.*

they were met by a second letter from Tipū, informing them that at the earnest desire of Col. Campbell, he had agreed to take charge of the fort of Mangalore.²³

In vain the Commissioners sought interviews with Tipū, who not only declined to see them, on various pretences from day to day, but continued acts of hostility, erecting gibbets opposite to the tent doors of each of the Commissioners, carrying by surprise a post dependent on Honāwar (Onore), cutting up a subaltern detachment from Col. Fullarton's army, and putting to death Gen. Matthews and several other English officers in prison.²⁴ They had the further difficulty of securing a suitable interpreter to assist in their deliberations, the Rev. Schwartz, who was proceeding for that purpose by the route of Gajjalahaṭṭi, having been stopped by Tipū at the bottom of the *ghāt* and never permitted to proceed, while the Indian interpreter had been found unsuitable.²⁵ The negotiations thus lingered on, assuming alternately every intermediate aspect from hope to despair.²⁶

Nor was the position of the Madras Government in regard to the peace question by any means free from difficulty. Since December 1783, ruined finances, broken credit and a Supreme Government differing from, if not opposed to its own views, as will be seen presently, threw a gloom over all their deliberations. Lord Macartney's policy was based on liberation of prisoners and

The difficulties in the way of the Commissioners, January-February 1784.

Their cold reception by Tipū.

Tipū's acts of hostility.


23. *Ibid.*, 262; see also and compare *Memoirs*, l.c., and Wilson, l.c.

24. *Ibid.*, 262-263; see also and compare *Memoirs*, l.c., and Wilson, l.c.

25. *Ibid.*, 260, 264-266 (referring to the story of an attempted escape on board ship by the Commissioners, a story given currency to by an Indian interpreter, a menial servant of the officer commanding the escort, and afterwards proved untrue).

26. *Ibid.*, 266.

restitution of territory, but the instruments he had chosen to effectuate his objective proved so unequal to their work. The Commissioners, when they were two, were divided in counsel; and when they became three, they were evidently far worse; and they committed the mistake of going back on their resolve to have personal intercourse with the English prisoners. Indeed they allowed themselves inveigled almost unawares into carrying out Tipū's own designs rather than their plans or keeping to the policy set down for them by the Government. Lord Macartney was thus ill-served by the men chosen by him, but his best defence would presumably have been that they were the best he could get together for the purpose. The Government of Lord Macartney had already determined that the release of prisoners should precede the restitution of Mangalore, and declared that in the distressed condition of their affairs, it was not worthwhile continuing the war for the possession of Mangalore, and that a peace ought to be made with Tipū, on the ground of each party retaining their former possessions. They further determined that Col. Fullarton should be required to fulfil the order of unqualified restitution enjoined by the Commissioners. The Colonel having, as before mentioned, received news of intimation of this determination, and the reiterated orders of the Commissioners, evacuated the whole of his conquests and retired within the prescribed limits at the very time that Tipū's troops remained in force on the Coromandel Coast, occupying to the southward a line of posts, north of the Coleroon, from Toraiyūr to Ariyalūr, and Pālamcōtta to the sea, and in the centre, the main body of Saiyid Sāhib's troops continued to occupy all that he held on their arrival, with the exception of the ruins of Chetput. On Col. Fullarton's first march from Coimbatore, he was first met by the Rev. Schwartz, whose mission to Haidar in 1779 has been related, and who, as



Earl Macartney—Another view.

we have referred to above, having consented to act as interpreter to the Commission, was proceeding to join them by the route of Gajjalahaṭṭi. Stopped by Tipū at the bottom of the *Ghāt*, the Rev. Schwartz, on meeting Col. Fullarton and learning the orders under which he was acting, described his astonishment at the proposed peace with Tipū, in terms which throw a lurid light on the policy of the English Government. "This excellent and venerable preacher of peace and Christian forbearance", in the words of Wilks, who writes in the contemporary vein, "in spite of a simplicity in the ordinary affairs of life sometimes amounting to weakness," is recorded to have observed: "Alas! Is the peace so certain that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these two rich countries (Coimbatore and Malabar) would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage that beast? The Colonel said, I cannot help it." Such, indeed, adds Wilks, was the general tone of humiliation, that even Colonel Fullarton, a few days before, had submitted to have a Captain and a small advanced guard cut off, and to be satisfied with a lame explanation. "This affair," says the Rev. Schwartz, "was quite designed to disperse the inhabitants, who came together to cut the crops, and to assist the English." But Col. Fullarton's distribution of his troops into cantonments, in conformity to these reiterated orders, were not yet completed, before the Government, reconsidering their precipitation, ordered him not only to retain possession of Pālghāt, should that fort not have been delivered, but likewise to hold fast every inch of ground of which he was in possession, till he should have received accounts of the results of the negotiation (January 26, 1784).²⁷

27. *Ibid.*, 259-261. See also and compare *Mys. Gaz.* (II. iv. 2570-2571), referring to the above as Wilks' adverse criticism of the *Treaty of Mangalore*.

All along, the Supreme Government at Calcutta had been viewing with disfavour Lord Macartney and his Council who had applied for plenary powers to treat with Tipū.²⁹ The Governor-General, Warren Hastings, had been contriving by means of diplomatic pressure to reduce Tipū to the position of a suppliant for peace and had succeeded in inducing Sindhia formally to call upon him to relinquish the English territories conformably to the Treaty of Sālbaī, or be prepared to face the united forces of the English, the Pēshwa and Sindhia.²⁹ Indeed, by about the middle of January 1784, the Mahrattas had been fully won over by Hastings and preparations were actually in progress for a combined attack on Tipū.³⁰

Alarmed by these developments, however, Tipū thought fit, in February 1784, to cease hostilities and withdraw his army from before Mangalore. "Tippoo perceived, by the active military preparations in every quarter, that the Government of Madras had", in the words of Wilks,³¹ "a poignant sense of the consequences of its errors. He knew that, in consequence of his feigned assent and practical rejection of the terms of the Treaty of Sālbaī, arrangements

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 259; also *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, VI. *Introdn.*, xvi.

²⁹ *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, l.c.; also p. 315, *Letter* No. 910, dated November 14, 1783—Warren Hastings to Tipū Sultān, where Tipū, who seemed inclined to treat and had even written to the Governor-General, is replied to the effect that no separate treaty with him was necessary as he was included both in the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Sālbaī, and that it only remained for him to fulfil the conditions by relinquishing the English territories and releasing the prisoners of war.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 325, No. 955: *Letter* from Mahadji Sindhia dated January 13, 1784.

³¹ Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 267. See also and compare Wilson (*l.c.*), who speaks of Tipū having "continued to postpone the settlement of the conditions of peace until the intelligence of the re-assembly of Colonel Fullarton's army, and of other preparations being made by Government, induced him to sign the treaty on the 11th March 1784."

between the English and the Mahrattas for a combined attack on his dominions were in forwardness, and, if commenced, could not terminate but in a joint peace ... and that his designs against the Mahrattas would be most conveniently effected when they should be unaided." At length, on the 11th of March 1784, after having led the English Commissioners from place to place, he condescended to grant them audience and sign the long pending *Treaty of Mangalore*, in the presence of foreign ambassadors at his court, desiring all present to bear witness that he granted peace to "the intreaties of the English."³²

Under this *Treaty*,³³ in ten articles, executed by the Commissioners, Messrs. Sadleir, Staunton and Huddleston on behalf of the English East India Company and the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt, on the one part, and Tipū, on the other: (1) Peace and friendship was to be immediately established between the Company and the Nawāb Tipū Sultān Bahādūr and their respective friends and allies, including the Rājas of Tanjore and Travancore and the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt on the English side and the Beebi of Cannanore and the Rājas or Zamindārs of the Malabar

32. *Ibid*; see also and compare Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 351; *Memoirs*, I. 512; Robson, *o.c.*, 168-169, and Stewart, *o.c.*, 49-50. Kirmāṇi's reference to the peace negotiations is too brief and scrappy. "The Sultan then marched towards Koorg," writes he, "when at this period arrived Mr. Sadleir, Colonel Dallas, etc., on the part of the Governor of the port of Madras, in order to renew and confirm the relations of peace, and, with expressions of friendship and regard, they presented rich dresses, and a profusion of gold and jewels, to the servants of the Sultan, and with well weighed words or explanation cleared away the dust of enmity from the mind of the Sultan" (Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 29).

33. For the full text of the *Treaty* in the original, *vide* Appendix III—(3); also Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 352-356; and Robson, *o.c.*, 170-173, detailing the *Treaty*. In keeping with the spirit of the original, Tipū is mentioned throughout the above section by his theoretical designation of *Nawāb of Mysore*, which his English contemporaries continued to recognise. He is actually referred to in the document as "Nabob Tippu Sultan Bahadur" (Nawāb Tipū Sultān Bahādūr). See also and compare Wilson (*l.c.*), briefly referring to the *Treaty*.

coast on the Nawāb's side. The English were not directly or indirectly to assist the enemies of the Nawāb nor make war upon his friends or allies, and the Nawāb was not likewise directly or indirectly to assist the enemies, nor make war upon the friends or allies of the English. (2) The Nawāb was to send orders for the complete evacuation of the Karnātic and the restoration of all the forts and places in it, possessed by his troops excepting the forts of Āmbūgarh and Sātgarh, the evacuation being made within thirty days from the day of signing the treaty. The Nawāb was also to send orders for the release of all the persons taken and made prisoners in the late war and then alive, whether European or native, and arrange for their being safely conducted and delivered at the nearest English forts or settlements, such release and delivery being effectually made within thirty days from the day of signing the treaty. The Nawāb was further to cause them to be supplied with provisions and conveyances for their journey, the expenses of which being made good to him by the Company and the Commissioners sending an officer or officers to accompany the prisoners to the different places where they were to be delivered. The Company was to observe a similar procedure in regard to the release and delivery of prisoners taken by them from the Nawāb. (3) The English Commissioners were to issue written orders for the delivery to the Nawāb of Honāwar (Onore), Kārwar, Sadāśivagarh and adjoining forts or places, sending ships to bring away the garrisons. The Nawāb was to cause troops in these places to be supplied with provisions and render any other necessary assistance for their voyage to Bombay. The Commissioners were also at the same time to issue written orders for the immediate delivery to the Nawāb of the forts and districts of Karūr, Aravakurichi and Dhārāpuram. Immediately after the release and delivery of prisoners,

the fort and district of Dindigal was also to be evacuated and restored to the Nawāb, after which none of the troops of the Company were to remain in the Mysore dominions. (4) On the release and delivery of the English prisoners, the fort and district of Cannanore was likewise to be evacuated and restored to Alī Rāja Beebi, the queen of that country. At the time that the Nawāb directed the evacuation and delivery of the forts of Cannanore and Dindigal, Tipū was to issue written orders for the evacuation and delivery of Ambūrgarh and Sātgarh to the English, none of the Nawāb's troops being in the meantime left in any part of the Karnātic except in these last mentioned forts. (5) The Nawāb was in future to relinquish all claims on the Karnātic. (6) All persons taken and carried away from the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt by Haidar or Tipū or otherwise belonging to the Karnātic and then in Mysore dominions and willing to return, were to be immediately allowed to return with their families and children. All persons belonging to the Rāja of Venkaṭagiri were also to be released and permitted to return, while lists of principal persons belonging to Nawāb Muhammad Alī Wālājah and to the Rāja of Venkaṭagiri were to be delivered to Nawāb Tipū Sultān's ministers. (7) As a testimony and proof of his friendship to the English, the Nawāb Tipū Sultān Bahādur was not to molest the Rājas and Zamīndārs of the Coromandel coast for having favoured the English during the late war. (8) The Nawāb was to renew and confirm all the commercial privileges and immunities extended to the English by his late father Nawāb Haidar Alī and particularly stipulated and specified in the treaty between the Company and the said Nawāb, concluded the 8th August 1770. (9) The Nawāb was to restore the factory and privileges possessed by the English at Calicut till 1779 and particularly Mount Dilly, belonging to the settlement of Tellicherry,

and possessed by the English till taken by Sardār Khān at the beginning of the war. (10) The Treaty was to be signed and sealed by the English Commissioners, a copy of the same being afterwards signed and sealed by the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George and returned to the Nawāb Tipū Sultān, and the same being acknowledged by the Governor-General and Council of Bengal and the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, binding on all the English Governments in India, and the copies of the Treaty so acknowledged being sent to the Nawāb in three months or sooner if possible.

Thus terminated the long war for the sovereignty of Southern India, begun by Haidar in 1780 and continued by his son and successor Tipū from 1782 onwards, a

Reflections.

war which as much marked a distinct stage in the expansion of the kingdom of Mysore as it proved disastrous to the other powers involved in it. It was, in the earlier phases, as we have seen, primarily a war between Haidar Alī and Nawāb Muhammad Alī Wālājah

The change in the position of the parties in the war of 1780-1784.

and his allies the English, though it gradually assumed the character of a Mysorean struggle with the English as the principals, Nawāb Muhammad Alī being relegated to the background under the policy of assignment of the Karnātic revenues worked out by Lord Macartney as Governor of Madras (1781-1785). Although, as was later alleged, Tipū, in the earlier stages of his negotiations with the English—especially in October 1783 when he sent his Vakīl Appāji Rām to Madras with a memorandum of peace—had coupled Nawāb Muhammad Alī's name with that of the English as one of the contracting parties to the proposed treaty,³⁴ he seems to

34. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, VI. pp. 380-381, No. 1257, *Letter* dated August 16, 1784—Nawāb of Arcot to Warren Hastings; also p. 366, No. 1163, dated June 22, 1784; p. 379, No. 1252, dated August 12, 1784; pp. 383-384, No. 1267, dated August 20, 1784—*Letters* from the Nawāb to Hastings.

have artfully avoided, and the English plenipotentiaries appear to have as heedlessly neglected, making any

The omission of Nawāb Muhammad Ali's name in the Treaty of Mangalore.

mention of the Nawāb in the Treaty of Mangalore, actually concluded as above.³⁵ Perhaps, as one contemporary writer tellingly observes,³⁶ such an

omission was meant to furnish Tipū in future "a plausible pretext for recommencing hostilities," of which "he

Its implications for Mysore.

will most assuredly avail himself," on the plea addressed to the Council of Madras, "My quarrel is with the Nabob

of Arcot, whom you have not even specified as your ally in our last treaty of peace." Whatever might have been

The omission, a great blow to the Nawāb.

the ulterior motive of Tipū, the non-inclusion of Nawāb Muhammad Ali's name as a party to the treaty was a great blow to the Nawāb, who bitterly

complained that it ignored his fundamental rights as the sovereign of the Karnātic. He protested against this to Hastings, who, on his return to Calcutta from Lucknow, ordered a fresh copy of the treaty to be made with a declaration subjoined to it that the Nawāb of Arcot being

The attempted modification and its failure.

the sovereign of the Karnātic was a party to it, this being so construed wherever the term Karnātic-Pāyngghāt was used in the treaty. The treaty

was again ratified in this form and sent to the Madras Government for being forwarded to Tipū. The latter was also separately informed of this modification. But Lord Macartney refused to transmit it lest it should give rise to suspicions in the mind of Tipū. He declared that he would answer for the consequences. In these circumstances Hastings expressed great vexation and had gone, indeed, so far as to

35. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 373.

36. *Ibid.*, 373-374.

think of drastic measures against Lord Macartney. But he lacked support from the Ministry at Home and the situation of his personal affairs compelled him to resolve on throwing up his office and returning to England, leaving Muhammad Ali's position in relation to the treaty in the same state as before.³⁷

This apart, contemporary English opinion was definitely against the conclusion of the peace with Tipū. We indeed find the Treaty of Mangalore generally referred to in the literature of the period as "humiliating" to the English East India Company. The treaty has been denounced as much for the manner in which it was concluded as for its contents. Both the manner of making it and the conditions forming it have been adversely criticised. In this connection, we cannot do better than quote the observations of Innes Munro, who took part in the war and who, as he puts it, was "a sufferer" by it. Thus he observes:³⁸

"Peace is generally considered by those who have toiled through the hardships of war as such a blessing, that the acquirement of it is generally applauded, however humiliating, or repugnant to the real interests of the state, the terms may be upon which it is obtained. To establish peace, upon a firm and lasting foundation, is an object that I should conceive requires the most profound deliberation. To begin a war is a matter of more serious import than the generality of mankind are capable of perceiving; but when once entered into upon proper grounds, in order to secure a permanent peace, it should never be ended while the least prospect of advantage remains.

37. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, VI. *Introdn.*, xvi-xvii; also *Letters* Nos. 1055, 1090, 1143-1144, 1240, dated April 29, 1784 to August 3, 1784—Correspondence between Nawāb Muhammad Ali and Warren Hastings.

38. Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 369, 370, 373.

"It is to be hoped that the treaty of peace, which the Company have lately concluded with Tippo Sahib, is only meant to be temporary. Such, I am certain, must be the wish of every Briton actuated by sentiments of patriotism, and capable of feeling the indignities which have been uniformly heaped upon the British name. Can any Englishman read of the sufferings of his unfortunate countrymen, in the different prisons of Mysore, without dropping a tear of sympathy?—Or can he peruse the account of the repeated indignity and contempt with which his nation has been treated by the present usurper of Misore, without being filled with indignation, and burning with sentiments of retaliation and revenge?

"It must be allowed that the distresses in which we were involved during the war, in this quarter of India, were in a great measure occasioned by our own imprudence and misconduct. Want of unanimity amongst our rulers laid the foundation for miscarriage and defeat; and the ardour of our armies was invariably checked by the want of supplies, withheld through the anarchy and dissensions that generally prevailed in the councils of Madras. The rocks, upon which we have split, are now perceptible to every eye; and it is to be hoped that future rulers may be directed by them to shun the fatal disasters into which the affairs of this settlement have lately been plunged. To retrieve our sinking reputation in India must be the united effort of labour and wisdom; and I should humbly conceive that no measure would be more likely to effect this desirable purpose than to crush the object of our just revenge, the present usurper of the Misore throne; and, by an observance of rigid integrity in our future engagements with the country powers, to wipe off the odium and distrust now universally attached by them to the British name.

"In my humble opinion, the fairest opportunity that ever can offer of accomplishing this great end was lost by concluding a peace with the Misorians, at a period that seemed pregnant with every advantage to our arms. It must be acknowledged, that without money war cannot properly be carried on; and it will ever be felt as a subject of serious

regret, that the Company were not better prepared for the public expenditures before they involved themselves and the nation in such a labyrinth of difficulties. Had that attention been paid by those in power here to the true interests of the Company, I am confident that the most felicitous consequences would have ensued. Tippoo Sultan, the inveterate enemy of the English name, might have been effectually humbled, in place of appearing to treat our embassy with the arrogant pride of a conqueror. From the many proofs that the Company had experienced of the fidelity and obedient disposition of their troops, they might have ventured to impose another year's service upon them without incurring a great additional expense; and to this I am confident the troops would have readily assented, not only from a desire of revenge for the barbarous treatment of their brave fellow soldiers, but from the idea of novelty and advantage arising from a prosecution of the war in an enemy's country, where the lure of plunder would have animated their hopes. It can hardly be doubted, when we consider the reduced state of the Misore army at that particular period, and the discontent and dissensions that very generally prevailed in it, but that success must have attended the efforts of four formidable and well conducted British armies, stationed nearly at the four extremities of the Misore kingdom; one of which indeed had already penetrated a considerable way into the enemy's country, and had secured several very important posts; and none of them above two hundred miles from its metropolis. Four such armies advancing boldly and at the same time to one great object, *viz.*, Seringapatnam, with a view of placing the rightful heir upon the throne, could not possibly have failed of success. But it is unpleasant to dwell upon circumstances that are now past remedy; I shall therefore only hazard one more observation.

"Prudence and policy will clearly dictate, that the deposing Tippoo Sahib, in attempting which little is to be dreaded, and establishing the lawful sovereign upon the throne of Misore, are objects of the most essential consequence to the interests of the India Company in the Carnatic. By such means the Marrattas would be kept as much in awe as at present; and

the Company, in the king of Misore, would most likely secure a peaceable neighbour and a powerful ally."

It will be seen from the above that Innes Munro would not consider the Treaty as giving peace to the land or to the English Company until Seringapatam was actually attacked and taken, Tipū's usurpation put an end to and the Hindu dynasty restored. That was the view of the time as much in the interests of the Company as of the Ruling House of Mysore and that was the view that came ultimately to prevail.⁸⁹

Lord Macartney has been blamed for making advances for peace and for not obtaining a full jail delivery from Tipū. As regards the former, it is to be feared that Macartney was too much obsessed by the peace idea because of his Government's weak financial position. The causes for peace may have been of the impelling kind, but there was hardly any reason for him to appear as a suppliant for peace, as Tipū boastfully declared him to be. He need not have gone the length of sending Commissioners to Mangalore, an idea of that artful diplomat Appāji Rām, who represented Tipū at one stage of the negotiations, to which he readily succumbed. As to his failure to insist on an instant and complete jail delivery, it must be conceded that this was pressed at every stage of the negotiations. Mr. Staunton, the Private Secretary of Lord Macartney, who was one of the peace Commissioners, positively denied, as we have seen, his assent to the surrender of Mangalore and the other western conquests, until perfectly satisfied of the release of every prisoner to be determined by the certificate of their existence by the other Commissioner in the form of an official message to Saiyid Sāhib, the

89. See also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2570.

General of Tipū. Again, a copy of the Treaty was delivered to Brigadier-General Macleod for his information and guidance, and he was ordered to hold Cannanore, with a strong garrison, until he should receive information of the release of all the prisoners. Lord Macartney, on discovering abundant ill faith on this head, even announced to Tipū that he would retain Dindigal, until the residue should be released. But so many of these unfortunate men had been doomed to death, by poison or assassination, that the question of their "return" was altogether beyond the ingenuity of Tipū Sultān. The "final humiliation," as it has been called "of surrendering Dindigal", despite the non-return of the prisoners and the forcible deportation of the inhabitants from across the border, was apparently a necessity that could not well have been avoided in the circumstances in which Lord Macartney's government found itself at the time. Lord Macartney, at the same time, was most punctilious in his inquiries about the fate of the various prisoners. For instance, he called upon Colonel Braithwaite, immediately after his release, for any information he might possess on the subject of the alleged murder of General Matthews, about which circumstantial accounts were then in circulation in Madras. The Colonel was of opinion, for certain reasons given, that no undue means had been resorted to in the case of General Matthews, though he could not "account for the deaths of several officers, without concurring in the general belief that they died of violence of some kind." Nor did the Madras Government drop the question here. Having come to know in November 1789 that Captain Rutledge of the Artillery was still alive and in prison near Seringapatam, they applied for his release, and that of other prisoners handed over to Haidar by Admiral Suffrein, through General Conway, the Commandant of the

French Settlements in India. Tipū, however, positively denied the existence of any such persons.

Before leaving the subject of prisoners, a word should be added of the *good Commandant*, Saiyid Ibrāhim, the theme of their prison songs and the object of their veneration, who animated the despondent, restrained the rash and furnished an example to all of cheerful resignation and ardent attachment. When removed from the prison to Kabbāldurg, he mildly bespoke attention to his family, if his fellow-prisoners should ever return, and some years elapsed after their release before accumulated sufferings brought him to the grave. Shortly after the restoration of the ancient Hindu Royal House, the Madras Government, by an order dated 26th May 1800, ordered the erection of a mausoleum over his remains at Kabbāldurg and endowed by Lord Clive (later Earl Powis), then Governor of Madras, on behalf of the East India Company, "with a view to perpetuate the remembrance of his virtues and the benefit of his example." Saiyid Ibrāhim commanded the Tanjore Cavalry in 1781 and was made prisoner during that year. He was repeatedly invited by Tipū to accept service in Mysore with the most brilliant promises. He persistently refused these offers, and was removed to Kabbāldurg, as stated above, where "he suffered the hardships of a rigorous confinement and unwholesome food, intended to have produced that acquiescence which the Sultān's invitations had failed to produce." His sister, who shared his misfortunes in captivity, and was subsequently wounded in the storming of Seringapatam, was given a life pension of 52 *pagodas* and 21 *fanams* per month.⁴⁰

40. *Ibid.*, 2571-2573. On the subject of the prisoners, see *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia*, vol. II; and Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 358-369, containing a pathetic and graphic account of their sufferings, etc.

It must be said in justice to Lord Macartney that he had to contend against many difficulties, among these the great scarcity of provisions and money, experienced by the army during the campaign of 1781-1782. The arrears due to the army were not in fact cleared until 1789. The fidelity of the Indian branch of the army was so great that notwithstanding the extreme severity of the service, it steadily resisted the numerous offers conveyed by the emissaries of Haidar and Tipū. Such fidelity, under such circumstances, has been characterised as being "without parallel in the military history of any nation." Lord Macartney endeavoured to meet the situation by obtaining the assignment of the revenues of the Karnātic in 1781-1782. Macartney did not, as we have seen, get from the Commanders-in-chief of his time that co-operation in the field or at the Council table that he had reason to expect from them, and even in regard to Sir Eyre Coote, who was responsible for the earlier part of the war, Wilks reluctantly admits as much. He made a great deal of his position as a Member of the Supreme Council at Calcutta and insisted on having his own way at Madras. Nor did Sir Eyre Coote's successor, Major General Stuart, give better satisfaction to Lord Macartney. From the time of his succeeding to the command of the army, he set himself in direct opposition to Government upon almost every subject. Without going so far as to profess absolute independence of the civil power, he went very near it, and on one occasion when called upon to interfere in a case where an officer of His Majesty's troops had refused to comply with a requisition from the civil authorities, he stated he was of opinion that there were cases where the requisition of Government concerning the employment of His Majesty's troops might be refused by the officer commanding. This conduct, as Colonel

Difficulties in the way of Lord Macartney.

Wilson remarks, and his assumption of authority over the Royal troops, gave Government much uneasiness, but no active measures were taken until after the suspension of hostilities with the French, when General Stuart was directed to make over command of the army to Major-General Bruce, and to proceed to Madras, there to account for his dilatory and unsatisfactory conduct during the campaign, and other matters. He made over charge accordingly on the 3rd July (1783) and returned to Madras, where he continued his obstructive and contentious behaviour until it became so serious that Lord Macartney took the decisive step of dismissing him from the Company's service on the 17th September (1783) and appointed Major-General Sir John Burgoyne as the senior officer in His Majesty's service, to take command of the King's troops. Despite this order of dismissal, General Stuart determined to retain command of the King's troops, and Sir John Burgoyne informed Government that he would continue to obey the General. The Government accordingly resolved to arrest him before he could take any steps for the subversion of Government. Colonel Wilson remarks that it is difficult to say whether there were sufficient grounds for this apprehension. Although General Stuart had been one of the principal persons concerned in the arrest and deposition of Lord Pigot in 1776, it must be remembered that he was then acting in concert with the majority of the Members of Government, whereas in 1783, he possessed no adherent in that body. On the other hand, it was known that the suspension of Lord Macartney was contemplated by Warren Hastings, then Governor-General, and the prospect of the support of the Governor-General might have induced an impulsive and arbitrary man to go to any length. The arrest of the General was effected by the Fort Adjutant and he was conveyed to the fort. Amīr-ul-Umara, second son

of Nawāb Muhammad Ali, is said to have summed up the situation with the epigrammatic remark in broken English, *Sometimz General Stuart catch one Lord; one Lord catch General Stuart*. Colonel Lang was appointed to assume command of the army and he forthwith took over the duties of the Commander-in-Chief. There were at first some signs of murmur among the Royal officers, but even they tendered their services shortly afterwards, on being satisfied that the authority of General Stuart over the Royal troops in India had only existed by virtue of his commission from the East India Company. Meanwhile, Government permitted Sir John Burgoyne to assume the separate command of the King's troops, but, as he began to issue orders not usually promulgated without Government's previous sanction, he was put under arrest on 31st December (1783) and the next senior officer placed in command of the Royal troops. At the same time, it was resolved by Government to send General Stuart to England, a proceeding against which he protested vigorously, alleging, amongst other objections, that the vessel taken up for him was not seaworthy. General Stuart would not embark until coercive measures were applied and this was done by the sepoys laying hold of him. He then protested he was being carried away against his will by force and went on board ship. The vessel, it must be added, had been duly surveyed before being chartered and pronounced perfectly seaworthy. The arrangements for the General's comfort on board appears to have been made on the most liberal scale. General Stuart, however, made the application of coercive measures, rendered necessary by his own conduct, a personal matter between himself and Lord Macartney, whom he called out on his return from Madras. A duel was fought accordingly near Kensington on 8th June 1786, in which Lord Macartney was

shot through the shoulder. Lord Macartney was attended by Colonel Fullarton and General Stuart by Colonel Gordon. The story of the duel has been told by Sir Charles Lawson in his *Memories of Madras* and is of interest to-day mainly because of the personalities involved in it.⁴¹

Apart from the troubles that Lord Macartney had from those at his own Council table, Lord Macartney and the Supreme Government of India, he had to deal with a Supreme Government which latterly became plainly inimical to him. Even Dr. Vincent Smith, who criticises warmly Lord Macartney's Governorship of Madras, has had to admit that "the interference of Calcutta sometimes was practised in an irritating way." That seems a very mild way of putting the attitude of Hastings towards Macartney. Sir Charles Lawson, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, suggests personal jealousy on the part of Hastings, who saw something strange in the "handsome young nobleman in Madras, who had influential friends at his back, especially Hastings' remorseless enemy, Charles James Fox." James Mill has remarked that Lord Macartney was not only of superior social rank to the Company's servants in India during the time he was Governor of Madras, but that he "set one of the finest examples of elevating a servant of the King to a high office in that country," and thereby of "intercepting the great prizes which animated the ambition of the individuals rising through the several stages of the Company's service." There was little disposition in Calcutta to give him credit for what Mill describes as his accomplishments, his talents, his calmness of temper, his moderation and his urbanity. He spared no pains to keep his Council well acquainted with his views about passing events; and he wrote despatch after despatch of a voluminous nature, and in courteous

41. *Ibid.*, 2578-2577 (based on Wilks, Wilson, Lawson, Love, etc.).

terms, to the Governor-General-in-Council, in view to inducing them to give up their poor opinion and distrust of him. The India Office Library and the British Museum contain a large number of his papers and Sir Charles Lawson, after an examination of them, has been led to endorse the conclusion of Sir John Barrow, the biographer of Lord Macartney, that his minutes are "masterly productions," and that his "whole correspondence with the hostile and counter-acting Government of Bengal is characterised by a clearness, closeness, and cogency of argument, and by a firmness and moderation which distinguish it, in a very striking manner, from the loose, the puerile, and fanciful reasoning, and the haughty, harsh and acrimonious language of the letters from Calcutta."

The relations of the Bengal Government with Lord Macartney were sufficiently friendly at first, and the pecuniary assistance of which Madras stood so much in need was afforded on more than one occasion, but this did not last long; the two Governments were soon at variance, and further aid was withheld. The jealousy entertained by Warren Hastings against Lord Macartney as his probable successor, aggravated by the steady opposition of the Madras Government to certain measures advocated by that of Bengal, has been assigned as the principal cause of this state of matters.

The first of these proposed measures was the cession of the rich and extensive district of Tinnevely to the Dutch, together with the exclusive right to the pearl fishery on the southern coast, in return for which the Madras Government were to be furnished with 1,000 European infantry, 20 European artillery, and 1,000 Malays, to be paid and maintained by the East India Company. Seeing that Government were not in want of more troops, but of money wherewith to pay those they already had, the acceptance of this proposal would

have increased their liabilities, while at the same time it would have diminished the means of meeting them. This negotiation, which had been carried on between the Bengal Government and the Director of the Dutch Settlements in Bengal, was suddenly dropped on receipt of the intelligence of war in Europe.

The cession of the Northern Circars to the Nizām on condition of being furnished by him with a body of horse was another of the measures pressed upon the Government of Madras. The Governor-General laid much stress upon the value of the aid to be received, while he depreciated that of the Circars as yielding only a moderate revenue, the extent of frontier involved rendering it difficult of defence. In reply it was pointed out that the collections for the year had amounted to 612,000 *pagodas*, that the extensive sea-board of the Circars afforded every facility for landing reinforcements should they be required, and that the country was of great importance on account of the manufactures it produced, for which reasons Lord Macartney declined to give it up without the special orders of the Court of Directors.

Another important matter regarding which the two Governments were at issue, was the assignment of the revenues of the Karnātic, an arrangement which had been originally concluded with the approbation of the Bengal Government, and the results of which had been very advantageous. Nevertheless, early in 1783, on the strength of certain *ex-parte* representations, the Madras Government were required to relinquish it. At this very time, orders had been received from the Court of Directors approving of the measure, and requiring the co-operation of the Bengal Government in carrying it out, but instead of obeying the Court's orders, that Government repeated their orders for the surrender of the assignment to the Nawāb. Lord Macartney, however, determined not to comply, and the matter rested

until 1785 when it was surrendered in conformity with orders received from the Board of Control. The impolicy of this measure soon became apparent, but no change was made until 1790, when Lord Cornwallis and the Supreme Government authorised and directed the Governor and Council of Madras to assume the management of the revenues of the Karnātic during the war :

“ In order that the total amount of the collections might be applied with fidelity and economy, in the proportions that had already been settled, to defray the exigencies of the war, and to support His Highness’ (the Nawāb’s) own family and dignity.”⁴²

This shows that Lord Macartney was in the main right in regard to the Karnātic question. Lord Macartney’s political prescience. Though Pitt took a different view of Lord Macartney’s policy in this matter in which he was subsequently falsified, he praised his work at Madras and said that his conduct while there entitled him to the highest applause that words could possibly bestow. The fact also that he had a definite offer of the Governor-Generalship, in succession to Warren Hastings, while yet in India, from the Court of Directors, which he had to decline owing to reasons of health and that the offer was renewed to him shortly after he returned to England and only fell through because the Ministry of the day would not countenance his request for such a mark of Royal favour as would unequivocally show the world that he was going out with the combined support of the Crown, the Ministry and the Company, confirm this estimate of his services. Pitt, however, could not see his way to confer on him the British Peerage he desired to receive and so the Governor-Generalship was, three days later, offered to and accepted by Lord Cornwallis. Lord Macartney

42. *Ibid.*, 71-2580 (based on Lawson, Love, etc.).

was the type of a true nobleman; he was an upright and incorruptible man; he returned home with absolutely clean hands; he entertained decided views about the necessity of subordinating the Military to the Civil authority in India, and he was full of ideas of administrative reform. Of his political talents and military plans, contemporary opinion was undoubtedly too critical. At any rate, modern opinion, based as it is on a fairer appreciation of the difficulties of his position, differs very widely from contemporary opinion, which appears, in some respects, to have been influenced by the passions and prejudices of the time. He was a genuine statesman, as his conduct towards Mysore showed it, while the unlimited confidence he reposed in Mr. Sullivan, who carried through the Mysore negotiations and whose political sagacity won even the approval of Wilks, who is uniformly critical of Macartney's acts, shows that he could choose his men well and act fairly towards them. The highest justification of Macartney's policy towards Mysore—which had for its sheet-anchor the end of the usurpation and the restoration of the ancient Hindu dynasty—must be that it was the one that ultimately came to prevail, though it required two more wars to reach that goal. Political prescience cannot surely be denied to a man who could map out a policy of the kind that Lord Macartney laid down so early as 1782 for the solution of the problem that Mysore presented as much to its own people as to the Company, their neighbours. It should be remembered too that Lord Cornwallis has been adversely criticised for the mildness of his treaty with Tipū in 1792, which, because it did not overthrow Tipū in entirety, cost another war. General Medows, as we shall see later, would have preferred to depose Tipū in 1792 and restore the country to its ancient Hindu rulers, the policy adopted later by Lord

Wellesley, who, it should be remembered, only executed what Lord Macartney, in 1782, had set out as the ideal policy for the effectual putting down of Tipū.⁴³

Tipū's conduct of the war against the English after he took charge of the army is open to serious criticism. While there is some criticism of Tipū's conduct of the war. vigour in it, especially in the earlier stages, it was faulty and blameworthy to a degree throughout. As at Haidar's death he still possessed Haidar's veteran army, he should have profited by the impression of his power, and should have endeavoured to ward off the blow he was raising against himself by his acts and policy against his neighbours. His treatment of Shaik Ayāz which eventually led to his desertion to the English at Bombay; the manner in which he put an end to the existence of Muhammad Alī, the Commandant, described as one of the greatest generals of Haidar, and considered by Haidar himself as one of the best officers in his army; and his quarrel with Mons. Cossigny and Boudenot and Col. Campbell, the heroic defender of Mangalore—are sufficient to show the radical differences that existed between his leadership and that of his father Haidar.

43. *Ibid.*, 2590-2591.

CHAPTER XII.

KHĀSĀ-CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VIII,

1776-1796—(contd.)

Tipu's retirement from Mangalore; reduction of Balam an Coorg, 1784—Renewed invasion of Coorg, 1785; the *Faujdar's* excesses—Preliminary operations—Tipu takes the field, October 1785—The first encounter—Further progress—Tipu's final measures; Tipu's return to Seringapatam, January 1786—General course of affairs; Tipu asserts his claims to sovereignty over the South of the Krishna—Rupture with the Mahrattas—Tipu proceeds against Nargund—The siege of Nargund; Burhan-ud-din commences the siege, March 1785—The defence; Kala-Pandit solicits the aid of the Mahrattas; Kumr-ud-din directed to proceed to Nargund—Kumr-ud-din joins, April 1785; reduction of Ramdurg, May 5, 1785; siege of Nargund resumed, May-August—Nargund capitulates, August 1785; the capture and confinement of the Deshayi, October 6, 1785; reduction of Kittoor, &c.—The Mahratta reaction, 1786—Their operations; siege and capitulation of Badami, May 1786; reduction of Dharwar, &c., May-June 1786—Tipu's counter-movements—Tipu takes the field, June 1786; appears before Adoni—The siege of Adoni; Tipu raises the siege, June 25, 1786—The action of June 27, 1786, and after; the retreat of the confederates, July 1, 1786; Tipu pursues them; fall of Adoni, July 11, 1786—Tipu proceeds against the confederates—The position of the confederates—The movements of the confederates and of Tipu, September 1786—Tipu prepares for a serious night-attack—The action before Savanur, October 1, 1786—Tipu marches towards Savanur, October 4, 1786; early relations between Tipu and Hakim Khan; Hakim Khan joins the Mahrattas and takes to flight, October 29, 1786; the spoliation of Savanur—Tipu marches northward, November 1786—His proposition to the Mahrattas—The action on the Gandaki—Further movements of the confederates and

of Tipu, December 1786—January 1787—Towards peace; peace concluded, February 14, 1787—Reduction of Harapanaballi and Rayadurg, March 1787; Tipu returns to Seringapatam, c. May 1787—Tipu's visit to Malabar, January-April 1788—Marches to Coimbatore-Dindigal; returns to Seringapatam, August 1788—Rebellion in Coorg and Malabar, December 1788: the course of affairs leading to it—Tipu proceeds to Malabar, January 1789; his progress against the rebels—His further progress: destruction of the Raja of Chirakal; moves to Coimbatore, June 1789—His design on Travancore—The principality of Travancore—The origin and early history of the Travancore Lines, 1662-1761—Subsequent developments, 1761-1777: construction of the Lines afresh, 1775—The position from 1777 onwards: The Treaty of Mangalore (1784) and after; Tipu forestalled by the English; the occupation of Travancore, a prelude to a contest with them; Tipu marches on to Travancore, September 1789—The protracted discussions *re* the Travancore issue, September-December 1789—Tipu's ultimatum to the Raja of Travancore, December 1789—His attack on the Travancore Lines, December 29, 1789—His repulse—Tipu's further movements, January-May 1790: takes the Travancore Lines, April 15, 1790; reduces Cranganore, May 8, 1790; the demolition of the Travancore Lines; Tipu's expectations disappointed; hastens to Seringapatam, May 1790—The French Revolution, 1789: its dire consequences to Tipu.

SHORTLY after the conclusion of the peace of Mangalore (March 11, 1784), Tipū, on his way to the upper country for the first time after his father's death, began his march through Balam, quelling a long protracted rebellion of the mountaineers of that region, and causing a new fortress to be erected there which he named *Munsirābād*.¹

Tipū's retirement
from Mangalore.

Reduction of Balam
and Coorg, 1784.

1. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 279-280; Kirkpatrick, *Select Letters*, 202 (noticing Tipū's *Memoirs* entitled *Tārīkh-Khoḍādādy*); Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 29. *Munsirābād*

Then he proceeded into the adjacent hills and forests of Coorg, whose inhabitants also were in a state of disaffection since 1780, and, yielding occasionally to overwhelming force, had never failed to reassert their independence, whenever the pressure was removed. Early in 1782, Haidar, as we have seen² had made a considerable detachment under Woffadār to the woods of Coorg, where a fort (Mercara), which he had built for overawing the inhabitants, had been invested soon after his descent into the Coromandel and provisioned with difficulty by the provincial troops. Woffadār was so far successful as to capture the family of the Rāja recently deceased, among whom was a youth aged fourteen, afterwards Rāja (the author of the historical tract on Coorg entitled *Rājēndranāme*); but had entirely failed in tranquillising the country or possessing any portion of it beyond the ground actually occupied by his military posts. When Tipū entered it with his whole army advancing from Periapatam in two divisions by different roads and in two days, the inhabitants yielded, as usual, to necessity, and apparent quiet was restored. At the residence of the governor of the district where the rebels had taken refuge, a great number of these were made prisoners. Katti Naik, the leader of the insurgents, was with his family and children pursued through the inaccessible woods and glens of Coorg. He, however, made his escape to Tellicherry where he died soon after, while his family was captured by the followers of Tipū. Marching further, Tipū took possession of the fort of Mercara which the populace had demolished. Orders were issued for the rebuilding of the fort, while

(now *Manjarabad* in Hassan District), so called by Tipū "because the numerical powers of the several letters composing that word, when added together, indicate the year of the *Higera* in which the place was conquered, viz., 1198," i. e., A. D. 1784 (see Kirkpatrick, *o. c.*, 203).

2. *Vide* Ch. V.

Zain-ul-labidin Mehdvi, a favourite servant of Tipū, was left as *Faujdar* of the district, with full powers to displace, imprison and punish all the rebellious and seditious people thereof, who were threatened with banishment and wholesale conversion to Islām should they rise in revolt again. Thus, calling together and haranguing them on the subject of their moral and political sins, Tipū said: "It is the custom with you for the eldest of five brothers to marry, and for the wife of such brother to be common to all five. Not a man in the country knows his father, and the ascendancy of women and bastardy of children is your common attribute. From the period of my father's conquest of the country, you have rebelled seven times, and caused the death of thousands of our troops. I forgive you once more, but if rebellion be ever repeated, I have made a vow to God, to honour every man of the country with Islam. I will make them aliens to their home, and establish them in a distant land, and thus at once extinguish rebellion and plurality of husbands, and initiate them in the more honourable practices of Islam." Giving the new fort of Mercara the name of *Zuferābād*, Tipū by successive marches hastened back to Periapatam. From thence, he proceeded in the direction of Seringapatam, arriving there towards the close of the year.³

3. Wilks, *o. c.*, 280-281; Kirkpatrick, *o. c.*, 203-207 (quoting from *Tārīkh*), and Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 80. Kirmāni roughly places the events of 1784 in 1782 (A. H. 1197). Wilks refers to Katti Naik or Kutty Naik as "Coote Naig" and speaks of Tipū having nicknamed him "*Coote Naik—Cutte Naik, cutta* meaning a dog—*Captain Dog*" (see Wilks, *o. c.*, I. Preface, xxxii). *Zuferābād*, the new name for Mercara, mentioned above, refers also, like *Munzirābād*, to the date of conquest of the place (*i. e.*, 1784). Elsewhere Kirmāni, referring incidentally to the custom of polyandry in Coorg, speaks of Haidar having abolished it during his conquest of the country (see Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 75). The custom, however, persisted in Tipū's time.

No sooner Tipū returned to Seringapatam than troubles began to brew in Coorg, where Zain-ul-labidin Mehdvi, placed in uncontrolled authority as its *Faujdar*, regulated the affairs of Government by mere caprice and folly, and went to the extent of forcibly carrying off the sister of one Momuti Nair, a minister of the local chief. Enraged at this conduct, Momuti Nair with his colleague Ranga Nair incited all their retainers and peasantry to rise in revolt against the *Faujdar*. At once Zuferābād was surrounded and besieged and the country in its vicinity plundered, while the besieged, who had neglected to provide themselves with sufficient stocks of provisions and ammunition, were reduced to such extremities that even during day-light they were afraid of quitting the walls of the fort. The *Faujdar*, who soon found his possessions limited to the walls of Zuferābād, reported the state of affairs to Seringapatam, where Tipū, since his return from Mangalore, was actively engaged in the regulation of the various departments of State.⁴

Preliminary operations.

In September 1785, Tipū, determined to punish the Coorgs, issued orders to the Quarter-Master-General to proceed with the Tiger standard and the blue pavilion and pitch them in the neighbourhood of *Sultānpet*, a town lately built at the distance of one *fursung* and a half west from Seringapatam. At the same time, Zain-ul-labidin Shoostri, Sipāhdār of a Kushoon, who as a theologian and man of letters of Tipū's court had impressed him as the author of a military treatise entitled *Futhul-Mujāhideen* ("Triumph of the Holy Warriors") containing a section on the mode of carrying on operations in a close and woody country, was with

4. *Ibid.* 281; Kirmāpi, o. c., 68-69. On the subject of the regulation of departments of State, *vide* Ch. XVI below.

his Kushoon and abundance of stores and 2,000 irregular foot (*ahashām*), sent in advance, with instructions to proceed by forced marches to the fort of Zuferābād, make a general attack on the rebels and chastise them in conjunction with the *Faujdār*. The Sipāhdār, marching quickly, arrived at the *ghāt* leading to Coorg, only to find himself attacked on all sides by the rebels with their arrows and muskets. His literary abilities proving hardly equal to the occasion, he soon retired in despair on the plea of ague and fever to the pass of Sidapur (*Siddāpura*), despite the remonstrances of his followers. Also he wrote to the headquarters that nothing but Tipū's own presence with the main army would terminate the war.⁵

Thereupon Tipū, bitterly taunting the Sipāhdār for the poor application of his own theory, hastened to proceed himself towards Coorg. Late in October he moved thither at the head of 20,000 regular infantry, 12,000 irregular foot, 10,000 horse and 21 field-pieces. Entering Coorg in two columns, he arrived and encamped near the stockade or bound hedge of the district, leaving all his horse at the pass of Sidapur, Periapatam and Munzirābād. Then with his irregular foot, Kushoons and artillery, crossing the pass, he began burning and destroying the patches of open country.⁶

Entering the woods of Coorg by the route of the Turkul Ghaut, he encamped on this side the gate of the stockade, called *Mundul*. The next day, he gave orders to his two Sipāhdārs with their Kushoons to

The first encounter.

5. *Ibid*, 281-282; Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 69-71; and Kirkpatrick, *o. c.*, *Letter* Nos. CXVII, CXXXI and CXXXII, dated September 17 and October 10 and 12, 1785. For further particulars about the text of *Futuhul-Mujāhideen*, see Kirkpatrick, *o. c.*, Appendix I, pp. LXVII-LXXVII.
6. *Ibid*, 282; Kirmāni, *o. c.*, 71; and Kirkpatrick, *o. c.*, *Letter* No. CXXXVII, dated October 15, 1785.

assault the stockade gate, before which the inhabitants had dug a deep ditch and had built a wall on each flank, from where they completely blocked up the road with their arrows and matchlocks. Tipū's Sipāhdārs accordingly commenced action. The besieged defended themselves with the utmost intrepidity, not only repelling the assailants but driving the two Kushoons before them and killing and wounding the greatest part. Tipū, however, proceeding with his troops by an otherwise inaccessible route, fell with rapidity upon the defenders, despatching a great number of them. On the other side, the French contingent of his under Mons. Lally and the *Asad Ilāhi* risālas or regiments of *Chēlas* likewise slew several of them. On the other flank also, the infantry of the body-guard disabled their opponents on the points of their spears or bayonets, making many of them prisoners. Despite all this, the besieged stood firm, making vigorous attacks on the assailing army and dispersing them. At length, the select of the body-guard and certain of the Sipāhdārs assembled those who still remained and determining by successive stages to make an impression, threw themselves at once on the enemy, breaking asunder the bonds which held them together and putting them to flight in utter panic and confusion.⁷

Closely pursuing the Coorgs at the point of the sword, Tipū with his troops advanced and encamped in the vicinity of Hulikalnād (the *Hulikulinār* of Kirmāṇi), where he was joined by the Sipāhdār Zain-ul-labidin Shoostrī, who, by way of erasing the impression of his former misconduct, had by now attacked the village of Kushālpur

7. Kirmāṇi, o. c., 77-78. Wilks is practically silent regarding the above details. On pp. 71-77, Kirmāṇi gives a description of the geography, fauna and flora of Coorg, and of the physiognomy, customs and manners of its people, etc., in his usual figurative style, by way of digression.

and plundered and destroyed it, making prisoners of the inhabitants. From here, Tipū despatched four *risālas* or regiments with a large supply of stores and provisions to the fort of Zuferābād, while he himself marched thither, by several stages, in November, and encamped on the eastern side of the town by the road through the jungles, which had been cleared by his Amīrs and Khāns at great risk and loss to the tenants. Thereupon, the Coorgs, no longer able to oppose the forces of Tipū, were dispersed and compelled to take refuge in the inaccessible woods and mountains where they, as usual, refrained from any decisive operations.⁸

On this, Tipū despatched his officers with large bodies of troops to punish these people and reduce the whole country to subjection. Accordingly Mons. Lally proceeded to the Cardamom Ghāts; Zain-ul-labidin Shoostri with his Kushoon and another under the command of Husain Ali Khān Bakshi marched in the direction of Kurumbanāḍ (*Akrubnār*), while the rest of the Sipāhdārs marched to Talakāvēri and Kushālpur and Tipū himself remained encamped on the same ground. Everything being ready along the whole circumference, these troops began to contract the circle, and beating up the woods, carried distress and confusion all over the country, attacking and destroying the towns and driving away and capturing immense crowds of wild men. In December, Tipū, after having completely settled the affairs of Zuferābād, moved forward and pitched his tents and standards on the ground to the southward of the hill of Talakāvēri. Then he despatched his troops in advance, directing them to pursue the rebels further. Accordingly the troops advanced to the attack on all sides and systematically closing in on the great mass of the population, succeeded in making prisoners of

Tipū's final
measures.

8. *Ibid.*, 78-80; see also and compare Wilks, l.c.

forty to fifty thousand of them, men and women. Both the leaders of the Coorgs, Momuti Nair and Ranga Nair, were taken on the cardamom mountains by the exertions of Mons. Lally. Momuti Nair, however, died soon after and Ranga Nair was circumcised and made a Mussulman, being named Shaikh Ahmad and appointed a *Risāldār*. All the other prisoners were driven off like a herd of cattle to Seringapatam where they were in due course converted to Islām and incorporated with the *Ahmadi* corps of the army. The landed proprietors and the husbandmen of Coorg were separated from the other prisoners and assigned to new Muhammadan settlers, though the scheme eventually proved abortive both on account of local climatic conditions and by falling into neglect and abuse. About the middle of January 1786, Tipū, after making arrangements for the security of his conquests in Coorg and erecting several wooden or stockaded forts (*Lakaḍi-kōṭe*), returned to Seringapatam by the route of Sidapur.⁹

Tipū's return to
Sringapatam,
January 1786.

Meanwhile, since 1784, affairs elsewhere were moving in a different manner. Tipū, as we have seen, had concluded the peace of Mangalore (March 11, 1784)

General course of
affairs.

to avert an impending confederacy, with a distinct view to the separate subjugation of its members, namely, the English, the Mahrattas and Nizām Alī. At the time of his signing the peace and subsequently thereafter, he openly avowed to his own subjects and to his French allies his determination of waiting for a more favourable opportunity to unite with them for the destruction of the English power. Any European interference, however, having been, for the time being, effectually removed, Tipū was at liberty to begin with either of his other

9. *Ibid.*, 80-84; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 282-283; and Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Nos. CLXIX, dated December 8, 1785; CLXXXVII, dated December 22,

enemies, the Mabrattas or Nizām Alī.¹⁰ In May 1784, about two months after the conclusion of the treaty of Mangalore, he wrote to the Nizām that he was master of the whole country south of the Krishna and that the territories to the north of that river belonged to him.¹¹

Tipū asserts his claims to sovereignty over the south of the Krishna.

Also he tried the effect of terror on Nizām Alī by asserting claims of sovereignty over Bijāpur.¹² Thereupon Nizām Alī answered by sending an envoy to Seringapatam¹³ and despatching his son at the head of 20,000 horse and foot to oppose Tipū, while he himself followed with a large force¹⁴ seeking a

1785; CXCVI, dated January 13 and 16, 1786. Kirmāni estimates the number of prisoners at 80,000 (o.c., 81); Wilks at 70,000 (o.c., II-288). Tipū himself estimates this at 40,000 or 50,000 (*vide* Kirkpatrick, o.c., Nos. CXCVI and CCII), which figure is adopted above as the more probable one. Kirmāni speaks of the Coorg campaign as one of longer duration, assigning a period of "seven months and a few days" to the capture of the prisoners (l.c.). But, in the light of other sources cited here, the entire campaign led by Tipū himself in person seems to have lasted not more than two months and a half, from about the close of October 1785 to about the middle of January 1786. Kirmāni, again, places the event in A. H. 1198 corresponding to A.D. 1783, but from the context it is referable to 1785-1786, as worked out above. Stewart, who makes a brief reference to the event, postdates it in 1787-1788 (*Memoirs*, 52). Wilks speaks of Tipū's return from Coorg to Seringapatam early in January 1786 (o.c., II. 294), but we have a letter of Tipū dated 13th and 16th January 1786, from which it would appear, his return took place about the middle of January 1786 (Kirkpatrick, o.c., No. CCII).

10. Wilks, o.c., II. 288-284.

11. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, VI. p. 355, No. 1118, dated May 29, 1784—*News from Ellore*.

12. Wilks, o.c., II. 284; also *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, l.c. Wilks places this move on the part of Tipū in 1784, immediately after his return to Seringapatam from Mangalore. But, in the light of the *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, above cited, it took place in May 1784 while on his way back from Mangalore.

13. *Ibid.* The envoy or envoys arrived in Seringapatam with congratulatory letters, etc., early in 1785, shortly after Tipū's return from Mangalore (Kirmāni, o.c., 46). Kirmāni, however, antedates this event and sets it down to A.H. 1197, i.e., A.D. 1782.

14. *Cal. Pers. Corres.*, l.c. The subsequent portion of this news-letter relating to the movements of the Nizām, the Mahrattas and Tipū is unconfirmed by other sources.

closer union with the Mahrattas against the alarming pretensions of Tipū, with whom they were known at the same time to have separate grounds of quarrel.¹⁵

Since his return from Mangalore, Tipū nourished certain grievances against the Chiefs of Poona who, in his view, had forgotten their treaty obligations to him and to his father. He had accordingly come to the positive determination of taking possession of the Mahratta territory situated between the Krishna and Tungabhadra.¹⁶ By virtue of Haidar's negotiations with Raghōba (1774), this entire tract had belonged to Mysore. Haidar, in conformity with the suggestions of Raghōba's envoy, had left certain of the forts and territories in this region in the hands of their Mahratta possessors, satisfied with the loose profession of their allegiance to Mysore. Among these was Kāla-Paṇḍit, the Dēshāyi or Chief of Nārgund, a hill fort of considerable strength, situated between two branches of the river Malprabha. The Dēshāyi was connected with the family of Parashurām Bhau of Mīraj, a powerful Mahratta leader, by a double inter-marriage of their sons and daughters.¹⁷ Early in 1785, shortly after Tipū's arrival in Seringapatam, intelligence was received from the spies and news-writers on the banks of the Tungabhadra that most of the tributaries of the kingdom of Mysore between that river and the Krishna were oppressive and disaffected and ready to break out in

15. Wilks, l.c.

16. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. VIII, dated March 15, 1785. The letter speaks of "the territory situated on the banks of the Kistna." With reference to the context, the reference here is to the country between the Krishna and Tungabhadra. This is in keeping with Kirkpatrick's interpretation also.

17. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 234-235; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 51-52. Wilks refers to the Dēshāyi of Nārgund as "Kala Pandit" or "Kallappa" (*o.c.*, II. 236); Kirmāṇi as "Kalia Desye" (*o.c.*, 50). In Tipū's letters, the name is spelt as "Kālā Pundit" (see Kirkpatrick *o.c.*, No. LXIX, LXXXV, etc).

open rebellion and mischief. Among these, Kāla Paṇḍit was charged with having neglected to discharge the *Pēshkāsh* due to Mysore for two years, insolently attacked the fort of Sōde, a dependency of Gurramkoṇḍa, plundered the towns belonging to it and stirred up tumult and disorder, assisted by the Pāḷegār of Madanapalli, with intent to make himself master of the entire country between the Krishṇa and Tungabhadra.¹⁸ Despatching the Sipāhdār Saiyid Gafoor to Nārgund, Tipū made certain demands upon Kāla Paṇḍit, and his refusal was followed by the arrival of ambassadors from the court of Poona demanding the arrears of three years' tribute due by Mysore.¹⁹

The demand, however, was not denied but evaded.

Tipū proceeds
against Nārgund.

Tipū, bitterly lamenting the Mahratta breach of faith during the Karnātic war of 1780-1784, ostensibly admitted the claim by replying the ambassadors to the effect that immediately after the settlement and regulation of Mysore, he would arrange to meet it. He also sent to Poona, at the same time, one Muhammad Usmon, an old servant of Haidar, with return presents, as a lesson or warning.²⁰ Almost simultaneously Tipū was actually preparing to proceed against Nārgund, in order that by the previous possession of that fort and other similar places, he might have a stronger hold on the new line of frontier before the commencement of a new Mahratta war. The Mahrattas, who had hardly questioned the Mysorean

18. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 50-52.

19. Wilks, o.c., II. 285; also Kirmāṇi, o.c., 51. "Two years' horse-shoe tribute and *chauth*," according to Kirmāṇi (o.c., 46). The reference here is to the tribute, which, on the authority of Wilks, seems to have been actually in arrears since 1782. The "horse-shoe tribute," as elsewhere explained in the course of this work, was technically known as *ghāsdana* (allowance for grass and grain) in the Mahratta military code.

20. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 46-48.

claim of customary tribute from Nārgund, declared that they would not suffer the exaction of the larger demand made by Tipū, founded on the allegation of plunder and misconduct. Tipū argued that there was an end of his authority, if a foreign power were to dictate his conduct to those included within the Mysore limits, and began by directing operations against Nārgund.²¹

Accordingly, in or about February 1785, Burhan-ud-dīn, the Sipāhsalār (Commander-in-Chief) and Tipū's cousin and brother-in-law, was despatched thither at the head of 5,000 horse and three Kushoons or regiments of foot.²²

Marching by way of Chitaldrug and Savañūr, Burhan-ud-dīn soon joined Saiyid Gafoor, the Sipāhdār, near Dharwar, and committing the charge of his right and left wings to his bravest officers, encamped in the neighbourhood of Nārgund early in March. The Dēshāyi, Kāla Paṇḍit, was forthwith summoned to surrender, with promises of eventual restoration of the fort to him. He, however, definitely refused to comply. Thereupon Burhan-ud-dīn marched on and halting by a river at the

distance of seven or eight miles, commenced the siege of Nārgund. The Sipāhdārs Saiyid Hamīd and Saiyid Gafoor, under Burhan-ud-dīn, advanced and enclosed the

mountain, whilst the infantry ascended and started the attack of the fort on all sides, battering down the walls by the fire of musketry and artillery.²³

The Dēshāyi, however, was a brave man and his troops often sallied forth and attacked the batteries, killing many of those defending them. One night, at an

21. Wilks, l.c.

22. *Ibid*; also Kirmāni, o.c., 52.

23. Kirmāni, o.c., 59-60. The reference to "Kumr-ud-dīn" on page 60 of the text of Kirmāni seems to be an error, apparently of the translator. It ought to be "Burhan-ud-dīn."

opportune moment, a small detachment of the Chief's garrison descended from the mountain and attacked the pickets of Burhan-ud-dīn's army, stationed at its foot, so vigorously that they killed the Bakshi Salābat Khān and 200 horse. Despite their strenuous exertions to take the hill fort, the Sipāhdārs of Burhan-ud-dīn made no progress and several assaults were made with little success.²⁴ It being summer, there was scarcity of water in the camp to such an extent that water-carriers had to bring it from the river below, on bullocks and camels, to the batteries at the foot of the mountain, while, in time of need, on account of distance, the men in the batteries could receive hardly any succour from the army. Yet the Sipāhdārs and officers of the *Ahashām*, or irregular infantry, persisted and eventually carried on the batteries to the very foot of the walls.²⁵ There-

Kāla-Paṇḍit solicits the aid of the Mahrattas.

upon, Kāla-Paṇḍit, in great alarm, reported the critical situation of his affairs to Parashurām Bhau of Mīraj and to the court of Poona, soliciting their aid. The Chief of Mīraj accordingly sent thither 5,000 horse. This body of horse encamped on a river swelled by the rains, and were waiting for a force of 10,000 horse from Poona, also proceeding to the aid of the Dēshāyi of Nārgund. Burhan-ud-dīn and the Mysorean ambassadors at Poona communicated these new developments to Tipū.²⁶

Kumr-ud-dīn directed to proceed to Nārgund.

On receipt of this intelligence, Kumr-ud-dīn, Tipū's cousin-german, who had been ordered from Cuddapah to Seringapatam, was directed to change his route and proceed with his force to the aid of Burhan-ud-dīn to effectually checkmate the Mahrattas and take the fort of Nārgund.²⁷

24. *Ibid.*, 60-61.

25. *Ibid.*, 61.

26. *Ibid.*, 61-62.

27. *Ibid.*, 62, and Wilks, l.o. See also Kirkpatrick, o.c., Nos. XIX, dated

Marching with his troops and 4,000 horse, Kumr-ud-dīn forded the Krishṇa. In one night-attack on the Mahratta horse, who were about to cross over, he put them to flight, taking many of them prisoners. Then he advanced towards the fort of Nārgund, where he arrived about the middle of April, and pitched his tents between the mountain and the encampment of Burhan-ud-dīn, sending to the latter's assistance one of his own officers, a Sipāhdār named Shaikh Imām.²⁸ The combined force, temporarily raising the siege of Nārgund, soon proceeded to attack the forces collected by Parashurām Bhau for relieving the place. There was little serious fighting and the superiority was claimed by both. But the result was clearly testified to by the forward movement of the Mysoreans, which enabled them to reduce, on the 5th of May, the fort of Rāmdurg, beyond the northern or true Malprabha, an acquisition which covered and facilitated the subsequent operations against Nārgund. The siege of the latter place was accordingly resumed. The arrangement of ordering the two divisions of Burhan-ud-dīn and Kumr-ud-dīn to co-operate, instead of vesting the command in one superior officer, however, resulted in prolonging the operations in consequence of

Kumr-ud-dīn joins,
April 1785.

Reduction of Rāmdurg,
May 5, 1785.

Siege of Nārgund
resumed, May-Aug-
ust.

April 19, 1785, XXXI-XXXII, dated April 24, 1785, and XXXVI, dated May 1, 1785, which convey Tipū's directions to Kumr-ud-dīn and Burhan-ud-dīn to drive away the Mahratta army beyond the Krishṇa and after signally chastising the enemy to take up their position for the attack of Rāmdurg, Nārgund, etc. Kirmāṇi, by way of digression, gives an account of Kumr-ud-dīn's activities in connection with the settlement of Cuddapah, whose chief, in agreement with the English at Masulipatam, had lately attempted its reconquest from Mysore (Kirmāṇi, o.c., 62-64).

28. *Ibid.*, 64; see also and compare Wilks (l.c.), according to whom Kumr-ud-dīn did not join Burhan-ud-dīn before the 10th or 12th April. This seems confirmed by Kirkpatrick who refers to the earliest letter of Tipū to Kumr-ud-dīn at Nārgund, [dated April 24, 1785 (Kirkpatrick, o.c., No. XXXII)].

divided counsels and reciprocal complaints to Tipū. Nevertheless, the place was reduced to such extremities that Kāla-Paṇḍit was induced to capitulate early in August.²⁹

Meantime, Tipū had issued directions to put to the sword, in the event of assault, every living thing, man, woman, child, dog or cat, with the single exception of Kāla-Paṇḍit (whose person was to be secured), and to employ every contrivance of truth or falsehood, which might induce the besieged to surrender the fort.³⁰ The unhappy Dēshāyi demanded for his security the sanction of oaths.³¹ Tipū, however, disregarding the necessity for oaths, had ordered Burhan-ud-dīn and Kumr-ud-dīn to conjointly persuade the besieged by every practicable means to deliver up and evacuate the place.³² The Dēshāyi descended under the escort of a select guard of his own men on the faith of a *Kaul-nāma* or agreement from Tipū's officers, guaranteeing him personal security and free permission to depart. He was detained, however, under a variety of pretences, and the vigilance and desperate aspect of his little guard was such as to restrain Burhan-ud-dīn for nearly two months from overpowering them by open violence. At last, on the 6th of October, the object was effected. Kāla-Paṇḍit was with his family placed under a guard and despatched

The capture and confinement of the Dēshāyi, October 6, 1785.

29. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 285-286. Wilks, as we shall see, subsequently speaks of an interval of two months between the Dēshāyi's capitulation and his final capture and confinement on October 6, 1785 (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 287). Hence the capitulation must have taken place early in August.

30. *Ibid.*, 286; see also and compare Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Nos. LXIX, dated June 21, 1785; LXXXII, dated July 10, 1785; LXXXV, dated July 16, 1785; and XCII, dated July 22, 1785, etc., containing directions in detail from Tipū to Kumr-ud-dīn, Burhan-ud-dīn and others, regarding the storming and reduction of Nārgund.

31. *Ibid.*; also Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. XCIII, dated July 23, 1785.

32. *Ibid.*; see also and compare Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Nos. XCII, dated July 22, 1785, and XCIII and XCIV, dated July 28, 1785.

in irons to Seringapatam and from thence to Kabbāldurg, where he ended his last days.³³ Nārgund was committed to the charge of an Amīr, an officer of Tipū; Kittoor, the residence of another Dēshāyi, was next seized, and Burhan-ud-dīn cantoned in the neighbourhood of Dharwar, Kumr-ud-dīn having been, in the meanwhile, recalled with his force to Seringapatam.³⁴

Reduction of
Kittoor, etc.

33. *Ibid*, 286-287; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 64-65, briefly touching on the course of affairs leading to the *Kaul-Nāma* or agreement. The entire proceeding, detailed in the text above, was in pursuance of Tipū's previous directions, according to which a capitulation was to be granted to the besieged, allowing them to depart with their arms and accoutrements; Kāla-Paṇḍit, with his family and kindred and principal bankers, was to be induced by engagements to descend from the fort, upon which they were to be placed under a guard and ten lakhs of pagodas demanded of them by way of reparation for ravages committed in the Mysore territories; otherwise they were to be kept in confinement, etc. (see Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Nos. LXIX and LXXXII, cited *supra*).

34. *Ibid*, 287; Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 65. Kittoor: In Belgaum district, 26 miles S. E. of Belgaum town. Though this place was taken towards the close of 1785, shortly after the reduction of Nārgund, its spoliation seems to have taken place only subsequent to February 1786. A letter from Tipū to Burhan-ud-dīn, dated February 8, 1786, directs him to despatch all the gold, silver, jewels, elephants, etc., belonging to the Dēshāyi of Kittoor, together with the Dēshāyi himself and his family (Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. CCXVII). Another, dated February 18, 1786, similarly directs Burhan-ud-dīn to despatch the Dēshāyi with all his effects, etc., to the Presence (*Ibid*, No. CCXXV). According to Kirmāni, the recalling of Kumr-ud-dīn was due to the intrigue of Burhan-ud-dīn, who, jealous of Kumr-ud-dīn because the fort of Nārgund had surrendered only after his arrival, had written to Tipū that he (Kumr-ud-dīn) was a disaffected person in communication with the Nizām of Hyderabad, and trying to abandon the Mysore service, etc. This suspicion against him having been confirmed, Kumr-ud-dīn, soon after his arrival in Seringapatam, was placed in confinement and his troops incorporated with Tipū's army (see Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 65-67, for a detailed account). Wilks also speaks of Kumr-ud-dīn having been reported at court "to have sent an envoy to join Nizām Ali with the force under his command, and to place himself and his jageer under the protection of that prince" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II.283). He, however, gives a different account relating to the confinement of Kumr-ud-dīn. According to him, in October 1785, when Tipū was preparing to proceed to Coorg, the death occurred in Seringapatam of an eminent person, Sirājuddin Muhammad Khān, formerly Mufti at Arcot, and afterwards chief officer in Mysore of

The Mahrattas, thus foiled in their purpose of saving Nārgund and its chief, were obliged for the time being to defer the execution of their designs against Mysore, while Tipū's envoys at Poona continued by a series of deceptions to prolong their stay, Tipū's mind seeming to fluctuate between the alternative of meeting the demand made, or attempting by a war to relieve himself from past and future claims.³⁵ Meantime, at the court of Poona, Nāna Farnavis, the astute Mahratta minister, having peremptorily rejected Tipū's proffered presents and money, had been actively

the department of Justice. "The Sultan," continues Wilks, "ordered his remains to be placed in a palankeen, and conveyed, with all the circumstances of honourable distinction, to be interred at Seringapatam. As the procession drew near, the rumour was spread that the Sultan was dead, and his corpse approaching. This report circulated with the utmost rapidity over all India, including the European settlements, and was so entirely and steadily credited, that Mr. Macpherson, then Governor-General of the English possessions, actually despatched from Bengal an embassy to the successor, or rather the Lord Protector, in behalf of the infant heir, an office which the same rumour assigned to Kummer-u-Deen. The designed propagation of such a rumour was, in all subsequent times, so steadily denied at court, that the general opinion in Mysore refers it to the accidental circumstance above related; but any other foundation than design would involve an early anxiety to contradict the rumour, and Kummer-u-Deen, for whom it was evidently designed, deceived by reiterated assurances of the fact, acted as might reasonably be expected on the supposition either of good or of bad intentions; he left orders with his troops to follow by forced marches, and proceeded post to the capital, where he was instantly placed under arrest; stripped of all his jageers and offices, and the troops which had hitherto been subject to his immediate authority, were dispersed and incorporated with the other divisions of the army. For two years after this event [*i.e.*, 1785-1787], Kummer-u-Deen remained in disgrace, and without any provision for his maintenance; at the expiration of that time, a monthly pay of five hundred rupees, or £750 a year, was assigned to him." (Wilks, *o.c.*, II.288-289). Both his alleged connection with the Nizām and his overt precipitation in seeking to avail himself of Tipū's supposed death, as stated above, seem to have contributed in no small measure to Kummer-u-din's temporary fall. Kirmāni places the siege and capitulation of Nārgund in 1784. But, in the light of other sources mentioned above, the event is referable to 1785.

35. *Ibid.*

engaged in framing such a confederacy as should ensure not only the exaction of the demand preferred from Mysore but the recovery of the territory between the Krishna and Tungabhadra, lost in the civil war of Raghōba.³⁶ However much the English, since the humiliating peace of Mangalore, desired in their own interests an alliance with the Mahrattas and the English, Nāna believed that his objective might be attained by the union of every branch of the Mahratta confederacy with Nizām Alī; and excepting in the case of urgent necessity, he did not seek the participation of the English in the expected advantages of the war which extended in prospect to the entire partition of the Mysore dominions. All the preliminary conditions, including the previous exaction of a considerable sum by way of *Chaut* from Nizām Alī, were adjusted. Early in 1786, the armies assembled for field operations and soon afterwards formed a junction near the Krishna, where a personal conference was held between Nāna and Nizām Alī for the purpose of digesting the plan of the war. After this, they returned to their respective capitals, leaving the command of the Mahratta contingents of all the chiefs to Haripant and of Nizām Alī's to Tohuvīr Jang, the former consisting of 80,000 horse, 40,000 foot, equipped with 50 guns of heavy calibre and vast quantities of warlike stores, while the latter was made up of 40,000 horse and 50,000 foot.³⁷

Early in May 1786, the confederates marched on and arrived at Bādāmi, a place of considerable strength on the northern frontier of Mysore. From here, the envoys

Their operations.

36. *Ibid.*, 292; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 85.

37. *Ibid.*, 292-294; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 85-86, and Kirkpatrick (*o.c.*, 325-326, quoting extract from Tipū's *Tārīkh-Khoḡadādī*) referring to the alliance between the Mahrattas and the Nizām "with the intention of making a joint attack on the *Ahmedy* dominions" (*i.e.*, Mysore). The "Tohuvver Jung" of Wilks is identical with the "Tehbur Jung" of *Tārīkh-Khoḡadādī* (see Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 330).

of Tipū received their dismissal and the allies having determined to attack the Mysorean forts, opened the

Siege and capitulation of Bādāmi, May 1786.

campaign with the siege of Bādāmi itself. The fort held itself out against the assailants. The allies, however, exerted themselves strenuously in the attack. They raised batteries and battered down the walls, though the repeated assaults involved them in great losses in their ranks. At length, on the 20th of the month, the town was carried by a general assault and the citadel surrendered soon afterwards.³⁸ The Mahratta horse spread themselves all over the country between the Krishna and Tungabhadra, while their regular troops were successively employed in the

Reduction of Dharwar, etc., May-June 1786.

reduction of Dharwar, Julihul, Gajēndragadh, Navalgunda, Nārgund, etc., in fact the whole of that side of the Tungabhadra. At the same time, the Pālegārs of Sirahattī, Dāmūl, Kanakagiri and Ānegondi transferred their allegiance to the Mahrattas and it seemed as if the Mysorean sovereignty over the northern Karnāṭak was fast slipping from Tipū's hands.³⁹

Meanwhile, Tipū on his part had been active, ever since his return from Coorg, devising measures to counteract the Mahratta aggression. During February-March 1786, he wrote to Burhan-ud-dīn, apprising him of the movements of the Mahratta force, and desiring him to take up immediately a position at Dharwar with necessary precautions, and despatching the whole of his baggage into the Bednūr (Nagar) country, remain

38. *Ibid.*, 295; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 86-87, and Kirkpatrick, *o.c.* 327. Kirmāṇi, perhaps by way of exaggeration, speaks of the capitulation of Bādāmi after a siege of nine months. According to Wilks, an earlier authority, the entire event took place in May 1786.

39. *Ibid.*; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 87-88; see also and compare Kirkpatrick, *l.c.*

with his army unencumbered, and at a favourable opportunity to make a night attack on the Mahrattas and chastise them signally.⁴⁰ Again, in May, Tipū, resolved to crush the Mahrattas,⁴¹ wrote to Burhan-ud-dīn of his intended movement to relieve effectually both Bādāmi and Rāmdurg.⁴² Burhan-ud-dīn, however, although reinforced by the disposable troops of Bednūr under Badr-u-zamān Khān, his father-in-law, an able and experienced officer, was too weak for offensive operations, but continued to hold the advancing Mahratta army in check, prudently keeping within a moderate distance of the woods of Sunda and Bednūr, as a security for his eventual retreat.⁴³

Early in June, Tipū, on receipt of intelligence of Mahratta advance on the north of the Tungabhadra, after the capitulation of Bādāmi, marched on to Bangalore with six brigades of regular infantry, three regiments of regular cavalry, 10,000 irregular foot, 30,000 good horse and 22 heavy guns, drawing at the same time on the support of the local Pālegārs (of places like Rāyadurg, Harapanahalli, etc). From Bangalore, Tipū, instead of moving, as expected by the enemy, in the direction of the confederate army, suddenly diverged to the right, and proceeding by forced marches through Doḍballāpur, Hindupur, Pāvugaḍa and Hanūr, stood, about the middle of the month, before the walls of Adoni, the strong frontier post of the Nizām, south of the

Appears before
Adoni.

40. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Nos. CCXX, dated February 4, 1786; CCXXXIX-CCXL, dated March 7, 1786; CCXLV-CCXLVI, dated March 16 and 30, 1786.

41. *Ibid.*, 298-296: Tipū's Proclamation or Manifesto related to his circular, dated May 3, 1786, referring to his "resolution of prosecuting a holy war against the infidels." The reference here is to the Mahrattas.

42. *Ibid.*, No. CCLXXI, dated May 6, 1786.

43. Wilks, *l.c.*

Tungabhadra, then under Mohabat Jang, son of Basālat Jang and nephew of Nizām Alī. Tipū's objective now was clear. If the confederates should march to oppose him, he would give them battle and an open field would be left for Burhan-ud-dīn; if they should persevere in their actual line of operations, he would take Adoni and carry off the harem of Mohabat Jang, lodged in the fort.⁴⁴ The fortifications of Adoni surrounded a group of five hills, standing in an irregular circle, and enclosing between them a considerable area of lower ground. The pathway up to this from the *pettah* of Adoni led through—judging from the present remains—three large gates connected with three lines of walls, one above the other. At the bottom, between the first and second walls are two wells, one called Sidi Masaud Khān and another known as Riza Ambar well, after the Dewān of Masaud Khān, and several Hindu temples and Muslim mosques. On the highest of the five hills of the fort—known as *Bārā-kille*—were the magazines and a stone cannon of olden times. There were, besides, on the way to the *Bārā-kille*, several Jain temples of olden days. Two tanks—still in use—supplied the fort with water.

Mohabat Jang, in the meantime, alarmed at the arrival of the Mysore forces before Adoni, had offered a large sum to purchase Tipū's forbearance, while his widowed mother had addressed him a letter imploring his commiseration.⁴⁵ He had also deputed his minister Asad Alī Khān to Tipū, entreating him not to injure or molest him. Tipū replied deprecating the disastrous consequences of the alliance of Nizām Alī with the Mahrattas, and offering Mohabat Jang immunity from

The siege of
Adoni.

44. *Ibid.*, 295-296; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 88-90; and Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 328-329, quoting from *Tārīkh-Khoṣṣādādy*. See W. Francis, *Bellary District Gazetteer*, I, Chapter XV, under *Administration*.

45. *Ibid.*, 296.

attack if he would only join and aid him against the confederates.⁴⁶ Mohabat Jang refused to accede to Tipū's propositions and prepared to defend himself. Whereupon Tipū opened up trenches against Adoni and commenced operations. The town was assaulted and taken. Nevertheless, Mohabat Jang was unyielding. Tipū, having resolved on the reduction of the fort, encompassed it on all sides and went about making his approaches and keeping up a continual fire of cannon and mortars, with a view eventually to draw off the confederates to the assistance of Mohabat Jang and his harem and force them to an accommodation.⁴⁷ At the same time, Mohabat Jang, on his part, giving orders for the regulation and security of the fort, put up a desperate defence at the head of 7,000 horse and foot, repelling the several columns of assault with great slaughter.⁴⁸ Tipū, having mounted batteries near the ditch, was employed in a similar assault of another breach but was repulsed with the same energy and effect.⁴⁹ [At this juncture, intelligence was received that the Nizām and the Pāshwa having returned to their respective capitals on pretence of ill health, the confederate armies under Mughal Ali, younger brother of Nizām Ali, Mushir-ul-Mulk, Tej Jang, Tohuvir Jang, Ganesh Pant, Appa Balavant,

46. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 90-91; see also and compare Wilks, *l.c.* Kirkpatrick refers to a letter from Tipū's agents Ali Razā and Bālā Mukund Dās to Asad Ali Khān, which speaks of their having mentioned to him four articles which were submitted for his acceptance, and desires him to state which of those articles he would agree to, so that they might get the business finally settled and ensure the safety of the harem of Mohabat Jang and the inhabitants of Adoni, etc. The articles, however, are not specified in the letter (Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. CCCI, dated June 18, 1786).

47. *Ibid.*, 91-92; see also and compare Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 329.

48. *Ibid.*, 93-94; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 296-297.

49. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 297; Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 329-330; see also and compare Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 95-97), whose account of the breaching operations seems not only exaggerated but also tinged with bias in favour of Tipū. The sequence too is not properly developed in this part of Kirmāṇi's narrative and differs from Tipū's own account in the *Tārīkh-Khoḍā-dādī*, quoted by Kirkpatrick.

Yasavant Rao Holkar, Paraśurām of Mirāj, Hari Pant and others, had arrived at the other side of the Tungabhadra to the relief of Adoni.⁵⁰

There being no convenient place for intercepting these forces, and Tipū's own army having been dispersed, Tipū, on the 25th of June—about ten days after the commencement of operations—having previously removed all his guns and stores from the batteries, raised the siege of the fort. Then he moved on and encamped with his rear to the Black Mountains, a few miles to the southward of Adoni, where, having stationed guards and pickets on all sides, he remained in readiness for action.⁵¹

By now the period of annual swelling of the rivers had arrived, and it was for the confederates to decide on transferring the seat of war to the south of the Tungabhadra, on the new line, where no depots or communications had been established, or, after removing the women, to leave Adoni to its fate. They adopted the latter alternative.⁵² Accordingly, two days later, on the 27th of June, Mughal Alī made a forward movement with a large division of the army, and brought on a partial action between the outposts or advanced parties of Tipū and the confederates, in which the latter were thrown into utmost dismay and confusion.⁵³ In this state, the confederates, proceeding along the skirts of

50. Kirmāni, o.c., 94-95; Kirkpatrick, o.c., 330; see also and compare Wilks, l.c.

51. Kirkpatrick, l.c.; Kirmāni, o.c., 97; and Wilks, l.c. The raising of the siege of Adoni by Tipū must have taken place on the 25th June 1786, for in a letter of his to Burhan-ad-dīn, dated the 24th June, he speaks of disengaging himself from his present business (i.e., siege of Adoni) and of marching on to the Dharwar region after inflicting signal punishment on the enemy's forces proceeding on the side of Adoni, etc. (Kirkpatrick, o.c., No. CCCVIII).

52. Wilks, l. c.

53. *Ibid*; see also and compare Kirmāni, o. c., 97-99; and Kirkpatrick, l. c.

the hills, reached the fort of Adoni, where they remained encamped during the next three days. On the fourth day (*i.e.*, 1st July), they took out all the people of the fort but were in such distraction and alarm that they left behind the whole of the wearing apparel of the females and every article of household furniture. In this condition, marching out by the west face, they took

The retreat of the confederates, July 1, 1786.

to flight at midnight and retreated, despatching Mohabat Jang with his property and family to the fort of Raichūr.⁵⁴ Thereupon Tipū detached Mīr Sādak with a body of troops to take possession of the fort of Adoni

Tipū pursues them.

and stores, while he himself, pursuing the confederates across the Tungabhadra, now risen to the full level with the banks, took some of their stragglers prisoners with some baggage left behind, and then returned and encamped on the north side of the fort. Mīr Sādak having in the meantime entered it by the south face and taken possession of all the property in the palace, Tipū, about

Fall of Adoni, July 11, 1786.

the 11th of July, foreseeing the probability of being obliged to relinquish the place on the conclusion of peace, ordered the removal of the guns and stores to Gooty and Bellary and demolished the fortifications, bestowing at the same time the country of Adoni in *jaghir* upon Kutub-ud-dīn Khān Daulat Zai, Bakshi of the *Bār-cuchēri*.⁵⁵

54. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 330-331; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 99, and Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 297-298.

55. *Ibid.*, 332; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 99-100; and Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 298. Kirmāṇi places the siege and reduction of Adoni in A. D. 1785 (A. H. 1199), but from the context the event is referable to A. D. 1786. Tipū found the place, when he returned to it, empty of troops but in other respects untouched. "The guns were found mounted on the walls," writes Wilks, "the arsenal and storehouses, the equipage of the palace, down, as Tippoo affirms, to the very clothing of the women, was found in the exact state of the mansion, ready furnished, for the reception of a royal establishment."

Determined to remove the theatre of war to the northward of the Tungabhadra with a view to chastise the confederates, particularly the Mahrattas,⁵⁶ Tipū then proceeded by the route of Kānchangarh, whose ruler Tungamma—widow of the deceased Pālegār—who had gone over to the Mahrattas, escaped by flight across the river, and whose son was taken prisoner and later circumcised and made a Muslim under the name of Ali Mardan Khān.⁵⁷ From here Tipū marched on by way of Kuragōḍu⁵⁸ and took possession of Saṇḍūr, whose governor Gōvinda Rao Ghōrpaḍe, nephew of Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe, having likewise joined the Mahrattas, had fled to their army.⁵⁹ The fort of Kopāl was next assaulted and taken.⁶⁰ Advancing by the neighbourhood of Hospet, Tipū, at last, between the 23rd and 30th August, crossed, with his entire army, by means of basket boats and rafts ordered from the country of Bednūr, the Tungabhadra, now in high floods, at the ford of Goraknāth,

56. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 298; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 101.

57. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 101-102. Kirmāṇi refers to Tungamma's son as "Moodkum Koor," of about ten or twelve years of age (*o.c.*, 102). "Kānchangarh" is the present "*Kenchangūḍḍam*," four miles s.w. of Siruguppa, in the present Bellary District. According to a lithic inscription dated 1708 A. D., found in the upper fort at this place, it was so named after one Kenchana Gowda, who built the temple and the fort. He was succeeded by his eldest son Virūpākaha, also known as Pampāpati, whose widow was Tungamma of the text. He had two sons. Both of them were seized by Tipū, one being murdered and the other converted to Islām (see Francis, *Bellary District Gazetteer*, Chap. XV, under *Kenchangūḍḍam*). For an earlier notice of the place in connection with the campaigns of Haidar, see Chapter I. p. 162, f. n. 192.

58. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. CCCXXII dated July 17, 1786, referring to Tipū's arrival at "Kurgoor" enroute Goraknāth. Kuragōḍu is situated about 25 miles s.w. of Adoni, near the southern bank of the Tungabhadra. Another letter of the same date (*o.c.*, No. CCCXXIII) speaks of Tipū's having pitched his "most holy camp on the banks of the Tungabhadra." The reference here is to Tipū's arrival at Kuragōḍu, mentioned in the previous letter.

59. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 103. Kirmāṇi spells Saṇḍūr as "Soondoor."

60. *Ibid.*, 103-104. Kirmāṇi refers to Kopāl as "Kopli."

and pitched his tents on the northern bank of the river.⁶¹

Meanwhile, the confederates, secure of an unlimited scope for their operations to the northward of the Tungabhadra, had moved to the more western line on which they had commenced their operations, subduing and taking possession of all the country on this side of the river. Also, with a view to attack Tipū, they had raised their standards opposite to him, and fortified with guns and musketry the ford of the river against the passage of his army.⁶² At the same time, they despatched an officer with a large body of troops to capture the hill-forts of Kopal and Bahadūr-Baṇḍa, the latter of which was eventually taken after a siege of two months, while the commandant of the former put up a vigorous defence.⁶³

On receipt of intelligence of Tipū's crossing the Tungabhadra, the confederates advanced with their troops and artillery. They approached, however, when too late and encamped within a few miles of Tipū. The ground was found to be unfavourable for the employment of their cavalry, and, after examining

61. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 298-299. See also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 104-107; also Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. CCCXLIX dated August 24, 1786, pp. 387-388, quoting extract from *Tarikh-Khoḍadādy*. According to a letter cited by Kirkpatrick, Tipū had arrived with his special retinue at Goraknāth on the 11th August, and was waiting to cross the Tungabhadra (Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. CCCXXXIX). The intervening period of about twelve days must have been occupied in the arrangements for crossing the river in floods, as mentioned in the text above. Kirmāṇi spells Hospet as "Huspeenth" and Goraknāth as "Goruknath". Kirkpatrick spells "Goraknāth" as "Gung-Kurknāt." It is rather difficult to locate this name of the ford. Grant-Duff calls the place "Gurkghaut" but cannot state its situation. As Sir Murray Hammick observes, "The fords across the river (Tungabhadra) are numerous, and probably the name has disappeared. There is no village of that name in the Bellary district at the present time" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 299, f.n.).

62. Wilks, *l.c.*; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 105.

63. Kirmāṇi, *l.c.*

the position, they moved in the direction of Savaṇūr with the view of drawing Tipū into the plain country. Tipū, with the whole of his horse, four regiments, guns and stores, followed, keeping the river as close on his left as the ground admitted, drawing his subsistence from the opposite bank; and determined to avoid a general action until he should be joined by Burhan-ud-dīn, who was by now descending by the left bank of the Warda (Varada), pressed by superior numbers. Two night-attacks were attempted by Tipū as he approached Savaṇūr, the first on the 11th of September, and the second a few days afterwards, neither being attended with any decisive effect. Before attempting to oppose the confederate movement, however, Tipū detached by a circuitous route a reinforcement to Burhan-ud-dīn of two brigades, and some irregulars under Ghāzi Khān, his (Tipū's) earliest military preceptor, and esteemed by Haidar the best partisan in his army. Everything succeeded as anticipated. The junction was formed without serious impediment. The confederates were encamped at Sirahattī, some miles in front of the fort of Savaṇūr, while Tipū occupied a strong position in full view of the confederate camp, at the confluence of the Tungabhadra and Warda, with the latter river, then fordable, in the rear of his right.⁶⁴

Not long after, Burhan-ud-dīn Sipāhsalār with his division of troops arrived from the neighbourhood of Ānavattī,⁶⁵ while Tipū prepares for a serious night-attack. Badr-u-Zamān Khān, who had been

64. Wilka, *o.c.*, II. 299-300; see also and compare Kirmānī, *o.c.*, 106-115, and Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 388-390, 425-426, and *Letter* No. CCCLXII, dated September 12, 1786, for tactical details, etc., connected with the earlier night-attacks before the action at Savaṇūr. Kirmānī refers to the Warda river as "river Bola or Bala" (*o.c.*, 112, 115). Also he places the course of affairs from the fall of Adoni down to the encampment of the confederates and Tipū before Savaṇūr in A.D. 1785 (A.H. 1199). But, from the context, these events are referable to A.D. 1786.

65. Kirmānī, *o.c.*, 116

directed to entrench himself strongly in readiness to co-operate with Burhan-ud-dīn in the chastisement of the confederates,⁶⁶ arrived with an immense convoy of provisions from the district of Nagar (Bednūr).⁶⁷ The Mahrattas, however, on receipt of news of Tipū's night marches, fancying that he was returning to Seringapatam from fear of their innumerable army, followed quickly and encamped at the distance of two *fursungs* in the rear of the Mysore army, so near that the pickets and outposts of both armies were stationed at the distance of an arrow's cast only from each other, and at this distance repelled the different attacks made by each other.⁶⁸ For two or three days, therefore, Tipū, having formed his plans, manouvred about every morning and evening under pretence of exercise, and, after driving in the outposts, returned to his position. On the third or fourth night, leaving the baggage and followers of his army in the same place, he made his dispositions for a serious attack from different points.⁶⁹ Dividing his force into four columns, he placed one of these under Maha Mirza Khān, who was directed to charge across the river. Another division, consisting of two or three Kushoons and six guns, under Burhan-ud-dīn, was to fall upon the enemy's left flank. A third, made up of two Kushoons, five guns and the French regiment, under Mīr Moin-ud-dīn, was to assail their right; while the fourth, consisting of two Kushoons, the horse of the *paigah* and the *ahashām* foot, led by Tipū himself, was to attack the main body of the enemy from the left centre.⁷⁰

66. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. COCL, dated August 30, 1786.

67. Kirmāṇi, *l.c.*

68. *Ibid.*

69. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 300; Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 427; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 116-117.

70. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 426; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 117; see also and compare Wilks, *l.c.*

Tipū, after retiring from his afternoon's bravado, and merely giving the troops time for their evening meal, moved off by a considerable detour of the two right columns, for the purpose of a combined attack on the enemy's left and centre, about an hour before day-light. It was concerted that on the head of his own column reaching its destined point of attack, he should fire a signal gun, which was immediately to be answered by the heads of the other three, in order that each might ascertain the position of the others and instantly afterwards commence the attack. On approaching a small outpost, his own column was challenged, and Tipū, as if determined on communicating information of his approach, personally gave orders for the discharge of a few platoons of musketry. He then advanced, and when near the camp fired the signal gun, but looked and listened in vain for reply. After much delay and anxiety, he fired another signal, which was answered by one only. He, however, moved on and entering the camp a little before the dawn, actually found himself accompanied by no more than three hundred men. It was the first of October. A dark and rainy night had caused the heads of all the columns, excepting his own, to lose their way, and each column had, from the same causes, been broken into several divisions, each pursuing at random separate routes. Luckily, as the light became more perfect, all were within view, and Tipū was enabled to make a disposition. But the camp was empty and the hostile army appeared regularly drawn up on a height, which overlooked their late ground. A cannonade ensued.⁷¹ Whereupon the Mysore forces with considerable difficulty and labour made their way to the points of attack. By the light of the early morning, Burhan-ud-dīn attacked

71. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 300-301; see also and compare Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 427-428.

the troops of Haripant and Rāste, while Mīr Moin-ud-dīn, leaving the heavy guns behind, fell upon the right wing of the Nizām's army commanded by Syfe Jang. Tipū himself with the greatest rapidity moved on to attack the main body of the enemy⁷². At the commencement of the cannonade, we are told, he had ordered no return to be made from his guns of good calibre, for the purpose of encouraging the enemy to advance, confident of their being left in camp. This deception was so successful that the opposing forces were soon repulsed with heavy loss.⁷³ The attacks on all sides having cooped and cabined the Mahrattas, their chiefs were fast kept aloof from the action, while the Nizām's army was entirely overrun and plundered. Nevertheless, the Mahrattas, contesting every inch of ground with the Mysore troops at the point of the guns, fell back on the fort of Savanūr.⁷⁴

From this position, the Mahrattas were dislodged after an interval of two days (*i.e.*, on the 4th October); and Tipū marched without opposition towards Savanūr, which had been evacuated by its Nawāb, Abdul Hakīm.⁷⁵

Early relations between Tipū and Hakīm Khān. Abdul Hakīm, it may be recalled, after the death of Haidar, had estranged himself from Tipū, to whom he had sent neither letters of congratulation nor presents of cloths, etc., on his accession to power.⁷⁶ Further, we have seen that on the occasion of the double marriage between the families of Haidar and Hakīm Khān, in 1779,

72. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 117-118.

73. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 301.

74. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 118-120; Wilks, *l.c.*; see also and compare, on this section, Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Nos. CCCLXXX-CCCLXXXI, dated October 10 and November 6, 1786; also pp. 428-429. The engagement at Savanūr (October 1, 1786) is also referred to in Nos. CCCLXXXV dated October 23, and CCCXII dated December 15, 1786.

75. *Ibid.*, 120; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 302.

76. *Ibid.*

one of the conditions of enlarging the possessions of Savanūr was the maintenance for Haidar's service of a body of 2,000 select Pathān horse to be commanded by one of his sons, and this body had joined Haidar for the invasion of the Coromandel. The hardships of the service, particularly during the march of cavalry under Tipū into the low countries of Canara in 1783, had destroyed great numbers of horses, while individual horsemen had from similar cause to abscond and return to their homes. On Tipū's return from Mangalore, in 1784, he ordered a muster of this contingent and 500 men and horses only were forthcoming. He, therefore, commanded the ministers of Savanūr to repair to Seringapatam and settle the account of deficiencies. A balance of 21 lakhs of rupees was made out in Tipū's favour, for which the ministers gave the conditional engagement of two bankers (*sāhukārs*), who had the usual collateral security of the revenues and the sanction of a guard of Tipū's troops to enforce the collection. Abdul Hakīm, who had debts, and not treasures, gave up, in the first instance, all his family jewels, estimated at only three lakhs, and desired his ministers and bankers to levy the remainder on the country in the best manner possible. Their regular receipts apart, these authorities soon found pretexts for seizing and putting into torture all landholder's suspected to possess money. An amount superior to the balance was supposed to be levied, but the ministers and bankers, considering that a large portion of the collection was due to themselves for their own trouble, allowed about one half the amount to reach Tipū's treasury and represented the impossibility of raising the remainder. One of the bankers paid the debt of nature in the midst of his iniquities, and the other was remanded to Seringapatam and remained in prison (where he was eventually murdered in the general massacre of prisoners in 1791). Meanwhile, Abdul

Hakīm continued to be goaded and threatened for the balance, down to the very opening of the campaign, when Tipū began to relax and endeavour to deceive. But the unfortunate chief, disgusted to the last

Hakīm Khān joins the Mahrattas and takes to flight, October 29, 1786.

degree by the coercive measures inflicted on himself and his country, determined to join the confederates with the handful of men he was still able to command.

At last, however, on the 29th of October, when he found that his friends, the Mahrattas, had retreated and Tipū had stood before the walls of Savanūr, he fled at night to their camp with his friends and dependents, leaving his son Abdul Khira Khān *alias* Khira Mean in the capital.

From the Mahratta camp, he was sent off, under a guard of 5,000 horse, to Mīraj, to take refuge behind

The spoliation of Savanūr.

the Krishna.⁷⁷ Meantime Tipū, establishing his headquarters about nine miles from Savanūr, despatched his

officers to take possession of the city.⁷⁸ The State of Savanūr with the accumulated treasures of ages was spoliated to the last degree, while the Nawāb's son (Khira Mean), who forthwith surrendered to Tipū, was kept under strict surveillance.⁷⁹

77. Wilks, *o.c.* II. 302-303; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 121, and Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, No. CCCLXXI and pp. 429-430.

78. *Ibid.*, 303; Kirmāni, *l.c.*"

79. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 121-124; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 303-304. According to Kirmāni, who gives a detailed account of the spoliation of Savanūr, "the officers (of Tipū) sent, agreeably to their orders, without opposition from any one, took and despatched to the Presence whatever they found of gold, silver, carpets, or tents, vessels, arms, etc., as, for instance, in Abdul Hakīm's wardrobe, they found fifty turbans of different colours, of the Boorhanpoor (Burhanpur) chintz kind, hung upon pegs in the wall, and honorary dresses of great splendour and value, of the same colour corresponding to the turbans, under cloth covers or in packages; but, besides these, articles of great value brought from all countries laid about in heaps, and these with lists of all of them were sent to the Sultan, and after being inspected by him were deposited in the *Tōsha-Khāna* (at Seringapatam). The light guns were all added to the Sultan's artillery and one gun composed of five metals, twelve legal *guz* in length, was broken up

After the capture and regulation of Savanūr, Tipū, leaving a garrison there, marched to the northward, encamping near Bankapur (*Jobun-garh*) during the fourteen days of the *Muhurram* (down to about the latter part of November).⁸⁰ Here he distributed his army into four divisions, each consisting of four Kushoons, 5,000 irregular foot, 5,000 Sillāhdār horse and 15 guns. The first division was placed under the command of Mīr Moin-ud-dīn (Saiyid Sāhib); the second under Burhan-ud-dīn; the third under Maha Mirza Khān and the fourth under Husain Alī Khān, the Mīr Bakshi. These Sipāhsalārs being directed to march on and encamp at the distance of three miles from the remainder of the Mysore army, they accordingly took up their ground and began to prepare their troops and arms for immediate action, while Tipū himself, with two Kushoons (the *Asad Ilāhi* and *Ahmadi*), three Mokubs or regiments of horse, eight Dustas of the Paigah or household horse, 4,000 Kuzzaks and 10,000 *ahashām* infantry, remained encamped where he was. These arrangements being completed, the first of Tipū's commanders was commissioned to the conquests of the dependencies of Hyderabad; the second to the conquest of those of Poona; the third to the maintenance of order at Raichūr, Kittoor, etc., and the fourth was ordered to Seringapatam to subject and control the different forts and districts of the

and sent to the mint to be coined into half pence. In fact, all the valuables, among which were carpets of the most elegant pattern with gold and silver flowers, each the load of four or five camels, and the *Kalecchas* and *Sutrinjas* (other kinds of carpets), of which each was the load of an elephant, were all seized by the Sultan's servants . . ." (*Kirmāni*, o.c., 122-123). *Kirmāni* places the course of affairs from the encampment of Tipū before Savanūr down to the capture and spoliation of Savanūr in A.D. 1784 (A.H. 1199), but from the context these are referable to A.D. 1786.

80. Kirkpatrick, o.c., 480; see also and compare *Kirmāni*, o.c., 125, and Wilks, o.c., II. 303. *Kirmāni* refers to Tipū's place of encampment as *Jobungarh*, probably a Persian substitute name for Bankapur.

Pālegārs, while Tipū himself was to attack the Mahrattas.⁸¹ On receipt of this news, the Mahrattas in their camp became alarmed, when of a sudden Mīr Moin-ud-dīn with his force marched at night and assaulted and took the hill-fort of Mondergi Durg (garrisoned by them), pillaging the town. In like manner, Burhan-ud-dīn surprised Bankapur and Misrikote, also in possession of the Mahrattas, while Tipū himself advanced straight against them. The Mahrattas, however, attacked the rear-guard of the Mysore army, plundering the Banjaras of ten thousand bags of grain.⁸²

At this point, however, Tipū, anxious to conclude a speedy peace with the Mahrattas in order that he might be the sooner in a position to make war upon the English,⁸³ despatched a diplomatic messenger to the leader of the Mahratta forces, Tukōji Rao Holkar, charged with a message to the following effect.⁸⁴ "You have obtained experience in feats of arms, and are distinguished among the chiefs for superior valour. Now that war has commenced its destructive career, and thousands are doomed to fall, why should we longer witness the causeless effusion of human blood? It is better that you and I should singly descend into the field of combat; let the Almighty determine who is the conqueror and who the vanquished, and let that result terminate the contest. Or, if you have not sufficient confidence in your own single arm, take to your aid from one to ten men of your own selection, and I will meet you with equal numbers. Such was the practice in the days of our Prophet, and though long discontinued, I

81. Kirmāni, o.c., 125-126.

82. *Ibid*, 126-127.

83. Kirkpatrick, o.c., 422-423, quoting from and commenting on Tipū's letter to the Governor of Madras, dated October 10, 1786.

84. Wilks, o.c., II. 304; see also and compare Kirmāni, o.c., 127-128, and Kirkpatrick, o.c., 430-431.

desire to renew that species of warfare. But if prudence should dictate your declining the second proposition also, let the two armies be drawn out, select your weapons, and let us, chief opposed to chief, horseman opposed to horseman, and footsoldier to footsoldier, engage in a pitched battle, and let the vanquished become the subjects of the victors." Tukōji, who well knew the valour of his own troops, and that without peace, he could not expect to save himself from destruction, declined to agree to Tipū's proposition. However, by the advice of some of his followers, who recommended war, he agreed to an action to be decided by the sword alone.⁸⁵

Tipū's messenger, in the meanwhile, had also been charged with separate instructions to propitiate some of the Mahratta chiefs by bribery, and with assurances of a pacific nature to the confederates at large.⁸⁶ Under cover, however, of the negligence and security which he expected these demonstrations to produce, Tipū, during the progress of the negotiations, making a forced march on pretence of forage, assembled his four divisions on the banks of the Gaṇḍaki for a more successful night-attack.⁸⁷ Arranging these in order of battle and appointing his Kushoons to the right and left wings, he himself mounted on an elephant with his guard and took his station on the field, ordering the men of his *Paigah*, or household cavalry, to commence the action. Accordingly,

85. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 128; see also and compare Wilks (*o.c.*, II. 304-305), who, referring to Holkar's reply as exhibiting "a nearer approach to the national character" of the Mahrattas, writes: "The passion for fighting (Holkar is made to say) had not descended to him from his ancestors, but rather the hereditary trade of flying, plundering, burning and destroying, and the petty warfare which involves but little danger." This view of Mahratta national character given currency to by Wilks is hardly just to them or in keeping with known facts.

86. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 305.

87. *Ibid*; see also and compare Kirmāṇi (*l.c.*), who refers to Gaṇḍaki as "Gaḍuk."

each *Dusta* galloped forward, and having formed in close order, took possession of the field. The Mahrattas also, armed *cap-a-pie*, now charged Tipū's troops and between them a very severe action ensued, which went on until midday next day.⁸⁸ In this action, without encountering serious opposition, Tipū got possession, among other booty, of the splendid camp equipage and stores of the confederate Tohuvīr Jang and the camels which conveyed it, estimated at not less than 500 animals.⁸⁹ Thereupon the Mahratta chiefs, with their whole force amounting to seventy to eighty thousand men, moved forward. Tipū, seeing that the Mahrattas had violated their agreement, immediately ordered his artillery to charge, and they, moving forward quickly from the flanks with the Sipāhdārs (and their Kushoons), put the Mahrattas to flight, capturing their horses, baggage, stores, arms and ammunition, and securing the allegiance of Hari Naik, Pālegār of Kanakagiri, who had deserted them.⁹⁰

In December, the confederates, from the ground thus precipitately abandoned, moved north-east towards Gajēndragadh, while Tipū in a more easterly direction marched towards Kopāl and Bahadūr-Baṇḍa, two little forts near to each other, which had been surrendered to the confederates in the early part of the campaign. On January 13th, Bahadūr-Baṇḍa surrendered after a short siege. The Arabs, who composed a portion of the garrison, were suffered to depart with their arms, but in violation of the terms, the Hindu matchlock-men, formerly of Tipū's garrison, who had gone over to the Mahrattas, were punished by the excision of their noses and ears,

88. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 128-129.

89. Wilks, *l.c.*

90. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 129-130.

and Hanumant Naik, their chief, by the amputation of both his legs.⁹¹ Tipū then marched on to Bankapur and encamped eighteen *kōś* to the northward of Savaṇūr.⁹² The subsequent movements, which on Tipū's part had chiefly for their objective the disturbance of the enemy's quarters by night-attack and the capture of their equipment, were generally unfavourable to the confederates, and particularly to the ill-organised troops of Nizām Ali, who had reason to be weary of the war.⁹³

So confident, indeed, were the Mahrattas at the commencement of the war that they had kept back a large portion of their contingents, and particularly the respectable infantry of Sindhia. But now, with the jealousies that prevailed among the chiefs of the Mahratta and Nizām's army, the ravages of the pestilence and the incompetency of Haripant's authority over the great number of the vast army assembled under his command, no great exertion was to be expected from the confederate army. Nor was Tipū able to make much progress to the northward or move far from the banks of the Tungabhadra, by which he would give the allies an opportunity of interrupting his convoys and render them masters of all the advantages arising from their great superiority in cavalry. At the same time Nāna Farnavis, who had hoped for the eventual support of the English, had been disappointed in his expectations on the succession to the

91. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 306; see also and compare Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 476-479; also 487 (quoting extract from Malet's *Journal*).

92. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 130.

93. Wilks, *l.c.*; also Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 130-133), for particulars of the last night-attack. The spoils from the confederate camp, according to Kirmāṇi, included "eighteen women, wives of the Mahratta chiefs," who were taken to Tipū's presence and honourably dismissed after making an agreement to the effect "that by every art and means, they would prevent their husbands from continuing the war, and that they would never withdraw their hands from importunity and solicitation, until their husbands laid their heads in submission to the orders of the Sultan," etc. (Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 132-133).

office of the Governor-General of Lord Cornwallis, who had distinctly avowed that the English would engage in none but defensive wars. Tipū, too, as we have seen, had distrusted the pacific intentions of the English for terminating a contest in which he had uniformly triumphed.⁹⁴

The military establishments of the English were by now being directed for the first time by military Governors. On the departure of Lord Macartney, Mr. Alexander Davidson, the Senior Member of the Madras Council, became the provisional Governor, and assumed charge of office on June 18, 1785. He was an honest man and true, his high integrity being well known. He proved a worthy successor to Lord Macartney, being irreproachable in every office he had held. He made over charge of office on April 6, 1786, within about ten months, to Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, who arrived in Madras on that date and assumed the Governorship. He had been in the Royal Engineers and seen service in America in the 71st Foot and been Governor of Jamaica. He also took over the office of Commander-in-Chief on the same date, in succession to Lieutenant-General Sir John Dalling, who had assumed it from Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Sloper, on Lord Macartney's resignation as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Madras, on 8th June 1785. Sir Archibald Campbell, as a military officer of rank, began to look into military matters with care and attention. Indeed military establishments were, at this period, organized with a degree of propriety which could not but indicate the expectation of war. Except on these grounds, it would be difficult to explain Tipū's open anxiety. When Campbell took charge of the office of Governor and Commander-in-Chief in 1786, he came to

94. *Ibid.*, 306-307; also Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 487.

hold those combined offices both in fact and in law. Hitherto, the Governor, though Commander-in-Chief in name—there being a different Commander-in-Chief of field forces—held the office of Commander-in-Chief with garrison limits only.⁹⁵ This meant, as we have seen, both divided responsibility and friction of a kind that meant inefficiency in the conduct of public affairs, especially at critical moments.⁹⁶

Alexander Davidson, on relief by Sir Archibald Campbell, reverted as Member of Council. He had entered the Madras Service as Writer in 1760 and had become Member of Council of the Governor in 1782, after having served as Senior Merchant and Member of Council at Cuddalore and Masulipatam in 1781 and died at Madras in 1791. He lies buried at Vizagapatam beside his wife, having died on 20th September 1791, while his wife Elizabeth had predeceased him by just a couple of months (8th July 1791). His Epitaph echoes thus his integrity. "The honesty and honour of this excellent man's character," says the inscription on his tombstone, "would have dignified and distinguished it in any sphere, but in the important and responsible trusts he held, his invincible integrity shone in the more heightened lustre the more it was tried. He attained, through the gradations of service, the Chair of the Madras Government and though without the wealth of a Governor, he was rich in the real worth of a man. Nor were his private qualities less amiable. His peculiar pleasantriness of mind and felicity of manner irresistably attracted attention and delight."⁹⁷ It was during his acting Governorship in 1785 that the first discovery of Roman gold coins (*aurai*) in the Madras Presidency was made by a ryot at Nellore.⁹⁸

95. See Love, *Vestiges*, III. 319-320.

96. See *ante*, Ch. IX. pp. 597-602.

97. Cotton, *List of Inscriptions on Tombs*, 357.

98. *Asiatic Researches* (1790), Vol. XI. 332.

During the early part of Sir Archibald Campbell's period of office in Madras, above
 Peace concluded, adverted to, the Mahrattas retired from
 February 14, 1787. the field, while Tipū received answers
 to the letters he had addressed to Holkar and Rastia, through whose mediation the overtures had been made. Thereupon negotiations for peace were set on foot, Badr-u-Zamān Khān and Alī Razā Khān, two officers of highest rank in the Mysorean service, being publicly deputed for the purpose to Poona. The negotiations, however, were protracted and after reciprocal exchange of presents between the Mysore and Mahratta courts, finally terminated on February 14, 1787, as described below, through the medium of Haripant on the Mahratta side.⁹⁹ Tipū, the Pēshwa and Nizām Alī were henceforward to remain united together, each in possession of his former territories; if a fourth person should make an hostile attempt upon the country of any one of the allies, all the three were, in such a case, to join in repelling the same whatever differences might subsist between them, such differences being suspended for the time being. Tipū having been found indebted to the Mahrattas to four years' dues which Haidar had stipulated to pay on condition of *being acknowledged as the undisputed master of everything south of the Krishna from sea to sea*, he now agreed to meet the same at the annual rate of Rupees twelve lakhs towards the arrears and Rupees three lakhs towards the Durbar expenses. Of the total sum of Rupees sixty lakhs thus due, a deduction was obtained of fifteen lakhs as compensation for damages sustained by the war (*Pai-mālī*, what is trodden under foot). Of the remaining forty-five lakhs,

99. Wilks, *o.c.*, 307; see also and compare Kirmāṇī, *o.c.*, 133-136 and Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 479-482, 487. Wilks remarks that Tipū had "really" addressed Holkar and Rastia, a relation with the Pēshwa by marriage, printing the word "really" in italics (Wilks, *l.c.*).

thirty were actually paid and fifteen promised at the expiration of a year. Kittoor and Nārgund, the original cause or pretext of the war, were to be surrendered to the Pēshwa who was also to be confirmed in the possession of Bādāmi and Gajēndragadh (the latter with Kānchangarh being given as *jahgir* to furnish the *paun* and betel-nut expenses of Haripant); Adoni was to be restored to Mohabat Jang, nephew of Nizām Alī; and Hakīm Khān, Nawāb of Savanūr, was to be pardoned for his offences and reinstated in his *suba*.¹⁰⁰

On the conclusion of this peace and the actual fulfilment of the conditions on the part of Tipū, the Mahrattas marched back to Poona, while Tipū, proceeding by the route of Kopal and Bahadūr-Baṇḍa and crossing the Tungabhadra, encamped on the tank of the Darōji-Mahal, two *kōś* to the eastward of Ānegondi and midway between Harapanahalli and Rāyadurg. During his halt there, the chiefs of these two latter places, accompanied by their dependents, entered his camp seeking admission to an audience. Tipū, however, bore violent hatred to these chiefs, whose allegiance to his father had been precarious, and who on every occasion had shown more attachment to the enemy than to him and had even, it was alleged though not proved, concurred in a conspiracy for Tipū's assassination. Not inclined to accept the offer of their services, Tipū, on pretence of dispersing his army in cantonments, detached at night two brigades, with secret instructions, to each of those fortresses. And having previously removed all grounds of suspicion, by repeated personal acknowledgments to the chiefs for the distinguished services they had rendered in the late campaign, he

100. For details relating to terms of peace, see and compare Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 482, 488-489 (quoting extracts from *Tārīkh-Khoḍadādī* and Malet's *Journal*); Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 307-308, and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 136-137.

seized them and their principal officers in camp on the same day and hour that the brigades overpowered the unsuspecting garrisons. The cash and effects of every kind, not excepting the personal ornaments of the women, were carried off as plunder, and the chiefs themselves, who were put in irons, were sent off as prisoners to Bangalore and later to Kabbāldurg, where they miserably perished. A brother of the chief of Harapana-halli fled in panic to Miraj, and Tipū, on the annexation

of both the principalities, marched
 Tipū returns to Seringapatam, c. back, returning to Seringapatam
 May 1787. about the middle of the year.¹⁰¹

In January 1788, Tipū, after some months devoted to innovations in the interior of the State¹⁰², proceeded, at the head of the army, by the route of Tāmrachēri, to visit and reform the Mysorean possessions in Malabar.¹⁰³ During his residence in this country for three months, Tipū having observed that the cultivators (instead of being collected in villages as in other parts of India) had each his separate dwelling and garden adjoining his field, classified these solitary dwellings into groups of forty houses, with a local chief and an accountant to each, an establishment which was to watch over the morals and realize the revenue, and a *Shaikh-ul-Islām* to each district for religious purposes¹⁰⁴. Also he addressed to the principal inhabitants a proclamation to the following effect¹⁰⁵: "From the period of the conquest until this day, during twenty-four years, you have

101. See and compare, on this section, Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 187-188, and Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 809-810. Kirmāni places the course of affairs from the capture and spoliation of Savaṇūr down to Tipū's return to Seringapatam in A. D. 1785-1786 (A. H. 1200), but from the context these are referable to A. D. 1786-1787. On the Mysore-Mahratta affairs, see also and compare Stewart, who gives a very meagre account of the same and antedates and sets them down to 1784-1785 (*Memoirs, o.c.*, 50-51).

102. See Ch. XVI below, for a detailed account of these innovations.

103. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 312.

04. *Ibid.*, 813-814.

105. *Ibid.*, 814.

been a turbulent and refractory people, and in the wars waged during your rainy season, you have caused numbers of our warriors to taste the draught of martyrdom. Be it so. What is past is past. Hereafter you must proceed in an opposite manner; dwell quietly and pay your dues, like good subjects; and since it is a practice with you for one woman to associate with ten men, and you leave your mothers and sisters unconstrained in their obscene practices, and are thence born in adultery, and are more shameless in your connection than the beasts of the field, I hereby require you to forsake these sinful practices, and live like the rest of mankind. And if you are disobedient to these commands, I have made repeated vows to honour the whole of you with Islām, and to march all the chief persons to the seat of empire". Other moral inferences, and religious instructions, applicable to spiritual and temporal concerns, were also written with his own hand, and bestowed upon them. At the same time Tipū ordered the entire destruction of Calicut, and the erection at a few miles distance of another fortress, with the new name of *Farookhi*.¹⁰⁶

Meantime the monsoon set in and Tipū marched on through the swamps and floods and the unceasing torrents of rain to Coimbatore.¹⁰⁷ From here he directed his steps towards Dindigal, a *jahgir* conferred by himself on his relation, Saiyid Sāhib (Moin-ud-dīn). Splendidly entertained by the latter, Tipū, before leaving this quarter, laid waste with fire and sword, the countries of such of the Pālegārs dependent on Dindigal and Coimbatore as had recently failed in obedience, as he termed it, and returned, in August, by the route of Gajjalahaṭṭi to Seringapatam.¹⁰⁸

Marches to Coimbatore-Dindigal.

Returns to Seringapatam, August 1783.

106. *Ibid*, 814, 817-818.

107. *Ibid*, 818-819.

108. *Ibid*, 821.

During the next four months, Tipū found himself occupied in the business of embodying all the Saiyids of his infantry into separate brigades and the Shaikhs into others, leaving the Pathāns and Mughals, for the time being, to be intermixed with the Hindus. Scarcely had he accomplished these separations before intelligence was received that the whole of Coorg and Malabar had risen in simultaneous rebellion and that they were every-

Rebellion in Coorg and Malabar, December 1788.

The course of affairs leading to it.

where pressing the Mysore troops with the utmost desperate valour.¹⁰⁹ Arshed Bēg Khān, it may be recalled here, had been appointed by Haidar shortly before his death to the office of civil and military governor of Malabar. A Mussulman of rare talents, humanity and probity, Arshed Bēg Khān, by adapting the scheme of his government to the actual circumstances of the country, had brought the province into a state of comparative tranquillity and contentment. But Tipū had composed his own rules and regulations, which were to be equally applied to all his dominions, not excepting Malabar. Among these was the separation of authorities, in consequence of which Arshed Bēg Khān was superseded in the civil, while he retained the military powers. On the arrival of his co-adjutor, Mīr Ibrāhīm, a relation of Zain-ul-labidin Shoostri, Tipū's secretary for the department of innovations, Arshed Bēg Khān, perceiving the inevitable consequences of the new system, wished to retire; and, in 1786, requested Tipū's permission to proceed on a pilgrimage to Mecca, which, however, was refused. The new Asof (Mīr Ibrāhīm) broke through all his *cowles* (written engagements entered into by Arshed Bēg), substituted new exactions and set the inhabitants in a flame. Arshed Bēg Khān employed

109. *Ibid*, 321-322.

this influence in the maintenance of quiet, and attempted in vain to impress on his colleague the duty of maintaining inviolate the public faith. His urgent entreaties to Tipū to avert the destruction of Malabar by his own presence had caused the latter's visit to that country in the beginning of 1788. Tipū found the conduct of Mir Ibrāhīm to have really placed the province on the verge of rebellion; he removed and confined him, and he also removed and disgraced Arshed Bēg Khān, who, in prison, soon afterwards died of grief and disgust. In spite of Tipū's assertion, Arshed Bēg Khān had uniformly realised a surplus revenue. Tipū's reversal of the existing order of things, which had already been as successful as could reasonably be expected, thus culminated in the rebellion in Malabar.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, about the 20th of January 1789, Tipū, observing that the Nairs of Malabar had risen in revolt in disregard of his preaching, pitched his tents and despatched thither a body of troops consisting of 5,000 sepoys and a detachment of Europeans under Mons. Lally, with the proposed design to extirpate the rebels and establish his authority in that quarter.¹¹¹ After some delay in traversing Coorg, during which he was obliged for a time to fall back in consequence of some success of the enemy against the advanced guard of his army, and restoring a temporary quiet, he descended

Tipū proceeds to Malabar, January 1789.

His progress against the rebels.

110. *Ibid.*, 322-323. See also and compare, on this section, Kirmāni (o.c., 152-154), who makes a reference to Arshed Bēg Khān and the Malabar rebellion, and places the event in 1790 (A. H. 1205). Kirmāni's account of the removal from office of Arshed Bēg Khān differs from that of Wilks, who is followed here, being an earlier writer. Kirmāni further refers to one Mahtab Khān Bakshi as Arshed Bēg Khān's successor in Malabar. Mahtab Khān is perhaps identical with Mir Ibrāhīm, mentioned by Wilks as Arshed Bēg's co-adjutor.

111. *Ibid.*, 323; also *Poona Res. Corres.*, III. *Letter* Nos. 30, 35 and 36, dated January 19, and February 14 and 21, 1789.

by the Pass of Tāmbrachēri into Malabar.¹¹² The report of the arrival of the whole army caused the Nairs to retire as usual into their woods and mountains, and Tipū divided his troops into numerous detachments for apprehending them. While the detached divisions were conducted with varied success, his own took the direction of a place named Gootipur, where about two thousand Nairs with their families occupied an old fortified position, which they defended for some days. Finding it, however, untenable against the superior number and means by which they were invested, the defenders were ultimately compelled to surrender at discretion. The alternative was signified to them of a voluntary profession of the Muhammadan faith or forcible conversion, with deportation from their native land. The unhappy captives gave a forced assent and on the next day the rite of circumcision was performed on all the males, every individual of both sexes being compelled to close the ceremony by eating beef. This achievement being completed, it was held out as an example to the other detachments of the army, who succeeded in hunting out of their places of confinement great numbers of Nairs and inflicting on them the circumcision.¹¹³

At the same time the Nair Rāja of Chirakal had been induced, by the most sacred promises, to pay his personal respects to Tipū, and was, for several days, treated with

His further progress : destruction of the Rāja of Chirakal.

112. *Ibid*; also *Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Letter No. 36*, dated February 21, 1789.

113. *Ibid*, 828-324. A *Fort St. George Letter*, dated April 21, 1789, speaks in general terms of Tipū's struggle with the Nairs of Malabar, thus: "By advices from the westward, we are informed that Tippoo Sultaun has been engaged in contests with the Nairs to whom his conduct has given great dissatisfaction. The religious enthusiasm he is inflamed with appears not unlikely to involve him in considerable commotions that may ultimately prove detrimental to his affairs....." (*Poona Res. Corres., o.c., No. 38, Letter from John Holland to C. Malet*).

considerable distinction, and dismissed with costly presents to his little principality. Immediately after his departure, real or pretended information was received of his being engaged in a secret conspiracy to revenge the cruel indignities of his countrymen. Tipū detached two brigades to effect his destruction, or ascertain his obedience, by directing him instantly to return to camp. His attendants, justly alarmed at these appearances, prepared for defence. Before any explanation could be given, a skirmish ensued, in which some of his attendants were killed and a few prisoners secured. Tipū, considering the accusation to be established, ordered the most base and unmanly indignities to be offered to the corpse, and that the dead and the living should afterwards be hanged on the same tree. The Nair Rāja, [we are also told, had, during his personal intercourse with Tipū, offered four lakhs of rupees and the plates of gold with which a particular temple was roofed, on condition of sparing the temple itself, to which proposition Tipū is said to have replied that he would not spare it for all the treasures of the earth and the sea. Marching further, Tipū paid a visit to Cannanore and solemnised the first ceremonies of a marriage between the daughter of the dowager chief (the Beebi of Cannanore) and one of his sons, Abdul Khālak. From Cannanore, he proceeded along the

Moves to Coimbatore, June 1789.

West Coast as far south as Chawgaut (Chavakkat), and on the outbreak of the monsoon, about June, moved off with his troops to Coimbatore, leaving in Malabar six divisions consisting of two brigades each, with distinct establishments of officers, spiritual, civil and military, charged with the threefold duty of surveying the lands, numbering the productive trees, and seizing and instructing the remaining Nairs.¹¹⁴

114. *Ibid.*, 330-332; see also *Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Letter No. 41*, dated June 3, 1789, referring to Tipū's movements to Coimbatore. Referring

Despite Tipū's offers to the fugitive inhabitants to return and resettle with their families under promises of their not being further persecuted,¹¹⁵ his measures of conversion in Malabar had been obstructed in the north by the escape of the Nairs to the English settlement of Tellicherry whence they embarked for Travancore, and in the south by the connivance of the Rāja of Cochin, who, though bound by more ancient ties to the Dutch and the Rāja of Travancore, was an acknowledged tributary of Mysore.¹¹⁶ This apart, Tipū, in close keeping with his father's policy,¹¹⁷ had an eye on Travancore itself. By 1780, as we have seen,¹¹⁸ Haidar, with Calicut as the base of his operations in Malabar, had obtained complete possession of the country between Chetwa and Cranganore further south. He had kept the fort of Chetwa well garrisoned and was well within reach of Travancore by way of Cranganore and Ayacottah bordering it, when his attention was diverted in another direction. Haidar was too busy with Muhammad Ali and the English from 1780 onwards to attend to the Travancore issue, which receded into the background till about 1789, when Tipū became anxious to achieve the conquest of the place without appearing himself as a principal in the war.¹¹⁹ Already, in 1788, he had actually

to the offer by the Nair Rāja of Chirakal of the temple treasures to Tipū, Wilks speaks of the latter having stated "the destruction in the course of this holy war of eight thousand idol temples, many of them roofed with gold, silver or copper, and all containing treasures buried at the feet of the idol, the whole of which was royal plunder." Wilks, however, does not attach much importance to this statement, for he observes, "when crimes are deemed virtues, we may infer their amount is much exaggerated" (o.c., II. 392). See also and compare, on this section, Kirmāni (o.c., 154-155), whose account is very brief and who sets down the event, as already mentioned, to 1790.

115. Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Letter No. 50, dated September 23, 1789.

116. Wilks, o.c., II. 397.

117. See *Ante*, Ch. I.

118. See *Ante*, Ch. III.

119. Wilks, l.c.

adjusted with the Zāmorin of Calicut the restoration of a part of his former territories on condition of his acting for him (Tipū), but in his own name, in rendering his earlier aims the ground for the conquest of Travancore. The project, however, was marred by Tipū's policy of beginning the work of general circumcision of the inhabitants, which the Zāmorin resented and joined in the general insurrection. Tipū, desirous, as a last indirect resource, of engaging the services of the Rāja of Cochin in this behalf, sent, on returning from his late visit of inspection, an order to him to repair to his camp. The Rāja, who had obeyed a similar summons in the preceding year, wrote in reply stating that he was paying his *pēshkāsh* (tribute) regularly and was ready to obey any other order, assigning at the same time his own excuses for entreating to be excused from appearing at court. Tipū temporised and in August (1789) sent an envoy to the Rāja with a letter acquiescing in his apology, but desiring that he would send his son or minister, whom he would not detain more than two days, intimating that he wished to purchase from the Dutch the fort of Cochin and hoped to accomplish it by the Rāja's means. A second disobedience roused Tipū's indignation and he openly declared that "if they did not attend the summons, he would come and fetch them by force." But to reach Cochin it was necessary to pass the wall of Travancore, to the origin and early history of which we have now to advert.¹²⁰

The principality of Travancore in the southern extremity of the Indian Peninsula, about the time we are writing of, had an individuality of its own. Its shores to the eastward of Cape Comorin and opposite to Ceylon, afforded an easy communication for small vessels between

120. *Ibid.*, 837-838.

that island and the mainland, with the whole coast of the Coromandel. Against the hostility of the southern province of Tinnevely, a double line of works, facing from north to north-east, aided the natural defence of the tremendous range of mountains which terminate near the southern cape. But from the period of the occupation of Tinnevely by the disjointed authority of Muhammad Ali and the English and the establishment of a factory at Anjengo on the West Coast, the relations of amity had been uninterrupted. The Rāja of Travancore, Bālārāma-Varman (1758-1799), had been acknowledged on various occasions as the ally of the English nation, and was specially so recognised in the treaty of 1769 between Haidar and the English, and in that of 1784 with Tipū himself. On the coast of Malabar, however, the boundaries of Travancore had followed the fluctuations of its fortunes.¹²¹

In 1662 and 1663, the Dutch obtained, in open warfare from the Portuguese, various possessions on the coast of Malabar, among them Cochin, Cranganore and Ayacottah, the last situated on the northern extremity of a narrow strip of land called the island of Vipeen, extending nearly twenty miles, the whole distance from the estuary of Cranganore to that of Cochin, and insulated by an inland connection of those estuaries. In the same year (1663), the Dutch and the Rāja of Cochin on the one part concluded a treaty with the Rāja of Porca (Porakād)—interposed between Cochin and Travancore—on the other, by which it was stipulated that the latter should pull down two hundred cubits of the wall built towards or against the country of Cochin. The Dutch, by another treaty, stipulated with the Rāja of Cochin to build a fort at Cranganore

The origin and early history of the Travancore Lines, 1662-1761.

121. *Ibid.*, 388-389.

This hardly affected the bounds of Travancore, which formerly extended beyond or south of Kāyankulam (*Kalicoulan* of Wilks) and latterly stood fixed at Porakād. In 1759, the Zāmorin of Calicut overran the territories of the Rāja of Cochin, possessing himself of nearly the whole. In this extremity, the Rāja looked up to his southern neighbour, the Rāja of Travancore, who aided him with an army under his general Rāma (*Rāma Ayyan Dalawa*). After a variety of sanguinary conflicts in 1760 and 1761, the Zāmorin was completely and finally expelled. As the stipulated price of this important service, the Rāja of Cochin formally ceded certain portions of territory to the Rāja of Travancore, and among them a strip of land extending from his own recently acquired possessions near the hills to the branch of an estuary which separates the narrow island of Vipeen from the sea. On this ceded territory and former possession, the Rāja of Travancore immediately commenced the erection of a line of works as a northern boundary towards Calicut, running east and west from a point on the hills deemed inaccessible, chiefly behind or south of a river, which discharges itself into the estuary. On the southern bank of the entrance of this estuary was situated the military post of Ayacottah, belonging to the Dutch, and on the northern bank of the same estuary, on a point projecting southward, and about three miles further up, was the Dutch fort of Cranganore. Such was the origin of the Lines of Travancore and the relative position of the contested points of Cranganore and Ayacottah, the territory of Cochin extending in front or to the northward of these Lines, from ten to thirty miles, and the remaining portion of that principality being in the rear, or to the south of these Lines.¹²²

122. *Ibid*, 339-341.

The Lines thus begun in 1761 were finished in 1766, by the time that Haidar made preparations for his first invasion of Travancore.¹²³ Intended primarily as a means of protection against the incursions threatened by Haidar,¹²⁴ these Lines gradually assumed such strategic importance that when Stavorinus visited Cochin in 1776 when the Dutch Company were at war with Haidar, he adverts to the Lines by stating that "the lands of Travancore had from time to time been suffered to be extended to the eastward, behind the lands of Cochin, as far as the river of Cranganore, so that the king of Cochin has but a little space of ground left to him."¹²⁵ On Haidar's reconquest of Malabar in 1773, it is necessary to recall here, he appointed to the government Śrinivāsa Rao Barakki, one of his oldest and most trustworthy officers, assisted in the military department by Sardār Khān (the *Cha-Der-gam* of Stavorinus). In 1775, Haidar, desiring to possess himself of Travancore, a valuable possession, which would place him as it were on the left flank of his enemy's line of defence, in his meditated invasion of the Coromandel, requested the Dutch Company a free passage for his troops through their possessions to Travancore. The refusal of this request, and the delay of a reply to his letter to the Supreme Government of Batavia, enraged him. And Sardār Khān, with about ten thousand men, ravaged the country with fire and sword, and laid siege to the Dutch fort of Chetwa, about ten miles to the northward of Cranganore. About this time, the Rāja of Travancore made an actual purchase from the Dutch of a strip of land near the north point of Vipeen, on which he continued the Lines across that island, a breadth of about 1,500 yards, and in

123. See *Ante* Ch. I. f.n. 12.

124. *Ibid.*

125. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 341.

the rear of the Dutch fort at Ayacottah. Reinforcements from Ceylon, in November 1776, induced the Dutch to attempt the relief of Chetwa, which failed. The place fell, and they confined themselves to the strong occupation of Cranganore and Ayacottah, whilst the kings of Cochin and Travancore threw up strong and fortified lines on the opposite side of the river, in order to defend their lands from an irruption on that side. The Lines, though actually commenced in 1761, were now constructed on a new plan, as both parties seemed

Construction of the
Lines afresh, 1775.

to refer to 1775 as the date of the construction of the works existing in 1782. Sardār Khān, Haidar's general, after the capture of Chetwa, considering the attack of the Lines as an enterprise beyond his strength, remained inactive, and seemed to be satisfied with the possession of the district of Cochin, situated north of the Lines. Adrian Moens, the Dutch Governor of Cochin, with a view to try the disposition of the two Rājās, proposed to them a plan of offensive operations, to which the Rāja of Travancore gave a distinct negative, declaring that his engagements with Muhammad Alī and the English assured to him their aid in the defence of his own possessions if attacked by Haidar, but not if he were himself the aggressor. In January 1777, the letter and presents from Batavia arrived and Moens thought it best to send them with an envoy to Haidar, who, having accepted this advance, affected to attribute the late hostilities to mutual misapprehension. This change in the aspect of affairs was, as Stavorinus mentions, ascribable in the main to Haidar's war with the Mahrattas, the revolt of the Nairs and the Moplahs, and the improved state of the Travancore Wall, including in that line of defence the fortifications of Cranganore and Ayacottah, constituting a system of defensive means, which Haidar could not attack with much hope of

success. So that the Lines, in 1777, although very sufficient with regard to dimensions and construction of the ditch and rampart, were really more imposing than effectual, as throughout the dangerous extent of thirty miles, few points were in the rear and those imperfectly, so as to admit of nearly the whole falling on carrying a single point.¹²⁶

For some years from 1777 onwards, however, no specific question had been raised regarding the Lines, while a special article in the Treaty of Mangalore

The position from 1777 onwards.

(1784) included the Rāja of Travancore among the allies of the English, on whom Tipū had stipulated that he would make no war. Nevertheless,

The Treaty of Mangalore (1784) and after.

since that treaty, Tipū had neither ceased to appreciate the original policy of his father nor to undervalue the advantage of a possession which would enable him to make the first step from his own frontiers at once on Tinnevely and Arcot. Tipū's investigation of the routes and the still more alarming attempt to induce the Rāja of Cochin to claim the ground on which the Lines were erected, had suggested the fears, and the hopes, which, in 1788, the Rāja of Travancore had conveyed to the Government of Madrás. And Sir Archibald Campbell, the then Governor, in communicating to Tipū the representations of the Rāja, added that any aggression on that ally would be considered by the English as a violation of the treaty of 1784, and equivalent to a declaration of war. Tipū stated in reply that the interposition of the territories of his dependent, the Rāja of Cochin, prevented the possibility of collision between him and Travancore, and professed his desire for the maintenance of the relations of amity with the English State. Nor was he, about this time, as we shall see, independently of his own designs

Tipū forestalled by the English.

against the English, unmindful that he might be anticipated by them. The early occupation of Travancore, which he actually contemplated all the while as an easy

The occupation of Travancore, a prelude to a contest with them.

about September

Tipū marches on to Travancore, September 1789.

achievement, seemed certainly, in his view, the most efficient preparation he could make for an eventual contest with the English power. Accordingly, 1789, Tipū, from his camp at Coimbatore, commenced his march towards Travancore at the head of 20,000 regular infantry, 10,000 spearmen and

matchlockmen, 5,000 horse and 20 field-guns, passing through the woods of Ānamalai (*Animallee* of Wilks).¹²⁷

On Tipū's approach, the Dutch Governor of Cochin, Von Anglebec, called on the Rāja of Travancore to perform the conditions of a treaty of thirty-four years' standing between him and the Dutch, which obliged him, in the event of an apprehended attack, to reinforce the Dutch posts of Cranganore and Ayacottah. This was accordingly done. But the Government of Madras, to whom the Rāja earnestly applied for assistance, did not contemplate these posts as the left flank of a line, nor propose arrangements to the Dutch for combining the defensive means in which the two nations were equally interested. An aid of two battalions had been sent in consequence of Sir Archibald Campbell's previous negotiations, but they were now expressly prohibited from being employed on any other than the particular part of that line of defence, which was built on the Rāja's own territory. At the same time, Tipū argued that the line actually intersected the country of his tributary, and was built on *his property*, and not on that of the Rāja of Travancore, and that the

The protracted discussions re: the Travancore issue, September-December 1789.

hended attack, to reinforce the Dutch posts of Cranganore and Ayacottah. This was accordingly done. But the Government of Madras, to whom the Rāja earnestly applied for assistance, did not contemplate these posts as the left flank of a line, nor propose arrangements to the Dutch for combining the defensive means in which the two nations were equally interested. An aid of two battalions had been sent in consequence of Sir Archibald Campbell's previous negotiations, but they were now expressly prohibited from being employed on any other than the particular part of that line of defence, which was built on the Rāja's own territory. At the same time, Tipū argued that the line actually intersected the country of his tributary, and was built on *his property*, and not on that of the Rāja of Travancore, and that the

latter had no right to build a wall on the Mysorean territory, nor to exclude him from going to every part of his territory of Cochin, on either side of that wall. The Rāja, thus terrified at being refused aid from the Government of Madras for the protection of his line of defence because one part of it was not his own, renewed a long pending negotiation for the purchase of Cranganore and Ayacottah. Thereupon Tipū represented to the Government of Madras that these posts were built on the lands of his tributary the Rāja of Cochin, for which lands the Dutch paid a rent. Mr. Hollond, Governor of Madras, took the line of decidedly disapproving these purchases without the previous concurrence of the English Government. The Rāja, however, broadly affirmed the concurrence of Sir Archibald Campbell, said to have been communicated to him through Brigade-Major Bannerman, deputed on a political mission to his court in 1788, while Tipū himself recognised the right of sale by offering to the Dutch double the sum contracted to be paid by the Rāja. Nor was this all. Tipū also complained to Madras about the protection afforded by the Rāja to his rebellious subjects. The Governor of Madras required the Rāja to discontinue the hospitable asylum which the unhappy Nairs had found in Travancore. These discussions were protracted till December (1789) and Mr. Hollond had proposed the appointment of Commissioners for the investigation and amicable adjustment of all the points in dispute. But Tipū had determined on a different issue.¹²⁸

128. *Ibid.*, 350-355. Wilks, by way of a digression, reviews the evidence connected with the alleged concurrence of Sir Archibald Campbell in the proposed purchase of Cranganore and Ayacottah, and comes to the conclusion "that the Raja of Travancore stands fully absolved from the charge of making the purchase without the previous sanction of the British Government; and that Major Bannerman stands equally absolved from the imputation of overstepping his authority in conveying the sanction of his Government," etc. (*Ibid.*, 352-354.)

About the 20th of December, Tipū, independently of his representations to the English Government, despatched his *vakil* to the Rāja of Travancore, demanding that the troops which the Rāja had in Cranganore were to be withdrawn; that the Malabar Rājas who had had protection in Travancore, some of them more than twenty years, were to be given up to him; that the Rāja's Lines, erected on the Cochin country, were to be demolished; and that unless these demands were complied with, he would bring his army against him. The Rāja replied to the effect that he never adopted any measure without the concurrence and advice of the English Government and that, therefore, before he could come to any ultimate decision on the subject of his demands, he must hear from the Government of Madras, to whom he had made a reference of the whole business. The Lines said to have been situated on the Cochin country, the Rāja continued, had been erected more than twenty-five years ago. At that period, it was made over to the Travancore Rāja by the Cochin Rāja in return for an assistance of troops which he gave him to repel the Zāmorin, who had possessed himself of the greatest part of the Cochin country. This happened long before the Cochin Rāja had become tributary to Tipū. These Lines were erected at the time and possessed, as they were now by the Travancore Rāja, at the time the treaty of peace was concluded between the English and Tipū (1784), so that if he had any claims he ought to have made them then.¹²⁹

129. Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Letter No. 52, dated December 20, 1789—George Powney to Major Alexander Dow. George Powney was then Senior Merchant and Resident at Travancore, besides being Paymaster of the troops there (1791-1800).

By the time this reply of the Rāja was received, Tipū had established his camp between six to ten miles to the northward of the principal gate of the Lines.¹³⁰ At length, on the night between the 28th and 29th of December, after an ineffectual attempt at a second embassy to both the Rājas of Cochin and Travancore,¹³¹ he directed operations against the Lines.¹³² Two *Kushoons* of regular infantry, all the cavalry and regular infantry, accompanied by the spearmen of Tipū's retinue, were ordered to manouvre at day-light in front of the principal gate, and at ten o'clock at night, Tipū marched with 14,000 infantry and 500 pioneers, by a circuitous route, discovered to him by a local inhabitant, to turn the right flank of the lines which terminated at a precipice supposed to be inaccessible. The demonstrations in front drew the attention of the enemy, who, by now, aware of Tipū's approach and intention, had raised three or four batteries on the banks of the different rivers, surrounded them with deep ditches and remained ready for battle, occupying the road with a strong body of archers and musketeers. At nightfall of the day, Tipū ordered his troops to assault and take the batteries, and found himself soon after day-light in possession of a considerable extent of the rampart on the right flank almost without opposition. It was now his object to gain the gate about nine miles from the point of entrance; to open it to the division manouvring in its front, and to establish his whole army within the lines in one day. Accordingly, he immediately moved on to a place where two rivers crossed the road, and where the enemy had built a wall across the road of the ford, and

130. *Ibid*; also Wilks, o.c., II. 355.

131. *Ibid*, Letter No. 53, dated December 24, 1789—George Powney to Major Alexander Dow.

132. Wilks, o.c., II. 355-356

had stationed themselves to defend it. The passage of the tide also, above and where the water of the sea flowed into the river, was blocked up by a mound, so that the water was stopped in its passage, and the bed of the river became dry. Although the opposition was feeble, contrary to the representations of Tipū's confidential servants, it was near nine o'clock before Tipū himself, seated in his palankeen (*pālki*) and proceeding with two *Risālas* and two thousand regular horse, entered the place. After he had advanced between two and three miles, some distant movements were perceived, and Tipū, thinking it possible that he might not fully accomplish his object on that day, and be obliged to take post and bring up his guns, ordered the pioneers to throw down a certain portion of the rampart into the ditch (about 16 feet wide and 20 feet deep), and to make a wide and solid road, and easy communication with the camp. The pioneers had been marching nearly twelve hours, and were not much disposed to vigorous exertion; the berm as well as the ditch was overgrown with thorny shrubs and bamboos, and the work proceeded very tardily. In the meanwhile, the troops advanced in one column along the rampart, and at one assault with their swords and muskets, drove the Travancoreans before them, and by the help of ropes and ladders, scaled and took the first works. From each successive tower, the latter retreated towards the fort, the resistance at each successively increasing, until the column approached a building within the works, constituting a square enclosure, made use of as a magazine, storehouse and barrack. The fugitives knew that support was at hand, but were not as yet in sufficient strength to maintain themselves. They, however, made a stand at this square, and drew into it a small gun, and some grape from their now useless lines, which did good service against the head of the column. The casualties of the

day had fallen heavily on the leading corps, and Tipū, halting where he was, ordered a fresh and select corps of infantry and artillery, with orders to carry the building at the point of the bayonet, the corps relieved being directed to fall into the rear.¹³³

The order, however, besides being ill-executed, was misapprehended; and at about day-break, when this corps was about to

His repulse. retire along the flank of the column, a party of about twenty men, which the Travancoreans had sent into the thick cover which here approached within a few yards of the rampart, cut down the mound which they had raised above, in order to stop out the sea, and the tide rushing in with great violence filled up the rivers to the brim, cutting off all means of succour to Tipū's troops. Also, attacking them on all sides with arrows and muskets, they threw in a regular platoon on the flank, which killed the officer commanding, and threw the corps into inextricable disorder and flight, despite their attempts to repel their assailants. The relieving corps, awkwardly advancing along the same flank, was met and checked by an impetuous mass of fugitives; the next corps caught the infection, the panic became general, and the confusion irretrievable. Tipū himself was borne away in the crowd; the rear, now become the front, rushed into the intended road across the ditch, which had been no farther prepared than by cutting down the underwood, and throwing a part of the rampart on the brim. The foremost leaped or were forced into the ditch, and such was the pressure of the succeeding mass, that there was no alternative to follow. The undermost were trampled to death, and in a short

133. *Ibid.*, 356-357; see also and compare Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 156-158), who perhaps erroneously refers to Travancore as "Cochin", and places the event in 1790 (A. H. 1205), though in the light of other sources it is referable to December 29, 1789.

time the bodies, by which the ditch was nearly filled, enabled the remainder to pass over. Tipū was precipitated with the rest, and was only saved by the exertions of some steady and active *chēlas*, who raised him on their shoulders, and enabled him to ascend the counterscarp. Tipū twice fell back in the attempt to clamber up, sustaining severe contusions, which resulted in a slight lameness which occasionally continued till his death. His palankeen remained in the ditch, the bearers having been trodden to death, his seals, rings, personal ornaments and dagger fell as trophies into the hands of the enemy, and the fortunes of a day, which was turned by twenty men, cost his army upwards of two thousand. Tipū, on clearing the ditch, with the help of Kumr-ud-dīn Khān, made the best of his way on foot towards camp, but was soon furnished with the conveyance of a common dooley, to bear him unperceived to his tent. In a mixed paroxysm of rage and humiliation, he swore that he would remain fixed on that encampment until he should carry the Travancore wall. He accordingly ordered the recall of Burhan-ud-dīn from Coorg, and of nearly the whole of his detachments from Malabar, and directed battering guns being brought from Seringapatam and Bangalore.¹³⁴

Also, about the middle of January 1790, seventeen days after the assault on the Lines, Tipū's further movements, January Tipū prepared a letter to the Governor—May 1790. of Madras, antedated fifteen days,

134. *Ibid.*, 357-359; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, o.c., 158-160. Among English records referring to Tipū's first attack on the Travancore Lines and his repulse, see *Poona Res. Corres.*, o.c., *Letter* Nos. 54-57. *Letter* No. 56, dated 2nd January 1790 (addressed by the Rāja of Travancore to Hutchinson), refers to the event thus: "On the 29th December, the troops of Tippoo Sultaun consisting of horse and foot about 15,000 appeared in front of my fort, commencing an attack, and 3,000 of them entered my fort. My people opposed them, and a battle ensued, when some of them were killed, others wounded, and the remainder fled. My people are now strongly entrenched"

giving a singular account of his own defeat. His troops were employed, he narrated, in searching for fugitives; the Rāja's people fired; the Mysoreans retaliated, and carried the Lines, but, on the first intimation of the affair, he ordered them to desist and return. Finally, he requested that the Rāja may be ordered to observe the treaty¹³⁵. At the same time, Tipū began to push through his preparations for the renewed attack on the Lines, having crossed the rivers by means of bridges of wood cut down from the jungle.¹³⁶ Cannon and equipments of every description, suited to the siege of a regular place of strength, slowly arrived for the reduction of the wall. Before Tipū would repeat the assault, a series of approaches were carried to the counterscarp, the ditch was filled, and a practicable breach effected nearly three-quarters of a mile in extent. The Rāja attempted to supply by numbers what he wanted in skill and discipline, but these very numbers contributed to spread panic. The resistance was contemptible.¹³⁷ At length, on the 13th of April, the Mysore troops commenced an assault on the Lines, which was returned; on the 14th likewise, an engagement occurred. And on the 15th, in the morning, they entered the Lines, made a desperate attack from different points to the extent or along a front of three miles, and killed and wounded 4,000 of the Travancoreans, obliging them to surrender the Lines¹³⁸.

Takes the Travancore Lines, April 15, 1790.

After taking possession of all the stores and other property available there,¹³⁹ Tipū, proceeding further, appeared

135. *Ibid.*, 369.

136. Kirmāpi, o.c., 160.

137. Wilks, o.c., II. 370-371.

138. *Poona Res. Corres.*, o.c., Letter No. 93 A, dated April 20, 1790—Rāja of Travancore to Resident of Travancore; see also and compare Wilks, o.c., II. 371, and Kirmāpi (o.c., 160-161), who, as usual, refers to the walls of Travancore as "the walls of the port of Cochin."

139. Kirmāpi, o.c., 161. According to this authority, "a nutmeg tree also, which was growing in the fort," was taken possession of by Tipū,

before Cranganore, which the garrison actually abandoned but were compelled to return by putting to death the leading fugitives.

Reduces Cranganore, May 8, 1790.

The fort of Cranganore being deemed untenable, at last surrendered to Tipū on the morning of the 8th May, the English battalions from Madras and the regiment of Europeans from Bombay under Colonel Hartley having proved unequal to offensive operations, and the Colonel having withdrawn the Rāja's garrison on the night of the 7th.¹⁴⁰ The English troops, separated by their insular position and Tipū's disinclination, came for the present into no contact with the troops of Mysore. Everything north of the estuary and all the territory of Travancore and Cochin was now open to the invader. The island of Vipeen was alone untouched. The plain country around suffered devastation and the inhabitants were hunted and sent in immense numbers to captivity and death. The Travancoreans had meanwhile retired to their fastnesses in the south, and monsoon fast approaching, Tipū, before leaving the country, ordered the effectual demolition of the Lines.¹⁴¹

The demolition of the Travancore Lines.

The whole army off duty was regularly paraded without arms and marched in divisions to the appointed stations. Tipū himself, placed on an entrance, set the example of striking the first stroke with a pick-axe; the ceremony was repeated by the courtiers and chiefs, followers of every description, bankers, moneychangers, shopkeepers; and the mixed crowd of followers were all ordered to assist the soldiers; and the whole was razed to the

which "he took up with the roots, and having wrapped in rice straw, despatched with the greatest care to Seringaputtan; and it was there planted in the Lal Bagh or garden: it did not, however, thrive, but soon died."

140. Wilks, o.c., II. 371-372.

141. *Ibid.*, 372.

ground in six days.¹⁴² Tipū had calculated on possessing every part of Travancore in December 1789. Had this expectation been realised, he would have been in a position to make a sudden invasion of the southern provinces from Travancore, Dindigal and Karūr; and by the time an English army could be assembled to commence war, he would be ready to defend Mysore, with the Cauvery as his northern frontier towards the Coromandel (with the exception perhaps of one or two places), a boundary anxiously and incessantly desired since 1751. Or, if the English should prove humble and acquiescent, Tipū would have the alternative of waiting to consolidate his power in Travancore before he should proceed to ulterior objects. In both of these expectations, however, Tipū was disappointed.¹⁴³ Indeed his actual achievement fell far short of his projected plan of political expansion in the south. It was already the month of May, and he had not reduced the whole of Travancore, having only touched the fringe of it. Neither had the English been humbled nor made acquiescent. Tipū's cumbrous train of trophies were still on the road to Seringapatam; he was distant from his regular arsenals; and all the equipments of his army required revision before he should be in a condition to begin an active campaign.

Hastens to Seringapatam, May 1790.

In this state of affairs, the alarming intelligence that the English had considered the war with him as actually commenced, quickened his departure home from Travancore.¹⁴⁴

142. *Ibid.*, 372-373.

143. *Ibid.*, 373-374.

144. *Ibid.* Kirmāṇi roughly speaks of Tipū as having "completed the conquest of this country (Cochin or Travancore), demanded tribute from the Poligar of Maliwar, and despatched a body of Kuzzaks to plunder and take possession of that woody country" (Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 162). The conquest of Travancore, in the light of Wilks, a more reliable authority, was not, however, complete. See also and compare,

Meanwhile a world event had occurred in Europe. The great Revolution had broken out in France in 1789, with consequences pregnant to that country and to the rest of the whole world. Despite the distance that separated Tipū and Louis XVI, the king of that country, Tipū was soon to be engulfed by its results, which contributed in no small measure to his own downfall in Mysore. By a singular coincidence, as Tipū was attempting to assume further distinctions of royalty here, in the year 1789-1790, and was directing the formation of the throne of gold for himself and adopting the tiger-stripe as his emblem,¹⁴⁵ Louis XVI, with whom he was later, in 1791, to open up negotiations for help, was getting into the meshes of the turmoil that was later to catch him so wholly. Though France has known other revolutions since 1789, the one that occurred in that year and ended with the death of Louis XVI is by pre-eminence called *The Revolution* in world history. Briefly put, it effected a sudden change, for the most part, in the constitution of France in consequence of internal revolt, the monarchy there being superseded by a Republic.¹⁴⁶ Though the details of the Revolution fall outside the scope of this work, as Tipū was, by his French connection, drawn into it and even corresponded with Louis XVI and sent two embassies to him, a few words seem necessary to indicate the leading features of it and how exactly he became embroiled in it. Born in 1754, Louis XVI succeeded in 1774 his grandfather Louis XV, surnamed *Bien-Aime* (the well-beloved),

on the Travancore issue, Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, II. 189-190 (based mostly on Wilks).

145. See Chapter XVI below.

146. The same remark applies to the Revolutions that occurred in France in 1848 and 1870, that which came about in 1890 being merely from one branch of the Bourbon family to another, very similar to the revolution in England that occurred in 1688. The years 1848-1849 were years of Revolution in Europe.

grandson of Louis XIV, the grand monarch. His accession had been hailed with enthusiasm, covering as it did his grandfather's, whose death was acclaimed with joy on account of the misery it produced by the whole French nation. Four years earlier, in 1770, Louis XVI had married Marie Antoinette, the youngest daughter of Maria Theresa of Austria, and a woman young, beautiful and accomplished, in high esteem for the purity of her character. On his accession, Louis XVI set himself to restore the ruined finances of his country by taking into his counsel those who could best advise him in her straitened state. One and all of these, however, found the problem an impossible one, owing to the unwillingness of the nobility to sacrifice any of their privileges for the public good. This led to the summoning of the States-General in 1789, and the outbreak of the Revolution by the fall of the Bastille on the 14th July of that year.¹⁴⁷ In the midst of this confusion, Louis, well-intentioned but without strength of character, proved submissive to the wishes of his court and the queen, lost his popularity by his hesitating conduct, the secret support he gave to the *Emigrants*¹⁴⁸, his attempt at flight and his negotiations with foreign enemies; and subjected

147. *Bastille* (lit. the Building), a State-prison in Paris, built originally as a fortress of defence to the city, by order of Charles V, between 1369-1382, but used as a place of imprisonment from the first. It is a square structure, with towers and dungeons for the incarceration of prisoners, the whole surrounded by a moat and accessible only by drawbridge. Popularly described as "tyranny's stronghold," it was attacked by a mob on 14th July 1789; taken chiefly by noise; overturned as "the city of Jerico, by miraculous sound;" demolished, and the key of it sent to Washington. The taking of the Bastille was the first event in the Revolution and is annually kept up in most European countries and elsewhere by one set of party politicians. For a graphic description of it in full, see Carlyle's *French Revolution*.

148. *Emigrants: Les Emigrés*. These were the members of the French aristocracy of the partisans of the ancient regime who at the time of the Revolution, after the fall of the *Bastille*, fled for safety to foreign lands, congregating particularly at Coblenz, where they plotted for its overthrow, to the extent of leaguings with the foreigner against their

himself to persecution at the hands of the French nation. He was, therefore, suspended from his functions, shut up in the Temple, arraigned before the *Convention* and condemned to death as "guilty of conspiracy against the liberty of the nation and a crime against the general safety of the State". He was accordingly guillotined on the 21st July 1793. He protested his innocence on the scaffold, but his voice was drowned by the beating of drums. He was accompanied by the Abbé Edgeworth, his confessor, who, as he laid his head on the block, exclaimed, "Son of St. Louis, ascend to Heaven."

Researches into the origin of the French Revolution have been so continuous and so intensive that it may be said to have not yet closed. Indeed, these have been such as to provoke the remark that they have revolutionized the study of the Revolution. The suggestion that it was mainly a product of the feudalism of 1789 has been questioned. The view has been put forward that it was not so much feudalism that was responsible for it as certain relics of it and its attendant results on the social structure of France of the time. The condition of the French people, especially in the rural districts, was irritatingly bad, while the system of government was thoroughly corrupt. Power was concentrated in the hands of the king and the nobles, there being no effective checks on them. The upper classes paid no taxation, which fell, in consequence, with great severity upon the poor. The country's finances

country, with the issue of confiscation of their lands and properties by the Republic that was set up. They proclaimed Louis XVII, second son of Louis XVI, then shut up in the Temple, as king, but he died in 1796 in prison "amid squalor and darkness". Louis XVIII, brother of Louis XVI, fled from Paris and joined the Emigrants along with his brother and took up arms, which he was compelled to lay down. He then wandered from one foreign court to another and at last found refuge in England.

were in a perilous state. The French peasant was, however, already free and buying land and eager to buy more before 1789.¹⁴⁹ That is the background of the state of church property and the stabilizing factor of the Revolution. The commonalty of the day were not the incompetent busybodies they have sometimes been represented to be. They had considerable experience of local affairs as well as the dominant ideas of Voltaire and Rousseau. They were less influenced or inflamed by the celebrated writers, as they influenced them and made them voice forth their grievances. They were, it is true, lawyers; but that did not signify a mere profession but merely the fact that they were men of affairs. Such, at any rate, was the practice of the time. The working classes were not so much unrepresented as that they deliberately chose men of the bourgeoisie and were on the whole content to do so. The standardized French of the capital by overcoming provincial dialects and Church Latin played a tremendous part in unifying France. The Revolution was, in short, a mass movement seeking leadership rather than the reverse. If it was able to discard one leader after another, it was entirely due to this fact. The various assemblies represented, in the language of to-day, public opinion, or, as they would have said, the sovereign people. Such are the conclusions arrived at by modern research. It is clear and undeniable to-day that a great deal of the later Bonaparte regime was already implicit in the Revolutionary Epoch. Though the Revolution itself began as a decentralizing

149. J. M. Thompson, *The French Revolution*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 32 sh. 6 d. net, *et passim*. This is the latest work on the subject (1944) and is of importance because it seeks to present the Revolution as understood in the light of recent research. Mr. Thompson endeavours to disentangle the historical from the mythical, working as he does against a background of contemporary experience which places in a new light these events of 1789 and after.

anti-despotic movement, the current of events forced it into the mould of strong centralized government of that heightened feeling for political authority which has been the mark of French politics from Louis XIV to date. As the remark goes, the more it changes, the more is it the same thing, except for the single fact that the Revolution of 1789 released a stream of human energy and idealism with violent and creative action on an unprecedented scale, unequalled before or since.¹⁵⁰

Though the number of books written on the subject of the Revolution is legion, Carlyle's *History of the French Revolution* still stands out as the most outstanding work on it. Personally Carlyle described the Revolution "as the open, violent revolt, and victory of disimprisoned Anarchy against corrupt, worn out Authority, the crowning Phenomenon of our Modern Time," but for which, he once protested to Mr. Froude, his biographer, he would not have known what to make of this world at all; it was a sign to him, he said, that the God of judgment still sat sovereign at the heart of it.¹⁵¹

The main events that marked the Revolution can only be referred to here. The actual movement began, as remarked, in 1789, when the States General, the

150. The fall of France, in 1940, during the present Global War, has been interpreted by some to be the final turn of the Revolution of 1789, the government of Vichy being described as pre-Revolutionary, if not anti-Revolutionary in its ideas. Many, however, look forward to a regenerated France which shall embody the ideas of 1789 in something like their early purity.

151. Edmund Burke, the great statesman and orator, a contemporary of the times (he lived between 1730-1797), wrote resolutely against the Revolution, eloquently denouncing it in his "*Reflections*", a weighty appeal. Sir James Mackintosh, philosopher and politician, also a contemporary of the times (he lived between 1763-1832), wrote *Vindiciae Gallicæ*, in reply to Burke's Philippic. He was a Whig in politics and had been Recorder of Bombay from February 1804 to November 1811. He subsequently entered Parliament (1812) and became a Commissioner of the Board of Control (1830). He wrote among other works, a *History of England*.

nearest approach to a representative body existing in France, was called together, for the first time since 1614. It met the Commons, or the third Estate, took the lead, and called a National Assembly. On July 14, 1789, the Bastille was destroyed and there were risings all over the country. The tricolour was adopted as the flag and the talk of a Republic began. The National Assembly decided that all privileges should be abolished, and turned itself into an assembly for the preparation of a constitution. Many of the nobles fled to England and elsewhere, but Louis XVI still had supporters, although he was little better than a prisoner. In June 1791, he escaped from Paris, but was brought back. The Assembly then resolved on the setting up of a constitutional monarchy but this could not be realized. Many of the foreign rulers and their people were by now generally alarmed, while the *Emigres* urged interference. The Emperor of Austria, the brother of Marie Antoinette, issued jointly with the king of Prussia a declaration demanding the restoration of Louis XVI as king of France. Meanwhile the Republican party, composed mainly of Jacobins and Girondins,¹⁵² were gaining in strength, and the attempt

152. *Jacobins and Girondins*: The Jacobins, a French political party, which arose during the French Revolution. It consisted of men who worked for constitutional reforms of a moderate kind. They were so named because they met in a building in Rue St. Honore, Paris, belonging to the Dominican Order, called in France the *Jacobin*. Later its members became more extreme in their views, and carried out the Reign of Terror. Its power ended in 1794 with the execution of Robespierre, while attempts to revive it failed. The word *Jacobin* was much used in Britain and continental Europe for the holders of extreme opinions. It was to combat these that the paper called *Anti-Jacobin* was founded in 1797.

The *Girondins* (or *Girondists*) represented another political party in the French Revolution, so called because some of its members came from the Department of the Gironde. Its leader was Brossot, other notable members being Vergniaud and Condorcet. The Girondins were really an offshoot of the Jacobins, but were more moderate. They were in control of affairs from March 1793, when they were overthrown by Robespierre. Many of them were arrested and executed. There is a well-known History of the *Girondins*.

to bring about foreign interference only added to their influence. In March 1792, France declared war on Austria. Despite riots and disorders, the French troops defeated the Prussians at Valmy. A National Convention took over control of affairs. The extreme party, led by Danton, Robespierre and Marat, became supreme. A Republic was established and on January 21, 1793, Louis XVI was no more. Treaties with foreign countries were repudiated and it was declared that France would help all Europe to overthrow hereditary rulers. While the Republican armies were winning continued successes, many were being put into the prison. In 1793, a committee of Public Safety was established, Robespierre being its dominating spirit. The Reign of Terror began. Hundreds of nobles and politicians were sent to the guillotine. On October 16, 1793, Marie Antoinette was executed and then those in power turned on one another. Robespierre brought about the execution of Danton on April 5, 1790, and he himself suffered the same fate on July 28 following. The Reign of Terror soon ended, but it was not until October 1795 that the Directory was established and the period usually described as that of the French Revolution was over. But the wars caused by and contemporaneous with the French Revolution did not end until the close of the 18th century. Among these wars, known as the French Revolutionary wars, was the one declared by Louis XVI on April 20, 1792, on the compulsion of his Girondist ministers in Prussia and Austria. Early in 1793, Britain, Holland and Spain joined them in coalition. Fighting against great odds, the French armies overran Holland in the winter of 1794-1795, and compelled Prussia and Spain to withdraw (1795) under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte, who brought Sardinia (1796) and Austria (1797) to submission. The French attempt at an invasion was foiled by the well-remembered British

victories at St. Vincent and Camperdown (1797), while Napoleon's Eastern campaign was finished by Nelson's famous victory at Aboukir Bay (1798) and Smith's defence at Acre (1799). The formation by Pitt of a second coalition (with Austria and Russia) was followed by the return of Napoleon to Europe, the withdrawal of Russia (1800) and Austria (1801) and the Peace of Amiens (March 1802).

The French and the English carried their wars into their outlying Settlements and thus India became involved in these Revolutionary Wars.

Such were the implications of a connection with the French at the time that Tipū opened negotiations with Louis XVI.

CHAPTER XIII.

KHĀSĀ-CHAMARĀJA WOḌEYAR VIII, 1776-1796—(contd.)

A retrospect: Tipu vs. The English—The English attitude—The reaction—The repercussion—The attitude of the Government of Madras—Lord Cornwallis' policy—Declaration of war with Tipu (*The Third Mysore War*), March 1790—The course of the war: *First Phase*, May 1790-January 1791: The Southern division of the English army; the campaign opens, May 1790; Tipu's conciliatory proposal fails—Gen. Medows' earlier progress, May-July 1790; reduction of Karur, June 15; Aravakurchi-Dharapuram, July 3-10; and Coimbatore, July 21—Gen. Medows detaches against Palghat and Danayakankote, July 1790; the preliminary to invasion of Mysore from the South-East; further detachments follow, July-August 1790—Siege and capitulation of Dindigal, August 16-22, 1790—Siege and capitulation of Palghat, September 21-22, 1790—Operations in the Coimbatore country, August 1790; Tipu descends into the Gajjalabatti Pass, September 1790—And takes the field, September 1790—The action at Satyamangalam, September 13, 1790; Col. Floyd's retreat, September 14, 1790—Further movements of Tipu and the English, September 14-29, 1790—October-November 1790—The Centre division of the English army: Its progress in the Baramahal, down to November 1790; Tipu's movements, November 9-14—Gen. Medows joins, November 17, 1790—The idea of Southern invasion of Mysore; the idea laid aside—Tipu's objective—The movements of the two powers, November 1790; Tipu proceeds as far as Trichinopoly—Gen. Medows follows—Tipu starts back: overtures for accommodation, December 1790—His further movements in the Karnatic, December 1790-January 1791; despatches an embassy to Pondicherry, January 1791—Gen. Medows moves back to Madras, December 1790-January 1791—Reflections.

SINCE the conclusion of the Treaty of Mangalore (1784), Tipū had steadily determined on the total extirpation and destruction of the English,¹ who had, as already

A retrospect.

Tipū *vs.* The English.

shown,² come in the way of the Mysorean scheme of domination over Southern India, particularly the Karnātic. Already in 1786, as we have seen,³ he was anxious to conclude a speedy peace with the Mahrattas and the Nizām, in order that he might be the sooner in a condition to make war upon the English. The formation of an alliance with these powers as a result of the actual conclusion of peace with them in February 1787, left Tipū decidedly a powerful factor in the political arena of South India. From now he set about actively planning schemes of conquest of the Karnātic as an essential preliminary to his grand objective. About this time, Tipū not only applied to the French for 4,000 Europeans to remain constantly in his service and pay,⁴ but also despatched an embassy to France ostensibly charged with instructions to form a treaty with the French to support him in his designs of conquest against the Mahrattas, but really offering the French a very handsome sum of money with peculiar immunities in trade and even the aid of his whole force to attack the English on the East Coast.⁵ And Tipū could only begin the offensive either by a direct move-

1. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.* No. LXXI, dated June 23, 1785; also No. CCCLXXX, dated October 10, 1786. The reference to the "enemies of the faith" and "the most inveterate of Infidels" in these *Letters* is to the English with reference to the context, in keeping with Kirkpatrick's interpretation (Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, 94).

2. See *Ante*, Chs. I and V.

3. *Ante*, Ch. XII.

4. *Poona Res. Corres.*, *o.c.*, Letter No. 7, dated June 20, 1787—Cornwallis to Malet.

5. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 9, dated July 22, 1787—Archibald Campbell to Malet. For a further account of the embassy, *vide* Ch. XVI below. As to Archibald Campbell, see Ch. XII, pp. 713-714 *supra*. As to Malet, see Ch. XIV below.

ment on the Karnātic or by finishing with Travancore in the far South and securing a powerful strategic position against the English in the South of India.⁶

Alarmed by the appearance of Tipū's hostile preparations on the borders of the Karnātic and by the apprehended invasion of

The English
attitude.

Travancore, Sir Archibald Campbell, Governor of Madras, wrote to him in September 1787, recalling to his attention the article of the Treaty of Mangalore, which secured English protection to the Rāja of Travancore.⁷ Tipū replied, assuring him that he would never violate the Treaty subsisting between him and the English and that the movements of his troops were merely intended to chastise some refractory Pālegārs of the coast of Malabar dependent on Mysore, and repeating his further assurance of a pacific and friendly disposition on his part towards the English.⁸ Despite these professions, intelligence prevailed that large bodies of Mysore troops were ready to take the field contiguous to the English frontier,⁹ while Tipū's detention of Indian British subjects as well as the population of the Coromandel, in direct violation of the article of the Treaty of Mangalore, pressed heavily on the English Government of the time as not only a legitimate but an imperious ground of war.¹⁰ In these circumstances, the idea suggested itself to Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General, Fort William, Bengal, of engaging the Mahrattas to penetrate the northern districts of the

6. *Vide*, on this point, *Poona Res. Corres. o.c.*, *Letters* Nos. 11, 16, 18, 19 and 20, dated August-October 1787. For details as to Tipū's military objective in regard to Travancore, see *Ante.*, Ch. XII.

7. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 16, dated September 28, 1787—Archibald Campbell to Malet.

8. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 23, dated November 11, 1787—Archibald Campbell to Malet.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Wilks, o.c.*, II. 349,

Mysore country, should Tipū ever invade the Karnātic¹¹; and the Calcutta Council desired Sir Charles Malet, British Resident at the court of Poona, to renew negotiations there for the purpose, only in case he should learn with certainty that Tipū had actually invaded the Karnātic or the dominions of their ally, the Rāja of Travancore.¹²

Tipū, on his part, who, since 1785, maintained that the English afforded assistance to his enemies notwithstanding the article of the Treaty of Mangalore,¹³ again complained in April 1789 that the English Factors at Tellicherry had broken the Treaty in taking Dharmapatam, a place belonging to Mysore; in allowing his tributaries, the Rājas of Cotiote and Chirakal, to embark to Travancore with their families; and in sheltering 20,000 Nairs of the Mysore Sarkār in Tellicherry and permitting them to carry on their depredations in the districts of Mysore.¹⁴ Although the Chief at Tellicherry took care to deny these allegations,¹⁵ Tipū had his own grievance against the English. On the death of Basālat Jang in 1788, the English secured from Nizām Ali, through the mediation of Sir John Kenna-way, Political Resident at Hyderabad, the cession of the Guntūr Circār. In the treaty then concluded with them, in July 1789, one of the articles regulated the demand of a subsidiary force to be furnished by the Company to

11. *Poona Res. Corres.*, l.c., also *Letter No. 18*, dated September 7, 1787—Calcutta Council to Malet.

12. *Ibid.*, *Letter No. 25*, dated December 14, 1787—Calcutta Council to Malet; also *No. 18*, dated October 15, 1787—Cornwallis to Malet, which also instructs Malet to treat Tipū's attack on the Rāja of Travancore as tantamounting to his having "actually invaded the Carnatic."

13. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, *Letter No. OXVIII*, dated September 17, 1785.

14. *Poona Res.-Corres.*, *o.c.*, *Letter No. 87 A*, dated April 23, 1789—Tipū Sultān to Chief of Tellicherry.

15. *Ibid.*, *Letter No. 39*, dated April 25, 1789—Factors of Tellicherry to William Medows.

Nizām Alī. It recited the powers against whom that force was not to be employed, and enumerated by name every power in the Deccan and the South, with the single exception of Tipū.¹⁶ In this state of affairs, Tipū at once perceived that he might be anticipated by the English at any time. The early occupation of Travancore which he had contemplated as an easy achievement was, in his view,¹⁷ the most efficient preparation he could make for an eventual contest with them. He accordingly began the offensive by his first attack on the Travancore Lines on the 29th of December 1789.¹⁸

The intelligence of this event had an immediate repercussion on the English Government of the time. An adherence to treaties being the predominant feature of their political policy, it was held, about this time, that there was not to be the least deviation from it in the instance of the Rāja of Travancore, who, being guaranteed in his possessions by the treaty of peace with Tipū, the English were bound to resent every attempt that might be made to dispossess him.¹⁹ Already, at an early period of correspondence between the Government of Madras and the Supreme Government of Bengal, Lord Cornwallis had expressed his regret and disapprobation of the conduct of the Rāja of Travancore in concluding political negotiations without the previous sanction of the power on which he depended for support.²⁰ But, on receiving from Mr. Hollond farther intelligence regarding the Rāja's purchase of Cranganore and Ayacottah and Tipū's claim of sovereignty over these places, adverted to in the preceding chapter, he transmitted, on the 13th

16. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 344-348.

17. *Ante*, Ch. X. II. p. 730.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Poona Res-Corres.*, *o.c.*, Letter No. 57, dated January 7, 1790—George Powney to Major Alexander Dow.

20. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 367.

November 1789, for the guidance of the Government of Madras, a broad and well explained consideration of the serious consequences of war on the one hand, and the fatal policy of a tame submission to insult or injury on the other, with corresponding instructions couched in terms sufficiently explicit. If, on investigation, his Lordship continued, it should appear that those places had belonged to the Rāja of Cochin; subsequently to his becoming a tributary of Mysore, the Rāja of Travancore was to be compelled to restore them to their former possessor; if they had not belonged to the Rāja of Cochin within the specified period, the Rāja of Travancore was to be supported in the possession as a legitimate right derived from the purchase. If Tipū should be in actual possession of these places before the arrival of these instructions, a negotiation was to be opened for the purpose of effecting an amicable adjustment on the principles explained; he was not to be forcibly dispossessed without the previous sanction of the Supreme Government, unless he should have attacked also the other territories of Travancore; but in the event of such attack, the Government of Madras was positively ordered to deem it an act of hostility, and the commencement of a war, which they were to prosecute with all possible vigour and decision.²¹

The Government of Madras, in their reply to the Supreme Government, dated 3rd January 1790, animadverted by stating

The attitude of the Government of Madras.

that the Dutch might as well dispose of Pulicat and Sadars to the French, without offence to the English, as sell Cranganore and Ayacottah to the Rāja of Travancore, without offence to Tipū. And reasoning from these parallel cases, they deprecated the policy of committing the honour of Government by taking part in the defence of places furtively obtained.

21. *Ibid.*, 367-368.

However, the prescribed communication to Tipū of the fixed determination of the Supreme Government to resist any attack on those places, was made. But a letter addressed to the Rāja of Travancore, even after the attack on his own Lines, not only discouraged the expectation of support in the defence of these two contested places, but expressly disclaimed the sanction of Government to a purchase, the validity of which was still undetermined by Lord Cornwallis.²² Tipū, as we have seen, about the middle of January 1790, wrote to the Government of Madras giving an account of his attack on and repulse from the Lines of Travancore, and requesting that the Rāja might be ordered to observe the Treaty. In reply, Mr. Hollond, the Governor, actually proposed the appointment of Commissioners for the adjustment of the points in dispute, and on the occasion of his approaching departure for England, declared to the Governor-General his conviction of Tipū's amicable intentions.²³

Lord Cornwallis, however, was prompt and decisive as regards the course of action to be pursued. Already about 1788, as we have seen, he had contemplated as inevitable an early war with Tipū. If, in his own words, the English had dissembled their sense of Tipū's failure in the performance of several stipulations in the last treaty of peace as well as overlooked many insults and injuries that he had offered to them in the course of the last three or four years, and if his Lordship's deliberate judgment patiently expected the opportunity which should justify on the part of the national authorities efforts "to curb his insolence, and exact signal reparation for the many injuries that we and our allies have sustained from them," symptoms of impending war, not

22. *Ibid.*, 368.

23. *Ibid.*, 369-370.

to be mistaken, were much augmented in 1789.²⁴ On the 29th August of that year, his Lordship issued special instructions to the Government of Madras regarding the measures to be adopted by themselves, and the communications to be made to the other Presidencies, and to the envoys at Poona and Hyderabad, in the event of being forced into a war. And on the 23rd of September following, those instructions were extended in nearly as ample detail as if the period was fixed for opening the campaign. If these orders, repeated in still more forcible terms in November next, had been strictly obeyed by the Government of Fort St. George, immediately on receiving intelligence of the attack of the Lines of Travancore on the 29th of December 1789, a formidable army would have been assembled in the best season for military operations, and allowing sufficient time for the most complete attainable equipment, that army might have been in contact with the rear of his position before the Lines, long before he was enabled to carry them. The season was lost, and Lord Cornwallis had prepared to repair these errors in person, when he received intelligence of the appointment to the Government of Madras of General William Medows, then Governor of Bombay, in which situation he was succeeded by General R. Abercromby. The presence of experienced officers to command the resources and lead the armies of those Presidencies thus seemed to render unnecessary the execution of his first intentions, and left him more at liberty to draw forth and combine the financial and military means of all the Presidencies for the general and vigorous prosecution of the war.²⁵ Also, about the same time, his Lordship proceeded without the loss of a single day to issue corresponding

24. *Ibid.*, 379.

25. *Ibid.*, 379-380.

instructions to his Political Residents at the courts of Hyderabad and Poona to negotiate a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with those powers against Tipū.²⁶

General Medows arrived at Madras on 19th February 1790 as Governor and Commander-in-Chief, and about the middle of March a considerable force was assembled at Wallajahbad, which marched for Trichinopoly on the 29th under Col. Musgrave.²⁷ On the 30th of the month, Lord Cornwallis not only criticised the late Government of Fort St. George as being "guilty of a most criminal disobedience of the clear and explicit orders of this Government, dated the 29th of August and 13th of November 1789, by not considering themselves to be at war with Tippoo from the moment that they heard of his attack," but also added,²⁸ "so far am I from giving credit to the late Government for economy in not making the necessary preparations for war, according to the positive orders of the Supreme Government, after having received the most gross insults that could be offered to any nation, I think it very possible that every *cash* of that ill-judged saving may cost the Company a crore of rupees: besides which, I still more sincerely lament the disgraceful sacrifice which you have made by that delay, of the honour of your country, by tamely suffering an insolent and cruel enemy to overwhelm the dominions of the Raja of Travancore, which we were bound by the most sacred

26. *Ibid.*, 374.

27. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 190-191; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 380. See also and compare Lt. R. Mackenzie (*Sketch*, I. 50-53), who gives details of Gen. Medows' movements.

28. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 370; see also and compare Mackenzie, who speaks of the "determined resolution" of the Governor-General "to demand speedy redress of Tippoo Sultaun for his presumptions and daring breach of the treaty which he executed in 1784" (Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 49-50).

ties of friendship and good faith to defend." This virtually amounted to a declaration of war with Tipū, on receipt of intelligence of which, in May, as we have seen, he hastened his departure from Travancore.

On the 24th of May, General Medows, who had left

The course of the
war:

First Phase,
May 1790-January
1791.

The Southern divi-
sion of the English
army:

The campaign
opens, May 1790.

Madras on the 17th May 1790, took command of the forces assembled at Trichinopoly; and on the 26th, made his first march with an army of about fifteen thousand men.²⁹ This principal army, after reducing Pālghāt and the forts of the province of Coimbatore, was to ascend by the Pass of Gajjalahatti, while a force under Col. Kelly, deemed to be capable of making a respectable defence if necessary against Tipū's whole army, and to be formed chiefly of the troops expected from Bengal, was to penetrate from the centre of the Coromandel into the Bārāmahal; and the operations of the two divisions were to be determined by the future course of events of the war.³⁰ Four days, however, before Gen. Medows moved from the plains of Trichinopoly,

Tipū's conciliatory
proposal fails.

Tipū, from Coimbatore, wrote to him lamenting the misrepresentations that had led to the assemblage of troops, and offering to send an envoy (*Vakil*) to clarify matters and remove "the dust which had obscured the upright mind of the General." To this, Tipū received the reply, just as the English army entered the frontiers of Mysore, that "the English, equally incapable of offering an insult as of submitting to one, had always looked upon war as declared from the moment he

29. *Ibid*, 380; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 191-192; see also and compare Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 53-54.

30. *Ibid*, 381-382.

attacked their ally, the King of Travancore."³¹ Immediately after receipt of this letter, Tipū set out for Seringapatam, directing all his regular troops to assemble in that neighbourhood and abandoning the eastern low countries of Mysore to their fate.³²

Meanwhile, Gen. Meadows, directing his course towards Karūr, distant from Trichinopoly about fifty miles and the nearest post in the Mysorean possession at the time, advanced by easy marches until he reached Coimbatore early in June. After halting here for ten days, the General resumed his march on the 12th, and on the 15th, took possession of Karūr, already abandoned by Tipū. The strength of the place, the sickly state of the army, the importance of the conquered district, and the advantage of communication with Trichinopoly, contributed as inducements towards fixing on Karūr for a constant post and the establishment there of a hospital.³³ By now, however, the south-west monsoon had set in, and the disadvantage of commencing operations at this period was evinced by the return of upwards of twelve hundred men for the hospital at Karūr before a shot had been fired.³⁴ Nevertheless, Gen. Meadows directed his attention towards the chain of regular fortifications with extensive dependent districts in the east of Mysore. On the 3rd July, the General, advancing further, reduced the weak fort of Aravakurchi; and on the 10th, Dhārāpuram, another weak fort, likewise surrendered to British arms. The former was

Gen. Meadows' earlier progress, May-July 1790.

Reduction of Karūr, June 15.

Aravakurchi-Dhārāpuram, July 3-10.

31. *Ibid.*, 382-383; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 58-60; see also *Poona Res. Corres.*, III. No. 111, dated 22nd March 1790 (for text of Tipū's letter to William Meadows).

32. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 60; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 388.

33. *Ibid.*, 57, 61; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 192; see also and compare Wilks, *l.c.*

34. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 383-384.

delivered to its Hindu possessor; the latter, with a large supply of grain and other necessities, was occupied by an English garrison for the reception of a further body of sick. General Medows, having determined to form a depot at this station and leaving in that vicinity a brigade to cover the heavy stores and some expected convoys, marched towards the important post of Coimbatore and took possession of it, without molestation, on the 21st, at just the period when Tipū was actually above the ghāts.³⁵

And Coimbatore,
July 21.

Two days later, the General detached an advanced force under Col. Stuart to proceed against Pālghāt.³⁶ Meanwhile, intelligence had been received of the approach to Daṇāyakankōṭe, at the head of about three thousand horse, of Saiyid Sāhib,³⁷ Tipū's kinsman, who had joined him at Coimbatore with his division from Dindigal, and on Tipū's ascent to Seringapatam, was left in command of the Sillādār and Pindāri horse to hang upon the English army and disturb its communications.³⁸ Determined to give battle, General Medows detached the whole cavalry supported by two companies of sepoys, with four pieces of cannon to that post. On the approach of the detachment, the fort, having taken the alarm, commenced a heavy fire, which, together with a scarcity of forage, rendered it necessary to fall back some distance. On the 28th, the detachment again advanced thither, and

35. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 63-67; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 384, and Wilson, *l.c.*

36. Wilks, *l.c.*

37. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 68; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 391. Mackenzie refers to Daṇāyakankōṭe as "Demiacotta," and Saiyid Sāhib as "Sahid Sahib." Daṇāyakankōṭe, a village now almost deserted; 30 miles north of Coimbatore; 18 miles w. s. w. of Satyamangalam; and seven miles south from Gajjalabaṭṭi, the foot of the Pass.

38. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 385.

directed a few shots against the fort, obliging the Mysorean general to decamp with great precipitation towards the Gajjalahatti Pass.³⁹ The immediate object of the detachment being thus effected, the whole fell back to Vellādi. It was now evident that

The preliminary to invasion of Mysore from the South-East.

the attainment of a chain of posts closely connected with each other, extending from the coast of the Coromandel to the foot of the Gajjalahatti Pass, was an essential preliminary to any invasion of Mysore from the Coimbatore District. On this principle, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Karūr, Erode and Satyamangalam presented themselves as links that must of necessity be secured; and in order to obtain possession of such of these posts as were still occupied by Tipū, and to keep the country, and in particular the line of communication, free from Saiyid Sāhib's horse, it became requisite to watch his movements at Satyamangalam and Poongar, the only places where the Bhavāni river was at that time fordable.⁴⁰ The reported review by Tipū of a well-appointed army to the eastward of Seringapatam, about the 7th of the month, also urged the propriety of keeping a watchful eye on these fords. Accordingly, about the end of the month, Lt. Col. Floyd was detached

Further detachments follow, July-August 1790.

to proceed against Saiyid Sāhib, while early in August another detachment under Lt. Col. Oldham was detached to capture Erode, in the best line of communication from Karūr to the ghāt. At the same time, Maj. Skelly was sent to command at Dhārāpuram, and Col. Stuart, who had by now abandoned the design against Pālghāt owing to incessant showers of rain and fallen to Podanūr, advanced by the route of Yarriacotah

39. Mackenzie, *c.c.*, I. 68-69

40. *Ibid.*, 69-70.

to reduce the strong fort of Dindigal, distant one hundred and twelve miles.⁴¹

Erode surrendered to Lt. Col. Oldham in the first week of August, and Capt. Oram, now on his way from Madura to camp and high in the confidence of General Medows, was also directed to attempt the reduction of Dindigal either by surprise, stratagem or negotiation.⁴² By August 16, Col. Stuart arrived before Dindigal. This place, erected on the summit of a smooth granite rock of limited extent, had within the last six years been rebuilt with excellent masonry, on a new line of defence consisting of eight bastions. It mounted fourteen good guns and one mortar, but its best defence was a rampart of natural precipice, except at one point of ascent.⁴³ Three cisterns that had been repaired by the directions of Saiyid Sāhib supplied the fort with abundance of water, and as the upper and lower forts contained from six to seven hundred fighting men without any scarcity of cannon, ammunition or provisions, it was at first judged advisable not to hazard an attack.⁴⁴ Agreeably to instructions, Capt. Oram summoned the Killedār, Haidar Abbās, to surrender the fort. The Killedār protested that private property should not be touched, that the troops should be escorted through the lately acquired territories into whatever part of Mysore they preferred and denounced at the same time the Commander-in-Chief's determination to put the garrison to the sword should they persist in a wanton and useless defence. Resolved, however, on not risking the surrender of a fort like Dindigal, the Killedār retorted that if any other person would come on that errand, he would

41. *Ibid.*, 70-72; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 384-385. Mackenzie refers to Podanūr as "Poodoor."

42. *Ibid.*, 71-73; Wilson, *l.c.*

43. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 386; see also and compare Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 74.

44. Mackenzie, *l.c.*

blow him from a cannon.⁴⁵ Thereupon, Col. Stuart decided to commence operations against the fort. Despite the difficulties that arose from the improvements in the fortification of Dindigal and from its natural strength, the service was so vigorously prosecuted that, by dint of perseverance and extreme fatigue, all the ordnance of the detachment opened against the walls on the morning of the 20th, from batteries that had been erected to the northward of the Pettah, within five hundred yards of the hill.⁴⁶ The allotment of ordnance for the reduction of the fort was calculated on the expectation of finding the place as it was left in 1784; two 18-pounders, two 12-pounders, and two mortars of the smallest size, constituted the whole battering train, and the equipments for these pieces were more insufficient than their number.⁴⁷ The embrasures, however, that had been opened for two guns on the 21st would not bear on the breach, and although there was an incessant fire kept by the fort upon the parapet, it began to slacken after noon and was silenced before midnight.⁴⁸ By the evening of the 21st, a very indifferent breach was effected, the defences of the works which flanked it being imperfectly taken off and some of the most important remaining uninjured. But, as shot only remained for about two hours firing, and a week would elapse before a fresh supply could arrive, Col. Stuart, estimating the value of time and the disadvantage of remaining passive, determined on risking the assault, on the evening of the same day. The slope of the breach, although accessible over the steep ascent of the rock, yet left upwards of ten feet of the interior revetment of rather a thin rampart, quite entire; the ascent by the flanks of the breach was rendered impracticable, and a mass of pikes from the

45. *Ibid*, 74-75.

46. *Ibid*, 75; see also and compare Wilks, l.c.

47. Wilks, l.c.

48. Mackenzie, o.c., I. 75-76; Wilks, o.c., II. 386-387.

foot of the interior revetment, received every man as he ascended the summit of the breach.⁴⁹ The onset was resolute and fierce. Animated by the example of their leader, again and again, the assailants repeated their efforts, and continued as long as any prospect of success remained. The desperate resistance of the garrison supported by various advantages from nature and art, rendered it necessary to abandon the design of carrying Dindigal by storm, for a time. The party, ultimately foiled and repulsed with loss, remained in the ditch of the lower fort, leaving the gallant Killedār in possession of his shattered yet well defended ramparts.⁵⁰ Towards ten o'clock, however, Major Skelly from Dhārāpuram directed that Capt. Oram who had the immediate command of the Indian troops should advance some companies up the hill. The ready execution of this order prevented the Mysoreans from strengthening the defences at the breach by keeping up a constant and well-directed fire during the night. About four o'clock in the morning, this party was withdrawn, and the whole division, disappointed of their object, retired to camp. Abandoned by a great part of his garrison during the night, the Killedār early the next morning exposed a white flag on the breach, in token of a disposition to surrender. Terms of capitulation, moderate and yet honourable, were readily granted, on the usual conditions of security for persons and property, including under the latter head, the pikes and matchlocks of the irregular foot; and Captain Bowser commanded to take charge of the fort.⁵¹

During the period that Lt. Col. Stuart was engaged in the reduction of posts which held in awe the Pālegārs that inhabited the southern extremity of the kingdom of

49. Wilks, o.c., II. 387.

50. Mackenzie, o.c., I. 76-77; Wilks, l.c.

51. *Ibid.*, 77-78; see also and compare Wilks., l.c., and Wilson, o.c., II. 192-193.

Mysore, Captain Wāhab was with his own battalion employed in collecting a supply of cattle and grain from the fertile and extensive districts in that direction; and forced to surrender without opposition Śankhagiri, Palni, Chidambaram, Chōjavaram, Ānamalai and other inferior posts.⁵² About September, Col. Stuart was, without joining headquarters, ordered to proceed to Pālghāt, reinforced by this battalion among others. After adjusting necessary arrangements, the Colonel, retracing his steps to Coimbatore, marched thither by the route of Dhārāpuram.⁵³ Composed of long blocks of granite, the strong fortifications of Pālghāt were so built as to present the end instead of the side to the shot, thus resisting the ordinary means of effecting a breach. The ordnance was, therefore, prepared on a respectable scale and placed under the direction of Lt. Col. Moorhouse, an officer of distinguished reputation. The preparations were made with corresponding care and at day-light, on the 21st of September, two batteries opened at distances under 500 yards, one for enfilade, and the other for breaching. The latter, consisting of eight 18-pounders, dismounted at their first discharge six of the guns opposed to them. In less than two hours, not only the guns of the fort were silenced but before night a practicable breach was effected, and before day-light the garrison desired to capitulate. Terms nearly similar to those allowed to the garrison of Diṇḍigal were granted, the chief condition of surrender being effective protection against the Nairs who had joined Colonel Stuart and were employed in the blockade. Early next morning, possession was taken of Pālghātchēri with a considerable quantity of grain and other articles, and Capt. Wāhab placed in command of the fort.⁵⁴

52. *Ibid.*, 78-80; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 198.

53. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 387-388; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 80-81.

54. *Ibid.*, 388-389; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 81-86, and Wilson, *l.c.*

While the exertions of Lt. Col. Stuart and his colleagues deprived Tipū of the territory Operations in the Coimbatore country, which had till now remained in his possession in the low countries to the southward of the Bhavāni and Cauvery rivers, the detachments that his lieutenant Saiyid Sāhib advanced to ravage the country in his front met with perpetual rebuffs at the hands of Col. Floyd and other officers since the 16th of August.⁵⁵ Col. Floyd, with very inferior numbers, commenced against this corps a series of well combined and active operations, and Saiyid Sāhib, incessantly kept on the alert, found it expedient to place his corps to the northward of the Bhavāni, a river running from west to east, and occasionally fordable at a few points; but finding himself exposed in that situation also to the enterprise of the English troops and restricted for space between that river and the hills, he ultimately ascended for safety above the ghāts.⁵⁶ Col. Floyd, however, whose operations were confined to the south of the Bhavāni and who had been joined after the reduction of Erode by the greater part of the troops appointed for that service under Col. Oldham, crossed the river on the 26th of August and with Satyamangalam

55. Mackenzie, o.c., I. 86 *et seq.*

56. Wilks, o.c., II. 385-386. "Tippoo," as Wilks continues, "was justly enraged at this weak and unskilful proceeding. Seyed Sahib, as he observed, ought never to have crossed the Bahyany (Bhavāni), but on Col. Floyd's approach, to have dispersed into small bodies, to have ranged round his rear and flanks, to have occupied in a desultory warfare every detachment on the line of communication with Trichinopoly, and to have straitened the supplies of those appointed to distinct services, and particularly that which afterwards reduced Dindigal and Palgaut, and subsisted exclusively on the country through which it marched; and the Sultaun concluded his angry harangue by declaring that Seyed Sahib had no business with the parade of fighting, and that any one officer under his command would have conducted himself with greater address" (Wilks, o.c., II. 386) - a passage which, significantly enough, points to Tipū's anxiety to maintain the *status quo ante* of Mysore in the South against his British opponents.

on the north bank as his main object, reduced and occupied that depot.⁵⁷ By the end of August, a chain of depots commencing with Tanjore and Trichinopoly, and including Karūr, Erode and Satyamangalam, situated in a most valuable and fertile tract of the kingdom of Mysore, were thus in the possession of the English, in a good line for advancing provisions and stores to the pass of Gajjalahaṭṭi, which Gen. Medows still expected to ascend early in October.⁵⁸ The fall of Satyamangalam, in particular, deprived Tipū of all access to Coimbatore but

by the ford of Poongar.⁵⁹ Accordingly, Tipū descends into the Gajjalahaṭṭi Pass, early in September, determined to September 1790. descend the ghāts at the Gajjalahaṭṭi

Pass and try his fortune on the plains before that ford also should be occupied, Tipū, leaving his heavy stores and baggage at the summit of the ghāt under Pūrnaiya, commenced the descent of this most difficult Pass of the whole eastern range at the head of 40,000 men and a large train of artillery.⁶⁰ Widely different was the army that he assembled for the purpose and reviewed in the beginning of August at Seringapatam from that with which he invaded Travancore in the foregoing December. Yet, the difference was still more wide between the corps that he had now to encounter and his antagonists on the former occasion. However, in expectation of bringing about by stratagem and finesse what he was unable to accomplish by force of arms, he put his troops in motion as soon as he had satisfied himself with their equipment.⁶¹

57. *Ibid.*, 390; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 90-91.

58. *Ibid.*; also Mackenzie (*o.c.*, I. 93-94), who observes: "With what anxiety and concern the Sultaun beheld his most valuable and productive territories, thus wrested out of his possession, can be better conceived than conveyed by any communication of thought."

59. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 94.

60. *Ibid.*, 94, 103; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 391.

61. *Ibid.*, 94; also, on this section, Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 194.

Tipū's descent into the Coimbatore District was so sudden, so silent, and so skilful in all respects, that it instantly occasioned a very material change in the general aspect of affairs. It laid open prospects that threatened with disastrous calamity the interests of the English throughout the Karnātic; and appeared, for a time, not only to render the war tedious, but also to outweigh all previous successes.⁶² Col. Floyd, however, who had early intelligence of Tipū's proceedings, was ordered by Gen. Medows to maintain his advanced position, opposite Satyamangalam. Among the precautions taken by Gen. Medows was a daily examination of the ford of Poongar and its vicinity. On the morning of the 12th of September, after the return of one of the Colonel's detachments, Tipū commenced the passage of the Bhavāni, at the ford, and in basket-boats above it; and before night, had passed a large portion of his army, and encamped some miles to the south of the ford. The remainder of the troops was ordered to descend by the north bank, to operate by cannonade across the river, to seize Satyamangalam, and eventually cross by the lower or upper ford, or by boats, according to circumstances.⁶³ The intelligence and appearances of the two preceding days indicated that the descent had been nearly accomplished. On the 13th, an hour and a half before daylight, three troops of the 19th regiment under Col. Floyd, were sent in advance to reconnoitre the ford, and a regiment of Indian cavalry was ordered out at daylight to support them. There were two roads to the ford, one winding by the river-side, and another more direct. The advanced body, after charging and driving into the river some cavalry they had met, returned by the riverside one; the Indian regiment was meanwhile moving by the

62. *Ibid.*, 103.

63. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 392; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 104 *et seq.*

direct road, and had only proceeded a few miles, when it was suddenly met by larger bodies than had hitherto been observed. The regiment was instantly charged and overthrew its immediate opponents, but perceiving heavy bodies of cavalry in every direction, the Officer Commanding determined to take post in a favourable spot, and to send intelligence to Col. Floyd to prepare for the requisite dispositions as well as for his own support. It was rather a position for infantry than cavalry. Nearly an hour elapsed before support arrived, during which time he was surrounded and hard pressed in every direction.⁶⁴

The fort of Satyamangalam, situated in a plain on the north bank of the Bhavāni, intersected by high and impenetrable enclosures, and connected by a road about fifteen miles long, leading through the Gajalahatti Pass into the kingdom of Mysore, occupied a unique position during the contest.⁶⁵ The Mysoreans, in surrounding the regiment which had taken post, had very improvidently entangled themselves among the enclosures. In one of these, from which there was no retreat, between four and five hundred of Tipū's stable horse were charged by two troops of the 19th and every man put to the sword. In other directions, the charges of the European and the Indian cavalry were perfectly successful. The field was completely cleared of every opponent, and the whole cavalry returned to camp. They had scarcely dismounted, however, before a large body was perceived descending the northern bank of the river, and about ten o'clock, opened some guns on the grand guard, which was immediately ordered to join the line. Tipū's columns were at the same time

64. *Ibid*, 392-393; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 105 *et seq*; Wilson, *l.c.*

65. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 109-110; Wilks, *l.c.*

perceived rapidly approaching from the west, in a direction which threatened to turn the left, and a change of front was promptly executed, which placed the infantry in a position difficult to be outflanked, and the cavalry imperfectly covered by a low hill. Tipū's army drew up in a corresponding order, and opened a distant but efficient cannonade, from nineteen guns, on the English detachment, who could not, however, effectually return the fire, both on account of the

distance and the limited store of
 Col. Floyd's retreat, September 14, 1790. ammunition with them. Col. Floyd,

with heavy casualties in his ranks, was compelled to retreat next morning, towards Coimbatore, abandoning the untenable post of Satyamangalam. Being, however, again attacked at Cheyūr, twenty miles south of Satyamangalam, the Colonel beat the Mysoreans off after a severe and well-contested cavalry action, in which Burhan-ud-dīn, Tipū's favourite kinsman, fell.⁶⁶

At length, Tipū, who had continued to gain ground on Col. Floyd by incessant cannonading on the rear divisions, alarmed by intelligence of Gen. Medows' approach, withdrew his whole force to an advantageous ground near Coimbatore, leaving the English detachment in quiet possession of the field.⁶⁷ Col. Floyd, on certain information of Gen. Medows' march towards Vellādi, moved thither, reaching that place on the 15th. Meanwhile, Gen. Medows, with a decided intention to compel Tipū to come to an action or to reascend the ghāts, no sooner he had intelligence of his descent into the plains than he determined to put the

Further movements
 of Tipū and the
 English, September
 14-29, 1790.

66. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 399-398; Wilson, *o.c.*, 194-196; also Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 110-114. Compare Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 167-168), who refers the fall of Burhan-ud-dīn to a later occasion.

67. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 114-117.

army in motion towards the ford of Poongar. But when he reflected on the number, equipment, and above all, on the high discipline of the corps, which had been posted in advance, he resolved upon straining every nerve to maintain Satyamangalam, until reinforced, should Tipū hazard an attack. Firm in this opinion, he proceeded for its relief early on the 14th, and encamped within four miles of Vellādi. But, on receipt of news of Col. Floyd's engagement at Satyamangalam, the General, ignorant of the evacuation of that post, marched early on the morning of the 15th to within a few miles of Daṇāyakankōṭe, either to intercept Tipū at the ford of Poongar or to obtain any position whatsoever between his army and the Bhavāni river. Apprized of these movements and lest his retreat should be cut off, Tipū abandoned all designs against Col. Floyd's detachment and fled with precipitation across the Bhavāni. In the meantime, Gen. Medows, with a view to strengthen Coimbatore, directed that Lt. Col. Stuart (who had proceeded to besiege Pālghāṭhēri) should send back the flank companies of the 71st and 72nd regiments; commanded that the sixth battalion should advance from Erode in the direction of Satyamangalam; and apprized Lt. Col. Floyd (who had by now joined him) of his intention to push Tipū, either by advancing by different routes from the two respective divisions, or after forming a junction, by pressing against him in one compact body. Tipū, however, took every precaution to avoid Gen. Medows in the field on terms of equal advantage. He occupied a strong post on the north bank of the Bhavāni; that river afforded protection to his front; on either flank, Daṇāyakankōṭe and Satyamangalam strengthened his position; nor did he neglect to guard the ford at the latter place as well as that of Poongar; and by detaching swarms of horse in different directions, he attempted to distract the attention and to thwart

the designs of the English Commander.⁶⁸ On the 18th, Gen. Medows with the united corps marched on in the direction of Cheyūr; and on the 20th, encamped in its vicinity. From here he fell back to Coimbatore, where he was joined by Col. Stuart's division after the capture of Pālghāt. The junction of the two corps had in the meanwhile disappointed Tipū's expectations, and he retired north of the river, not so much in the expectation of attack as to be enabled to observe the customary festival of ten days, the *Muhurram*.⁶⁹ On the 29th, Gen. Medows, with the reunited forces, again advanced in quest of his opponent. In six marches, the General, pursuing the route of the latter, round by the Bhavāni to the Cauvery, found Erode successively abandoned by his own garrison and by its captors after emptying the storehouses.⁷⁰

Nor did Tipū in the meantime remain inactive. Foiled in his principal object, he was determined on attempting the recovery of the garrisons that had been lately wrested out of his possession.⁷¹ From Erode, he proceeded due south, closely followed by the English army, and on the 6th of October, surrounded Dhārāpuram, the first object of his attention. Next day his whole force encamped within one thousand yards of its walls, and by break of day on the 8th, batteries were ready to open on three faces of the fort, at equal distance from the ditch and the encampment. Unprovided with cannon, the garrison, which now consisted of about one hundred Europeans and double that number of Indian troops, obtained an honourable capitulation, which was strictly

October-November
1790.

68. *Ibid.*, 118-122, see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 398-400.

69. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 400-401; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 122-123.

70. *Ibid.*, 401; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 124-125; also, on this section, Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 196-197.

71. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 126.

adhered to by both parties.⁷² Coimbatore, with the field hospital, valuable stores and battering train deposited therein, was the next objective of Tipū; and he approached within six miles of that untenable post, when he received intelligence that that place had been opportunely reinforced by three regular battalions of the Madras Establishment and one corps of Travancoreans sent by Col. Hartley from Pālghāt. Finding, therefore, an attempt on Coimbatore to be hopeless, he suddenly withdrew towards Satyamangalam.⁷³ On the 15th, however, Gen. Medows, after receiving his convoy, encamped at Singānallūr (about six miles from Coimbatore); on the 20th, he again put the army in motion, to seek the Mysorean in the direction of Erode, and encamped at Erode on the 2nd of November. On approaching Erode, a large mass of the *Wulsa* (*valasa*) was met proceeding from the westward of that place, whence they had been compelled to depart by Tipū's command, in order that no population should remain to give intelligence of his movements in a country covered by his light cavalry. On the 7th, a strong corps under Col. Floyd was sent to make an extensive reconnoissance, only to ascertain, on the 8th, that Tipū with his whole force had crossed, about the beginning of the month, above the confluence of the Bhavāni and Cauvery (*Bhavāni-kūḍal*), and had proceeded in a northerly direction.⁷⁴ Thereupon Gen. Medows, crossing the rivers at a ford below Erode, followed, on the 10th, with all expedition to checkmate Tipū, who, in truth, when last passing Satyamangalam, had heard of the actual invasion of the Bārāmahal, and moved thither with about

72. *Ibid*, 126-127; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 197-198; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 402-403.

73. *Ibid*, 127-128; see also and compare Wilks, *l.c.*

74. *Ibid*, 129, 131; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 403-404, Mackenzie refers to Bhavāni, kūḍal as "Bevin coral".

three-fourths of his army, leaving the remainder to watch the motions of Gen. Medows, under orders of Kumr-ud-dīn, now first restored to military command since 1787, by transferring to his charge the elephant and insignia of Saiyid Sāhib, who was thus tardily disgraced for his flight up the Pass of Gajalahatti.⁷⁵

The Centre division of the English army from Bengal, which left Burhanpur on the 27th February and reached Conjeeveram on the 1st of August, it is necessary to recall, had been augmented to nine thousand five hundred men (including three regiments of European infantry, one regiment of Indian cavalry and a formidable artillery) and assembled at Ārni under the command of Col. Kelly.⁷⁶ It was the Colonel's intention to invade the upper country, besiege Bangalore and reduce the adjacent districts under the British Government. At an early period of the war, he had detached Captain Beatson with Captain Read and Lieutenant Munro to ascertain the practicability of entering Mysore by the Mugly Pass; and he had also, in a letter to the Council at Fort St. George, delineated the measures in his opinion the most likely to be attended with success against the upper provinces, whilst Tipū with his main body was held in check by Maj. Gen. Medows in Coimbatore.⁷⁷ By the death of Col. Kelly, however, on the 24th of September, the command of the Centre division devolved on Lt. Col. Maxwell of the Madras Establishment, whose

75. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 404; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 198. See f.n. 56 *supra* re: Tipū's reproof of Saiyid Sāhib's military conduct. For the earlier operations of Gen. Medows and the movements of the English army and Tipū in the Coimbatore country down to November 1790, see also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 162-164), whose account is too brief and lacks chronological sequence.

76. *Ibid.*, 406; see also Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 152-165.

77. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 136-137.

immediate object was, in pursuance of the original plan of the campaign, the conquest of the Bārāmahal Valley besides that of keeping in view the feasibility of a junction with the Grand Army.⁷⁸ Entering the Barāmahal on the 24th of October, Col. Maxwell, after reducing Vāṇiyambādi, Sheagur, Tirupattūr and other mud forts, approached, on the 1st of November, the formidable hill-fort of Krishnagiri, with its well-constructed walls and batteries.⁷⁹ Then he established his headquarters near the central position of Caveripatam, in order that he might, by making demonstrations towards the Pass

Tipū's movements,
November 9-14.

and the fort, return and attempt Krishnagiri by surprise. On the 9th, the presence of considerable bodies of ight cavalry indicated the approach of Tipū, who, alarmed by the danger that appeared to threaten the defenceless provinces of Mysore to the northward, had moved thither after studiously avoiding Gen. Medows for over seven weeks in Coimbatore. On the 11th, the only regiment of cavalry, allowing themselves to be inveigled in pursuit through a defile, were attacked by about six times their number, and driven back with considerable loss. On the 12th, Tipū shewed his army in his full force, and attempted, by a variety of evolutions, to find the means of attacking Col. Maxwell with advantage; but the strong position assumed by that officer frustrated these intentions, and Tipū drew off at night without any serious attempt. Similar means on the 13th, varied so as to compel an entire change of position, terminated in the same manner. On the 14th, numbers farther augmented made similar demonstrations, but these were actually intended to conceal his meditated departure on the ensuing day.⁸⁰

78. *Ibid.*, 184, 188; see also and compare Wilks, l.c.

79. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 406-407; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 165-167; see also and compare Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 164-165.

80. *Ibid.*, 407-408; also Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 168-173.

Meantime, Gen. Medows, who, as we have seen, had commenced his march from the Cauvery on the 10th, had passed through Śankaridurgam and Ōmalūr, determined on a junction with the Centre division to oppose Tipū's progress in the north-east of Mysore. On the 14th, he encamped at the southern extremity of the pass of Tōpur, and on the 15th was enabled, by the improvement of the road effected by Tipū a few days before, to clear the pass and the range of hills, and encamp on their northern face, on an elevated ground overlooking the Bārāmabal, and distant about twenty-nine miles from Col. Maxwell's position at Caveripatam. On the preceding evening, Tipū, marching to the west in the vale of the pass of Policode, had drawn off some miles south from Col. Maxwell's position, and calculating on Gen. Medows requiring another day to clear the pass, had marked an encampment which he found prudent to abandon. On the 16th, Gen. Medows moved fifteen miles further in the direction of Caveripatam, effecting a junction with Col. Maxwell on the 17th at Pullampatti, twenty miles from the head of the pass of Topūr and twenty-six from its southern extremity.⁸¹

Until the arrival of the armies at Pullampatti, the primary plan of the campaign (*viz.*, that of entering Mysore from the Coimbatore country) does not appear to have undergone either suspension or change. The posts occupied in the conquered territories were not only continued, but strengthened with an addition of troops and of guns. Those who favoured the original mode of attack produced arguments in support of operations against the southern extremity of the kingdom of

81. *Ibid.*, 498; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 139, 141, 144-151, 173-174. See also and compare Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 165.

Mysore. It was on the districts of Coimbatore, Erode, Karūr, Dhārāpuram, Pālghāt and Dinḍigal, they reasoned, that Tipū had to depend for the principal part of his supplies, both of grain and of forage, and the degree of ease with which these countries were not only prevented affording him any assistance but absolutely wrested out of his possession, clearly discovered the advantage of the measure. They asserted that nature even seemed to point out that quarter as the most proper object of attack, that part of the country not bounded by the territories of the East India Company or their allies being divided from the rest of Mysore either by a stupendous chain of mountains, penetrable but in a very few places, or by the river Cauvery. A southern invasion, they insisted, was likewise better calculated either to repel the encroachments of Tipū on the possessions of the Company and their allies, or to favour the exertions of the English after the junction with the armies of Bombay and Travancore, the operations of Tipū having rendered that measure necessary. It was said, too, that an invasion by Gajjalahatti and the possession of that Pass assured the Company an immediate access to the capital of the kingdom of Mysore, commanding a communication with their new acquisitions and with the Company's southern provinces, besides enabling them to secure those territories from any considerable irruptions. However much these arguments were invalidated by the experience of ensuing years, General Medows, with a force far superior in numbers and equipment to any that Great Britain had assembled in India at a former period, and sufficient (in the General's opinion) to secure his convoys and to keep open the communication with Pālghāthēri and Coimbatore, meant forthwith to proceed up the Caveripuram Pass and take post at the head of Gajjalahatti until the battering train expected from Bombay should join and

enable him to proceed to the siege of Seringapatam.

The idea laid aside.

The idea of invasion by this route was, however, from an unexpected movement of Tipū, laid aside in its turn for the original plan of operations.⁸²

Instead of any attempt to defend the kingdom of Mysore against the Grand Army thus reinforced, and doubly sensible by the junction of Col. Maxwell, of his inequality to face Major General Medows in the field, Tipū, in order to give alarm for the Company's possessions upon the coast, and for the safety of their garrisons in the conquered countries, determined to return of a sudden to the eastward. By carrying the war into the heart of the Karnātic, he expected to withdraw the attention of the English Commander from his intended invasion to the defence of his own possessions. By pointing towards Coimbatore, or by descending through the pass of Tōpur, he threatened the several garrisons as well as the numerous supplies, collected in the districts lately acquired. Either, or both, of these operations lay perfectly at his option. For a time, Tipū's success was equal to the boldness of this design, Krishna Rao, the head of the Treasury (*Tōshe-khāna*), being alone admitted to his councils on the occasion.⁸³

Although the two British armies were ready to act collectively against Tipū in case of emergency, they continued to march and encamp in separate divisions for some days after they approached Pullampatti. By break of day on the 18th of November, both the powers were in motion to put their respective plans in execution. Tipū had shown a decided intention to ascend the ghāts at Udayadurgam; yet, relying on want of intelligence

82. Mackenzie, *o. c.*, I. 141-144, 174-175.

83. *Ibid.*, 175-176; see also and compare Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 408-409.

on the English side, he doubled back from Policode, and recrossing the Bārāmahal Valley, some miles to the southward of Dharmapuri, his advance entered the Tōpur Pass before noon. General Medows, leaving Col. Maxwell to follow with his division, moved also towards Tōpur on his way to Caveripuram, both intending to clear it in two easy marches.⁸⁴ As the corps under General Medows advanced, three battalions of infantry of the rear of Tipū's main column, who had drawn up on a rising ground in the centre of the Valley and were making demonstrations on the right, were gradually intercepted and forced to make a straggling retreat through the ravines and woods in the opposite direction. The remainder of Tipū's army also completely cleared the pass, with the loss of only one tumbril and some military stores; the cavalry disappeared about sun-set, a small body taking the route of the pass and the rest in a circuitous direction by Pennāgara. At length, after a tedious march of twenty miles, the English army encamped at night near the summit of the pass of Tōpur.⁸⁵ Meantime, Tipū, who was personally present with the cavalry which made the demonstrations on the right, proceeding under cover of the *Pēsh-khāna*, was joined with supplies by Kumr-ud-dīn, near Śankari-durgam. Abandoning now every design against the posts in the conquered countries and marching expeditiously by the route of Nāmakal, he descended by the northern bank of the Cauvery at Karūr, and towards the close of the month, made a formidable appearance at Munsapet, threatening Trichinopoly itself.⁸⁶

Tipū proceeds as far as Trichinopoly.

84. *Ibid.*, 176; see also and compare Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 409; and Kirmāni, *l. c.*

85. Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 409-410; Mackenzie, *o. c.*, I. 177-178. See also and compare Kirmāni (*o. c.*, 165-166), who speaks of demonstrations, etc., by Tipū's army.

86. *Ibid.*, 411; Mackenzie, *o. c.*, I. 183-184, 189, 191; and Wilson, *o. c.*, II. 202.

Meanwhile, Gen. Medows, although he was not enabled to force Tipū to a decisive engagement, setting out in a southerly direction from Ōmalūr, closely followed him, and for two days having a distant view of the rear of his columns, encamped at Veyloor on the banks of the Cauvery, opposite Karūr, on the 27th November.⁸⁷ Believing that Tipū had passed to the southward, he also ordered a strong detachment under Col. Oldham across the river, with reinforcements for the places which he considered most vulnerable. Deeming Tipū's views to be chiefly directed to fixing the seat of war in the low countries, the General, who does not yet appear to have altogether abandoned the design of entering Mysore by one of the passes to the southward, declared his opinion, "that the most determined measure, the likeliest to bring him to action, and drive him out of this country, is boldly to go up the ghats ourselves, which I mean to do by the Caveripuram Pass, and taking post at the head of the Gujelhutty, and opening that of Tambercherry, preserve our communication with Coimbatore, Palghat and the other coast." He added that he hoped to be able to set out for the Caveripuram Pass by the 8th December, and expressed his belief that if he were once up the ghāts, Tipū would either fight or treat. Before that date, however, the latter had made various demonstrations against Trichinopoly, but they had no material result beyond the plunder and devastation of the island of Śrīrangam.⁸⁸ Though Col. Bridges at Trichinopoly discovered no apprehension of danger, the importance of that post unavoidably summoned Gen. Medows to its defence.⁸⁹ Marching by the route of Marpaich and encountering a vigorous attack by the

87. *Ibid* ; Mackenzie, o.c., I. 180, 188-189.

88. *Ibid*, 411-412; Wilson, l.c.

89. Mackenzie, o.c., I. 191.

Kuzzaks of Tipū's army in the plain of Satyaman-galam,⁹⁰ the General at last arrived opposite to Trichinopoly on the 14th of December.⁹¹

The approach of the British army within one march of Tipū proved as usual his signal for departure.⁹² Detaching Kumr-ud-dīn to take the fort of Satyamangalam, he turned the direction of his standards

Tipū starts back.
Overtures for accom-
modation, December-
1790.

towards the Pāyanghāt and encamped in the neighbour-hood of Toreyūr-Pālayam (Turwur Paleh), from where he further detached his cavalry to plunder and destroy the dependencies of Trichinopoly and Tanjore.⁹³ Meantime he had even tried an overture for accommodation. On the 5th of December, while Gen. Medows was encamped at Mugganore, two *hircarrahs* brought him a letter addressed by Tipū's Vakils, Mīr Sādak, Alī Raza and Appāji Rām, in which they suggested the restoration of friendship through the agency of Commissioners on either side meeting at a place to be nominated by the General. A speedy answer being required for this request, Gen. Medows sent without delay a reply through Capt. M. Auley, his Aid-de-camp, informing him that he had powers to enter into a treaty with him, "but that before he does so, he must have some person or place of consequence put into his hands as security for the Sultaun's being in earnest, when the first Article will be the unequivocal release of every English officer, known to be still in existence, and in confinement in the Mysore country." He informed Tipū that Earl Corn-wallis was about to take supreme command and that "every nerve strained in the English Empire to bring the war to an honourable conclusion," and added the admonition: "From the assistance of our Allies, but, above all, from our own resources, and what we have

90. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 166-168.

91. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 412.

92. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 196.

93. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 168.

seen, little is to be dreaded from the war, though from sound policy as well as humanity we wish for peace."⁹⁴ Nevertheless, Tipū, moving from Munsapet on the 8th in the direction of Oottatore (Uttattūr) and Valikondapuram, threatened the siege of Tiagar (Tyāgadurg).⁹⁵ He expected, as in the times of his father, that a commercial people, actuated by interest only rather than continue an expensive war, would listen to overtures for accommodation when proposed in the heart of their dominions. "It was thus", as Mackenzie remarks, "that Hyder dictated a peace in the vicinity of Fort St. George when the victorious Smith threatened the strong fortress of Bangalore." Accordingly, from the neighbourhood of Tiagar, Tipū again proposed to open an accommodation.⁹⁶ Replying through his Dewān, he wrote to Capt. M. Auley that an ambassador of consequence would be sent to the General for personally discussing "the points which require adjustment." To this, the brief reply was caused to be sent that as "he had not complied with his request of having some person or place of consequence put into his hands to ensure the Sulṭaun's being in earnest," he could not reopen the subject, which he would leave to Earl Cornwallis to deal with, who, he added, would "act in concert with our faithful allies." This terminated the correspondence.⁹⁷

On approaching Tiagar, a hill-fort with a weak and

His further movements in the Karnāṭic, December 1790-January 1791.

extensive town at its foot, distant about eighty miles from Trichinopoly, Tipū found that the whole of the

94. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 198-195.

95. *Ibid.*, 196; Wilson, *l.c.*

96. *Ibid.*, 198-198.

97. *Ibid.*, 198-199. See also and compare, on the subject of overtures for accommodation, Wilks (*o.c.*, II. 417), who begins thus: "Some advances to negotiation with the English in the course of the late campaign, are chiefly remarkable for their awkward indirectness, and a deviation from the customary formalities of respect."

surrounding population had taken refuge under its protection, attracted by the well-known character of its Commandant, Capt. Flint, the defender of Wandiwash. Tipū, who anticipated no difficulty in forcing the town and securing rich spoils, made demonstrations for a regular siege. The attempt to protect the town incurred from the relative localities the risk of its defenders being cut off from the body of the place. Capt. Flint, however, determined that the population should not be sacrificed, beat off with considerable loss two successive attempts to carry the town. Abandoning every design on Tiagar, Tipū next approached Tiruvannāmalai, thirty-five miles farther north, a town adjoining an ancient temple in a lofty square enclosure. The inhabitants of this place, animated by the intelligence received from the weaker town of Tiagar, collected the arms of the vicinity, and prepared to defend the temple in the hope of holding out till the arrival of the English army. Their behaviour was at first respectable, but batteries erected across the streets of the town, and a position on the neighbouring hill, overlooking the square, induced an unconditional surrender, under circumstances too shocking for description. From this place, Tipū, making a circuit of the rich plain country, passed through Chetput, Wandiwash and the Gingee hills. Thence, he moved immediately towards Permacoil, a post in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, which had been dismantled and blown up in a former war. It was kept as a post of observation, with one company and an officer, who had directions to retire on the Mysorean's approach; but the place being unexpectedly surrounded through the treachery of the Indian officer, his second in command, retreat became impracticable, and Tipū, on its surrender (23rd January) to Kumrud-dīn, proceeded with his whole force in the direction of Pondicherry, and pitched his encampment on the

Red Hills. From here he despatched an envoy to Pondicherry. The services of a French official (M. Leger) were there engaged as ambassador to Louis XVI, demanding the aid of 6,000 men and offering to pay all expenses. With this assistance, Tipū engaged to destroy the English army and Settlements in India and ensure their possession to France. The King of France, Louis XVI, however, on receiving Tipū's message, declined the assistance applied for. The envoy, we are told, addressed himself to Bertrand de Moleville, Minister of Marine, who informed Louis XVI of Tipū's proposals. Notwithstanding their advantages and the Minister's observation that the insurrection at St. Domingo would have furnished a good pretext for the unsuspected embarkation for India of the 6000 men demanded, the natural probity of the King's mind would not permit him to adopt the measure. "This resembles," said he, "the affair of America, which I never think of without regret. My youth was taken advantage of at that time, and we suffer for it now; the lesson is too severe to be forgotten." In the midst of his distress, the King was amused, we read in M. Bertrand's work, with the shabby finery of Tipū's miserable presents to himself and the queen, "trumpery to dress up dolls," which he desired M. Bertrand to give to his little girls.⁹⁸

Meanwhile, on the West Coast, Tipū's troops under Hussain Ali were totally defeated on the 8th December by a regiment under Col. Hartley, and Cannanore taken by Gen. Abercromby, Governor of Bombay, on the 14th; and the whole of Malabar was in the possession of the English. Elsewhere in the South, Gen.

Gen. Meadows moves back to Madras, December 1790-January 1791.

98. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 414-416; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 202-208; see also and compare Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 202-205; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 168-171.

Medows, who appears to have received at Karūr intelligence of Lord Cornwallis' original design of assuming in person the direction of the war, determined to remain in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, until he should receive his orders. But if no orders should be received or if his Lordship should be prevented by any unforeseen circumstances from taking the command of the army in person, it was still his intention to commence his march for the upper country on the 1st of January. His Lordship arrived at Madras on the 12th December, and on receipt of orders, Gen. Medows commenced his march thither on the 30th of December, abandoning every idea of invasion for a time, ordering supplies expected from Karūr in the direction of Trichinopoly, and leaving sufficient troops to strengthen the English acquisitions to the southward as far as Madura. Pursuing Tipū's route as far as Tiruvannāmalai in the north, the General took the direction of Ārṇi, where the heavy stores and guns were left under the second in command, Col. Musgrave, and the remainder of the army, with Tipū's horse hovering at some distance in the rear, proceeded by Conjeeveram to the encampment of Vellout, eighteen miles from Madras, where it arrived on the 27th of January. And Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by a reinforcement of artillery and Indian troops, by various important branches of equipment and conveyance, and by a heavy military chest, assumed the command on the 29th.⁹⁹

Although much had been done by Maj. Gen. Medows to distress Tipū and many solid advantages had resulted from the campaign in the South, yet it had not been attended with either definite or brilliant results. While the operations of the campaign had not fulfilled the public expectations, objects had been accomplished of

Reflections.

99. *Ibid.*, 412-413, 416, 418-419; see also and compare Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 195-196, 214, 224-227.

great importance to the commencement of a second. Karūr and Diṇḍigal materially facilitated the protection of the southern provinces; Coimbatore and Pālghāt were two additional points of eventual support to the operations of a field corps, and to an intercourse with Malabar. Gen. Medows had no doubt decided to take that most determined measure, as he called it, of going up the *ghāts* to drive Tipū out of the Madras territory. His idea was that if the English were once up the *ghāts*, Tipū would either fight or retreat. He had even determined to go up by the Caveripuram Pass by the 8th December. Before that date, however, he had been compelled to be in full march in the opposite direction in consequence of Tipū's demonstrations before Trichinopoly, which threatened that most important but weak and extensive depot. The retreat of Col. Floyd's corps and the loss of the artillery had produced a painful impression, and had even given an opportunity to Tipū to lay claim to a victory. Tipū's irruption had interrupted the collection of provisions, and the loss of the magazines which had resulted from it would in its turn, it was feared, delay the English army from entering the Mysore country before the rains. Lord Cornwallis, while acknowledging "General Medows' zeal for the public good as well as his professional abilities," declared, in a minute dated the 5th November 1790, that if the English army could not before the ensuing January be able to act for "the execution of offensive operation which can alone produce an honourable termination of the war," "we should," he said, "not only be under great difficulties to account for the delay to the satisfaction of our Allies, but we should also have the most serious grounds for apprehension that Tippoo would avail himself of that opportunity to turn his whole force against the Marattas and the Nizam, and endeavour either to weaken their power, or to intimidate them in a negotiation for a

separate peace." He, therefore, thought that "some immediate steps should be taken, which may tend to animate and encourage our Allies to persevere with firmness in the favourable disposition which they have lately shown to perform their engagements." He added: "I conceive it to be possible that my presence in the scene of action would be considered by our Allies as a pledge of our sincerity, and of our confident hopes of success against the common enemy, and by that means operate as an encouragement to them to continue their exertions, and abide by their stipulations." The allies, however, whose participation in the war will be elsewhere noticed, and who, although their armies kept the field, had as yet rendered no service that could materially contribute to the general cause, cautiously awaited the event of British operations. They plainly perceived that the British army must attract the whole attention of Tipū and inevitably deprive him of leisure or means sufficient to oppose the progress of invasions on the northern extremities of Mysore.¹⁰⁰

100. *Ibid.*, 417-419; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. 230-232; *Mys. Gaz.*, *o.c.*, II-iv. 2591-2593. See also and compare *Poona Res. Corres.*, III. *Letter* Nos. 144, 159, 160, 167 and 175, referring incidentally to the events during the first phase of the war.

CHAPTER XIV.

KHĀSĀ CHĀMARĀJA WOPEYAR VIII,

1776-1796—(contd.)

War with Tipu (*The Third Mysore War, 1790-1792*), (*continued*) : The diplomatic background; the formation of the Triple Alliance, June-July 1790—Aims and objectives of Lord Cornwallis—His expectations, June-October 1790; to what extent realised; the dilatoriness of the Allies—His Lordship resolves on taking the field in person, November 1790; and assumes the command, January 29, 1791—*Second Phase of the War*: January-April 1791: "Plan of operations—Lord Cornwallis advances, February 1791—Tipu's movements—The English army encamps before Bangalore, March 5, 1791; the action of the 6th March—The action of the 7th March: The storming of the *Pettah* of Bangalore; Tipu's efforts for the recovery of the *Pettah*—The siege of the fort of Bangalore March 7-21, 1791; description of the fort—The operations; Lord Cornwallis determines on the assault, March 21st.—Krishna Rao's action—The assault—Bangalore taken; the importance of the event—Further movements of Tipu and Cornwallis, March-April 1791; the junction of the Nizam's Cavalry with the English army, April 13, 1791.—Circumstances connected with the junction: A retrospect—*Third Phase*: May-June 1791: Renewed movements of Tipu and Cornwallis; Lord Cornwallis marches on Seringapatam, May 3, 1791; reaches Arakere, May 13, 1791—The operations of May 1791; Tipu opposes the English at Karighatta, May 14, 1791; the English victory on the 15th—The allied troops move to Kannambadi; Lord Cornwallis relinquishes the attempt against Seringapatam, May 20, 1791; the state of his camp at Kannambadi—Lord Cornwallis commences his return march, May 26, 1791: the junction of the Mahratta Cavalry with the English army at Chinkurli, May 26-28,

1791—Reflections on the Cornwallis' campaign of 1791: Tipu's deficiencies; Lord Cornwallis' limitations; commissariat arrangements—Other circumstances in the way.

THE stage had been set for some time for achievements of great magnitude on the English side. In


War with Tipu
(*The Third Mysore War, 1790-1792*) (*continued*): The diplomatic background.

January 1790, about the time when Gen. Medows succeeded to the Government of Madras and Lord Cornwallis resolved upon war with Tipu, his Lordship, it is necessary to recall,¹ issued corresponding instructions to his Political Residents at the courts of Hyderabad and Poona to negotiate a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with those powers against Tipu. Accordingly, Sir Charles Warre Malet at Poona and Captain (afterwards Sir John) Kennaway at Hyderabad proceeded to negotiate the alliance with the Peshwa and the Nizām, respectively, on the principle of mutual aid and reciprocal partition². By virtue of these alliances the

1. *Ante*, Ch. XIII, pp. 755-756.

2. *Sir Charles Warre Malet, Bart.* (1752-1815): Son of Rev. Alexander Malet, b. 1752; joined the East India Company's service at Bombay; became Resident at Poona, 1785; negotiated at Poona, on June 1, 1790, an offensive and defensive alliance with the Peshwa and the Nizām against Tipu; created Bart., 1791; Member of Bombay Council, April 1797; retired, 1798; F.R.S., F.S.A.; died, January 24, 1815. Of his two sons, G. G. Grenville Malet (1804-1856) was in the Indian army; served in Gujerat, Kathiawar, etc.; was in the Afghan War; served under Sir Charles Napier in Sind; was killed in the Persian War at the capture of Bushire; author of *A History of Sind*, which is well known. His younger brother Arthur Malet (1806-1888) was in the Bombay Civil Service and rose to be Member of Council; retired, 1860; died, 1888.

Sir John Kennaway, Bart., (1758-1836): Entered the East India Company's military service in 1772; Persian Secretary to Col. T. D. Pearce, commanding the force sent from Bengal to the Karnātic, 1781; becoming Captain in the same year, served under Sir Eyre Coote against Haidar in the Karnātic, as also in the subsequent campaigns up to 1786; became A.D.C. to Lord Cornwallis, who sent him in 1788 to insist on the cession of the Guntur Circar as agreed upon, and to make a treaty in July 1790 with the Nizām; created Bart., 1791; first Resident at Hyderabad, April 28, 1788; was instrumental in making the Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam with Tipu, March 18, 1792; returned to England, 1794; died, January 1, 1836.



Marquis Cornwallis, K. G., Governor-General of India, 1786-1798, and 1805.

English East India Company were to have an exclusive claim to all conquests previous to the commencement of the co-operation of the allies, and the acquisitions made

The formation of from the period of their respective
the Triple Alliance, entrance into the war were to be equally
June-July 1790. divided.³ The treaty with the Pēshwa

was concluded on the 1st of June, but the apprehensions of Nizām Alī that the Mahrattas would invade his territories while his army should be absent on service, and his earnest endeavours to introduce in a specific article the previous guarantee of his own dominions, protracted the final execution of that instrument until the 4th of July. The Treaties with the respective confederates provided that measures should be immediately taken to punish Tipū and deprive him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity; that each should vigorously prosecute the war; that Nizām Alī and the Mahrattas should each, if required, send a contingent of ten thousand horse to act with the English army, and to be paid for by the State concerned; and that an English detachment should act in like manner with each of their armies; that an equal division of conquests should be made at the conclusion of the war, with the exception of such forts and territories as should be reduced by the English previously to the commencement of war by the other parties; and that the territories of particular Zamindārs and Pālegārs named in the treaty and formerly dependent on the Mahrattas should, if conquered, be restored to them in full sovereignty by whichever of the Allies they might be reduced.⁴

3. *Poona Res. Corres.*, III. *Letter No. 77*, dated March 12, 1790—Malet to William Medows; and *Letter No. 85*, dated April 2, 1790—Malet to Robert Abercromby.

4. *Wilks, o.c.*, II. 374-375. For the texts of the *Treaty* in the original, see Edward Moor's *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment* (1794), pp. 443-454, Appendix I and II. For preliminaries of the *Treaty* with the Poona Court, see also *Poona Res. Corres.*, o.c.,

Such a dependence upon the support of both these powers, Lord Cornwallis held,⁵ "was founded solely upon the expectation of their being guided by the common influence of passions and by considerations of evident interest, which ought to dispose them to seize a favourable opportunity with eagerness to reduce the power of a Prince whose ambition knows no bounds and from whom both of them have suffered numberless insults and injuries." His Lordship's views being entirely confined to the reduction of Tipū's power and to the speedy termination of the war with him,⁶ it was his determination that not only all the troops in the Karnātic were to act against Tipū but the forces of the Presidency of Bombay and large reinforcements from Madras were likewise to attack him in different quarters, "which all together will greatly exceed forty battalions."⁷ In pursuance of this plan, Gen. Medows, as we have seen⁸, proceeded with the Madras army against the southern parts of the kingdom of Mysore and Gen. Abercromby with a considerable force from Bombay attacked the Mysorean possessions on the Malabar coast, while, under the treaty of alliance, the Mahrattas, with a view to prevent the danger of the Karnātic being overrun by Tipū during

Letter No. 69, dated February 24, 1790—Malet to Cornwallis. See also and compare Kirmāpi (o.c., 178), who records that in the formation of the confederacy for the conquest and division of "the whole of the Balaghaut provinces", Lord Cornwallis was "stimulated" and "incited" by Aboo Kāsim Khān alias Mir Ālam, ambassador of Nizām Ali, who had been sent to Bengal "by the policy of Mushir ul Moolk, the Prime Minister of the Chief of Hyderabad". The rivalry between the courts of Hyderabad and Mysore also contributed to the diplomatic issue.

5. *Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Letter No. 72, dated February 28, 1790—Cornwallis to Malet.*
6. *Ibid., Letter No. 121, dated June 7, 1790—Cornwallis to Capt. Kennaway.*
7. *Ibid., Letter No. 92, dated April 17, 1790—Cornwallis to Malet.*
8. *Ante, Ch. XIII; see also Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Letter Nos. 126 A and 135.*

Gen. Medows' operations, were with the help of a body of English infantry and a suitable artillery to be persuaded to attack the naked and defenceless northern frontier of Mysore and thus create a powerful diversion in favour of Gen. Medows⁹; and the Nizām was to be incited to make the most rigorous exertions on his part to distract and distress the common enemy in the same direction.¹⁰

So sanguine were his Lordship's expectations during the course of Gen. Medows' operations in the South of Mysore (June-October 1790), that it was hoped that a simultaneous commencement of hostilities on the part of the confederate powers on the northern frontier of the kingdom would be followed by the necessary consequence to Tipū "of embarrassment in his councils, failure in his resources, and dismay, discontent and defection in his army, particularly if the important diversions proposed by Gen. Abercromby and Col. Kelly can be executed in aid of Gen. Medows' design of penetrating the Ballaghaut from Coimbatoor."¹¹ "I entertain great hopes", his Lordship wrote¹², "that the late rapid successes of Gen. Medows and the probability of his being able to invade the Mysore country early in the next month with an army that Tippoo cannot resist will hold out so tempting a prospect of conquest and work so forcibly on

9. *Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Letter No. 92 cited supra*; also Nos. 93 and 119. In No. 119, dated June 7, 1790 (Cornwallis to Malet), his Lordship lays stress on the point in general, thus: "A number of circumstances have hitherto concurred to render it apparently of great importance to our interests that the Marrattas and the Nizam or even that either of those powers should not only engage to join us in the war against Tippoo but also that they should be prevailed upon to proceed to immediate acts of hostility in order to create a diversion in our favour."

10. *Ibid., Letter No. 126 A, dated June 17, 1790—Cornwallis to Capt. Kennaway.*

11. *Ibid., Letter No. 149, dated September 18, 1790—Malet to Cornwallis.*

12. *Ibid., Letter No. 151, dated September 22, 1790—Cornwallis to Major Palmer.*

the avarice and ambition of the Mahrattas as to stimulate them to exertions, which a regard to good faith and to the observance of their solemn engagements has not yet been able to produce.....I have so good an opinion of the understanding of Nanna Furnaveese as to believe that he sees how much it would raise the credit of his administration, and promote his own interests as well as those of his country, to reduce the power of Tippoo and recover from him the rich and extensive territories which he and his father have taken from the Mahratta State.” “I think”, he again wrote,¹³ “the Mahrattas will be so perfectly convinced of our determination to attempt the entire destruction of Tippoo’s power, and of our having a force that is very likely to accomplish it, that they will look with confidence to the prospect of recovering the extensive and valuable territories which have been wrested from them, and that an object so tempting to their avarice as well their ambition will stimulate them after the Dussarah to execute their engagements with vigour and effect. The complete success of General Medows in the Coimbatore country, and the accession of the Bibbee of Cannanore to our alliance, which gives us possession of all the southern part of the Malabar coast, and ensures to us the assistance of the Nairs and Moplahs, will, I have reason to believe, render it unnecessary to send so large a force from Bombay to the southward as Colonel Abercromby at one time intended.” Tipu’s retreat in the South before Gen. Medows, in September, removed, however, for the time being, all necessity for a diversion,¹⁴ and the complete operation of distress in his affairs was, in October, believed to rest on the General’s ascent of the ghāts and entrance into the upper country, by which means, “even should he not advance to Seringapatam, the enemy will be held so

13. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 153, dated September 27, 1790—Cornwallis to Malet.

14. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 149, cited *supra*.

completely at bay as to be unable to act in that decided manner against the allies in the Deccan and on the Mallabar coast as he will, should the General find the ascent of the ghats impracticable."¹⁵ Gen. Medows' progress in the South thus far "made

To what extent realised.

the Company masters of a valuable and extensive tract of territory independent of all claim to participation, while ours to a share in their conquests is coeval with their commencement, which has happened opportunely on the approach of what may be expected to prove the most arduous period of the war when the efforts of our armies are to be directed against the natural and improved strength of the interior parts of the enemy's country and when every man drawn from the defence of those quarters must necessarily lessen the difficulty of penetrating them."¹⁶

The dilatoriness of the Allies.

But the systematic dilatoriness of the allies in proceeding to action despite the pressure brought to bear on them was a matter of great concern to Lord Cornwallis who complained, as early as September, that it was no small disappointment to him and "highly prejudicial to the general interests of the confederacy."¹⁷ Indeed, as Malet wrote,¹⁸ their grand object was "to reap as great a benefit as possible from the war and to stimulate Tippoo's and our exertions to the exhaustion of our mutual force, by which means they may become

15. *Ibid*, Letter No. 163, dated October 22, 1790—Malet to Cornwallis.

16. *Ibid*, Letter No. 149, cited *supra*.

17. *Ibid*, Letter No. 150A, dated September 20, 1790—Cornwallis to Capt. Kennaway. See also Letter Nos. 145, 166 and 167.

18. *Ibid*, Letter No. 161, dated October 16, 1790—Malet to Cornwallis. See also Letter No. 165, dated October 25, 1790, where Malet, writing to Cornwallis, observes: "This much, however, may, I think, be pronounced on the character and genius of our allies that they will omit no means of converting the alliance to their exclusive benefit, while our dependance for asserting our right and controuling all intrigues must rest on the success of our arms."

the arbiters of future negotiation, which object only can and, I confidently hope, will be completely counteracted by the success of our arms."

In these circumstances, his Lordship resolved, in

His Lordship resolves on taking the field in person, November 1790.

November, on taking the field in person and carrying powerful reinforcements from Bengal, "to bring the war to a speedy and happy conclusion ;

to cement an everlasting connection between the Mahratta State, the Company and Nizam ; to punish a wanton insult ; and circumscribe the dangerous power of Tippoo," who, "urged on by the strong confederacy formed against him, will leave nothing untried to defeat the purposes of it."¹⁹ Accordingly, Gen. Medows was, as we have seen,²⁰ recalled from the South and Lord

And assumes the command, January 29, 1791.

Cornwallis, who arrived in Madras on the 12th of December, assumed the command of the English army on the 29th of January 1791.

His Lordship determined, instead of pursuing a plan

Second Phase of the War: January-April 1791.

of a southern invasion, "to penetrate by the Passes that lead from the centre of the Carnatic, and to commence

Plan of operations.

operations with the sieges of Oussore

(Hosūr) and Bangalore, unless Tippoo should resolve to hazard an action, and its event should render it expedient to take other measures."²¹ Almost simultaneously a body of the Nizām's cavalry under Rāja Tējwant Bāramal, proceeding from Hyderabad, and the principal Mahratta cavalry under Haripant, proceeding from Poona, were to effect a junction with the Company's forces and assist his Lordship in the siege and reduction of Bangalore and

19. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 169, dated November 7, 1790—Cornwallis to Malet; and No. 170, dated November 8, 1790—Cornwallis to the Peshwa.

20. See *Ante*, Ch. XIII, p. 784; also Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 203-204.

21. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 5; see also *Poona Res. Corres.*, *o.c.*, Letter No 221 dated February 18, 1791—Malet to Cornwallis.

in keeping Tipū's main force employed to the north-east of Mysore, while Gen. Abercromby, advancing with the Bombay army from the neighbourhood of Tellicherry, was to ascend the ghāts towards Bednūr and a section of Mahratta cavalry under Paraśurām Bhao, Chief of Miraj, assisted by an English detachment from Bombay under Capt. Little under the treaty of alliance, was, either after reducing Dharwar or not, to form a junction with Gen. Abercromby, penetrate the kingdom of Mysore from the north-west and proceed towards Seringapatam, cutting off Tipū's resources and reducing him to the necessity of either immediately submitting to the terms of the confederates, of traversing his own dominions before the superior forces or of taking post in some of his strongholds that would be equivalent to a conclusion of the war.²²

Equipped with a powerful army of infantry, experienced cavalry and an ample train of battering train, artillery, cattle and stores, Lord Cornwallis commenced his march from Vellout on the 5th of February, and on the 11th, the army, proceeding in a westerly direction, was concentrated near Vellore. It was his Lordship's intention to ascend the Karnātic by the Passes near Āmbūr or those of the Bārāmahal. But, about this time, Tipū, who, after his failure to procure an advantageous peace from the English, had been delayed by his negotiations at Pondicherry, proceeded rapidly by the Passes of Changama and Palacode, determined to divert his Lordship from his designs on Mysore and to protract the war. Consequently Lord Cornwallis, by a feint of ascending by the pass of Āmbūr, was in full march to the north, and thence turning to the west

Lord Cornwallis
advances, February
1791.

22. *Poona Res Corres., o.c., Letter Nos. 218 A, 221, 223, 227 B, 229, 231, 244 and 247A, dated in February-March 1791—Nizām to Bālāji Pant; Malet to Cornwallis, etc.*

by the pass of Mugli (near Chittoor) on the 14th, occupied the summit of the pass on the 17th, and on the 21st, arrived with the stores and baggage (including provisions for forty-five days) on the table-land of Mysore, ninety miles from Bangalore, without firing a shot since his departure from Vellout.²³ After mustering the bullocks and distributing the elephants, the English army marched towards Bangalore on the 24th, at day-break, in three columns, the infantry moving in the centre, with the artillery on their right, and cavalry on their left, flank. On the 25th, after a tedious march through a rugged country, the whole encamped within a short distance of Muḷbāgal. Resuming the march, on the 27th, the army passed through Kōlār and Hoskōte, which, though they refused to surrender, made no resistance, and were placed in possession of friendly Pālegārs after securing the forage, grain and cattle found in them. Marching on, his Lordship arrived, early in March, at Krishnarājpur, three *kōś* from Bangalore.²⁴

Resolved as Tipū was upon destroying the Karnātic for the security of the Mysorean possessions, it was his first object to harass the English army as they advanced, to destroy as much as possible their baggage, to lay waste the whole face of the country, and to burn and carry off all grain and forage. To deprive his antagonist of any communication with the Pālayams and Pālegārs of every description was naturally his next endeavour. Accordingly, a small body of his horse first made their appearance, on the 27th of February, in the

Tipū's move-
ments.

23. Wilks, *o.c.* II. 422; Wilson, *o.c.* II. 204; Mackenzie, *o.c.* II. 1-15; also *Poona Res. Corres.*, Letter Nos. 221, 222A, 227B, and 234, dated in February-March 1791—Malet to Cornwallis, Cornwallis to Capt. Kennaway, etc.

24. Mackenzie, *o.c.* II. 15-21; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.* II. 424; Wilson, *l.c.*, and Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 178.

rear of the English army during its march to Kōlār.²⁵ But no incident occurred worthy of observation until the 4th of March, when the nearness of the contending powers to each other enabled the Mysoreans to rocket the English camp and the cavalry (*Kuzzaks*) of Tipū's army appeared in some force, but failed in almost every attempt to attack the English baggage.²⁶ Tipū, who was dreaming of 6,000 Frenchmen from France for his support, had been already outmanouvred by Lord Cornwallis' movements, and now, alarmed for his *harem*, chose personally to superintend their removal from Bangalore, whither he proceeded.²⁷

At the same time, the English army, resuming its march, halted at Hosūr on the 4th of March, and proceeding north-eastward in a parallel direction, separated by a piece of low swampy ground, and checking by cannonade the designs of Tipū's horse to capture their baggage on the front and opposite flank, encamped at length, on the evening of the 5th, within random shot of Bangalore.²⁸ On the 6th, Lord Corn-

The English army
encamps before
Bangalore, March 5,
1791.

25. *Ibid.*, 18.

26. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 424-425; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 22; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 178-179.

27. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 424; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 179.

28. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 180; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 22-24; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 425-426, and Wilson, *l.c.* Mackenzie refers to a daring, yet unsuccessful, attempt on the life of Lord Cornwallis during this movement, an attempt said to have been frustrated by the vigilance of his guards. "Three desperadoes," writes Mackenzie, "riding at full gallop, mixed with a body of our troops on a rising ground, from whence his Lordship, with General Medows, and several staff officers, viewed the movements of the enemy. Two of them forfeited their lives to their temerity; the third was spared through the mercy of the General. Ferocious and unenlightened as the Sultaun has been represented throughout this work, to charge him with a design so diabolical as the deliberate intention of murdering his antagonist, would be dangerous to the cause of truth. The most reasonable conclusion is, that he was totally ignorant of that dark, savage, and truly villainous attempt, and, that it arose, either from an ill-judged intention to establish superiority in courage amongst the individuals; or from an

wallis moved his encampment to stronger ground, embracing the Pettah. A large portion of the cavalry was employed in the morning, in covering the reconnoissance of the engineers, to the north-east, and at three in the afternoon, the whole cavalry under Col. Floyd, with the brigade of infantry, attached to the same command, moved for a similar purpose to the south-west. The object was satisfactorily accomplished, and the troops were preparing to return, when a body of less than a thousand horse appeared. Tipū had, on the very day, made a circuitous march to the neighbourhood of Kengēri. He had just alighted and a large part of the army had already taken up their ground, when reports were brought of the approach of the English Cavalry, in a direction to intersect the column of march, and the command of Bālāji Rao was ordered to check their advance. Col. Floyd charged the rear of Tipū's infantry and guns, and was entirely successful at first. But he carried the pursuit too far and arrived in front of the *Tōpe-khāna* or Park of Artillery, and was proceeding to dislodge the largest body of the Mysoreans on an eminence, when a musket-ball entered his cheek and passed through both jaws. He fell as if struck by a common shot and a retreat commenced. Though the casualties were not heavy and the loss in horses great, the reverse did not matter, especially as Floyd's brigade soon reached Major Gowdie's brigade of infantry and guns, which had advanced in support on witnessing the disaster. Although the affair thus terminated favourably for Tipū, his greatest apprehension was a night-attack on his camp. Accordingly, on this night, he moved six miles farther west to Kengēri, leaving the

instantaneous effect of stupefaction occasioned by the free use of *Bhang*" (Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 24). See also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 426-427.

garrison of 8,000 men, appointed for the defence of the fort, under the new Killedār Bahadūr Khān, and for the Pettah, 2,000 regular infantry and 5,000 peons.²⁹

Early in the morning of the 7th, however, Lord Cornwallis, who had abandoned his intention of storming the *Pettah* or fortified town of Bangalore on the 5th night in view of its being reinforced during the day, renewed it, hoping thereby to retrieve the late disaster and to secure a large supply of forage and materials for the siege of the fort. The point of attack was a gate-way of considerable strength on the north face. A disposition was accordingly made with a reinforcement of Europeans and one of Indian infantry supported by an equal reserve under Col. Cockerel, with the field artillery and six battering guns under Lt. Col. Moorhouse, a distinguished officer of the Madras Artillery. The first barrier was soon carried. After a few discharges of an eighteen-pounder, the troops rushed to the bayonet. They secured this post and pushed forward; but whilst the field-pieces played on the inner gate, without effect, as it was barricaded with stones, a brisk fire from a mud bastion, from turrets, and from roofs of houses, made considerable slaughter amongst the Europeans. Lt. Col. Moorhouse fell, just as the heavy guns made their appearance. His exertions were followed up by Gen. Medows, and after an attack of six hours, the place was at length carried, with its rich stores of grain and bales of cotton and cloth. Astonished and indignant, Tipū moved from Kengēri with his whole force for the recovery of the *Pettah*. A long but thin column with numerous guns moved in sight of the English army, in a direc-

The action of the
7th March:

The storming of
the *Pettah* of Banga-
lore.

Tipū's efforts for
the recovery of the
Pettah.

29. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 427-430; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 204-205; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, I. I 25-28; see also and compare Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 180-181), who refers to Kengēri as "Tunkri,"

tion to turn its right; the cavalry made a concealed detour, to a position where it was well placed to take advantage of any forward movement. But the main strength of the infantry under Kumr-ud-din moved by a route concealed from view into the *Pettah*, with positive orders to recover its possession at all risks, Tipū himself being on the western glacis to inspect and animate their exertions. Early in the afternoon, he, as a feint, drew out his army to the north-east of the fort, and advanced towards the English camp with all the appearance of an intention to give battle, while his real design was to strengthen his troops, not yet dislodged by Col. Cockerel, with six thousand chosen men. Lord Cornwallis, suspecting the true motives of these demonstrations, strongly reinforced the *Pettah* and changed his disposition on the right. A distant cannonade was not returned, but in the meanwhile efforts for the recovery of the *Pettah* were made on a great scale, and for some time with considerable spirit. So long as the English troops continued to fire, Tipū's were not inferior. But this mode was soon abandoned by the Europeans for the never failing bayonet, and after a prolonged contest, in which the Mysoreans were successively driven from every quarter of the town in which they took post and even pursued across a part of the esplanade, they ultimately evacuated the *Pettah*.³⁰

80. Mackenzie, o.c., II. 29-33; Wilks, o.c., II. 431-434; Wilson, o.c., II. 205-206; see also and compare Kirmāni, o.c., 181-182. Wilks speaks of the loss in killed and wounded on the Mysore side during the retreat in the action of the 7th as "upwards of two thousand men," and of the casualties of the English on this day as "amounting to 181" (o.c., II. 433). Wilson also gives nearly the same figures (o.c., II. 206). But Mackenzie, an earlier authority (writing in 1793-1794), refers to the Mysoreans "losing from three to four hundred men" (o.c., II. 33). Mackenzie gives also the following description of the *Pettah* of Bangalore in 1791, which is pertinent to note here: "The pettah of Bangalore is of a circular form, and measures full three miles in circumference. All around, except where it is defended by the fort, it has a deep dry ditch, the inner side of which is in general faced with

The fort of Bangalore was now besieged by the English army, who collected the materials for their operations, such as fascines, stockades, etc., round the town and commenced raising batteries and continually attacked the fort during the next fortnight. The fort, entirely rebuilt with strong masonry by Haidar and Tipū, and of nearly an oval form, with round towers at proper intervals and five powerful cavaliers, contained a faussebray, a good ditch and covered way without palisades and some well finished places of arms, but the glacis imperfect in several places. No part was entirely destitute of the support of reciprocal fire, but in no part was there a perfect flanking defence. There were two gateways, one named the Mysore, the other the Delhi Gate; the latter, opposite the Pettah, overbuilt with the projection of traverses common to Indian forts. The Pettah or town, of great extent to the north of the fort, was surrounded

The siege of the fort of Bangalore, March 7-21, 1791.

Description of the fort.

stone. Besides an open communication towards the garrison, there are four entrances to this place, all defended by strong gates and bastions with embrasures for guns. Of these one is on the east face; two are to the northward, and one at the north-west quarter. A thick and almost impenetrable jungle of trees, bamboos, thorny bushes, and prickly shrubs, extends along the ditch, within which a lofty mud wall, with several turrets, ranges. To strengthen the inner works, this jungle, which is upwards of one hundred yards in depth, is secured by redoubts or fletches at each of the outer entrances. Many years ago these defences, on repeated occasions, baffled the whole Maratta force; nor does it appear hazardous to affirm, that they are still abundantly strong against any native power in the east. An idea of their sufficiency, even against our army, prevented the destruction of all grain and forage, which, without doubt, considerably facilitated the fall of Bangalore. Here there are many streets laid out with much regularity, and of great width; few towns in Hindustan can boast of better houses, or of richer inhabitants, if credit can be given to appearances; and although the people had removed the principal part of their wealth on the advance of the British army, still, bales of cloth, with immense quantities of cotton and grain, were strewn in every direction; indeed the booty dug up by individuals, out of concealments and deserted houses, strongly indicated ease, comfort, and happiness in former times." (Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 31-32).

by an indifferent rampart and excellent ditch, with an intermediate berm of near one hundred yards wide, planted with impenetrable and well grown thorns; and this defence was only intermitted exactly opposite the fort, where there was a slight barrier, and an esplanade of insufficient extent: the Pettah had several gates, protected by a sort of *fêche* at the end of each sortie outside the ditch, neither the fort nor the Pettah having draw-bridges.³¹

“ Few sieges ”, in the words of Wilks,³² “ have ever been conducted under parallel circumstances; a place not only not invested, but regularly relieved by fresh troops; a besieging army not only not undisturbed by field operations, but incessantly threatened by the whole of the enemy’s force. No day or night elapsed without some new project for frustrating the operations of the siege; and during its continuance, the whole of the besieging army was accoutred, and the cavalry saddled, every night from sun-set to sun-rise.” So steadily were the operations pushed through, and so just was the aim of the English artillery, that on the 18th, notwithstanding the strength of the wall, the breach was considered practicable. Early on the 19th, the four-gun battery opened, and a constant cannonade kept up on the breach and neighbouring towers, that of Tipū being much

31. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 430-431, 434; Mackenzie (*o.c.*, II. 38-36, 43-49), who gives a graphic account of the fort of Bangalore, its monuments, etc. Referring to the climate of Bangalore, he observes: “ The climate of Bangalore is extremely temperate and salubrious. Situated nearly in the centre of the peninsula, and abounding with reservoirs of water, the lands benefit by the monsoons of either coast, without being deluged by the weight of their fall; the soil is fruitful; and produces the necessaries of life in great plenty; cabbages, lettuce, and other European culinary wares, planted by British officers, thrive in the gardens all around without any extraordinary attention; and cypress, plantain, Guava, with trees and shrubberies of various descriptions, rising in clumps in all directions, afforded abundance of shade.” (Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 49). See also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 182.

32. *Ibid.*, 434.

slackened. The fire of the 20th widened the breach and rendered it much more easy of access, by the destruction of its defences, which, notwithstanding the cannonade, were still numerous and respectable.³³ By now Tipū perceived distinct indications of an early assault, and on the morning of the 21st, drew up his army on the heights to the south-west, to protect an advanced body with heavy guns, who had, on the preceding day, been observed opening embrasures in an old embankment, which, resting its left on an unfinished part of the south glacis, extended in a direction, and at a proper distance, to enflade and destroy the whole of the trenches and open sap, now advanced near the crest of the glacis, and no longer covered by the works of the Pettah. Whereupon, about eight o'clock, on the clearing of a fog, Lord Cornwallis instantly struck his camp, and commenced a very imposing demonstration of serious attack on the enemy's right: the guns, nearly prepared to open from the embankment, were soon perceived to be in motion to support the position on the heights, which Tipū determined to defend, and his Lordship had not the slightest intention to attack, unless compelled to it by a resumption of the serious danger which threatened his

Lord Cornwallis determines on the assault, March 21st.

approaches: the guns did return late in the evening to resume these preparations, and the crisis arising from this and other causes determined Lord Cornwallis to give the assault on the same night.³⁴

So far, Kumr-ud-dīn, agreeably to Tipū's orders, had, with his own division of troops, remained in the neighbourhood of Basavan-gudi (within a mile and a half of the Mysore Gate) to render all the assistance he could to the

Krishna Rao's action.

33. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 36.

34. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 434-435; see also and compare Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 37-38.

besieged. When, however, the walls of the fort were battered down, Tipū became very anxious and ordered that the fort should be evacuated. Krishṇa Rao of the *Tōshe-khāna* (Treasury), an officer of his, was accordingly sent thither, and he brought away all the property of the State (including guns, money, stores, etc.), which was despatched to Seringapatam, leaving only one detachment (*Kushoon*) and two thousand irregular troops (*Ahashām*) with their artillery in the fort. Then it was determined in consultation with Tipū's advisers that the defence of the fort should be left to Mons. Lally, and that Kumr-ud-dīn and Saiyid Sāhib with a strong force should be appointed to make a demonstration against the English army, while Tipū himself should march to arrest the progress of the armies of the Nizām and the Pēshwa. Accordingly M. Lally marched and had arrived at the tank or reservoir of the canal, while the officers in the trenches got their troops in readiness and all at once made their attack. Saiyid Hamīd, the Sipāhdār, and the Killedārs had allowed their men to go to their quarters and cook their victuals, and none remained at their posts except a few sentinels.³⁵

35. Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 182-183. According to Wilks (*o.c.*, II. 447), Tipū, afraid of the immediate fate of the capital, from a *coup de main*, without a regular siege, dispatched two confidential officers, Krishṇa Rao, the treasurer, and Mir Sādak, the Dewān, "to make immediate arrangements for the removal of the treasure, the harem and the families of his officers to Chittledroog" (Chitaldrug), but his mother dissuaded him from this step as betokening fear to the troops. Kirmāpi charges Krishṇa Rao with gross treachery in the subsequent transaction relating to the assault and capture of the fort of Bangalore. He is not supported by any other contemporary source nor by any later writer or annalist. According to him, Krishṇa Rao and his colleagues, becoming acquainted with Tipū's new plan, "gave a hint to the English *hircarrahs*; and they immediately apprised the guards in the trenches that now the time had arrived to make an assault and take the fort. Krishṇa Rao after this left the fort, and at the bank of the tank above mentioned, meeting M. Lally, took him by the hand and kept him in conversation about trifles" while the English proceeded with the assault of Bangalore, etc. The Royalist movement against Tipū was no doubt active about this time in Seringapatam, but Krishṇa Rao seems to have been unconnected with it,

"It was bright moonlight;" Wilks writes,³⁶ "Eleven was the hour appointed, and a whisper along the ranks was the signal appointed for advancing in profound silence:

The assault.

the ladders were nearly planted, not only to ascend the faussebray, but the projecting work on the right, before the garrison took the alarm, and just as the serious struggle commenced on the breach, a narrow and circuitous way along a thin shattered wall, had led a few men to the rampart, on the left flank of its defenders, where they coolly halted to accumulate their numbers; till sufficient to charge with the bayonet. The gallantry of the Killedār (Bahadūr Khān), who was in an instant at his post, protracted the obstinacy of resistance until he fell; but the energy of the assailants in front and flank at length prevailed. Once established on the ramparts, the flank companies proceeded as told off by alternate companies to the right and left, where the resistance was everywhere respectable, until they met over the Mysore Gate: separate columns then descended into the body of the place; and at the expiration of an hour, all opposition had ceased.

"On ascending the breach, a heavy column was observed on the left, advancing from the embankment described, to attack the assailants in flank and rear; but this also had been foreseen and provided for, and they were repulsed with great slaughter by the troops reserved for that special purpose; a similar column, lodged in the covered way on the right, had been dispersed at the commencement of the assault, by a body appointed to scour it, and draw off the enemy's attention from the breach; and at the moment the flank companies had met over the Mysore Gate, another column was perceived advancing along the sortie, to enter and reinforce the

36. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 435-436; see also and compare Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 39-42, 45; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 183-184.

garrison; but a few shot from the guns on the ramparts, announced that the place had changed the masters. The carnage had been severe, but unavoidable, particularly in the pressure of the fugitives at the Mysore Gate, which at length was completely choked..... ”

Tipū, who had warned the garrison to expect the assault, had appointed two heavy corps to fall upon both flanks of the assailants, and moving at night-fall from his camp at Jigani (about six miles to the south-west), conveyed his whole army to near the Bull temple (*Basavan-gudi*), within a mile and a half of the Mysore Gate, to support the place. But so rapidly was it carried that the fugitives crowding out of the gate gave him the first intimation of its capture. He had on every successive day of the siege drawn up an army of very superior numbers to the whole of the besiegers, with the intention of serious attack; he had as often returned without attempting anything of importance against a storming party, numerically inferior in numbers, which finally carried the place. The casualties on the English side in the whole siege did not amount to five hundred; the loss on the Mysore side was not ascertained, but upwards of

The importance of the event.

one thousand bodies were buried by the English the day after the storm.³⁷

Thus fell the fort of Bangalore, a momentous event “which finally fixed the war in the heart of the enemy’s dominions, as it put Britain in possession of probably the strongest and most important fortress in Mysore,”³⁸ celebrated throughout the Deccan as *Dar-ul-Sultanat* or Capital of the Empire.”³⁹

37. *Ibid.*, 437-438; see also and compare Mackenzie, l.c.; Wilson, o.c., II, 206; and Kirmāni, o.c., 184-185.

38. Mackenzie, o.c., II. 42.

39. *Poona Res. Corres.*, o.c., *Letter* No. 276, dated 2nd April 1791—Capt. Kennaway to Cornwallis. See also *Letter* No. 267 (dated 23rd March 1791—Cornwallis to Lieut. Steuart), where Cornwallis refers to the

On the morning of the 22nd, Tipū marched on to the westward, and placing the forest of Māgaḍi in his rear, encamped there. At day-light, on the same day, Lord Cornwallis, whose most urgent want after the capture of Bangalore was that of forage for the preservation of the surviving cattle, moved from the exhausted and horribly offensive encampment to the west of the fort. After repairing the breaches, depositing the battering guns, and organising an arsenal and artificers' yard to prepare for the siege of Seringapatam, he marched, on the 28th, in a northern direction, by the route of Yelahanka, towards Dēvanhalli.⁴⁰ For his immediate objects were to effect a junction with a body of the Nizām's Cavalry under Rāja Tejwant and with a reinforcement of troops and stores from the Karnātic (coming by way of Āmbūr), to recruit his stock of provisions and to refit the train of heavy artillery which was to move with the army for the reduction of Seringapatam in the latter end of April or early in May.⁴¹ By now Tipū had moved in the direction of Doḍballāpur, where the roads on which the hostile armies were marching crossed each other diagonally. Kumr-ud-dīn with a large force laboured hard to obstruct and defeat the English army, while Tipū's *Kuzzaks* constantly hung on their rear. Lord Cornwallis advanced with all possible expedition. The cattle, reduced to skeletons, were scarcely able to move their own weight; the soldiers, European and Indian, everywhere seized the drag-ropes and advanced the guns frequently at a run. Tipū

taking by assault of the fortress of Bangalore "on the night of the 21st."

40. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 438-440; see also and compare, Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 49, 54-55; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 185-186.

41. *Poona Res. Corres.*, *o.c.*, Letter No. 279, dated 4th April 1791—Cornwallis to J. Uthhoff; see also and compare Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 54-55; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 443; and Kirmāṇi, *l.c.*

personally covered his retreat with his horse. The English artillery successively dispersed them at every stand they attempted, and the infantry continued the pursuit until Tipū was compelled to break into several columns, on different roads, to effect his retreat, losing only one brass nine-pounder and some ammunition; and the English army halted after a march of twenty miles, and pitched their camp in a situation surrounded with excellent dry forage. This advantage continued as they advanced to the north, and the oxen recovered with the most surprising rapidity. Tipū, meanwhile, collected his scattered columns near Doḍballāpur on the same night after a march of twenty-six miles. But, not considering his position about eleven miles from the English encampment to be sufficiently distant, he resumed his march towards Śivaganga in a north-west direction. During March-April, Dēvanhalli, Chikballāpur and Ambājidrug successively surrendered without opposition to Lord Cornwallis. Tipū, disseminating false intelligence, marched himself in pursuit of the English army to Chikballāpur, and encamped in the neighbourhood of Sūlkunṭe. After a march of about seventy miles north, Lord Cornwallis remained stationary for five days, deceived by reports which induced him to abandon the hope of forming the junction with the Nizām's Cavalry, and to move south, on the 11th April, for the purpose of joining a convoy, advancing by the Pass of Ambūr. But, on the evening of his first retrograde march, he received more correct information which

The junction of the Nizām's Cavalry with the English army, April 13, 1791.

caused him to resume the northern route, and the junction was at length formed, at Kottapalli, on the 13th, when the united bodies moved in the direction of the convoy, which was itself escorted by a reinforcement of nearly four thousand men. Tipū projected a great effort to strike at this convoy, but was

foiled in his preparatory movements by the superior skill of his opponent; and the united bodies moved to Bangalore where they arrived on the 28th.⁴²

Since the outbreak of the war, it is necessary to note incidentally here, the desire of revenging the many insults offered to Nizām Ali and of recovering his ancient possessions was so strong in Hyderabad that the whole face of the country was covered with men in arms, with elephants, camels, horses and military equipments of every description. This unwieldy mass, moving south-west, at first to Pangal, after crossing the Krishna, reached Raichūr and pitched their encampment in that neighbourhood for about six weeks. From thence, proceeding towards the South, possession was taken of Adoni with other barrier stations, which offered little or no resistance. After laying waste the whole country, and being strengthened according to agreement by two battalions of Madras sepoys under Major Montgomery, the Nizām with his grand army turned his attention to the reduction of the fortresses of Cumbum and Kopbal.⁴³ The former surrendered on the 16th of November 1790, while the latter baffled the utmost exertions of Captain Andrew Read for a fairly long time. Meanwhile, the failure of Gen. Medows' campaign in the south of Mysore and the commencement of operations in the north by Lord Cornwallis brought the Nizām to the forefront. The comparatively short distance between Pangal (where Nizām Ali had encamped) and the theatre of the renewed operations facilitated a brisk correspondence, and the Nizām's minister Azīm-ul-umara promised whole-hearted and

42. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 441-443, see also and compare Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 207; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 55-56, 59; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 186-189, 194-195.

43. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 60-61; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 481-482; also *Poona Res. Corres.*, *o.c.*, Introduction, xiii. Mackenzie refers to Adoni as "Vanco" (*o.c.*, II. 60).

vigorous co-operation in the war. As early as the 4th of January 1791, the Nizām sent through the British Resident at his court (Captain John Kennaway) an assurance to the Governor-General to the effect that "as soon as the necessary particulars can be ascertained of the time when and the route by which your Lordship proposes a body of our forces shall penetrate into Tippoo's country from the Carnatic, the army under Asud Ali Khan, Mahomed Ameen [Arab] and Raja Baramal [Tējwant] shall proceed to whatever place your Lordship may appoint."⁴⁴ This firm assurance was belied by systematic procrastination under the temporizing and vacillating policy of the Nizām's court. On the 10th of February, the Hyderabad Minister assented to the junction of a body of cavalry—rated at 15,000 but really amounting to 10,000—with Lord Cornwallis. An army was assembled at Jammalmadagu (near Gunjicōtah) towards the beginning of February under Rāja Tējwant, with Asad Ali Khān as his second in command. In the meanwhile, the Governor-General had commenced his march, and a most urgent letter was sent on the 23rd of February to Tējwant to proceed with the whole of his cavalry (leaving artillery and infantry behind) with the utmost expedition and join the English army in the siege

44. Later Rāja Tējwant Bāramal was relieved in his diplomatic trust by Mir Ālam, "a man of real talent" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 470); and Hari Pant remained with Lord Cornwallis as the representative and plenipotentiary of the Mahratta government for political purposes (*Ibid.*). Mir Ālam afterwards went as envoy to Calcutta (*Ibid.*, 550). He was very popular with all classes in Hyderabad and when he died, the popular saying went: *Mir Ālum margaya, ghar ghar pāni hāgaya*. Mir Ālam died; every household is drowned in tears. Universal lament cannot be more appropriately expressed. Mir Ālam succeeded Arister Jah in 1804 as Minister at Hyderabad under Nizām Sikander Jah, son of Nizām Ali, who ruled from 1803 to 1829. Under him served the famous Chandū Lāl as his Assistant. Mir Ālam died in 1808, deeply lamented. Rāja Chandū Lāl succeeded him and was Minister till 1843. Mir Ālam's pay was a commission of annas three on the Rupee in the revenues of the State. On the average, this commission amounted to about Rs. 17½ lakhs per annum.

and reduction of Bangalore. But all the earnest solicitations and written remonstrances of Lieutenant Steuart failed to quicken Tējwant's movement. On the 12th March, he broke ground at Guramchirlah and then began to move at a snail's pace. On the first day he marched only two miles, and then halted for five days, resuming his march on the 17th. After five days, he reached Yempalli on the 22nd, after traversing a distance of only twenty-six miles and a half. Tējwant again halted for breath and wrote to the Governor-General to send a detachment of infantry to Chintāmanipet to facilitate his safe advance against the Mysorean force. In deference to his wishes, Cornwallis turned towards Chintāmanipet and informed the Rāja of his expected arrival there on the 7th or 8th April; but to his utter surprise, when he reached Chintāmanipet, Tējwant lurked behind and refused to move forward to effect the promised junction. Thus the Rāja's callous procrastination was matched by his cold perfidy. The Governor-General was evidently thrown into great perplexity, but luckily, on the 13th April, as we have seen, he at last effected his union with Tējwant at Kottapalli.⁴⁵

45. *Poona Res. Corres.*, o.c., *Introduction*, xiii-xv, based on *Letter* Nos. 180, 196, 227B, 231, 233, 245, 249, 252, 263, 269, 278, 284 and 291 (examined). *Letter* No. 291 refers to "Hodally" as the place of junction between the English army and the Nizām's cavalry. This is evidently a mis-spelling for Kottapalli, a village in the present Anantapur district, Madras, 84 miles north of Bangalore. Mackenzie refers to the place as "Cottapilly" (o.c., II. 56). Both Wilks and Mackenzie give fantastic, yet graphic, accounts of the Nizām's detachment under Rāja Tējwant (Wilks, o.c., II. 444-446; Mackenzie o.c., II. 56-57). "They were rated at 15,000, and really amounted to ten thousand men," writes Wilks, "well mounted on horses in excellent condition..... their first appearance was novel and interesting." He also speaks of "the total absence of every symptom of order, or obedience, or command, excepting groups collected round their respective flags; every individual an independent warrior, self-impelled, affecting to be the champion whose single aim was to achieve victory; scampering among each other in wild confusion.....," and observes, "The contemptible state of this cavalry may, in some degree, have arisen from the effeminacy and decline which marked

On the arrival of the combined forces at Bangalore,

Third Phase:

May-June 1791.

Renewed movements
of Tipū and Corn-
wallis.

Tipū, joined by the division from Gooty of Kutub-ud-dīn, took a strong position in the main road to Seringapatam, named the Channapatna road, supported by the hill forts of Rāma-

giri and Śivangiri, where he professed the intention of making a serious stand. Lord Cornwallis, who had intelligence of the advantages of this position, and of

Lord Cornwallis
marches on Seringa-
patam, May 8, 1791.

the industry with which forage and grain had been destroyed on that route, hoped to avoid some of those in-

conveniences by adopting the more circuitous route of Kānkānhalli, nearer the Cauvery. Accordingly, on the 3rd of May, at the head of an army consisting of one regiment of European cavalry, five regiments of Indian cavalry, three battalions of artillery, seven regiments of European infantry, ten battalions of coast sepoys, with seven battalions of sepoys from Bengal, and fourteen thousand irregular horse, he marched on from Bangalore in a westerly direction by the route of Biḍadi and Chan-

the general character of the government to which they belonged' (Wilks, o.c., II. 444-445). See also Vol. II. Ch. XII, pp. 364-367 of this work, where Wilks' account is dealt with at greater length while comparing the Mysore and Mughal armies of the period. Mackenzie speaks of the Nizām's reinforcement "which consisted of about fifteen thousand fighting men, all on horseback", as having "set order and discipline at defiance," etc. (l.c.) But we have a *Letter* from Lt. Steuart to Cornwallis, referring to the state of Nizām's cavalry under Rāja Tējwant, where he observes: "I attended the Rajah on the march and have no hesitation in saying he commands the best cavalry I have seen in India: they are very respectable not only on account of the excellence of the horse and equipment of the men but the character of their Chiefs, many of whom are much more famous for military enterprise than for rank or family; the best proof of money for present wants having been supplied is in the ready obedience of the whole to move without prevaricating for advances or arrears due to them..... My Lord, from the view I have had of this army, I, by no means, think it unequal to oppose Tippoo's whole cavalry." (Poona Res. Corres., o.c., *Letter* No. 245, dated March 12, 1791—Lt. Steuart to Cornwallis). Wilks and Mackenzie seem evidently to be more critical of the Nizām's military system of the time than of its component parts or its state of actual efficiency.

napātṇa. Turning south-east, the army pressed onward, and after passing through Kabbāldurg and leaving Kānkānhallī and Sultānpet in the rear, took possession of Maḷavallī. The road all along was much intersected by rivulets and ravines, and the thunderstorms in the evening and by night were accompanied by torrents of rain. The army marched, as usual, before day-light, and from local circumstances always by the left. The exhaustion of the cattle daily increased, and the quantity daily augmented by stores was destroyed, because they could not be carried on, although a large and increasing proportion was dragged by the troops; and the pressure of Tipū's infantry and Kuzzaks, posted in ambush, was rather active than powerful, who, harassing the army in the front and the rear, gained signal advantages over them, capturing almost every night hundreds of *Banjāras* with their bullocks laden with corn, and cutting off their noses and ears. In vain Lord Cornwallis arranged an orderly disposition of the line of march and pointed out to Tējwant that detachments of bodies of horse should be sent out into the open country along the flanks of his army with orders to drive Tipū's small parties from the neighbourhood of the army, and to intercept everything going to and coming out of Seringapatam on the roads leading to it from Channapaṭṇa and Śivaganga. The entire route of the Governor-General had been converted into a desolate waste, all the villagers and cattle being driven into the island of Śivasamudram and every vestige of supplies or forage destroyed. In this state, with the followers already in the greatest distress for grain, his Lordship, proceeding from Maḷavallī, at last reached Arakere, about nine miles east of Seringapatam and overlooking Kari-ghatta, on the 13th of May.⁴⁶

Reaches Arakere,
May 13, 1791.

46. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 451-453; Wilson, *l.c.*; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 87-93; Poona Res. Corres., *o.c.*, Letter Nos. 311 and 312, dated 8th and 10th May

The quantity of water in the river Cauvery at Arakere, at this time of the year, was found to be discouraging to the prospect of any effective operation against Seringapatam, and the passage of the river below one of the masonry dams near the English encampment was rocky and impracticable. Lord Cornwallis, therefore, resolved to move to Kannambāḍi, about eight miles above Seringapatam, for the double purpose of fording the river there and forming a junction with the Bombay army under General Abercromby, who, after taking Cannanore (December 14, 1790), had commenced his march to the eastward with four European regiments, five sepoy battalions and a suitable artillery in February 1791. By then he had, after securing the zealous allegiance of the Rāja of Coorg, ascended through his territory and had already taken possession of Piriyaṭṭa, about forty miles west of Seringapatam. Tipū, who had thus far avoided a general action with the English army, being goaded to risk a battle for the capital, had in the meanwhile taken up a strong position with the island and the fort of Seringapatam in his rear, and raised batteries on the north side of the island to oppose the passage of

1791.—Cornwallis to Tējwant. See also and compare Kirmāṇi (o.c., 200-201), who, referring to the "cutting off the noses and ears" during the harassing warfare carried on by Tipū's troops on the first march of the English army towards Seringapatam (1791), writes: "And whoever brought in a nose, received a *hoon* or pagoda (as a reward); any one who brought in an ear, received a *purtab* (or half a pagoda); for every bullock with his load, five rupees; and for every horse two *hoons* were given." This passage affords interesting evidence of the latest instance in Mysore history (1791), when the custom of cutting off noses and ears was resorted to by the Mysore soldiery. Mackenzie refers to Cornwallis' march from Bangalore on the 4th of May (o.c., II. 90); Wilks tacitly assumes 3rd May as the date of his Lordship's departure (o.c., II. 451); but we have a letter from Vasantapuram (near Bangalore), dated 3rd May 1791, where the Governor-General speaks of his having that day moved his heavy guns from Bangalore and advanced six or seven miles from thence on his way to Seringapatam (see *Poona Res. Corres.*, o.c., Letter No. 307—Cornwallis to Captain Kennaway).

the English. For there was no hope of striking an effectual blow against General Abercromby, except by a general action with Lord Cornwallis, which should cripple his equipments, and compel him to return for provisions to Bangalore. Lord

Tipū opposes the English at Karighaṭṭa, May 14, 1791.

Cornwallis planned a night attack to turn his left flank and cut off his retreat to Seringapatam, but the bursting of a tremendous thunderstorm threw the troops into confusion. All hopes of surprise were thus at an end, but the Governor-General resolved to bring Tipū to action if possible, and continued his advance. Tipū, on his approach, changed front to the left, his right being covered by a deep ravine, and his left resting upon the lower spurs of the Karighaṭṭa hill. Lord Cornwallis, after crossing the ravine, which took nearly two hours, drew up his army in battle array, and a general engagement

The English victory on the 15th.

ensued, on the 15th, in which the English were eventually victorious, and took four pieces of brass cannon, and Tipū's forces, driven from every point, were forced to take refuge on the island under the guns of Seringapatam where they could not be followed.⁴⁷

The allied troops rested in the camp at Arakere till the 18th of May, when by two successive marches by a circuit of twenty miles, they moved to Kannambāḍi.

The allied troops move to Kannambāḍi.

But the lateness of their arrival, the severity of the monsoon, the deficiency of provisions, and the inactivity of the allies of the English, discovered

47. *Ibid.*, 453-461, 472, 478; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 207-208; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 93-102; Poona Res. Corres., *o.c.*, Letter No. 325, dated May 31, 1791—Cornwallis to the Nizām. See also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 201-203. Wilks and Mackenzie give detailed accounts of the operations of the 14th and 15th of May. These have been condensed in the *Mys. Gaz.* (II. iv. 2597), which is adopted here.

the futility of attempting the siege of Seringapatam, until a more favourable season, fresh equipments and an addition of strength should afford better prospects of success. On the 20th, Lord Cornwallis, after receiving

Lord Cornwallis
relinquishes the
attempt against Seri-
ngapatam, May 20,
1791.

official reports of the general wretched condition of the public cattle of the army, due to want of forage, saw the impossibility of moving the heavy guns and stores from the spot where they then were; felt the conviction that the accompaniment of this cumbrous impediment at such a season was from the first a false measure, and saw the necessity of relinquishing entirely the plan of the campaign, in which Gen. Abercromby had been instructed to co-operate. Accordingly, on the 21st, the General was directed, "after descending the ghauts, with the troops under his command, to put them into cantonments on the coast of Malabar during the rains, and until the proper season should return, for recommencing our operations". Thus necessitated to abandon the enterprize, orders were issued on the 22nd to burst three twenty-four and eight eighteen-pounders, to bury and destroy all military stores for which conveyance could not be procured, and to distribute the whole of the public grain amongst the troops. Meanwhile a large body of the Mysoreans was observed moving westward against the Bombay army from Seringapatam, and two brigades under Col. Stuart were sent across the river, on the 24th, to intimidate them. Before receiving any authentic account of Gen. Abercromby's march, however, these brigades were recalled and Lord Cornwallis was driven to the necessity of moving from Kannambāḍi.⁴⁸ For the entire

48. Mackenzie, o. c., II. 102-104; Poona Res. Corres., l. c.; see also and compare Wilks, o. c., II. 461-463; Wilson, o. c., II. 209; and Kirmāṇi, o. c., 203-204.

The state of his
camp at Kannam-
bādi.

ground on which his Lordship had encamped had become a horrible scene of pestilential air caused by the increasing mortality of cattle, while the total want of provisions, wood and forage and the cries of famine from all parts of the camp had augmented his difficulties. A seer of rice was sold nominally at the price of four rupees, though none ever saw a grain; and rupees three was the price of a seer of flour of *rāgi*; a seer of clarified butter was sold at rupees eight and a chicken was rated at a *hun*, but even at that price these were not procurable. Among the variety of untried expedients for conveying stores and provisions on leaving Bangalore, that of issuing to the Indian troops three times the quantity of grain they usually carried, was the least likely to succeed. The experiment was made, in the hope that means would be found by individuals, among their followers and friends, of conveying the surplus quantity of an article for their future subsistence. But many sepoys could hardly resist the temptations of hunger, that they were actually without food before half the calculated period had elapsed. The ration of rice to the fighting men had now for some time been necessarily reduced to one half; the appearance of the sepoys, living exclusively on vegetable food, indicated a gradual but very perceptible wasting and prostration of strength. Many followers had actually died of hunger, and more were verging in various degrees to the same extremity; the animal food would, under any other circumstances, have been rejected with disgust; and a bleak wind and continued drizzling rain had more than its usual influence on constitutions shaken by other causes, and greatly added to the sufferings of the troops⁴⁹.

49. Wilks, o. c., II-463-464; Kirmāni, o. c., 203. Kirmāni also adds: "The Europeans could not support this scarcity of food, and, therefore, according to the orders of their officers, the gun bullocks were

On the 26th, Lord Cornwallis commenced his return march towards Bangalore, there to rest until the rains were over. At the same time Gen. Abercromby was forced to return to the West Coast and eventually canton his troops at

Lord Cornwallis commences his return march, May 26, 1791.

Billiapatam, Cannanore, Dharmapatam and Tellicherry (June 10), while Tipū had a salute fired at Seringapatam to announce the capture of the General's battering train by Saiyid Sāhib. On the same day, at the close of the Governor-General's first march from Kannambādi, the advanced guard of the long expected two divisions of the Mahratta army under Haripant and Paraśurām Bhao, consisting of 40,000 horse and upwards of twenty pieces of cannon, accompanied by two Bombay battalions under Captain Little, suddenly made their appearance on the historic field of Chinkurli (near Mēlkōte), seven miles north of Kannambādi. A junction being

The junction of the Mahratta Cavalry with the English army at Chinkurli, May 26-28, 1791.

effected on the 28th, the sufferings of the main body of troops were somewhat relieved by the ample, though exorbitantly priced, supplies the allies

had brought with them⁵⁰.

Thus ended the Cornwallis campaign of 1791.

Reflections on the Cornwallis campaign of 1791.

Tipū's deficiencies.

Though the Mysorean army was "vastly superior in strength" to the British army, Tipū, as one critic, Lt. Col. L. H. Thornton, puts it, showed "a curious lack of decision"

during the latter's first advance on Bangalore (March

killed and their flesh served to sustain their strength for some time" (Kirmāpi, o. c., 203-204).

50. *Ibid*, 464-468; Wilson, l. c., and Mackenzie, o. c., II. 104-108, 111-118; see also and compare Moor, *Narrative*, 72-73; Dirom, *Narrative*, 4, 9-10; Poona *Res. Corres.*, l. c.; and Kirmāpi, o. c., 204-206. Moor specifically refers to the junction of the allied armies on the 28th of May 1791. According to Wilks and Mackenzie, the junction was effected between the 26th and the 28th of May.

1791) and personally failed to prevent its capitulation.⁵¹ This was no doubt a matter of advantage to Lord Cornwallis, who, however, was, from the beginning, conscious

of his own limitations in regard to the next stage of the campaign, namely, the

advance on Seringapatam (April-May

1791). "There were now," Thornton observes,⁵² "two

courses open to Lord Cornwallis. He might defer his

advance on Seringapatam till the cold weather had set

in. In the meantime he could place his supply and

transport arrangements on a sound basis, and he could

render secure his communications with the Carnatic

and with the Nizam's and the Mahratta's territory.

The second course open to the Commander-in-Chief

was to advance without further delay on Seringapatam.

This course, as Lord Cornwallis well knew, would be

attended with very grave risk. His supply service was in

a most precarious state. Since the opening of the

campaign, no less than twelve thousand bullocks had

perished, and this loss had been but very partially made

up by the arrival of Colonel Oldham's convoy. The

British communications with the Carnatic and with the

allies' territory were rendered more insecure by the

existence, situated on their flanks, of many strongholds

still garrisoned by Tippoo's forces. Even Oldham's

convoy, escorted as it was by seven hundred Europeans

and four thousand five hundred native troops, had been

robbed of one thousand three hundred bullocks laden

with supplies on their journey from the Carnatic.

Finally, the Mahrattas were known to be busily

engaged two hundred and eighty miles away at Darwar,

and their active co-operation in an attack on Seringa-

patam was very doubtful. None the less Lord Corn-

wallis chose the second course, hazardous though it

51. L. H. Thornton, *Light and Shade in Bygone India*, 155-161.

52. *Ibid*, 166-167.

was. He has told us the reason why. He felt that both the situation in Europe and the state of the Company's finances in India demanded an early termination of hostilities. The risk, he knew, was great, but he considered that circumstances justified him in accepting it. To mitigate the risk, the Commander-in-

Commissariat
arrangements.

Chief appealed to the officers to reduce their baggage and to place at his disposal their surplus bullocks for the carriage of shot and stores for the coming siege of Seringapatam. This appeal was met in a most generous spirit, and two thousand five hundred bullocks were transferred from private to public use. The officers' tentage was also cut down by half. Further assistance was obtained from the followers of the Nizam's contingent, who undertook to carry five thousand eighteen-pounder shot, reckoned equal to eight hundred bullock loads, taking into consideration how weak these animals were. The followers of the Anglo-Indian army also helped by carrying a certain number of eighteen-pounder and twenty-four pounder shot. The native troops were served out with as much rice as they could carry, and this was considered to be sufficient to last them till they should arrive at Seringapatam. Actually, the not unnatural result of this dangerous expedient was that the sepoy had either consumed or sold a large proportion of their load before they had completed half the journey to Seringapatam."

Other circumstances also, as we have seen, stood in the way of his Lordship, which Thornton conveniently refers to as "friction" making itself felt in some form or other. One such was the terrific thunderstorm which broke out during the march of the Grand Army towards Seringapatam, on the night of 14th May, to launch the attack on Tipū's left flank. Though Lord

Other circum-
stances in the way.

Cornwallis pressed on, it must have been exasperating to him in the extreme to think "how complete his success would have been were it not for the weather, and the weather would have been all in his favour had not the Nizam's contingent wasted those precious ten days in April" (*i.e.*, after the siege of Bangalore).⁵³ Another circumstance was the strange conduct of Tējwant Singh, the leader of the Nizām's contingent, during Lord Cornwallis' main attack on the 15th forenoon. "All was going well, and four of the enemy's guns had already been taken," writes Thornton,⁵⁴ "when friction with its malicious influence again asserted itself. Up from the rear came blundering the Nizam's ten thousand horsemen, and surged in a disorderly mass directly across the front of the British advance, effectually stopping all further progress, and allowing Tippoo to withdraw his shaken army in safety across the river in Seringapatam." Lord Cornwallis at first attributed the action of Tējwant to an error of judgment, but the scrutiny of papers captured at Seringapatam in 1799 has shown that it was less misguided zeal than "calculated treachery," which affected the progress of Lord Cornwallis that day. Few commanders could have stood in more urgent need of victory than he did then and the disappointment for the time being must have been immense, though he eventually came out successful. Among other factors in the situation were the arduous march of the Grand Army from Seringapatam to Kannambādi (18th-20th May), the lamentable shortage of transport animals and supplies of provisions, and the prevalence of pestilence in the army.⁵⁵ The cumulative effect of all these circumstances was that it deterred his Lordship from reaping the full benefits of the earlier and yet fortuitous fall of Bangalore.

53. See *Ibid.*, 169, 170.

54. *Ibid.*, 171-172.

55. *Ibid.*, 179-174.

CHAPTER XV.

KHĀSĀ-CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VIII,

1776-1796—(contd.)

War with Tipu Sultan (*The Third Mysore War, 1790-1792*):

Third Phase: May-June 1791 (*contd.*): Circumstances connected with the junction of the Mahrattas with the English (May 1791); their advance on the South, May-June 1790; Dharwar, their first objective—The siege of Dharwar, September 1790-March 1791; a protracted siege—Renewed operations; reinforcement under Col. Frederick, January 1791—Premature assault, repulse, chagrin and death of Col. Frederick, March 13, 1791—The capitulation of Dharwar, March-April 1791—The capitulation and after—Parasuram Bhau advances to Seringapatam—Tipu's renewed negotiation for accommodation during the campaign, February-May 1791—*Fourth Phase*: June-December 1791: Movements of the allied armies, June-July 1791—Progress of the main army under Lord Cornwallis, July-November 1791: reduction of Rayakota, etc., July-September 1791—The siege and capitulation of Nandidurg, September 22-October 19, 1791—Operations in the South-East, October-November 1791; reduction of Pennagara, October 31, 1791; attack on and retreat from Krishnagiri, November 7, 1791—Operations in the South, June-November 1791: The position at Coimbatore—The siege and defence of Coimbatore, June-August 1791; the repulse of the assailants—Tipu detaches Kumr-ud-din to Coimbatore, September 1791; a stiff siege; the capitulation of Coimbatore, November 3, 1791—*Fifth Phase*: December 1791-March 1792: Operations to the north of Seringapatam: The topography of Savandurg—The siege and capitulation of Savandurg, December 10-21, 1791—Reduction of Hutridurg, Ramagiri, Sivangiri, etc., December 23-27, 1791—Progress of the Allies: (1) Nizam Ali: siege and capitulation of Kopbal, October 1790-April 1791; surrender of Bahadurbanda; surrender of

Ganjikota, etc., May 1791—The siege and blockade of Gurramkonda, September-December 1791—The tragic end of Hafiz Farid-ud-din, November 22, 1791—Further movements of the Nizam's main army; joins Lord Cornwallis, January 25, 1792—(2) The Mahrattas: Parasuram Bhau's activities in the north-west of Mysore since July 8, 1791; Lord Cornwallis' uneasiness—The campaign of 1792: The march of the confederates to Seringapatam, January 25, 1792—Their route—The night attack on Seringapatam, February 6, 1792—The fortified camp; redoubts—Tipu's army—The island—The order of attack: Right Division; Centre Division; Left Division—Movements of the Right Division—Movements of the Centre Division: Front Party—Centre Party—Rear Party; repulse of the Sultan's forces—Lord Cornwallis retires to the Karighatta hill—Movements of the Left Division—Operations on the 7th; the attempt of the Mysoreans to retake the Sultan's Redoubt; their repulse—Further operations; the Mysoreans driven out of the *Pettah*—Casualties—The Mysoreans retire into the island—The Sultan surprised—Efforts at negotiation—General Abercromby joins the Main Army, February 16, 1792; renewed dispositions for the siege of Seringapatam, February 19-22, 1792—Tipu's position critical: personally superintends the defence of Seringapatam—Danger of doubtful allegiance within—Attacked at the vulnerable points without—Tipu continues negotiations; the ultimatum of the confederates, February 22, 1792—The Preliminary Articles signed, February 23, 1792—The armistice and after; the reception of the hostages, February 26, 1792; protracted negotiations re: the Definitive Treaty of Peace; the claim for the cession of Coorg: the case for and against—Tipu prevaricates; preparations for a renewed attack on Seringapatam; the *Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam* concluded, March 19, 1792—The ceded territories—Prize-money and gratuities—Lord Cornwallis' policy criticised: a defence, by Lt. Mackenzie—And by Major Dirom—Wilks' opinion as a critic of policy—Lewin B. Bowring on the subject—Lt. Col. L. H. Thornton—And Dr. V. A. Smith; General

Medows' view, in the light of the treaty of 1782; the story of the attempted suicide of General Medows; Kirmani's circumstantial account of it—Fresh attempt at Restoration of the Royal Family, c. March-May 1791: Kirmani's account of the alleged British connection with the Loyalists—Krishna Rao of the *Toshe-Khane* suspected of treachery to Tipu at Seringapatam; Wilks' account of his victimisation and death—Reflections on the event—Kirmani's account—Radical difference between the versions of Wilks and Kirmani.

THE Mahrattas, like Nizām Alī, ostensibly took the field at the same period as the English. The

War with Tipū
Sultān (*The Third
Mysore War, 1790-
1792*).

Third Phase:
May-June 1791
(contd).

Circumstances
connected with the
junction of the
Mahrattas with the
English (May 1791).

Their advance on
the South, May-
June 1790.

detachment of two battalions of sepoy with one company of European, and two of Indian artillery, under Captain Little, destined to act with the Mahratta army according to treaty, embarked at Bombay in May 1790, and entering the river of Jaigarh, nearly two degrees to the southward, proceeded in the same boats as far as the river was navigable, and then debarking, ascended the ghāts of Amba in the very depth of the monsoon. On the 26th of June, they joined the army under Paraśurām Bhau Patwardhan (of Miraj) at Coompta, a place about fifty miles south-east from the head of the Pass. The removal of an hostile and dangerous frontier was of the utmost importance to the security of his own possessions; and the virulence of political hostility was aggravated by the personal violation perpetrated on one of his family after the capture of Nārgund in 1785. The interests of the confederacy in that quarter could not, therefore, have been committed to Mahratta hands more likely to conduct them with earnestness and zeal, the force under

his command having been rated at 20,000 horse and 10,000 infantry. The first national object was the recovery of those provinces between the five rivers (*i.e.*, Krishna, Gutprabha, Malprabha, Warda and Tungabhadra), obtained by the house of Haidar during the civil war of Raghōba; and of these provinces Dharwar was deemed the capital, and principal military depot, situated on a plain, with the usual annexation of a large fortified town, but both constructed with as much care and strength as is compatible with an entire ignorance of scientific principles.¹

The defence of Dharwar and the military government of the province were committed to Badr-u-Zamān Khān, the most respectable officer in the Mysorean service, with a division of five regular *Kushoons*, furnished with a complete field equipment of guns, and an unlimited command over the irregular infantry of the province, a force which Paraśurām Bhau could not, with any military prudence, leave in his rear. The rivers being full and the season unfavourable for military operations, he did not commence his march from Coompta until the 3rd of August, and arrived before Dharwar on the 18th of September. In spite of

The siege of Dharwar, September 1790 - March 1791.

A protracted siege. the opportunity of receiving better counsel, the old Mahratta tactic of firing into the town from a distant eminence during the day, and withdrawing the guns at night, was continued for about forty days. On the 30th of October, Paraśurām Bhau moved to occupy a more advanced position on a different face of the fort. The actual strength of the garrison at this time was estimated at 7,000 regular firelocks, and 3,000 irregulars, and Badr-u-Zamān Khān, with about 2,000

1. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 488-484; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 196-197.

men and four guns, moved out to an exterior position, to prevent the occupation of the intended ground. He was attacked in this position, and as might be expected, the weight of the service fell on the English detachment; but although Paraśurām Bhau obstinately refused to adopt the suggestion of commencing the operation by a false attack with his own troops on the flank of the position, he performed with tolerable accuracy, all that he engaged to execute; and Badr-u-Zamān and his troops were dislodged and routed with considerable loss and the capture of three of their guns. ²

2. *Ibid.*, 484-485. Referring to Badr-u-Zamān Khān, mentioned above, says an official letter: "As to the personal character of Buddur-al-Zuman Khan, he is reputed to be a sensible, well informed old man, whose professional abilities and conduct render him worthy of the trust his master has reposed in him. All the negotiations during the last war between Tippoo and the Marrattas were carried on by him, and he concluded the treaty of peace upon such favourable terms, when Tippoo would have ceded several places on this side of the Tumbuddra, had the Marratta general stood out for them and not retired so precipitately. In reward for this service, he was appointed to the command of Tippoo's northern frontier with a jagheer of twelve lacks for the pay of 5,000 troops. He was formerly in the service of the Nabobs of Curpa, in great esteem, and Bueshy of horse; when upon the reduction of that country, Hyder took him into his service and immediately gave him the command of 8,000 men. The great friends he has at Tippoo's court, and a younger brother continually attending the Nabob's person have maintained him thus long in his present command, in which he has been lately confirmed. He has a daughter married to a nephew of Tippoo's, Burhan-ud-deen Khan, in whom the Nabob puts the greatest trust" (*Poona Res. Corres.*, III. Letter No. 64, dated 1st February 1790, addressed to Malet). Lt. Edward Moor speaks of him, at the time of surrender of Dharwar, as "a man of good appearance, of middle stature, about fifty or fifty-five years of age," with "a handsome beard, and a scar, apparently from a wound, on his left cheek," dressed in "white, quite plain and very neat," etc., (*Moor, Narrative*, 87-88).

Badr-u-Zamān Khān was a Navāyat. Kirmāni says that his father and grandfather were known to Haidar and esteemed by him. He is said to have come to Haidar, shortly after his victory over Khapḍe Rao, "from the vicinity of Runjangurh," with a view to enter his service. Haidar was glad to welcome and appoint him as Bakshi to the Regular Infantry *cuchēri* on Rs. 500 a month (Kirmāni, *Neshawmi-Hyduri*, 108). On the reduction of the Pālegār of Chikballāpur and the taking of Nandidurg (called by Kirmāni "hill fort of Nandi"), Badr-u-Zamān Khān was appointed Governor of the latter newly captured fort (*Ibid.*, 124). In this capacity, he

The same process of ridiculous annoyance by day, and reciprocal repose by night, was continued until the 13th of December, when an attack by escalade was made on the town, headed of course by the English detachment, whose commander was the first to ascend the ladders, and was wounded. The service was completely executed, and the English returned to their camp. But the Mahrattas who dispersed for plunder accidentally set fire to the town in several places, and Badr-u-Zamān, availing himself of the consequent confusion, sallied, drove them out, and re-occupied the town, the Mahrattas having previously carried off three guns as trophies. It was again carried on the 18th; but in conformity to the usual practice, even the guns placed in battery in the town, were uniformly withdrawn at night. Captain Little had at a very early period reported the total inefficiency of the means possessed by Paraśurām Bhau for the reduction of Dharwar; but the precise nature of that inefficiency either was not accurately understood at Bombay, or was not adequately remedied.

Reinforcement
under Col. Frederick,
January 1791.

A reinforcement was ordered from that place, consisting of one regiment of European infantry, one battalion of sepoys, a considerable augmentation of

commanded the whole of Chikballāpur in the capacity of Faujdār (*Ibid*, 155). When Pēshwa Mādhava Rao first invaded Mysore, he gave up the keys of Chikballāpur and departed to Cuddapah (*Ibid*). When Haider attacked Cuddapah, he was serving Abdul Halīm Khān, Nawāb of Cuddapah. Through his brother-in-law, Ali-Zamān Khān, he had an assurance of safety sent to him (*Ibid*, 291). When he came over, he was restored to the office of Bakhshi (of Regular Infantry) (*Ibid*). Badr-u-Zamān Khān was present at the taking of Ārpi. He raised a strong battery to the westward of the fort, and in one day fired a number of cannon-shot into the place. Husain'Ali Khān, who held it, surrendered it (*Ibid*, 283). He became subsequently Faujdār of Nagar. His daughter was married, much against his will, to Burhan-ud-dīn, the son of Lāla Mean, brother-in-law of Tipū. Lāla Mean took part in the fight at Chinkurji and fell there (*Ibid*, 85).

European artillery-men, *but no cannon or stores*, and three officers of engineers, under the orders of Col. Frederick, who arrived before Dharwar on the 2nd of January 1791.³

Independently of the insufficiency of the cannon furnished by the Mahrattas, so precarious and unskilful were the arrangements of their military departments, that there was frequently a want of ammunition at the most critical periods, and no operation of a siege could be undertaken with the least certainty that any one material required would be ready at the period promised. A deficiency of ammunition, which could not be supplied for a considerable time, induced Col. Frederick to attempt an assault, at an earlier period than was otherwise expedient, on the 7th of February. The arrangements were well advanced, the dry ditch was filled with fascines, and the assailants were on the point of issuing from the advanced cover with the confidence of terminating their labours, when it was found necessary to abandon the attempt. The materials of the fascines were rather dry; the experienced Killedâr had sent some trusty men to creep along the ditch and lodge a few lighted portfires among them at the proper time, and before the storming party could have crossed, their fascine causeway was a mass of flame. It was the 1st of March before the expected supply of ammunition arrived, and the regular approaches were resumed, but Col. Frederick, sinking under the feelings arising from sacrifice of reputation in an important command, on which high expectations had been founded, without any of the ordinary means of commanding success, died on the 13th of March, and the command devolved on Major Sartarius of the engineers.⁴

3. *Ibid.*, 485.

4. *Ibid.*, 485-486.

Paraśurām Bhau had by this time received a few additional heavy guns from Poona; but the same disregard of precision in the performance of a promise continued to render it equally impracticable to pursue with consistency any fixed series of measures. The approaches, however, continued to advance, disturbed, as during the whole service, by frequent sorties. An extensive lodgment was made on the crest of the glacis by both the Mahrattas and the English; but the incessant disappointments regarding every material and every supply, did not inspire any sanguine confidence of early success. Private intelligence, however, indicates an approaching scarcity of provisions in the place, and on the 30th of March, after being invested for six months and twelve days, the Killedār proposed to treat for its surrender. The intelligence of the capture of Bangalore on the 21st, had, in this as in every part of the dominions of Mysore, produced the most powerful influence on public opinion; but the veteran Killedār professed to have been actuated by no motive but the impossibility of retaining the place for want of provisions, and the desire of joining Tipū with his division, while still capable of efficient service. The last of the garrison, with their arms and ammunition, colours flying, and three field-pieces, evacuated the place on the 4th of April. The casualties of the English, throughout the service, were found to have amounted to about five hundred, and those of the Mahrattas were computed at three thousand.⁵

Badr-u-Zamān Khān, apprehensive of treachery, encamped and marched his troops in a hollow square, with all the precautions of being surrounded by enemies, and unprotected by the obligations of public faith. And on

The capitulation of
Dharwar, March-
April 1791.

The capitulation
and after.

5. *Ibid.*, 486-487. See also and compare Kirmāñi (o.c., 197), whose account is brief.

the 8th, the British troops, who were unanimous in their admiration of his respectable defence, heard with astonishment and grief, that his corps had been attacked, plundered, and nearly destroyed; and that he himself, covered with wounds, was sent as a prisoner to the hill fort of Nārgund. The suggestion that the capitulation was violated has not been proved, and should be held to be not established in view of the evidence recorded to the contrary by Wilks himself on the testimony of a Mysorean officer, which has been later confirmed by independent evidence. The reinforcement from Bombay, which had been conducted to Dharwar by Col. Frederick, commenced its return immediately after the surrender of the place, but before reaching the coast, the Indian battalion was ordered to return, at the request of Paraśurām Bhau, and formed a junction near Seringapatam, with the original detachment under Captain Little, now consisting of three battalions, which continued to serve with the Mahrattas until the conclusion of the war.⁶

6. *Ibid.*, 487-488; also Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, '197-198. As to the alleged violation by the Mahrattas of Badr-u-Zamān Khān's capitulation, Wilks further observes: "No official explanation has ever been published of this transaction, and in the prints of the day, it was treated as a simple treachery, perpetrated for the purposes of plunder. The Mahrattas affirm that Badr-u-zeman Khan had stipulated to surrender the fort, with its guns and stores in their actual condition: that after the capitulation was settled, he caused the powder in the magazine to be ruined by water, and the stores to be destroyed to the extent that his time and means admitted; and they contend that they were justified in retaliating the breach of the capitulation. This statement was denied by the party accused; but the author must add, as a tribute of truth, that it was circumstantially related to him by a Mysorean officer, who was wounded on that occasion, and who had, as he affirmed, been personally employed in the destruction of the stores" (Wilks, *l.c.*). See also Grant-Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, II. 201; and Poona Res. Corres., *o.c.*, Letter Nos. 293 and 297, for a similar reference to the breach of the articles of capitulation on the part of Badr-u-Zamān Khān himself as the cause of his subsequent arrest and imprisonment at the hands of the Mahrattas. In June 1792, Lord Cornwallis urged the court of Poona for Badr-u-Zamān's release under the *Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam* (March 19, 1792), and this was not effected till July following (see Poona Res. Corres., *o.c.*, Letter Nos. 457-458, and 461).

The surrender of Dharwar was followed by the early possession of everything north of the Paraśurām Bhau advances to Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis having communicated to the Mahratta court his fixed determination to advance against Seringapatam and his expectation of being joined by their army before that place, Paraśurām Bhau crossed the Tungabhadra at Harihar, and advanced by the direct western road from that place, overcoming the resistance opposed to him at Rāmagiri, Mayakonda and other inferior posts early in May; while another army from Poona, under Hari Pant, proceeded by the more eastern route of Gooty, Rāyadurg, Harapanahalli and Sira, preserving a parallel line and equal advance, until the junction already referred to was effected with the English army near the field of Chinkurli, an omen which contributed in no small measure to the confidence of that people in a favourable termination of the war. To the north and north-west, therefore, the Mahrattas had not only recovered their former possessions beyond the Tungabhadra, but several places to the south of that river. The garrisons had been withdrawn from the places occupied by Paraśurām Bhau, on his approach from Harihar to Seringapatam by the western route; but the eastern communication by Harapanahalli and Sira, on which Hari Pant had advanced, was strengthened and preserved, and in the course of the intermediate operations before the return of the proper season for concentrating before Seringapatam, the Mahrattas would necessarily contract within still narrower bounds of the area of Tipū's remaining resources.⁷

7. *Ibid.*, 488-489; also Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 198-200. On the siege and capitulation of Dharwar and the progress of the Mahrattas in their march to Seringapatam, see also Moor's *Narrative*, 1-74; Mackenzie, *Sketch*, II. 67-71; and Poona *Res-Corres.*, *o.c.*, Letter Nos. 149, 154, 283, 293, 297, 306, 308, 316, 321, 325, 326, 326A, 328 and 353; also, on the subject of the Mahratta junction, Dirom, *Narrative*, 1-13, and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 109-110.

This junction of the Mahrattas apart, advances towards negotiation on the part of Tipū had

Tipū's renewed negotiation for accommodation during the campaign, February-May 1791.

occurred subsequently to Lord Cornwallis' assumption of the command of the English army, which it will be convenient to notice here. Tipū's first letter, dated the 13th of February 1791, was received at Muglee on the 18th. In substance it offered to receive or send an ambassador for the adjustment of existing differences. To this letter Lord Cornwallis replied, on the 23rd, that the infraction of the treaty was with Tipū, that if he was willing to make reparation for the insult, and indemnity to the allies, it would be necessary for him to state so in writing, as, without the establishment of a basis for negotiation, sending an ambassador would be useless. On the 3rd of March, an answer was received from Tipū, containing a laboured explanation of the affair of the Lines of Travancore, and drawing into prominent notice the misconduct of that Rāja, in receiving and protecting his rebellious vassal, the Rāja of Cochin; disclaiming insult, and repeating his wish for negotiation. This did not seem to require any further reply. On the 22nd of March, Lord Cornwallis wrote a mere letter of courtesy, offering the body of Bahadūr Khān, the Killedār of Bangalore, for interment, which was declined with a suitable acknowledgment, and his Lordship directed the funeral to be conducted with due honours by the Muhammadans of his own army. On the 27th of March, Tipū renewed the proposition of sending a confidential person, to which Lord Cornwallis, at that time unaccompanied by any plenipotentiary from either of the allies, answered that as one of the confederates, he could not receive a confidential person, but if the Sultān would reduce his propositions to writing, they should be communicated to the allies, and an answer returned. On the 17th of

May, Lord Cornwallis offered the release of the wounded prisoners of the action of the 15th, which Tipū received with thanks, and renewed the proposal of negotiation. A Mahratta Vakīl had joined his Lordship before his departure for Bangalore, and Tājwant was present on the part of Nizām Ali. Lord Cornwallis accordingly answered, on the 19th, that if he would commit his propositions to writing, a meeting of Commissioners might be arranged; and his Lordship would even consent, if Tipū should desire it, to a cessation of hostilities. On the 24th, Tipū answered this letter, without taking the slightest notice of the last proposition, but renewed his former ones; and on the same day Lord Cornwallis gave up the point of written propositions, and consented that the allies should send deputies to Bangalore. This letter remained four days unanswered. On the 26th, a salute was fired at Seringapatam ostensibly to announce some advantage gained by Saiyid Sāhib over the rear of the Bombay army, but really to buoy up the spirits of the people of Seringapatam from sinking under distress. But on the 27th, the day after the junction of the Mahratta advanced guard, the army being in full view of Seringapatam, a letter containing proposals for accommodation was sent from Tipū's secretary to the Persian Interpreter to Lord Cornwallis, with a present of fruit for his Lordship's use, and a camel, to replace that of the courier of the 17th, which had died at Seringapatam. These demonstrations were witnessed by the whole army, who, on the ensuing morning, beheld the loads of fruit untouched, and the camel unaccepted, returning to Seringapatam. It was declared in the British camp that no negotiation could be entered upon unless the proposals came addressed to the confederacy, and until a general release of all the British subjects in the Mysorean dominions was granted. However, trusting that he could breed discord in the league, he could not be

prevailed upon publicly to acknowledge its existence, and still persisting that no British prisoners were detained in Mysore, Tipū, on the 29th, replied to Lord Cornwallis condescending letter of the 24th, and after a series of long and unmeaning explanations, he proposed that his Lordship should first return to the frontier, and then proceed in the manner suggested in his two last letters.⁸

The allied armies continued in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam until the 6th of June, when they marched northward past Nāgamangala, and then inclining eastward, crossed the Maddūr river on the 19th. On the 20th, the hill-fort of Huliūrduṛg was invested and the

Fourth Phase:
June-December 1791.

Movements of the
allied armies, June-
July 1791.

Killedār was induced to surrender it on a promise of security of private property and personal protection to the inhabitants. After destroying the fort, to prevent Tipū's forces from re-occupying it as a post, the armies continued their march northward on the 22nd, arriving on the 25th, before Hutriduṛg, about ten miles north-easterly from Huliūrduṛg. The place was summoned, but being found too strong, was abandoned, and the confederates, proceeding further, encamped, on the 28th, at Māgadi, about six miles from Sāvandūṛg. After reconnoitring the duṛg without any prospect of success, Lord Cornwallis, early in July, marched north-eastward towards Bangalore, fixing up a plan of operations in consultation with the Mahratta commanders. They decided to refit and organise their army during the interval of the rainy season when military operations would be brought to a standstill. In the meanwhile, they would coop Tipū up by holding a string of places from Rāyaduṛg and Sīra to Hosūr. The maintenance of communication

8. *Ibid.*, 489-492; Mackenzie, *o.c.* II. 111-112; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 204-205,

with their respective places was deemed essential for the security and the steady flow of supplies. Hence, on the 8th, Paraśurām Bhau, with his army and the Bombay detachment commanded by Capt. Little, directed his march towards Sira. The greatest part of the Nizām's horse was sent under Asad Khān, to join the other forces of the former at Ganjikōtah, a few of the best remaining under Rāja Tējwant, who had been lately superseded by Mīr Ālam in the office of Commander-in-Chief and Minister Plenipotentiary on the part of the Nizām. Hari Pant, as the representative of the Mahratta State, also remained with his army along with Lord Cornwallis, who at length encamped on the 11th of July at a short distance to the westward of Bangalore. It was agreed that after the rains Lord Cornwallis, aided by a portion of Mahratta cavalry, and General Abercromby, seconded by the largest portion of the Mahratta cavalry, would invest Seringapatam on both sides of the Cauvery and "the officer who is to command in the Sera country will not allow his attention to be so much diverted by light and unimportant designs, from the principal object of the war, as not to be in perfect readiness to take his share when called upon in the general plan of co-operation." ⁹

Lord Cornwallis, after the requisite arrangements at Bangalore, where the talents and military skill of Captain Alexander Read had succeeded in bringing forward the most important supplies, without any loss, although greatly interrupted by the Mysorean detachments, moved in a south-eastern direction to Hosūr, which was evacuated, and imperfectly blown up on his approach. Thence he moved, on the

Progress of the
main army under
Lord Cornwallis,
July - November
1791.

Reduction of Rāya-
kōta, etc., July-Sep-
tember 1791.

9. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 209; Dirom, *o.c.*, 15-26; also Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 118-116; Moor, *o.c.*, 75-78, 97-100; and *Poona Res. Corres.*, *o.c.*, *Introduction*, xvii, and *Letter Nos.* 332 and 333; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 205-206.

15th, in the direction of the Passes of Policode (Pālakḥoda) and Rāyakōṭa for the purpose of reducing the congeries of forts, which command the access to these Passes, from above as well as from below. The possession of these posts would accomplish the double purpose of establishing a secure and easy communication with the Karnātic for the battering train and supplies for the ensuing campaign, and protecting the Company's possessions, from the inroads of small divisions of cavalry, by occupying all the direct roads from Seringapatam to the Bārāmahal. An advanced brigade under Major Gowdie invested, on the 20th, Rāyakōṭa, the chief of the forts, garrisoned by 800 men, forcing it to capitulate on the 22nd. The minor posts—like Anchittydurg, Neelagiri, Ratnagiri, Udayadurg, Channarāyadurg—all capable of protracted defence, offered various but unsuccessful degrees of resistance; some of them, favoured by local circumstances, stood the assault, and the garrisons escaped by the opposite descent into the woods. With the exception of Krishṇagiri, everything essential to communication with the Coromandel and the Bārāmahal to the south-east and east, was secured by September, but a considerable number of places, some of them of importance, to the north-east of Bangalore, not only prevented the very important object of commanding the resources of these countries, but were interposed in the line of communication with Gurrumkonda, and with the army of Nizām Ali. Major Gowdie, reinforced with some battering cannon, was detached on this service, and by the 20th of the month rapidly succeeded in obtaining possession of all those of minor importance, like Rahmān-garh, Ambājidurg and Chillumkōtah.¹⁰

10. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 495-497; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 209-210; also Dirom, *o.c.*, 29-42; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 116-121, 143-144. See also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 212), who places the siege and capitulation of Rāyakōṭa subsequent to the fall of Nandidurg!

But Nandidurg—named by Tipū “Gurdun Shekoo”
(Terror of the World)—was found to

The siege and
capitulation of Nandi-
durg, September 22-
October 19, 1791.

require larger reinforcements and more extensive means. Major Gowdie forced the Pettah, and examined the northern face on the 22nd of September, and finding it unassailable in that quarter, made a circuit to the west, and finally sat down before the place on the 27th. The defence of the works of Nandidurg, a granite rock of tremendous height, was committed to Latif Ali Bēg, a distinguished officer of Haidar and Tipū. There was no choice with regard to the face to be attacked, because except in that one direction, the precipice was inaccessible, the comparatively weak point had been strengthened by a double line of ramparts; and the foundation was laid for a third, which ultimately aided the assailants in forming their last lodgement. The defence was highly respectable, the ammunition of the cannon was well reserved, and the *janjāls*, or wall-pieces, were served with peculiar steadiness and skill. The labour was excessive of working regularly up the face of a steep and craggy mountain to breaching distance, and dragging cannon to the batteries; but in twenty-one days two breaches were effected, one in the exterior rampart, and the other in an outwork, and it was resolved to give the assault and form a lodgement for the farther operations against the interior works. The assailants received, however, a particular direction for endeavouring to enter with the fugitives, while the division allotted to forming the lodgement, should be employed in providing cover; and in order that every possible impression might be made on the minds of the garrison, Lord Cornwallis moved the army to the immediate vicinity: some additional flank companies were ordered in to lead the assault, and General Medows desired to take the immediate direction of the service. The assault was given by clear moonlight on

the morning of the 19th of October; but the lodgement was within one hundred yards of the breach, and although the garrison was perfectly alert, the ardour and rapidity of the assailants surmounted every obstacle, and they pressed the fugitives so closely as to prevent their effectually barricading the gate of the inner rampart. It was forced after a sharp conflict and the place was carried with the loss in the assault of only thirty killed and wounded. Thus Nandidurg, defended by seventeen pieces of cannon, chiefly iron guns of a large calibre, improved by its late works and well garrisoned, was taken by regular attack in the course of three weeks, although of such strength that the Mahrattas did not yield it to Haidar till after a tedious blockade of three years. And its fall was followed by the surrender of Kamaldurg (Calarunconda), the other hill-fort, dependent on it.¹¹

The communication with Gurrukonda, still invested by the troops of Nizām Ali, being thus completely opened, a portion of the battering cannon employed in the siege of Nandidurg was sent to their aid; and Lord Cornwallis was called again to the south-east by an alarm for his communications. A force under Bākīr Sāhib, an active young officer and son of Badr-u-Zamān Khān, the late Killedār of Dharwar, had been detached by the route of Coimbatore and Topūr into the Bārāmahāl, with a respectable reinforcement for Krishṇagiri, with orders to act on the communications of the English army, and particularly to sweep off in a southern direction the population and cattle of the whole district. On the 21st of October, Col. Maxwell with a suitable division of the army was detached for the purpose of endeavouring to disperse

11. *Ibid.*, 497-499; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 210-212; Dirom, *o.c.*, 42-50; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 144-152; and *Poona Res. Corres.*, *o.c.*, Letter No. 381. See also and compare Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 207-208.

these intruders, and in descending the ghât, he received intelligence that a proportion of Bâkir Sâhib's troops had carried off the population to Pennâgara, a post in the

Reduction of Pennâgara, October 31, 1791.

angle formed with the main range of mountains, by the cross chain of Topûr, whence only a mountain path communicates farther south. He moved with rapidity in that direction, and on the 31st demanded the surrender of the place by a regular summons; but Bâkir Sâhib's troops, not satisfied with a simple refusal, fired upon the flag. As the appearance of works justified prompt measures, it was instantly assaulted and carried by escalade, with little loss to the assailants; but of the garrison, two hundred men were killed, before the indignation of the troops could be restrained, and the cavalry escaped by the mountain-paths. The activity of Col. Maxwell's movements soon induced Bâkir Sâhib to withdraw from a country too much bounded for the safe operations of cavalry. He descended by the pass of Changama into the Coromandel; but finding from the presence of the English cavalry under Col. Floyd that any enterprise towards Madras would be hazardous, he turned southward, and re-entered the Mysorean dominions by the pass of Ahtoor. Col. Maxwell had been ordered, if he found the enterprise advisable, to attempt

Attack on and retreat from Krishnagiri, November 7, 1791.

the destruction of the town, within the lower fort of Krishnagiri, for the purpose of depriving the Mysoreans as much as possible of cover for their predatory arrangements, and after effecting his objects in other parts of the province, he encamped, on the 7th of November, within a few miles of the place, without any other demonstration than that of reascending the pass. He moved at ten at night, in three divisions, and carried the lower fort by escalade: the officers commanding the divisions were instructed to follow up the blow, and

ascend the rock with the fugitives, who had barely time to shut and barricade the gate; and so close was the pursuit that a standard of the regular troops was taken on the very steps of the gateway. The bearers of the ladders were not so expeditious in their ascent, and the garrison, more numerous than their assailants, began to hurl dreadful missiles of granite. Projections of rock afforded cover to the assailants, and repeated attempts were made during two hours to apply ladders, which were as often crushed with those who bore them. And Col. Maxwell at length found it necessary to desist from the assault with considerable loss. The garrison sallied on their retreat, but it was conducted with so much regularity that they quickly returned. The English troops, after setting fire to the town, withdrew before day-light; and the detachment returned to headquarters on the 30th of the month, having moved along the back of the range between the passes of Policode and Ped-naikandurg, for the purpose of restoring a number of minor posts to the families of their former Hindu possessors.¹²

Meanwhile affairs were moving in a different manner in the South. When General Medows followed Tipu's course from the Bārā-mahal to Trichinopoly in 1790, it will be recollected, he detached a respectable force under Col. Oldham across the river at Karūr. During the early operations of Lord Cornwallis in 1791, his Lordship had ordered this detachment to the north, and it formed the basis of the strong corps which escorted his supplies to the upper country, after the junction with the horse of Nizām Alī. On

Operations in the South, June-November 1791.

The position at Coimbatore.

12. *Ibid.*, 500-502; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 216-217; also Dirom (*o.c.*, 55-60) and Mackenzie (*o.c.*, II. 153-155), who refer to Bākīr Sāhib as "Bunker Saib". See also and compare Kirmāpi (*o.c.*, 211-212), who refers to Col. Maxwell as "General Meadows" and places the event in 1792 (A. H. 1207).

Col. Oldham's departure from the south, he left a detachment under the command of Major Cuppage, who, on the concentration of the army of Bombay for the ascent of the ghāts, was charged with the defence of Pālghāt and Coimbatore, and their reciprocal communication. On examining minutely the fort of Coimbatore, Major Cuppage, considering it to be incapable of standing a siege, removed the heavy guns, ammunition and stores to Pālghāt. Its possession was indispensable to the fiscal management of the province, and it was deemed capable of resisting any force unprovided with heavy cannon; but on the appearance of a force so provided, the garrison was ordered to fall back to Pālghāt, with the exception of a small corps of *Topasses* who had been collected for the English service and placed under Lt. Chalmers. After the removal of everything valuable from Coimbatore, Lt. Chalmers, on examining the guns deemed unserviceable, found two three-pounders and one four-pounder to stand the proof. Means of mounting them were obtained from the fragments of broken carriages. There were also several swivels and *ianjāls* and a large quantity of damaged powder, and he prevailed on Major Cuppage to send him five hundred shot for his guns. The latter's corps was reduced by detachments to one hundred and twenty *Topasses* and two hundred men from a battalion of Travancoreans under a young Frenchman named Migot de la Combe.¹³

About this time, Tipū, having been relieved from the pressure on Seringapatam, and resolved to recover the provinces which had been wrested out of his possession at the beginning of the war, had moved to the northward to draw supplies from the country of Bednūr and check the depredations of Paraśurām Bhāu

The siege and
defence of Coimba-
tore, June-August
1791.

13. *Ibid.*, 502-504; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 212; also Dirom *o.c.*, 51, and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 124-125.

in and around Chitaldrug, sending also a detachment to attack Coimbatore and a party to raise contributions and endeavour to collect supplies from there.¹⁴ Descending by the Gajjalahaṭṭi Pass, early in June, this detachment, on the 13th of the month, invested Coimbatore, with about two thousand regular infantry and a considerable mass of irregulars, eight guns (the largest an eighteen-pounder), a number of *janjāl* pieces served by irregular infantry, abundance of rockets, and a sufficient body of horse, all under the command of Mīr Bakshi Shadavadalli Khān. The bad quality of the powder was extremely unfavourable to the efforts of the little garrison, though Lt. Chalmers was preparing with greater care the means of repelling the ultimate assault, sufficiently adapting the powder to the preparation of a contrivance for exploding among the assailants. The *Pettah* was taken on the 16th and the Mysoreans then summoned Lt. Chalmers, threatening to put the whole garrison to the sword unless the place was given up at once. The summons having been disregarded, the siege commenced; and fire was opened on the evening of the 20th. Despite the incessant clamour for surrender from all the Travancoreans, the defence was prolonged for nearly two months, before the assailants after repeated summonses, gave the assault. It commenced about two hours before daylight on the 11th of August, in five columns, each accompanied by ladders, and the ramparts were completely gained at several points. The first struggle was at the post defended by De La Combe, who was nearly overpowered by numbers until supported by a reinforcement of *Topasses*. The period had not only arrived, but had somewhat passed away, for the persons charged with the care of combustible barrels to execute their orders, not only were the ditch and berm filled with the Mysoreans, but a considerable number was actually on

14. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 128; Dirom, *l.c.*; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 496-497, 502.

the rampart engaged in close encounter; and the post defended by Lt. Chalmers in person, as being the weakest point, was by this time pressed with still greater vivacity

The repulse of the
assailants.

than any other. The explosion of a barrel at this moment in a crowded mass of the assailants produced the desired impression, and it was followed up by similar means, by tumbling down large stones prepared along the whole extent of the parapet, and by the redoubled efforts of the garrison to clear the ramparts of the opponents. After a severe conflict of nearly two hours, the efforts of the assailants entirely ceased; the day began to dawn; the assault was repulsed with great loss; above three hundred of the Mysoreans were killed in the fort and ditch; and the rout of the detachment was completed by Major Cuppage, who, advancing with great expedition from Pālghāthēri, took the two battering guns with which they had breached the place, and pursued the remains of the opposing force till they crossed the Bhavāni, opposite to Dannāyakankōte.¹⁵

Pressed as Tipū had been on all hands, at this stage of the war, he could not brook the failure of an expedition, to the success of which he looked forward with the utmost confidence. No sooner, therefore, he returned from his movement to the northward than he detached a much larger body of troops under Kumr-ud-dīn Khān, to retrieve the disgrace to his arms at Coimbatore. The approach of this force, about the latter end of September, left but a short interval for Lt. Chalmers to refresh his garrison and to repair the breaches which had been made during the former siege. Different reinforcements had increased his strength to seven hundred fighting

Tipū detaches
Kumr-ud-dīn to
Coimbatore, September 1791.

15. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 504-506; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 212-213; Dirom, *o.c.*, 51-52, and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 125-135.

men; he had also the two pieces of cannon which were lately captured from Mysore; and he was further supported by Lt. Nash with his company of sepoys.¹⁶ Kumr-ud-dīn, with 14 guns (12 six-pounders and two eighteens), four mortars, 8,000 regular infantry, and a large body of irregulars and of horse, at length sat down to the north-west of Coimbatore on the 6th of October, and took possession of the *Pettah*. He soon met with

A stiff siege.

as determined opposition as the disgraced commander of the former detachment had done, and laid siege to the fort in vain for three weeks. Lt. Chalmers was resolved to hold the place to the last extremity, expecting Major Cuppage to advance again to his relief. On the 23rd, intelligence was received of the approach of Major Cuppage with three regular battalions (at most 1,800 men), two of Travancoreans, and six field-pieces. On the 25th, Kumr-ud-dīn, leaving a strong body in the trenches, marched with the remainder of his force to Madukarai, about ten miles to the westward, in the vicinity of a pass, where the woods of Anamalai terminate and the plain commences. Unfortunately at this period a large equipment of oxen for General Abercromby's army was assembled at Pālghāt; and Kumr-ud-dīn made a decided demonstration of passing to the Major's rear. If he should be enabled to gain the pass and the uninterrupted access to Pālghāt by the capture of the oxen, he would strike a blow of infinitely greater importance than the fall of Coimbatore, and be even in a condition, with his superior numbers, to render precarious the Major's return to Pālghāt. The one manœuvred for the pass, the other to prevent its occupation, and a severe action not only terminated in Major Cuppage's possession of the pass, but also in his return to Pālghāt. "I have seen", said Kumr-ud-dīn

16. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 135-136; also Dirom, *o.c.*, 52, 62; and Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 506-507.

on his return, "the nature of your expected relief; do not

The capitulation of Coimbatore, November 3, 1791. persist in throwing away the lives of brave men." He resumed the siege

with fresh vigour, and a very respectable degree of skill; a wide breach was in all respects practicable, and the sap carried to the covered way; the ammunition, originally bad, was nearly expended. Lts. Chalmers and Nash were both wounded on the same day, and the bravest of the former defenders of the place urged their commander to accept the repeated offers of an honourable capitulation. On the 3rd of November, terms similar to those given to Dhārāpuram in the campaign of 1790 were prepared and executed, and it was an explicit condition that the garrison should march to Pālgāt; but after the actual surrender of the place, it was pretended that the Sultān's ratification was necessary, and after a detention of 13 days at Coimbatore, they were ultimately marched as close prisoners to Seringapatam, in direct and open violation of public faith, without even a pretext for its infraction, excepting one which was founded on an open violation of truth.¹⁷

This reverse to the English arms at Coimbatore was soon counterbalanced by the brilliant achievements which attended the main army under Lord Cornwallis after the

Fifth Phase: December 1791-March 1792.

Operations to the north of Seringapatam.

junction of Col. Maxwell on his return from his expedition to the Bārāmahal.

Everything interposed between Bangalore and the Coromandel was now cleared for the access of supplies; but between that post and Seringapatam, on every possible route, several places of strength remained

17. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 507-508; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 214-215; also Dirom, *o.c.*, 62-65, and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 136-140. See also and compare, on the siege and capitulation of Coimbatore, Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 169), who mixes up the event with those of 1790 and speaks of it as the siege of Satyaman-galam!

in Tipū's possession, the reduction of which Lord Cornwallis deemed to be of essential importance to the uninterrupted communication with his depots during the intended siege. A fresh battering train had been brought forward, and the last and most important convoy, under Col. Floyd, with the recovered cavalry, was shortly to arrive, but impediments connected with the operations of the allies, to be adverted to presently, caused an embarrassing delay. And Lord Cornwallis determined to employ the intermediate time in attempting the reduction of those places, of which the most

The topography of
Sāvandurg.

formidable, and reputed to be the strongest in Mysore, was Sāvandurg, a place which he long regarded as an obstacle of most serious inconvenience to the reduction of Seringapatam, an enormous mass of granite situated eighteen miles west of Bangalore, considerably more elevated than Nandidurg, and rising above half a mile in perpendicular height from a base at the least eight miles in circumference, everywhere apparently inaccessible from below, and at the height of about two-thirds of its total elevation, separated by a chasm into two citadels, each independent of the other, and both abundantly supplied with water. Exclusively of the convenient position of this fortress, as the headquarters of a corps, to interrupt the communications, its extraordinary height commanded a view of every convoy that could move on either of the two principal roads. In June, on the return of the army from Kannambādi, the place had been, as we have seen, carefully reconnoitred; it was then deemed to be unassailable, and the discouragement was increased by the reputed insalubrity of the woods and impenetrable thickets by which it is surrounded. The capture since that period of a considerable number of hill-forts hitherto deemed impregnable, and particularly of Nandidurg, encouraged the English General in

the attempt, which, if successful, he expected to be followed by the early surrender of all the others that he desired to possess.¹⁸

Col. Stuart, with two European and three Indian corps, and a powerful artillery, was detached for the immediate conduct of the siege, and Lord Cornwallis made a disposition of the remainder of the army to watch every avenue from Seringapatam by which the operations of the siege might be disturbed. Col. Stuart encamped within three miles of the place on the 10th of December, and immediately commenced the arduous labour of cutting a gun road through the rugged forest to the foot of the rock. The batteries opened on the 17th, and the breach in what was named the lower wall of the rock—fifteen hundred feet higher than its base—was deemed practicable on the 20th. Lord Cornwallis had come from the camp, distant seven miles, to witness the assault; the grenadiers were ordered to their stations, and the garrison was seen to be collecting behind this wall, which was found to be so frail that a few discharges must dislodge its defenders. The arrangements for the ensuing day were founded on the fact thus opportunely ascertained, the batteries were prepared for the purpose, and in the morning the requisite number of guns were directed against this wall with the most perfect success; every person behind it was dislodged, and the storming party, having been placed without observation, within twenty yards of the breach, the assault commenced by signal at eleven o'clock in the forenoon. The defenders had been so unexpectedly dislodged from their appointed positions, that no new disposition had been made. On the 21st, the assailants

The siege and capitulation of Sāvan-durg, December 10-21, 1791.

18. *Ibid.*, 508-510; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 217; also Dirom, *o.c.*, 66-67, and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 161.

accordingly ascended the rock without the slightest opposition, clambering up a precipice, which, after the service was over, they were afraid to descend. The eastern citadel was completely carried; and the assailants, on reaching the summit of the rock, had the satisfaction to descry a heavy column of infantry, destined to reinforce the garrison, in full march to enter the place, which would have been effected if the assault had been postponed even for half an hour. A division of the assailants, after ascending considerably above the breach, had been directed to turn to the right along the path which had been observed to be practised by the garrison, leading along the side of the rock to the western citadel. Then the Killedār of that citadel sallied with the view of taking in flank the defenders of the eastern rock, but was unexpectedly met among the rocks by the division described; and at the same instant, a few well-directed shot from the batteries fell with great execution among his troops. He retreated in surprise and dismay, followed with great energy by the English troops. At this instant, the assailants, who had gained the highest eminence of the eastern rock, obtained a distinct view of the pursuit: they observed the Killedār to fall just as he approached the gate of his citadel, and the pursuers to enter with the fugitives. Everything was carried within one hour from the commencement of the assault; and an enterprise which had been contemplated by Lord Cornwallis as the most doubtful operation of the war, was thus effected in twelve days from the first arrival of the troops.¹⁹

Col. Stuart marched on the 23rd for the next in strength and importance of the intermediate posts, Hutridurg, about twelve miles west from Sāvandurg; and next day, the 24th, Lord Cornwallis

Reduction of Hutridurg, Rām agiri, Śiv agiri, etc., December 23-27, 1791.

19. *Ibid.*, 510-512; Wilson, *o.c.*, II, 217-218; also Dirom, *o.c.*, 67-72; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II, 162-168.

followed with the army, and encamped at Māgadi, between these forts. The Colonel, on his arrival before Hutridurg, sent a party to summon the place, which had been examined and summoned also during Lord Cornwallis' last return from Kannambādi. The Killedār had then answered that he would not surrender his post till the English first took Seringapatam. But as the recent fall of Sāvandurg might produce a change in his decision, Col. Stuart sent forward to offer liberal terms. The Killedār, however, seemed still determined in the same intention, and, to avoid any communication, fired on the flag of truce. Whereupon Col. Stuart made his disposition to attack the lower fort and *Pettah* next morning. Capt. Scott of the Bengal establishment was sent on this service, while another body made a feint, and opened some guns on the opposite side of the fort. Capt. Scott carried the lower fort by escalade so rapidly that the Killedār sent to request a parley. While this took place, an appearance of treachery was observed in the upper fort, and the garrison were employed in moving and pointing guns to bear upon the assailants. Fired at this sight, and impatient of the delay, the troops again rushed on to the assault. A proper number of field-pieces were run down to the appointed stations, and under cover of their fire the escalade commenced. The side of the rock assaulted was not precipitous, but rose at an angle of perhaps thirty-five degrees, defended by a succession of seven ramparts rising above each other, including that of the *Pettah* first stormed, and the place was ill-provided with cannon. The artillery-officers were ordered, as fast as one wall should be carried, to point their guns over the heads of the assailants against the next in succession, for the purpose of keeping down the fire of the garrison. Some of the gateways were forced by the pioneers, but most of the ramparts were carried by escalade; and such

was the astonishment and confusion that a heavy fire from each successive rampart was actually thrown into the air; and to the surprise of Col. Stuart, the place was found to be carried without the loss of a life and with a trifling number of wounded, the Killedār being made prisoner and a number of the garrison being killed. About the 27th, the forts of Rāmagiri and Śivangiri, on the central road, surrendered without much resistance to a detachment under Capt. Welsh, who had been sent thither on the 22nd. Huliūrduṛg, repaired and re-occupied by Tipū's troops, was retaken in advancing, and held as a post of communication; and nothing intermediate remained, excepting Kabbālduṛg, which, being on the southern road of Kānkānhaḷḷi, not intended to be used, Lord Cornwallis did not deem of sufficient importance to repay the deviation and loss of time it would involve. The strong hilly country between Bangalore and Seringapatam, which, studded with hill-forts, had opposed such serious inconvenience to the operations of the army, now increased the security of the convoys, and gave the most promising hopes of success in the attack of the last and main object of the war²⁰.

Elsewhere the main army of Nizām Alī, which was to co-operate with Lord Cornwallis in the reduction of Seringapatam, was active since the 28th of October 1790 in the siege of Kopbal, a lofty and precipitous rock, surmounted by a rampart, and containing a central citadel commanding the interior area. The cannon placed in the batteries were of so bad a quality

Progress of the
Allies: (1) Nizām Alī.

Siege and capitulation of Kopbal,
October 1790-April
1791.

20 *Ibid.*, 512-514; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 218-219; also Dirom (*o.c.*, 73-78) and Mackenzie (*o.c.*, II. 168-172), who refer to Śivangiri as "Sheria Gurry (Ghery)". Rāmagiri and Śivangiri: two fortified hills, on the right and left banks of the Arkāvati river near Closepet, 23 miles south-west of Bangalore. Hutriduṛg: a fortified hill in the south-west of the Konigal Taluk, Tumkūr District, rising to 3713 feet above the sea.

that in one week the assailants were disabled by their own fire, and a new battering train, to be brought forward from various points, did not arrive before the middle of January 1791. The English artillery performed in the most satisfactory manner the duties required by that branch of the service, and the infantry was equally efficient, but the ignorance of Nizām Ali's commander rendered their skill and energy of little avail. The place baffled the utmost exertions of Capt. Andrew Read till the 18th of April, when it surrendered by capitulation; and Bahadūrbanda, a

Surrender of Bahadūrbanda. similar post about three miles to the northward, acceded to the same terms.

Both the places were amply garrisoned and provided with everything necessary for a much longer resistance; but the unexpected intelligence of the fall of Bangalore (21st March 1791) produced a converse operation. Kopbal had been invested for upwards of five months, and the intelligence which damped the energies of the garrison, furnished them also with a plausible apology for surrender. After the requisite arrangements in that vicinity, the army directed its march to the south-east to regain Cuddapah and its dependencies, lost in 1779.

Surrender of Ganjikōta, etc., May 1791. Ganjikōta surrendered about the time that Lord Cornwallis left Kannambādi, and minor places fell without resistance.

Gurramkonda was, however, the chief place of strength and importance which remained to be reduced in that quarter.²¹

21. *Ibid.*, 482-488; Wilson, *o.c.*, II, 220-221; Dirom, *o.c.*, 79, and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II, 60-63. See also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 195-196. Kopbal or Kopāl: village about 200 miles s. w. of Hyderabad, north of the Tungabhadra river, situated between Hospet and Gadag. Ganjikōta: Gandikōta, in the Jamunalmadugu Taluk, Cuddapah District; a large fortress, built on the edge of a cliff, on the south bank of the Pennār river.

The army of Nizām Alī sat down before Gurramkonda on the 15th of September, and no progress was made until the arrival, early in November, of the guns dispatched by Lord Cornwallis from Nandidurg. The place was remarkably strong, consisting of a *droog* or hill-fort very difficult of access, and of two lines of fortification surrounding the foot of the hill, both of considerable strength, and known as the outer and inner forts. Capt. Andrew Read, who had lately succeeded to the command of the English detachment serving with this army, offered, on the condition of being permitted the exclusive direction of measures, to put them in possession of the lower fort which commanded the only access to the hill, and would thus complete the blockade which they might then manage in their own way. On the 6th of November, he made an effectual breach and on the night of the 7th, the artillery-men volunteered to quit their batteries and lead the assault. It was completely successful, and a large body of Nizām Alī's troops was put in possession, under an officer of reputation, named Hāfiz Farid-ud-dīn (Hāfiz Jee), who was left with an adequate force of infantry and cavalry to continue the blockade. Gurramkonda, however, still contained a few of Tipū's relations, the family of Saiyid Sāhib (Mīr Moin-ud-dīn); and Hāfiz Farid-ud-dīn was an object of peculiar vengeance. Accordingly, Tipū, desiring to raise the blockade of the place, placed his eldest son Futteh Haidar, then about eighteen, in the nominal command of nearly all the Silledār horse, assisted by Ghāzi Khān, the Sultān's original military preceptor, and Alī Razā as a privy councillor. About the middle of November, Futteh Haidar, marching by the route of Turuvekere towards Sīra, and keeping his troops under cover of the jungles of Gūlūr and Bukkāpatnam, encamped his troops there, while he himself,

with a small detachment, marched lightly equipped towards Gurramkonda. Their appearance at Gurramkonda was totally unexpected; and Hāfiz, supposing the party to be no more than a few plunderers, mounted his elephant for the advantage of a better view, and leaving his batteries, went out to examine their numbers, followed by no more than twenty horsemen, the rest being ordered to follow. He had not advanced far, when he found himself surrounded by superior numbers of *Jānbāz* horse of Tipū, and descended from the elephant to mount a horse, and endeavour to force his way back. While in the act of mounting, he was charged on all sides, and carried off as a prisoner; and the horse, who were coming on in tens and twenties, as they could get ready, were attacked in this state, and cut to pieces; and such was the panic that, at length, on the 21st of the month, the lower fort was evacuated with great loss, and the Mysoreans were at liberty to remove the individuals from the hill, and to afford the besieged the opportunity of re-occupying the lower fort.²²

The transactions of the ensuing day are not less remarkable than the first result of the tragic end of Hāfiz Farid-ud-dīn, this well-conducted enterprize. November 22, 1791. Hāfiz Farid-ud-dīn, it will be recollected,²³ was the ambassador sent by Nizām Alī to Tipū Sultān in 1789. He had been treated with marked disrespect, and was really more a prisoner than an ambassador. In the course of negotiation, Tipū was induced to depute Alī Razā to accompany him on his return and to propose a treaty of marriage. The court of Nizām Alī felt it incumbent on their dignity to

22. *Ibid*, 514-515; see also and compare Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 221-222; Dirom, *o.c.*, 79-81, 84; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 63-65; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 209-210. Mackenzie mentions Futteh Haidar as "Hyder Sahib", whom he refers to as "one of the Sultān's illegitimate sons", being evidently misinformed. All other authorities are agreed that he was the eldest son of Tipū.

23. As to this subject, *Vide* Ch. XVI below.

retaliate in some degree the disrespect experienced by their own envoy; and the whole was ascribed to Hāfiz Farid-ud-dīn, who affected no concealment of his actual sentiments. When taken prisoner, however, Hāfiz was plundered of his last garment, and some person had the charity to give him a sort of patch-work quilt, covered with which he was seated at the place of his confinement. In this state, Alī Razā approached him. "You recollect," said he, "the disrespectful language you employed towards my sovereign and me at Hyderabad on the occasion of the demanded marriage." "Perfectly well," replied the prisoner, "we were then serving our respective masters: that day is past. If you are here for the purpose of revenge, murder me at once, but do not dishonour me." Alī Razā immediately ordered him to be led out to a concealed situation under cover of a rock, and in his own presence to be cut to pieces in cold blood. This done, Futteh Haidar, throwing some succour into Gurrunkonda, and taking out the families of some principal people from the lower fort, marched back with the spoils of war to Seringapatam, to make a circumstantial report of the transaction in public durbar (in January 1792.)²⁴

Meanwhile, to repair the disgrace that Rāja Tāj Want's conduct had brought upon the Nizām's arms during Lord Cornwallis' late campaign against Seringapatam, Further movements of the Nizām's main army.

24. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 515-516. See also and compare Dirom, *o.c.*, 84-85; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 65-66; and Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 210-211. According to Mackenzie, Hāfiz Farid-ud-dīn "fell under a multitude of blows, overcome by superiority of numbers"; according to Kirmāni, Futteh Haidar, during the vigorous and effectual cavalry charge, "separated the head of Hāfiz from his body and it was stuck on a spear's head." The account given by Wilks is not only more specific but substantially correct, based as it is on direct sources available to him. As to Tipū's attitude on the "circumstantial report" of Hāfiz' death, Wilks further observes: "Tippoo had the grace to express a slight disapprobation of the death of Hāfiz Fareed-u-Deen, actually commanded by himself" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 516).

adverted to in the last chapter, the Nizām had again promised the most vigorous co-operation as early as June. The marching tents of Prince Sikandar Jah were pitched as early as the 23rd August, and pressing solicitations were sent by the Governor-General to the Nizām's court to expedite the march of his army, so that the union between the two armies might be effected about the middle of October. But the Prince and the Minister Mīr Ālam (Mushīr-ul-mulk) could be induced to enter the tents only on the 6th October. On the 9th, they, accompanied by Sir John Kennaway, British Resident at Hyderabad, commenced their march, but it was slow, their movement being held up by endless pretexts. On the 7th of November, they joined the main army of Nizām Alī at Gurramkonda, which, after leaving Hāfiz Farid-ud-dīn to continue the blockade of the place, moved towards the Pednaikdurgam Pass to strengthen a convoy, then on its way to the English army with Lt. Col. Floyd. On the 25th of December, the Nizām's force was back again in Gurramkonda, when the English detachment once more put it in possession of the lower fort. After arranging a more efficient blockade, the Nizām's army—computed at about 18,000 horse—resumed its march to the south, and reached Bangalore on the 18th of January 1792. Proceeding by easy marches south-west, it joined Lord Cornwallis at Māgadi, near Hutridurg, on the 25th.²⁵

Joins Lord Cornwallis, January 25, 1792.

Everything that related to the eastern line of operation and supply was not only ready but the advance of Lord Cornwallis had been retarded not so much by the awkward arrangements of Nizām's army detailed above, as by the intentional delays of the Mahrattas. Indeed, the victories of

(2) The Mahrattas.

25. *Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Introduction*, xvii-xix; also Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 65-67; Dirom, *o.c.*, 85, 112-114; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 516, and Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 222.

the Governor-General and the quick reduction of the strongest hill-fortresses had awakened in the Poona Durbar an apprehension of the ascendancy of the English, and instead of employing Paraśurām Bhau's arms in forwarding the success of the English, the Mahratta energies were now directed to extending their own sphere of conquests in Mysore. The more Sir Charles Malet, British Resident at Poona, began to press Bhau's advance to Māgadi, the more did Bhau recede towards the west. After separating from Lord

Paraśurām Bhau's activities in the north-west of Mysore since July 8, 1791.

Cornwallis on the 8th of July 1791,

Paraśurām Bhau, on his route to Sīra, threw a garrison into Dodballāpur and

left a corps under Balavant Rao to

mask Maddagiri. Kumr-ud-dīn, with a superior force, attacked and completely routed this corps, and the garrison at Dodballāpur returned in alarm to Bangalore. Nevertheless, Paraśurām Bhau, proceeding further with the detachment under Capt. Little, pursued his exclusive object of plunder, in which he was eminently successful, and completed what had been left unaccomplished by Hari Pant, near Rāyadurg, of a secure route for its realization in the Mahratta territory. Lord Cornwallis' summons to advance found him occupied in the neighbourhood of Chitaldrug, where, on the 1st of September, he attacked and took possession of Kanaguppe (eighteen miles n. e. from Chitaldrug). His supposed illness detained him in that quarter; but in fact, he contemplated the rich plunder of the town and province of Bednūr; and to this object, he determined to sacrifice all those interests of the confederacy, which depended on his co-operation in the concerted plan. On the 21st of December, Hoḷe-Honnūr, situated near the confluence of the Tunga and Bhadra, was carried by assault; Benkipur next surrendered on the 24th; and Shimoga-capitulated on the 3rd of January 1792 after a

hard fought battle, in which Tipū's forces under Ali Raza were worsted. Then Paraśurām Bhau penetrated the woods, and marched in the contrary direction towards Bednūr.²⁶ This systematic failure in

Lord Cornwallis' uneasiness.

Bhau's engagements threw Cornwallis into the greatest difficulty. It seemed to nullify the success of the whole enterprise. As the Governor-General wrote to Malet, "As in consequence of the Bhow's failure in his engagements, the plan of campaign, the success of which must otherwise have been ensured by the capture of Savendrug and other late acquisitions, may totally fail. The want of provisions may oblige us once more to return without reducing a place which I am convinced could not have made a long resistance, if the means which I had prepared at an immense expense to the Company could have been brought to act in full force against it."²⁷

At this moment of disappointment and dismay, Lord Cornwallis made a new disposition of his forces, which, according to the returns, consisted of 22,033 men, a battering train of forty-two pieces and forty-four guns, but excluding the artillery-men and pioneers, his effective force, in cavalry and infantry, was 16,721 men. He also altered General Abercromby's plan of operations, whereby the General, instead of entering Mysore by the Bednūr or the north-western route in concert with Paraśurām Bhau, was to advance to and take up a position near Periyāpaṭṇa, sixteen miles to the west of Seringapatam. General Abercromby's preparations too for the campaign of 1792 were well considered and effective.

The campaign of 1792.

The march of the confederates to Seringapatam, January 25, 1792.

26. Wilks, o.c., II. 497, 517, 521-524; Dirom, o.c., 99-106; Mackenzie, o.c., II. 177-179; Moor, o.c., 100-161, and *Poona Res. Corres.*, o.c., *Introduction*, xviii.

27. *Poona Res. Corres.*, I.c.


The duties of his government had carried him to Bombay, and he returned to Malabar in November 1791, bringing with him or receiving from Pālghāt all the means of a good equipment; and he made his first march from the head of the pass towards Mysore on the 22nd of January with an effective force of eight thousand four hundred men. The Governor-General's uneasiness was, however, partially relieved by the arrival of the Nizām's army under Sikandar Jah and Mīr Ālam at Māgadi, three days later, *i.e.*, on the 25th, when the confederate armies, together with a small body of the Mahrattas under Hari Pant (commanding about 12,000 horse), commenced their march towards Seringapatam.²⁸

All the arrangements for the siege of Seringapatam being now matured, communications free and supplies abundant, the confederates, passing through the jungle among the hills, encamped on the 27th at Huli-yūrdurg. The place being garrisoned, was established as an advanced post, being ten miles nearer the grand object than Hutridurg. On the 31st, the British troops were drawn out in review before those of Poona and Hyderabad. On the 1st of February, every human dwelling was in flames as the troops approached. The British army, leaving Huli-yūrdurg close upon the right, quitted the


Their route.

28. *Ibid.*, xviii-xix; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 520, 525-526; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 222-225; Dirom, *o.c.*, 112-116; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 181-182; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 212.

Abercromby, Sir Robert (1740-1827): younger brother of Sir Ralph; entered the Army in 1758; served in North America till the peace in 1763; and again, from 1776 to 1783, throughout the war to the capitulation of Yorktown; went to India, 1788, and in 1790, was Governor of Bombay and C-in-C there; Major-General, 1790. After operations on the Malabar coast, he joined Lord Cornwallis in attacking and defeating Tipū at Seringapatam in 1792; K. B.; succeeded Lord Cornwallis as C-in-C in India, October 1793, being at the same time Member of the Supreme Council till February 1797. He defeated the Rohillas at Batina in Rohilkhand in 1794; Lt. General, 1797; M. F. for Clackmannan County in 1798; Governor of Edinburgh Castle, 1801; General, 1802; died, November 1827.



Seringapatam in 1792.



jungles, and after crossing the river at Maddūr, encamped near Tagihalli; the other branches of the confederacy, advancing as it suited their convenience, remained on the opposite bank of the river. The mud fort of Tagihalli was likewise taken and formed the second line of communication from Hutridurg. On the 3rd, the army halted at Keregōḍu, another mud fort, which was put in a state of repair, and on the 5th, after passing over a high ground which gave a full view of Seringapatam, and of Tipu's army stationed under its walls, it encamped about six miles to the northward (behind the French-Rocks), with the allies at some distance in the rear.²⁹

The Sultān had made every effort to strengthen the defences of Seringapatam during the preceding six months, and was now encamped on the north. The country had already been laid waste during the former campaign, and he seemed confidently to rest his hopes on the strength of his works and army for protracting the siege, till the want of supplies or the approach of the monsoon should again oblige his enemies to withdraw from the capital. He had also persuaded himself that nothing decisive could be undertaken until the junction of the Bombay army under General Abercromby, now arrived at Periyāpatṇa. But Lord Cornwallis resolved to attack at once, on the night of the 6th. The English force was formed into three columns, without artillery, the centre being commanded by the Governor-General in person. Under a brilliant moonlight, the three columns marched in dead silence, at about half

29. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 526; Wilson, *l.c.*; also Dirom, *o.c.*, 116-128; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 182-184. See also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 212-218. Dirom refers to Keregōḍu as "Karrioode"; Mackenzie as "Caricoode," and Kirmāṇi as "Kurrigooreh." Kirmāṇi also refers to the hills of French-Rocks as "the hills of Hurroor," Hurroor being a corruption of Hirōḍe, the original name of the place, by which it is still known among the local people.

past 8 o'clock, towards the Sultān's fortified encampment.

This camp was established on the northern side of the Cauvery, immediately in front of the island on which the fort stands, and occupied an elevated piece of ground enclosed by a wide hedge of prickly-pear, and other thorny plants. This space was about three miles in length, 3,000 yards in breadth at the western extremity, diminishing to about one mile in the centre, and running nearly to a point at the eastern end, where it was flanked by the defences on the Karīghaṭṭa hill. One large redoubt, known as the Eedgab, stood at the north-western angle close to the hedge, two redoubts were in the centre, also near the hedge, with about 600 yards between them. A second line of redoubts, *viz.*, Lally's, Mahomed's, and the Sultān's, lay behind, nearly equidistant from the bound hedge and the river. All of these were armed with heavy cannon.


Redoubts.

Tipū's infantry, computed at 40,000 men, with 100 field-pieces, was drawn up nearly midway between the line of redoubts, with about 5,000 cavalry in the rear.

Tipū's army.

The island, somewhat more than three miles long, and about one mile and a half in breadth at the widest point, contained the fort, two palaces within walled gardens, and a *pettah* also surrounded by a good wall. The fort, about one mile long and 1,100 yards broad, occupied the western angle; next to it at the distance of about 500 yards, with one face resting on the northern branch of the river, was the Daria-Daulat-Bāgh; then came the *pettah* (of Shahar-Ganjām) at an interval of about 400 yards; the Lāl-Bāgh, protected by lines of entrenchment and batteries, filled the eastern angle.

The island.



A vertical number line with tick marks at 0, 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000.

☐ British

Mysores

100

100

100

100

The guns in the fort and other parts of the island were estimated at 800. The
The order of attack. attack was made in three divisions, *viz.*, the right under Major-General Medows, the centre under Lord Cornwallis, with Lt. Col. Stuart as his second in command, and the left under Lt. Col. Maxwell. The Right Division, consisting of 900 Europeans, and 2,400 Indians, was composed of H. M.'s 36th and 76th regiments under Lt. Col. Nesbitt, the 3rd, 13th and 26th Bengal sepoys, and the 2nd Bengal Volunteer battalion under Lt. Col. Cockerell, and the 22nd Madras battalion under Captain Oram.
Right Division. Centre Division. The Centre Division, consisting of 1,400 Europeans and 2,300 Indians, was composed of H. M.'s 52nd, 71st and 74th regiments under Lt. Col. Knox, the 7th, 14th and 28th Bengal sepoys under Major Russell, and the 2nd and 21st Madras battalions under Major Langley. The
Left Division. Left Division, consisting of 500 Europeans and 1,200 Indians, was composed of H. M.'s 72nd regiment, and the 1st, 6th and 23rd Madras battalions under Lt. Col. David Baird. Parties of artillery-men and of pioneers were attached to each division, the former being without guns, but provided with spikes and hammers.

The Right Division carried the Eedgah Redoubt after a severe struggle, killing about 400 of
Movements of the Right Division. Tipū's force, but sustaining the loss of 11 officers and 80 men killed and wounded. Leaving four companies of H. M.'s 36th and the 22nd Madras battalion to hold the redoubt, General Medows moved to the left to join the centre column, but missing the way, he got to the Karīghaṭṭa hill, and did not meet Lord Cornwallis until after daylight.

The Centre Division was formed into three parties.

Movements of the
Centre Division.

The Front Party under Lt. Col. Knox, composed of six flank companies of Europeans, H. M.'s 52nd and the 14th Bengal battalion, was ordered to push through the camp, and to cross the river near the north-eastern angle of the fort. The bound

Front Party.

hedge was forced about 11 o'clock under a heavy but ill-directed fire from cannon and musketry and a battalion company of the 52nd followed by the grenadiers of the 52nd, 71st and 74th with the light company of the 52nd, all under Capt. Monson, crossed the river, and took post on the southern side of the island after having dispersed several bodies of the Mysoreans. Col. Knox, with the light companies of the 71st and 74th, crossed immediately afterwards, and marched to the *Pettah*, the gate of which was found open. Halting there, he detached parties against the batteries which lined the bank of the river at that point, and as they were all open to the rear, they were carried at once without loss. Capt. Monson and Col. Knox were soon followed by the seven battalion companies of the 52nd, and three of the 14th Bengal battalion, all under Capt. Hunter, who took possession of the Daria-Daulat-Bāgh, but, as this position was untenable, he repressed the river and joined Lord Cornwallis.

The Centre Party under Col. Stuart was composed of

Centre Party.

H. M.'s 71st, the 7th and 28th Bengal battalions, and seven companies of the 14th Bengal battalion which had separated from the Front Party during the confusion that followed the loss of Capt. Archdeacon, the Commandant, who was killed in the advance against the bound hedge. Col. Stuart marched against the Sultān's Redoubt, and finding it abandoned, he left Capt. Sibbald of the 71st to hold it with two companies of that regiment, a party of sepoys, and a few artillery-men. He then proceeded

towards the eastern boundary of the enclosure, and meeting the division under Col. Maxwell, which had descended from the Karīghaṭṭa hill and turned the right flank of Tipū's line, he took command of the whole.

In the meantime, Lord Cornwallis, with seven companies of 74th and the 2nd and 21st Madras battalions, halted behind the Sultān's Redoubt in the expectation of being joined by General Medows, who, as has been mentioned, passed towards the Karīghaṭṭa hill without having observed him. About two hours before daylight, the Mysore forces advanced in great numbers against this party.

Repulse of the
Sultān's forces.

Fortunately, at this moment, Captain Hunter returned from the Daria-Daulat-Bāgh with the ten companies under his command and joined Lord Cornwallis. A desperate contest ensued, the Mysoreans not having been finally repulsed until after several attacks. The following circumstantial account of this part of the action is taken from Lt. Mackenzie's *History of the War*:—

“The force that His Lordship had collected bore no proportion to the number by which he was attacked. It consisted of seven companies of the 74th regiment under Captain Dugald Campbell, with the 2nd, and 21st Coast battalions under Captains Vigors and Montgomery. This handful of men withstood the furious and desperate onset of many thousands for some time. Three companies of Madras sepoys that had been detached under Lieutenants Kenny and Roberts to within fifty yards of the enemy, fired by platoons with a regularity and steadiness that would stamp credit on the best troops in Europe; and on being seasonably reinforced by Captain Hunter's division, the whole body came to the bayonet, and after repeated charges proved successful. The Mysoreans, however, on this occasion discovered no want either of discipline or valour. The reinforcement which fell suddenly on their right flank instantly received a heavy and well-directed fire from a corps that changed front for that

purpose, nor did this body give way until they felt the points of the bayonets from different directions."

After the repulse of the Mysore forces, Lord Cornwallis drew off towards the Karighaṭṭa hill, so that he might not be exposed to the fire of the fort at daylight, and he there met the column under Gen. Medows.

Lord Cornwallis
retires to the Kari-
ghaṭṭa hill.

The Left Division under Col. Maxwell, after having carried the defences on the Karighaṭṭa hill, descended towards Tipu's camp, crossed the river Lōkapāvani and the bound hedge, and met the party under Col. Stuart a few hundred yards further on. Col. Stuart then assumed command and advanced to cross the Cauvery into the island, a hazardous undertaking, as the river at that point was very deep, and the passage was under the fire of the batteries on the bank near the *Pettah*. Fortunately, at this very time, these were taken by the parties detached by Col. Knox, so that, although a number of men were drowned, the column crossed with comparatively little loss.

Movements of the
Left Division.

Operations on the
7th.

The attempt of the
Mysoreans to take
the Sultān's Redoubt.

On the morning of the 7th, Tipu's forces were still in possession of the redoubts at the western end of the camp, and in considerable force in other parts of the enclosure. Their first attempt was to retake the Sultān's Redoubt, and assembling round it, they kept up a constant fire. The gorge of this work being open towards the rear, all endeavours to close it were defeated by the fire of the fort and about 10 o'clock the Mysoreans made an assault, but were beaten back with loss. Notwithstanding, they continued their fire; and about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, a second and very resolute attack was made by a body of dismounted cavalry, about three hundred strong; this

Their repulse.

was also repulsed. About an hour afterwards, a third attempt was made, led by the Europeans of Lally's brigade. This attack, contrary to expectation, was the least formidable of the three; for, after having advanced a short distance and losing a few men, the assailants fell back in disorder. About 4 o'clock, the Mysoreans gave up the attempt and retreated into the island, thus giving the gallant defenders the opportunity to go in search of water, of which there had not been a drop in the redoubt.

The reserve, which had marched in the morning from the French-Rocks, was joined by two Further operations. battalions detached by lord Cornwallis, and encamped during the day behind the river Lōka-pāvani, with the left on the Karighaṭṭa hill. Col. Stuart, shortly after crossing into the island, assembled all the troops which had entered it and took up a position in front of the Lāl-Bāgh facing towards the *Pettah*, and covered by the river on each flank. Soon afterwards, he was reinforced by six companies of the 36th and the 3rd Bengal battalion. With the exception of some musketry fire from the *Pettah* in the morning, which did not continue long, Col. Stuart remained unmolested until about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when two brigades of infantry, with a body of dismounted troopers, entered the *Pettah* and advanced towards the line, but retired on the advance of the 1st Madras battalion under Capt. Brown, which followed them into the *Pettah*, and being joined by the 71st, the Mysoreans were driven through the streets, and ultimately out of the place.

The Mysoreans
driven out of the
Pettah.

Information having been received that an attack during the night was meditated, Col. Stuart's Casualties. men lay on their arms until daylight, but were not disturbed. The loss of the Mysoreans in killed alone was computed at upwards of 4,000, that of

the British was only 535 killed and wounded. Eighty pieces of cannon were taken in the camp, and on the island; 36 of brass, the remainder of iron.

On the morning of the 8th, it was found that the Mysoreans had withdrawn entirely from the fortified camp, upon which picquets were sent into the redoubts, and the army, exclusive of the detachment posted in the island, encamped parallel to the bound hedge at such a distance in the rear as to be out of range of fire from the fort.³⁰

The Sultān, at the commencement of the eventful night of the 6th February, had made his evening meal in a redoubt to the right of the spot where the Centre Column had entered (the Sultān's Redoubt). On the first alarm he mounted, but before he could get news of the nature of the attack, the crowds of fugitives announced that the enemy had penetrated the camp. He fled precipitately to the ford, and barely succeeded in passing over before the advanced column of the English. Taking his station on an outwork of the fort which commanded the scene, he remained there till morning, issuing orders and spending one of the most anxious nights in his life. During the confusion, 10,000 Coorgs, who had been forcibly converted (*Ahmadi Chēlas*), made their escape to their own country; and a number of French and other Europeans (*Asad Ilāhis*), who had rendered unwilling obedience to Haidar and Tipū, seized the opportunity to gain their liberty. It so happened that a large treasure was in camp that night for the purpose of paying the

30. *Vide*, on the affairs of February 6-7, 1792, described in these sections Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 526-542; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 224-231; also Dirom, *o.c.*, 128-184; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 184-212; and *Poona Res. Corres.*, *o.c.*, Letter No. 434, dated February 8, 1792, briefly referring to the English assault on Seringapatam on the 6th night, Tipū's repulse, etc. See also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 213-215), whose account of the affairs of the 6th-7th February 1792 is very brief, and agrees in the main with the other sources cited here.

troops next day. But it was all safely conveyed into the fort on the backs of camels by the skill and ability of Pūṃaiya, although he was severely wounded. The whole of the next day, the most vigorous attempts were made to dislodge the English from the island. The Sultān's passionate appeal "Have I no faithful servants to retrieve my honour?" was gallantly responded to by a body of 2,000 cavalry, but being foiled at every point, all the redoubts north of the river were evacuated the same night, and promptly occupied by the English.³¹

Various efforts at negotiation had been, as we have seen, made by Tipū since Lord Cornwallis took command of the army, but they were not calculated to succeed.

Efforts at negotia-
tion.

The last attempt was the mission of the veteran diplomatist, Appāji Rām, to Bangalore, in August 1791. Appāji Rām was attended at the town of Sarjāpur (15 miles s. e. of Bangalore) by an English escort. But at the time of commencement of his business, it was found that he was specially prohibited from negotiating with any intermediate agent, being ordered to move only with the direct representatives of the respective confederate powers. Lord Cornwallis, suspecting his intention, refused to meet him on equal terms; and he was accordingly desired to return without delay.³² When, however, the long gathering storm was at length ready to burst over his head, Tipū, on the 12th of January 1792, resumed the attempt and sought again to obtain Lord Cornwallis' reception of an envoy. An answer was immediately returned, stating that the release of the prisoners taken at Coimbatore (November 1791), including Lts. Chalmers and Nash, in violation of the articles of capitulation, was indispensable as a preliminary. On

31. Wilks, o.c., II. 536-542.

32. *Ibid.*, 492-493, 542; also Dirom, o. c., 37-38; Mackenzie, o.c., II. 141-142 and Poona Res. Corres., o.c., Introduction, xvii.

the 8th of February, after all his military efforts had failed, Tipū set free the officers and sent by them letters containing offers of peace. The letters affirmed that the terms of capitulation had been misrepresented, that Kumr-ud-dīn had not been engaged for the liberation of the garrison of Coimbatore, but only promised to re-command it; and to cover this gross violation of truth, the Sultān had caused the counterpart of the articles of capitulation, signed and sealed by Kumr-ud-dīn, to be forcibly taken from Lt. Chalmers previous to his release. But, while thus suing for peace, Tipū secretly despatched a body of horsemen in disguise to penetrate to the English camp and assassinate the Governor-General. On the 10th, at dawn, the plot was discovered and frustrated. The peace proposal fell through, as nothing definite had been proposed for Lord Cornwallis' consideration. Accordingly, preparations for the renewed siege were commenced.³³

General Abercromby, with the Bombay division, leaving a detachment strongly posted at Siddēśvar Ghāt, proceeded on the 8th of February in conformity to the orders of Lord Cornwallis. On the 10th he passed Periyāpaṭṇa and marching northward, crossed the Cauvery at Yedatore on the 11th, joined the main army on the 14th, and encamped north-west of the fort. On the 19th he crossed the river and took up a position south-west of the fort. A redoubt immediately in front of his position was taken the same evening after a feeble resistance, and occupied as an outpost. On the 22nd,

General Abercromby joins the Main Army, February 16, 1792.

Renewed dispositions for the siege of Seringapatam, February 19-22, 1792.

Ibid., 542-546; also Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 281; Dirom, *o.c.*, 189-192; Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 217-220; and Poona Res. Corres., *o.c.*, Letter Nos. 486, 487 and 440.

Tipū attempted to dislodge the General, but gave up the attempt after a fruitless struggle. By this time, the dispositions for the siege were rapidly pushed on. The second parallel had been completed, and the batteries were in a forward condition. The operations of the siege were so far advanced as to enable Lord Cornwallis to calculate with certainty on opening his breaching batteries on the 1st of March.⁸⁴

Meantime Tipū's position was becoming critical in the extreme. As Major Dirom records,⁸⁵

Tipū's position critical.

Personally superintends the defence of Seringapatam.

"he was seen frequently every day on the ramparts, particularly at the north face, viewing the English approaches, and giving directions to his own troops.

He was constantly bringing guns to the works and cavaliers on that side, and had a multitude of people at work thickening the inner rampart, filling up the embrasures to strengthen the parapet where he could not have guns, and repairing such as had been blown and damaged by the firing of his cannon. He had first employed his people in completing the glacis and strengthening the works on the east face of the fort towards the island; but since the opening of [the English] trenches on the north side, all his attention and exertions were turned to that quarter. He was at work day and

84. *Ibid.*, 546-550; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 281-282; also Dirom, *o.c.*, 198-210, 218-217; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 221-230 (for strategic details).

85. Dirom, *o.c.*, 212. See also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 215), who thus speaks of Tipū's preparations for the defence of Seringapatam: "The valiant Sultān now strengthened all sides of the fort of Seringaputtun with guns, mortars and every description of fire-arms, and stationed his brave troops in all parts of the works, and with exceeding confidence and a truly royal spirit gave orders that his tents and canopies made of European velvet, the silks of Khotun and China, and the embroidered or brocaded cloth of Constantinople, should be raised on every one of the towers of Seringaputtun, and the most beautiful Bayaderes, or dancing women, and the best singers and musicians being assembled, were employed day and night in dancing, singing, and all kinds of pleasure and merriment."

night, making every preparation possible for a vigorous defence."

"But within doors," as Lt. Mackenzie observes,³⁶

Danger of doubtful
allegiance within.

"Tippoo was by no means secure from danger. However faithful their allegiance, it was natural to conceive that the multitudes of peaceful people who had flocked to the capital could not relish a struggle of so little expectance, whilst their families and property remained at hazard on the issue." The whole of his cavalry, encamped on the south side of the river, was sent towards Mysore, several of whom deserted to the confederates with their cattle and effects. The desertion from the parties of the Sultān's sepoys, posted on the outworks of the fort at night, continued also to be considerable; great consternation prevailed among the troops and civilian population of Seringapatam; headmen were even holding cabals among themselves; and nothing kept them quiet but the assurances of peace.³⁷

This apart, the Sultān, in addition to the numbers that nearly encircled Seringapatam, was being systematically attacked in the most vulnerable points of the dominions of Mysore. In the South, since December 1791, a corps of 400 Europeans and three battalions of sepoys, with field-artillery, under Major Cuppage, having dislodged the Mysoreans from the district of Coimbatore, had reduced the intermediate posts of Daṇḍayakankōte and Satyamangalam, and by February 1792 ascended Talamalai, at the top of the

36. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 230.

37. Dirom, *o.c.*, 212-213. See also and compare Kirmāṇi (*l.c.*), who elsewhere speaks of the affairs of the kingdom as having been "ruined by the villainy and neglect of his (Tipū's) ungrateful and traitorous Amīrs and Chiefs" (Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 219), which is in keeping with the position depicted by the contemporary English writer, Major Dirom.

Gajalahatti Pass, where large supplies from Trichinopoly and Pālghāt were ready to advance to facilitate the long-contemplated English occupation of the key-post of Haradanahalli and the reduction of the new but unfinished fort of Mysore, barely eight miles south of Seringapatam.³⁸ In the north-west, Paraśūrām Bhau, with the English brigade serving with his army, who had, as we have seen, reduced Shimoga on the 3rd of January, arrived on the 28th of the month before the exterior lines which surrounded the city of Bednūr. He was preparing to force them by means of the English troops, when he received intelligence that Kumr-ud-dīn had been detached with a large corps of cavalry from Seringapatam, and was rapidly approaching by a route in the woods, which would intercept his retreat. He instantly commenced a retrograde movement, called in his detachments, and began his march to the south-east, crossing the Tunga, near Shimoga, on the 10th of February.³⁹ The division of Paraśūrām Bhau, which was hourly expected, was not only fully equal to invest the south side of the fort of Seringapatam, but, by perfecting the line of circumvallation, would entirely cut off all chances of supply and complete the blockade of the place, while Mysore and the surrounding places remained for the confederates free from molestation. Brinjāris out of number conveyed grain imported from Bengal to Madras, with every species of produce from the districts to the northward. The exertions of General Abercromby, aided by the active and zealous Chief of Coorgs, from the nearness of their country, had established immense magazines close at hand to the westward, and supplies were coming forward constantly from the Malabar coast. While there was

38. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 551; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 219; Dirom, *o.c.* 220; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 231.

39. *Ibid.*, 523-524, 543; Moor, *o.c.*, 169-173; and Poona Res. Corres., *o.c.*, Letter Nos. 489-441.

abundance in the grand army, arrangements had been made for sending supplies to the armies of the Mahrattas and the Nizām, who, thoroughly bent on the overthrow of their ancient scourge, neglected nothing that could tend to whet every instrument of vengeance. The Sultān, having no army that could keep the field and closely blockaded, and confined to one end of the small island, must soon be reduced to distress, while the allied armies had all the resources of his and their own countries open to them from every part of the peninsula, and no hope could remain to him that even the monsoon—of which the effects are partial and only material from its swelling the river—would oblige his enemies to raise the siege.⁴⁰

Thus situated, Tipū, having sent in the prisoners taken at Coimbatore, continued his negotiations for peace, and in conformity to the acquiescence indicated by

Tipū continues negotiations.

Lord Cornwallis in his letter dated 11th February, Tipū's Vakils, Gulām Ali and Ali Razā, had been received in camp on the 14th. They were met by Sir John Kennaway and Mr. Cherry on the part of the Governor-General, and by Mīr Ālam and a representative of Hari Pant on the part of the Nizām and the Mahrattas. From the 15th to 21st, four conferences, each lasting nearly the whole day, generally with the intervention of a day for reference and instruction, brought the demands of the confederates to a distinct issue; and on the 22nd, the envoys of Tipū brought him

the ultimatum of the confederates, requiring the cession to the allies, from February 22, 1792. the countries adjacent to theirs, of one-

half of the dominions which he possessed before the war; the payment of three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees, one-half immediately, the remainder in three instalments of four months each; unequivocal release of all prisoners

40. *Ibid.*, 551; Dirom, o.c. 220-221; and Mackenzie, o.c. II. 230-231.

of the four powers from the time of Haidar Ali; and the delivery of two of his eldest sons as hostages for a due performance of the treaty. On the mutual execution of these preliminary articles, hostilities were to cease and a definitive treaty was to be adjusted.⁴¹

Hemmed up on all sides by enemies flushed with victory, it was now left to Tipū only to choose between a desperate defence against the storm, and a submissive compliance with the dictates of his opponents. On the 23rd, after his late fruitless attempt to dislodge General Abercromby, Tipū assembled all the principal officers in the mosque and sought their advice. "You have heard," said he, "the conditions of peace, and you have now to hear and answer my question: *shall it be peace or war?*" They unanimously offered to lay down their lives in defence of the capital, but equally unanimously hinted with various shades of expression that the troops were disheartened and had become undeserving of confidence. These miserable prospects, rendered still less supportable by the distraction of his forces in every direction, at length reduced Tipū to the necessity of compliance with the preliminary articles, which were duly signed and sealed, and returned to Lord Cornwallis the same day.⁴²

An armistice being thus virtually concluded, hostilities ceased on the 24th, though the works of Seringapatam were strengthened daily in the direction of the English approaches. On the 26th, the two young princes, surrendered as hostages, Abdul Kālak and Mooza-ud-din, the one aged ten and the other eight, were received

The preliminary
Articles signed, Feb-
ruary 23, 1792.

The armistice and
after.

The reception of
the hostages, Febru-
ary 26, 1792.

41. *Ibid.*, 550, 552; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 232; Dirom, *o.c.*, 213, 225-226; and *Poona Res. Corres.*, *o.c.*, Letter No. 442, dated 24th February 1792—Cherry to Malet. See also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 215-217, 219. As to the text of the *Preliminary Treaty*, see Appendix III—(5).

42. *Ibid.*, 551-552; Dirom, *o.c.*, 226; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 230, 232.

in the English camp with every consideration due to their rank, and by Lord Cornwallis with all the tenderness of a father. But during their stay there, Tipū continued by numerous artifices to protract the negotiations relative to the adjustment of the Definitive Treaty of Peace.

Protracted negotiations re the Definitive Treaty of Peace.

The territories to be ceded to the allies formed a lengthened subject of discussion. The extent of the cessions was of course to be determined by the amount of revenue. Tipū's Vakils pretended that the revenue accounts of many of the provinces were lost. At one time, they attempted to give in statements overrating the districts that would be claimed under the treaty, and underrating those that would be left to him. At another, Tipū's specie or coins (*pagodas*), which were tendered in payment, were estimated by his shroffs at double their value. On some days, the revenue collections for the Huzūr exchequer at Seringapatam were diminished to half their amount; on others, the supremacy of Coorg furnished grounds for contention. In particular, the

The claim for the cession of Coorg: the case for and against.

claim of the English to that country so exasperated Tipū that the peace was on the point of being broken, when he yielded. "To which of the English possessions," he asked, "is Coorg adjacent? Why do they not ask for the key of Seringapatam? They know that I would sooner have died in the breach than consent to such a cession, and durst not bring it forward until they had treacherously obtained possession of my children and my treasure," for a crore of rupees had already arrived in Lord Cornwallis' camp. Tipū had every reason to consider the Chief of Coorg as one of the main instruments of the war and was doubtless harbouring the severest vengeance against him. He asserted that as the territory of Coorg approached close to Seringapatam and was by no means contiguous to any of the

countries of the allies, it could not be demanded under the preliminary articles of peace. Though the cession of this province might thus have been unexpected by Tipū, there was nothing in the preliminary articles against the demand made for it, especially as it was not far removed from Malabar, whose cession was not objected to by him. Moreover, he had no right to expect that Lord Cornwallis had the "intention of abandoning the only ally who had performed all his obligations with fidelity, efficiency and honour."⁴³

43. *Ibid.*, 553-554; Dirom, *o.c.*, 226-239; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 232-234.

Major Dirom, who gives a vivid account of the reception of the hostages (February 26, 1792), writes of the historic scene thus: "Lord Cornwallis, attended by his staff and some of the principal officers of the army, met the Princes at the door of his large tent as they dismounted from the elephants; and after embracing them, led them in, one in each hand, to the tent: the eldest, Abdul Kalick, was about ten; the youngest, Mooza-ud-Deen, about eight years of age. When they were seated on each side of Lord Cornwallis, Gulam Ali, the head Vakeel, addressed his Lordship as follows:—'These children were this morning the sons of the Sultan, my master; their situation is now changed, and they must look up to your Lordship as their father.'

"Lord Cornwallis, who had received the boys as if they had been his own sons, anxiously assured the Vakeel and the young Princes themselves, that every attention possible would be shewn to them, and the greatest care taken of their persons. Their little faces brightened up; the scene became highly interesting; and not only their attendants but all the spectators were delighted to see that any fears they might have harboured were removed, and that they would soon be reconciled to their change of situation, and to their new friends.

"The Princes were dressed in long white muslin gowns, and red turbans. They had several rows of large pearls round their necks, from which was suspended an ornament consisting of a ruby and an emerald of considerable size, surrounded by large brilliants; and in their turbans, each had a sprig of rich pearls. Bred up from their infancy with infinite care, and instructed in their manners to imitate the reserve and politeness of age, it astonished all present to see the correctness and propriety of their conduct. The eldest boy, rather dark in his colour, with thick lips, a small flattish nose, and a long thoughtful countenance, was less admired than the youngest, who is remarkably fair, with regular features, a small round face, large full eyes, and a more animated appearance. . . . After some conversation, his Lordship presented a handsome gold watch to each of the Princes, with which they seemed much pleased. Beetle-nut and otter of roses being then distributed, he led them back to their elephants, embraced them again, and they returned, escorted by their suite and the battalion to their tents" (Dirom, *o.c.*, 228-230).

This apart, day after day produced some new quibble.

In short, Tipū's conduct had such an equivocal appearance that, on the 10th of March, immediately after the receipt

of the part payment of the indemnity in the English camp, immense bodies of men were perceived at work on a strong intrenchment behind the face attacked, while the studied procrastination of the vakils appeared to indicate a renewal of hostilities and a desire to protract the rupture to the latest possible period. While such of Tipū's troops as had been dispersed at the storm of his lines collected from all directions under an idea of a speedy termination of the war, the division of Kumr-ud-dīn found means to throw themselves into Seringapatam. Matters were thus situated till about the middle of the month, when, on the other side, fair copies of the Definitive Treaty were prepared and sent to Tipū, with the alternative of executing them within a certain number of hours, or finally breaking off the negotiation. The captured guns

Preparations for a renewed attack on Seringapatam. which had been brought to camp were sent back to the positions assigned

them for the siege, and all other preparatory measures were openly adopted. The troops under General Abercromby were instructed to occupy their former position, and Paraśurām Bhau, who had at length joined the confederates before Seringapatam about the 10th March, was sent to co-operate with the General in investing the south side of the fort. Tipū's vakils, however, blustered, made some frivolous claims to the liberation of the hostages, and talked of taking their leave, until they found his Lordship's determination to be irrevocably fixed, and then announced their master's acquiescence. On an evasion to gain more time, the hostages were, on the 16th, moved preparatory to their march to the Coromandel, and the guards in their suite disarmed and

made prisoners. The vakils, struck with the state of the preparations and anxious for the fate of Tipū, entreated with abundant promises and obtained that the departure of the Princes might be suspended for one day, and withdrew to the fort. But that day passed over with promises only; a third had nearly elapsed, when they at length appeared with the treaty duly executed and ratified, Tipū having in the meanwhile listened to reason and seriously begun to relent. On the 19th, the

The *Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam* concluded, March 19, 1792.

last scene of the war was ended by the hostage Princes publicly concluding the forms of delivery and interchange of the *Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam*, soon after which the army left the place accompanied by several thousands of Indians of the Karnātic, given up under the Treaty with their cattle and effects.⁴⁴

The cessions of the treaty of 1792 were founded on the principle of equal partition to the three confederates, without reference to the gratuitous inequality in the provisions of the offensive and defensive treaty of 1790, or any retrospect to the conditions intended to secure to the earliest in the field the exclusive benefit of their own efforts. The English accordingly obtained Malabar and Coorg, Dindigal, Śankaridurg, the Bārāmahal and other places, the rental of which was estimated at 13,16,765 pagodas. The Mahratta boundary was extended to the Tungabhadra, their frontier in 1779, the cessions to them in the Doab, Dharwar and other places being valued at 13,16,666 pagodas. To Nizām Alī was restored his possessions north of that river and Cuddapah to the south—which he had lost about this time—valued at a

The ceded territories.

44. *Ibid.*, 554-557; Dirom, *o.c.*, 237-248; and Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 234-237. As to the text of the *Definitive Treaty*, see Appendix III—(6).

like sum. Thus terminated the war with Tipū Sultān (*The Third Mysore War*).⁴⁵

The prize-money realized from the sale of property captured during this war amounted to £ 93,584, made up as follows :—

	£
First campaign, 1790	19,804
Second campaign to 31st July 1791	52,618
Third campaign, 1st August 1791 to 24th February 1792	21,162

Lord Cornwallis added a gratuity from the sum paid by Tipū; and the Court of Directors made a similar grant, and both Lord Cornwallis and General Medows magnanimously gave up their claims. In the result, the share of a Colonel amounted to £1,161, that of a Sergeant £29, and that of other ranks £14. As regards Indian troops, a Subādār got £27, a Havāldār £11, and other ranks £ 5.⁴⁶

The treaty which ended this war has been adversely criticised both by contemporary and later writers. Among contemporary writers, Lt. Mackenzie, who with Major Dirom, as we have seen, brings out in bold relief the critical position of Tipū during the last stage of the war, points to those who disapproved of the Treaty and the policy underlying it, and defends Lord Cornwallis against them. The critics, according to him, seem to have held that while the siege of Seringapatam—in the circumstances in which Tipū found himself—could have been easily turned by the Allies into an effective blockade and there was the opportunity of ridding themselves of Tipū, Lord Cornwallis, it was felt, lost it by showing kindness to one

A defence, by Lt. Mackenzie.

45. *Ibid.*, 557-558; Wilson, l.c., and Dirom, o.c., 271-272. See also and compare Kirmāṇi, o.c., 219-220.

46. Wilson, o.c., II. 292-293.

who had least deserved it. Mackenzie, writing of these adverse critics, says: ⁴⁷

" This glorious conclusion of the war was celebrated from the centre to the utmost extremities of the British Empire, with the most brilliant rejoicings; few indeed affected to disapprove of the treaty, and these were actuated by a desire of seeing the House of Hyder totally extirpated, without attending to the danger of throwing an addition of power into the hands of our northern allies. With men of judgment and experience, the peace was evidently calculated to ensure permanent as well as immediate advantages to the several European settlements in the east, for, whilst the loss of half his dominions would be fatal to his plan of conquest, the tranquillity of India would, in all human probability, be out of danger from the restless disposition of Tipoo Sultan for many years. His resources crippled, his treasures exhausted, his troops dispersed, his artillery reduced to wreck, the most stern policy could not have demanded further reparation for the insult offered to the British nation, in the attack of her ancient and faithful ally, the inoffensive Prince of Travancore."

In keeping with this, Major Dirom also speaks of the "moderation he (Tipū) met with from Lord Cornwallis" as having "proceeded from wisdom, and not from any apprehension of failing in the enterprise." ⁴⁸

And by Major
Dirom.

Wilks writes at length on this identical subject and his opinion is the more valuable, for it is based not only on authentic materials but it is eminently characteristic of him as a critic of policy. ⁴⁹

Wilks' opinion as a
critic of policy.

" In whatever degree the wisdom of those measures may have divided public opinion, the moderation of Lord Cornwallis

47. Mackenzie, *o.c.*, II. 237-238. See also and compare *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv, 2609-2611.

48. Dirom, *o.c.*, 245.

49. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 558-560; also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2611-2613 (quoting Wilks).

was eminently conspicuous, and universally acknowledged. That the desire of maintaining or establishing a balance of power had, according to the prevalent opinion, influenced his Lordship's determination, can nowhere be traced in his official correspondence. The treachery or imbecility of his allies, of whom one (the Mahrattas) had exhibited a total disregard of every obligation necessary to the success of combined measures: and the other, an incapacity to take any effective part in their execution, had undoubtedly rendered him long anxious for an early termination of the war, but constituted no part of the question at issue at the date of the preliminary treaty, when he had only to determine, whether he should be satisfied with anything short of the extinction of the House of Hyder, which, according to every information and appearance, would have followed the capture of the capital. The approach of Mahdajee Sindia to Poona, with views inimical to the English, might constitute a very important object of future consideration, but did not affect the question, limited to ten or fifteen days, of urging the siege to extremity, or consenting to a smaller sacrifice. Without, therefore, seeking altogether to exclude the influence of these considerations, they are certainly more doubtful than those which remain to be described.

"General opinion in England was averse to all war in India and would censure with peculiar asperity any result which might be tortured into evidence of premeditated conquest. The expediency of the earliest practicable termination of the contest, a proposition self-evident in every war, disputable with reference to conditions alone, and never to the abstract principle, had been strongly impressed on his Lordship's attention by the most recent despatches from the Court of Directors and the minister for Indian affairs; and the great national importance of being prepared to take any part that the exigency of events might require in those agitations which were about to convulse the whole European world, was too obvious to be absent from the mind of any statesman. But leaving, as is most candid in every practicable case, the author of a measure to assign his own motives, the decision itself, and the more immediate grounds on which

it was formed, are stated with the greatest clearness and simplicity in his official despatches, before the negotiation, and during its progress. In the first of these documents, he declares, 'that to allow Tippoo to retain even a considerable portion of his present power and possessions at the conclusion of the war, would only, instead of real peace, give us an armed truce, and he should immediately reject any proposition of this nature; but that if such concessions were offered as would put it out of the enemy's power to disturb the peace of India in future, his Lordship would suffer no prospects, however brilliant, to postpone for an hour that most desirable event, a general peace.' (Abstract of Lord Cornwallis correspondence with the Government of Madras, given in their General Letter to England, dated 21st February 1792). In the second document, describing the nature of the measure in progress, he states his opinion 'that it would be more beneficial to the public than the capture of Seringapatam, and render the final settlement with the allies much more easy,' a most important consideration, which has been overlooked or undervalued in all the discussions on the subject. Those (his Lordship adds—General letter, dated 15th March 1792), whose passions were heated, and who were not responsible for consequences, would probably exclaim against leaving the tyrant an inch of territory, but that it was his duty to consult the real interest of the Company and the nation.

"Although in the sequel of his communications with the Sultaun, after the conclusion of peace, his Lordship's natural courtesy disposed him to the most conciliatory conduct and even to language indicating the direct hope of cordial amity, it is neither just nor necessary to infer so superficial an estimate of human nature, as should really calculate on friendship as the fruit of deep mortification. No adequate ground had intervened for changing the opinion delivered by his Lordship, in the official letter accompanying the definitive treaty, which describes Tippoo 'as a faithless and violent character, on whom no dependence could be placed.' It is necessary, therefore, to revert to his Lordship's professed determination to exact 'such conditions as should put it out of the Sultaun's

power to disturb the peace of India'; and it only remains to decide, whether this legitimate purpose, of which the English General had been the acknowledged master, was or was not effectually attained. The evidence of subsequent events will probably be deemed to amount to a negative answer; but candour cannot fail to add, that if, under the political circumstances of the moment, the entire extinction of the Mysorean power were really inexpedient, no farther reduction of that power could have been attempted without the imminent risk of being forced into the extreme alternative."

Among modern writers, Lewin B. Bowring takes a view not wholly dissimilar to that of Wilks, though he has a word of defence for the soldier-statesman and the conditions under which he was acting. He observes:⁵⁰

"In estimating Lord Cornwallis' policy, it must be remembered that soldiers are ordinarily more generous than other negotiators to a conquered foe and that he deprecated a further conflict which would entail a great sacrifice of life. Moreover, he was probably fettered by restrictions placed upon him by the E. I. Company, who, while unwittingly founding an empire, were still walking in commercial leading-strings. Tipu was undoubtedly an usurper, as his father had been before him; the lawful Mysore Raja, though a captive, was still alive; and Tipu had not hesitated to avow himself the implacable enemy of the English. The Sultan was hemmed in all sides, and Seringapatam must inevitably have fallen had the siege been prosecuted. It must be confessed, moreover, that it was a dubious policy to restore to power a bitter foe, thus enabling him to resume an hostile attitude which eventually compelled Lord Mornington to crush for ever the despot's arrogance.

"Cornwallis was of opinion that he had effectually curbed Tipu's power of disturbing the peace of India, a mistaken idea of which subsequent events showed the fallacy. The restoration of the lawful Mysore dynasty does not appear to have

50 *Ibid.*, 2613-2614 (quoting L. B. Bowring's *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*).

been contemplated nor would the captive Raja have been able to maintain his rule unsupported by British troops. The territory held by his predecessors at the time of Haider Ali's usurpation formed but a portion of the Mysore dominions in 1792. These considerations were probably factors in inducing Lord Cornwallis to refrain from the extreme measure of dethroning Tipu Sultan."

Equally critical is Lt. Col. L. H. Thornton, who

Lt. Col. L. H. writes:⁵¹
Thornton.

"It will have been noted that Lord Cornwallis had held Tippoo in the hollow of his hand, and there were not wanting critics to say that the Governor-General had been too lenient; that he should have crushed the Sultan completely, and have erased the State of Mysore from the list of future possible belligerents. Apart from the fact that he was by nature inclined to moderation in all things, Lord Cornwallis had adopted a lenient attitude in dealing with Tippoo for two reasons. In the first place, the public at home was strongly opposed to further conquests in India. The terms enforced on Tippoo were in consequence accorded a favourable reception in Parliament, being in accordance with the trend of public opinion. They none the less were opposed by a small but noisy group who denounced in one breath the inception, conduct, and termination of the war. Lord Porchester, indeed, a member of this group, the spirit of faction blinding him to all sense of justice, declared that Lord Cornwallis had gone to war for reasons of avarice. Well might the Governor-General, mindful of his personal renunciation in the matter of gratuity and prize-money, exclaim that he regretted sometimes that he was not within reach of Lord Porchester's ears. The other reason which influenced Lord Cornwallis was his desire to maintain the balance of power in India. To Henry Dundas he wrote: 'We have effectually crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable.' The Governor-General was afraid that if he completely destroyed the military power of Mysore, he would place the Mahrattas in a position of

51. L. H. Thornton, *Light and Shade in Bygone India*, 218-219.

such preponderance that a conflict between them and the British for supremacy would be inevitable. Actually, as it turned out, Tippoo, before seven years had passed, had recovered to such an extent as to become a grave menace again to peace, and the East India Company was put to vast expense in crushing him, this time once and for all. There followed, as had been anticipated by Lord Cornwallis, a struggle with the Mahrattas. This struggle was indeed inevitable, but it might have been undertaken without the expense of another war with Tippoo, had Lord Cornwallis adopted sterner measures in 1792. Few things, however, are easier than to be wise after the event."

Dr. Vincent A. Smith, another writer on the subject, also admits that subsequent events proved that Lord Cornwallis' policy cost another war, which could well have been avoided by a most drastic treatment of an implacable enemy. He refers to General Medows' view, which proposed the dethronement of Tipū and the restoration of the country to its Hindu rulers, the policy finally adopted by the Marquess of Wellesley, but does not enlarge on it. Adopting the opinion that the annexation of the whole of Mysore would have displeased both the Nizām and the Mahrattas, he says it would have also offended public and official opinion at home and contravened the policy of the Act of 1784. The partial annexation effected was approved by the Ministry of the time and Lord Cornwallis was promoted to the rank of Marquess. Subsequent events proved that both Lord Cornwallis and the Ministry had underestimated not only the capacity of Tipū for mischief but also the possibilities of a settlement based on the Mysore Treaty of 1782, which was ultimately adopted by Wellesley. General Medows, who was conversant with this treaty and had been in close touch with its negotiators and who was amongst the first to conceive the idea of

General Medows' view, in the light of the treaty of 1782.

bearding the lion in his own den by carrying the war into the extreme corners of Mysore, and had actually followed Colonel Fullarton in his march on Mysore by the Gajjalahatti Pass on the eve of the Treaty of Mangalore, was nearer the mark, when he suggested the restoration of the ancient Hindu Royal Family. Such a step, in his opinion, would not only have satisfied the altogether theoretical contention in favour of the balance of power but also done fair justice to the agreement of 1782, which, though to some extent based on expected ephemeral advantages which did not altogether materialise,

The story of the attempted suicide of General Medows, was essentially fair as between the Company and the King of Mysore. The

story has been told of the attempted suicide of General Medows, on the eve of the Treaty of Seringapatam, because it was a premature one, in the sense that it did not *follow* the capture of Seringapatam, but *preceded* it, thus countenancing the continuance of Tipu's authority in Mysore and postponing the Restoration of Hindu Rāj. Neither Mackenzie nor Dirom refers to this story; nor is it referred to by Wilks, who uni-

Kirmāṇi's circumstantial account of it.

formly writes appreciatively of Medows. Kirmāṇi, however, gives a circumstantial account of it in his *History of the Reign of Tipu Sultān*, which is worthy of note in this connection. After mentioning that the siege, which had just commenced, seemed to require "the sacrifice of multitudes of lives," the Allies, knowing "the fortitude and courage of the Sultān," sought the means of making peace, while the Sultān sent ambassadors to them with the same view, he writes :—

"On this day, General Medows, on returning to his tent, loaded a pistol and fired it off on himself; the ball, however, did not wound him mortally, but passed through the skin of his abdomen, and he had taken up another pistol (to put an end to himself), when Colonel Malcolm, the Adjutant-

General, hearing the report, rushed into the tent, seized the pistol and despatched an account of what had happened to the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Cornwallis immediately visited the General in his tent, and taking him by the hand, returned thanks to God that he was safe, and after consoling and comforting him with kind words, said,—‘at this precise period, peace is our best policy, for although taking the fort and making the Sultan a prisoner be easy, and allowing both the Sultan and fort fall into our hands, still, I am not satisfied respecting our confederates, who are sharers with us in all things; for in such a case, what good will result to the Company’s Government?—Indeed, after mature reflection, I am convinced this is the proper time to make peace’, and the General now agreed to the truth of these words.”

If the above story is true, it could only mean that General Medows and Lord Cornwallis fundamentally disagreed on the policy adopted by Lord Cornwallis, to which General Medows gave only reluctant adherence, after making known his positive dislike for it.⁵²

During the progress of the war, just about the time that Bangalore was taken (March 21, 1791), a fresh attempt appears to have been made by the Loyalists for the restoration of the ancient Royal family. The oppression and cruelty which Tipū exercised, particularly his mad attempt at forcibly converting his own Hindu subjects, especially the highest classes amongst them, had driven them to seek desperate remedies to put a final end to his power. The discontent among the dispossessed *Pāḷegārs* was so great that they became willing partners in a well organized attempt to uproot the usurpation. The highest officers serving under Tipū, too, had grown weary of his exactions and tortures and religious frenzy, and Hindu and Moslem

52. V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, 561, f. n. 1; Kirmāṇi, *Tipu Sultan*, 218-219; also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2614-2616 (citing these authorities).

seem to have made up their minds that the time was ripe for ending the unbearable tyranny. Whether the Mahārāṇi lent any support to the idea and if so, to what extent, is not by any means clear. The authorities—both Wilks and Kirmāṇi, whose accounts are based on contemporary information gathered within a short period of the final fall of Tipū—are wholly silent on the matter. From the general testimony borne by these authorities, it might be inferred that this latest attempt, unlike its predecessors, was one in which officials, subjects and dispossessed *Pāḷegārs* played a predominant part. The Intelligence Department organized by Lord Cornwallis, under Captain William Macleod, aided the Loyalist leaders to an extent that it is difficult to conceive of at this distance of time. Col. Alexander Read, who commanded at Āmbūr, and afterwards became famous as the preceptor of Munro in revenue matters, proved highly active in winning over the discontented *Pāḷegārs*, who kept close connection through *hircarrahs* with the Loyalist leaders at the capital and elsewhere. The British Intelligence Department was not only efficient; it had also

Kirmāṇi's account of the alleged British connection with the Loyalists.

unlimited command of means for obtaining all possible information at the most moderate expense. Kirmāṇi thus writes of Read's work:—

“Colonel Read, the Darogha of the Intelligence Department, who was appointed to the command of Amboor Gurh, with great address, and by the liberal distribution of money, sweet words, and kind actions, brought over to his side the whole of the Poligars of the Balaghaut, who from the oppression and cruelty of the late Nawab, and the tyrannical character of the Sultan, had abandoned their own country, and had sought refuge in the towns of the Karnatic Payanghaut; such as the Poligar of Gungoondi Pala (Kangundi Koppam); the sons of Bhyreh Koor, the Poligar of Chuk Balapoor; Pud Nair, the Poligar of Vinkut Giri Kote, who was residing at Charkul; Shunk Rayel, or Rawul, the Chief of Punganoor,

and besides these, the Poligars of Khut Koomnir, Mudunpalli, Anikul, Oonkus Giri, Cheel Naik, etc., all being dispossessed of their lands, received written assurances of protection, and were despatched to their own districts on condition they should collect and forward supplies of forage and provisions to the English army; and they also received authority to retake or recover (by any means) their own districts and talookas; and, notwithstanding the severe restrictions in the Balaghaut, where without passes from the heads of districts, a man was not permitted to go from one town to another, he, Colonel Read, obtained maps of the whole of the country, by sending clever spies and able *moonshis* at great expense, dressed as merchants into that country, and by their agency or mediation, also, several chiefs and officers of Sirkar Khodadad, having been brought over to his interest, he sat waiting the arrival of the Governor-General, and although a certain Syud Imam, previously private intelligencer to Colonel Read, who was residing at the Capital (Puttun), had obtained employment in the Sultan's service; still, he wrote and despatched correct intelligence on all subjects, continually to Colonel Read, and he also had assembled a number of traitors to his aid; when all at once the dish of his detection and shame appeared from beneath the blanket (in allusion to some Persian custom, or game, apparently), for his treachery by reason of some correction he had given to a boy, his servant or slave, was published to the world; and at length certain of the Sultan's faithful servants seized him and his boy and brought them before the presence, and detailed all the circumstances of his treachery; this doomed man, therefore, fell under the heavy displeasure of the Sultan, and he was asked by him, what have you been doing? 'If you tell the truth, you may by that means save your life for a time.' In these difficulties this foolish man made up a story with truth and falsehood intermixed, and wrote the names of several officers who had leagued with him in his treachery, and presented them to the Sultan, and according to this list of names, fifteen persons, such as Lalla Khan Bukhshi of Punganoor, Mir Nuzzur Ali, Mekkubdar, and his brother, and Ismael Khan Risaldar, etc., were seized and given over in charge to the executioner, and

after the proof or establishment of the secret intelligence of writer's guilt (Islam Khan's), the Sultan asked him, 'how he who had eaten his salt could have acted so treacherously, and what punishment he thought such conduct deserved?' The culprit, however, returned no answer, and the Sultan then said, 'send this gentleman with the rest of his companions;' and he was also put to death.

"Another person, also, named Imam Uddin, a news-writer, who had been employed in the same work and who resided at Kolar and Nandi Gurh, hearing this news at night, fled from the place to Kurumpaut, depending on Sauthgurh. Still, however, notwithstanding the disclosure of all this treachery, and the execution of his hired dependants, Colonel Read did not abstain from his intrigues and projects."

At Seringapatam suspicion fell on Krishna Rao (the "Kishen Row" of Wilks). Krishna Rao from all accounts was one of the ablest and highly trusted officers of Tipū. He had served under Haidar as well and had risen from the ranks. He was, it would appear, a Mahratta Brāhman, good at accounts and revenue matters, and with an uncommon head for offering sound advice in matters military at the most critical situations. He had combined with Pūrpaiya in making easy the succession of Tipū on the death of his father. He was one of the two who kept secret Haidar's death and controlled the army until Tipū's arrival and taking over charge of the same. He had followed Tipū in his expeditions. He was present at the taking of Permacoil, where, as head of the Treasury (*Tōshe-Khāne*), he settled the ransom due from the people and collected on the spot a large sum of money from the people who had sought refuge in the fort. He it was that offered advice to Tipū to try a diversion on Trichinopoly to draw off General Medows from his design of invading Mysore from the Caveripuram Pass, a ruse that was wholly successful.

Krishna Rao of the *Tōshe-Khāne* suspected of treachery to Tipū at Seringapatam.

He was present at Bangalore when it was taken by Cornwallis and so far enjoyed the confidence of Tipū as to be deputed by him, on the eve of its fall, to go into the fort and bring away all the property in it, including guns and treasure, the *harem* and the families of his officers—the uniform pledge he exacted from them—a task which Krishna Rao executed with the promptitude that usually characterised his actions. Their removal effected, he arranged for their safe despatch to Seringapatam, where they arrived without accident. Such was the man who was suspected by Tipū of treachery towards himself, on the mere accusation of a discontented relation (of Tipū), whose defalcations he had made public. No wonder Wilks stigmatises in strong language what he calls “the mean and merciless character” of Tipū as

Wilks' account of his victimisation and death.

disclosed in actions of this nature. The story of how this able functionary was done to death is told by Wilks in a passage which deserves to be quoted, both as illustrating certain aspects of the character of Tipū and the extent of the discontent that had resulted from his ill-judged and cruel measures :—

“One of his emissaries was unfortunately detected at this period, with a letter in the Canarese language, concealed in his hollow bamboo or walking stick. The Sulṭaun, as we shall hereafter perceive, in reviewing the measures of his reign, had reasonable cause for distrusting all Bramins, and such were all his secretaries for the languages of the south. A relation of his own (the brother-in-law of Seyed Saheb) who read the Canarese language, was entrusted with the examination of the letter, and the writer was seized; formerly a Bramin, but forcibly circumcised, and now named Mahommed Abbas. The name of Sheshgere Row, brother of the treasurer Kishen Row, was implicated, and before he could be seized, he had heard of the accusation, and fled to his brother at Seringapatam; the treason seemed alarming and extensive, and Tippoo ordered the writer of the letter to be brought into his presence. Abbas

perceived his death to be inevitable, and he resolved that it should be exemplary; he denied no part of his own imputed guilt, but boldly declared that no torture should compel him to implicate others. 'And how long,' said Tippoo, 'have you been a traitor?' 'From the period,' replied he, 'that you began to circumcise Bramins and destroy their temples.' He was put to death, by being publicly dragged round the camp, at the foot of an elephant; but the treasurer, Kishen Row, with three brothers, including Sheshgere Row, were privately tortured and despatched. With whatever mystery these affairs were conducted, the acknowledged execution of one of the most able and intelligent officers of the State, could not but excite very general observation, and one-half of the community continues under the impression, that as the letter was never submitted to the inspection of a Bramin, the imputed participation of Kishen Row in any act of treachery, was a calumny invented by-Seyed Saheb, in revenge for retrenchments made some years before, in the accounts of Dindégul."

Wilks adds:

"I could never get Poornea, his colleague, to give an opinion. He kept aloof from enquiry; and of course from interposition, from the natural dread of consequences; and professed to have had no opportunity of forming a judgment."

No wonder that Purnaiya kept away from the inquiry.

Reflections on the
event.

If he had interested himself, he would have been implicated and what that meant is known from the fate that befell Krishna Rao himself. Later, but wholly untrustworthy, accounts have suggested that Purnaiya was jealous of Krishna Rao and left him to his fate without even putting a word of intercession on his behalf from entirely selfish motives, if he did not indeed connive at his unnatural despatch. There is no evidence whatever to support this belief still current in the land. Purnaiya had nothing to gain from the disappearance of Krishna Rao; both were equals in the service; and if anything, Purnaiya stood even higher than Krishna Rao in the

esteem of Tipū and his mother, to whose word the son paid great respect. There being no motive for such unfriendliness, the charge laid against Pūrṇaiya cannot but be dismissed as both unjustified and groundless. Accounts current to this day state that Krishna Rao was really innocent of the designs of the Loyalists and that his death was compassed by his enemies, who were many. The manner in which he was actually put to death is not mentioned by Wilks but tradition states that he was bodily lifted by jetties and thrown into a boiling cauldron of oil, in which he perished. The executions took place at Seringapatam before the departure of Lord Cornwallis from Bangalore (May 3, 1791).

Kirmāṇi, in his account of the affair, sets out the reasons that impelled Tipū to take extreme measures against Krishna Rao.

Kirmāṇi's account.

His version suggests that he was in league with the invading English army, to whom he is supposed to have supplied information. Though baseless, this version indicates what was popularly believed at the time both by Tipū and his informants. Kirmāṇi thus writes detailing Tipū's arrangements for the defence of Bangalore fort :—

“ It was, therefore, determined by the advice of certain of the Sultān's councillors, that the defence of the fort should be left to Monsieur Lally, and that Kumr-uddin Khān and Syud Sāhib with a strong force should be appointed to make a demonstration against the English army, while the Sultān himself should march to arrest the progress of the Moghuls (the Nizām's troops) and the Mahrattas. In pursuance of this arrangement, the French officer (Lally) actually marched, and had arrived at the tank or reservoir (Basavangudi) of the canal, when Kishn Rao and some other traitors, becoming acquainted with this plan, gave a hint to the English Harkāras, who were always about them habited as their own servants, and they immediately apprised the guards in the trenches that now the time had arrived to make an assault and take the fort. Kishn Rao after this left the fort, and at the

bank of the tank above mentioned, meeting Monsieur Lally, took him by the hand and kept him in conversation about trifles, while the officers in the trenches as soon as they received the information mentioned before, immediately got their troops in readiness and a little after midnight, all at once made their attack. Syud Humid, the Sipahdār, and the Killadārs (commanders of the garrison), according to the directions of the traitor Kishn Rao, had allowed their men who were all prepared to defend the fort, to go to their quarters and cook their victuals, and, therefore, except a few sentinels, no one remained at their posts, but notwithstanding their helpless condition, they boldly advanced to repel their assailants, and drove them back from the chain of the gate. The Europeans, however, having been quickly supplied with the wine (or rather spirituous liquor), which inspires courage, returned to the charge, and by the time the brave garrison had assembled, they had stormed and mounted the walls and towers. The Syud, being without his men and seeing he could not maintain his ground, escaped and joined the army. The two Killadārs with forty or fifty of their men planting their feet manfully at the gate were there slain, as was Shaikh Boodhun Risāldār, after giving manifold proofs of his courage and fidelity. Shaikh Oonsur Sipahdār and the Naikwars (the Nairs or Hindu chiefs) and soldiers of the fort were taken prisoners. The fort, therefore, was captured and the garrison with their women and children, and their money and property of all kinds, fell into the possession of the English soldiers."

After the loss of Bangalore, Kīrmāni states, Tipū lost his balance and ordered the indiscriminate execution of several of his officers. Among these were Jōgaiya-Paṇḍit, the nephew of Achanna-Paṇḍit, better known as Rāja Bīrbal, and Rāja Rāmachandra Phadak, the Subādār of Arcot, who was the Sheristedār of Bangalore and adjacent taluks, who was also suspected of leaguings with the British; the Pālegārs of Rāyadurg and Harapanahalli, "because," we are told by Kīrmāni, "the fire of the Sultān's wrath burned fiercely, at the bare mention of the names of the Poligars." At about this time, Krishṇa Rao was, we are told, sent by Tipū "to take charge of the capital (Serīngaputtan), and to despatch money for the

payment of the troops, while the Sultān himself with the army and its departments marched in pursuit of the English army to Balapoor Khoord."

What followed may be told in Kirmāṇi's own words :

"The brave and powerful Sultān with his victorious army had at this time turned the head of his generous steed towards the English army with the intention to attack it, when a *jasoos*, or spy dressed in a suit of mourning, arrived, sent by his mother from Seringaputtun, and this man in private informed the Sultān that the villain Kishn Rao, conspiring with some other traitors, had so concerted and arranged that probably by this time a sedition had broken out in the capital, or would soon break out, the repression of which it would not be very easy to accomplish—he having followed the path of the rejected Khundi Rao, and had sent for a large body of English troops from Bombay, and that the Queen (the Sultān's wife) had given up all hope or care of her life. At hearing this intelligence, the Sultān despatched Syud Sāhib with a body of troops to provide for the security and order of his capital."

Kirmāṇi proceeds to relate :—

"When Syud Sāhib received orders to depart, he proceeded forthwith by the route of the Makri Jungul (? Māgadi) and Rai Droog (? Ramgiri Durg), and arrived at the capital of the Sultān, Seringaputtun, at midnight, and placed his encampment on this side of the river, while he himself with a few friends, and four or five hundred horse advanced to the gate of the fort, and before the appearance of the first light of the morning, called out to the guard at the gate to open it. As it happened that Assud Khān Risāldār and other loyal subjects of the Sultān had been appointed to the charge of this gate, they, pleased at the arrival of the Syud, opened the wickets, and he entered, and having stationed parties of his horse over different departments of the State, he proceeded to pay his respects to the Sultān's mother, and she seated herself in the Hall of audience. At this time, the commander of the troops at the capital, who was deeply implicated in the treason of the Brahman, finding his secret disclosed to the world, immedi-

ately repaired to Syud, and boasting of his own fidelity and loyalty, and condemning the folly and treason of the Brahman, persisted in demanding that he should be imprisoned. The Syud, therefore, despatched a Chobedār to summon Kishn Rao to the Hall of audience or Durbār, and, as he, being aware of his danger, returned for answer that it was unusual and unreasonable the Syud should send him orders, that he had nothing to do with him—his answer confirming the suspicion before entertained of his treachery, the Syud ordered the persons present to proceed to his house and seize him, and they forcing their way into his house and breaking open the door of his apartment, which he had bolted, or secured in the inside, they with their swords and muskets put him to death, and threw his body into the drain of the bazar, and his house was plundered, and the property found in it carried to the treasury. During the last moments, however, of this fiend, he said—'I have lighted up a fire, which, as long as the Sultān lives, will not be extinguished'—this, alas, was but too true."

Krishna Rao's wife, a beautiful, faithful and virtuous lady, was, according to one version, adds Kirmāni, "tyrannically forced," after her husband's death, into the Sultān's own seraglio.

It is hardly necessary to invite attention to the radical difference that exists between the versions of Wilks and Kirmāni in regard to the connection of Krishna Rao with the ever-active Loyalist group

Radical difference
between the versions
of Wilks and Kirmāni.

—necessarily described as "traitors" to Tipū—and to the different verdicts they pass on him. While Wilks holds him innocent, Kirmāni holds him guilty of walking in the footsteps of Khandē Rao and leaguering with the English at Madras and at Bombay. Whether Krishna Rao was in the attempt or not, it is clear that the moral basis—if any—of Tipū's administration had been sapped to its foundations by Tipū's own unbridled acts, and people were not only tired of him but also actively

against him. If only Lord Cornwallis had pressed his terms hard, he could have ended the tyranny at once and thus saved the people of Mysore and the Company another war. But, as stated already, he was too noble, too generous, too highminded and too much tied down by the Company's injunctions and by the barren theory of balance of power, rejected by so good an authority as Sir John Malcolm, to seem exacting with even such an unfaithful neighbour as Tipū.⁵³

53. *Vide*, on the entire section, Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 174-176, 182-184, 187-188, 189-193; and Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 449-451, with f.n.; also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2615-2625 (quoting from these sources). The statements in the last mentioned work (on pp. 2621, 2622) regarding Krishna Rao's innocence of the designs of the Loyalists and the baselessness of Kirmāṇi's version about his (Krishna Rao's) treachery to Tipū during the siege and defence of Bangalore (March 1791) should be noted for a correct understanding of Tipū's state of mind at the time and its consequences to himself. As to the course of internal affairs which made Tipū unpopular to the people of Mysore, *vide* Ch. XVI below.

CHAPTER XVI.

KHĀSĀ CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VIII,

1776-1796—(contd.)

Internal affairs: Tipu's innovations, 1784-1786—The military system; the infantry; the cavalry; effect of the changes—Tipu's assumption of the title of *Padshah*, 1786—His desire for foreign curiosities, etc., 1786—Further innovations, 1787; formation of administrative divisions; fixing up of boundaries; the issuing of the *Hukum-Nameh*; issuing of the *Imami* coins and the introduction of the *Mauladi* or *Muhammadi* year; the reformation of the Calendar; destruction of Mysore town and fort—Attempted assumption of the role of a Prophet, 1788—Other changes, c. June 1788: Augmentation of infantry: substitution of Friday for Sunday for the *nowbat*—Embassy from Nizam Ali, c. June-July 1788; classification of the army, August-December 1788—Embassies to Constantinople and France, 1784-1787—The story of the second embassy to Constantinople, 1785-1789—Attempted assumption of the further distinction of royalty, 1789-1790; directs the formation of a throne of gold, 1790; the adoption of the tiger stripe; codification of domestic manners and morals of Islam—Defence measures, 1790-1792: the spirit of innovation pervading them—Tipu's failure to ascend the throne, c. 1792—Other measures (down to 1792): Commercial arrangements—Fiscal and revenue arrangements; Tipu, as the enforcer of prohibition—Police and judiciary—The navy—The Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam (March 18, 1792) and after; payment of the war indemnity, etc.—Changes in civil and military affairs after the *Treaty*: Tipu's increasing predilection for Islam; displacement of Hindus by Muhammadans in the offices; the consequences of the measure; the oppression and tyranny of Mir Sadik, the Dewan—Confiscation of funds of Hindu temples, etc.—Tipu's administrative and

other blunders—The return of the hostages, 1794; renaming of the brigades of the army, etc., 1794-1795—Tipu and the reigning Hindu sovereign (down to 1796): the Dasara in Mysore as described in 1783; the King; the Palace, Durbar, etc.—Death of Khasa-Chamaraja Wodeyar, April 17, 1796: suspected murder.

FROM the measures of external policy, described thus far, which, as we have seen, led to the abstraction of one-half of the dominions of Mysore,

Internal affairs.

we may turn to those of internal administration, introduced by Tipu since his accession to power in 1783, and prominently mentioned in his own memoirs as the "incomparable inventions and regulations." These professed and formal regulations for the conduct of affairs had commenced before his departure from Mangalore, with the aid of his great innovator, Zain-ul-Abidin Shoostri, and embraced either directly or incidentally every department in the science of government. Regulations, military, naval, commercial and fiscal, police, judicature and ethics, were embraced by this modern Minos, and his reformation of the calendar and of the system of weights and measures was to class him with those philosophical statesmen and sovereigns, of whose useful labours the Secretary (Zain-ul-Abidin) had obtained some obscure intelligence. It

Tipu's innovations,
1784-1786.

may be stated regarding the whole that since his return to Seringapatam in 1784 the name of every object was changed: of cycles, years and months, weights, measures, coins, forts, towns, offices, military and civil, and the official designations of all persons and things without one exception—a singular parody of what was transpiring elsewhere at the time (in France) between the extremes of unbridled democracy and uncontrolled despotism, a system of subversion, as sweeping and indiscriminate, as

if the axiom were familiarly established that everything is wrong because it exists.¹

The administration itself was named the *Sarkār-Khodadād* or God-given Government.

The military system. The army, the mainstay of authority,

was enlarged so as to include the *Asad Ilāhi* and *Ahmadi* corps, the former consisting of Chēlas from the Coromandel, and the latter comprising of the Portuguese Nazarenes (Christians) of the West Coast captured by Tipū on his return from Mangalore (1784) and converted into Islām and formed into battalions of five hundred each, as well as the prisoners taken from Coorg, also converted to Islām and formed into eight *risālas* or regiments (1785-1786). Obsolete Persian and Turkish were substituted for all French or English words of command in the military regulations, and a separate treatise called *Futhul-Mujāhideen* ("Triumph of the holy warriors") was written by Zain-ul-

The infantry. Abidin and his system was confirmed.

The organization of companies, battalions and brigades was frequently varied, and was sometimes made to include a body of cavalry, and to become a sort of legion, and at other times it changed the proportions of artillery to infantry. Thus, from the regular infantry, five thousand men being selected, they were named a *Kushoon*, and the officer commanding

1. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 563, 565; Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 80-81, 88. Among the forts whose names were changed were: Chitaldrug (called *Furrokh yab Hissar*), Gooty (*Fyze Hissar*), Bellary (*Sumr Puttun*), Pennkonda (*Fukhrabad*), Pāvagada (*Khutnigarh*), Sira (*Bustumābād*), Nandidurg (*Gurdōn Shukoh*), Dēvanhalli (*Yusufābād*), Punganūr (*Darussuroor*), Māgadi (*Sawangarkh*), Bul or Balam (*Munzurālad*), Coorg (*Zufurābād*), Calicut (*Islāmābād*), Dindigal (*Khalikābād*), Sankaridurg (*Muzuffarābād*), Krishnagiri (*Fulk-il-asum*), Mysore (*Nuzurābād*)—Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 88. Kirmāni, however, dates these changes in 1782-1783, though, according to the context and Wilks, they actually took place subsequent to Tipū's return from Mangalore, *i.e.*, during 1784-1786. Among other places which bore new names during Tipū's period were Mangalore (*Giorial Bundur*, cf. *Corial Bundur* or *Port Royal* of Haider), Cochin (*Koochi Bundur*), etc., (*Ibid*, 16, 155).

that body was called a *Sipāhdār*. In each *Kushoon* were four *Risāldārs* or colonels of infantry, and one of cavalry, and under the orders of each *Risāldār* or colonel, were ten *Jowkidārs* or captains, and on that scale or proportion one hundred men being a *Jowk*, the chief of them was called a *Jowkidār*, and every *Jowk* or company included two *Sur Kheil*, ten *Jamādārs* and ten *Duffadārs*. In the regiments of troop or regular horse, which were formed and appointed after the manner of Europeans, the *Teepdār* and *Subādār*, called Major and Adjutant in the French and English languages, were styled *Youzdār* and *Nakib*. In distinction to the *Nakib* of the *Kushoon* and *Risāla*, he who was called *Yussakchi* had his name changed to *Shurbushurn*. The officer commanding three or four *Teeps* (regiments of cavalry) was called *Mōkubdār*. The *Bār-Cuchēri* (regular infantry) was known as the *Jysh-Cuchēri*; the troop or regular horse *Cuchēri* as the *Uskeri-Cuchēri*; and the *Bundeh* or slave *Cuchēri* as the *Asad-Ilāhi-Cuchēri*. The practical effect of the whole system of his infantry was considerable expertness in the use of the musket, and a respectable degree of facility in the evolutions most commonly

The cavalry. required on service.² In the cavalry, besides a formation of regiments never effectually organised, Tipū's most remarkable change was the abolition of the martingale,

2. *Ibid.*, 277-279, 282, 565-566; Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 31-32, 82-83; and Kirkpatrick, *Select Letters*, pp. 57-60. See also and compare Stewart, *Memoirs*, 51-52. Kirmāni frequently refers in his work to Tipū's system of government as *Khodadād Sarkār* (God-given Government), and this is reflected in Tipū's letters also (see, for instance, Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, App. H.). In keeping with this is the Memoir of Tipū Sultān written by himself and entitled *Tarikhi-Khodadādy*, i.e., *Khodadādy Annals* or History of the *Khodadād Sarkār*, a work which has come down in an imperfect state (see Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Preface, xviii). The *Futuh-ul-Mujahideen* of Zain-ul-Abidin, said to be a work of eight chapters, has come down in three chapters, (the third, fourth and fifth), which Col. Kirkpatrick has noticed in nine sections dealing mostly with Tipū's military organization,

which he considered in his instructions as rendering the horse obedient but cramping in his powers. The general tendency of the

Effect of the changes effected in the whole of his changes.

military establishment was to increase and improve his infantry and artillery at the expense of the cavalry, and this was doubtless among the causes of that superiority which he attained over his Indian adversaries in the campaigns of 1786-1787, and later became the most decided source of inferiority in his contest with the English power.³

Tipū's return from Coorg in January 1786 was not only marked by the circumcision of the greater part of the inhabitants taken prisoners there, but also by the proclamation of the royal dignity of the title of *Pādshah*, which he had determined to assume. His intention does not seem to have been publicly announced, but all Muslims were summoned to attend the reading of the Khutba at the mosque of the Lāl Bāg. Rumour had announced that something extraordinary was to occur, and an immense crowd was assembled. The officiating priest does not even seem to have been entrusted with the secret, and Ali Razā ascended the pulpit. When he came to

Tipū's assumption of the title of *Pādshah*, 1786.

mentioned above (see Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, App. I. pp. lxxvii-lxxviii). Stewart refers to this work as "a code of Military Regulations, compiled by Tippoo Sultan, part of which have been translated and published by Mr. B. Crisp of Bengal" (see Stewart, *Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Library of Tippoo Sultan*, P. 93, Item No. XXXIV). The details set down by Kirmāni agree in the main with those described in the extracts from this treatise. As Col. Kirkpatrick, however, elsewhere observes, the *Futūh-Mujāhidiin*, referring merely to the formation of a single *Kushoon* of infantry, hardly states the total number of such *Kushoons* or furnishes any other data for estimating the aggregate strength of the army during the early part of Tipū's regime (Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, App. I. p. xciii). So mechanical, indeed, was the substitution of the Persian words into the military technique that, as Wilks remarks, Zaiṇul-Abidin himself "never lost the nickname of *Chep-geer-Dumuc*, his first word of command in the manual exercise" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 566, f.n.).

3. *Ibid*, 566-567; compare Stewart, *Memoirs*, l.c.

that part of the Khutba in which prayers are offered up for the reigning sovereign, instead of the name of Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor of the time, then customary over all the mosques of India, he substituted that of Tipū Sultān, to the entire astonishment of the great body of the auditors. And Tipū himself, in one of his official letters, conclusively assigned the reason that Shah Alam being the prisoner or servant of Sindhia and a mere cypher, none but an idiot could consider him as a sovereign. From this time onward, the Chobdārs and attendants were ordered, in announcing the salutations of persons who entered the durbar, to observe the formalities of the court of Delhi, and proclaim the presence of a king, by which title (*Pādshah*) he was ordered to be addressed and designated by all his subjects.⁴

Tipū's desire for foreign curiosities about this time is best reflected in a letter wherein he directs his ambassadors to France to procure from that country "a skilful physician, a pharmacopolist, thoroughly acquainted with, and capable of preparing, every kind of medicine known in Europe; and lastly, an able surgeon."⁵ His acquaintance

4. *Ibid.*, 294-295; also Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Letter No. CCCXXXI. Compare Stewart, *Memoirs*, 51. *Pādshah*: *Pāshah*. Persian *Pāshāh*, contraction for *Pādīshah*, meaning *Protector* or Great King, i.e., king of kings; Sultān of Sultāns. The term was later adopted by Turkey. In Turkey, the term *Pāsha* signifies a military, civil or naval officer of high rank, his jurisdiction or district being called a *Pashalic*. *Sultān*: From Arabic; a prince; Muhammadan sovereign, of the Sultān of Turkey, who assumes the title of "Sultan of Sultans" (see *Turkey* in *Nuttall*). Sultān Muhammad, after taking Khorassān in his own name, ordered the name of the Sāmānis to be left out of the public prayers, and having soon after received an investiture from the Calif (the dispenser of powers which he himself no longer enjoyed), he declared himself an independent sovereign and first assumed the title of *Sultān*, since so general among Muhammadan Princes. Though not before adopted by the Mussulmans, it is an old Arabic word for king (see Elphinstone, *History of India*, 825, f.n. 2). As for the title "Sultan" as applied to Tipū, *vide* Appendix III--(4).

5. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Letter No. CCCCIX, dated December 3, 1786. As to the embassy to France, see below.

with physical science may be estimated by two letters addressed to Mons-Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, one acknowledging the receipt of "a *barometer*, complete in every respect, excepting the quicksilver, which, owing to its oldness, does not move up and down. It is therefore returned; and you are requested to send a good one, made in the present year." And the letter requests a certain instrument, and a Persian translation of an European treatise on its use, "in which it is written that at certain times, the quicksilver rises a certain number of degrees; and that if, at such times, a person afflicted with certain disorders, shall, during a paroxysm of the complaint, place his hand on the instrument, the ascent of the quicksilver will mark the height of the disease." In the first of these letters, the word *barometer* is used; in the second *howanuman*, literally shewing the air (the *hawāmāna* of Kannada, meaning state of weather). He appears to have received some obscure idea of the common or, perhaps, the differential thermometer; and desired to ascertain its application to medicine, a science in which he affected to be considered as a master, to the extent of frequently commanding, in his official letters, certain prescriptions for the cure of disorders. His system, like that of all Muhammadan physicians, was founded on the distinctions of the Greek schools, into hot, cold, moist, and dry; and among a multitude of absurdities, may be noticed one prescription, perhaps long untried, to prevent hydrophobia, by keeping open the wound for six months.⁶

Tipū again found himself employed in the enlargement of numerous innovations in the interior, since his return from the campaign against the Mahrattas about the middle

Further innovations,
1787.

6. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 564-565 (referring to Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, *Letters* Nos. CXV, dated September 12, 1785, CCCCXVII, dated December 28, 1786, and CCCCXX, dated December 29, 1786).

of the year 1787. He now divided the whole of the territory under his authority into three parts, each of which was distinguished by a different name. For instance, the country on the coast was called the *Suba Yum* (the sea); the cities and towns of the hilly and woody country the *Suba Turun*; and the open and level or champaign country the *Suba Ghubra* (the earth). The chief officers of *Parganas* also received the title of *Asof*. Round every city, town and fort, at the distance of one *fursung* ($4\frac{1}{2}$ miles), he erected a strong stockade with four gates, and to these he appointed vigilant guards, that no one without his authority and permission, and the signature or mark of the military governor, should be permitted to pass in or out, thus cutting off entirely the intercourse of foreign merchants and the commercial men of the country. In addition to this, Tipū stockaded the frontier between the limits of Mysore and the districts of the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt, from the boundaries of Dindigal and Karūr to the *ghāt* of Būdiḥāl and the limits of Kambam; and 12,000 foot-soldiers were stationed along the stockade as a cordon, in order to prevent any one from entering Mysore from the Pāyanghāt, or any one from quitting the Bālaghāt for that quarter. About this time a number of rules and regulations (*Hukum-Nāmeḥ*) were also issued for the different departments of Government, *viz.*, Revenue, Treasury, Seals of office, Heralds' office, Caravan Department, Kitchen, Hospital, Wardrobe, Armoury, Granary, Fortifications, etc., all compiled under the immediate inspection of the Sultān. Among other innovations introduced were the issuing of silver coins and rupees called *Imāmi*, having on the obverse

Formation of administrative divisions.

Fixing up of boundaries.

The issuing of the *Hukum-Nāmeḥ*.

Issuing of the *Imāmi* coins and the introduction of the *Maulādi* or *Muhāmmadi* year.

"The religion of Ahmud enlightened the world from the victories of Hydur," and on the reverse "He is the sole or only just King"; and the institution of the *Maulādi* or *Muhammadi* year, which is thirteen years in excess of the *Hijri*, being reckoned from the conclusion of the Prophet's office and the commencement of the duties of his mission.⁷ The

The reformation of
the Calendar.

new calendar consisted in the simple adoption of the Hindu cycle of sixty years, and the substitution of their year, consisting of twelve lunar months, with an embolismal month at stated periods, to make it correspond with the solar reckoning for the ordinary lunar year of the Muhammadans, which makes the beginning of every successive year recede eleven days, and thus make the round of all the seasons. The Hindu names of the years were fabricated from the scheme usually named *Abjud*. This having been adopted, ordered and circulated (in 1786), it was now discovered that it would be an improvement to adopt another and more simple scheme, by which the power of each letter depends on its place in the alphabet;

7. Kirmāpi, o.c., 142-144; also Wilks, o.c., II. 581-582, and Kirkpatrick, o.c., Preface, XXX (referring to the *Maulādi* or *Muhammadi* year). Kirmāpi dates these innovations roughly in 1787 (A. H. 1202). They actually took place in the latter part of the year, according to the context. As to the *Hukum Nāmah* issued by Tipū, see Stewart, *Catalogue*, pp. 98-94, Items Nos. XXXVII-L (fourteen volumes). Stewart further quotes the following *Note* by the Persian Secretary to the Governor-General of India as applicable to all the Regulations comprised in the *Hukum Nāmah*: "Tipoo Sultan, either with a view to denote in the most conspicuous manner his pretensions to absolute sovereignty and independence, or from the suggestions of pride and caprice, changed the era in use with all other Mussulman States, and altered the names and designations of all the offices of Government; of the divisions of territory, and terms of revenue; of the implements of war; of coins, weights and measures; substituting names of his own invention for those which are in use in every other part of Hindustan" (Stewart, o.c., 94).

As for the coins of Tipū, these were issued in the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth to seventeenth years of his period of office, corresponding to 1786, 1787, 1788, 1789, 1790, 1791 to 1799. For a detailed notice of these coins, *vide* Appendix IV—(4).

and the new edict was accordingly issued. The numerical letters composing the name of each year being added together, indicated the place of that year in the cycle; and the new names of the months were merely ordered, so that the first letter of each should shew its place in the year as in the alphabet, the twelve first letters of the alphabet being the initials of the new names of the twelve months.⁸ In November, Tipū

Destruction of
Mysore town and
fort.

ordered the destruction of the town and fort of Mysore and commenced the erection of another fortress on a neighbouring height, which he called *Nazarbār* (now going by the name of Nazarbad, a part of modern Mysore City). The very same stones were reconveyed to rebuild the same old fort of Mysore in 1799. The town was utterly destroyed, and the inhabitants were ordered to remove at their option to Ganjām on the island of Seringapatam or to Agrahār Brahmapuri, renamed *Sultānpet*, a little to the southward of Seringapatam.⁹

We have a typical instance of how Tipū, in his zeal for Islām, went even one step further than the middle of 1788, just after his successful campaign in Malabar.

Attempted assumption of the role of a Prophet.

8. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 582-583; also Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Preface, xxxii-xxxvii. "But it was a consideration", remarks Wilks critically on the Calendar, "which his (Tipū's) avocations and studies do not seem to have brought under review, that all chronology is set at defiance by reckoning from a particular date or era one part of the series in lunar years, and the remainder by the solar account" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 583). Kirkpatrick also, as he describes in his *Preface*, found it difficult to reconcile the dates in terms of Tipū's calendar.
9. *Ibid.*, 312; see also and compare Stewart, *Memoirs*, 53. "Agrar Bumboor" of Wilks is identical with the extant village of Brahmapuri Agrahār in the Seringapatam Taluk. Tipū's renaming of Brahmapuri near Seringapatam as *Sultānpet* in 1757 has an interesting parallel in the renaming of Brahmapuri as *Islāmpuri* by Aurangzib in 1699. According to Abdul Karīm's *Rauzatul Safa*, Aurangzib gave the new name to Brahmapuri in the course of his encampment there. The place is 20 miles s.e. of Pandarpur on the banks of the Bhīmā. Aurangzib stayed there for four years (1699-1703), despatching forces to other directions (Khafī Khān). (see Dr. M. A. Chaghtai's article on the Persian Ms. in the *BISM'S Quarterly* for October 1943).

The monsoon had commenced and he determined to march through the height of it to Coimbatore, answering those who attempted to dissuade him that he would order the clouds to cease discharging their waters, until he should have passed. Though it may be difficult to determine whether this was intended as an impious jest, or a blasphemous pretension, it is certain that about this period, he frequently placed his own exploits in the cause of religion, particularly in the number of his converts, above those of the celebrated Prophet. The word *Paigambar*, he said, signified no more than a bearer of tidings (to the uninstructed) and the Prophet was but such a man as Tipū Sultān. Pretensions of this extreme kind naturally gave great offence to the orthodox Muslims. However this may be, the clouds were not controlled and the army suffered the greatest hardships in their tedious march through the swamps, the floods and the unceasing torrents of rain, until their arrival at Coimbatore.¹⁰

The reforming tendency, however, continued to manifest itself. The Sultān had, during the last two years, been gradually increasing his infantry, and in preparation for the war which he now evidently contemplated as near, made a further augmentation, while at Coimbatore, of two *cuchēries* of infantry, amounting to 11,376 men.

At the same place, he employed himself, as he informs us, in a profusion of "new inventions and creations of the mind", an example of which is best furnished in the concluding page of his own *Memoirs*. "Aurangzebe",

10. *Ibid*, 318-319. Wilks, on this point, rightly observes: "If the Sultaun's arrogance had not been checked by the subsequent English war (i.e., War of 1790-1792), there is abundant reason to conjecture that, drunk with flattery and uncontrolled dominion, he would have openly claimed the apostolic character, and as his followers believe, a still more impious assumption" (Wilks, o.c., II. 318).

says he, "from the commencement of his reign, which happened on a Sunday, ordered the Substitution of Friday for the *nowbat*. five times on that day of the week: and for want of due consideration, the practice had since continued. His Majesty, the shadow of God, reflecting on this subject, ordered the substitution of Friday for this ceremonial. Because Sunday is appropriated by the Nazarenes; Saturday by the Jews; and Friday is the festival of the Mussulmans; and the excellence of that day is impressed on every mind by numerous traditionary texts. The Almighty, on that day, created the heavens; on that day occurred the martyrdom of the heads of the church; on that day commenced the flood of Noah, besides other holy coincidences. Therefore, in a propitious hour, when the Moon was in the mansion of Taurus, Mercury and Venus in the mansion of Virgo, the Sun in Leo, Saturn in Aquarius, and Venus in opposition to Libra—the royal mandate descended, directing the *nowbat* to be performed in the royal hall, and by all Mussalmans entitled to that distinction, five times every Friday."¹¹

About this time, Nizām Alī, taking advantage of the termination of the Mysore-Mahratta war of 1786-1787, had despatched an ambassador named Hāfiz Farid-ud-dīn Khān, who, in conformity to directions previously sent to Seringapatam, waited the Sultān's arrival at Coimbatore. This envoy was charged with the proposal of a strict and indissoluble union between these only remaining Muhammadan powers of the Deccan and the South. A splendid Korān was sent for Tipū's acceptance; and the return of a similar pledge was to establish the most sacred and solemn obligations of friendship and alliance. To this proposition Tipū

Embassy from
Nizām Alī, c. June-
July 1788.

11. *Ibid.*, 332-334.

agreed but demanded an intermarriage between the families as an essential preliminary, purely in the interests of Islām. But on this subject the envoy had no orders, and could give no reply. Thereupon Tipū sent an embassy in return, consisting of Kutubuddin Khān, Dowlat Zai Ali Razā (called Ārkāti) and Muhammad Ghiaus, who accompanied the envoy to Hyderabad, to negotiate further in the matter. Nizām Ali, however, distinguished between political union and the degradation which he attached to the proposed alliance, at which his pride recoiled; and the negotiation and the embassy terminated.¹²

On Tipū's return from the South to Seringapatam in August, four months were exclusively

Classification of
the army, August-
December 1788.

devoted to a classification of *Saiyids* and *Shaikhs* in his army into distinct brigades, leaving for the time being the

Patāns and *Mughals* to be intermixed with the Hindus.¹³

Meanwhile embassies with ludicrous pretensions had been sent twice to Constantinople

Embassies to
Constantinople and
France, 1784-1787.

(Room) and once to Paris. The first embassy to Constantinople, in 1784, under Othmān Khān, formerly Tipū's

valet, was apparently for the purpose of obtaining some preliminary information. The intelligence transmitted by this envoy of certain conferences then in progress between the English ambassador and the Grand Seignor appears to have hastened the second and principal embassy to that power, consisting of four persons, Ghulām Ali Khān, Lutf Ali Bēg, Shah Nūrullah and

12. *Ibid*, 334-335; also Kirmāni (o.c., 147-151), who waxes eloquently on Nizām Ali's rejection of Tipū's offer. Kirmāni mixes up this event with those of 1787, though, according to Wilks, it took place about June-July 1788, on and after his arrival at Coimbatore from Malabar.

13. *Ibid*, 321.

Muhammad Haneef, who departed in 1785; and on their arrival at Constantinople, Othmān Khān returned. The second embassy was instructed, after finishing the business committed to their charge, to proceed on a special mission to the court of France. But the Sultān, on hearing the personal report of Othmān Khān, changed this resolution and deputed by the more expeditious route of a sea-voyage, from Pondicherry, a direct embassy to France, consisting of three persons including Othmān Khān, in the beginning of 1787. And these envoys, after executing the objects of their mission, had returned and joined Tipū at Coimbatore (c. July 1788). A feud among them, originally excited on the occasion of receiving some valuable presents under orders of Louis XVI, eventually led to Muhammad Othmān informing against his colleagues who were disgraced.¹⁴

The second embassy to Constantinople, which was accompanied by a suite estimated at eleven hundred persons, embarked in 1785 on four ships, carrying, among other presents, four elephants, which all died before their arrival at Bussora on the Persian Gulf; and one of the ships was destroyed by fire at the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris. At Bussora, the envoys were hospitably received by the Governor, Sulaimān Pāsha; but were detained nearly three months, pending receipt of orders regarding the arrangements of their journey to Constantinople. During their detention at Bussora, the envoys visited the holy shrines of Nejef and Kerbela, and when leave

14. *Ibid.*, 361-362. Compare Stewart, *Memoirs*, 53-55. See also Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, *Letters* Nos. VII, CXCI, CCXII-CCXVI, CCXIX, CXXXII-CCXXXIII, CXXXVII, CCCC, CCCXIX, CCCCXIII, CCCCXXXIV (of 1785-1786), referring to these embassies. The other ambassadors to France were Muhammad Dervish Khān and Akbar Ali Khān (Wilke, *o.c.*, II. 361, f. n.).

arrived, they were conveyed by water to Bāgdād, and thence overland by Moosul and Diarbeker, to Constantinople. Some months elapsed before they could be presented to the Grand Seignor, and the visionary character of Tipū's views may be gathered from the objects sought to be secured by them during their interview with the Seignor. These were either to deliver up Mangalore in exchange for Bussora, or to obtain permission to erect a commercial factory at Bussora with exclusive privileges; and lastly, permission to dig a canal for the purpose of bringing the waters of the Euphrates to the holy shrine of Nejef. On this last proposition being translated, the Grand Vizier, it would appear, smiled, spoke Turkish to the Reis Effendi stating (as was understood) that if the thing was proper, it would be effected without the aid of the mighty Tipū Sultān, but he had the civility to answer, through the interpreter, that the application should be made to Sulaimān Pāsha, the Governor of Bussora. In fact, they had sounded him regarding this position while waiting in Bussora; and the Pāsha, who appears to have been a man of wit as well as courtesy, replied with suitable gravity that the suggestion had once been made in days of yore, but had been forbidden in the dream or revelation of a saint, and that, without some communication of assent from the invisible world, the project could not be resumed! There was no other professed interview of business, and the envoys were treated with every courtesy and distinction and entertained with a variety of public spectacles, at one of which they exhibited the evolutions of their sepoy escort. But the political ills of the mission were greatly exceeded by their physical misfortunes. The plague commenced its ravages, and before their departure from Constantinople, five hundred and sixty-five persons had fallen victims to it. Their orders to proceed to France were unrevoked

but they had expended a large portion of their money, and the funds were insufficient for that purpose. The plague had alarmed them unduly, and desiring to be expedited home by whatever route, they at length embarked for Alexandria, where they received private intelligence of the separate embassy by sea to France. From Alexandria they sailed up the Nile to Cairo and thence crossed the Suez. From Suez they sailed to Jedda, and thence performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. While at Mecca, the Sheriff, finding that a portion of the diplomatic funds still remained untouched, gave a friendly intimation of his requiring a loan to that amount, and Ghulām Alī escaped this robbery by a singular device. He forged a letter which he caused to be brought in by an express camel-courier in the night. The messenger was of course stopped by the guards of the Sheriff, one of whose officers was ordered to accompany him to the quarters of the embassy, and the despatch was read aloud in his presence. It contained intelligence of a great victory over the last of Tipū Sultān's enemies in India, and the preparation of a numerous fleet for the purpose of occupying the holy cities with an army capable of renewing the first triumphs of Islām. Discreet rejoicings ensued at the quarters of the embassy, and secret terrors in the councils of the Sheriff. The loan was no longer wanted, and the embassy hastened to its port of embarkation, whence it arrived at Calicut on the 28th of December 1789, the very day of Tipū's repulse from the Lines of Travancore; and shortly afterwards in camp, just five years after taking leave at Seringapatam, bringing back alive to Mysore sixty-eight of the eleven hundred who had arrived in safety at Constantinople. The cost of the embassy was estimated at Rupees twenty lakhs, and besides return presents of ornamented sword and shield and friendly and

congratulatory letters from the *Viziers*, the only value received in turn, as was silyly observed, was a *firman* from the Sultān of Constantinople and sixty-five half quires of journal worth about five rupees! But Tipū, attributing no part of this result to his own folly and ignorance, ascribed the whole to the unskilfulness or dishonesty of Ghulām Alī Khān, who was soon divested of all his employment and ordered to confine himself to his house. During the investigation which preceded this result, Tipū one evening directed one of the officers-in-waiting to call the *man-eaters*. The officer stared; and Tipū explained by desiring him "to call the men who had lately returned from Room (Constantinople) after eating their companions". This joke became current, and as long as its novelty lasted, the ambassadors were distinguished by the nick-name of the *man-eaters*!¹⁵

The royal state and title (*Pādshah*) had been, as we have seen, assumed by Tipū in 1786, and his power and arrogance may be deemed to have reached their summit already in 1789. It was shortly after the return of the second embassy to Constantinople, described above, and Tipū's own return to Seringapatam in May 1790 after his attack on the Travancore Lines, that he, according to the suggestions of the *Viziers* of Room (Constantinople) and the advice of his faithful Amīrs, collected all the treasures of the State, or rather assumed the pomp and splendour of royalty, and directed the formation of a throne of gold, ornamented with jewels of great value in the shape of a tiger, a figure from the first most

Attempted assumption of the further distinction of royalty, 1789-1790.

Directs the formation of a throne of gold, 1790.

15. *Ibid*, 362-367; see also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 144-145), who sets down this event to the years 1788-1787 (A.H. 1198-1202). As to Tipū's projected construction of an aqueduct from the Euphrates to the holy shrine of Nejef, see also Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, *Letters* Nos. CXXXIII (dated 1st March 1786) and CCCC (dated 19th November 1786).

approved by him, and signified also by his own name (*Tippoo*, lit. tiger).¹⁶ From now, the adoption of the

The adoption of
the tiger stripe.

tiger stripe in the uniform of the infantry, and as a distinctive ornament in the palaces, in casting guns, and on all the insignia of royalty, was founded on this name. Royal tigers were chained in the court of entrance of Tipū's residence, and the construction of the throne was made to conform to the same terrific emblem. A tiger, rather exceeding the full size, of pure gold, and well fashioned, the eyes and teeth of appropriate stones, was the support of the throne; and from a richly ornamented canopy, was suspended over the throne a fluttering *humma*, formed of beautiful precious stones, in conformity to the poetical fancy that the head on which its shadow falls is destined to be encircled with a crown. One branch of the national festivity was to have been the solemnization of 12,000 marriages on one and the same day. A separate code was also prepared about the

Codification of domestic manners and morals of Islām.

same period for regulating domestic manners and morals. A draft of one of these in the Sultān's handwriting was to the following effect: "The faithful shall dine on animal food on Thursday evening, and on no other day of the week, on the same evening and no other *uxores suas amplexu tenere licet*." ¹⁷

16. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 145; see also and compare Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 530. Kirmāṇi, however, sets down this event to 1787 (A. H. 1202) and Wilks to 1786. But, in the light of the context as recorded by both the writers, the construction of the throne was ordered only in 1790, shortly after the return of the second embassy to Constantinople and Tipū's return from Travancore. As Col. Miles, the translator of Kirmāṇi, rightly observes: "it appears from this (*i.e.*, Tipū's ordering the formation of the throne) that Tipū wanted the sanction of the Sultān of Room, before he assumed the titles and distinctions of royalty" (Kirmāṇi, *l.c.*, foot-note).

17. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 580-581.

About this time, war with the English having broken out (*The Third Mysore War*), Tipū, inspired by the reports of the favourable impression which had been created on the mind of the Sultān of Constantinople by the warlike weapons he had sent him as presents (especially the rockets), set about systematically preparing also for the defence of Seringapatam. Talented English and French artisans were assembled and constantly employed in casting metal or brass guns and the manufacture of muskets, besides scissors, pen-knives, hour-glasses, pocket-knives with many blades, etc. The Sultān's manufactories were called *Tārā-Mandal* and were established in Seringapatam, Bangalore¹⁸, Chitaldrug and Nagar (Bednūr). The chief part of the Sultān's time was, however, spent in collecting and enlisting men for his horse and foot, but notwithstanding this, the Amīrs and Khāns of old times whom Haidar had allured to his service from all cities and countries at great expense, were now all at once cast down from rank and power, and the honour of the Sultān's confidence; and low bred, vulgar, young men were appointed in their places. The chief merchants and horse-dealers, etc., (*Karwan-Bashiaum*), on account of low prices or want of demand for their ware, abandoned trade, and those persons who were willing to take up a musket and a pair of pistols were entered in the cavalry, while those who opposed this innovation were deprived of their rank and dismissed. As the confidence of the Sultān was chiefly placed in artillery and the muskets as the most efficient description of arms, the brave men who excelled at the handling of the sword and spear lost heart, and some cavalry officers were appointed and compelled to enlist men for the *Jysh*.

Defence measures,
1790-1792.

The spirit of innovation pervading them.

18. In Bangalore City, a part of the area is known to this day as *Tārāmaṇḍalpēt*.

and *Uskur* horse and foot, who were ignorant of the rules and qualifications necessary for these divisions of the service. Consequently, in a short time, confusion and ruin appeared in the fundamental regulation of the government and kingdom.¹⁹

About 1792, the throne of gold which Tipū had ordered in 1790 was finished, as was desired. Tipū's failure to ascend the throne, c. 1792. "But", says Kirmāṇi,²⁰ "as according to the customs of the Kings of Delhi, first introduced by Sultan Julaluddin Muhammad Akbar—for they previously demanded the daughters of the family of Juswunt (*i.e.*, daughters of the Rajput princes of Hindustan)—previous to the Sultan's ascension, a certain ceremony remained unperformed," the Sultān having despatched hundreds of thousands of pounds to the Rāja of Kutch for realizing the object. By his presents and favours, Tipū made the Rāja willing and agreeable in the matter. "At this period, however," to use the annalist's words, "fortune being employed in endeavours to ruin those professing the true religion, and the defender of God's people, this happy result was not attained." Preparations had been made for the public ceremony of ascending the throne but the events of the years 1790-1792 interfered with the projected festivities and the Sultān was never destined to sit upon his throne.²¹

19. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 145-147. Kirmāṇi, as usual, sets down these affairs to 1787 (A. H. 1202), but in the light of the context, they are referable to the period 1790-1792.

20. *Ibid.*, 239-240. Kirmāṇi is evidently pointing here to the vanity of Tipū in imitating his prototype Akbar in endeavouring to follow the custom of the Emperor demanding Rajput princesses in marriage. Kirmāṇi sets down this event to c. 1794 (A. H. 1208-1209) but in the light of the context, *i.e.*, the war with the English (1790-1792), it is assignable to c. 1792.

21. Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 580. Wilks dates the event in 1789 but, according to the context, it has to be placed about 1792.

Tipū's commercial regulations since his accession to power were founded on the basis of making the sovereign, if not the sole, the chief merchant of the dominions.

Other measures (down to 1792).

Commercial arrangements.

Commerce with Europeans, especially with the English, was considered pregnant with danger in every direction. Possessed of this view, he prohibited the cultivation of the pepper-vine in the maritime districts, and merely reserved those of inland growth to trade with the true believers from Arabia. Monopolies were numerous, those of tobacco, sandalwood, pepper and the precious metals being the most lucrative. Exports and imports were prohibited for the protection of domestic trade; a board of trade of nine commissioners was also organised, with seventeen foreign and thirty home factories in the several districts, with a new code for its guidance; and it was in contemplation to establish something like a bank, while the State itself monopolised the profits of money-changers in furnishing coins from the treasury to servants paid by regular salaries. When Rāja Rāmchander, the person in charge of the bank, reported that the dealers were keeping aloof from it, that the expenses far exceeded the profits, and that it was necessary either to abandon the plan or to enlarge it, so as to embrace not only regular banking establishments but commercial speculations necessary for their prosperity, he got the reply: "There is no regulation issued by us, that does not cost us, in the framing of it, the deliberation of five hundred years—do as you are ordered." A part of the suggested plan was, however, gradually introduced, and the funds in the hands of the money-changers were employed in advantageous loans. Yet with all this parade of being the master of every detail, Tipū was ignorant of the contents of his "*Tōshe-Khāna*" (royal ware-house of the capital),

to the extent of sending to Poona, on the occasion of a marriage, for a small quantity of gold cloths (of which a ton at the least was found in store on the capture of Seringapatam 1799).²²

The regulations of revenue, professing like those for pecuniary deposits to be founded on a tender regard for the benefit of the people, contained little that was new, except that the nomenclature and institutions of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar were promulgated as the admirable inventions of Tipū Sultān, on the same principle that Spanish guns were found ornamented with the tiger stripe and inscriptions, purporting that they were cast at Seringapatam. Though among the real novelties in the code of revenue not one improvement could be discovered, offices requiring an exact knowledge of accounts, and formerly filled by Brāhmans or other Hindus, were gradually ordered to be executed by Muslims, and when it was objected to by many of the individuals that they could not even write, the Sultān gravely replied that they would learn. But one measure of his deserves the modified consideration of those who value the health or morals of the people. Tipū began, at an early period, to restrict the numbers and regulate the conduct of the shops for the sale of spirituous liquors, and he finally and effectually abolished the whole, together with the sale of all intoxicating substances and the destruction, as far as he could effect it, of the white poppy and the hemp plant, even in private gardens. The large sacrifice of revenue involved in this prohibition was founded on the

Fiscal and revenue
arrangements.

Tipū as the
enforcer of prohibi-
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22. Wilks, *o.c.* II. 568-572 (referring also on p. 572 to Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Letter No. XCVIII, dated 2nd August 1785, addressed to Rāja Rāmchander). As to the details of commercial regulations, see Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, App. E, pp. xxxiii-xlvi (in eight sections).

unforced interpretation of a text of the *Korān* "everything intoxicating is forbidden."²³ Tipū, however, made an exception in the case of Europeans in his service, for in a letter to Mons. Lally he says: "You must allow no more than a single shop to be opened in your camp for the vending of spirituous liquors; and over that you must place a guard for the purpose of preventing the sale of spirits to any but the Europeans belonging to you, it being a rule in our army that no shop of this kind shall be permitted to be established in it."²⁴

Of Tipū's system of police, the following single extract from his official instructions
 Police and judi- may suffice. "You must place spies
 ary. throughout the whole fort and town, in the bazars, and over the houses of the principal officers, and thus gain intelligence of every person who goes to the dwelling of another, and of what people say, etc., etc." All this Haidar effectually did, and all this Tipū Sultān only attempted. Of his talents for judicature, we must seek for examples, not in a general code to supersede the all-sufficient *Korān*, but in those occasional edicts which may be thought in some degree to belong to the department of police. The frequency of feuds between the right and left hand castes (*Balagai* *Yeḍagai*) in the country once engaged his attention, and he applied his profound research and experience to trace the origin of these sects and to devise the means of preventing future riots.²⁵

23. *Ibid.*, 572-573; see also and compare Stewart, *Memoirs*, 53.

24. Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, Letter No. CCCCXI, dated December 11, 1786.

25. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 574-575. See also Stewart who refers to the first volume of *Hukum Nāmeh Jāsūsān*, containing "Tipū's Code of Regulations for the spies or Intelligence Department" (Stewart, *Catalogue*, p. 93, Item No. XXXV). On the use of Post Office in modern Britain in the political sphere, see Medley, *English Constitutional History*, 479 et seq.

The fleet was originally placed by Tipū under the Board of Trade, and it was not till after 1792 that the construction of a navy to vie with that of England was proposed. The absurdity was not perceived of seeking to create a warlike fleet without a commercial navy, or of hoping, literally without means, suddenly to rival England in that department of war, which was represented to be the main source of power, by the Vakils who accompanied the hostages, and had been specially instructed to study the English institutions. This novel source of hope was not finally organized on paper till 1796, and can scarcely be deemed to have had a practical existence. He began in 1793 with ordering the construction of an hundred ships; but in 1796, he reduced the number to twenty ships of the line and twenty frigates; eleven Commissioners or Lords of the Admiralty (*Meer-e-yem*) who were not expected to embark; thirty *Meer Buhr* or Admirals, of whom twenty were to be afloat, and ten at court for instruction. A 72-gunship had thirty 24-pounders, thirty 18-pounders, and 12 nines; a 46-gun frigate had twenty 12-pounders, as many nines, and six 4-pounders; the line of battleships were 72's and 62's; and the men for the forty ships are stated at 10,520. To each ship were appointed four principal officers: the first commanded the ship; the second had charge of the guns, gunners and ammunition; the third, of the marines and small arms; the fourth, the working and navigation of the ship, the provisions and stores; and the regulations descend to the most minute particular, from the dock-yard to the running rigging; from the scantlings of the timbers to the dinner of the crew. Tipū had access to tolerably correct authorities in matters of mere detail, which in many cases he rendered ludicrous by a pretended knowledge

and profound ignorance of the objects to be regulated.²⁶

After the departure of the confederates on the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam (March 18, 1792), Tipū, brooding over the heavy losses he had sustained and the deep wounds that had been inflicted on his pride, shut himself up for several days in an agony of despair. His first public act was to

The Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam (March 18, 1792) and after.

make arrangements regarding the money due under the treaty. It was resolved that Rupees one crore and ten lakhs of the total amount should be paid from the treasury, that sixty lakhs should be contributed by the army, and one crore and sixty lakhs by the civil officers and inhabitants at large under the head of *nazarāna* or forced gift. The oppression of the population in levying the last drove great numbers to seek an asylum in the Bārāmahal and other neighbouring districts, though there was a large balance standing in the accounts for several years afterwards.²⁷ An improvement of the fortifications of Seringapatam was also commenced and labourers imported in large numbers for the purpose, though no part of the works was ever completed.²⁸

Tipū's numerous administrative and other measures had made him unpopular to the large majority of the people of Mysore already by 1791, when, as we have seen,²⁹ the Loyalists in Seringapatam attempted without success the subversion of his regime and the restoration of the ancient Hindu dynasty. The Sultān's caprice, fanaticism and spirit of innovation

Changes in civil and military affairs after the Treaty.

26. *Ibid.*, 567-568. As to the details of marine regulations, see Kirkpatrick, *o.c.*, App. K. pp. lxxvii-xciii.

27. *Ibid.*, 562-563.

28. *Ibid.*, 588-590; see also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 235.

29. See *Ante*, Ch. XV.

increased with his misfortunes during the period subsequent to the treaty of March 1792, and were carried to the verge of insanity. At this time,

Tipū's increasing predilection for Islām.

says Kirmāni,³⁰ Tipū developed "a great aversion to Brahmans, Hindus and other tribes" and "he did not consider any but the people of Islām his friends, and, therefore, on all accounts, his chief object was to promote and provide for them." Mir Sādik, the displaced Amīr, was restored to the office of Dewān. In the offices

Displacement of Hindus by Muhammadans in the offices.

both at headquarters and in the taluks (*parganas*), Hindus were displaced by Muslims who could scarcely read or write, and the order went forth that all accounts should be submitted in the Persian language. Not only was all punishment such as beating, flogging, etc., renounced, but, to render more sacred the injunction to an honest discharge of public duty, the principal public officers, civil and military, were annually assembled from all parts of the country, and each made oath on the *Korān*, that he had not in the preceding, and would not in the current year, defraud the Government, or suffer it to be defrauded, and had observed, and would maintain fidelity to the sovereign in every respect, including the observance of prayer and the

The consequences of the measure.

abstinence from forbidden things. But no human being was ever worse served, or more easily deceived. Every sort of speculation was increased by the cover of these oaths, and when, subsequently, not content with the oaths of the great officers, Tipū exacted them from every individual in the ranks of the army and the lowest civil officers of the Government, the lust of plunder became unbridled and unlimited. Oaths seem to have lost their value.

30. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 230-231.

Corruption increased all round in the country parts directly under the charge of *Asofs* and *Amils*. As the Persian annalist dolefully writes, their former Brāhman predecessors in office, the *Deshmukhs*, *Deshpandes* and *Kanungos*, although thrown out of office, still, by sycophancy and their knowledge of business, and by intriguing with the *Amils* and *Asofs*, were continued in their employment in revenue affairs as usual, without the knowledge of the Sultān, and the *Asofs* and *Amils*, relying on their ability, abandoned the duties of their offices, and gave themselves up to pleasure. Their nominees in the meantime plundered all the taluks at their discretion, giving half to the *Asofs* while retaining the other half for their private use.³¹ Yet Tipū, keeping in view the oaths of these faithless officials, neither punished the offenders nor manifested anger at their misconduct. Tipū also built a Musjid in every town, and appointed a Muazzim, a Maula and a Kāzi to each; and promoted the education and learning of the Mussulmans to the utmost of his power. While he considered as his personal enemies those who neglected the appointed prayers, he himself spent his time in prayer, reading the *Korān* and counting the beads of his rosary.³² "When, therefore," adds Kirmāni,³³ "for the sake of his religion, the Sultān withheld his hand from the duties of government and conquest, and ceased to inquire into the actions and conduct of his agents and servants, every one in his place did as he pleased fearlessly, and without restraint. The old Khāns and faithful servants of the State were now cast down from confidence and power, and low men and men without abilities were raised to high offices and dignities.... From this cause, however, it was that disorder and disaffection forced their way into the very foundations of

31. *Ibid.*, 223, 229-232; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 574-578.

32. *Ibid.*, 232.

33. *Ibid.*, 232-235.

the State, and at once the nobles and Khāns, being alarmed and suspicious, became the instigators of treachery and rebellion. The Amīr, Mīr Sādik, covered

The oppression and
tyranny of Mīr Sādik,
the Dewān.

with kindly benefits, opened wide the doors of deceit and fraud on the highest and lowest servants of the State, until at length the reins of the government and the supreme direction of affairs, all fell into his hands, and his duties and rank rose higher and higher. Becoming conceited, he took into his own hands most of the questions relative to government and revenue, and decided on them without asking the consent or pleasure of the Sultān. He also by his oppression and violence filled all parts of the kingdom with tumult and sedition, and regulated matters of the highest importance at his mere fancy and caprice. Also, by reading charms, incantations, and by prayers for domination (for his necromancers burned half a maund of black pepper every day), he so subjected the mind of the Sultān, that when he heard complaints against him (Mīr Sādik) from the mouths of his Amīrs, he listened to them with clemency and forbearance, and without in any way discountenancing or punishing him, he still strove to raise him to the highest dignities. The Mīr, therefore, by the Sultān's daily increasing favour, gained authority and power over all the forts and castles of Mysore, and treating the chief men of the kingdom with neglect and insolence, he allowed no one any share in the conduct or administration of public affairs. He also dispatched misplaced or unnecessary firmans and orders to the different dependencies of the State, and neglected to report to the Sultān the state of the different departments, the condition of the people, and the occurrences in the kingdom." So unsettled did become the loyalty of those surrounding Tipū that in due course he organized a corps called *Kerbeela* at first,

and afterwards *Zumra*, to act as his bodyguard, and prescribed an appropriate dress for it.³⁴

Tipū's bigotry about this time led him to consummate the extinction of Hindu worship in the State, the confiscated funds of the temples being intended to balance the loss of the revenue derived so far from the tax on intoxicating substances. The measure commenced to operate from an early period of his regime, and the extinction was gradual, though (in 1799) the two temples within the fort of Seringapatam (*i.e.*, the Ranganātha and Narasimhaswāmi temples) alone remained open throughout the extent of the kingdom. The service *ināms* of Patels were likewise confiscated, and an income was raised by dividing the houses in the fort of Seringapatam into separate wards for different classes and putting prices upon them, the owners being ordered to shift for themselves outside, no compensation being paid to them. Tipū strove, in short, to obliterate every trace of the previous rulers. For this purpose, even the fine irrigation works, centuries old, of the Hindu Rājas were to be destroyed and reconstructed in his own name.³⁵

As regards selections for offices, the Sultan fancied that he could discover by mere look the capacity of a person, which naturally resulted in the most absurd blunders. All candidates for every

Tipū's administrative and other blunders.

34. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 608-609 (referring to the measures of 1797).

35. *Ibid.*, 573-574, 611-612; also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2629. See also and compare Stewart, *Memoirs*, 53. A good instance of Tipū's tendency to obliterate irrigational relics of Hindu rule and reconstruct them in his own name is afforded by the lithic inscription (in Persian) dated 1798, now standing on the site of the Kannambādi dam (at Krishnarājasāgar), referring to the progress of his scheme of an embankment across the Cauvery at that very spot—it had been raised to more than 70 feet height by that date—and the conditions under which lands under the reservoir were to be cultivated (see E.C., III. i. My. 54). It is significant that it was at this place that Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar had also projected a similar scheme about a century earlier (see Vol. I of this work, pp. 377-379).

department were ordered to be admitted and drawn up in line before him, when, looking steadfastly at them, he would, as if actuated by inspiration, call out in a solemn voice, "Let the third from the left be Asoph of such a district; he with the yellow drawers understands naval affairs, let him be *Meer-e-Yem*, Lord of the Admiralty: he with the long beard and he with the red turban are but Amils, let them be promoted."⁸⁶ Tipū's code of regulations was ordered to be studied night and day. It was declared to contain "all rules necessary to be observed," but "if any case should occur, not provided for, and requiring reference to the resplendent presence, such reference was to be made." An anecdote on this subject is worth noting here. A husbandman came out of breath once to tell the Amil at Kānkānhalli that a large field of sugarcane was on fire. "Fetch me the book of regulations; positively I can recollect nothing about a fire in a field of sugarcane." "I will tell you what to do, if I may be permitted," said the astonished husbandman, and with great volubility talked of the village drum summoning every man, woman and child, with each a pot of water. "The book of regulations tells me what to do," said the Amil, "the case is unprovided for, and must be reported and referred." In the meanwhile the field was destroyed, and the report was made. Rumour was more expeditious than the letter, and every one was full of jest and expectation. The Sultān heard the dispatch with a vacant stare, which sometimes preceded a laugh, and sometimes a wise reflection. The courtiers misinterpreted the look, and a competition ensued of wit and epigram, at the expense of the unhappy Amil. The royal stare continued for a time and then dropped into the philosophical preparative. "The man," said the Sultān, "is a good and an obedient servant; prepare instantly an edict to be

86. *Ibid.*, 604-605.

added to the regulations, prescribing what is to be done in the event of fire in sugar-fields.³⁷ The manner in which complaints were heard and disposed of may be illustrated by a single example. A number of raiyats appeared on a certain occasion before the Sultān to complain of exaction. Mīr Sādik, the Dewān, admitted the fact and said it was made on account of *Nazarāna*, which silenced the Sultān at once. The Dewān, however, holding out to the raiyats a hope of future immunity, succeeded in inducing them to agree to pay thirty-seven and a half per cent additional, and this circumstance being brought to the notice of Tipū as demonstrating the falsehood of their former complaint, the chief spokesmen, the most intelligent and active of the Patels or headmen, were hung on the spot, and the increase extended to the whole of the Mysore dominions.³⁸ The army in the meanwhile had received no more than seven months' pay in the year, and began to evince considerable discontent. To reduce the numbers, or touch the efficiency of the instrument, by which alone he could hope to retrieve his affairs, did not enter into the Sultān's contemplation; but he adopted the project of granting *Jaghirs* in lieu of one half of the pay, reckoned at ten months' pay in the year, which would leave a balance of five to be paid in money. Such allotments could only be made to corps, troops or companies, and not to individuals, and the acceptance was very prudently permitted to be optional. The Silledār horse, without exception, embraced the arrangement, as also many of the stable horse and infantry. It was Tipū's wish to extend it to his whole army, but the details of such a measure were complicated, and proceeded but slowly; and such was the disordered state of finance that the possessors of *Jaghirs* were alone exempted from frequent and urgent distress.³⁹

37. *Ibid.*, 579-580.38. *Ibid.*, 601-603.39. *Ibid.*, 603-604.

By 1794, the money due under the treaty was paid and the hostages, accompanied by Captain Doveton, were returned to the Sultān at Dēvanhalli (renamed *Yusufabad*) in March.⁴⁰ On this occasion, a banquet was also given by the Sultān, at which the most distinguished of his officers were honoured with the title of *Mir Mirān*, among them Saiyid Gafar, the faithful servant of Tipū, Muhammad Razā *alias* Benki Nawāb, maternal uncle of Haidar and grandfather of the Sultān, Khān Jehān Khān and Pūrṇaiya. At the same time the brigades or divisions of the army (*Cuchēri*) were named or numbered

after the *Ismail Hussena*, the names of the most high, ninety-nine in number; for instance, the *Ilāhi-Cuchēri*

was named the *Rahmān-Cuchēri*, the *Gafoor-Cuchēri* was named the *Gafoor*, and so on. Then Tipū returned to Seringapatam, where he appointed three to four thousand sepoy to each *Cuchēri*, and abolished the name of *Jysh* calling them all *Uskur*. All the *Mir Mirāns* were also presented dresses of gold embroidery and tassels, with jewels arranged in a certain order, and jewelled gorgets. About this time, the Sultān changed the names of the different fire-arms, as, for instance, a *bandook* or match-lock was called *Tofung*; a tope or cannon, *Duruksh*; and a ban or rocket, *Shuhab*, and so forth.⁴¹

While Tipū was thus engaged in a series of measures of internal administration of a varied character, he had not, in the height of his power, omitted the customary form of tendering homage to the reigning king Khāsā-Chāmārāja Wodeyar before his assembled court and people at

Tipū and the reigning Hindu sovereign (down to 1796).

40. *Ibid.*, 598-599. See also and compare Kirmāṇi (o.c., 296). who places this event in 1798 (A. H. 1208).

41. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 287-289. Kirmāṇi, as mentioned above, places these affairs in 1798 but with reference to Wilks and the context, they are referable to the years 1794-1795.

the feast of the Dasara.⁴² Referring to this feast, a

The Dasara in contemporary records:⁴³ "The annual Mysore as described Gentoo feast commenced this evening, in 1783.

which was continued, according to custom, for nine days. The King of Mysore made his appearance in a veranda, in front of his palace, about seven o'clock". Referring further to the king, he

records:⁴⁴ "This young prince, in

The King.

whose name the family of Hyder Ally, who assume only the title of regent,

carry on the administration of government, is allowed, for himself and his family, an annual pension of one lack of rupees. He is treated with all those marks of homage that are paid to crowned heads. In his name proclamation is made of war and of peace, and the trophies of victory are laid at his feet. Like kings, too, he had his guards; but these are appointed and commanded by the usurper of his throne, whose authority and safety depend upon the prince's confinement. Yet such is the reverence that is paid by the people of Mysore to the blood of their antient kings, and so formidable are they rendered even in their present state of subjection to the most vigorous character as well as powerful Prince in the peninsula of Hindostan, by their numbers, and the extent of their cities, especially of Seringapatam, the capital, which would facilitate their intercourse and co-operation, if any common principle or cause should spread the flames of discontent and insurrection, that it is thought expedient by the present government, not to cut off the hereditary prince of Mysore, according to the usual policy of despots, but to adorn him with the pageantry of a crown . . . to

42. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 605.

43. *Memoirs of Late War in Asia*, II. 148-149 (*Narrative of the captivity and sufferings of European Officers, etc., referring to the Dasara in Mysore which commenced on the 27th of September 1783*).

44. *Ibid.*, 149-150.

unnervé his mind, and at stated times to present him, a royal puppet, to the view and acclamations of his people." "The spacious palace in which the young King of Mysore resides," continues this contemporary writer,⁴⁵ "stands in a large square, in the very centre of Seringapatam . . . The prince, who is quite black, but exceedingly comely, appeared, as already mentioned, in a royal veranda or open gallery in front of his palace. The curtains with which the gallery was hung being drawn up, discovered the King seated on a throne, with numerous attendants on each hand, some of whom fanned him, others scattered perfume on his long black hair, and on his cloaths, replenished from time to time with betel and other narcotics. The veranda was decorated with the finest hangings, and resplendent with precious stones, among which a diamond of immense size and value shone with distinguished lustre. On a stage extended in the open square, along the front of the palace, musicians, balladières [bayaderes] and a species of gladiators, entertained the King with his train in the gallery, and the multitude that filled the square with music, dancing, tumbling, wrestling, mock engagements, and other pantomimical diversions . . . The King, having sat motionless in great state for several hours, rose up, when he was about to retire, and advancing to the edge of the gallery, showed himself to the people, who honoured him with marks of the most profound and even superstitious veneration. The curtains then dropped, and his Majesty retired to the inner parts of the palace. It is only on occasion of this anniversary that the King of Mysore is visible to his nominal subjects." Though the foregoing picture refers to the year 1783, there is little doubt that the same state of affairs continued during a greater part of Tipū's regime.

The Palace, Durbar, etc.

45. *Ibid.*, 150-152.

On the 17th of April 1796 King Khāsā-Chāmarāja Wodeyar passed away in his twenty-third year.⁴⁶ Wilks attributes his death to small-pox.⁴⁷ A news-letter from *Fort St. George*, however, speaks of "Teepo Sultan having killed the person who was the real Chief of Mysore."⁴⁸ In keeping with this, a letter, purporting to be addressed by Mahārāṇi Lakshammammaṇi to Lords Mornington and Clive, refers in general terms to Tipū having "after the late Treaty (of March 1792), under the advice of the French, caused the death of the Rajah."⁴⁹ We have no means of knowing the actual manner of the king's death, though it is certain that Tipū in this regard but followed his father's policy. Tipū, however, for the first time, omitted the ceremony of even a nominal succession to the throne of Mysore, removed the family to a mean dwelling and plundered the palace of everything, including the personal ornaments of individuals. Krishṇarāja (afterwards Krishṇarāja Wodeyar III), the two year old son of Khāsā-Chāmarāja Wodeyar, cried bitterly at the attempt to take away his little golden bracelets, and there was, adds Wilks, "sufficient feeling among the instruments of tyranny to be touched at the distress of the child and to abstain from this last violation."⁵⁰ Among the losses sustained on this occasion was the valuable Mss. Library of the Mahārāja's Palace at Seringapatam, in which lay by curious good luck the *Kaḍatam* in Kannada entitled the

46. *Annals*, I. 240, specifically referring to the King's death on *Naḷa-Chai tra su.* 10, corresponding to April 17, 1796. The *Annals*, however, maintains a discreet silence as to the cause of the death.

47. Wilks, l.c.; see also Stewart, *Memoirs*, 78, merely referring to the King's death in 1796.

48. *Records of Fort St. George: Mily. Sundries*, XCI. pp. 88-84, recording intelligence from Bellary, dated June 28, 1796, transmitted by Capt. W. Kirkpatrick, Resident, Hyderabad, July 19, 1796.

49. See *Mysore Pradhans*, App. M. (pp. 41-42), *Letter* dated Feb. (?) 1799.

50. Wilks, l.c.; also Stewart, l.c.; and *Annals*, l.c.

Mysūru-Dhōregaḷa-Pūrvābhyudaya-Vivara or the Succession of the Kings of Mysore from ancient times down to 1712, at first apparently compiled at the instance of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar and later written into a book by command of Tipū Sultān by Nagar Puṭṭaiya Paṇḍit—a work, on which, to some extent, Wilks' *History* is based.⁵¹

51. *Ibid.*, 605, f.n.; see also Vol. II. App. I—(2) of this work, as to the authorship of the compilation mentioned above. See further, Appendix II—(9) to this Vol., i.e., Note on the location of the site of the old Palace at Seringapatam.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE INTERREGNUM, 1796-1799.

The death of Khasa-Chamaraja Wodeyar and after; the Royalist position; a probable stop-gap arrangement; the Interregnum, 1796-1799—The Royalist Movement active for the last time; Maharani Lakshammanni's exertions, c. 1796; her renewed exertions, February 3, 1799; the English response, April 1799—General course of affairs (down to 1798): a retrospect: *The Third Mysore War* (1790-1792) and after; Lord Cornwallis' proposed treaty of guarantee with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, 1792-1793; the attitude of the allies—The Mahratta aggression; domination of Mahadji Sindhia and Nana Farnavis; Nizam Ali seeks English aid; Sir John Shore's policy—The battle of Kardla (Kharda), March 11, 1795—Kardla and after; the rebellion and flight of Ali Jah, June 1795; the death of the Peshwa, October 1795; succession of Baji Rao, December 4, 1796; succession of the Marquess Wellesley, May 1798—Tipu's activities (down to 1798); intrigues at the Court of Hyderabad (down to 1797)—Tipu's asylum to the Prince of Iran, c. 1795-1797; his embassy to Zaman Shah of Kabul, 1796-1797—Intrigues with the French Government (down to 1798); Embassy to the Isle of France, 1797—Progress of the Embassy, 1797-1798—The English reaction; Wellesley's policy—Concludes a subsidiary treaty with Nizam Ali, September 1798; conducts negotiations with the Court of Poona—Tipu's secret machinations at Poona (down to 1799)—The Marquess Wellesley's views of Tipu's late proceedings at the Isle of France—His admonition to Tipu, November 1798; the state of Tipu's mind—The Marquess' arrival at Madras, December 31, 1798—His exposure of Tipu's real designs, January 19, 1799; Tipu procrastinates, January-February 1799; war with him declared by the Governor-General (*The Fourth Mysore War*), February 22, 1799—The course of the War, February-May 1799: The British army marches for Mysore, February 1799—Colonel Wellesley in command

of the Nizam's Contingent—Surrender of forts on the way, March 1799—The force from Bombay; action at Siddesvar, March 6, 1799—General Harris' march, March 9-24, 1799—Tipu's movements—Action at Malvalli, March 27, 1799—General Harris' further march on Seringapatam, March 28-April 5, 1799—The defences of Seringapatam: towards the siege—The first English attack, April 5: General Harris' despatch on—Renewal of the attack on Sultanpet, April 6—The regular siege commences, April 17—Colonel Hart's Post; Macdonald's Post—General Floyd detached—Capture of the post at the Powder-Mill, April 20—Tipu's negotiations for peace—Attack on the Bombay Division, April 22; batteries at the Powder-Mill, etc.,—Operations of April 23-26—The Mysoreans driven into the fort—Skelly's Post—Colonel Campbell's attack—Further operations, April 27-May 3; Wallace's Post—Breaching Batteries—A practicable breach effected, May 3—Renewed negotiations—The assault delivered, May 4—Details of the troops warned for the assault—Right attack: Left attack—The Sultan's military disposition—The Sultan's death—The search for the Sultan—Casualties—Strength of Tipu's forces—Plunder of the town—Captured ordnance—Surrender of Tipu's sons and officers—Colonel Read's detachment—Colonel Brown's detachment—Prize Money.

WHILE the treatment accorded by Tipu to the surviving members of the Mysore Royal Family on the death of Khāsā-Chamarāja Wodeyar was deeply resented by the Royalists, his omission even to nominate a successor of the late king, which was in itself a daring departure from the policy pursued by his father, made him thoroughly unpopular in the kingdom.¹ Although Tipu, in his love of power and in his attempt to arrogate to himself the

The death of
Khāsā-Chamarāja
Wodeyar and after

The Royalist posi-
tion.

1. *Annals*, I. 240; also letters cited below.

attributes of sovereignty, grossly neglected to recognise the claims to succession of Krishnarāja, the two-year old son of Khāsā-Chāmarāja, there is some ground for the belief, as indicated in an earlier Chapter,² that some in the State expected, in view of the non-age of Krishnarāja, that the succession would go to one

Kaṇṭhīrava-Arasu, as seems suggested by the succession list of the Kings of Mysore, contained in a lithic inscription from Arkalgud. It is not clear why or how this succession came to be suggested and who exactly this personage was and how he was connected with the Royal House. It is likewise doubtful if Tipū was aware at all of such a stop-gap arrangement of a major to secure the unbroken continuity in the succession to the throne of Mysore during the minority of the undoubted legitimate ruler Krishnarāja Wodeyar (III), which eventually came off under more happy auspices in June 1799. The period between 1796

The Interregnum,
1796-1799.

to 1799 may conveniently be termed as one of "Interregnum" from the point of view of the fortunes in the main of the ancient Hindu Ruling House of Mysore. The long succession to the Mysore throne had not been broken from 1399 onwards to 1796, when Tipū tried to break it for the first time in the most violent fashion. But such breaches are but incidents in the history of Royalty itself. Thus, the succession to the throne of England has been broken three times, first by the Danish Kings, Canute and his sons; next by the Norman Kings, William the Conqueror and his successors, in the eleventh century; and thirdly by Oliver Cromwell in the 17th century.

2. *Vide* Ch. III, p. 246, f. n. 18, noticing Arkalgud 62 of 1811.

During the period of the "Interregnum," the Royalist movement, under the inspiring leadership and dogged perseverance of Mahārāṇi Lakshammamṇi in prison, was again active for the last time in its long projected objective of freeing the kingdom of Mysore from the shackles of Muhammadan usurpation and restoring the Hindu dynasty to its age-long position of dignity and importance. Already about 1796, the Mahārāṇi, after the failure of the attempts of 1783 and 1791,³ wrote to her agent Pradhān Tirumala Rao, directing him to prevail on the English at Madras "to invade the country (*i.e.*, Mysore) with a large army before the arrival of French assistance to Tipū," to keep exerting his best, see Tipū destroyed, and get the legal heir to the Mysore Royal House placed on the throne.⁴ "If, however," she added,⁵ "it should happen by God's grace that we should be alive, and the English conquer Tipū and restore to us our kingdom, we shall pay the expenses of the English army to the extent of one crore of pagodas. And for this they must abide by the terms of our old treaty with Sullivan and Macartney. You should communicate all this to the English and get the army to march at once. And it cannot be timed to arrive here at a more opportune moment. For Tipū is acting here in the most foolish manner. He does not know who are his best friends, and who his worst enemies. And hence he has lost control even over his own army. He has no good military officers. And everybody here is wishing for his discomfiture, and he is very unpopular. By whatever route the army may come

3. *Vide Chs. X and XV above.*

4. *See Mysore Pradhāns*, App. J. p. 35.

5. *Ibid.*, 35-36.

now, it can have ample supplies and good water. If you will therefore exert your best now without delay, and with your usual zeal, ability and intelligence, I have no doubt that God will second your efforts and give us victory this time." Again, on 3rd

Her renewed exertions, February 3, 1799.

February 1799, in her letter to Lords Mornington and Clive (Earl Powis), Governor of Madras, after narrating in detail the sufferings undergone by the Mysore Royal Family from the time of Haidar's usurpation in 1761, and referring to her own confinement by Tipū since 1796, she added:⁶ "While in this state, we learn that you have been sent to this land specially to restore to us our kingdom. Besides, we have also heard of your great nobility of character and purity of heart; and placing implicit faith in you, we seek your protection and aid. And hence with your usual goodness, considering the claims of justice, and with an eye to God and everlasting fame, you should root out the enemy, and restore to us our kingdom, according to the conditions of our last treaty with you. We shall pay you a crore of star-pagodas for the expenses of the war. We have also written to our Pradhān Tirumal Row in greater detail, and he will tell you everything. As he is our best friend, whatever is said or done by him on our behalf shall have our fullest approval, and you may consider them as completely ratified by us. As we are in the hands of the enemy, we cannot count upon our life. Should it happen that we are no more, with the assistance of this our Pradhān Tirumal Row, we request you to establish the Rāj with justice, and acquire fame for all time to come." It was not, however, till the 16th of April following, that this request of the

The English response, April 1799.

6. *Ibid.*, App. M. p. 42. The reference to Lord Clive in this letter is to Lord Clive, Earl Powis, Governor of Madras, 1798-1803.

Mahārāṇi received a response from the English Government communicating their solemn promise to serve her and attend to her business after the war with Tipū which they had declared,⁷ under circumstances to which we have now to advert.

The Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam (March 18. 1792) which terminated the *Third Mysore War* (1790-1792), crippled the power of Tipū. An important aspect of that war was, as we have seen, its diplomatic background, which centred round the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between the English, the Mah-

General course of affairs (down to 1798): a retrospect.

The *Third Mysore War* (1790-1792) and after.

rattas and Nizām Alī, concluded in 1790. The 13th Article of that Treaty provided that "if after the conclusion of peace with Tippoo, he should molest or attack either of the contracting parties, the other shall join to punish him, the mode and conditions of effecting which, shall be hereafter settled by the three contracting parties." After the conclusion of peace, Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to reduce this conditional stipulation

Lord Cornwallis' proposed treaty of guarantee with the Mahrattas and the Nizām, 1792-1793.

into the form of an explicit and intelligible treaty of guarantee. But the policy of the Mahrattas was in direct and systematic opposition to everything explicit and definite in relation to the

other powers. The minister, Nāna Farnavis, in particular, freed from all immediate apprehension of hostility from the side of Mysore, was more anxious for the maintenance of his own influence and power in the Mahratta State, against the designs of Mahadji Sindhia, than for the guarantee of Nizām Alī, whom he reckoned as his earliest prey. Nāna Farnavis accordingly applied early to Lord Cornwallis

The attitude of the allies.

to subsidise a British corps in order

7. *Ibid.*, App. N. p. 43.

to enable the Pēshwa (his nominal master) to reduce to obedience any dependent who might prove refractory. Lord Cornwallis, however, rejected the proposal, as such an obligation, broad and indefinite in itself, might bring the British subsidiary force into immediate contact with the troops of Sindhia or involve the English Government in an indirect pledge in contravention of the spirit of the treaty of Sālbaī (1782). After a protracted negotiation of more than a year, his Lordship's hope of obtaining the assent of the Mahrattas to any reasonable treaty of guarantee was finally abandoned. But in the exact proportion of the aversion of the Mahrattas was the anxiety of Nizām Alī for that bond of union and security contemplated by such a treaty. He contended that the failure of one of the three parties in the fulfilment of its engagements was no justification to the other two for a violation of theirs; and he urged on Lord Cornwallis the conclusion of the treaty before his departure from India. Lord Cornwallis, on his part, could do nothing beyond declaring that the English Government was satisfied with his verbal acquiescence and formally assuring him that it would always be ready to act according to existing treaties.⁸

Meanwhile, the Mahrattas were becoming a source of alarm to the Nizām. Mahādji Sindhia, after a career of successful aggrandisement resulting in his usurpation of the fast declining Mughal Empire, had proved a thorn in the side of Nānā Farnavis, from whom he possessed the power to wrest at pleasure the possession of the Peshwa—the pageant of a pageant—whom they each desired to employ as the mere instrument of their respective designs. Even before the war of 1790-1792, Sindhia had made overtures to become a party in the confederacy

The Mahratta aggression.

Domination of Mahādji Sindhia and Nānā Farnavis.

against Tipū, on the English guarantee of defending his (Sindhia's) northern possessions and their general pledge to aid him in the reduction of the Rajput States in Hindustan. But Lord Cornwallis having rejected his scheme of alliance, Sindhia moved towards Poona in the expectation of a much longer continuation of the war with Tipū as a favourable opportunity for the accomplishment of his own designs. With views far from friendly to the English, he also made little secret of his opinion that Tipū ought to be supported as an instrument for restraining their dangerous aggrandisement. Hence we find, in 1793, evidence of an active correspondence between Sindhia and Tipū. While there was, as we have seen, no reasonable hope of a treaty of guarantee—contemplated by Lord Cornwallis—with the Mahratta Court, torn by dissension, polluted by intrigue and governed by a system hostile to fixed rights, a counter-project of such a treaty was afoot, about this time, drawn by Nāna, containing among other anti-social conditions the recognition of the claim of the Mahrattas on Tipū Sultān for *Chauth*. Mahadji Sindhia took an active part in the negotiations at Poona, regarding the treaty of guarantee not only as it related to the Mahratta State but also the Nizām. The Mahrattas were, in fact, preparing for the

Nizām Ali seeks
English aid.

invasion of his dominions, on the
alleged ground of arrears of *Chauth*.

Nizām Ali, conscious of his own weakness, sought a consolidation of his alliance with the English and their mediation to avert the extremities anticipated from the

Sir John Shore's
policy.

Mahratta claims. But Sir John Shore,
who took over charge of the office of
Governor-General in August 1793 in

succession to Lord Cornwallis, pledged to the strict observance of the principle of non-intervention in compliance with the Act of Parliament of 1784, abandoned

Nizām Ali to his own fate. Nāna Farnavis would have now reluctantly consented to any enlargement of Tipū's power and disliked his co-operation, while Tipū, from a reciprocal feeling of personal enmity, was somewhat shy in his advances until the expected downfall of the minister should be effected. Sindhia pretended to be ready to force the measure either with or without the disposition of Nāna.⁹ "But there is reason to believe," in the words of Wilks,¹⁰ "that the support of Nizam Ali by the English, instead of his abandonment, would at least have caused Sindia to pause in his designs, and the counter-influence of Nana Furnavese might probably have preserved the peace of India. Under the actual circumstances, however, Sindia was too good a Mahratta to admit an associate in plunder.....; and Tippoo was kept back because the English had made his aid unnecessary." Such then was the test of insufficiency of the treaty of 1792 that "Tippoo Sultan, so far from being rendered incapable of disturbing the public peace, was ready and willing to be marshalled by the Mahrattas against Nizam Ali and the English power, if the latter, by the abandonment of its ally, had not left a clear field for the Mahrattas alone".¹¹

In this state of affairs, Mahadji Sindhia died (February 1794). His nephew and heir, Daulat Rao Sindhia, with views similar to those of his predecessor, assembled additional forces for their execution. Nizām Ali, having now lost all hope of English support, turned to their European rivals, the French, one of whose talented military officers, Mons. Raymond, who had previously served in Mysore, went over to him and organised an efficient corps of infantry under the

9. *Ibid.*, 616-621; also V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, 574.

10. *Ibid.*, 621-622.

11. *Ibid.*, 622.

command of European officers from Pondicherry and elsewhere. In February 1795, a combination of the Mahrattas, including the Pēshwa, Sindhia, Holkar and other leaders, approached in force, and on the 11th of March gave battle to Nizām Alī on the field of Kardla (Kharda), in which, among other incidents, a charge of Nizām Alī's cavalry drove Paraśurām Bhau completely off the field. Mons. Raymond ably manouvred his troops and the operations of the day were on the whole most favourable to Nizām Alī. Mons. Raymond repeatedly urged him to follow up the advantage gained by the flight of Bhau, and was in expectation of receiving the necessary orders and support, when at four o'clock in the afternoon, he was obliged to retreat in pursuance of the wishes of Nizām Alī who was accompanied by his harem. This retreat was soon followed by a disgraceful peace, by which Nizām Alī agreed to cede to the Mahrattas a territory yielding rupees thirty-five lakhs (including the fort of Daulatabad), and to deliver to them, as a hostage, his minister Musheer-ul-Mulk (Azeem-ul-Omra).¹²

On the conclusion of this treaty, the Mahrattas retired within their own frontier. Nizām Alī's power was much reduced and his fortunes were at a low ebb, when two events occurred, which tended to avert his extinction and restore his political importance in the Deccan. These were the rebellion of his son Alī Jah in June, and the death of the Pēshwa in October 1795. Immediately after the peace with the Mahrattas, Nizām Alī, in hopes of augmenting and improving the corps under Mons. Raymond, assigned to him the country of Cuddapah to meet their expenses. This arrangement was most acceptable to Mons. Raymond, from the vicinity of Cuddapah to the sea-coast, the facility acquired of recruiting his officers, and the still more important expectation of

Kardla and after.

12. *Ibid.*, 622-624; see also and compare Smith, *o.c.*, 574-575.

uniting with an European corps from France, with which he hoped to strengthen the interests of his nation in the Deccan and the South. For the execution of Louis XVI of France in January 1793 had resulted in the beginning of the Revolutionary War between France and England, which lasted almost without interruption until the battle of Waterloo in 1815. Sir John Shore, who appears to have acutely felt the danger of Nizām Ali's preparatory arrangement, directed the British Resident at the court of Hyderabad to declare that if Mons. Raymond were not withdrawn from Cuddapah, he should be forced to advance a body of English troops in that direction. The rebellion and flight of Ali Jah which took place at this juncture, however, terminated the unpleasant discussions which followed on the subject of Raymond's troops, in consequence of orders given to him to march forthwith against the rebel, and a simultaneous and pressing application from Nizām Ali to the English Government to aid him with a detachment of troops for the same purpose. Raymond had reduced and captured the rebel just before the arrival of the English corps, but the promptness and activity of the English in complying with Nizām Ali's request tended to restore better dispositions. At the

The rebellion and flight of Ali Jah, June 1795.

The death of the Pēshwa, October 1795,

court of Poona at the other end, however, dissensions followed regarding the choice of a Pēshwa on the death of Mādhava Rao Nārāyan, who, weary of the galling tutelage of Nānā Farnavis, committed suicide on the 25th of October 1795. Sindhia supported the true heir Bāji Rao, son of the late Raghōba, while Nānā Farnavis sought to establish, as his own pageant, Chīmṇāji, younger brother of Bāji Rao. These dissensions divided the chiefs of the Mahratta confederacy into two contending factions. The desire of Nānā to

employ the aid even of the feeble state of Nizām Ali facilitated the able machinations of Mushir-ul-Mulk, who as a hostage and a prisoner, contrived to hold at his disposal some of the most powerful Mahratta chiefs, and by concerted demonstrations of the troops of his own State, was enabled to negotiate and conclude a new treaty, toning down the most injurious parts of the treaty of Kardla, and obtaining his own liberation, which was followed by his reinstatement in the office of Prime Minister to Nizām Ali. At the Mahratta court, many intrigues between Sindhia, Holkar and Nānā Farnavis followed, but on the 26th of May 1796, Chinnāji Mādhava Rao, Bāji Rao's brother, was invested as Pēshwa, while Bāji Rao was detained as a prisoner by Sindhia. Eventually, Nānā Farnavis, who had fled from Poona, obtained a guarantee from Nizām Ali and Sindhia, and returned to Poona, and resumed his duties as Prime Minister, and Baji Rao was placed on the *musnud* on the 4th of December 1796.

Succession of Bāji Rao, December 4, 1796.

About a year and a half later, in May 1798, Sir John Shore was succeeded in the office of the Governor-General of India by Richard, Baron Wellesley in the Peerage of Great Britain and Earl of Mornington in the Peerage of Ireland, an accomplished scholar, who had been for several years a member of the Board of Control and had devoted special attention to the acquisition of a knowledge of Indian polities.¹³

Succession of the Marquess Wellesley, May 1798.

The policy of non-intervention or masterly inactivity, a contradiction in terms, which was observed by Sir John Shore in relation to the Indian powers of the time, steadily helped Tipū to regain his strength and mature his hostile designs against his contemporaries.

Tipū's activities (down to 1798).

13. *Ibid*, 625, 627-628, 649-650, 666; also Smith, *o.c.*, 573-575, 578-579.



Tipu Sultān—Another view.



Already about 1795, Tipū was, as we have seen, ready and willing to be marshalled by the Mahrattas against Nizām Alī. Again, in 1795, shortly after the battle of Kardla, he had an opportunity of making his influence felt at the court of Hyderabad. An

Intrigues at the
Court of Hyderabad
(down to 1797).

envoy named Khāder Hussain Khān, from the Saint at Gulbarga, was residing in Seringapatam since Tipū's abandonment of his projected marriage alliance with the Saint's family (1794). Khāder Hussain's knowledge of the court of Seringapatam had pointed him out to Alī Jah as a fit agent to obtain the Sultān's active and immediate co-operation in the dethronement of his father Nizām Alī. The first overture, most promptly accepted, was the cession to Tipū of everything south of the Tungabhadra and Krishna, the very objective of the expansion of the kingdom of Mysore in the north since the time of Haidar Alī. The Mysore troops destined for the service were ordered to rendezvous at Gooty, on the pretence of demanding tribute from Kurnool. Khāder Hussain, who was received for the purpose into the immediate service of Tipū, was sent as his envoy to the camp of the rebel, to concert the conjoint operations. He was, however, anticipated by the activity of Mons. Raymond, who had defeated and taken Alī Jah before his arrival. Khāder Hussain, having reason to think that his mission was suspected and his life in danger, instead of destroying the diplomatic documents with which he was entrusted, resolved to provide himself with proofs of innocence. It was the fashion of the time to seal Tipū's letters with wax and these waxen seals Khāder Hussain dexterously removed from the letters addressed to Alī Jah and his associates, to those addressed to Nizām Alī and others. Fortified with these documents, he proceeded to Hyderabad, whence he dispatched answers to these forgeries,

addressed to the Sultān, who approved the ingenuity of the device. There was, however, about this time, at Hyderabad, another Mysorean envoy, with whom Khāder Hussain came into ridiculous collision. This was Medina Shah of Kurnool, a saint, whose aid Tipū solicited as a Mussulman in forwarding the political objects of the faith. A singular correspondence ensued between the Sultān and each of these envoys, which concerned more with reciprocal accusations than political events. Tipū seems alternately to have meditated the recall of each, and at one time had even stopped the allowances of both. But, despite the constant representations of pecuniary distress, the intrigues were actively continued, and neither of them ever returned to Seringapatam. It would seem, from the negotiations of the period, that Nizām Alī was still ready to conclude arrangements for a perfect union of interests with Tipū, if the latter had consented to exchange the pledge of a Korān.¹⁴ But Tipū's continued rejection of this advance was, as Wilks observes,¹⁵ "a curious example of that intellectual aberration, so often observable, which, abandoning every intelligible principle of morality and religion, is yet restrained and chastened by an unimportant form". Among the complicated intrigues of Hyderabad which followed at different periods (down to 1797) was a treaty of marriage with the great niece of Nizām Alī, not only without his consent, but for the purpose of subverting his power; and after the rebellion of Alī Jah, a treaty of alliance with another son, who meditated rebellion and deputed to Seringapatam a person of importance to concert the means of success as a permanent ambassador.¹⁶

14. *Ibid.*, 628-630.

15. *Ibid.*, 630.

16. *Ibid.*

During the progress of these intrigues, the Prince of Irān, on account of the opposition and enmity he met with in his father's court, was obliged to quit his own country, and after suffering many hardships, arrived at Seringapatam. Tipū visited him and lodged him in the suburb of Ganjām, according him a treatment befitting his rank and dignity. About 1797, the Prince, agreeably to the request of the Amīrs of his country, received Tipū's permission to depart, on which occasion Tipū said, "after you have made your arrangements regarding the capital of Sultanut of Persia, it is my wish that you and I in concert with Zuman Shah, should endeavour to regulate and put in order (*i.e.*, divide between ourselves) the countries of Hindostan and the Dukhun." The Prince agreed and pledged himself to this proposition.¹⁷ For it had by now become Tipū's avowed ambition to join and act in concert with the kings of Islām against his enemies, particularly the English. And in the boundless variety of schemes contemplated by him for the restoration of his own power and the expulsion of the English from India, he had found means, through his agents at Delhi, of opening a correspondence with the ministers of Zāman Shah, son of Timūr Shah and grandson of Ahmad Shah Ābdālī Durāni, the chief of Kabul and of the Afghans.

His embassy to Tipū, early in 1796, despatched Zāman Shah of ambassadors thither, with valuable presents, elephants and friendly letters, proposing the modes of affording each other aid and assistance, in pursuance of the common objective of "carrying on the holy war against the infidels, and freeing the region of Hindostan from the contamination of the enemies of our religion." The ambassadors were, however, instructed carefully to

17, Kirmāni, *o.c.*; 240, 248.

conceal their political objects, to proceed by the way of Kutch, where a commercial factory was already established, thence to Karāchi ("Keranchy"), in Sindh, on the pretence of establishing another factory, and from thence, on the pretext of a mercantile and religious journey to the holy tombs in Persia, to obtain safe conduct through Baluchistan, and make good their way to Kabul. According to the projected means by which the co-operation of this sovereign was proposed to be rendered available, the conquest of Delhi, the expulsion of the Mahrattas, and the consolidation of the Empire of Hindustan were to occupy one year; and in the second, an Afghan army was to invade the Mahratta dominions in the Deccan from the north, while he should assail them from the south. These objects effected, the destruction of the remaining infidels, it was thought, would be nothing. Zāman Shah had previously meditated the invasion of Hindustan and had moved for the purpose in the same year, but was recalled by intestine war. The ambassadors, however, returned with the rarities and presents of the country, after making a suitable impression and confirming terms of peace and amity between the two powers by oaths and treaties.¹⁸

These movements nearer home apart, which were intended to restore Tipū's affairs, it
Intrigues with the French Government (down to 1796).
remains to describe the measures directed to the same end, which he attempted to concert with the French Government. Tipū's embassy to Paris in 1788 terminated, as we have seen, in general professions of amity, in assurances of a disposition to promote his views at a proper opportunity, and in explanations of the reasons which prevented

18. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 633-634; Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 240-241. As to the correspondence bearing on Tipū's embassy to Zāman Shah in 1796-1797, see J. Salmond, *A Review of the Origin, Progress and Result of the Decisive War with Tippoo Sultaun* (1800), A p. A. Nos. 21 to 26.

Louis XVI, the French King, from then engaging in an English war. After the humiliating treaty of 1792, Tipū, in his numerous applications for aid, systematically ascribed his misfortunes to the jealousy of the English at some previous indications of friendship with France. In conformity to the general rule, his uniform attachment to the French, and his public embassy to Paris in 1788 were alleged as the principal causes of the confederacy the English had contrived for his destruction during the late war (1790-1792). Probably in 1795 or 1796 representations to this effect were transmitted to the French Government through the medium of Pierre Moneron, while numerous communications were made through General Cossigny, who resided in the Isle of France. The success of the Revolutionary armies had enabled the French in Tipū's service to impress on his mind the decided superiority by land of the new French tactics and moral energy over any possible efforts of the English. These opinions rendered him not only anxious but impatient for the execution of those assurances of the utter expulsion of the English from India, which the French had so incessantly made.¹⁹ In

Embassy to the
Isle of France, 1797.

this posture of affairs, stress of weather drove, in the early part of 1797, a privateer from the Isle of France to the port of Mangalore, having on board an obscure individual by name Ripaud. This person represented himself to be the second in command at Mauritius, and had been specially instructed to touch at Mangalore for the purpose of ascertaining Tipū's wishes regarding the co-operation of a French force which was ready at the Isle of France for the expulsion from India of their common enemy, the English. Being sent to Seringapatam by Ghulām Ali, the former envoy to the court of France

and the Meer-e-Yem (Lord of the Admiralty) at Mangalore, Ripaud was admitted to daily interviews and long consultations with the Sultān. Tipū sought the opinions of his principal officers on the proposed negotiations with the French nation, stating his own suggestion to receive and retain Ripaud in his pretended capacity of envoy, to purchase the ship, lade it with merchandise for the Isle of France and send thither confidential agents of his for the purpose of concerting all that related to the desired armament. Tipū's officers having, however, discovered that Ripaud's assured rank and political mission was an impudent imposture, represented their conviction of the troubles attending his agency. Their arguments were brushed aside by Tipū with the remark "whatever is the will of God, that will be accomplished." Ripaud's vessel was accordingly purchased for Rupees seventeen thousand and the consideration money committed to the hands of a Frenchman named Pernore, who was to pay it at the Isle of France, in conformity to Ripaud's instructions. The officers of the ship were to navigate her on the part of Tipū; Ripaud was to remain as French ambassador at his court, and four envoys from the Sultān were appointed to embark in the assumed character of merchants, and after concluding the negotiations at the Isle of France, one of them was to return with the fleet and army, and the other three were to proceed as ambassadors to the Executive Directory at Paris. The embassy, together with Pernore, left Seringapatam in the month of April 1797. Pernore, however, on the night following their arrival at Mangalore, absconded with Ripaud's money. Whereupon, though Ripaud was at first suspected by Tipū of collusion to obtain double payment for his vessel, it was determined after some consideration to restore the vessel to him, to require his bond for the repayment of Rupees seventeen thousand he had actually received, and to send


him to the Isle of France with the ambassadors, now reduced to two, who did not ultimately sail till October.²⁰

After some altercation and an ineffectual attempt on the part of Ripaud to seize and open the letters to the French authorities, the embassy reached the Isle of France in January 1798, and, despite the obvious necessity for secrecy, was openly received by General Malartic, the French Governor, with distinguished marks of respect. The dispatches from the Sultān were delivered in public and were found to contain the project of a treaty with the Government of the Isle of France for fixing the terms and objects of co-operation of a large army, supposed to be present, of from five to ten thousand European French, and from twenty to thirty thousand Africans. They were to be joined, at a rendezvous to be fixed, by sixty thousand Mysoreans, and the first object of the war was the conquest of Goa from the Portuguese, with whom no cause of enmity was assigned. This port and territory were to belong to the Sultān, and Bombay, when conquered, to the French. The ambassadors were instructed to explain, as the next objects of the war, after the adjustment of everything in the west of India, the reduction and razing of Madras, the subjugation of the Mahrattas and Nizām Alī, and finally the conquest of Bengal. To the great disappointment of the ambassadors, however, they found that every part of Ripaud's representations was equally and totally false, and that no armament for the service of the Indian Continent had arrived or was expected. But to make amends, the Governor sent the Directory in France a duplicate of the Sultān's dispatch, with assurances to the envoys of immediate succour; and deputed two officers by name Mons. Chapuis and

20. *Ibid.*, 635-638.

Dubuc, to reside at the court of Seringapatam. At the same time, he issued a formal proclamation, on the 30th of January 1798, acquainting the people of the island that two ambassadors had arrived from Tipu Sultān with despatches to his Government and to the Executive Directory, that the Sultān desired to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and to maintain, at his charge, the troops which might be sent to him; that he was perfectly prepared, and waited only the arrival of the French, to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desired to expel from India; and finally inviting the populace to join the Sultān's standard as volunteers on advantageous terms of pay. The result of these measures was that the embassy which was intended to have conveyed an armament sufficient to have swept the English off the face of India, returned, in April 1798, with a motley reinforcement of ninety-nine men (including civil and military officers), the refuse of the Isle of France, burning with a zeal for "liberty and equality". A Jacobin club was formed in Seringapatam, a tree of liberty set up crowned with the cap of liberty, and the Sultān, who looked upon the general denunciation of kings and rulers as directed by the Revolutionaries against the English alone, enrolled as *Citizen Tipu*. In July, about three months later, M. Dubuc himself was sent with two Muhammadan envoys to the French Directory to expedite the succours to the Sultān, to enable him "to attack and annihilate for ever, our common enemies in Asia."²¹

21. *Ibid*, 639-647; see also and compare Kirmāni (o.c., 252), who briefly refers to the arrival from Mauritius of Frenchmen under the command of Mons. Seepoo or Seboo (Chapuis). As to the text of Malartic's *Proclamation* dated the 30th January 1798, see Lt. Col. Alexandar Beatson, *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultann* (1800), App. I. V. A. Smith speaks of the publication of the *Proclamation* in June 1798 (o.c., 583), apparently an error for January 1798. For the *Narrative* of Tipu's embassy to the Isle of France and the text of his despatch to the Executive Directory at Paris, dated 20th





Marquis Wellesley, Governor-General of India, 1798-1805.

By now England had been engaged with France in the deadly struggle of the Revolutionary War (1793-1815). Napoleon, then known as General Bonaparte, had led an expedition into Egypt, and avowedly cherished designs for the conquest of India. These designs were shattered by Nelson's remarkable victory on August 1, 1798 at the battle of the Nile or Aboukir Bay. But the spectre of French ambition in the East long continued to engage the attention of English statesmen, notably that of the Marquis Wellesley, who, as we have seen, assumed charge of the office of the Governor-General of India in May. Wellesley's policy of subsidiary alliances and annexations, which was directed to establish the supremacy of the British power in India, was largely determined by his resolve to eschew for ever all possibility of French competition. India, whether she liked it or not, had been drawn into the vortex of European politics, and while Tipū, the Nizām and the Mahrattas each sought to gain French support, rumours of Tipū's proceedings at the Isle of France reached Calcutta on the 8th of June 1798. On the 18th a regularly authenticated copy of General Malartic's Proclamation was received enclosed in a letter from Lord Macartney—now Governor of the Cape of Good Hope—dated 28th of March 1798, the intelligence being confirmed and attested by several eye-witnesses of the

July 1798, sent through Mons. Dubuc, see Beatson, *o.c.*, App. III and XIII. Capt. John Urquhart, Commander of the ship, *St. George*, was the first to send news to Marquess Wellesley from the Isle of France of the arrival of Tipū's ambassadors at that island. Urquhart was captured three times by the French and carried to the Isle of France. He transmitted at the hazard of his life to Wellesley a circumstantial account of the proceedings of Malartic on the arrival of the envoys of Tipū with a copy of the Proclamation issued by Malartic. Urquhart died in his 27th year on 25th May 1805, and lies buried in St. Mary's Cemetery, Madras. See J. J. Cotton, *Lists of Tombs and Monuments* (No. 244), p. 40.

transaction to which the document referred. Wellesley, however, while recognising the necessity of the earliest possible preparation for war with Tipū Sultān, resolved to deal first with Nizām Ali, who had been estranged by Shore's desertion in 1795 and had endeavoured to strengthen himself by allowing Mons. Raymond to organise for him a powerful body of regular troops, similar to those commanded by Mons. de Boigne and his successors for Sindhia. This corps, which now amounted to fourteen thousand men, is described in the despatches of the time as having "attained a degree of discipline superior in every respect to that of any native infantry in India, excepting the sepoys entertained in the English service", and their efficiency was supported by a large and well organized train of field-artillery. Imbued with the principles of the French Revolution, Mons. Raymond had secured the services of a tolerably full proportion of French officers from Pondicherry and had even opened a correspondence with Tipū, which, however, appears to have been discouraged after the arrival of the party from the Isle of France, by the jealousy of the Frenchmen in the Mysorean service. His battalions carried the colours of the French Republic, the staff being surmounted by a spear, transfixing or supporting the Muhammadan Crescent. The cap of liberty was engraved on the buttons of the clothing. By secret intrigues, he encouraged mutiny and desertion among the Indian corps in the English service, stationed near the frontier; and developed a spirit of determined hostility against the English Government. The designs of aggression declared by Tipū vested in the Governor-General the right to demand from the members of the confederation of 1790 the execution of the 13th Article of that Treaty, but "it was obvious", as the military historian of Mysore puts it, "that while an army commanded by Frenchmen of such principles and views,

and of such uncontrolled power (as the one under Mons. Raymond) should remain in the service of Nizam Ali, the alliance of that Prince, instead of an accession of strength, would be a source of imminent danger, in a war with Tippoo Sultaun.²²

Accordingly, in September 1798, the Governor-General concluded with Nizām Ali a treaty, persuading or compelling him to accept a revised form of subsidiary alliance, augmenting the English force to six battalions with a formidable artillery, and to consent to the dismissal of the corps under French command in his service. The accomplishment of Wellesley's plan was facilitated by the death of Mons. Raymond; and by astute diplomacy coupled with a well-conceived military demonstration, by which the force organized by him was completely disarmed and disbanded in October without any loss of life. This bold stroke instantly reduced the Nizām to complete dependence on the Company. But the Mahrattas proved a harder nut to crack. The objects of the treaty with the Nizām were communicated to the Pēshwa both before and after its conclusion, and he was invited to concur in giving effect to the principles of guarantee, contained in the 13th Article of the Treaty of 1790. The councils of Daulat Rao Sindhia, which now directed the nominal measures of the Pēshwa, were governed rather by regard for his own interests than for those of the State of Poona. Indeed the young Pēshwa Bāji Rao had evinced the greatest anxiety to be released from the state of insulting thralldom in which he was kept by the overgrown power of Sindhia, and had even secretly solicited the interference of the British Government. The latter had a right to remonstrate against

22. *Ibid.*, 663, 656-659, 671, 680, 689; also Beatson, *o.c.*, 21-22, and Smith, *o.c.*, 581-582.

that open interference and control which prevented the Pēshwa from performing his engagements as a member of the alliance of 1790 ; and strenuously endeavoured to oblige Sindhia to leave Poona. Sindhia was perfectly

Conducts negotiations with the court of Poona.

well disposed to unite with Tipū for the prosecution of his own views in the Deccan and the South. But he clearly saw that during the hostile operations of a large portion of his regular army in that quarter, his most valuable possessions in Hindustan were open to attacks by an English army, cantoned near the frontier ; and that he could not effectually prosecute new conquests without imminent risk to himself. Considerable fluctuation, sometimes amounting to the prospect of an improved alliance, prevailed at different times at the court of Poona, though the Mahrattas generally sought to evade and procrastinate. The accession of strength to English interests, from the events at Hyderabad in October 1798, alarmed Sindhia for the double danger he should incur in the south and in the north by a rupture with that State. Although, therefore, he firmly adhered to the prosecution of his views at Poona, and prevented the Pēshwa from executing the provisions of the Triple Alliance of 1790, he determined to postpone any active military interference of his own on either side. While Wellesley thus anticipated an unwilling neutrality as the best object he could immediately accomplish at Poona, he continued amicable relations with that court, with the view of participating with the two allies (the Nizām and the Mahrattas) in the execution of their common engagements. He accordingly decided on the necessity of pursuing his operations against Tipū Sultān, without any aid from the Mahrattas, leaving in their present undecided condition the state of his political relations with the Pēshwa and Sindhia.²³

23. *Ibid.*, 655, 661-665 ; also Beatson, *o.c.*, 22-28, and Smith, *o.c.*, 582.

Meanwhile Tipū was actively carrying on his secret machinations with the court of Poona. On the death of Pēshwa Mādhava Rao Nārāyan in October 1795, he dispatched an emissary, Bālājī Rao, to congratulate his would-be successor, Bāji Rao, and to concert with him a more intimate political union. On his arrival at Poona, however, the envoy found Chimnāji on the *musnad*, Paraśurām Bhau a minister and Bāji Rao a prisoner with Sindhia. He soon got himself introduced to an informal interview with Bāji Rao, who eventually succeeded to the office in December 1796. The envoy, under instructions from the Sultān, represented to the Pēshwa that their respective fathers (Haidar and Raghōba) had been connected by the most intimate political ties; that Nāna Farnavis had been the efficient cause of his father's banishment and death, and of placing on the *musnad* the posthumous Mādhava Rao Nārāyan, and had equally been the source of Tipū's misfortunes by promoting the confederacy of 1790; that the Pēshwa ought to consider that minister as a worm eating into the edifice of his government, that he was treacherously leagued with the English and that his imprisonment or removal was essential to the efficiency of the Pēshwa's rule. Bāji Rao said in reply that he was faced with various conflicting evils and would endeavour to extricate himself from them all. He desired the envoy to assure his master of his sense of the important connection between their parents, and his grateful recollection of the pecuniary aid afforded by Haidar to his father in his acute distress. He expressly prohibited the envoy from any intercourse with his ministers or relations, and placed with him a confidential agent as a medium of private communication. On the occasion of Musheer-ul-Mulk's departure from Poona, the Pēshwa appears to have entertained a temporary hope of being emancipated

both from Sindhia and Nāna Farnavis, and expressed a desire for military aid. To this Tipū replied that his whole army was ready, and recommended, after terminating the domestic feud, an immediate invasion of Nizām Ali's territories from the west, while he should attack it from the south. But although the Sultān was in secret communication with Sindhia, he does not seem to have comprehended that the views of that chief were entirely incompatible with the political emancipation of Bāji Rao, on which event the Sultān most relied for giving efficiency to his projected alliance with the State of Poona. Again, on the occasion of the negotiations opened by the English Resident at Poona following the discovery of the transactions at the Isle of France, the Pēshwa sent for Bālāji Rao, and informed him of the events at Hyderabad which had established the English ascendancy there on the downfall of the French. He admonished him that the distracted state of his own Government would compel him to adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1790 on the requisition of the two other powers; that his master's intrigues with the French at such a period were in the last degree imprudent, and would lead to his destruction, without its being possible for the Pēshwa, however well disposed, to avert it; and that as a sincere friend, he advised him to drop that connection and conciliate the English by whatever concessions he could. Curiously enough, among other reasons for temporising, the Pēshwa adverted to the inefficient state of the Sultān's army, which in general opinion had been much injured by his late innovations. The Pēshwa, he added, was considered both by the envoy and his master to be seriously well disposed to the Sultān, whose preservation he considered of importance to his own interest, and especially in what related to his eventual emancipation from Nāna Farnavis. He promised his best efforts to prevent the ultimate march of the

Mahratta contingent for the siege of Seringapatam. The actual ascendancy of Sindhia being on the same side, the councils of Nāna, who really desired the performance of the 13th Article of the Treaty of 1790, were made to yield to that conjoint influence. Bālāji Rao, however, being but a secret agent to the Pēshwa, without the knowledge of Nāna, had no opportunity of attempting to negotiate with that minister. The Nāna had the conduct of the communications with the British Resident, and he recommended to the Sultān a public mission, which accordingly took place towards the close of 1798 under Ahmad Khān and Fukr-ud-dīn. It was not until April 1799 that Nāna Farnavis discovered the existence of this secret mission, when he alarmed the Pēshwa at the consequences of its being divulged to the English Resident, and prevailed on him to dismiss Bālāji Rao. This he did with professions of the greatest friendship, charging the envoy to return with all possible expedition and advise his master to dispel at any sacrifice the storm which was ready to overwhelm him. But it was too late, for before the envoy reached the frontier of Mysore, he heard of the fate of the capital.²⁴

The Marquess Wellesley, though he had refrained from immediate direct communication with Tipū Sultān regarding his knowledge of the latter's recent proceedings at the Isle of France, thus expounded his views on this matter as early as August 1798 :—²⁵

"The rights of States, applicable to every case of contest with foreign powers, are created and limited by the necessity of preserving the public safety; this necessity is the foundation of the reciprocal claim of all nations, to explanation of suspicious or ambiguous conduct, to reparation for injuries done, and to security against injuries intended.

24. *Ibid.*, 665-668.

25. *Ibid.*, 670-673 (quoting from the Governor-General's Minute in the Secret Department, dated 12th August 1798); also *Beaton*, *o.c.*, 10-12.

"In any of these cases, when just satisfaction has been denied, or from the evident nature of the circumstances, cannot otherwise be obtained, it is the undoubted right of the injured party, to resort to arms for the vindication of the public safety; and in such a conjuncture, the right of the State becomes the duty of the Government, unless some material consideration of the public interest should forbid the attempt.

"If the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun had been of a nature which could be termed ambiguous or suspicious; if he had merely increased his force beyond his ordinary establishment, or had stationed it in some position on our confines, or on those of our allies, which might justify jealousy or alarm; if he had renewed his secret intrigues at the courts of Hyderabad, Poona and Cabul; or even if he had entered into any negotiation with France, of which the object was at all obscure; it might be our duty to resort in the first instance to his construction of proceedings, which being of a doubtful character, might admit of a satisfactory explanation. *But where there is no doubt, there can be no matter for explanation.* The act of Tippoo's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war, aggravated by an avowal, that the object of the war is neither explanation, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British Government in India.

"To affect to misunderstand an injury or insult of such a complexion would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear. No State in India can misconstrue the conduct of Tippoo; the correspondence of our Residents at Hyderabad and Poona sufficiently manifests the construction which it bears at both those courts; and in so clear and plain a case, our demand of explanation would be justly attributed either to a defect of spirit or of power. The result of such a demand would therefore be, the disgrace of our character and the diminution of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our allies and of every power in India. If the moment should appear favourable to the execution of Tippoo's declared design, he would answer such a demand by an immediate

attack; if, on the other hand, his preparations should not be sufficiently advanced, he would deny the existence of his engagements with France, would persist in his denial until he had reaped the full benefit of them, and finally, after having completed the improvement of his own army, and received the accession of an additional French force, he would turn the combined strength of both against our possessions, with an alacrity and confidence inspired by our inaction, and with advantages redoubled by our delay. In the present case, the idea, therefore, of demanding explanation must be rejected as being disgraceful in its principle, and frivolous in its object.

"The demand of reparation, in the strict sense of the term, cannot properly be applied to cases of intended injury, excepting in those instances where the nature of the reparation demanded may be essentially connected with security against the injurious intention.

"Where a State has unjustly seized the property or invaded the territory, or violated the rights of another, reparation may be made, by restoring what has been unjustly taken, or by a subsequent acknowledgment of the right which has been infringed; but the cause of our complaint against Tippoo Sultaun is not that he has seized a portion of our property which he might restore, or invaded a part of our territory which he might again cede, or violated a right which he might hereafter acknowledge; we complain that, professing the most amicable disposition, bound by subsisting treaties of peace and friendship, and unprovoked by an offence on our part, he has manifested a design to effect our total destruction; he has prepared the means and instruments of a war of extermination against us; he has solicited and received the aid of our inveterate enemy for the declared purpose of annihilating our empire; and he only waits the arrival of a more effectual succour to strike a blow against our existence.

"That he has not yet received the effectual succour which he has solicited, may be ascribed either to the weakness of the Government of Mauritius, or to their want of zeal in his cause, or to the rashness and imbecility of his own councils; but neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to restrain it, nor of our danger from it, are to be estimated by

the amount of the force which he has actually obtained ; for we know that his demands of military assistance were unlimited ; we know that they were addressed, not merely to the Government of Mauritius but to that of France, and we cannot ascertain how soon they may be satisfied to the full extent of his acknowledged expectations. This, therefore, is not merely the case of an injury to be repaired, but of the public safety to be secured against the present and future designs of an irreconcilable, desperate and treacherous enemy. Against an enemy of this description, no effectual security can be obtained, otherwise than by such a reduction of his power as shall not only defeat his actual preparations but establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence."

According to the Governor-General, in the general confusion which followed the war of 1790-1792, the power of Tipū Sultān which had been the objective of English policy to reduce to the degree then deemed necessary to render him incapable of mischief, had remained not only unimpaired but had been anxiously augmented. Its farther diminution was therefore indispensable to the safety of the English Government. The absolute extinction of Tipū's power was at no period in the contemplation of the Marquess Wellesley. He had hoped, through the effective co-operation of his allies and the successful issue of his preliminary measures, to convince the Sultān of the fatal tendency to himself of his hostile designs, and to induce his unwilling assent to such arrangements as should render his political existence compatible with the security of the English interests in India. The danger of French co-operation assumed in the meanwhile a more threatening aspect. Although the French expedition to Egypt in August had no immediate connection with Tipū's embassy to the Isle of France, it was the result of those previous designs which always reckoned on the Sultān as the efficient instrument of France for the recovery of their power in

the South, as Shah Ālam, the blind imprisoned Mughal Emperor at Delhi, was to be the ostensible engine of their operations in the north. The existence of this danger accordingly led the Governor-General to the necessity of either compelling the Sultān to detach himself from the interests of France, or of depriving him of the power of co-operating with the French, if they should be enabled to reach India.²⁶

In consonance with these views, the Marquess Wellesley first wrote to Tipū Sultān on the 4th of November, announcing the unprovoked French attack on the Sultān's Muhammadan ally in Egypt and the English victory of Aboukir. To this Tipū replied in a friendly tone, offering his congratulations. On the 8th of the same month, the Governor-General again wrote to the Sultān, apprizing him of his knowledge of his recent negotiations with the French, proposing to depute Major Doveton on the part of the allies to explain the *sole means* for the removal of distrust and suspicion, and for the establishment of peace and good understanding, and desiring Tipū to state when he intended to receive him. To this letter, Tipū had the temerity to answer that the existing treaties were a sufficient security, and that he could imagine no other means more effectual, thereby distinctly declining the reception of the envoy. The negotiations of the English at Hyderabad and Poona and their extensive preparations in Madras and Bombay about this time were intimately known to the Sultān.

26. *Ibid.*, 673-674; also Beatson, *o.c.*, 28-29. The Marquess Wellesley, in adopting this objective, was closely following the instructions to him contained in the letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 18th June 1798, who advised him "to take the most immediate and most decisive measures to carry our arms into our enemy's country," and held that they had "not in view a wanton attack upon our inveterate enemy, with a design to augment our own power, but a necessary and justifiable defence of our own possessions" (see Beatson, *o.c.*, App. VI).

The English preparations, he thought, were always tardy, and his allies might be more alert; his ambassadors had, in 1789, returned from the Red Sea to Calicut in less time than was necessary for the maturity of the English plans of invasion, and his allies would not abandon him to destruction, without some effort for his deliverance, from France, from Mauritius or from Egypt. He would send embassies to Constantinople and to Kabul, and stir up the faithful to prevent the extinction of the faith. His emissaries at Poona would work on the passions and interests of Sindhia and of Bāji Rao, and the ascendancy of the English at Hyderabad might again yield to his superior address. The means alluded to by the Governor-General could be no other than demanding the remaining sea-coast of Mysore in Canara (comprising the ports of Kodyāl, Mangalore and Honāvar) and thereby excluding him from communicating with the French, and from the only possible chance of retrieving his affairs. Indeed the state of Tipū's mind at this time appears to have been one of resignation to his fate. "If his destruction was pre-ordained," he said, "let it come! the sooner the better! but he might still hope that his own efforts would prolong the contest until aid should arrive." Every discussion was terminated by the professedly pious remark, "after all, whatever is the will of God, that will be accomplished." This state of passive contemplation, although materially disturbed, was not permanently changed, even by the receipt of the letter from the Marquess Wellesley, dated the 8th of November.²⁷

On the 10th of December, the Governor-General,

The Marquess' arrival at Madras, December 31, 1798.

wrote again, calling the Sultān's attention to the above-mentioned letter, and requesting to be favoured with a reply

27. *Ibid.*, 674-676; Beatson, *o.c.*, 31, with App. VIII; see also and compare Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 254.

at Madras, whither the Marquess was about to proceed to direct the operation of an immediate war. On reaching Madras on the last day of the month, the Governor-General found a reply waiting for him, dated the 25th. This letter opened with the intimation of Tipū's joy at the brilliant naval victory of the Nile over the French, of which he had been advised by the Governor-General, and a wish for greater success. He explained away the embassy to the Isle of France as being simply the trip of a merchantman that conveyed rice and brought back some forty artificers, an incident, which, it was alleged, had been distorted by the French. The Sultān added also that he had never swerved from the path of friendship and could not see (as before mentioned) more effectual measures for establishing it than those that already existed ²⁸.

The Governor-General replied on the 9th of January 1799, exposing the whole affair of Tipū's real designs, of Tipū's embassy to the Isle of France as ratified and approved by himself; expressing a wish still to listen to negotiations by renewing the proposal to depute Major Doveton; and allowing one day's time for a reply, with a significant warning that "dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs." This letter was accompanied by a Persian translation of the Manifesto issued by the Ottoman Porte, declaring war against the French, consequent on their invasion of Egypt. Again, on the 16th of the month, the Governor-General wrote to the Sultān, forwarding a letter addressed to him by the Grand Signor, dated the 20th of September 1798, transmitted through the English Minister at Constantinople, in which the Grand Signor exhorted him to manifest his zeal for Islām by renouncing all intercourse with the French, an admonition to which the Governor-

General drew Tipū's pointed attention. Tipū, though roused from his stupor, was still not master of himself. The Governor-General's letter made him see the immediate pressure of the danger and even in a certain degree the folly which had produced it. The gratuitous folly of receiving a military contingent of ninety-nine Frenchmen was just dawning on him, and he held in one of his apologies: "a weather-beaten fragment of skull produced the death of forty persons—the fractured mast of Ripaud's worthless vessel will cause the subversion of an empire." But he still went on with "the

Tipū procrastinates, January-February 1799. procrastination naturally belonging to an unpalatable resolve, hesitating from day to day to execute the deter-

mination of the last; and the lingering indecision of the fatalist suggested the hope that, if at the last moment no favourable chance should arise, he might still be in time to submit to an alternative, short of absolute destruction. At this period, there were constant assurances to him from the French in his service (particularly from Mons. Dubuc, who did not finally sail from Tranquebar until the 7th of February) that troops in aid of him should have actually embarked on the Red Sea and might be daily expected. Projects of resistance or submission held their alternate empire, as reason or passion prevailed; and it is believed by those who had the best opportunities of judging that the confident assurances of the French officers were the efficient cause of diverting the Sultan's mind from the only wise resolution it was then in his power to form, and produced his ultimate destruction." How far these assurances were or could be reliable, he did not stop to enquire. It is certain that they could only have originated in vague inferences regarding the ultimate objects of the Egyptian expedition, and in an entire ignorance of the actual facts. After the destruction of the French fleet on the


1st of August 1798, Bonaparte could not have contemplated distant detachments ; it was as much as he could do to preserve his first conquest. But there is hardly any doubt that that General's letter to Tipū (written in February 1799 and beginning with the famous words "you have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea"), professing the intention of liberating him from the iron yoke of England, distinctly shows the intended execution of that design to be distant, which seems natural when we remember that he desires the despatch of a secret envoy to meet him at Cairo, and the exactly contemporaneous character of the sieges of Acre and Seringapatam. This apart, Tipū, with the object not of offensive war but preservation from impending destruction, in vain sent, at the end of January 1799, a second embassy to Zāman Shah of Kabul, and, early in February, deputed a mission to the Grand Signor (the Ottoman Porte) of Constantinople, in reply to his letter of the 20th September 1798, entreating both the powers to exert themselves in the common cause, namely, the holy war (*jihad*) to be carried on by the confederate Islāmic states against the British power in India. At length, after a lapse of more than a month, Tipū broke the spell of his long silence by his reply to the Governor-General's letter of the 9th of January, which was received in Madras on the 13th of February, in which he wrote, with utter disregard, that he was proceeding on a hunting excursion, and desired that Major Doveton might be sent "slightly attended." The Governor-General's urgent representations had thus far produced no effect on the Sultān, who, by his studied and systematic delay, had postponed noticing his admonitions until the period of the season rendered the advance of the army necessary to the common security of the allies, namely, the Nizām and the Pēshwa. In the words of the Governor-General, Tipū, "disappointed

in his hopes of immediate vengeance and conquest, now resorts to subterfuge and procrastination, and by a tardy, reluctant and insidious acquiescence in a proposition which he had so long and repeatedly declined, endeavours to frustrate the precautions of the allies, and to protract every effectual operation, until some change of circumstances and of season shall revive his expectation of disturbing the tranquillity of India by favouring the irruption of the French army." The allies being equally prepared "to repel his violence and to counteract his artifice and delay," the Governor-General at last on the

War with him
declared by the
Governor-General
(*The Fourth Mysore
War*), February 22,
1799.

22nd of February declared, on their behalf and on behalf of the English East India Company, war with Tipū Sultān, informing him of the same, and authorizing Lt. Gen. Harris, the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces, "to receive any embassy which Tippoo Sultaun may dispatch to the headquarters of the British army, and to concert a treaty on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indisputably necessary for the establishment of a secure and permanent peace." Intelligence of the invasion of Egypt by the French having reached the Governor-General on the 18th October 1798, he had ordered the Madras Government to advance the army to some convenient place near the Mysore frontier, and advised them of the intended dispatch from Calcutta of three battalions of Indian volunteers. Instructions had also been sent to Bombay at the same time for the assembly of a body of troops in Malabar for the purpose of co-operating in the siege of Seringapatam should hostilities become unavoidable.²⁹

29. *Ibid.*, 634, 676-686, 689; Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 311: also Beatson, *o.c.*, 32-33, 37-39, with App. VII, XI, XIV, XV and XVI, for correspondence between Tipū and the Governor-General, etc. As to the letter from the Ottoman Porte to Tipū Sultān, dated 20th September 1798, see J. Salmond, *o.c.*, App. C, Nos. 20 and 21. Also App. A. Nos. 29 and 30.



General George Harris, G.C.B.

Thus broke out the last and final war with Tipū, which was to decide the fate of the kingdom of Mysore. It being the objective of the Governor-General to finish the war not only in a single campaign but by one operation, the plan of the campaign naturally excluded the occupation of intermediate posts.⁸⁰ An army consisting of nearly 21,000 men of all arms had been assembled near Vellore under the command of General Harris, and it marched for the frontier on the 14th February. On the 20th, when near Ambur, it was joined by the troops from Hyderabad, amounting to about 16,000 men, under the general command of Mīr Ālam Bahadur, a minister of Nizām Alī. On the 23rd, Major-General Floyd was sent in advance, with a strong body of cavalry and the left wing of the army, in order to cover the passes of the

The course of the War, February-May 1799.

The British army marches for Mysore, February 1799.

in the same work, for Tipū's letters to Zāman Shah and the Ottoman Porte, dated 30th June 1799 and 10th February 1799 respectively, accompanying Tipū's embassies to those courts. Wilks is obviously referring to these embassies when he observes that they were "despatched, but returned without reaching their destination" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 675, *f. n.*). Kirmāpi, not always a safe authority, perhaps best represents the view-point of the local Muslim historian when he, touching briefly on the course of affairs above referred to, speaks of the English thus: "At the arrival of the French and the permission given to them (to visit Seringapatam), the horse-shoe of the English chiefs was placed in the fire, and they fearing that by the aid, and at the instigation of the French, the troops of the Sultan would proceed to the attack and pillage of the towns of the Karnatic and Hyderabad, in consultation and concert with their friends, they formed a plan for the destruction of the Khodadad State, and assuming the arrival of the French as the plea and ground of their hostilities, they with the advice of Mushir-ul-Mulk and Mir Alum, wrote a detailed account of these occurrences to Lord Mornington, then residing in Calcutta, and he who was looking out for such a contingency, and who was also well acquainted with the weakness and disorganization of the departments of the Mysore State, with the greatest promptitude and speed embarked with four thousand sipahees on board ship and arrived at Madras . . . and having assembled the army under General Harris, Commander-in-Chief, dispatched it in advance to the conquest of Seringaputtun" (Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 252-253).

Bārāmahal. General Harris followed; and on the 28th he joined the leading division at Karimangalam.³¹

Immediately before entering the Mysore territory, General Harris considered it expedient to add a regiment of European infantry to the Nizām's Contingent, and H. M.'s 33rd was the one selected. This arrangement placed the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley in command of the division, much to the dissatisfaction of Major-General Baird who believed himself entitled thereto; but the nomination of Colonel Wellesley was justified partly on political grounds, and partly because the Contingent was a Colonel's command.³²

The army arrived at Rāyakōta on the 1st March, and was soon engaged in reducing a congeries of small hill-forts in the neighbourhood, which the Treaty of 1792 had left in possession of the Sultān. Thus, on the 5th idem, a detachment, under Major John Cuppage, 1st Battalion 6th Regiment, took possession of the small hill-forts of Nildurg and Anchittydurg. Two or three days afterwards, the forts of Udayadurg and Ratnagiri surrendered, the former to the 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver, and the latter to Six Companies 2nd Battalion 4th Regiment under Captain Irton of that corps.³³

The force from Bombay, assembled in Malabar under Lieutenant-General Stuart, had received instructions to ascend the ghāts into the province of Coorg, and to remain there until further orders. It marched from Cannanore accordingly on the 21st February, and on the 2nd March, the right brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor,

31. Wilson, *o. c.*, II. 312-314; see also and compare Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 700-701; Beatson, *o. c.*, 52-55; and Kirmāpi, *o. c.*, 253-254.

32. *Ibid.*, 814.

33. *Ibid.*; see also and compare Wilks, *o. c.*, II. 707, and Beatson, *o. c.*, 55.

encamped at Seedaseer (Siddēśvara) on the Coorg frontier, about seven miles from the town of Periapatam, on the high road to Seringapatam, the main body remaining about eight miles in the rear. Tipū, who, in the meanwhile, had lain encamped near Maddūr in a state of agitation and suspense regarding the arrival of the English envoy, had received no answer to his last letter to the Governor-General. Apprized, however, of the movements of General Harris, he said, "All my decisions must now be desperate. I am but losing precious time in waiting for their ambassador, while they are closing in upon me on either side. I will march and strike a blow." Accordingly, leaving a detachment of 3,000 stable horse and four kushoons of infantry under Pūrpaiya and Saiyid Sāhib to watch the motions of General Harris, he hastened, on the 3rd of March, by the route of Kannambāḍi and Periapatam, determined to cut off the column under General Stuart. He arrived before the English camp on the 5th, the very day on which General Harris crossed the frontier of the Karnātic, and dispatched to the Sultān the letter of the Governor-General, dated the 22nd of February. Vīrarāja, the romantic Rāja of Coorg, now discerned from the summit of the Siddēśvara hill, the plain near Periapatam dotted with tents, including a green one, and flew to the English with the news. But the dawn following (6th March), Tipū's force was

Action at Siddēś-
var, March 6, 1799.

in motion, and he suddenly attacked Colonel Montresor with a select corps of about 11,800 men. A fog and the dense jungle screened his approach till the advanced British line was attacked both in front and rear, Saiyid Ghaffar, Hussain Alī Khān and Muhammad Razā *alias* Benki Nawāb, among the Sultān's officers (*Mir Mirāns*), distinguishing themselves in the attempt. The brigade, although completely surrounded, behaved with great resolution, and maintained the position until about

3 o'clock in the afternoon, when General Stuart coming up with the flank companies of the 75th, and the whole of the 77th, the Sultān's forces retreated in all directions with the loss of about 1,500 killed and wounded. The casualties on the British side amounted only to 143 killed, wounded and missing. The Sultān thought of renewing the attack on the ensuing day with augmented numbers, but in the meanwhile General Stuart had changed all his dispositions, evacuating the post of Siddeśvar. Tipū, having brought disgrace upon himself by his late repulse, employed all his art and knowledge to recover his lost reputation. At length, on the 11th, after a lapse of four days, he marched back to Seringapatam, seeing the futility of resolving to attack the Bombay army again³⁴.

On the 9th March, the English army, under General Harris' march, March 9-24, 1799. Harris encamped at Kilamangalam, and on the next day Lieutenant-Colonel Read, who had joined General Harris shortly before, was detached in order to protect the frontier of the Bārāmahal, to collect provisions, and ultimately to co-operate with a force under Col. Brown, which had been assembled near Trichinopōly, and was about to march for Seringapatam by Karoor, Erode and Caveripuram. After making the arrangements for Col. Read's detachment, General Harris marched on the 10th, Colonel Wellesley's division moving at a considerable distance on the right flank of the army for the protection of the baggage and stores. Soon after leaving Kēlamangalam, the columns were harassed by bodies of Mysore horse under Pūrṇaiya and Saiyid Sāhib, one of

34. *Ibid.*, 215; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 686-687, 702-706; Beatson, *o.c.*, 71-77 with App. XXI (letter to the Governor-General, containing Virarāja's account of Tipū's operations against General Stuart in Coorg, March 1799). See also and compare Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 255, 259-260. 21st April, referred to at p. 703 of Wilks' work as the date of General Stuart's march from Cannanore, is clearly an error for 21st February 1799 in the light of both Wilson and the context.

which succeeded in cutting up the light Company 1st Battalion 11th Regiment, which formed part of the rear-guard of the Nizām's Contingent. Twenty men were killed. Lieutenant Reynolds and thirty-six men were wounded. Then the army marched north-west, leaving the village of Ānekal on the right and passing through Kalagondanahalli and Jigani. A halt was made on the 11th, a quantity of the public stores having not yet arrived in camp. The army moved on the 12th and again halted on the 13th from the same cause, and marched on the 14th to an encampment within sight of Bangalore and distant from it about nine miles. There were now three routes from Bangalore to Seringapatam, namely, the central and the shortest by Channapatna, the more southern by Kānkānhalli and the most northern by Huli-yūrdurg, the last two having been used by Lord Cornwallis during the campaigns of 1791 and 1792 respectively. Limiting his choice, however, to the route of Kānkānhalli, General Harris entered it on the 16th. On the 18th, the army again halted, to remove the obstacles to the battering train, which had occasioned the loss of powder, shot and other military stores. Resuming the march on the 19th, it encamped at Kānkānhalli on the 21st and proceeding from thence, took up a position upon the west bank of the river at Maddūr on the 24th.³⁵

Meanwhile Tipū, who had left Periapatam on the 11th, arrived at Seringapatam on the 14th.

Tipū's movements. After remaining here for a short time to refit, his first movement was in the direction of Channapatna, by which route, he had been informed, the English army would advance. But learning, on the

35. *Ibid.*, 316-317; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 701-711; Beatson, *o.c.*, 59-70; see also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 255-256), who refers to Pūrnaiya as the "accursed Mir Mirān" and hints at his lukewarmness in opposing the advance of the English army. There is no reasonable ground whatever for this characterization. Pūrnaiya was always overruled by the supposed superior wisdom of Tipū.

16th, that General Harris had entered the southern road, he deviated by his right to Malvaḷḷi and marched to the Maddūr river, where he encamped on the 18th, and was joined by the corps under Pūrpaiya and Saiyid Sāhib, who had also crossed from the central road after destroying and setting ablaze all the dry forage in and around Bangalore. It being a close woody country and the fixed system of Haidar and Tipū generally preferring an open field, Tipū, departing from the precedent, opened several roads through the woods. He not only abstained from any effectual attempt but also occupied an advantageous position to oppose the passage of the river in front, placing beyond it a strong corps to operate simultaneously on the enemy's right flank, with an open rear and a secure retreat from both positions. He, however, soon abandoned the intention of giving battle on this ground, as strongly recommended to him by Mons. Chapuis and his own best officers, because the plan of defence necessarily involved the risk of a few guns. And he determined to fight on ground which he had examined about two miles to the westward of Malvaḷḷi, a town twenty-eight miles east of Mysore and eighteen miles south of Maddūr. Accordingly Tipū moved thither.⁸⁶

Nothing of moment occurred until the arrival of the English army near Malvaḷḷi, where an action took place on the 27th, thus described by General Harris :—

Action at Malvaḷḷi,
March 27, 1799.

"On the 27th March, the army reached Mallvelly, to the westward of which place, but at a considerable distance, the army of Tippoo Sultan appeared, formed on a very commanding ground to oppose our further progress. I had previously arranged the march of the army so as to preserve the right

86. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 709-710, 712-713; Beatson, *o.c.*, 77; see also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 256), who refers to Malvaḷḷi as "Marooli." Tipū had given the Islāmic name of Gulshanābād to Malvaḷḷi. Tipū would rather listen to Chapuis or Pūrpaiya as he had chosen this place for offering battle.

wing and cavalry free from the incumbrance of baggage, and ready to act as occasion might require in conjunction with Colonel Wellesley's division, which, lightly equipped, moved at some distance on our left flank, the left wing under Major-General Popham being allotted to protect our baggage, provisions and stores, in the event of an action, which although it was not my object to seek, I had determined not to avoid by any movement which might lead the enemy to suppose I could entertain a doubt of the event.

"Judging from the distance of the enemy that they did not intend an attack, I directed the ground to be marked out as usual for the encampment of the army, but at 10 o'clock guns were opened from the distant heights on the cavalry and the corps advanced for picquets on our right. The shot falling on the line, I ordered the picquets to be supported by H. M.'s 25th Dragoons and the 2nd Regiment of native cavalry, the three brigades of infantry to form line on the left of the picquets, and the whole to advance on the enemy's left and front, while Colonel Wellesley's division was directed to move towards the right flank of the enemy's line.

"The picquets under Colonel Sherbrooke, assisted by H. M.'s 25th Dragoons, were opposed to a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who hovered on the right flank of our troops during the advance which was too rapid to admit of the field-pieces attached to corps keeping their position in the line. Encouraged by this circumstance, a small corps of the enemy's cavalry hazarded a resolute charge on the European brigade commanded by Major-General Baird, but found it impossible to make any impression on H. M.'s 12th, and the Scotch Brigade, who received them with the greatest steadiness, and by a continued, close and well directed fire, repulsed them with considerable loss.

"This corps was accompanied in its precipitate retreat by a large body of horse, led, as we have since learnt, by the Sultan in person, which had been prepared to sustain the attack if successful; and by a brigade of infantry that for some time had maintained a heavy fire of musketry, principally directed, and not without effect, at H. M.'s 74th Regiment,

"Nearly at the same time that their cavalry charged our right, a large division of the enemy's infantry had advanced on our left to attack the force commanded by Colonel Wellesley, and was broken by H. M.'s 33rd Regiment which led his column.


"At this critical moment, H. M.'s 19th Dragoons and two regiments of native cavalry, commanded by Major-General Floyd, charged this retreating corps, and nearly destroyed it.


"The army continued to advance in a well-connected line, while that of the enemy retreated before it in the utmost confusion. Their cannon were drawn off, and after a short pursuit, the want of water not permitting to encamp upon the field of battle, the army returned to the vicinity of Mallavelly.

"The 19th Dragoons, the 12th, 33rd, 74th and the Scotch Brigade, which alone of H. M.'s corps were engaged, were equally distinguished by their steadiness and gallantry. The 25th Dragoons, although prevented by their remote situation from joining in the charge of the cavalry, was most eminently useful with the picquets under Colonel Sherbrooke in checking the advance of the large corps of the enemy's horse which menaced the right flank of the army till the conclusion of the action."

It was afterwards ascertained that Tipū's loss amounted to about 2,000 men killed and wounded. British casualties were trifling, *viz.*, 66 men, and 48 horses, killed, wounded, and missing.³⁷

37. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 317-319. Compare Beatson, *o.c.*, 77-82, and Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 713-714. Wilks, who bases his account of the action mainly on General Harris' narrative, speaks of the result to the Sultān of "this injudicious affair" as "the loss of upwards of a thousand men and to the English of sixty-nine only" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 714). See also and compare Kirmānī, *o.c.*, 256-259. Kirmānī, while he gives the meed of praise to the Mysore troops who "fought with the artillery of the enemy hand to hand and shoulder to shoulder", attributes their ultimate retreat and the English victory to the shameful neglect of duty on the part of Kumr-ud-dīn, one of the officers of Tipū, who, "having put his body of horse to a canter, like a blind man (instead of charging the enemy), fell upon a division of the Sultān's brave troops, and put them all into disorder," etc.





Seringapatam in 1799.

Immediately after the action at Malvalli, General Harris determined to cross the Cauvery. Tipū, however, anticipating that the British army would take the same route to the capital which had been taken in 1792, moved off north and south-east, destroying all the forage in that direction. But General Harris defeated his project by crossing the Cauvery at Sōsale on the 29th and 30th March and resumed his march on the 1st April, encamping thirteen miles from Seringapatam. When intelligence of this skilful movement reached the ears of the Sultān, he had continued his march from Arakere and was deeply dejected. Assembling a council of his principal officers at Bannūr, he observed with great emotion: "We have now arrived at our last stage," intimating that there was no hope. "What is your determination?" "To die along with you" was the universal reply, and the meeting broke up bathed in tears, as if convened for the last time. In accordance with the deliberations of this assembly, the Sultān hastened to the southern point of the island, and took up his position at the village of Chandgāl; but General Harris, by slow yet cautious marches, again thwarted his plans, and making a circuit to the left, safely reached the ground towards the west, occupied by General Abercromby in 1792, and sat down before the capital on the 5th, in the space of a month from the date of his crossing the frontier. The position he occupied was about two miles from the south-west face of the fort. It fronted east and the right was on high commanding ground, whence it gradually descended to the left flank, which was doubly secured by an aqueduct and by the river Cauvery.³⁸

38. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 715-719, 721; also Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 819; Beston, *o.c.*, 82-88. See also and compare Kirmāni (*o.c.*, 260), who refers to Sōsale as the "Ford of Hosilly".

Since the year 1792 a new line of entrenchments had been constructed on this side of the fort, from the Daria-Daulat-Bāgh to the Periapatam bridge, within six or seven hundred yards from the fort, thus avoiding the fault of the redoubts in 1792, which were too distant to be supported by the guns of the fort. The Sultān's infantry was now encamped between these works and the river, and on the same evening on which the British army took up its position, a portion was attacked by Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the future hero of Waterloo, and Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe. Although this first attempt failed, success was achieved on the following morning, and strong advanced posts were established within 1,800 yards of the fort, with their left on the river and their right at Sultānpet.³⁹

The first English
attack, April 5.

The first English attack is thus described by General Harris:⁴⁰

"His Majesty's 12th Regiment, and two battalions of Madras Sepoys under Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, attacked a post occupied by the enemy in a ruined village about 2,000 yards from the fort, and in front of our left.

"Colonel Wellesley, with H. M.'s 33rd Regiment, and two Bengal battalions, advanced soon after to scour, and occupy a wood near the village of Sultanpett about a mile to the right of the post attacked by Colonel Shawe, with which it was connected by a large watercourse then nearly dry, having a strong bank, which winding round, and through, the wood afforded perfect cover to a large body of the enemy's troops. The attack under Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe was successful, but that on the wood failed from the intricacy of the position, and

General Harris'
despatch on.

39. *Ibid*, 718, 721-722; also Beatson, *o.c.*, 86, 89-92.

40. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 319-320 (quoting the despatch). Beatson and Wilks, cited above, evidently base their account on General Harris' despatch.

SERINGAPATAM


1799

Scale of Yards

0 500 1000 2000 3000

British

Mysoreans



Ruins of
Eadgah Redoubt

Agrar

R. KAVERI

Karigat
Hill

Tipu
Gate where
was killed

Palace

Bangalore
Gate


Bridge

Bridge

Little Kaveri

Aqueduct

Sultanpet
Tape



the darkness of the night. [Colonel Wellesley, advancing at the head of his regiment, the 33rd, into the tope, was instantly attacked, in the darkness of the night, on every side, by a tremendous fire of musketry and rockets. The men gave way, were dispersed, and retreated in disorder. Several were killed, and twelve grenadiers (these men were all murdered a day or two before the storm) were taken prisoners—*Life of Sir David Baird*, Vol. I. p. 191.]

"The enemy therefore continued to occupy the watercourse, whence, with musketry and rockets, they severely galled the troops posted in the village seized by Lieutenant-General Shawe, during the whole of that night, and part of the succeeding day."

The attack on Sultānpet was renewed on the morning of the 6th by the same troops, strengthened by the Scotch Brigade and two Madras Battalions under Lieutenant Colonels Bowser and Haliburton, the whole under Colonel Wellesley as before. Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, at the same time, pushed forward to the watercourse in his front with the 12th Regiment, supported by the flank companies of the 74th, and four companies of sepoys under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, which moved from the left of the camp along the watercourse, and turned the flank of the enemy. These attacks were successful and placed the British in possession of a strong line of posts in their front along the watercourse, extending from the river Cauvery on the left to the village of Sultānpet on the right, a distance of about two miles.

While Tipū's attention was occupied in the defence of these outposts, Major-General Floyd

The regular siege commences, April 17.

marched off from the rear of the camp towards Periapatam with a strong detachment in order to meet the army from Bombay. He effected this on the 9th, and returned to Seringapatam on the 14th accompanied by that army. Major-General Stuart crossed to the northern bank of the Cauvery on

the 16th, and took up a position with his right on the river, and his left on the rocks near the ruins of the Edgah Redoubt. The next day he detached Colonel Hart, with H. M.'s 75th Regiment, and two battalions of sepoys, to dislodge the enemy from a village near the bank of the river where it was intended to establish a battery to enfilade the south-western face of the fort, distant about 900 yards. From this day (17th April) the regular siege may be said to date. It was ultimately decided to storm at the western angle, across the river.

Colonel Hart having been joined by H. M.'s 74th, and a battalion of Madras sepoys sent across by General Harris, made his attack about sunset, and carried the village. The position thus gained was called "Hart's Post," and was armed on the 18th with a battery of six 18-pounders, and two howitzers. Simultaneously with

Colonel Hart's attack, Major Macdonald, with the 2nd Battalion 12th Regiment Madras Infantry, advanced from Shawe's Post to drive the enemy from a stream about 700 yards in front, which, running from the Cauvery some 1,200 yards above the fort, and nearly parallel to the works, afforded cover for an extent of about 600 yards near an entrenchment which the enemy had thrown up at the ruins of a powder-mill on an island formed by the Cauvery, and the stream in question. This service was ably executed, and the position, which became of importance, was named "Macdonald's Post." On the next day, it was connected with "Shawe's Post" by a trench.

An examination of the provisions in camp having been made on the 15th, much anxiety was caused by the discovery that the supply of rice would not suffice for more than eighteen days' consumption at the rate of half allowance

General Floyd
detached.

to each fighting man. It was therefore determined to detach Major-General Floyd towards Caveripuram to meet, and bring on the detachment under Colonel Read which was escorting supplies. The General marched accordingly on the 19th, with all the regular cavalry, and the 3rd Infantry Brigade under Major Gowdie.

On the evening of the 20th, Tipū's entrenchment at the Powder-Mill in front of MacDonald's Post was attacked and carried by H. M.'s 73rd, and a battalion of Bengal sepoys. This detachment, under the general direction of Colonel Sherbrooke, was divided into three parties, one under Lieutenant-Colonel Moneypenny of the 73rd, another under the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel St. John of the same regiment, and the third under Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner of the Bengal army. During the night, this post was connected by a parallel with the works already established on the south attack.⁴¹

Tipū, in order to open communications, had written to General Harris on the 9th, affecting ignorance of the cause of hostilities on which he was referred to the Governor-General's letters. He now, on the 20th, proposed a conference, and was, on the 22nd, furnished in reply with the draft of a preliminary treaty to be executed in twenty-four hours, the principal conditions of

Capture of the post
at the Powder-Mill,
April 20.

Tipū's negotia-
tions for peace.

41. *Vide*, on these sections, Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 320-322; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 724-780; and Beatson, *o.c.*, 92-104 (for details from the English point of view). Wilson seems to have relied upon these among other authorities for the sketch given by him. The local historian, Kirmāṇi, is, as is but natural, not very helpful on the subject of the operations of the English siege. He merely refers to General Harris having "encamped to the westward of the fort (of Seringapatam)" after crossing the Cauvery at Sōsale and passing Sultānpet. Then he speaks of the English regiments having "made an attack on several strong outworks which covered the fort, and were occupied by the Sultān's troops, and after a sharp contest and the slaughter of most of their defenders, took them," etc. (Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 260-261).

which were, the cession of half of his remaining territories, the payment of two crores of rupees in two instalments, and the delivery of four of his sons and four of his principal officers as hostages. Otherwise, the Sultān was informed, the allies reserved to themselves an extension of their demands for security, even to the possession of the fort of Seringapatam, until a definitive treaty could be arranged and its stipulations carried into effect. But the time passed without Tipū's accepting the proposals. For "he raved at the arrogance and tyranny of the conditions, talked of the pre-ordained decrees of fate which might still invert the relative condition of the belligerents", and declared that "in the short span of human life, it was of little importance, whether an inevitable event should arrive a few days or years sooner or later, and it was better to die like a soldier, than to live a miserable dependent on the infidels, in the list of their pensioned rājas and nabobs."⁴²

Before daylight on the 22nd, the advanced posts of the Bombay army were attacked by the besieged in force, but they were repulsed with loss. Many of the French troops, which led the assault on this occasion, were killed. About 6 o'clock the same morning, fire

Batteries at the Powder-Mill, etc.

was opened from a battery of four 18-pounders and two howitzers which had been constructed at the Powder-Mill. This fire was aided by that of some field-pieces, placed near the banks of the river to the left of Shawe's Post, which dislodged the besieged from the positions from which they galled the Bombay troops from Hart's Post.⁴³

42. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 730-731; also Beatson, *o.c.*, 93, 109-110, with App. XXIII-XXVI.

43. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 322-323; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 731-732; and Beatson, *o.c.*, 110.

On the 23rd, five 18-pounders from the battery at Hart's Post enfiaded the works of the south-west face of the fort with great effect. On the same day, a small battery for two 12-pounders was erected about 400 yards in front of Shawe's Post. On the 24th and 25th, the battery at the Powder-Mill was increased to 8 guns, and the approaches were considerably advanced, and further strengthened by a new battery for four guns. The rest of the operations may be described in the words of General Harris' Report to the Commander-in-Chief in India.⁴⁴

Operations of April 23-26.

"It now became necessary to drive the enemy from their advanced works in order to establish the breaching batteries on the spot they covered within 380 yards of the walls of the fort, upon the bank of the southern branch of the Cauvery, along which they extended nearly parallel to the south-west face of the fort of Seringapatam, each flank strengthened by a kind of stockaded redoubt, that on their right placed on the angle formed by the separation of the river to embrace the island of Seringapatam, that on their left being a circular work nearly communicating with another a short distance in its front, built to defend a stone bridge over the rivulet which formed the island on which our works were placed.

The Mysoreans driven into the fort.

"The enemy's attention was engaged by a well directed and continued fire from the batteries at Hart's Post, and all those on the south attack which could bear on their entrenchments, or the works which commanded them, until the moment of attack. As the Sun set, the troops, arranged in two columns, advanced from the trenches. That on the left

44. *Ibid.*, 323-326; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 732-737; and Beatson, *o.c.*, 110-124. Kirmāni briefly refers to the breaching operations thus: "The English troops, according to the orders of their commander, collected the materials for their batteries from the gardens of that vicinity, and one battery was thrown up to the westward of the fort and another to the north-west, and these having been completed, they began to batter and breach the walls, and to set fire to the city by throwing shells into it" (Kirm āni, *o.c.*, 261).


consisting of four companies of the Scotch Brigade, and four of Bengal sepoy, was commanded by Major Skelly, and assaulted the right of the enemy's position. The right column commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Moneyppenny of H. M's 73rd Regiment consisting of four companies of that Regiment and an equal number of Bengal Sepoys drew them from a great part of the works on their left. The success of these attacks enabled Lieutenant-Colonel Moneyppenny's division to occupy a watercourse, which running along the front of the enemy's entrenchment, afforded some cover to the troops, while that of Major Skelly took post at the work near the small bridge which was afterwards distinguished by his name.

"The enemy however still possessing the circular redoubt on the left of their late posts from which they galled our troops in the newly acquired position, by a constant fire of musketry, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the 74th, who had just arrived from camp to relieve the corps on duty in the trenches, advanced rapidly with a small party of Europeans, attacked and routed the enemy, pursuing them over the great bridge across the Cauvery, penetrating a work raised for its defence, and spreading a general alarm. Profiting by the confusion occasioned by his advance, he retired with little loss within our posts.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's conduct on this occasion merited the highest praise; the small party which he led consisted of the Light Company of the 74th and a company of the Swiss Regiment De Meuron, a corps whose gallantry and zeal, on this and every other occasion during the siege, are fully equal to that of our national troops.

"Although every possible exertion had been made during the night to profit by the comparative quiet enjoyed by our posts after Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's attack, and a double detail of troops was employed on this duty, they were, on the morning of the 27th, still exposed to a very destructive fire principally from the circular work, which, under the protection of the fort, was again occupied by a large body of the enemy's infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Wallace

Further operations,
April 27-May 3.



Seringapatam, Siege, 1799.

with three companies of His Majesty's 74th regiment, was ordered to dislodge them. This service he performed with that gallantry by which he has ever been distinguished, and kept possession by securing his men behind the parapet of his post, which from this time bore his name. In the course of the succeeding night, the approaches were deepened, and Wallace's and Skelly's Posts made perfectly tenable.

“On the 28th and 29th April, a battery for six 18-pounders was erected on the left of our most advanced trench, to bear on the western angle of the fort, from which it was distant 360 yards. The difficulty of conveying guns across the watercourse deferred its opening till the 30th in the morning, when its fire commenced with effect. Before the close of the day, the outer wall was breached, and the main rampart of the angle bastion extremely shattered. During the night, another battery for five guns was erected rather to the right and front of that which had opened in the morning. A position for six howitzers was cleared in the trenches near the battery, and the nature of the bed of the Cauvery was ascertained by Lieutenant Farquhar of His Majesty's 74th, and Lieutenant Lalor of His Majesty's 73rd Regiment who, attended by a small party of Europeans employed as pioneers, requested to be charged with this important and hazardous service.

“On the 1st May, a small battery of two 18-pounders to take off the defences of some low works which bore obliquely on the right of those already erected to breach, was constructed in their rear.

“The embrasures of the six-gun battery were altered so as to concentrate the whole breaching fire on the curtain a short distance to the right of the western angle, and in front of a large cavalier which it was also intended to destroy. A new battery was likewise commenced at Hart's Post to increase the enflading fire which had uniformly been kept up from the batteries there with the best effect, in order to favour the assault on the breach when practicable.

“On the 2nd May, the breaching batteries were opened early in the morning with admirable effect, and before the

evening, the outer wall was perfectly breached, and the principal rampart considerably damaged.


"A magazine of rockets in the fort was, during the day set on fire by a shot, from the battery at Hart's Post, which, with all the other batteries, kept up an incessant, and extremely well directed fire on every part of the works within the range of the guns. This night a communication was made from the trenches to the edge river opposite the breach, and a sunken battery for four 12-pounders was commenced at a favourable situation between Shawe's and Skelly's Posts, intended to enflade the works on the southern face of the fort, and bear on some cavaliers which fired from a considerable distance, but with much effect, on our batteries.

A practicable
breach effected, May
3.


"On the evening of the 3rd May, the breach, which the enemy had attempted to repair on the night of the 2nd, appearing nearly practicable, it was determined to make the assault in the course of the ensuing day; and the night was employed in drawing from the Bombay army the detail of that force destined to share in this enterprise, in forming the plan, in arranging the troops, and in making every other necessary preparation which could tend to ensure its success."

Meanwhile the Sultān, driven on the 27th April from his last exterior line of defence, having perceived the true character of the approaching crisis, again attempted negotiations. With a mind half reconciled to terms which he hoped would be less humiliating than those announced on the 22nd, and a still more anxious desire for deception and delay, he addressed, on the 28th, a letter to General Harris, stating that he was about to send ambassadors to adjust the points at issue. To this the General immediately replied that however justified by his non-compliance with the terms offered on the 22nd and by the subsequent change of circumstances, in extending those demands, the allies were disposed to evince their moderation by still adhering to the conditions of that

Renewed negotia-
tions.



The Storming of Seringapatam, 1799.



Sir David Baird.

date until three o'clock next day, and that he would receive no ambassadors, unless accompanied by the hostages and the treasure.⁴⁵ After the Sultān's perusal of this reply, mixed indications rather of grief than rage finally subsided into a silent stupor, from which he seldom seemed to wake, except for the purpose of affecting a confidence, by which no one was deceived, that the capital could not be taken. But though no trace was evinced of those active energies of mind and body, by which alone such a confidence could be reasonably supported, yet with the firmness and hardihood of his character he still determined neither to quit the fort and retire to some other place, nor offer conditions of peace. He resigned himself, therefore, to the will of God, and having committed the defence of the fortifications of the capital to the *Zumra* (or his choice troops), he determined to fight to the last.⁴⁶

Before daybreak on the memorable 4th of May, the assaulting party consisting of 4,376 men (2,494 Europeans and 1,882 Indians) under the command of Major.

The assault delivered, May 4.

General Baird, had taken their stand in the trenches with scaling ladders, fascines and other materials ready. The Sultān had persuaded himself that the assault would never be made by daylight. One o'clock, however, had been decided on as the hour. At that precise moment, General Baird, eager to avenge the hardships he had suffered within the walls of Seringapatam and the secret massacre of his countrymen, stepped forward from the trenches in full view of both armies, and drawing his sword, called on the soldiers in a tone which thrilled along the trenches to "follow him, and prove themselves worthy of the British name." His

45. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 735; also Beatson, *o.c.*, 118-119, with App. XXVIII-XXIX.

46. *Ibid.*, 735-736; Kirmāni, *l.c.*

men rushed at once into the bed of the river. Though immediately assailed by musketry and rockets, nothing could withstand their ardour, and in less than seven minutes, the forlorn hope reached the summit of the breach, and there hoisted the British flag, which proclaimed to the world that the fate of Tipū was decided.⁴⁷

The following extract gives the details of the troops warned for the assault, and touches on the capture of the Fort, etc.:—⁴⁸

"The flank companies from the European (His Majesty's 75th and 77th, and the Bombay European regiment, 103rd Foot) corps serving in the Bombay army, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, His Majesty's 77th regiment. Four from the Scotch brigade, and regiment De Meuron, under Colonel Sherbrooke. Ten companies of Bengal, eight of Madras and six of Bombay sepoy's under Lieutenant-Colonels Gardiner, Dalrymple and Mignan of the Company's service on those several establishments; His Majesty's 12th, 33rd, 73rd and 74th regiments, 100 artillery under Major Robert Bell of the Madras artillery, 200 of the Nizam's infantry and the corps of European and Native pioneers, commanded by Captain Dowse, formed the corps ordered for the assault; consisting of nearly 2,300 European and 2,000 Native troops, under the immediate orders of Major General Baird, whom, from a knowledge of his perfect merits as a soldier, I had selected to command on this important service. Major-General Popham was directed to occupy the trenches during the attack, in command of the battalion companies of the Swiss regiment De Meuron, and four battalions of Madras Sepoy's, forming a sustaining corps, to act if required in its support.

"On the morning of the 4th May, the batteries kept up an incessant and well-directed fire on the breach and remaining defences of the fort, which was warmly returned by the enemy till noon, when as usual their fire slackened, and their

47. *Ibid.*, 737-739, 742-744; Beatson, *o.c.*, 124-126. As to General Baird, *vide* Appendix III-(7).

48. Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 326-329.

attention was in some degree turned from the principal point of attack by the fire of the new four-gun battery which opened on the cavaliers, and southern face of the fort.

x x x x

"From knowledge of the customs of the natives of India, I judged that during the heat of the day the troops of the garrison would not be apprehensive of an assault, or prepared to make that obstinate resistance which at any other time I might expect to be opposed to our attack. I therefore directed it to take place at 1 o'clock. The troops passed the rugged bed of the Cauvery, which, opposite to the breach, was about 280 yards in breadth, exposed to a very heavy fire from the still numerous artillery of the fort, crossed the ditch, and ascended the breach in despite of all opposition from the enemy, many of whom rushed down the slope to meet them. The assailants divided, as they had been instructed to do, at the summit of the breach, and although obstinately resisted by the enemy posted behind a succession of traverses thrown up across the ramparts, particularly on the northern face of the fort; in two hours the whole of the works were occupied by our troops, and the British colours flying in the place.

"The utmost degree of humanity was shewn to such of the enemy as asked the protection of the troops, but the large force in the place, their perseverance in resistance, and the formidable army encamped under its walls, rendered rapidity and energy necessary to the safety of the troops, and the success of the assault. The slaughter was in consequence very considerable.

"So soon as the ramparts were occupied, a detachment was sent to secure the palace, and protect the family of the Sultan from insult. A battalion of the 8th regiment of Madras sepoys was already formed in its front to whom Monsieur Chapuis had surrendered his colors, and many of the French party under his command. (The party of Monsieur Chapuis from the Mauritius consisted of 17 officers and 56 non-commissioned and privates. The party of Monsieur Questin, being the remains of Lally's corps, long in the service of Hyder and Tippoo, consisted of 4 officers, and 45 non-com-

missioned and privates.) After some communication made through Major Allan, the Deputy-Quarter-Master-General of the army, General Baird, with a detachment of troops, was admitted into the palace by two sons of the Sultan on his promise for their personal safety. These princes were sent to me in camp, and it was soon after discovered that Tipoo had fallen under the fire of a party of our troops who had met him at a small gate in the inner rampart on his retreat from the outer works on the northern face. His body being found in this place, amidst a heap of slain, was removed to the palace, and recognised by his family and servants." (See below for details.)

X	X	X	X
<p>The right attack.</p> <p>Left attack.</p>	<p>The right attack under Colonel Sherbrooke was accompanied by General Baird, and reached the eastern face of the fort in less than an hour without having met with any serious opposition except near the Mysore Gate where many men were killed and wounded. The left attack met with more resistance, the traverses on the northern rampart having been resolutely held until the defenders became exposed to a flanking fire from a detachment of the 12th regiment, which had got on the inner rampart, and advanced parallel with the main body of the column. With this assistance, Captain Lambton, who had assumed command, <i>vice</i> Dunlop disabled on the breach, forced the traverses one after another, and drove the enemy to the north-east angle of the fort, where having perceived the near approach of the right column, they fell into confusion, and great numbers were killed. Immediately after this, Captain Lambton joined General Baird near the eastern gate.⁴⁹</p>		

The intermediate military conduct of Tipū may now be glanced at. It furnished some aid to a just estimation of his character. On the day of General Harris' ultimate

The Sultan's military disposition.

49. *Ibid.*, 329; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 744-746; Beatson, *o.c.*, 128-130 (for details).

encampment before Seringapatam (5th April), the Sultān caused a small tent to be pitched for his personal accommodation, on a large cavalier, on the south face, whence he directed the early operations. When General Stuart crossed the northern bank of the Cauvery (16th April), Tipū moved his headquarters to the western angle, whence he superintended the efforts made to dislodge that army from its northern position. On the opening of the first batteries (17th April), the Sultān, who could not be convinced that the fall of the capital was so near at hand, removed from this exposed situation, and during the next fortnight took up his residence in the inner partition of the *Kaḷale Diddi*, a water-gate through the outer rampart of the north face of the fort, which had for some years been closed by an exterior revetment. The troops on duty at the several works were regularly relieved but the general charge of the angle attacked was committed to Saiyid Sāhib, his father-in-law, assisted by Saiyid Gaffar, formerly an officer in the British service, who was taken prisoner with Colonel Braithwaite and was now serving Tipū. The large cavalier behind the angle bastion was committed to the charge of Mons. Chapuis. Futte Haidar, the Sultān's eldest son, with Pūrṇaiya and other *Mīr Mirāns*, commanded a corps intended to disturb the northern attack, and the second son was in charge of the Mysore Gate and the southern face of the fort, while Kumr-ud-dīn was absent watching Colonel Floyd. Among his own personal staff and attendants, it has been observed, that there was not one man of professional character. "He fancied," in the words of the military historian of Mysore, "the attachment of men raised by his own favour, to be more genuine and sincere than the support of persons possessing established character and high pretensions; and whenever a report was made of the alarming progress of the besiegers, these ignorant sycophants affected to ascribe

it to fear. Seyed Ghoffar was early in the siege wounded in the hand, but did not confine himself. He saw distinctly what was to happen; 'he is surrounded (said this excellent officer) by boys and flatterers, who will not even let him see with his own eyes. I do not wish to survive the result. I am going about in search of death, and cannot find it.' In the forenoon of the 4th May, he saw in common with other experienced observers, that the trenches were unusually crowded, and concluded that the assault was about to be given; nothing could persuade the Sultaun and his flatterers, that the enemy would dare the attempt by day-light, and the Killedar, Nedeem, one of the new men, was so grossly ignorant and destitute of all reflection, as to make an issue of pay to some of the troops on duty, which caused their absence at the moment of assault; the Sultaun, however, in reply to the report from Seyed Ghoffar, said it was proper to be alert, but that the assault would be given at night; meanwhile that officer had satisfied himself by farther observation, that an hour would not elapse before it should commence, and in a state of rage and despair hurried towards the Sultaun: 'I will go (said he) and drag him to the breach, and make him see by what a set of wretches he is surrounded; I will compel him to exert himself at this last moment.' He was going, and met a party of pioneers, whom he had long looked for in vain, to cut off the approach by the southern rampart. 'I must first (said he) shew these people the work they have to do,' and in the act of giving his instructions, was killed by a cannon shot.

"In the meanwhile, Tippoo, as if despairing of human aid, was seeking those delusive means of penetrating into futurity, so familiar in the history of every country, and of even engaging supernatural aid, through the incantations of the Brahmins, from whom he had meritted the most earnest prayers for his destruction,

The Jebbum (*Japam*), at an enormous expense, was in progress; and the learning and sanctity of the high-priest at Cenapatam (Channapatna), was farther propitiated by costly offerings. The Sultaun, in his early youth, treated with derision the science of astrology, and various statements are given regarding the completion of the particular prediction, which made him a convert to its reality; but it must have preceded the marriage of his son to the daughter of the Bebee of Cannanore, and his discoveries at Coimbetoor, in 1789, which he relates with considerable ostentation of his own proficiency in the science. Either from chance, or from right judgment respecting objects more real than those of their pretended science, the astrologers had exhibited to the Sultaun a set of diagrams from which they gravely inferred, that as long as Mars should remain within a particular circle, the fort would hold out; he would touch the limit on the last day of the lunar month, the 4th of May, and on that day they dared only to recommend that the Sultaun should present the prescribed oblations, for averting a calamity; which oblations were ordered to be prepared on the 3rd of May. On the morning of the 4th, about nine o'clock, he proceeded to the palace, bathed, and presented the oblation, through the high-priest above-mentioned, with the customary formalities; and with the farther solemnity of attempting to ascertain the aspect of his fortunes by the form of his face reflected from the surface of a jar of oil, which constituted a part of the oblation; a result depending on mechanical causes, by which the reflection of any face may be formed to any fortune."

Having finished these ceremonies about the hour of noon, he returned to his accustomed station, and shortly afterwards ordered his usual midday repast, when intelligence was brought of the death of Saiyid Gaffar. He was greatly agitated at this event, but said "Seyed


Ghoffer was never afraid to die," and ordered another officer to take his place. He then sat down to his repast, which he had scarcely finished when a report was made to him of the actual assault, and he hastened to the breach along the northern rampart. He mounted with a few attendants and *eunuchs*, and when within two hundred yards of the breach fired several times with his own hands at the assailants, under cover of a traverse. But seeing that his men had either fled or lay dead, and that the assailants were advancing in great numbers, he retired along the rampart, slightly wounded, and meeting one of his favourite horses, mounted him and proceeded eastward till he came to the gateway leading into the inner fort, which he entered with a crowd of fugitives.

A deadly volley was poured into this crowded passage by a portion of the storming party.


The Sultān's death. Tipū received a second and third wound, and his horse was struck, while the faithful servant Razā Khān, who still clung to his master's side, was also hit. Razā Khān advised him to discover himself. "Are you mad? Be silent," was the prompt reply. He then made an effort to disengage his master from the saddle, but both master and servant fell in the attempt on a heap of dead and dying. Tipū's other attendants obtained a palanquin and placed him in it, but he contrived to move out of it. While he lay with the lower part of his body buried underneath the slain, the gold buckle of his belt excited the cupidity of a soldier, who attempted to seize it. Tipū, snatching up a sword, made a cut at him, but the grenadier shot him through the temple, and thus terminated his earthly career. He was then in his forty-seventh (or fiftieth) year and had held office for seventeen years.

So long as the Sultān was present, a portion of his troops on the north side made efforts at resistance and his French corps

The search for the Sultān.



The Last Stand of Tipu Sultan, 1799.



persevered in it for some time longer, but they were, as noted above, soon quelled. Immediately after the assault, Colonel (afterwards Sir Alexander) Allan and General Baird hastened to the place in the hope of finding the Sultān. The inmates, including two princes who were themselves ignorant of his fate, solemnly denied his presence, but the doubts of the Colonel and the General were not satisfied. The princes were assured of protection and removed under military honours to the British camp, and the palace was thoroughly searched with the exception of the *Zenāna*, but all to no purpose. At last, the General's threats extorted from the unwilling Killedār the disclosure of the secret that the Sultān lay wounded in the gate; and here, after a search in the promiscuous and ghastly heap of slain, the body was discovered. It was removed to the palace in a palanquin and next day consigned with all military honours to its last resting-place at the Lāl-Bāgh by the side of Haidar Ali. The solemn day closed with one of the most dreadful storms that ever visited this part of the country.⁵⁰

Although all accounts concur in describing the resistance to the right column as having been much less vigorous than that opposed to the left attack, yet the casualties in the former somewhat exceeded those in the latter.

Tipū's forces amounted to about 21,800 men, of whom 13,750 regular infantry were in the fort, and the remainder in the entrenchments on the island. Their loss was not accurately ascertained, but has been computed at about 40 men killed and wounded per diem during the siege.

50. *Vide*, on these sections, Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 738-741, 746-752; Beatson, *o.c.*, 180-187, 146-147, 161-165, with App. XXXIII and XLII; also Major

During the night of the 4th, almost every house in the town was plundered, and it was not until the 6th that Colonel Wellesley, who had been appointed to command in the fort, reported that the plundering had been stopped, the fires extinguished, and that the inhabitants were returning to their homes. In the *interim*, several men had been executed, and a number flogged for plundering.

Nine hundred and twenty-nine pieces of ordnance were found in the fort, of which two hundred and eighty seven were mounted on the works. There was also a very large quantity of gunpowder, round shot, small arms, and military stores of different kinds. The artillery, however, when examined in detail, does not appear to have been of a very formidable description, as there were no fewer than 436 guns throwing balls under five pounds. Out of 373 brass guns, 202 were from Tipū's own foundry, 77 were English, and the rest French, Dutch and Spanish; of the 466 iron guns, only 6 were from Tipū's foundry, 260 having been of foreign, and 200 of English-make. Of 60 mortars and cohorns, 22 were Tipū's, the rest English and foreign. The howitzers, 11 in number, had, with one exception, been cast in Seringapatam.

A few days after the storm, the sons of Tipū, Pūrṇaiya, the Minister, Kumr-ud-dīn and most of the Sultān's principal officers came in and surrendered. Major-General Floyd returned to Seringapatam on the 11th, having been

Plunder of the town.
Captured ordnance.
Surrender of Tipū's sons and officers.

A. Allan, *An Account of the Campaign in Mysore* (1799). See also and compare Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 262), who speaks only of Tipū's arrangements for the defence of Seringapatam under Futte Haidar, Pūrṇaiya, Kumr-ud-dīn and others. Beatson refers to Kalale Diddi as "Cullali Deedy, built by the Delaway, or Regent of Mysore, Deo Raje, about eighty years ago" (Beatson, *o.c.*, 161). The reference here is to the construction of the water-gate by Dalavāi Dēvarājaiya of the Kalale Family about 1720.

joined near the head of the Caveripuram Pass by the detachments under Colonels Read and Brown.

Colonel Read, having delivered a large supply of provisions at the headquarters of the army near Kilamangalam on the 8th March, returned to Rāyakōta in order to complete the equipment of his detachment. This having been effected, he proceeded to make himself master of the forts on the frontier. He took Sūlagiri by storm on the 24th March with the loss of a few men, and on the 30th the fort of Peddanaikdurg capitulated on being summoned. A few days afterwards he received orders to make his way to Caveripuram as quickly as possible, there to meet Colonel Brown, after which the united detachments were to move on through the Pass to join General Floyd who was waiting to escort the convoy to Seringapatam, a precaution deemed necessary on account of the presence in the neighbourhood of a strong force under Kumr-ud-dīn. Colonel Read arrived at Caveripuram on the 22nd April. The fort surrendered the same day, and as there were no signs of Colonel Brown, Read marched on the 23rd and reached Marenhalli, at the top of the Pass, on the 27th, the distance being 30 miles, and the road extremely bad. The next few days were spent in getting the convoy up, and by the end of the month, Colonel Read joined General Floyd at Kowdahalli, a few miles further on.

Colonel Brown left Trichinopoly on the 29th March, and took possession of Karoor, Erode, and other small forts early in April.

He was then directed to hasten his march to Caveripuram, but owing to the badness of the roads, he did not reach the place until the 1st May. On the 6th, he joined General Floyd and Colonel Read at Kowdahalli, and on the 11th, the whole, together with the convoy, arrived at Seringapatam.

Lieutenant-General Stuart with the Bombay army marched for the Malabar Coast on the 13th May in order to occupy the province of Canara.

On the 17th, Colonel Read was detached to take possession of Savandurg, Kopaldurg, Bangalore, Nandidurg and other places in the Mysore country, all of which were given up without resistance.

Colonel Brown's detachment, *minus* the Madras European regiment, left near Seringapatam, and the 1st battalion 2nd regiment ordered to join Colonel Read, returned towards the south on the 22nd, and took possession of the district of Coimbatore.

On the 25th of the same month, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser, with part of the Hyderabad Subsidiary force, *viz.*, the 2nd battalion 2nd regiment, and the 1st battalion 11th regiment, together with a body of the Nizām's troops, were detached to occupy Gurrunkonda, Gooty, and other places which it had been determined to make over to the Nizām.

H. M.'s 33rd regiment, the Scotch Brigade, the 2nd battalion 3rd, the 2nd battalion 9th, and 2nd battalion 12th regiment N. I., with a proportion of artillery, were placed in garrison at Seringapatam, while General Harris encamped in the neighbourhood with the main body, to prepare for further operations, and to make arrangements for the settlement of the Mysore country.

On the 2nd June, the Governor-General in Council directed the immediate distribution of
Prize Money. the treasure and jewels captured in the fort (estimated at £1,143,216), and the reservation of the ordnance, ammunition and military stores, until the receipt of instructions from England.⁵¹

51. *Vide*, on these sections, Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 330-333, 335.

CHAPTER XVIII.

HAIDAR AND TIPŪ IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

Early references—Later writers : Dr. Francis Buchanan-Hamilton ; Dr. John Leyden ; his *Dirge on Tippoo Sultan*—Bernard Wycliffe ; Sir Henry Newbolt—Col. Meadows Taylor—Sir Walter Scott ; *The Surgeon's Daughter* (1827)—The plot—The characters—The scenes—The background—Sir Walter Scott and Bangalore—Some Prison Poems—Mysore Military Memoirs and Despatches.

IF Haidar passed away in 1782, six years after the accession of Khāsā-Chāmarāja Wodeyer, Tipū fell in 1799, three years after the death of that king. Haidar was at the helm of affairs in Mysore as its *Sarvādhikāri* or Regent for a period of twenty-one years (1761-1782), while Tipū held that position, and even sought to go beyond it, for a period of seventeen years (1782-1799).

Early references. It now seems necessary to note, in however brief a manner, the impress that the personalities of Haidar and Tipū have left on the English literature of the 18th and 19th centuries. The raids of Haidar and the ambassadorial excursions of Tipū to foreign European courts attracted the attention of reputed English writers. Haidar struck terror in the minds of all and his name created quite a sensation in England. "I no more trouble my head about who's in or who's out than I do about Hyder Ally or Ally Cawn, than about Ally Croaker," was a saying of the time. The political relations of the British settlement at Fort St. George with Haidar Alī were of the most momentous character at the time, and the embassies of Schwartz and George Gray (1779-1780) brought back romantic accounts of him, while the first English translation of his life and career by the French writer M. M. De La Tour was published in London in 1784, to

be followed two years later by the publication of another account by the English writer, Captain Robson.¹

When in 1799, on the death of Tipū, the English took possession of Seringapatam, Dr. Francis Buchanan-Hamilton was deputed to report on the dominions of the Mahārāja of Mysore. He proceeded from Madras, travelling through Conjeeveram, Vellore, Punganūr and other places, and his topographical account entitled *A Journey through Mysore, Malabar and Canara* (1802) fills two big volumes, which bear eloquent testimony to the destruction caused by the wars of the period. A similar journey fell to the lot of Dr. John Leyden a few years later. And he wrote:—

Later writers.

Dr. Francis Buchanan-Hamilton.

Dr. John Leyden.

Dreadful frown'd in martial pride

A hundred Droogs from hill to hill.

Leyden had been appointed Surgeon to the Mysore Survey, and his letters mention a few exciting incidents in his wanderings in the Mysore country. He was to relieve speedily a sick official of his duties, but a river in flood lay across. He repaired to a reputed den of robbers and enforced their assistance to him. Three of them swam in the water holding between them a brass kettle, on which Leyden was transported! In another part of the same journey, he was dogged by a monstrous tiger for a distance of three miles. Leyden was profoundly inspired by the event of Tipū's death to compose that most

His *Dirge on Tip-
poo Sultan.*

remarkable poem, the *Dirge on Tippoo Sultan*, from the current songs in Kannada, still fresh in popular memory.

Thus, on the vanity of human wishes, he bursts out:—

In Vishnu's Lotus-feet alone,

Confide! his power shall ne'er decay,

When tumbles every earthly throne,

And mortal glory fades away.

1. See Vol. I of this work under *General Bibliography*; also Vol. II Appendix IV—(2), for details about these publications.

The glory of Seringapatam, the erstwhile residence of Tipū, too, cannot naturally escape description :—

Girt by the Cauvery's holy stream,
By circling walls in triple row,
While deep between, with sullen gleam,
The dreary moat out-spread below.

A short list is made of the notable personages who had defended the kingdom under Tipū. Among them are Kummer (Kumr-ud-dīn), Sher Khan, Meer Saduk (Mīr Sādak), Mīra Hussein, Soobria Mutti, Bubber Jung, Khan Jehān Khan, Seid Saheb (Saiyid Sāhib) and Poornia (Pūrṇaiya).

Pournia sprung from Brahma's line,
Intrepid in the martial fray,
Alike in council formed to shine :—
How could our Sultan's power decay ?

Bernard Wycliffe's "The Mussulman's Lament over the Body of Tipu Sultan, written on the spot where he fell", composed in August 1828, contains some spirited lines which deserve to be quoted. Thus we read the following apostrophe to Tipū :—²

Star of the battle ! thou art set ;
But thou didst not go down,
As others who could fame forget
Before the tempest's frown—
As others who could stoop to crave
Pardon and peace from their haughty foes ;
Better to perish with the brave
Than to live and reign with those.

Chorus

Allah ! it is better to die
With war-clouds hanging ready o'er us,
Than to live a life of infamy,
With years of grief and shame before us.

2. In the edition of De La Tour's *History of Hyder Shah* by Prince Gholam Mohammed, the *Dirge* appears, as in Kirmāni's *Tipu Sultan*, in an abbreviated form.

Seringapatam by the way forms also the subject of a poem by Sir Henry Newbolt (b. 1862), in which occur the following lines:—

Sir Henry Newbolt.

The sleep that Tippoo Sahib sleeps

Heeds not the cry of man.

The story of Tipū attracted the well-known novelist

Col. Meadows Taylor.

Colonel Meadows Taylor, who endeavoured to give a picture of the times in his *Tippoo Sultaun*, a tale of the Mysore War (1799). Abdool Rhyman Khan, travelling from Hyderabad and passing through Adoni, Anantapur and other places, halted at Nandidurg, where the prison-house into which European prisoners were thrown reminds the visitor of Haidar's terrible ways. The rock also was there, from the top of which the offending captives were hurled down. The approach to Seringapatam lying "amidst groves of trees and surrounded by richly cultivated lands" is mentioned with animated pleasure.

By far the most important writer who was profoundly impressed with the characters of

Sir Walter Scott.

Haidar and Tipū is the famous novelist Sir Walter Scott, who, in weaving his story of *The Surgeon's Daughter* (1827),³ pictures the times of Haidar Ali with the Bēgum Montreville in possession of a Mysore frontier hill-fort.

The Surgeon's Daughter (1827).

3. Mr. R. H. Hutton, in his brilliant study of the *Waverley Novels*, does not so much as mention this work of Scott or refer to its significance with its scene laid in distant India in the time of Haidar and Tipū. Nor does he remember Adam's name even in discussing the leading characters in the different novels of Scott (see Hutton, *Scott*, in the *English Men of Letters*, Ed. by John Morley, Chap. X, 94-121). *Ivanhoe* (1819) was undoubtedly Scott's first triumph in the field of foreign history. The first of his novels, however, in which he passed beyond the British Isles and laid the scene in foreign lands was *Quentin Durward* (1823). While the

The plot.

The plot is laid in the period of the First Mysore War (1767-1769), when the Directors of the English East India Company "had determined to send a large reinforcement of European troops to the support of their power in India, then threatened by the kingdom of Mysore" under their formidable rival Haidar Ali.⁴ Richard Middlemas, a son of Captain Tresham (afterwards General Witherington) and Zilia Moncada, born before their legalised marriage and entrusted to the care of Dr. Gideon Gray, Surgeon in the village of Middlemas in Scotland, practises as Surgeon with Dr. Gray for sometime and later proceeds to India, taking up a commission as a Lieutenant in the service of the East India Company at Fort St. George. Richard, by his unruly behaviour, kills his commanding officer in a duel. Then he leaves Fort St. George and seeks his fortune under Adela Madame de Montreville (the Bēgum Montreville) *alias* Mōti Mahal *alias* Queen of Sheba⁵, widow of a Swiss officer, commanding a hill-fort on the Mysore frontier under the sway of Haidar. Middlemas, seeing "every prospect of rendering our [*i.e.*, English] government

Talisman (1828) deals with the period of the Crusades, *The Surgeon's Daughter* is devoted to the troublous times of Haidar (*d.* 1782). *The Chronicles of Canongate* (1827) included the three tales—*The Highland Widow*, *The Two Drovers* and *The Surgeon's Daughter*. These formed the first series of the *Chronicles*, while the second one included *The Fair Maid of Perth* (1828). For the study made here, No. 28 of the *Border Edition of The Waverly Novels*, containing *Count Robert of Paris* and *The Surgeon's Daughter* (Macmillan, London, 1928, pp. 591-854), has been used.

4. *The Surgeon's Daughter*, p. 781.

5. *Sheba*, from which her title seems to have been taken, is believed to be a region in South Arabia, along the shore of the Red Sea. *Sheba*, however, should not be confounded with Beer Sheba, the Biblical village in the south of Canaan and the most southerly, 27 miles from Hebron; associated with Iran in the north, to denote the limit of the land and what lies between. This place lies in a pastoral country, abounding in wealth, and is frequently mentioned in Patriarchal history. It means "the Wall of the Oath."

essential service by his interest with Hyder Ali", and in hopes of being eventually permitted "to return and stand his trial for the death of his commanding officer,"⁶ prevails upon Miss Menie Gray, the only daughter of Dr. Gideon Gray (by now deceased) and the object of his early love, to sail to India and share his reviving fortunes by accomplishing the engagement into which they have long ago entered.⁷ Menie, on her arrival at Fort St. George, is left under the care of the Bēgum Montreville as a companion in her family. Middlemas, as the Bakshi or general of the Bēgum, becomes in the meanwhile so subservient to the latter's wishes that he openly acquiesces in her proposal to secure for him the post of Killedār of Bangalore in exchange for the transference of the lovely Menie Gray to the harem of the young regent Tipū, whose passion for her has been excited by the Bēgum by placing within his power the original of Menie's portrait.⁸ To prevent the calamity canvassed for the young lady, and to secure his own ultimate restoration and pardon at Fort St. George,⁹

6. *The Surgeon's Daughter*, 796.

7. *Ibid.*, 798-799.

8. *Ibid.*, 805.

9. *Ibid.*, 811. Pāpaiya, the person referred to in the text, was variously known as *Lunger Pāpaiya*, *Paupā Braminy* (*Pāpaiya Brahmin*), *Avadhānum Paupā* and other names. He was interested in the sea-carrying trade, hence the sobriquet *Lunger*, which means *anchor*; *Avadhānum*, because he belonged to a family which was learned in all the Vedas; *Paupā*, because he hailed from the Brahmin caste. He was *dubash* (interpreter, agent, of John Holland, acting Governor of Madras, February 7, 1789 to February 13, 1790, on which date he made over charge and embarked for England. As Haider lived between 1717 (or 1723) to 1782, there is an anachronism in making him a contemporary of Pāpaiya, who belonged to the days of John Holland (1789-1790). That Scott himself had this anachronism pointed out to him by his friend and critic Col. James Ferguson is testified to by himself in a foot-note he adds at the end of Chapter XII of this novel in the following frank words:—"My friend Mr. Fairscribe (*i.e.*, Col. James Ferguson) is of opinion that there is an anachronism in the introduction of Paupiah, the Bramin Dubash of the English Governor—C. C." (*i.e.*, Chrystal Croftangry, which was the assumed pen-name of Scott).

Middlemas secretly negotiates with Pāpaiya, the Governor's astute Brahman Dubash at the Residency, agreeing to a well-conceived plan for the betrayal of Bangalore to the English army under General Smith, on his (Middlemas') being placed in possession of the city. "I will save her yet;" he says,¹⁰ "ere Tippoo can seize his prize, we will raise around his ears a storm which would drive the God of War from the arms of the Goddess of Beauty. The trap shall close its fangs upon this Indian tiger, ere he has time to devour the bait which enticed him into the snare." The Bēgum Montreville with the prize, accompanied by Middlemas and a small body of troops, proceeds by slow marches towards Bangalore, under whose walls she waits in state upon Tipū for the due execution of her project.

Meanwhile, promptly apprised of the delicate position of Menie Gray, Dr. Adam-Hartley, Surgeon in the Company's service at Madras and an early acquaintance and comrade of both Menie Gray and Richard Middlemas, hastens to Seringapatam, resolved "to throw himself at the feet of Hyder and beseech his interposition before the meeting betwixt Tippoo and the Begum should decide the fate of Menie Gray."¹¹ Hartley meets on his way from Madras to Seringapatam with a *Sādhu* ("Sadhu Sing"), who having suffered the shock of seeing his bride mauled by a tiger on the wedding day, remains a melancholy recluse for life, though he has the satisfaction of killing the offending animal.¹² At Seringapatam, Hartley is at first informed of the absence of the Nawāb from the city on a secret mission. But, on meeting his friend, the fakīr Barak el Hadgi, Haidar's late emissary to Madras, with Haidar himself disguised as the 'Elder Fakir,' he communicates to the latter "the villanous plot which was laid to betray Menie

10. *Ibid.*, 808.11. *Ibid.*, 821.12. *Ibid.*, 819-821.

Gray into the hands of the Prince Tippoo" and seeks his "intercession with the Prince himself, and with his father the Nawaub, in the most persuasive terms."¹³ Hartley is then directed to Bangalore. Barak el Hadgi and the pretended 'Elder Fakir' also proceed thither in time to witness the reception to the Bēgum Montreville on Tipū's stately return to the city. The Bēgum with Richard Middlemas also makes herself conspicuous on the occasion. Tipū, in acknowledgment of the services and fidelity of the Bēgum, announces the appointment of her Bakshi (Richard Middlemas) as the Killedār of Bangalore, and is about to accept from the Bēgum, in return, the present for his seraglio of the "lily from Frangistan" (Firangistan)¹⁴ in the person of Menie Gray, placed in a closed litter.

At this juncture, the 'Elder Fakir' from the crowd of bystanders bitterly assails Tipū for condescending to entrust the command of the city to an apostate and to barter justice for lust. For his insolence, the 'Elder Fakir' is directed to be dragged and his robe cut into tatters. Whereupon he flings his cap and fictitious beard on the ground, to the intense astonishment and mortification of Tipū, who now encounters "the stern and awful eye of his father" Haidar! A sign dismisses Tipū from the seat of authority which Haidar himself ascends, while the officious menials hastily disrobe him of his tattered cloak and fling on him a robe of royal splendour, and place on his head a jewelled turban.¹⁵ The Nawāb, chastising his son for his unseemly conduct, at once directs the litter containing Menie Gray to be placed at his disposal and the young lady to be tended in all honour and then escorted back to Madras with his Vakīl and Dr. Hartley. Haidar at first concedes Tipū's appointment of Richard Middlemas as the Killedār of

13. *Ibid.*, 828.14. *Ibid.*, 840.15. *Ibid.*, 841.

Bangalore, but on being soon warned by the Bēgum Montreville of his "plot to deliver Bangalore to the Feringis and the Mahrattas,"¹⁶ orders condign punishment to be inflicted on Middlemas, that of being trampled to death by the very elephant on which he rides on the occasion of his investiture of the office of Killedār of Bangalore. The Bēgum Montreville obtains her pardon as the approver of the whole plot, but she is justly punished by Haidar for injuries inflicted on Menie Gray, being made liable to compensate her to the extent of "a sum of no less than ten thousand gold mohurs, extorted almost entirely from the hoards of the Begum."¹⁷ The Bēgum dies not long after, on the forfeiture of her fort and government by Haidar. Menie Gray with Hartley reaches Madras in safety. Hartley dies about two years later, leaving a considerable part of his moderate fortune to Menie Gray. And Menie Gray herself finally sails home and settles in her native village a virgin for life.¹⁸

16. *Ibid*, 844.17. *Ibid*, 846.18. *Ibid*, 846-847.

The principal incident on which this novel turns, as originally narrated to Sir Walter Scott by his friend Mr. Train of Castle Douglas, in Galloway, was in broad outline as follows:—

D, a near relation of "The Thane of Fife" and a young man of dissolute habits, was attached to Emma, the fair and accomplished daughter of a respectable surgeon in a neighbouring village. D, after securing an appointment in the Civil Service of the East India Company and taking possession of his new station in a large frontier town of the Company's dominions in India, addressed to the village surgeon a letter assuring him of his attachment to Emma and indicating his desire to marry her on her arrival in India. Emma, with the consent of her parents, set out thither, entrusted to the care of C, an old school-fellow, captain of the ship by which she was to proceed. On the arrival of the vessel at the appointed port, D, with a large cavalcade of mounted Pindarees, was ready to welcome Emma on landing and to carry her direct into the interior of the country, declining to have the marriage performed, according to the rites of the Church, till he returned to the place of his abode. C, confirmed in his suspicion that all was not right, resolved not to part with Emma till he had satisfactorily fulfilled the promise he had made to her parents of giving her duly away in marriage. Unable to alter by her entreaties the resolution of D, Emma solicited her protector C to accompany her to the place of her intended destination, to which he readily agreed, taking with him a sufficient number of his crew to

Though *The Surgeon's Daughter* is, from the English point of view, as Andrew Lang remarks,¹⁹ "of an exotic and alien kind, and of no very manageable compass,"

The characters.

Scott is certainly at his best in the portrayal of characters and scenes, particularly in the Indian portion of it. Menie Gray, the central figure in the novel, is a model of "generous and disinterested simplicity and affection;"²⁰ Adam Hartley is a gallant and selfless soul, an "eager vindicator of betrayed innocence";²¹ Richard Middlemas is a headstrong, restless and scheming young man, "a cold-blooded miscreant", "a profligate and treacherous lover", richly meriting the punishment meted out to him for his villainy;²² Pāpaiya, the Governor's Dubash at Madras, is "a master counsellor of

ensure the safe custody of his innocent protege, should any attempt be made to carry her away by force. Both parties journeyed onwards till they arrived at a frontier town, where an Indian Rājah was awaiting the arrival of the fair maid of Fife, with whom he had fallen deeply in love, from seeing her miniature likeness in the possession of D, to whom he had paid a large sum of money for the original, and only intrusted him to convey her in state to the seat of his government. C, on ascertaining the villanous action of D, communicated the particulars to the commanding officer of a regiment of Scotch Highlanders then quartered in that part of India, seeking his active support in resisting any attempt that might be made by the Indian chief to wrest from their hands the virtuous female who had been so shamefully decoyed from her native country. The Rājah, finding he could not easily attain his object, assembled his troops and attacked the place where the affrighted Emma was for a time secured by her countrymen, who resolutely fought in her defence until they overpowered their assailants and forced them to retire in every direction, leaving behind many of their slain, among whom was found the mangled corpse of the perfidious D. C was immediately afterwards married to Emma and the couple lived happily for many years in the county of Kent, on the fortune bequeathed by "The Thane of Fife" (*Ibid*, Appendix to Introduction, 597-601).

With this incident in the background, Scott has woven around it a story of absorbing interest with necessary variations, drawing freely upon and adapting the materials (especially for the Indian portion) of which he had fairly adequate knowledge, as shown above.

19. *Ibid* (Editor's Introduction), 594.

20. *Ibid*, 847.

21. *Ibid*, 822, 846.

22. *Ibid*, 804-811, 832, 838, 843-844.

dark projects, an Oriental Machiavel";²³ the Bēgum Montreville is a typical European adventuress in the East, an "Amazonian Princess", crafty, ambitious and unscrupulous to the core;²⁴ Tipū is a voluptuous young prince with "the cunning of his father and his military talents" but lacking "his cautious wisdom";²⁵ and Haidar, though a "usurper and tyrant", is an "able, sagacious and all-powerful Nawaub", well known for his "princely generosity, even-handed justice and forbearance", "whose glance inspired wisdom, and whose nod conferred wealth", and who impressed his English compeers as "just by reflection, and perhaps from political considerations."²⁶

Of Seringapatam, mentioned as having been visited by Adam Hartley, we read as the "Great City" with "the temple of the

The scenes.

celebrated Vishnoo, the splendid Bazaar and the splendid Gardens called Loll-baug [Lāl-Bāgh], which were the monument of Hyder's magnificence, and now hold his mortal remains", with "a grove of mango trees, through which an infant moon was twinkling faintly amid the murmurs of waters, the sweet song of the nightingale, and the odours of the rose, yellow, jasmine, orange and citron flowers, and Persian narcissus."²⁷ Bangalore, next visited by Hartley, is referred to by Scott as "the strong, happy, fine and populous city" with "an encampment in a tope, or knoll, covered with trees," and looking "full on the gardens which Tippoo had created," with "the rich pavilions of the principal persons flamed with silk and gold, and spears with gilded points, or poles supporting gold knobs."²⁸ We have a superb picture of the stately return of Tipū to Bangalore, with

23. *Ibid.*, 809.

25. *Ibid.*, 809-810, 840-841.

27. *Ibid.*, 781, 822, 826-827.

24. *Ibid.*, 808, 812, 889.

26. *Ibid.*, 780-781, 815-816, 844-845.

28. *Ibid.*, 830-831.

"howdahed elephants and royal banners," accompanied by "a heavy firing of artillery from the bastions of the town," and by "a tide of cavalry, riding tumultuously forward, brandishing their spears in different attitudes, and pressing their horses to a gallop."²⁹ We have the equally exuberant oriental pageantry of his grand procession (*savāri*) through the city of Bangalore "to receive the Begum Montreville as his honoured guest at his pleasure-house in the gardens." We read of Tipū in rich apparel mounted on the royal elephant in "caparisons of scarlet cloth, richly embroidered with gold," and occupying the howdah or seat of silver, "embossed and gilt," with "a place behind for a confidential servant, who waved the great chowry, or cowtail, to keep off the flies;" of the solemn and deep sound of the *nagāra* or state drum, followed by a long roll of musketry, trumpets and *tom-toms*; of *chōbdārs* bearing silver sticks and clubs, and reciting titles; of champions or bodyguards on foot (afterwards Tipū's celebrated Tiger regiment, disciplined and armed according to the European fashion), "bearing spears, matchlocks and banners, and intermixed with horsemen, some in complete shirts of mail, with caps of steel under their turbans, some in a sort of defensive armour, consisting of rich silk dresses, rendered sabre-proof by being stuffed with cotton;" of "the various courtiers and officers of the household, mounted chiefly on elephants, all arranged in their most splendid attire, and exhibiting the greatest pomp;" and of the houses in the principal street of the town down to the gate of the royal gardens as having been "ornamented by broad cloth, silk shawls, and embroidered carpets of the richest colours, displayed from the verandahs and windows," even the meanest hut being adorned with some piece of cloth, "so that the whole street had a singularly rich

29. *Ibid.*, 833.

and gorgeous appearance." We read also of the splendid procession entering the royal gardens and then approaching, through a long avenue of lofty trees, "a platform of white marble, canopied by arches, and raised four or five feet from the ground, covered with white cloth and Persian carpets," with the *musnud* or state cushion of the Prince, in the centre, "six feet square, composed of crimson velvet, richly embroidered," from where he was to hold his Durbar, etc.³⁰

Scott wrote this novel about sixty years after the First Mysore War and thirty years after the fall of Tipū Sultān, when that epoch-making event was still fresh in his memory. Though he had never been in India and "lacked the personal knowledge of Kipling,"³¹ his imagination had been enriched by his Indian studies, including, as he tells us,³² "the delightful pages of Orme", dealing with "men like Clive and Caillaud who influenced great events," and with "the various religious customs, habits and manners of the people of Hindostan—the patient Hindoo, the warlike Rajpoot, the haughty Moslema, the savage and vindictive Malay". "The Indian dialogue between Hartley and the Fakir," as Lang observes,³³ "shows some acquaintance with Oriental manners, probably derived from Eastern Tales, of which Scott was a great reader, and from the instructions of Colonel Ferguson." The sketch of Madame Montreville *alias* Queen of Sheba reminds us of her counterpart Madame Mequinez in De La Tour's *Ayder Ali* (1784). Madame Mequinez was, we read in that work,³⁴ "the widow of a Portuguese officer, who had rendered signal services to Ayder, and was afterwards slain in a battle against the

30. *Ibid.*, 894-897.

31. *Ibid.* (Editor's Introduction), 594.

32. *Ibid.* (Prefatory), 617.

33. *Ibid.* (Editor's Introduction), 594.

34. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 157-158.

Marattas : Ayder, in return, had given the widow the regiment of Topasses her husband had possessed, with the appointment of Colonel, till an adopted son of her husband's was of age to command the regiment himself. This lady accompanied her regiment everywhere: the colours were carried to her house; and she had a private sentinel at the door. She received the pay, and caused the deductions to be made in her presence from each company. When the regiment was collected, she inspected them herself, as well as all the detachments that were ordered out; but she permitted the second in command to exercise the troops, and lead them against the enemy". We further read of this lady as enjoying "a great revenue by the bounty of the Nabob", of her having once contested a false suit against the Jesuit Fathers of the West Coast for the recovery of her alleged deposits of jewels and money, and of her subsequent confession to Haidar's judges and entreaties to his French Commandant "to conceal the detail of the affair from the Nabob", who was eventually convinced of her "iniquitous contrivance against the reverend fathers", and reduced her to a sergeant's pay, "because she had dishonoured the name of her former husband, whose services had demanded that the woman who bore his name should not be without the means of subsisting reputably".³⁵ Though Scott has woven the novel around the principal incident as narrated to him by his friend Mr. Train of Castle Douglas,³⁶ he seems evidently to have been well acquainted with De La Tour's account of Madame Mequinez for his nice adaptation of the character of Madame Montreville, of whom we read thus:³⁷ "This lady is the widow of a Swiss officer in the French service, who, after the surrender of

35. *Ibid*, 158-169 (n). See also Vol. II. pp. 346-347 of this work for an account of Madame Mequinez.

36. See f, n. 18 *supra*.

37. *The Surgeon's Daughter*, 787-788.

Pondicherry, went off into the interior, and commenced soldier on his own account. He got possession of a fort, under pretence of keeping it for some simple Rajah or other; assembled around him a parcel of desperate vagabonds of every colour in the rainbow; occupied a considerable territory, of which he raised the duties in his own name, and declared for independence. But Hyder Naig understood no such interloping proceedings, and down he came, besieged the fort and took it, though some pretend it was betrayed to him by this very woman. Be that as it may, the poor Swiss was found dead on the ramparts. Certain it is, she received large sums of money, under pretence of paying off her troops, surrendering of hill-forts, and Heaven knows what besides. She was permitted also to retain some insignia of royalty; and, as she was wont to talk of Hyder as the Eastern Solomon, she generally became known by the title of Queen of Sheba. She leaves her court when she pleases, and has been as far as Fort St. George before now. In a word, she does pretty much as she likes..... Hyder, it is supposed, has insured her fidelity by borrowing the greater part of her treasures, which prevents her from daring to break with him....." This account of the origin of Madame Montreville with her subsequent doings and the ultimate fate which befell her, as portrayed by Scott in this novel, shows clearly that the idea of creating and developing the character of an adventuress of this type perhaps suggested itself to his fertile and imaginative brain by his acquaintance with De La Tour's memoir recording, for the first time, the career and character of the historical Madame Mequinez. Though *The Surgeon's Daughter* is thus not a strictly contemporary work, it has its interesting appeal to us to-day as a successful 19th century attempt at the delineation of the times of Haidar Ali against what is assumed to be a realistic background.

A personal link between Sir Walter Scott and Bangalore may be referred to here. The novelist's eldest son, serving as an officer in the Hussars, was stationed at Bangalore from 1839 till his departure in 1846. We read of this son in Lockhart's *Life of Sir Walter Scott*: "Sir Walter having unwisely exposed himself in a tiger hunt, in 1846, was, on his return to his quarters at Bangalore, smitten with fever which ended in liver disease. He was ordered to proceed to England, and died near the Cape of Good Hope on board the ship *Wellesley*, February the 8th, 1847." In 1923, a correspondent wrote in the columns of the *Madras Mail* about the agreeable social qualities and pleasant memories of the Baronet. There is a memorial tablet to him in Trinity Church, Bangalore. He died without issue at the age of 45 and with him the Baronetcy became extinct.

To the English of the Eighteenth century who suffered under the hands of Haidar Ali as his prisoners of war, Haidar, it would appear, seemed more cruel than his son Tipū. The prisons at Seringapatam and Bangalore were full of the English captured in the war which resulted in Colonel Baillie's defeat (September 10, 1780). Both these prisons were hideous examples of their kind, and the uniform cruelty exercised over the unfortunate men found expression in lines which will ever be recalled with mingled feelings of pity and sorrow. Over the prisoners themselves, life in them impressed itself "with all the force", it is said, "of a deep tragedy." The *Prison Song of Seringapatam*, apparently written by an inmate of that prison, is well known.

Wilks' *History* and Buchanan-Hamilton's *Journey* have already been mentioned. The *Mysore Military Memoirs and Despatches*, *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1799 and 1800 contains biographical anecdotes

and memoirs of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultān, drawn from contemporary Persian Manuscripts. In 1809, Col. Charles Stewart published his account entitled *Memoirs of Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultan* (appended to his *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Library of the Late Tippoo Sultan of Mysore*), based mostly on unsifted materials. Viscount Valentia's *Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, etc.*, published in the same year, and James Forbes' *Oriental Memoirs*, published in 1813, contain interesting references to the character, personality, etc., of Haidar and Tipu and valuable personal reminiscences of their period of office in Mysore. On the military history of Mysore, many volumes have been written. Of these, *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* is a contemporary account of the war of 1780-1784 and of the treatment which English and Indian prisoners received at the hands of Haidar and Tipu in the prisons of Seringapatam and Bangalore. The authorship of this work has been attributed to Col. Alexander Read, who was Commissariat Officer during the last war with Tipu and was subsequently in charge of the Bāramahal district. This was the gentleman under whom Sir Thomas Munro learnt work as a junior Revenue Officer. A close study of the *Memoirs* shows that Read could have contributed only a part of the work, the rest being accounts of the warfare collected by him from other persons engaged in it for inclusion in the publication. At the end of a long preface, he describes himself as "the compiler of these Memorandums." Captain Innes Munro's *A Narrative of the Military Operations* includes an account of the fighting on the Coromandel Coast against the combined forces of the French, Dutch and Haidar Ali from 1780 to 1784. It is in a series of letters in which are included "many useful cautions to young gentlemen destined for India." It was originally published in 1789 and dedicated to the Duke of Northumberland. Lt. Col. William Fullarton's

A View of English Interests in India, published in 1787, also deals with this war from a critical point of view. In Gleig's *Life of Sir Thomas Munro* are included some notable letters throwing considerable light on the fighting of this period. Major Dirom's *Narrative of the Campaign* describes the war with Tipū in 1792. It was published in 1793, being dedicated to Henry Dundas, one of the Secretaries of State at the time and one of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India. Among the illustrations in this work is an excellent one which gives a north-east view of Seringapatam, drawn by I. Smith, from a view taken on the spot, in which Tipū's Palace, the Rāja's Palace, the Hindu Temple and the Muhammadan Mosque are clearly shown. Lieutenant Mackenzie's *Sketch of the War with Tippoo Sultan* (in two Volumes) relates to the same period. It was published at Calcutta in 1793-1794. A work of unique interest, published in 1794, is Home's *Select Views in Mysore, the Country of Tippoo Sultan*. Home's drawings are famous and convey some idea of the impression produced by the "Glorious War," in which Lord Cornwallis, to whom the work is dedicated, distinguished himself. Among the more notable illustrations in it are an inside view of Tipū's Palace in Bangalore Fort, a north view of Bangalore from the *Pettah*, a distant view of Sāvandurg, several views of Seringapatam, of which a west view from the middle of the river Cauvery is exquisitely done; and a view of Haidar's tomb in the Lāl-Bāgh at Seringapatam. The history of the last war with Tipū and some part of the subsequent history of Mysore may be read in the Wellington and Wellesley *Despatches*. In Lt.-Col. Alexander Beatson's *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultan* (1800) and Sir Alexander Allan's *Account of Campaign in Mysore* may be read in great detail the history of the warfare which ended in

the fall of Tipu and the conquest of Seringapatam in 1799. Beatson was Surveyor-General to the Army during the campaign and Sir Alexander Allan, Bart., was Deputy Quarter-Master-General with the Madras and Bengal Forces. A work entitled *Narrative Sketches of the Conquest of Mysore*, printed in 1800, contains at the end a descriptive sketch of the storming of Seringapatam, as exhibited in the great historical picture painted by Sir Robert Ker Porter. The breach occupies the centre, and in it General Baird, surrounded by his staff, is seen prominently. The painting was executed upon a large scale, occupying 2,550 sq. ft. of canvas, and contained several hundred figures, as large as life, with nearly twenty portraits of British Officers. Mr. Theodore Hook's *Life of Sir David Baird*, who led the storming party in 1799, partakes the character of a partisan publication, but is full of valuable information. Captain W. H. Wilkins' recently published *Life of Sir David Baird* (1912) is a more judicious and interesting record of the great General's career. The Rt. Hon. S. R. Lushington's *Life of General Lord Harris*, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army which captured Seringapatam, is another work which deserves special mention in this connection. Among other works, Mr. Lewin Bowring's *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* (1893) is a readable volume in the *Rulers of India Series*, edited by the late Sir William Wilson Hunter.³⁸

38. See *General Bibliography* in Vol. I of this work as also Vol. II, Appendix IV—(2), for details about the main references mentioned above.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE FALL OF TIPU SULTĀN.

Alleged treachery of Tipu's officers: Mir Hussain Ali Khan Kirmani's version—Examined with reference to other writers—Colonel Allan's characterization of Tipu Sultan—Victory celebrated; the *Seringapatam Medal*, 1799—Reflections on Tipu's fall—Causes of Tipu's failure—Tipu's appearance and character; his blood-red turban—Wilks' estimate; comparison between Haidar and Tipu—A French view of Tipu: M. Michaud's sketch—Kirmani's sketch of Tipu's character—Later European views: Lewin Bowring's delineation—Dr. J. R. Henderson's estimate—An analysis of Tipu's character: his defects and merits—His redeeming features—Tipu, a comparison and contrast—Other comparisons, etc.—Progress of Indo-Saracenic architecture during Tipu's period: Bijapur style—Mughal style: the remains at Sira, Seringapatam, Bangalore, etc.

POPULAR belief has long ascribed Tipū's final fall to the treachery of some of his officers. Mīr

Alleged treachery
of Tipū's officers.

Mīr Hussain Ali
K h ā n Kirmānī's
version.

Hussain Ali Khān Kirmānī, who gives some colour to this belief, is not definite in his accusation, but he distinctly alleges that Saiyid Gaffar was diverted from his successful and gallant defence of the Mehtab Bagh by the treachery of "the enemies of the Sultān" and that his recall from it resulted in the English troops attacking and taking it and filling it with artillery and musketeers and run on their approaches towards the fort. Next, Kirmānī mentions that Tipū was prevented from acting on Mons. Chapuis' advice "that he and his family should quit the fort and retire to Sira or Chitaldrug and detach a body of his troops to oppose the infidels, or if he thought best, he might deliver him

(Mons. Chapuis) and the rest of the French up to the English, and then an accommodation might be made between the contending parties or if he chose, he could give up the breached walls of the fort to the charge of Mons. Lally for defence, without, however, allowing Lally to be subject to the interference or control of the Sultān's Indian officers." Tipū, it is added, refused to accept the suggestion of the surrender of Chapuis and his countrymen, "even if our kingdom should be plundered and laid waste," and as regards the rest of Mons. Chapuis' "excellent advice," as Kirmāṇi styles it, consulted his Dewan Mīr Sādik (whom Kirmāṇi invariably calls "the villain"), who, he adds, "in furtherance of his own views and projects," said :—

"It must be well known to your Highness that this people (the French) never kept faith with any one, and your Highness may be well assured, that if you give up the fort to their care and defence, that at that very moment it will fall into the possession of the English, for both these people (the English and the French) consider themselves originally of the same tribe, and they are in one heart and language."

Tipū's mind was, we are told, by the "villain's" misrepresentations turned from "the right path." The city walls had been meanwhile battered and breached, and Tipū prepared to "quit the city with his treasure, valuables and *zenana* and also all his elephants, camels and carriages were kept in readiness to move at the shortest warning." Before acting on his resolve, Tipū, it is said, held a consultation on the subject of his departure with his Amīrs. Badr-u-Zamān Khān "inconsiderately" opposed it on the ground that it would discourage his troops and added that thereby "the bonds of union in the garrison of the capital will be broken asunder." Tipū, on hearing this, looked up—Kirmāṇi states—towards the heavens, and sighing deeply, said, "I am entirely resigned to the will of God,

whatever it may be" and forthwith abandoned his intention of quitting the capital. The articles packed, however, still remained, ready for removal in the treasury. About this time, Ghāzi Khān, the celebrated commander of Haidar's irregular infantry and cavalry, was, it is said, "put to death in prison by the hands of the Sultān's executioners at the instigation of the same traitor (the Dewān)." In fact, he adds, "though the walls of the fort were battered down, still the information was withheld from the Sultān." At length, however, we are told, "on the twenty-seventh of Zi Kad, from some secret source, he (Tipū Sultān) became acquainted with the treachery of certain of his servants; and the next morning he wrote with his own hand a list of some of their names, and having folded it, gave it to Mīr Moyinuddīn; with instructions to put his orders therein contained into execution that night (that is, to put those named to death) in order to strengthen his Government." The Mīr, not knowing what it contained, opened the paper and perused it in full Durbar. A menial servant, who could read and write, happened to cast his "unlucky eye" upon it and saw it contained "the name of the lying Dewan the first in the list." He immediately passed the news to the Dewan, who "kept on the alert at his own quarters and at about midday sent for the troops stationed in the works near the breach under pretence of distributing their pay among them and having collected them near the Alī Musjid, remained looking out for what ill-luck might bring forth." Colonel Miles notes in connection with this passage that Kīrmāñi "evidently supposes some secret correspondence or intelligence between the Dewan Mīr Sādik and the English General, or some of his staff." There is no confirmation of this suggestion in any other authority. Nor is there any confirmation either for the other suggestion also made by Kīrmāñi, that after he heard of the death of

Saiyid Gaffar, the Sultān "immediately left off eating and washed his hands, saying, 'we also shall soon depart,' and then mounted his horse and proceeded by the road of the postern on the river, which is called in the Kinhiri (Kannada) language, Holi Vuddi, towards the flag or western battery. The Sultān's enemies, however, who were looking out for opportunities to betray him, as soon as the worthy Syud was slain, made a signal from the fort by holding out white handkerchiefs to the English soldiers, who were assembled in the river ready for the assault, informing them of that event, and accordingly at about twenty minutes after midday, the European and other regiments mounted the walls by the breach, and before the Sultān's troops could be collected to man the walls and bastions of that flank of the works, they with but little labour took the fort. The garrison, although they quickly came to the rescue and the repulse of their enemies, and with sword and musket, steadfastly resisted them, still as on all sides so much disorder and confusion reigned, that remedy was hopeless, they mostly threw away their shields and dispersed and left their women and wealth to the soldiers of the enemy, covering their shameless heads with the dust of cowardice and disgrace. It was about the time that the Sultān's horse and followers arrived near the flag battery, that the lying Dewān followed in the rear and shut up the postern before mentioned, blocking it up securely, and thereby closing the road of safety to the pious Sultān, and then under pretence of bringing aid, he mounted his horse and went forth from the fort and arrived at the third gate (of the suburb) of Gunjam, where he desired the gate-keepers to shut the gate as soon as he had passed through; while, however, he was speaking, a man came forward and began to abuse and revile him, saying, 'Thou accursed wretch, thou hast delivered a righteous prince up to his enemies, and art

thou now saving thyself by flight? I will place the punishment of thy offence by thy side'. This man then with one cut of his sword struck the Dewān off his horse on the ground, and certain other persons present crowding round him soon despatched him, and his impure body was dragged into a place of filth and uncleanness and left there. Mīr Moyinuddin being wounded, fell into the ditch and died there. Sher Khān Mīr Asof, also, was lost in the assault and was never after heard of—when the Sultān, the refuge of the world, saw that the opportunity for a gallant push was lost (some copies say lost, and some not), and that his servants had evidently betrayed him, he returned to the postern or sally port, but notwithstanding he gave repeated orders to the guards to open the gate, no one paid the slightest attention to him;—nay, more, Mīr Nudīm, the Killadār himself, with a number of footsoldiers, was standing at this time on the roof of the gate, but he also abandoned his faith and allegiance, and placing his foot in the path of disloyalty (took no notice of his master)."

Kirmāṇi adds:—

"To be concise, when the storming party, firing furiously as they advanced, arrived near the Sultān, he, courageous as a lion, attacked them with the greatest bravery, and although the place (said to have been a gateway) where he stood was very narrow and confined, he still with his matchlock and his sword killed two or three of the enemy, but at length having received several mortal wounds in the face, he drank the cup of Martyrdom."

In keeping with the charge of treachery that Kirmāṇi prefers against Dewan Mīr Sādik, Mīr Nadim and others, is his moralization at the burial of the Sultān's body in the mausoleum of his father, on the right side of his tomb:—"There rested (the body) from the treachery and malice of faithless servants and cruel enemies."¹

1. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 262-272; also *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iv. 2661-2665.

Wilks, who had access to all the documents of the time and had enquired of those intimate with Tipū, and had survived the final struggle, nowhere suggests treachery. As regards Mir Sādik, he does not even mention his death, though Colonel Allan, in his account of the campaign, records the fact that he "was killed by the Sultan's troops endeavouring to make his escape."² Colonel Allan writes:—"Raja Cawn (Tipū's favourite servant) is of opinion that Tippoo's object, when compelled to retreat, was to reach the palace; and that he intended to have put an end to himself and his family, to avoid that disgrace, to which his women would have been exposed, in the fury of the storm. He had too much reason to dread the meeting of our Europeans." Similarly, in explaining the movements of Tipū after the English troops had gained the ramparts and the confusion that in consequence resulted among the besieged, which soon "became irreparable", Wilks says:—"The Sultaun had received a slight wound and mounted his horse a few minutes before this occurrence; if an attempt at flight had been his object, the water-gate was near, and his escape was more than possible; he took the direction of the body of the place through the gateway of the interior work, with intentions, which can only be conjectured, and were not

2. If even a tithe of what has been alleged against Mir Sādik is true, there is no evidence available to prove either the statements of Kirmāni or to disprove them, except wide popular belief. Mir Sādik may perhaps be compared to Caesar Borgia (died, 1507), son of Pope Alexander VI, who was made a Cardinal at the age of 17. Relinquishing that high honour, he became a soldier, in which capacity he gave himself to deeds of inhumanity, which made his name a synonym for any action that is most crafty, revolting and cruel. Notwithstanding the execration in which his memory is held, he is reported to have been just as a ruler in his own domain, and a patron of art and literature. As we have said, however, there is no independent evidence of Mir Sādik's treachery, though it is true that his memory excites to this day feelings of disgust and hatred on the part of the generality of Muslims.

perhaps distinctly formed in his own mind; the most sanguine hope could only have led to an honourable capitulation in the palace; to close the gate of the interior rampart, if practicable, would have been unavailing for the purpose of defending the inner fort; for these works were no longer defensible after General Baird had passed the point of their junction; and the rampart which he now occupied was itself a part of the interior work. Among the conjectures of those who were chiefly admitted to the Sultaun's intimacy, in the last days of his existence, was one founded on obscure hints which had escaped him, of the intention to destroy certain papers, to put to death his principal women, and to die in defence of the palace. He was destined to a fall more obscure and unnoticed." There is no smell of treachery here. But it must be remarked that Wilks habitually writes from what might be termed the "usurper's" point of view and not from that of those whom he oppressed. His justification must be that at his time there was no difference perceived between the *de facto* and *de jure* positions of the usurper and the ruling sovereign, to whom he owed allegiance and who was still in existence, though neglected and even plundered to the last degree. Whatever the truth in this charge of treachery, there is no doubt that the memory of Mir Sâdik is still held in execration and his name has become a byword for treachery and scorn among the masses of the country. So vilely, indeed, is he regarded that the mere mention of his name is enough to rouse in people the worst sentiments against him ending in a contemptuous spitting on the ground, indicative of their utmost contempt for him and his memory. His alleged faithless disregard for his master's interests appears to be the one thing remembered about him, despite the century and a quarter that has elapsed since his death.³

3. Allan's *Journal*; Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 746; also *Mys. Gaz.*, *o.c.*, 2665-2667.

Colonel Allan in a brief characterization suggests that

Colonel Allan's
characterization of
Tipu Sultān.

"It is impossible that Tippoo could have been beloved by his people. The Musselmen certainly looked up to him as the head of their faith; by them, perhaps, his death is regretted but they could not have been attached to him, by affection; or why the necessity (he asks) of that barbarous policy, which Tippoo was constrained to adopt of keeping in close confinement in the fort at Seringapatam, the families of his principal officers and of his troops in general."

He records the fact that the report of Tipu having "inhumanly" murdered the unfortunate Europeans who fell into his hands during the siege, had been confirmed. Their bodies had been actually dug up. They had, it would appear, been strangled in the Fort by Tipu's orders on the 28th April (1799), the day, perhaps the very hour, writes Colonel Allan, that Tipu was writing a letter to General Harris, proposing to send ambassadors to camp to negotiate the peace, was this deed perpetrated! "Of the real character of this Prince", he remarks, "we hitherto have been ignorant! but now it will be placed in its true light. That he was suspicious, vindictive, cruel and hurried away by the sadder impulse of passion, to which he was subjected even without any apparent provocation, is certain and probably it will be found that he was more deficient in military talents, and others as essential to govern an extensive kingdom than has been generally imagined."⁴

The capture of Seringapatam and the glorious termination of the Mysore War were celebrated with great rejoicings and a day of public thanksgiving throughout the British possessions, and the anniversary of the event was specially observed

4. Allan's *Journal*; also *Ibid*, 2667.

for many years after. As an indication of the progress made in communications since that time, it may be noted that the news did not reach London till the 13th of September.⁵ The *Seringapatam Medal*, 1799, struck in commemoration of the fall of Seringapatam; is extant, on whose obverse is represented the storming of the fort and the meridian Sun showing the time of the storm, and on the reverse the lion subduing the tiger. The *Medal* was one of the earliest of the decorations issued by the East India Company and distributed to the troops engaged in military campaigns.⁶

The *Seringapatam Medal*, 1799.


The fall of Tipū Sultān meant the final fall of the kingdom of Mysore, which, beginning with the foundations of the early rulers of the Wodeyar Dynasty (down to 1704), had been developed and consolidated into a dominant political power in South India during the period of the later rulers by the strenuous endeavours and perseverance of their *Sarvādhikāris*—including Haidar Ali and Tipū Sultan as well, so long as Haidar lived and directed affairs—throughout the eighteenth century. As Major Charles Stewart remarks, "many of the circumstances attending the death of Tippoo Sultan and the fall of Seringapatam, bear a strong resemblance to the fate of Palæologus, the last of the Greek Emperors, and the capture of Constantinople by the Turks (A. D. 1453)."⁷ In view of his conduct, Tipū's fall was the necessary sequel to the Cornwallis Treaty of Seringapatam (March 18, 1792). Indeed, if the bearding

Reflections on
Tipū's fall.

5. *Ibid*; also *Ibid*, 2667-2668.

6. See *Hindu*, dated September 26, 1943, publishing this *Medal*. Also L. H. Thornton, *Light and Shade*, 20.

7. Stewart, *o.c.*, 93, *f.n.* (citing Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chap. LXVIII). Wilks also speaks of the fall of Seringapatam as "resembling the fate of the Roman capital of the Eastern Empire," etc., (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 754).



Marquis Wellesley—Another view.

of Tipū and the complete shattering and crippling of his resources during the Third Mysore War (1790-1792) was the work of Lord Cornwallis, to the Marquess Wellesley belongs the credit of having finally reduced his power. "Wellesley", in the words of a recent writer, "killed a Tiger of Seringapatam whose claws had been cut and fangs extracted seven years before, a dazed and drooping chieftain with obscured vision and lost initiative, a mere shadow of the military genius, whose strategy in 1790-92 had excited the admiration of his English antagonists."⁸

Among the fatal blunders, political and other, committed by Tipū which led to his ultimate fall, may be noted the following in brief terms : (1) Tipū did

Causes of Tipū's failure.

not follow his father's *ideals, plans* or methods in conducting the internal or external affairs of the State. (2) He relied too much on the French who could not help him. (3) The French were a dead factor in India in 1799. (4) He lived in a world of his own. His mode of life and the objectives he pursued had no relation to actual facts of his surroundings or the times he lived in. (5) His implacable hatred towards the English for no specific purposes or attaining distinct objectives or adjustment of grievances. (6) He pursued wrong and uninspiring ideals and hastened his own ruin. Muhammadans were employed everywhere in the civil, military, etc., departments, to the detriment even of public interests. (7) His unsound education and training led him to pursue the phantom and give up what would have conserved his energies to the benefit of the State. (8) His ill-balanced mind which wavered between different objectives. (9) His habitual disregard of truth; his cruelty; his iconoclastic aims and forced conversions

8. J. Sarkar in *Poona Res. Corres.*, III. Foreword, iii.

did much to damage him⁹. (10) His incapacity to take advice from others. (11) His overweening self-confidence. (12) His utter hostility to the Royal family and his wanton supercession of the interests of the infant king Krishnarāja III made him thoroughly unpopular with all classes and communities, and created a wrong impression against him both internally and abroad. (13) By his conduct he dug a ditch between himself and the masses and thus reversed the country's political aims and ambitions. He abandoned Haidar's policy and got wrecked. (14) His worst mistake was that he wrought changes in an institution which instinctively resents changes, even though most of its members may appreciate the benefits produced. They are apt to put the expression of that resentment first. Any one who gives himself to the task of army reform needs to be a philosopher, with a strong sense of humour and of history. It is not an inviting prospect for a man of high ambitions and a programme of political conquests. The army did not like his meddling with its organization. What he should have done by persuasion and suggestion, he tried to carry through directly by the exercise of his authority. And this was enough to raise the class spirit of the military against him and poison their normal goodwill for him. (15) Tipū was an innovator. A knowledge of military history would have shown him that the strength of an army lies in its corps of officers. To neglect training or to reduce the prestige of an officer is the surest method of ruining the fighting value of an army. The degradation of officers, the spoliation of their hard-earned wealth, confining them in prisons and turning them out of their own homes, which Tipū indulged in so freely during the latter part of his life, was a quicker method of ruining it.

9. On Tipū's iconoclastic zeal, see Appendix IV—(5).

Tipu's policy, after 1793, was one of scuttle and defeatism. He grew pessimistic and except spasms of activity, he lost the faculty to think sanely in political affairs. He should have shown his resistance with greater courage and emphasised his determination to stand out, if he meant to do so. He should have arranged to wage a war of prolonged resistance, based on the time-honoured strategy of wearing down the enemy. He should have redoubled his efforts in developing the resources of the country left to him under the treaty of 1792 and used it as a strong base for prolonged warfare. He lost the art of thinking correctly. He vent his spleen on his ministers. He cursed and abused. He attempted reforms in the wrong direction. He failed to do what was required. His army reform, his administrative reform, etc., all helped to bring him down still further. He forgot the essentials of his father's policy, his aims and objectives, his methods and the limitations under which he carried out his policy. When he lost his territories, the Boundary Commission, at whose head was Sir Barry Close, tried to take what was most valuable from a strategic point of view. Tipu was inattentive to the needs of a future war.

One in his position would have hastened the administration on a realistic basis. He would have hastened the construction of vast artificial No-Man's Lands, along his north-eastern and south-western frontiers as first lines of defences for his own country. His main idea should have been to evolve a line of defence to slow down and finally halt an approaching army by the natural barriers of defence and lack of communication. The plan would have included to some extent the deforestation and depopulation of a belt ranging from a few mile wide to a 100 mile wide all along his north-eastern and south-western frontiers; the destruction of

all transportation arteries within this belt; the construction of a line of fortifications at the north-east and south-west of his boundaries abutting on the two belts thus created; and the development of big military concentration centres, together with well-fortified and provisioned military bases, behind these areas. What Haidar would have done in similar circumstances, Tipū could not even dream of. He proved singularly unfit for the rôle he had to play. Compared with his father, he is a pigmy; we miss in him that strong grasp of fact, that intensity of passion to accomplish great deeds and strident ambition to outshine all and conquer, which distinguished Haidar.

There is a popular idea that as Haidar means *lion* (a name of Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad), so Tipū means *tiger*, but this appears to be a mistake. As elsewhere

Tipu's appearance
and character.

explained¹⁰, he was named Tipū after a holy man whose shrine is at Arcot, near which Haidar was when he heard of the birth of his son at Devanhalli. The 'tiger, however, was adopted by Tipū as emblematic of himself and his power. His throne was in the form of a tiger, with the head life-size, in gold (now at Windsor Castle; also the *humā*, or bird of paradise, covered with jewels, which glittered at the top of the canopy), and tigers' heads formed the capitals of the eight pillars supporting the canopy. His own uniform and that of his soldiers was covered with the tiger stripe, and this was also engraved on his guns and other articles. Tigers were chained at the entrance to his palace, and he is declared to have said that he would rather live two days

His blood-red turban.

as a tiger than two centuries as a sheep.¹¹ The blood-red turban used by him until his death at Seringapatam

10. See *Ante*, Vol. II. p. 263, n. 15.

11. Wilks, o.c., II. 580-581; Beatson o.c., 153-154, etc., also *Mys. Gaz.*,

in 1799, now occupies a place of honour in the Exhibition Hall of India House, London. The turban came into the possession of Lieutenant Hugh Mitchell of the Scotch Brigade after Tipū's death and it has been presented to India House by one of his descendants, Mrs. Inglis of Edinburgh.¹²

Tipū was born in 1753 (1749 according to some authorities) and died in 1799 in his forty-seventh (or fiftieth) year, having held supreme sway seventeen years and four months. "In person," he was, according to Wilks, "neither so tall nor so robust as his father, and had a short pursy neck; the large limbs, small eyes, aquiline nose, and fair complexion of Hyder, marked the Arabic character derived from his mother. Tippoo's singularly small and delicate hands and feet, his large and full eyes, a nose, less prominent, and a much darker complexion, were all national characteristics of the Indian form. There was, in the first view of his countenance, an appearance of dignity which wore off on farther observation; and his subjects did not feel that it inspired the terror or respect, which, in common with his father, he desired to command. Hyder's lapse from dignity into low and vulgar scolding was among the few points of imitation or resemblance, but in one it inspired fear, in the other ridicule. In most instances exhibiting a contrast to the character and manners of his father, he spoke in a loud and unharmonious tone of voice; he was extremely garrulous, and on superficial subjects, delivered his sentiment with plausibility. In exterior appearance, he affected the soldier; in his toilet, the distinctive habits of the Musalman; he thought hardiness to be indicated by a plain

o.c., 2668. See for a picture of his throne, *De La Tour* in Gholām Muhammads' Edition, Plate facing p. 813.

12. See *Hindu*, dated February 10th, 1938.

unincumbered attire, which he equally exacted from those around him, and the long robe and trailing drawers were banished from his court. He had heard that some of the monarchs of antiquity marched on foot at the head of their armies, and he would sometimes affect a similar exhibition, with his musket on his shoulder. But he was usually mounted, and attached great importance to horsemanship, in which he was considered to excel. The conveyance in a palankeen he derided, and in a great degree prohibited, even to the aged and infirm; but in all this tendency, there was as much of avarice as of taste. He was a minute reformer in every department, to the extent of abridging, with other expenses of the palace, the fare of his own table, to the pleasures of which he was constitutionally indifferent; and even in the dress of his menial servants, he deemed respectable attire to be a mark of unnecessary extravagance."

"Of the vernacular languages, "Wilks continues," he spoke no other than Hindustani and Kanarese; but from a smattering in Persian literature, he considered himself as the first philosopher of the age. He spoke that language with fluency; but although the pen was for ever in his hand, he never attained either elegance or accuracy of style. The leading features of his character were vanity and arrogance; no human being was ever so handsome, so wise, so learned, or so brave as himself. Resting on the shallow instructions of his scanty reading, he neglected the practical study of mankind. No man had ever less penetration into character; and accordingly no prince was ever so ill-served; the army alone remained faithful, in spite of all his efforts for the subversion of discipline and allegiance. Hyder delegated to his instruments a large portion of his own power, as the best means for its preservation. Tippoo seemed to feel every exercise of delegated authority as an usurpation of his own. He would familiarly say to the soldiers, "if your officer gives you one word of abuse, return him two." The revolutionary doctrine of equality imported

from France, scarcely appeared to be a novelty. No person ought to be of importance in a State but the Sovereign alone; all other men ought to be equal; the murder of the Sovereign was not an extraordinary incident in the history of any nation, and probably arose from laxity in command.

"From constitutional or incidental causes, he was less addicted than his father to the pleasures of the harem, which, however, contained at his death about one hundred persons.

"From sun-rise until midnight he devoted his whole time to public affairs, with the interruptions necessary for meals, and for occasional exercise, seldom imitating his father's practice of a short repose in the heat of the day. But his occupation was not business; he was engaged in the invention of new machinery never finished, while the old was suffered to decay. His application was intense and incessant; he affected to do the whole of his own business, and to write with his own hand the foul draft of almost every despatch, however unimportant; and he suffered the fate familiarly known to attach to that absurd pretension; the machine stood still, because the master would not let it work. A secret emissary had been sent to Poona, he reported, and reported and represented that his cash was expended; after the lapse of several months, Tippoo delivered a foul draft to a secretary—let this be despatched to A.B., at Poona. 'Here I am,' said the emissary! he had returned for some weeks from mere necessity; he had presented himself daily at the durbar and could never before attract notice. The Sultaun for once hung down his head.

"The ruling passion for innovation absorbed the proper hours for current business: and failures of experiment, obvious to the whole world, were the topics of his incessant boast as the highest efforts of human wisdom. Hyder was an improving monarch, and exhibited few innovations! Tippoo was an innovating monarch, and made no improvements! One had a sagacious and powerful mind; the other a feeble and unsteady intellect.

"There was (says one of my manuscripts) nothing of permanency in his views, no solidity in his councils, and no confidence on the part of the governed; all was innovation on

his part, and the fear of further novelty on the part of others; and the order of to-day was expected to be reversed by the invention of to-morrow. It may be affirmed of his principal measures however specious, that all had a direct tendency to injure the finances, undermine the Government, and oppress the people. All the world was puzzled what distinct character should be assigned to a sovereign who was never the same. He could neither be truly characterized as liberal or parsimonious; as tyrannical or benevolent; as a man of talents; or as destitute of parts. By turns, he assumed the character of each. In one object alone he appeared to be consistent, having perpetually on his tongue the projects of *jehad*, holy war. The most intelligent and sincere well-wishers of the house concurred in the opinion of his father, that his heart and head were both defective, however covered by a plausible and imposing flow of words; and they were not without suspicions of mental aberration.

"Tippoo, like his father, admitted no associate in his councils; but, contrary to his father, he first determined, and then discussed; and all deviation from the opinion which he announced, or was known to favour, was stigmatised as obstinacy or incapacity.

"As a statesman, Tippoo was incapable of those abstract views, and that large compass of thought, embraced by his father's mind. His talents as a soldier, exhibited the same contrast. He was unable to grasp the plan of a campaign, or the conduct of a war, although he gave some examples of skill in marshalling a battle. Unlike his father, whose moderation was ever most conspicuous in success, whose equanimity was uniform in every aspect of fortune, and, who generally extracted some advantage from every discomfiture, Tippoo was intoxicated with success, and desponding in adversity. His mental energy failed with the decline of fortune; but it were unjust to question his physical courage. He fell in the defence of his capital; but he fell, performing the duties of a common soldier, not of a general. The improvement in his infantry and artillery would have been considerable, had it not been marred by incessant dislocations, and unmerited promotions; but, his army, as a whole, gradually declined in efficiency, as

it departed from the admirable organisation received from his father. The success of the campaign of 1786 may, in part, be ascribed to the remains of that organisation. His failure against the English arose from the policy of neglecting his most efficient arm, the cavalry.

"During the life of Hyder, it was the fashion to indulge in high expectations of the equalities of the heir apparent, but it was the homage of disappointed, un-informed and generally unworthy men. Hyder in his life-time was stigmatized as a tyrant; comparison made him almost seem merciful; the English prisoners hailed the intelligence of Tippoo's accession, and they learnt to mourn for the death of Hyder.

"The tolerant spirit of Hyder reconciled to his usurpation the members of every sect; appropriate talents regulated his choice of instruments, to the entire exclusion of religious preference; and it may be affirmed that he was served with equal zeal by men of every persuasion. Hyder was seldom wrong, and Tippoo seldom right in his estimate of character; and it is quoted as a marked example, that Hyder knew Seyed Saheb to be a tolerably good man of business, but neither a brave nor a sagacious soldier; and accordingly, never employed him in an important military trust. Tippoo in the campaign of 1790 had himself degraded him for incapacity, but, in 1799, committed the post of danger and the fate of Empire to the same incompetent hands. A dark and intolerant bigotry excluded from Tippoo's choice all but the true believers: and unlimited persecution united in detestation of his rule every Hindu in his dominions. In the Hindu, no degree of merit was a passport to favour; in the Mussalman, no crime could ensure displeasure.

"In one solitary instance, the suppression of drunkenness, he promoted morals without the merit of virtuous intention; bigotry exacted the literal version of a text generally interpreted with laxity; arrogance suggested that he was the only true commentator; and the ruling passion whispered that the measure was new. Both sovereigns were equally unprincipled; but Hyder had a clear undisturbed view of the interests of ambition; in Tippoo, that view was incessantly obscured and perverted by the meanest passions. He murdered his English

prisoners, by a selection of the best, because he hated their valour; he oppressed and insulted his Hindu subjects, because he hated a religion which, if protected, would have been the best support of his throne; and he fawned, in his last extremity, on this injured people, when he vainly hoped that their incantations might influence his fate; he persecuted contrary to his interest; and hoped, in opposition to his belief. Hyder, with all his faults, might be deemed a model of toleration by the professor of any religion. Tippoo, in an age when persecution only survived in history, renewed its worst terrors; and was the last Mohammedan prince, after a long interval of better feeling, who propagated that religion by the edge of the sword. Hyder's vices invariably promoted his political interests; Tippoo's more frequently defeated them. If Hyder's punishments were barbarous, they were at least efficient to their purpose. Tippoo's court and army was one vast scene of unpunished peculation, notorious even to himself. He was barbarous where severity was vice, and indulgent where it was virtue. If he had qualities fitted for empire, they were strangely equivocal; the disqualifications were obvious and unquestionable; and the decision of history will not be far removed from the observation almost proverbial in Mysore, 'that Hyder was born to create an Empire, Tippoo to lose one.' " 13

Tipu had continuously in his service French officers and artificers of every kind. Their help he valued and their alliance he sought at every step. A view of what a typical representative of that nation thought of him—of his military talents and political

A French view of
Tipu: M. Michaud's
sketch.

13. Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 760-767; see also *Mys. Gaz. o.c.*, 2668-2674. Wilks writes mainly from personal knowledge. Lt. Col. Beatson also writes in a similar vein about Tipu's personality and character, in his *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*, which Wilks seems evidently to have consulted. Among other contemporary writers, Viscount Valentia, James Forbes and Charles Stewart too are not wholly favourable to Tipu. We have, however, some *partial* contemporary estimates of Tipu by English writers as they saw him during the period 1790-1792, which are in the main just to him. For details of all these accounts, see Appendix IV—(1).

wisdom—seems necessary as a corrective to the English view set forth above. The following is a translation from the French of a sketch of Tipū's career and character, that was issued about 1816, being based on a work by M. Michaud published in Paris in 1809, entitled *Histoire des progrès de la chute de l'empire de Mysore, sous les regnes d'Hyder-Aly et de Tippoo Saib*:—¹⁴

"Feth-Aly Khan, commonly called Tippoo Saib, born about 1749, was the son of the celebrated Hyder-Aly-Khan, sovereign of a powerful empire which he had usurped from the young Rajah of Mysore, of which his genius and his conquests had given him possession. On the death of his father, December 7, 1782, the young Tippoo found himself heir to a territory of twenty-seven thousand square miles, of which the revenues amounted to nearly fifty million francs, and an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men. At the news of the death of Hyder-Aly, the English, commanded by General Mathews, entered Mysore. Tippoo Saib, forced to leave the Carnatic which he had just taken, hastened to the succour of his States; surprised the English in the plains of Canara; routed them; took prisoners the whole of General Mathews' army; and avenged with the greatest ferocity the cruelties the English had committed in the town of Aumapore (Anantapur). After some other successes, he concluded a peace with England, which lasted eight years. During this time, Tippoo occupied himself in ameliorating the internal condition of his empire; and continued to cultivate the friendly relations which had long existed between the French and the sovereign of Mysore. But impelled by the impetuosity of his character, and by the remembrance of his former successes, he resolved to put into execution the project of his father, and to again make fresh efforts to oust the English from India. With this object in view, he sent three ambassadors to the court of Versailles. They were received with distinction, but failed to secure the help they had solicited. On their return to India, they unceasingly vaunted the riches, the power, and the happi-

14. M. Michaud quoted in *Mys. Gaz.*, o.c., 2674-2677.

ness of France, until Tippoo, tired of their discourse, ordered two of them to be put to death.

"A fresh war soon arose between England and Mysore. In 1790, Tippoo was beaten in a battle in Travancore, and lost many pieces of cannon, his turban, his jewels, and his palanquin. The following year the English laid siege to Bangalore, and took possession of that place, where the general of the Sultan perished in the assault. Cornwallis marched against Seringapatam; but famine, floods and contagious diseases forced the English to raise the siege. The third campaign in this war was yet more disastrous to the Sultan. The Mahrattas and the Soubah of the Deccan joined forces with the English. Many forts in the Bangalore country had been taken, when the loss of the fortress of Savandroog, until then deemed impregnable, completed the discomfiture of the Mysore army. In the month of January 1792, the united forces of the allies marched a second time against Seringapatam. Tippoo was forced to make peace, with most stringent conditions. He gave up to the English the half of his States; undertook to pay them about seventy-five million francs; and gave them two of the sons as hostages, as a guarantee of the faithful execution of the treaty. Embittered by these reverses, Tippoo Saib banished the pleasures of his court, formerly so brilliant, and occupied himself solely in discovering means to avenge the indignity of his defeat. The old allies of his father had become the auxiliaries of the English. He sent many ambassadors to Zeman-Shah, sovereign of the Empire of the Abdallis, to try and make him adopt his plans. Not succeeding on this side, he sent Hassan-Ali and Shaik-Ibrahim to the Isle-de-France, in order to open fresh negotiations with the French Republic. The feeble help he obtained only hastened his fall. The Marquess Wellesly, Governor-General of India, knowing the Sultan's preparations for war, assembled an army of seventy-five thousand men, commanded by General Harris. Tippoo only wished to temporise; counting upon the help which he expected from France, he tried to postpone war, and had put off under various pretexts the envoys of the Marquess Wellesley. But as soon as he learnt of the approach of so formidable an army, he only thought of defend-

ing his kingdom, and left at the head of sixty thousand men. He was defeated at Sedesear, and at Malaveli, and imprudently shut himself up in his capital. He wished to open negotiations with the English; but the conditions with which peace could only be obtained, appeared so harsh to the haughty mind of the Sultan, that he determined to die, or to bury himself under the ruins of Seringapatam. This town was defended with the greatest courage. Tippoo, during the whole of the siege, commanded the troops in person, betaking himself wherever danger appeared imminent. On the 21st April 1799, the English began to make a breach, and on the 4th May the town was carried by storm. The French in the service of the Sultan disputed every inch of the ground, and several times they managed to rally the troops of Mysore. A large number of them were killed whilst fighting bravely. The unhappy Tippoo displayed on this day all the valour of the bravest soldier. Driven to the foot of the ramparts, he leapt on his horse, and tried to reach his palace; but, struck by shot, he fell, and his body was discovered under a heap of corpses.

"Thus died," says M. Michaud, "Tippoo Saib at the age of forty-five. The beginning of his military career had covered him with very great glory throughout Hindustan; fortune had favoured him in allowing him without opposition to sit on the throne of Hyder-Aly; and she also did something for him on this occasion in not leaving him to survive the downfall of his empire. His height was five feet eight inches (English): he had a thick short neck; his shoulders, square and massive; his limbs were small, particularly his feet and hands; his eyes large, and his eye-brows arched; he had an aquiline nose, and a brown complexion. Tippoo Saib was a cultured man; he was master of several European languages; he possessed a deep knowledge of the sciences studied in India; but he had not that power of perception, that farseeing and active intuition, which prepares for contingencies, or that wisdom which puts them to profit. Possessed of a boldness which braves all dangers, he had not the prudence which avoids them; endowed with an impetuous and irascible spirit, he nearly always preferred violent to slow and prudent

measures. In short, it can be said of this Prince, that he occupied himself too much with the means for displaying his power, not and enough with those for preserving and strengthening it."

For a contemporary Muhammadan opinion, we may take by way of contrast, the sketch of Kirmāṇi, which while not being extravagant is fair. He writes in the last chapter of his work :—¹⁵

Kirmāṇi's sketch
of Tipā's character.

"In his courts, the splendour of kingly magnificence and majesty were well sustained. He had profited to a considerable extent in all the sciences. He wrote and composed with ease and elegance, and indeed had a genius for literary acquirement, had a great talent for business; and, therefore, he was not obliged to rely on the aid or guidance of others in the management of public affairs. He had a pleasing address and manner, was very discriminating in his estimation of the character of men of learning, and laboured sedulously in the encouragement and instruction of the people of Islam. He had, however, a great dislike to, or rather an abhorrence of, the people of other religions. He never saluted (or returned a salute to) any one. He held his durbars from the morning until midnight, and after the morning prayers, he was used to employ some time in reading the *Korān*, and he was to be seen at all times with his *Tusbih* or rosary in his hand, having performed his ablutionary duties. He made only two meals a day, and all his Amirs and the Princes dined with him. But from the day on which peace was made between him and Lord Cornwallis Buhadur, (to the day of his death) he abandoned his bed and bed-stead and slept or took a few hours' rest on certain pieces of a coarse kind of canvas called *Khaddi* (used for making tents), spread upon the ground. He was accustomed on most occasions to speak Persian, and while he was eating his dinner, two hours were devoted by him to the perusal (from standard historical works), of the actions of the Kings of Persia and Arabia, religious works, traditions and biography. He also

15. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 280-287; also *Mys. Gaz.*, o.c., 2677-2679.

heard appropriate stories and anecdotes related by his courtiers. Jests and ribaldry, however, from the repetition of which the religion of Islam might suffer disparagement, or injury, were never allowed in the courts or assemblies of that most religious prince. For the sake of recreation (.....) as is the custom of men of high rank, he sometimes witnessed dancing (or was present at the performance of Bayaderes). He was not, however, lavish or expensive in any of his habits or amusements, not even in his dress, and contrary to his former custom, he latterly avoided the use of coloured garments. On his journeys and expeditions, however, he wore a coat of gold, or of the red tiger stripe embroidered with gold. He was also accustomed to tie a white handkerchief over his turban and under his chin, and no one was allowed to tie on, or wear, a white handkerchief in that manner, except himself.

"Towards the end of his reign, he wore a green turban Shumlehdar, (twisted apparently) after the fashion of the Arabs, having one embroidered end pendent on the sides of his head. He conferred honours on all professors of the Arts, and in the observance of his prayers, fasts and other religious duties, he was very strict, and in that respect the instructor, or example of the people of Islam. Contrary to the custom of the deceased Nawab, he the Sultan retained the hair of his eye-brows, eye-lashes, and moustaches. His beard, however, which was chiefly on his chin, he shaved, thinking it not becoming to him. In delicacy or modesty of feeling, he was the most particular man in the world, so much so that from the days of his childhood to that of his death, no one ever saw any part of his person except his ankle and wrist, and even in the bath he always covered himself from head to foot.

"In courage and hardihood, the Sultan took precedence of all his contemporaries, and in the management of a horse and the spear, he had no equal in the world as will appear after an attentive perusal of this work. He was fond of introducing novelty and invention in all matters, (and in all departments) as for instance, the year called Muhammadi, an account of which has been before given, also the names of the solar months....."

" Besides these inventions, his workmen cast guns of a very wonderful description, lion-mouthed ; also, muskets with two or three barrels, scissors, penknives, clocks, daggers called *sufdura*, also a kind of shield woven and formed so as to resist a musket ball.

" Besides these, he also instituted manufactories for the fabrication or imitation of the cloths of all countries, such as shawls, velvet, *kimkhub* (cloth of gold), broad cloth (European), and he expended thousands of pounds in these undertakings.

" His chief aim and object was, however, the encouragement and protection of the Muhammadan religion, and the religious maxims or rules of the *Soonni* sect,—and he not only himself abstained from all forbidden practices, but he strictly prohibited his servants from their commission.

" He also formed regulations on every subject and for every department depending on his government, every article of which was separately written with his own hand. If, however, he dismissed any one from his office for any fault, or neglect, he after correction and punishment, was accustomed to re-appoint him to the same office again, and from this cause it was that during his reign, treachery gained head so far as to cast his kingdom and power gratuitously to the winds."

At the top of his *firman*s or public papers, he was accustomed to write the words—"In the name of God"—in the *Toghra* character in his own hand, and at the end, his signature.

The particular form of signature mentioned by *Kirmāni* is really a device or cryptogram, meaning "*Nabbi Mulik*" or the *Prophet is Master*. *Lewin Bowring*, in his monograph on *Haidar Ali and Tipū Sultān*, mentions an order bearing this cryptogram on it. Other orders are known containing not only the same signatures but also a square seal with his impression *Tipu Sultan*. The *Mughal Emperor Shāh Ālam* is known to have bestowed on him the title of *Fatah Ali Khān*, but he does not appear to have made use of it in

his official correspondence. The French writer, M. Michaud, mentions this name in his account of Tipū. On his coins, Tipū does not recognize the great Mughal. Indeed he ordered the *Khutbah*, or daily prayer, to be read in the mosques in his own name, instead of the Mughal Emperor.¹⁶

Later European views of Tipū Sultān's character have been a little more sympathetic. Though by no means countenancing his cruelties or atrocities, the view has been suggested that he should be judged as a product of his age. Lewin Bowring, writing nearly a century after the fall of Seringapatam, gives different instances, based on Tipū's own correspondence, to illustrate his "ferocious character" and then says:—¹⁷

"But enough has been said to show the character of a ruler, who, urged on by religious bigotry, innate cruelty, and despotism, thought little of sacrificing thousands of lives to his ardent zeal and revengeful feelings. These darker shades in his disposition are not relieved by any evidence of princely generosity, such as Haidar Ali occasionally showed. Tipu would grumble at the expense of clothing his troops or even at the number of wax-candles needed for ship-stores. He once rebuked an officer who complained of being supplied with old and black rice, by telling him not to engage in improper alteration.

"Whatever indignation may be excited by the Sultan's vindictive character, it is enhanced by the miserable state of the prisoners who fell into his hands. Haidar indeed put his captives in irons, fed them sparingly, and treated them badly, but he rarely put an end to their lives deliberately. Tipu, on the other hand, had no compunction in cutting their throats, or strangling and poisoning them; while, as has been stated, numbers of them were sent to die of malaria and starvation

16. *Mys. Gaz.*, o.c., 2680.

17. Lewin Bowring, *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* (Rulers of India Series), quoted in *Ibid.*, 2680-2682.

on the fatal mountain of Kabbaldrug. The English prisoners were specially selected as victims of his vengeance, not omitting officers of rank such as General Matthews, while, in direct contravention of the treaty made at Mangalore in 1784, he did not scruple to retain in captivity considerable numbers of Europeans. Many of these, particularly young and good-looking boys, were forcibly circumcised, married haphazard to girls who had been captured in the Coromandel districts, and drafted into the ranks of the army, or compelled to sing and dance for the amusement of the sovereign.

"It must be admitted that the times were barbarous, and that the most atrocious punishments were frequently inflicted on malefactors. Even impaling was occasionally resorted to, and it would be unjust to attribute to Tipu alone the commission of crimes which were characteristic of the period. It has been mentioned that those who conspired against him were put in a cage. This was an imitation of Haidar's treatment of Khande Rao. The unhappy victims were allowed half a pound of rice a day, with salt, but no water; so they soon expired under this frightful ordeal. There were other punishments nearly equally dreadful, such as making men bestride a wooden horse on a saddle studded with sharp spikes. On a spring being touched, the horse of torture reared, and the spikes penetrated the unfortunate wretches. A more common mode of punishment was to bind tightly the hands and feet of condemned men, and then to attach them by a rope to the foot of an elephant, which, being urged forwards, dragged them after it on the rough ground and painfully terminated their existence. Some again were ruthlessly thrown into the dens of tigers to be devoured, and it is said that three of Tipu's high officials met with this fate. Cutting off of ears and noses was a general practice, and was frequently inflicted on defaulters, thieves and peccant subordinates.....

"So many instances have been given of the atrocities which he committed in the name of religion, that it would be superfluous to add to them. In this respect, he rivalled Mahmud of Ghazni, Nadir Shah, and Ala-ud-din, the Pathan Emperor of Delhi, surnamed the Khūni, or the Bloody, all of

whom were famous for the number of infidels slaughtered by their orders. For this very zeal for the faith, notwithstanding the cruelties which attended his persecutions, the name of Tipu Sultan was long held in reverence by his co-religionists in Southern India—a proof how readily crimes that cry to Heaven are condoned when the perpetrator of them is supposed to have been animated by a sincere desire to propagate the faith which he professed. On his tomb at Seringapatam, it is recorded, in phrases which, as in the case of Haidar Ali, commemorate by the *Abjad* system the year of his death, that the 'Haidari Sultan died for the faith. The words are 'Nur Islam wa dinz dunyā raft,' i.e., 'The light of Islam and the faith left the world : ' 'Tipū ba wajah din Muhammad Shahīd shud,' i.e., 'Tipu on account of the faith of Muhammad was a martyr,' 'Shamshēr gūmshud,' i.e., 'The offspring of Haidar was a great martyr,' all these phrases being supposed to represent the year 1233 Hijri, corresponding with A. D. 1799. The inscription was composed by Mir Hussain Ali, and was written by one Abdul Kādir.

A more recent estimate is not only appreciative of certain of the much criticised aspects of Tipū's character, especially certain of his innovations, but also pleads for a closer study of his life for a juster appraising of his character. Dr. John R. Henderson, C.I.E., who, it should be remembered, wrote during the time the last Great European War was in progress, in his monograph on the *Coins of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*, observes :—¹⁸

"It is difficult to form an accurate estimate of the character of Tipu Sultan, because the views of contemporary writers, whether English or Muhammadan, are obviously biased. His cruelty and religious bigotry are undoubted and he perpetrated many atrocities in the name of religion; he has been justly censured for his excesses in war, though they never perhaps exceeded a standard set elsewhere in more modern times. That he was a brave man cannot be doubted,

18. Henderson, *o.c.*, quoted in *Ibid.*, 2682-2683.

and while on several occasions he showed considerable military ability, he fell far short of his father in this respect. Unlike Haider, he was a man of education and the changes which he introduced into the calendar, the names of his forts, of Civil and Military officers, and of weights and measures, certainly display a considerable amount of ingenuity, though by more than one writer they have been held to afford evidence of his insanity. Nowhere else is Tipu's love of innovation better seen than in his coinage. It has been left to an English writer of fiction to give, in the words of one of his characters, the most favourable account of Tipu Sultan that I have been able to discover, and while no doubt reproducing contemporary Muhammadan opinion, it is perhaps nearer the truth than are some of the accounts which have been written in an entirely opposite direction. This imperfect notice may fittingly conclude with the extract in question:—¹⁹

"He was a great man—such as one as Hind will never see again. He had great ambition, wonderful ability, perseverance, and the art of leading men's hearts more than they were aware of, or cared to acknowledge; he had patient application, and nothing was done without his sanction, even to the meanest affairs, and the business of his dominions was vast. You will allow he was brave, and died like a soldier. He was kind and considerate to his servants, and a steady friend to those he loved. Mashalla, he was a great man."

It must be acknowledged that Tipu has been with reason charged with what has been termed "a spirit of innovation." Almost the only innovation which has won the appreciation of Wilks is his attempt to put down the drink evil. His reform of the coinage, under French influence, has not received the praise it deserves. Nor have his certain other reforms received the examination they have certainly required for a just appreciation of their utility. It seems a singular misfortune that the darker side of Tipu's life and character should have so completely overshadowed the better and more enlightened

19. *Ibid*, quoting Meadows Taylor, *Tippoo Sultan*, p. 460.

side of it as to give a somewhat totally distorted view of it.²⁰

In judging of the character of Tipū, we should not only remember the points against him
An analysis of Tipū's character : his defects and merits. but also those in his favour. His ardent love for the French, for the aid he at one time freely got from them and for what more he expected from them, was the cause of his ultimate ruin. He never for a moment had the political wisdom to see that the French were at the time the mortal foes of the British and that the British would treat the allies of the French as their own enemies. As Wilks has pointed out, Tipū inherited his friendship for the French from his father, who, disappointed with the English at Madras, went over to the French at Pondicherry, and with them formed the design of driving the English out of India. Tipū's life-time was spent in his attempts at realization of this vain hope. He spared neither money nor opportunity to attain this object. His desire for foreign alliances and his despatch of embassies to foreign courts had this sole aim in view. This hatred for the English led him to extreme measures against British prisoners. His barbarous cruelty towards them and towards his own subjects are blots on his character, which, from any point of view, are wholly indefensible. The above quoted European writer has tried to justify the atrocious cruelties of Tipū from the cruelties practised during the last World War. This view, however, cannot be accepted, for the convincing reason that cruelty, whether new or old, is cruelty and it is cruelty whether it is practised by an European or an Indian. One wrong cannot right another. Tipū's systematic breach of the terms of capitulations entered into by him with those who surrendered to him and of solemn treaty engagements is equally repugnant to higher political

20. See also for this view, *Mys. Gaz.*, o.c., 2683-2694.

and moral instincts. His religious fanaticism and the excesses he committed in the name of religion—both in Mysore and in the provinces, especially in Malabar and in Coorg in particular—stand condemned for all time. There is hardly any other aspect of his character that deserves greater castigation than this one. His bigotry, indeed, was so great that it precluded all idea of toleration to others' feelings in religious or social matters. He kept up intercourse with the Sringeri *Guru* but it was more for the political benefits he expected to derive from it than for allowing him unmolested the free exercise of his own religion. History records no instance of a like kind during any age. Equally cruel was Tipū's treatment of the *de jure* ruler of the State, whose ostensible servants he and his father long professed to be. His repeated plunders of the Royal House and the indignities to which its members were subjected by him indicate a weakening of the moral fibre in him that is hardly compatible with the royalty and state he himself tried to assume. The infamous character of this particular crime so worked itself into the people that they made several attempts, time and again, to throw off his dreaded yoke. It must be acknowledged that Muslims were as much to the fore in these attempts as the Hindus and the entire collapse of his cause after his death shows Tipū had no hold either on his co-religionists or on the Hindus, whom he so much oppressed. Tipū held the kingdom by instilling fear in the minds of his subjects; he kept them down by the severity of his rule; and never felt bound by any ties of moral responsibility to his subjects. The people never felt, on their part, they owed any obedience to him. The tie of sovereign and subject was non-existent between him and the people of Mysore. On the one side, Tipū never thought he owed any responsibility to the subjects of the State, whom he involved in

repeated wars and the unbearable miseries resulting from them, whom he individually plundered as he desired, and whom he, without reason or justice, subjected to indignities so far unknown in the land. On the other hand, the people felt that they owed no allegiance to him, for they failed to see any moral right attaching to his position, which, founded in usurpation, had been supported by open injustice, extortion and cruelty. This was the primary reason why on his death, the deposition of his family proved so easy. None—not even among the Muslims—was found to support the revival of the rule of his family in his descendants. As a matter of fact, as has already been stated, the generality of the Muslims were against his rule and some of them even took part in the several attempts made to dethrone him. The Marquess Wellesley, the great statesman that he was, perceived this cardinal fact in the situation immediately after the fall of Seringapatam and based his policy of after war settlement of the country primarily on it. Another weakness in Tipu's character was his want of stability in administrative matters. His suspicion of his generals, his lack of understanding of human nature, and his imperfect political wisdom were other radical defects in his character, which wholly disabled him from grasping the essential facts of a situation. He was thus misled into adopting measures which disrupt an Empire, which, had he exercised ordinary prudence and calmness of judgment, he could have easily conserved and added to even. His vanity, his boastfulness and his unpreparedness at a moment of crisis were other traits in his character which deserve mention. His conduct of the last war, which ended in his destruction, showed how, in the midst of plenty, he was unprepared for the event. He did not lack men; he did not lack war materials; and he did not lack generals; yet his preparations for checkmating the

enemy's advance were, as we have seen, hopelessly faulty, in that he gave no real thought to them, with consequences the most disastrous to himself. The enemy had literally a walk over, which one Persian historian describes in language which borders on the farcical. So downcast had he become after the loss of half of his territories and exacting of his sons as hostages, that while he was endeavouring for strong measures against the British, he was not girding up his loins to the work in a truly military spirit. There are those who maintain that he got unhinged from that time forward and that he delivered himself into the hands of his Fate. His own actions in the height of the crisis not only confirm this surrender but also betray traces of regret at his past conduct. His lack of military talents—despite the fact that he was a good soldier and died a real soldier's death fighting with sword in hand—disabled him to see the faults of his own generalship. Cornwallis was deeply disappointed at his lack of military prudence; while Colonel Allan frequently notes in his *Journal* how his want of foresight was evidenced in the dispositions of his forces and in the utterly disorganized manner in which the opposition to the advance was offered by him. He expresses his surprise again and again that a wiser generalship would have opposed the British advance at various points and disputed every inch of the ground; even where he did offer some resistance, it was so weak that it made no impression on the enemy. While he was not himself equal to the task, he would not leave it to others; far worse, he attributed the effects of his own bad generalship to his officers, which, added to the suspicion with which he usually treated them, took the heart out of their service. The worst, however, of Tipū's faults was his want of regard for truth. While he meant one thing, he was doing another. His dupli-

city towards the English and his treatment of Nārgund are illustrative of this trait in his character. It was a radical defect, it stamped him as unfaithful as an ally, unreliable as a neighbour and unbelievable in warfare. If he had any regard for the treaty engagements he had entered into in 1792, he would have been less prevaricating with the Marquess Wellesly in 1798-1799; if he had kept his word with his Pālegār chiefs, they would not have welcomed the enemy with open arms when the advance commenced; if he had not deceived those who had capitulated and broken the terms under which they had surrendered, his reputation with the British for honesty would not have been so low as it actually was in 1799.²¹

But though the defects of character from which Tipū laboured were many and some of them wholly incurable, there were redeeming features in it, which made it less unloveable than it might easily have been but for their presence. The first among these was his habitual energy, which especially, before the losses of 1792, kept him restlessly marching from conquest to conquest and from battlefield to battlefield. His

His redeeming
features.

21. See also *Ibid*, 2684-2688. Tipū's communications with Srīngarī Math during the period 1791-1799, originally noticed in the *Mysore Archaeological Report* (down to 1923), have since been published in *extenso* in the collection entitled *Selections from the Records of the Srīngarī Mutt* (Mysore, 1927). These letters, in Kannāḍa, twenty-one in number (Nos. 46 to 66), bear the "Sun" seal and Tipū's signature in Persian. While Tipū, throughout this correspondence, professes his great regard for the *Guru* of the time (His Holiness Śrī Sachchidānanda Bhāratīsvāmī) and his solicitude for the welfare of the Math, his ulterior motive stands clearly out, namely, he was seeking the spiritual support of the *Guru* for achieving a political object. This was no other than averting the danger of English invasion during 1790-1792, and 1798-1799, by having recourse to *japan* (i.e., propitiatory rites like *Chandī-havana*, *Sahasra-Chandī-hōma*, etc.) performed under the auspices of the Math. He seems to have held this attitude not inconsistent with his iconoclastic spirit, elsewhere noticed.

march to the Karnātic from Malabar at the time of his father's death and from the Karnātic to Mangalore are good examples of this trait, while his general restless disposition shows that normally, under more favourable conditions, he might have proved himself an undoubtedly energetic ruler and leader. He did not allow himself a chance to make a good use of the boundless energy he displayed. If he had been a little more true to himself and true to others, his countrymen and opponents alike, he would have fared the better for the physical and mental energy he was endowed with by a bounteous nature. His soldier-like bearing, his personal bravery, and his absolute refusal to discover himself to the British at the time he was about to be felled down, show him in a character which wins our goodwill for him. His constancy to those whom he considered his friends was another loveable trait in his character. His haughty refusal to deliver Mons. Chapuis and the handful of French soldiers with him, at the siege of 1799, when by so doing he could have saved himself, brings out in bold relief this particular characteristic of his. His zeal for his religion needs a word of commendation, though it overstepped the bounds of reasonable restraint, especially as applied to conquered countries like Malabar and Coorg. His ardent desire for reform, which was real, was a prominent feature of his rule. It extended from the army to weights and measures, and in some respects (especially as to suppression of drink and coinage) was much in advance of his times. The admiration to be extended to this well-meant zeal should, however, be qualified with the observation that he often displayed a sad lack of human understanding in putting some of them through. While, for instance, his adoption of a stronger artillery arm to his army should be praised, his depreciation of the cavalry led to the ruin of his army and to his own final destruction. His powers of assimila-

lation were great—whether in adopting European training or European methods of warfare—but he often did not realize the limits beyond which it would be impossible to go. His veneration for his mother was a leading trait in his character. Her advice he never disregarded even when it went against his own cherished views. He had, however, no tender feeling for women generally. Women, indeed, he classed with “other rubbish” in one of his admonitory epistles addressed to Burhan-ud-dīn. Though he had thirteen sons and an equal number of daughters, he was not susceptible, as Bowring remarks, to the charms of the fair sex. His strict, abstemious life, bordering on the puritanical, and his devotion to the duties of a good Moslem, even to the detail of counting the rosary, remind one of Aurangzib, who is said to have earned the money required for his private expenses by multiplying copies of the *Korān* from his own hand. Though Tipū did not go this length, still there is no doubt that he was both a devoted and zealous Moslem. His eagerness to spread the religion he professed cost him dearly but it is to be feared that he was wholly unconscious of the price he was paying for it until the last moment. Even the repeated warnings of his mother, whose influence over him was manifestly great, proved unavailing in this respect. A valued public servant like Pūrṇaiya did not escape his attentions in this respect, though he avoided extreme measures in his case, because of the solemn reproof administered to him by his mother in this connection. Praise is due to Tipū for his businesslike habits, of which there is ample evidence in his correspondence. He was, it would appear, fond of reading, though he had no true literary instincts in him. His education had been perverted and did not include, as Haidar intended, the science of politics or the art of conquering countries and making mutually advantageous treaties with neighbours

and enemies.²² The history that goes in his name (*Tārikhi-Khodadādy*) was written, at least in part, to his dictation, and is in a style which has not won much appreciation from competent critics. It is, in some instances, devoted to the falsification of what actually took place. Despite this defect, it is worthy of attention because of the light it sheds on the state of his mind at the time of its composition. Considering the defects of his character and his bringing up—he was educated under a Maulvi who instilled more religion than culture into him—it cannot be denied that a kindly fate permitted him to die fighting on the walls of the fort he knew so well and loved so greatly, without allowing him to fall into the hands of the enemy whose prisoners he had so ruthlessly and so mercilessly beheaded, even while he was fighting for his own life, for them to make him taste a little of that human misery that he, like his far-famed

22. For Haider's chastisement of Tipū's teacher when he came to know how wrongly Tipū, his son, had been trained and taught in as a bigoted Muslim fond of his religion which would prove the destruction of the country—see *Mys. Gaz.*, Vol. IV. 490-493. According to Kirmāni, Haider, it is interesting to note, "took great pains in the training and education of his sons (including Tipū), and appointed men of his court to the duties of tutors and servants to them, who made him acquainted with every particular relating to their manners and conversation; and sentinels, from the Nawaub's guard, were placed around their houses or tents." "Whenever Tippoo," Kirmāni continues, "was commissioned to repel enemies, or to attack forts, to whatever quarter he might be sent, he was first summoned to the presence; and the Nawaub told him that he had selected him for this service, because he found him worthy in all matters to be employed; that he committed a force of so many horse and foot, so many guns, and a treasury of so much money to his orders; and that he must take great care no neglect occurred, and, using great prudence and caution, return successful. He then dismissed him. The officers and men, who were placed under Tippoo on this occasion, were also sent for and strictly enjoined that, as the Prince was young, they should never allow him to be separate from them, or peril himself by inconsiderate rashness; but, on the contrary, consider his safety at all times as placed at their responsibility by their faith and agreement. When the Prince returned to the presence, from his expedition, he was again placed under surveillance . . ." (Kirmāni, *Hydur Naik*, 477-479). Subsequent events showed that Tipū did not fully come up to Haider's expectations in this behalf.

contemporary and would be ally Napoleon, for so long had despised.²³

Tipū was like Philip II of Spain (1527-1598 A.D.) in certain respects. Like him he was a bigot in religion ; a hard, unloved and unloving man, and erratic ruler. If Philip fatally injured Spain by crushing her chivalrous spirit, by persecuting the industrious Moors, and by destroying her commerce by heavy taxation, Tipū crushed the spirit of his subjects, persecuted the Hindus and destroyed agriculture, trade and industries by his unwise regulations and by his ill-considered administrative acts. If Philip encouraged the Inquisition in Spain and introduced it into the Netherlands, Tipū attempted the wholesale conversion of the Nairs and the Coorgs and called on his own generals and soldiers to embrace Islām. If Philip lost, as the result of his policy, the Netherlands which revolted against him, and the seven United Provinces ultimately achieved their independence, Tipū invited the vengeance of his neighbours. If Philip's hatred of England ended in the disaster of the Armada, Tipū's hatred of the English ended in the loss of his power and his very life.²⁴

Some comparisons of Tipū or references to him are frequently met with in contemporary literature. These are of importance as showing how he impressed his contemporaries as a leading Indian personality of the

Other comparisons, etc.

23. See also *Mys. Gaz.*, *o.c.*, 2688-2690.

24. Like Pericles during the Peloponnesian War, Tipū surrendered the city (of Seringapatam) with walls, his policy being to defend it from within them rather than face the enemy in the field. But this policy proved fatal, for it tended to damp rather than quicken the ardour of the army. Pericles' policy during the Peloponnesian War was on concentration in Athens, leaving the rest of Attica to its fate. The Peloponnesian War, it might be recalled, was fought between Athens and Sparta, 431-404 B. C. In the first period, which was concluded by the peace of Nicias (421 B. C.), both sides had their successes. In the second, Sicily was the theatre of hostilities. In the third, Sparta

18th century. De La Tour, for instance, compares Tipū to Alexander, in the following passage referring to the year 1780. "The total defeat of a detachment commanded by Colonel Brawlie [Baillie]," he writes, "is likewise an exploit of Tippou Saeb, who, having begun, like Alexander, to gain battles at the age of eighteen, continues to march in the steps of that Grecian hero, whom he may one day resemble as well by the heroism of his actions as by the multiplicity of his conquests." Captain Robson refrains from comparing Tipū, much less Haidar, to any historical character. "I have forborne," he says,²⁶ "to compare Hyder Ally to Philip of Macedon or his son Tippoo Saib to Alexander the Great." Innes Munro, writing in 1780, compares Tipū to Hannibal in the following passage. "I have been told from good authority," he observes,²⁷ "that he (Hyder) secretly entertains an implacable aversion to all Europeans, which he takes as much care to instil into the mind of his son Tippu, as Hamielar, the famous Carthaginian General, did when he caused Hannibal to take the oaths of perpetual enmity against the Romans." The *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* (1788) is conspicuous by the absence of any comparison of Tipū to historical characters. Nor does Roderick Mackenzie, giving a stray notice of the character of Tipū in or about 1792, hardly compare him to any historical character.²⁸ Major Dirom, too, writing in 1794, hardly compares Tipū to any historical character, although he observes:²⁹ "Confiding in his superior power and talents, and aiming at universal conquest,

had the advantage. Athens was captured by Lysander in 405 B. C.; the city walls were destroyed, and her power broken, leaving Sparta temporarily supreme.

25. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali* (1784), II. 198.

26. Robson, *Life of Hydur Ally* (1786), Preface, vi.

27. Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 128.

28. See Mackenzie, *Sketch* (1794), II. 71-73.

29. Dirom, *Narrative*, 250.

this active Prince not only disclaimed the paramount authority of the Emperor of Delhi, and declared himself to be the greatest king on earth, but also pretending to derive his descent from the founder of his religion, announced himself to be the restorer of the Mahommedan faith.....". "Tippoo is the first Mahommedan Prince," he further observes,³⁰ "who, since the establishment of the Mogul Empire, has openly disclaimed the authority of the King of Delhi or Great Mogul, and who has presumed to impress coin with only his own titles....." Lt. Col. Alexander Beatson too, writing in 1800, hardly compares Tipū to any historical character, though he remarks:³¹ "In short, the whole of his conduct, since the year 1792, proves him to have been a weak, headstrong, and tyrannical prince; influenced in his views, both foreign and domestic, by a restless and implacable spirit, and totally unequal to the government of a kingdom, which had been usurped by the hardness, intrigues, and talents of his father." Major Charles Stewart (1809), as we have already seen,³² though he does not specifically compare Tipū with any historical character, speaks of the circumstances attending the death of Tippoo Sultān and the fall of Seringapatam as bearing a strong resemblance to the fate of Palaeologus, the last of the Greek Emperors, and the capture of Constantinople by the Turks (A. D. 1453).³³

The progress of Saracenic style of architecture during Tipū's period demands a few words, more especially because Tipū himself erected some noble buildings, some of which exist to the present day. They more or less retain the characteristics of that

80. *Ibid.*, l. n.

81. Beatson, *Vind.*, 151.

82. See l. n. 7 *supra*.

83. As for the comparison of Tipū with Sultān Muhammad of Ghazni (977-1080 A. D.), *vide* Appendix IV—(8).

style, at least ten different modifications of which are distinguished by Burgess. The Bijāpur style. Bijāpur Sultāns, who were the first to invade Mysore in the north and east in the 17th century, had a distinguished record as builders in their own territories. Far famed though they were as the creators of the beautiful Juma Masjid (1557-1570), the celebrated Gōl Gumbaz (1626-1656) and other equally well-known structures at their capital, which are remarkable as much for originality of design as for boldness of execution, they have hardly left their impress on Mysore from the purely architectural point of view. The only building connected with their period is a solitary mosque erected by Randhulla Khān, their general, at Sante Bennur in the Shimoga District, which may be set down to *Circa* 1637, the very period covered by the construction of the Gōl Gumbaz by Muhammad Adil Shah. Though they approximate in dates, these two structures entirely differ in the styles they adopt. While the Gōl Gumbaz bears no trace of Hindu forms or details, the Sante Bennur mosque is, like the first mosques built by the Muhammadans in Northern India, an adaptation of a Hindu structure with but comparatively slight alterations. Randhulla's mosque is, in fact, built on the site of an old temple of Ranganātha erected by Hanumappa Nāyak, the local chief, which was destroyed for making room for the mosque. The materials of the temple were used in the construction of the mosque, which is an imposing structure with groyned roof and Saracenic details. The mosque was, however, desecrated in revenge by the ousted Pālegār, and has accordingly never been used. The *honda*, or reservoir in front, converted into a *hauz*, is faced round with a grand flight of *ashlaz* steps, and had ornamental *mantapas* (pavilions) at the angles, in the centre and in the middle of its sides, with very finely worked turrets and *gōpuras*

in the Dravidian and Chālukyan styles. These were improved with elegant additions by Randhulla Khān, but are at present in a ruinous condition. Apparently a fountain used to play from the middle pavilion. The paucity of structures in the true Bijāpur style in the State is probably due to the fact that the Governors of its possessions in the Karnātic were Mahrattas and not Muhammadans.

Bijāpur was taken by the Mughals under Aurangzib in 1687, and the subjection of the Karnātic provinces belonging to it immediately followed, ending in the establishment of Sira as the capital of the new territory acquired in Mysore. The architectural

The remains at
Sira, Seringapatam,
Bangalore, etc.

remains now existing are the Juma Masjids at Sira (built in 1696) and Hirebidnūr near Goribidnūr, and several tombs, now partially in ruins, both at Sira and Hirebidnūr. The domes at Sira are not large, but of a very light and elegant design, being well raised on a sort of floral cup, the petals of which press close round the base. The structures have survived through, being built of stone. It is on record that a palace was erected by one of the Governors of Sira, named Dilāvar Khān, of such elegance that it was adopted as the model on which Haidar and Tipū built their palaces at Bangalore and Seringapatam. There may be truth in this tradition. Haidar, who received the title of Nawāb of Sira in 1761, was undoubtedly much impressed with the Mughal architecture of the place. He accordingly modelled his own buildings on the one at Sira. The Bangalore Fort was in like manner rebuilt on the model of the fort at Sira and the Lāl-Bāgh at Bangalore was probably suggested by the Khān-Bāgh at Sira. Tipū followed in Haidar's footsteps in this particular domain of activity. But all the three buildings at Sira, Bangalore and Seringapatam

were of such perishable materials, though thickly decorated with gilding and colour, that hardly anything now remains of any of them. The same fate has overtaken Latif Sāheb's *Darga*, at one time a handsome ornamental structure, at Hoskote, Bangalore District. The Bangalore Palace, like the *Sejje* or Durbar Hall of the Old Palace at Mysore, unfortunately destroyed by fire, and the Daria-Daulat at Seringapatam, referred to below, appear to have been built in the Mughal style of architecture resembling Akbar's famous Durbar Hall at Allahabad, in which Indian and Saracenic details are mixed up. In these buildings, while the main floors were mean in proportion and dwarfed in height and filled with the most fantastic mosaic decorations, an appearance of grandeur was imparted to the structures by the tall and beautifully carved wooden pillars, running up from the basement right up to the top of the ceiling of the first floor and connected with ornamental and fretted rods formed by wooden planks. The approaches to these buildings were laid out with great regard to beauty and one felt, in approaching these piles, one's own insignificance compared with the splendour and magnificence of the monarchs who held their Durbars on the projecting balconies of the top floor. The Bangalore Palace was long used for the office of the Administration until 1868, when, being no longer safe, it was abandoned, and the greater part has since been demolished. In what remains, a municipal school was for sometime maintained but it was ordered to be removed for conservation as a work of historical and architectural interest. Of the Palace at Seringapatam, Buchanan says that it was a very large building, surrounded by a massive and lofty wall of stone and mud; and though outwardly of a mean appearance, contained some handsome apartments but ill-ventilated. The private apartments of Tipū formed a square, on one side of which were the rooms that he

himself used. The other three sides of the square were occupied with warehouses, in which he had deposited a vast variety of goods, for he acted not only as a prince but also as a merchant. These goods were occasionally distributed among the Amildars with orders to sell them, on the Sultān's account, at a price far above their real value, which was done by forcing a share of them upon every man in proportion to his supposed wealth. The apartment most commonly used by Tipū was a large lofty hall, open in front after the Mussalman fashion, and on the other three sides entirely shut up from ventilation. From the principal front of the palace, which served as a revenue office, and as a palace from whence the Sultān occasionally showed himself to the populace, the chief entry into the private square was through a strong narrow passage, wherein were chained four tigers. Within these was the hall in which Tipū wrote, and into which very few persons except Mīr Sādik were ever admitted. Immediately behind this was the bed-chamber, which communicated with the hall by a door and two windows, and was shut up on every other side. The door was strongly secured on the inside, a close iron grating defending the windows. The Sultān, lest any person should fire upon him while in bed, slept in a hammock which was suspended from the roof by chains in such a situation as to be invisible through the windows. The only other passage from the private square was into the *Zenāna* or women's apartments.

Tipū's *Mahal* at Chitaldrug appears to have been an imposing, though plain, structure. It is also in a ruined state now. The ceiling of the inner hall has tumbled down but the lofty wooden pillars still standing indicate the nature of the building. The pillars, however, have no ornamentation about them like those in the Palace at Bangalore Fort. The upper storey has a few plain-looking rooms. There was apparently a garden

attached to the building, of which the remains are still to be seen.

A few buildings, designed in the Mughal styles, however, are also to be found in fair preservation, some being maintained in good order by special grants. They are the *Makbara* or mausoleum of Haidar's family at Kōlār, the great mosque at Seringapatam, the well-known *Gumbaz* (or mausoleum of Haidar and Tipū) in the Lāl-Bāgh at the same place, and the Summer Palace known as the Daria-Daulat. To these may be added the little known but fine *Gumbaz* at Hoskote (see M.A.R. for 1919, Plate VI, facing page 10) and the tombs at Chenapatna and the mosque at Nagar. Of the Kōlār *Makbara* (sometimes called Imāmbāra), there is architecturally little to remark. The imposing mosque at Seringapatam is a fine structure, built on the site of an old temple, with two lofty minarets. One of the five Persian inscriptions in it gives 1787 A. D. as the date of its construction and the others contain extracts from the *Korān* and the ninety-nine names of Allah. The *Gumbaz* of Haidar and Tipū at Ganjām, near Seringapatam, is an effective building, consisting of a large dome resting on a basement storey, which is surrounded with a colonnade of pillars of black serpentine. The dome covers the central apartment containing the tombs. The interior is lacquered with the tiger-stripe emblem of Tipū, and the doors are of ebony inlaid with ivory, a special industry of Mysore. The present ones were the gift of the Marquis of Dalhousie to replace the old ones which were worn out. (For the ground plan and front elevation of this building, see E. C., Mysore, i. pp. 32 and 56). On its west wall is an inscription in Persian characters, dated in *Hijira* 1195 or A.D. 1782, the year of Haidar's death. In this inscription the building is described as the "bed-chamber" of the "King" Haidar, who is said to be "taking rest" in it. In its hyperbolic

language, it is thus described : " Marvellous is the dome which from the loftiness of its construction has made the firmament low in height. As you will, you may call it either the moon or the sun, and the firmament finds itself put to shame on account of envy. The pinnacle of the dome is the light of the firmament's eye, from which the moon has borrowed its light. The fountain of mercy has gushed out from the earth and the cherub angels have surrounded it. " As we enter the precincts of this mausoleum, surrounded on three of its sides by mosques, prayer halls and rest houses for visitors, built in imitation of the Saracenic buildings of Northern India, with its cypress trees and finely laid-out gardens, a solemnity unconsciously steals on us and makes us feel that it is a resting place for one of the Sultāns of Mysore.

The Daria-Daulat building was a summer palace, erected on the bank of the river by Tipū Sultān, and was at one time occupied by Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington. It is an oblong building, with small rooms and steep stairs at each of the four corners. The upper storey forms an inner floor, with canopied balconies in the middle of the four sides, working down on to the spacious audience halls below. The whole stands on a high basement, surrounded with deep verandahs. The most striking feature in the building is the painted walls. " The lavish decorations, which cover every inch of wall from first to last, from top to bottom, recall the palaces of Ispahan," says Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Rees, " and resemble nothing that I know in India. " (*The Duke of Clarence in South India*, 81). There is a good picture of the building in his book. The design seems to be substantially similar to that of Tipū's palace at Seringapatam and Bangalore, which were, as already stated, copied from one erected at Sirā by the Mughal Governor Dilāvar Khān. The most striking fresco on the wall of the Daria-Daulat Palace

is a representation of the defeat of Colonel Baillie's detachment by the Mysore troops, which occupies the greater part of one side.³⁴

34. *Mys. Gaz.*, II-i-371-377. For the historical painting, see *Ante*, Ch. V, of this work (at p. 339, f.n. 53); also *Mys. Gaz.*, Vol. V. ch. vi, under *Seringapatam*.

CHAPTER XX.

THE RESTORATION AND INSTALLATION OF KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR III (1799-1868).

Criticism of Tipu's conduct of the war—Prize Property at Seringapatam—The town plundered: order restored—Submission of Tipu's officers—Submission criticised by Kirmani—Partition Treaty Arrangement—Disposal of conquered territories: Restoration of Mysore Dynasty resolved on by the Marquess Wellesley—Motives underlying his policy of Restoration—Moral justification of the Restoration—Installation of His Highness Sri Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, June 30, 1799—Marquess Wellesley's vindication of the claim of the Mysore Royal House—Appointment of Purnaiya as Dewan and Col. Barry Close as Resident—Division of Territories—Marquess Wellesley's re-affirmation of the principles underlying his policy of Restoration—The rule of His Highness Sri Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, 30th June 1799-27th June 1868.

OPINION seems unanimous that Tipu showed an entire lack of generalship in the war. It was in keeping with his conduct of the previous war which ended with the first siege of Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis, ascribing to him firmness and decision, had apprehended that he would leave the defence of the capital to a trusty officer and ample garrison, and keeping aloof with a light and effective army, act on the communications of the besiegers, and dislodge them by the mere force of their own members. These apprehensions received additional force from the absence of the only branch of the confederacy—that under Paraśurām Bhao—from which Lord Cornwallis expected efficient aid. But the actual presence of Tipu's army dissipated all alarms on that account, and enabled Lord Cornwallis

to realize his best hopes of striking a decisive blow before the commencement of the siege. The very same mistake of locking himself up in his fortress in the face of the advancing enemy was repeated by Tipū on the present occasion, with worse results. The curious reader will find in Colonel *Allan's Journal* of the march of the British army that it reached within sight of Bangalore, a distance of nearly 150 miles, from Vellore, from which it started, practically without firing a shot. Kīlamangalam was the first place where the advancing army fell in with parties of Tipū's horse. Though some showed themselves daringly, they did not molest the British forces, but simply destroyed the forage round about the British camp and retired, desiring that there was no need "to fire on them" as they had been "ordered by the Sultaun" to do no more. At Garadipalli, they could not have easily taken the Adjutant-General (Colonel Close) a prisoner, if Tipū's troops had only been a little active. He crossed them "at the distance of a few yards." While Tipū's troops were expecting the British troops at Bangalore, the latter evaded them by proceeding by way of Ānekal, within 9 miles of Bangalore, and then striking into the road leading to Kānkānhalli, they crossed the rugged high grounds which run from Bangalore to the Cauvery and encamped at Kaglipuram; still there was no sign of any activity on the part of Tipū's troops. Almost the only thing so far done by a small party (about 60 horses) of the latter was to watch the motions of the advancing army and send daily intelligence of its progress. A few others were told off to breach the tanks or poison them—as in the previous war—by throwing quantities of milk-hedge into them. The advancing army was well prepared for it, expecting this mode of annoyance, and rapidly repaired the tanks or removed the poisoning shrubs. At Maddūr river, the British army was wholly disappointed in not being

opposed. They had seen Tipū's forces encamping in the neighbourhood and Saiyid Gaffar, one of his generals, was also there. Tipū had lately opened the road from this place to Kānkānhalli and it is natural to suppose that it was his intention to oppose the advancing British forces there before they advanced any further. "That he did not at the Maddur river," records Colonel Allan, "is unaccountable. The ground was particularly favourable for him and had he sacrificed a few guns, which he might have placed to great advantage on the heights in our front, which command the passage of the river, he might have given us a great deal of annoyance, killed and wounded a number of men and when pressed by our troops, as the country was quite open in his rear, he might have drawn off, in perfect security. He must have been aware of these and from all our information, it was supposed, he would have availed himself of them. Tippoo was advised by Mons. Chapuis to oppose our army at this place, and at the time had resolved to do so, but on the approach of our army, he retired towards Mallavally (Malvalli). That he did not, can only be attributed to want of confidence in his troops; occasioned probably by the repulse he met at Sedaseer (about 20 days before). Hitherto we have met with scarce any opposition from the enemy, when he ought to have harassed us every day on the march, and by retarding us, have gained time, which should be his principal object." That is cogent criticism of Tipū's inactivity at the supreme hour of his peril; it was due to want of confidence in his own generals, whom he never trusted; to indifference to sound advice by them; and to the malevolent influence of a consuming vanity which made him think that he was the best judge of what should be done. On the other hand, the British General was guided by a carefully prepared plan of action and the policy underlying it had been worked by the best available talent, civil and military, and it was

strictly adhered to, except when the occasion required any alteration. At this very spot, orders for march had been given on the 24th March but on the morrow, they were countermanded by General Harris. He found that he was too near Tipū to be moving in separate divisions, and it would have been the height of imprudence to have left the artillery, park stores and provisions in the rear.

"Our object," as Col. Allan records in his *Journal*, "is to protect our equipment and to take up a position before Seringapatam as expeditiously as possible, not to seek an action. In our present almost crippled state for want of carriage, it would but add to our embarrassments, to have to carry perhaps two or three hundred wounded men.....At the same time, an action should not be avoided. I have more than once mentioned the conduct of Marquis Cornwallis, on the day we took up ground before Bangalore in the face of the whole of Tippoo's army. Although we did not return one shot, it was one of the most brilliant days during the war." Tipū thus lost a great opportunity, with disastrous consequences to himself and to his power. It were futile to speculate what Haidar would have done under identical circumstances. It is certain, in any case, he would never have risked the enemy's advance against the capital in the singularly inept manner in which his son, lost in his fatalistic notions, did at the most critical moment of his life-time.

Kīrmāṇi indeed charges the officers of Tipū not only of incapacity but also of treachery in not foiling the British advance. He thus transfers the blame from Tipū's shoulders to those of his commanders. How far this is justified is evident from his own narrative. He mentions the fact that when he got information of the arrival of the British army at Āmbūr and Tirupattūr, he detached some of his Mīr Mīrans, among them Pūrṇaiya, to check its advance, while he himself gave

orders to assemble his Amīrs and the remainder of his army. Except Pūrṇaiya, there was no veteran of acknowledged ability or fame among those told off for turning back the invading hosts. At Rāyakōṭa, Tipū's forces attacked the British army "in a scattered and confused manner," and apparently failed of their purpose, despite the aid that they received from the cavalry. Kīrmāṇi is so disgusted with the weakness displayed by those appointed to check the advance, that he openly suggests that it should have been due to treachery. "It appeared, therefore," he says, "to every one, after this, that the intention of their officers was to avoid fighting and consequently displayed no more zeal or enterprise, and more like an escort or safeguard quietly preceded and followed the troops of the enemy as they marched along." Colonel Allan's *Journal* leaves no doubt that it was not treachery that prevented the onward march of the British army as the want of generalship, of a carefully thought out plan of operations, of military policy, in a word, on the part of Tipū. If he had not given up hope in advance and utilized the talents available to him, he could have easily despatched suitable detachments to check the advance. This he failed to do throughout this campaign, and the blame attaching to it can only be borne by him. He not only failed to plan in advance how he should checkmate the British advance; he was hopelessly weak in his intelligence branch. He knew not what way the British marched; in fact, he got wrong, if not, false news of their movements. The march of the British troops by way of Kāṅkāṇhalli and their crossing the Cauvery at Sōsale, both against his expectations, are quite conclusive of this defect in his arrangements. At Maḷavalli, there were not lacking opportunities for Tipū to turn the tide in his favour but he utterly failed to perceive the moment. Several British brigades, even single columns, at

that action, were advancing towards Tipū's forces so rapidly and in such unconnected fashion as to have left their guns behind. If, at this period, Tipū's horse had done its duty, it would have prevented the British gaining any advantage. On the other hand, it retired to the next rising ground, and the British brought up some of their field-pieces and two brass 18-pounders to a commanding spot and fired with effect over the Right Wing as it advanced. At the same time, they took care to cover the field-pieces which had been left behind. Not only that, they pushed a cavalry regiment forward to within two hundred yards of Tipū's *howdah* elephant, and but for the order of retreat, unwillingly given by General Harris for this particular regiment, the day at Malavalli would perhaps have ended with the capture, alive or dead, of Tipū himself. At Sōsale, the British "did not see a horseman on the march"—so unexpected was the route and so ill-provided with news was Tipū. The advance from Sōsale, *via* Rangasamudra, Hārohalli, Ankanahalli, Nava Shāhi, and thence to Seringapatam, within 4,000 yards its south-west face, was reached without any obstruction, except for a few occasional pickets thrown by Tipū's troops. If they had been properly prepared for it, they could have not only obstructed, but also made the enemy lose time, with the result that the siege would be delayed, if not made infructuous, through the advance of the season. At Rangasamudra, the Nizām's troops were in front and so near were Tipū's forces to it, that if they should have chosen to attack, those troops would have fallen on the main British line and created the greatest confusion. At Hārohalli, the march proved so tedious, the troops having to cross several times a dry *nullah* with high banks and that with a heavy park of artillery, that it is hard to conceive what an attack at this spot by Tipū's forces might have meant. Similarly, on the march of

the British forces to Nava Shâhi, a very large body of Tipû's regular cavalry showed themselves in front near the Chandgâl fort, but made no attempt whatever to annoy the advancing hosts. The junction of the Bombay army with the main army was equally without incident *via* Periapatna, Kattemalalavâdi and Belagola. This rapid review of the advance shows that Tipû allowed himself to be hopelessly out-generalled and out-manœuvred, with the consequence that he allowed the British forces to sit down before his walls well in advance of the monsoon, and batter them down.¹

The prize property seized at Seringapatam immediately after its fall was estimated at 40,30,300 Star Pagodas, equivalent to £ 1,600,000. This property was thus made up:—

Actually counted and valued—			Star Pagodas.
In specie	16,00,000
In jewels	6,50,000
Not valued but estimated by Prize			
Agents—			
In jewels	4,50,000
Grain	3,00,000
Clothes, etc.	10,00,000
The Throne	30,000
Total			40,30,000

The jewels were subsequently estimated at Rs. 9 lakhs. Apart from this property, the military stores seized were valued at Rs. 10 lakhs. The total number of ordnance captured was 929, including guns, mortars and howitzers, 176 of which were twelve-pounders and over. The booty in the Palace included a magnifi-

1. Allan's *Journal*; Kirmāni, *Tipu Sultan*, 255-272, etc; also *Mys. Gaz.*, II, iv. 2690-2696.

cent throne, a superb howdah, curious and richly jewelled matchlocks and swords, solid gold and silver plate, costly carpets and Chinaware, a profusion of fine gems and a very valuable Library.² The Library was at first ordered to be given to the Court of Directors for the foundation of their Eastern Literature, the duplicate copies being sent to the Asiatic Society at Calcutta. But subsequently, except the precious copy of the *Korān*, referred to below, the greater part of it was transferred to the newly founded College at Fort William, Calcutta.³ A diamond star and ornaments were presented by the British Army to the Marquess Wellesley. Tipū's war-turban, one of his swords, and a sword of Murāri Rao, the famous Mahratta ruler of Gooty, were sent to Marquess Cornwallis. A sword found in Tipū's bed-chamber was publicly presented by General Harris to General Baird, who had led the assault. The sword of Tipū, *i.e.*, the one he usually used and reckoned distinctively his own, being one usually placed in his Musnud, was presented, on behalf of the British Army, by Major Allan, Deputy Quarter-Master-General, in person, at

2. Tipū Sultān's gun, sword, helmet and standard, among other personal relics of well known British heroes, will be found by the interested reader included in *Naval and Military Trophies*, a series of thirty-six large chrome lithographic plates in colours and gold, from drawings by William Gibbs, with descriptive notes by R. R. Holmes, His Majesty's Librarian, at Windsor Castle, where the relics are exhibited with an Introduction by Viscount Wolsley (Impl 4 to), 1896. For a description of Tipū's *Musical Tiger*, which, after being removed from Seringapatam after its fall, was long exhibited at the India Office Museum and Library, London, see Appendix IV—(2) of this Vol.

3. These are Mss., from which Major Charles Stewart made his *Descriptive Catalogue of the Library of Tippoo Sultaun* (1809). These Mss. are now part of the India Office Library. Their presentation was ordered in 1800; instructions for transfer to London were sent out in 1805 and the actual reception of the portion sent out from India took place in 1807. Part of the Collection was kept in the Library of the College founded at Fort William, Calcutta. Of the copies of the *Korān* and the *Shahnamah* for which Tipū's Library was famous, details will be found in Loth's and Etche's Catalogues (see Arberry, *o.c.*, pp. 23, 80-83).

Madras, to the Marquess Wellesley. Major Allan was the first to visit the Marquess Wellesley after the conquest of Seringapatam. (Seringapatam fell on the 4th May and he visited the Governor-General at Madras on 30th May.) He was made Honorary Aid-de-Camp to the Governor-General in recognition of his meritorious services. On the handle of the sword presented by him to the Marquess Wellesley was the following inscription:—

“My victorious sabre is lightning for the destruction of the unbelievers. Haidar, the Lord of the Faith, is victorious for my advantage. And, moreover he destroyed the wicked race who were unbelievers. Praise be to him, who is the Lord of the Worlds! Thou art our Lord, support us against the people who are unbelievers. He to whom the Lord giveth victory prevails over all (mankind). Oh Lord, make him victorious, who promoteth the faith of Muhammad. Confound him, who refuseth the faith of Muhammad; and withhold us from those who are so inclined. The Lord is predominant over his own works. Victory and conquest are from the Almighty. Bring happy tidings, Oh Muhammad, to the faithful; for God is the kind protector and is the most merciful of the merciful. If God assists thee, thou wilt prosper. May the Lord God assist thee, Oh Muhammad, with mighty victory.”

On most of the *furzees* and blunderbusses found in the palace of Tipū, the following inscription in Persian was seen:—

“This is incomparable piece, belonging to the Sultan of the East, which has no equal but in the most vivid lightning, will annihilate the enemy that it strikes, although fate should otherwise have ordained him to live”.

On some gold medals, also found in the palace, the following legend, in Persian, was seen on one side:—
“Of God, the bestower of Blessings” and on the other, “Victory and conquest are from the Almighty”. Apparently they were struck in commemoration of some

victory—probably after the war of 1780. The following is a translation of an inscription on the stone found at Seringapatam, which was to have been set up in a conspicuous place in the Fort :—


“Oh Almighty God ! dispose the whole body of infidels ! scatter their tribe, cause their feet to stagger ! overthrow their councils ! change their state ! destroy their very root ! cause death to be near them, cut off from them the means of sustenance ! shorten their days ! be their bodies the constant object of their cares (*i.e.*, infest them with diseases), deprive their eyes of sight, make black their faces (*i.e.*, bring shame and disgrace on them), destroy in them the organs of speech ! slay them as Shedaud (*i.e.*, the Prince who presumptuously aimed at establishing a paradise for himself and was slain by command of God) ; drown them as Pharoah was drowned, and visit them with the severity of thy wrath. Oh Avenger ! Oh Universal Father ! I am depressed and overpowered, grant me thy assistance.”

This inscription should have been engraved after the conclusion of the Cornwallis Treaty. It shows Tipū's inveterate rancour and determined enmity to the English, of which there are numberless proofs. On this occasion, one might suppose that he had taken a leaf out of Ernunphus' book of Curses.

The Throne which formed part of the booty was a newly made one.⁴ Its principal ornament was a tiger's head of life-size, wrought in gold, which served as the support of the throne. The bas-reliefs of the throne, which was approached by silver steps, were decorated with tigers' heads worked in gold and adorned with precious stones. Over it was suspended a *humā* or bird of Paradise, whose brilliant wings, encrusted with

4. See Note—for an illustration of it—in Gulam Mohamad's Edition of De La Tour, facing p. 318: “Throne of the late Tippoo Sultaun.” Four tigers are shown with *huma* bird at top, etc., with the whole throne resting on a four-footed tiger, which tiger is shown with tongue forwards peering out to the true right, etc.





Major-General The Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B., on the
Staff, Madras, 1802-1805.

diamonds, rubies and emeralds, hovered over the Sultān. The *humā* formed the apex of a canopy, fringed with pearls, which was attached to a gilt pillar seven feet high. At Windsor Castle are preserved the royal footstool of Tipū and the richly-jewelled bird, the *humā* above mentioned. Among other relics of Tipū, there are portions of his tent with silver holes, ivory chairs, elephant and horse trappings, a *palankeen*, two richly ornamented field-pieces, and various weapons including the sword and shield which were found with his body after the siege. In the Library of the Castle is a copy of the *Korān* formerly belonging to the Emperor Aurangzīb, which was found in Tipū Sultān's Library. It is said to have cost Rs. 9,000, and is beautifully written in the *Naksh* character, with elegant ornamentation. The rest of Tipū's Library contained many curious and interesting manuscripts, of which the following is a summary:—

"Koran, 44 volumes; commentaries on Koran, 41; Prayers, 35; Traditions, 46; Theology, 46; Sufism, 115; Ethics, 24; Jurisprudence, 95; Arts and Sciences, 19; Philosophy, 54; Astronomy, 20; Mathematics, 7; Physics, 62; Philology, 45; Lexicography, 29, History, 118; Letters, 53; Poetry, 190; Hindi and Dekhani poetry, 23; Hindi and Dekhani prose, 4; Turkish prose, 2; Fables, 18."

Some of these manuscripts belonged to the kings of Bijāpur and Gōlkonda, but the majority were acquired by plunder at Chittoor, Savaṇūr and Cuddapah.⁵

The town suffered plunder for a day, and at last guards having been placed over the houses of the respectable persons, and four of the plunderers executed by order of the Provost Martial in the most conspicuous place in the fort, the soldiery was effectually restrained, and tranquillity restored. Colonel

The town plundered; order restored.

5. *Mys. Gaz.*, o.c., 2696-2700 (based mostly on Allan's *Journal*, etc.).

Arthur Wellesley, who had meanwhile been appointed to command in the Fort, was mainly responsible for this restoration of order.⁶

This was followed by the surrender of Fattah Haidar, the eldest of the sons of Tipū, and of Pūrṇaiya, Kumr-ud-dīn Khān and other officers, on the following day.

Submission of
Tipū's officers.

Circular orders were issued by General Harris, accompanied by communications from the Meer Soodoor, to the officers in charge of the different forts in the territories, to deliver their charges to the British authorities, and giving them general assurance of favour and protection. By these means, the country submitted, the ryots returned to their peaceful occupations, and the land had rest from the incessant warfare of the past fifty years.⁷

The submission of Tipū's sons and officers has been severely criticised by Kirmāṇi, who probably reflects current Muslim military opinion in this matter. He states that Futteh Haidar "saw the symptoms of fear, distress and despair, prevailing among his followers, and at the same time heard the consolatory and conciliatory language used by the English General and others of his officers, included in which were hints or hopes held out of his being placed on the throne;" he "abandoned all intention of fighting or further opposition, although several of his bravest officers such as Mullik Jehan Khān (better known as Dhoondia Waugh) who after the death of the Sultān had been released (by the British troops) and had presented himself to the service of Futteh Hydar Sultān; also Syud Nasir Ali Mir Miran and other Asofs dissuaded him from peace, and strenuously urged him to continue the war. They represented to him that the Sultān had devoted his life only to the will of God,

6. *Ibid.*, 2700.

7. *Ibid.*

but that his dominions, his strong cities and forts were still in the possession of his servants, and that his army with all its artillery and stores was present. That if there were any intention to reconquer the country, or if any spirit or courage remained, now was the time (for exertion), and that they were ready and willing to devote their lives to his service. This descendant of Hydar, however, notwithstanding his constitutional or hereditary bravery.....at once rejected the prayers of his well-wishers, and consequently washing his hands of kingly power and dominion, he proceeded to meet and confer with General Harris."⁸

The glorious and decisive victory over Tipū Sultān placed the whole kingdom of Mysore, with all its resources, at the disposal of the British. The only power in India, to which the French could look for assistance, or which could be deemed formidable to British interests, was deprived of all vigour, if not entirely extinct. All this was achieved within four months from the date of the arrival of the Marquess Wellesley at Fort St. George and within two months from the period of the British army's entrance into Mysore. Wellesley was thus neither deficient in alacrity nor diligence in the prosecution of the war against Tipū Sultān. The success was not only due to his quickness of perception of the realities of the situation but also to the ample manner in which he invested General Harris when he took the field with the most efficient and extensive powers which it was possible for him to delegate. Harris, indeed, carried with him, as Wellesley intimated the Court of Directors, to the gates of Seringapatam, the full vigour and energy of the Company's Supreme Government in India. To the judicious exercise of this ample authority,

Partition Treaty
Arrangement.

8. *Ibid.*, 2700-2701 (referring to Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 274-275).

combined with the liberal supplies which had been provided for the army, may be ascribed, in a great measure, the unparalleled rapidity and promptitude of its operations and the great signal victory they ended in. The problems that the conquest presented were, however, of a character entirely different from those that confronted Wellesley at the time he declared war against Tipū. Previous to General Harris' departure from the Karnātic, he had appointed a Commission to assist him in all matters relating to political negotiations and had furnished them with instructions applicable to every contingency he could then foresee. Though the Commission had, under General Harris' orders, given him complete satisfaction, the circumstances created by the victory seemed to call for his immediate presence at Seringapatam "for adjusting," as he said, "the affairs of the kingdom of Mysore on such a foundation as shall permanently establish the tranquillity" of the Company's possessions in the South of India. He accordingly intimated General Harris that he was proceeding to Seringapatam *via* Royakottah and asked him to send a detachment of his army to meet him at the place as soon as he could prudently spare it. In the meantime, he directed Henry Wellesley, his brother and Private Secretary, and Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, his Military Secretary, to proceed direct to Seringapatam, with requisite orders for the guidance of General Harris. This was on the 12th May 1799. On the 13th May, General Harris wrote to Wellesley that Pūrṇaiya had seen him and had suggested to him an arrangement, the adoption of which, in his opinion, would restore immediate order and tranquillity. The outline of his plan was (1) that one of the family of Tipū should be placed at the head of the Government to be established in the country; (2) that he should pay to the English such tribute as should be agreed upon; and (3) that the English troops should

garrison such forts as they might deem necessary for the security of the country. Pūrṇaiya proposed that the prince chosen should be Futteh Haidar, while he, as Dewan, should be charged with the administration of the revenues of the new Government. It should be added that this arrangement was proposed by Pūrṇaiya as he seems to have felt that "under any other plan", the troops, which had not yet been disbanded, "would become a lawless banditti pillaging the country and only to be quelled by force, which would under this (arrangement) remain quiet, in the hope of future employment in the service." He also seems to have suggested that by this means "the family of Tippoo Sultān would be preserved in a respectable rank and the power of the English established by an arrangement, the moderation of which would do honour to the National character." General Harris promised to communicate the proposals to the Marquess Wellesley and in the meantime informed Pūrṇaiya that Futteh Haidar should repair to Seringapatam and that he should arrange, on certain conditions, to disperse the troops to their homes. In communicating Pūrṇaiya's suggestions to the Marquess Wellesley, General Harris intimated that he had suggested in the course of the conversation the possibility of an arrangement for "the establishment of a Hindu Government in favour of the ancient family of Mysore, but Pūrṇaiya cautiously evaded entertaining this idea, in the slightest degree." General Harris indicated Pūrṇaiya's reasoning for this "evasion" thus :—

"The Muhammadan interest is so intimately blended with every Department of the State in this country, that no plan by which it is set aside in favour of an Hindu Prince would produce the very desirable effect of restoring tranquillity, and reconciling the troops and most powerful class of the inhabitants to the change of Government."

The Marquess Wellesley, however, was against the

restoration of any one of a family which had had a hand in the establishing of a French alliance. He, therefore, desired on 20th May 1799 that enquiries should be made of "the state of the family of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, and the character and disposition of the persons composing it." He preferred that mode of settlement which would have "united the most speedy restoration of peace and order with the greatest practicable security for the continuance of both." For this purpose, he would not only conciliate the interests of the Company, but also of those of the Nizām, the Mahrattas and of the leading chieftains in Mysore. Among other objectives aimed at by him were that the military power of Mysore should be "absolutely identified with that of the Company," Seringapatam must in effect be a British Garrison, and Malabar and Coimbatore, with the heads of the passes on the table-land, should be in the Company's hands. By 4th June 1799, Wellesly had made up his mind in favour of a settlement which included the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore. He wrote to the Commissioners of Mysore on that date :—

"The restoration of a representative of the ancient family of the Rajahs of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of territory between the allies in which the interests of the Mahrattas should be conciliated, appeared to me, under all the circumstances of the case, to be the most admirable basis on which any new settlement of the country can be rested. I have resolved to frame, without delay, a plan founded on these principles; and I hope, in the course of to-morrow, to forward to you the articles of a Treaty with proper instructions annexed, for the purpose of carrying the above mentioned plan into effect."

In order to facilitate the intended arrangement, he asked the Commissioners to induce Kumr-ud-dīn to leave for Gurramkonda, which he obtained for him, with the aid of Mīr Ālam and the Nizām; to conciliate Tipū's



Major-General Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B.

Sirdars on the basis of their being employed and provided by the Allies and the Maharaja of Mysore collectively; the Killedārs to be paid off their arrears with liberal gratuities for the purpose of conciliation; the devising of necessary measures for removing Tipū's family to Vellore, the details of which "painful but indispensable measure" he left to Col. Arthur Wellesley.⁹

The Marquess Wellesley had by this time—4th June 1799—resolved upon making over a portion of the conquered territory to a descendant of the ancient royal house of Mysore, and to divide the remainder between the Company, the Nizām, and the Pēshwa. For this purpose, he appointed a Commission of five officers—General Harris, the Hon. Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, and Lieut. Col. Barry Close, with Captains Malcolm and Munro as Secretaries and Edward Golding as Assistant Secretary—to conduct the details of the arrangement and to conclude the treaty with the Nizām. They were styled Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, were bound to secrecy and vested with full powers to negotiate and conclude, in the Governor-General's name, "all such treaties, and to make and issue all such temporary and provisional regulations, for the ordering and management of the civil and military Government and of the revenues of the said (conquered) territories as may be necessary for the immediate administration and settlement thereof." The result was the Partition Treaty of Mysore concluded on the 22nd June 1799, and ratified by the Nizām on the 13th July

9. *Ibid.*, 2701-2705 (based mainly on *Wellesley's Despatches*, relating to Mysore). See also, on this and following sections, Beatson, *o.c.*, 206-265; Wilks, *o.c.*, II, 767-773, and *Mysore State Papers*, Vols. I, III and IV.

of the same year. The basis of this Treaty was explained by the Marquess Wellesley himself in a letter dated 5th June 1799, which is worth noting. Kirkpatrick had proposed a complete cession of all the conquered territories to the Royal House of Mysore, to which they belonged, and suggested the cession from the latter again of certain of them to the allies who had helped in the Restoration of the family. Wellesley, however, thought it more advantageous to put the arrangement on a different footing. "I think," he wrote back to Kirkpatrick, "the whole transaction would be more conveniently thrown into a different form, from that which you have given to it. I do not see any necessity for ceding the whole country in the first instance to the Rajah of Mysore, and accepting again as a cession under his authority, such districts as must be retained by the allies. I think it will be more convenient and less liable to future embarrassment, to rest the whole settlement upon the basis of our right of conquest, and thus render our cession the source of the Rajah's dominion. (This was the view of Col. Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, who wrote from Seringapatam, on 8th May 1799, to the Marquess Wellesley, stating that his view was "to take it all as a conquest," subject to certain "restrictions," which he mentioned in that letter. How far the Marquess was influenced by his distinguished brother's views, it is difficult to determine). "For this purpose, the proceeding should commence with a Treaty between the Nizām and the Company, with power to the Pēshwa to accede under certain conditions. The next step should be a Treaty with the Rajah, containing all that relates to his connection with the Company and to his interior Government. The Rajah after his accession made a party to the general guarantee contained in my draft accompanying this letter (This was substantially the Partition Treaty of Mysore as finally concluded)." The Marquess Wellesley



Sir Thomas Munro.



also objected to Kirkpatrick's plan of holding a number of fortresses in absolute sovereignty in the Mysore territories. He limited that demand to the fortress of Seringapatam which, he said, he would not "consent to part with." His view was that the possession of Seringapatam and the Subsidiary Treaty with His Highness the Rajah would give the Company "a sufficient command over them." It is worthy of remark that the Marquess Wellesley was moved not only by high considerations of policy in the settlement he determined upon but also by the essential justice of the claims of the Mysore Royal House. He thus explained his exact motives in this connection to the Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas, in a letter dated 7th June 1799 :—

"To have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam, while it would have afforded strong grounds for jealousy to the Mahrattas, would have aggrandised the Nizam's power beyond the bounds of discretion and would have left in our hands a territory so extensive as it might have been difficult to manage, especially in the present state of the Company's service at the Presidency. To have divided the Territory into three equal portions allowing the Mahrattas who had taken no part in the expense or hazard of the war, an equal share in the advantages of the peace, would neither have been just towards the Nizam, politic in the way of example to our other allies, nor prudent in respect of aggrandisement of the Mahratta Empire. To have given the Mahrattas no larger a Territory than is now proposed, while the Company and the Nizam divided the whole of the remainder to the exclusion of any central power, would have been liable nearly to the same objection as that stated against a total exclusion of the Mahrattas from all participation. The establishment, therefore, of a central and separate power in the ancient territories of Mysore appeared to be the best expedient for reconciling the interests of all parties."¹⁰

10. *Ibid*, 2705-2708.

After dismissing the claims of Tipū's sons to be the "central power" suggested by him, on the ground of the hereditary connection of their family with the French and the probable dangers of a renewed combination on their part against British interests in India, the Marquess Wellesley wrote :—

Moral justification
of the Restoration.

"In the exercise of this right (of conquest), if I were to look to moral considerations alone, I should certainly on every principle of justice and humanity, as well as of attention to the welfare of the people have been led to restore the heir of the ancient Rajah of Mysore to that rank and dignity which were wrested from his ancestors by the usurpation of Hyder Ali.

"The long and cruel imprisonment which several branches of his family have suffered, the persecution and murder of many of their adherents, both by Hyder and Tippoo, and the state of degradation and misery in which it has been the policy of both these usurpers to retain the surviving descendants of their lawful sovereign, would have entitled the representative of the ancient family of Mysore to every degree of practicable consideration; but it is also evident that every motive must concur to attach the heir of the Mysore family, if placed on the throne, to our interests, through which alone he can hope to maintain himself against the family of Tippoo."

Nor did the Marquess Wellesley anticipate any the least opposition to the restoration of the ancient Royal House of Mysore, for the jealous policy of Tipū and the brilliant and rapid success of war had dissipated such fears. Accordingly, on the 8th June 1799, he wrote to the Commissioners to proceed with the conclusion of both the Tripartite and the Subsidiary Treaties on the lines sketched out by him and he added :—

"I authorize you to place the Rajah formally upon the Musnad, and to appoint, in the Rajah's name, Purniah to be his Dewan."

He also directed that they should fix up the "fortress of Mysore" as "the most acceptable seat of the Rajah's residence."

Finally, he wound up by asking them, in the event of their placing the Rajah upon the Musnad, to appoint in his name, Lieut. Col. Close to the office of the Resident in Mysore. The intentions of the Marquess Wellesley were made known to the Royal House and the Commissioners waited on His Highness the Rajah to pay their "personal respects" to him and to his family on the 26th June. Mahārāṇī Lakshmi Ammaṇṇi, called the Rāṇa in the correspondence of the period, received them with becoming grace and expressed to them, through one of her attendants, "the lively sense" which she entertained of the Marquess' clemency and added that the "generosity of the Company in having restored the ancient rights of her House in the person of her grandson, had opened to her a prospect of passing the remnant of her days in peace." The Commissioners also saw the youthful Rajah, of whom they wrote to the Marquess Wellesley that he was of "a delicate habit; his complexion rather fair than otherwise and his countenance is very expressive." The Treaty and elevation of the Rajah were also proclaimed the same day. The captive sons of Tipū were provided with liberal allowances and they were, on 18th June 1799, removed under military escort with their families, from Seringapatam to the fort at Vellore, which had been, under the orders of the Marquess Wellesley, prepared for their reception. The principal officers of Tipū were pensioned. Mir Kumr-ud-dīn received two Jaghirs, one from the Company, another from the Nizām, and he was permitted to reside at Gurramkonda. The other officers were pensioned according to their ranks. It was resolved upon to appoint Pūrṇaiya to the post of Dewan in view of the knowledge he possessed of the finance and resour-

ces of the country, in preference to Tirumala Rao, the Agent of Mahārāṇi Lakshmi Ammanni, already referred to. It would appear from certain despatches of the Marquess Wellesley that Tirumala Rao was known to the latter from a time prior to the fall of Seringapatam (see *Wellesley Despatches*, I. 442-448, Letter dated 22nd February 1799). There can be no question that he had been, as Henry Wellesley remarked, "the channel of communication in all the most secret transactions of that family (Mysore Royal Family) with the British Government." (Letter of Henry Wellesley to Col. Arthur Wellesley, dated 7th August 1801). Soon after the conquest of Seringapatam, he was allowed by the Madras Government to proceed to Seringapatam but "he arrived in the British camp two days after the Commissioners had communicated to the different members of the Mysore Family the intentions of the British Government in their favour." The declared object of his journey was "to obtain the situation of confidence in the new Government which the Commissioners had allotted to Purniah. He had several interviews with the Commissioners, in all of which he deprecated the idea of Purniah being appointed Dewan to the new Government," describing him in rather vivid colours and as unwelcome to Mahārāṇi Lakshmi Ammanni (*Ibid*). The Commissioners had, however, already made their choice and Tirumala Rao, for one thing, was too late in urging his claims on them. Apart from that fact, Henry Wellesley had definitely left on record that "it had always been determined to place him (Pūrnaiya) at the head of affairs—a circumstance of which he was well aware," (*Ibid*) and so it did not require any special effort on his part to win the goodwill of the Commissioners so far as his nomination was concerned. Col. Arthur Wellesley has hinted in some of his letters his dislike of people connected with Madras. (see Letters dated 8th July 1801 and 10th October

1801). He has expressly stated that the introduction of Tirumala Rao would have meant the introduction of "*dubashery* corruption (management through *dubashes* or agents) into this (Mysore) country, with a scene of desperate confusion." And he described one of the Madras officials interested in such enterprize as "a most notorious jobber", and as one who would not fail to endeavour, if an opportunity offered itself, to disturb the arrangements arrived at, "if any fellow will give him half a Crown for doing so." (Letter dated 10th October 1801). While the official referred to might have fully merited the stinging rebuke applied to him by Col. Wellesly, there is scarcely any doubt whatever, that apart from the single error of describing his competitor in adverse terms, Tirumala Rao was anything other than an honorable, upright and self-sacrificing person, who had, against tremendous odds, done much to advance the interests of the Mysore Royal House. It is worthy of remark that his services were recognized by the British Government after the Restoration. The Marquess Wellesly directed that he should be placed, so far as allowances were concerned, on a footing of equality "with the officers of the late (Tipū's) Government, distinguished by the title of *Mīr Meeran* (*Mīr Amīr* or *Lord of Lords*) and that his allowance be secured by the Company." In addition to the recognition and the monthly stipend which he was to receive from the Company, the Court of Directors directed the presentation of 4,000 Pagodas to him as a compensation for all his demands on the Company and as a recompense for his past exertions and services (Letter dated 11th November 1801, from Madras Government to Tirumala Rao. See *Records of Fort St. George, Country Correspondence*, Political Department, Letter No. 59). He retired to Madras and there died in 1815.¹¹

11. *Ibid.*, 2708-2712.

Installation of His
Highness Śrī Krish-
narāja Wodeyar III,
June 30, 1799.

The Brāhmins having fixed upon the 30th June as the most auspicious day for placing His Highness Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar on the *musnad* of Mysore, the ceremony was accordingly performed at the ancient town of Mysore, where special preparations were made for the function. An open *pendāl* was erected and a numerous concourse of people gathered at the place to witness the ceremony. General Harris specially rode from camp attended by his suite and an escort of European cavalry to assist in person on the occasion. The Commissioners accompanied by Mīr Ālam proceeded to the spot—not far away from the Palace—preceded by His Majesty's 12th regiment of foot, and there General Harris, the senior member of the Commission, placed His Highness Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar on the *musnad*, about noon, under three volleys of musketry from the troops on the spot and a royal salute from the guns of Seringapatam. General Harris, sometime after, delivered to His Highness the seal and signet of the Rāj. "The deportment of the young prince"—now in his fifth year—reported the Commissioners to the Marquess Wellesley, "during the ceremony was remarkably decorous." In justifying the restoration of the ancient Royal House of Mysore, the Marquess Wellesley wrote to the Court of Directors about a month later, on 3rd August 1799, a long despatch, from which the following deserves to be quoted:—

"Between the British Government and this family an intercourse of friendship and kindness had subsisted; in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortune, they had formed no connection with your enemies. Their elevation would be the spontaneous act of your generosity, and from your support alone they ever hope to be maintained upon the Throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultan,

Marquess Welles-
ley's vindication of
the claim of the
Mysore Royal House.



Krishnarāja Wodeyar III at his Installation.

or against any other claimant. They must naturally view with an eye of jealousy all the friends of the usurping family, and consequently be adverse to the French or any State connected with that Family, in the hereditary hatred of the British Government. The heir of the Rajahs of Mysore, if placed on the throne, must feel that his continuance in that state depended on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts; his interest must, therefore, be to unite with cordiality and zeal in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency and vigour. The effect of such arrangement of the affairs of Mysore would not be limited to the mere distribution of hostile power which menaced our safety; in the place of that power, would be substituted one, whose interests and resources might be absolutely identified with our own, and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity and alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our defence and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects and allies."

Soon after the enthronement of His Highness Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar, Pūrṇaiya was appointed by the Commissioners to be His Highness' Dewan, while Lieut. Col. (afterwards Sir Barry) Close became, under the orders of the Governor-General, Resident at the Court of His Highness, immediately after the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam was signed. The Mysore Commission itself was then dissolved on the 3rd July 1799.¹²

Under the Partition Treaty of Mysore, dated 22nd June 1799, the province of Canara and the districts of Coimbatore and Wynad, the annual revenue of which was estimated at Pagodas 7,77,170, fell to the share of the Company, subject to a deduction of Pagodas 2,00,000 per annum on account of the maintenance of the families of Haidar and Tipū, leaving a balance of Pagodas 5,37,170.

12. *Ibid.*, 2712-2714.

The revenue of Gooty and other places assigned to the Nizām, estimated at Pagodas 6,07,332, was charged with an annuity of Pagodas 70,000 payable to Kumr-ud-dīn, leaving a balance of Pagodas 5,37,332.

The revenues of the districts in Mysore granted to His Highness Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar were estimated at Pagodas 13,74,076 per annum. The Mahrattas not having taken any active part in the campaign, the share offered to the Peshwa was comparatively small, *viz.*, the districts of Harapanahalli (included in the present Bellary district), Soonda, Harihar, etc., yielding an annual revenue of Pagodas 2,63,957.

Under the *Subsidiary Treaty*, concluded on 8th July 1799, with His Highness Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar, the Company bound themselves to maintain a force for the protection of the dominions of His Highness, in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lakhs of Star Pagodas.¹³

In his Despatch of 3rd August 1799, which has been above referred to, the Marquess Wellesley estimated the clear increase of the revenues of the Company at £ 459,056 per annum as the result of his settlement. He wound up this Despatch in words which reiterate the sound moral and political principles on which he based his arrangements:—

“I entertain a confident expectation, that the recent settlement of the Dominions of Tippoo Sultan will prove not less durable than, I trust, will be found equitable in its fundamental principles, beneficial in its general operation, and conformable, in every point of view, to the liberal character of the English East India Company, and to the just and moderate policy prescribed by Parliament, for the Government of the British Empire in the East.”

13. *Ibid.*, 2714. As to the text of the Partition and Subsidiary Treaties of Mysore, see Appendix IV—(6) and (7).

This enunciation of the principles which guided the Marquess Wellesley not only indicate the farseeing statesmanship that he displayed in working them out but also the deep sense of justice that actuated his policy and dominated every act of his in this connection. In giving effect to them, he overruled, as only he could do, the views of many others, including among them of Col. (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro, which, read today, show how even gifted men could go wrong and help to buttress their preconceived views by a reference to the history of the country of which they had little or no real knowledge.

His Highness Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar III thus commenced his reign under the most inspiring auspices with Pūrṇaiya as Dewan and Col. Close as Resident at his Court.¹⁴ Here begins a new and memorable chapter in the history of Mysore, which deserves to be dealt with by itself separately.

The rule of His Highness Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar III, 30th June 1799-27th June 1868.

14. *Ibid.*, 2714-2715.



APPENDIX I.

(1) THE DEPUTATION TO MĀDHAVA RAO, THE PĒSHWA, 1767.

The British deputation to Pēshwa Mādhava Rao at Kōlār, which was led by Col. Tod and Mr. Charles Bouchier, is referred to in certain of the letters contained in the Palk Mss. (see *Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, Ed. by Col. Love, 1922). As we have seen, Lt. Col. Tod, who was commanding, was then (1767) in command of the Indian infantry. Associated with him was Mr. James Bouchier, brother of Mr. Charles Bouchier, Governor of Madras at the time. As Captain, Tod had commanded the sepoy's during the siege of Madras in 1758-59 and subsequently had been Town Major of Fort St. George. Mr. Charles Bouchier had entered the civil service at Fort St. George in 1751, and when Pondicherry fell in 1761, he became Prize Commissary there. He enjoyed the confidence of his brother and was sent out on special duty to relieve Col. Smith of his political duties during the war and to co-ordinate relations between the English on the one side and the Nizām and the Mahrattas on the other. Mādhava Rao was an astute politician and was not to be outwitted by the diplomatic skill that Col. Tod and Mr. James Bouchier could bring into play. The end of their mission confirmed this more than anything else. It is clear however from the papers now available that the mission had been charged with a task which it could not fulfil. In a word, the English desired to have everything they wanted without taking note of the nature of the men they were dealing with. A memorandum drawn up for the information of Governor Bouchier

brings out this point so clearly and pointedly that a reference to it is necessary (see *Report on Palk Mss., Letter dated 19th March 1767*, from Col. John Call to Governor Bouchier, enclosing a memorandum he had drawn up for the latter's information). Col. Call, the author of this memo, was a member of the Madras Council at the time and he enjoyed the confidence of Governor Bouchier. He had entered the Company's service in 1751 and had been an active and energetic member of the Madras Council. The fact that he prepared the Memo, which was to form the basis of the instructions to be issued to the envoys to Mādhava Rao shows that it reflected the rather optimistic views the Madras Council held in the matter of winning over both the Nizām and the Mahrattas to their views. It is worthy of note that the memorandum, while it agreed with the views of Khande Rao's party in Mysore which aimed at putting down Haider and restoring the reigning king to his full powers, departed to some extent though not wholly from the views of Lord Clive, who aimed at keeping up a friendly attitude with Haider, so that Mysore might prove a buffer against the Mahrattas preventing their inroads in the South and adding to their aggrandisement. The reference to the restoration of the Bednūr house under the overlordship of the Mahrattas is another point worthy of incidental note, especially in view of what eventually befell it after the liberation of Rāṇi Virammāji and her adopted son by Mādhava Rao. In this particular matter, the *Call Memorandum* sets down a suggestion which evidently had been heard of in diplomatic circles at the time and was especially welcome to the Mahrattas themselves, who had an eye on Bednūr for a long time, not only as a valuable buffer State but also as a country on which they could depend for men and money in case of need.

In the Memorandum he drew up, Col. Call states

that both the Mahrattas and the Nizām desired the reduction of Haidar's power, and that while it was necessary to be cautious in contributing to the aggrandisement of the Mahrattas, it was advisable to temporise and appear to fall in with the views of the Mahrattas, in view of the necessity of removing Haidar from his position in Mysore. Col. Call expresses the fear that owing to Nizām Ali's want of money, he would be likely to be influenced by offers from Haidar. It was, therefore, necessary and highly advisable in his view, that the English should maintain a close connection with the Mahrattas, as in that case it was improbable that Nizām Ali would risk withdrawing from the alliance. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the Mahrattas might change sides and threaten the Deccan and the Karnātic. It was, therefore, advisable that somebody of political importance should be sent to maintain the alliance between the Mahrattas and Nizām Ali, while Col. Smith was engaged in his military operations. Call suggested that the English envoy should be instructed, if possible, to obtain the agreement of the two parties (*i.e.*, the Nizām and the Mahrattas) to the following stipulations:—(1) vigorous action against Haidar and no separate peace without the consent of both the parties; (2) that all forts and towns should be garrisoned and held by the Nizām's troops until the end of the war; (3) that the Rāja of Mysore should be restored to power and pay fixed tribute to Nizām Ali; (4) that Bednūr should be handed over to the Mahrattas, and restored by them to the Bednūr Chief's family; (5) that Malabar should be handed back to the former possessors of that area, the English retaining trading rights and privileges at Calicut, Tellicherry and Honore; (6) that the country about Bangalore should be at Nizām Ali's disposal; (7) that Dindigal and the districts round Āttūr (in modern Salem) and Vāṇiyambādi

(in modern North Arcot) should be made over to Muḥammad Āli Wālājah; (8) that Cuddapah should be restored to the Nawāb of that place; (9) that Murāri Rao should be rewarded by the grant of some territory; (10) that Basālat Jang and the Nawāb of Kurnool should acknowledge the sovereignty of Nizām Āli and pay him tribute; (11) and that Mādhava Rao (the Pēshwa) should be paid *chaut* (one-fourth part of all the tributes received by Nizām Āli) for all the territories handed over to Nizām Āli south of the Krishna river.

How Col. Call came to think that the above terms would prove acceptable to Mādhava Rao or Nizām Āli, it is difficult to see. Mādhava Rao had both the ability and the means to assert his rights—the rights he and his nation avowed or pretended to possess in the Deccan and the Karnātic—and whenever possible to enforce them. As regards the *chaut* suggested in his favour, his nation was already collecting it in the Deccan and in the Karnātic. They were levying contributions which, though unwillingly paid, were yet available, rightly or wrongly. Moreover, the terms tacitly denied to the Mahrattas the right to levy the *chaut* elsewhere, and debarred them territorially from the Karnātic, by making it partly the preserve either of the Nizām or of Muḥammad Āli Wālājah. As regards keeping the Mahrattas and the Nizām allied together against Haidar, the English were incapable of it at the time, as they had not yet evolved the Indian “political” which they did a little later. As regards Nizām Āli, while he disliked the Mahrattas, he disturbed the English only a little more. The English too did not yet realize that he was as bad an “ally” as Muḥammad Āli Wālājah had proved himself and as trustworthy as Muḥammad Āli as a “friend”. While he could get nothing from either the Mahrattas or the English, he could get the money he saw badly needed from Haidar.

Haidar had not only organized a system of finance on the model of the one he had inherited from Nanjarāja and his predecessors, but he had also improved it to meet sudden emergencies such as war raids, etc., which latterly had threatened to become bandy annals. He had also an organized army which had earned a name by its conquests already, far and wide; and he had, besides, proved himself a leader of armies, and a negotiator of ability. More than all, he was, like Nizām Ali, a Muhammadan and one too who would prove agreeable to a common political policy in the Deccan and the Karnātic. The impecuniosity of the Nizām was not his only drawback. His lack of sincerity, which was only equalled by his readiness to actively deceive others with whom he entered into engagements, was something like a second nature to him. Wilks has a characterization of him in his work in this very connection, in which he severely stigmatises him, much too severely, as one could see. While a modern reader would not approve of Wilks' generalization from Nizām Ali's individual case as to Muhammadan character as a whole, there is no question that he stands justified when he suggests that nothing but "disgust" would overtake a mind after "contemplating incessant fraud" of the kind practised by him.¹ As to the restoration of Bednūr and its subordination to the Pēshwa, it was but the recognition of a proposal already

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1. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 565. The following sentence is sufficient to indicate the severity of Wilks' considered judgment: "As a feature of Mahomadan character, it is an example not altogether singular of the mixture of pride and meanness which accompanies imperfect civilization and defective morals." Lower down he observes: "The mind which had abandoned the truth, and the virtues which are her offspring, was yet sensible to the shame of being influenced by fear: such is the ground of distinction on which superficial reasons have affected a preference for the virtues of uncivilized life" and so on and on. Wilks' indignation as a historian is best illustrated by these reflections on Nizām Ali's conduct during the whole of this campaign and what preceded and followed its inception.

part of a compact between Mādhava Rao and the Rāṇi, by virtue of which he had liberated them both from Haidar's clutches. There was nothing new in it; it was yielding to what he had already agreed to and bound to carry out by his engagement with the Rāṇi. The proposals as to Malabar would have involved loss to Haidar, while securing to the English their trading rights in that region, and neither Nizām Alī nor the Mahrattas had so far put forward any claim to those regions. The disposal of Bangalore, Sira, Dindigal and the places in the Bārāmahal country, mentioned in the Memo, as also the proposals to restore Cuddapah, etc., meant despoiling Haidar in favour of Nizām Alī and Muhammad Alī, which would not have pleased Mādhava Rao, as it directly affected the treaty he had just agreed to with Haidar Alī. The proposal to restore the King of Mysore to power would have suited Mādhava Rao and pleased him but the idea of making Mysore pay a fixed tribute to Nizām Alī would have only angered him, to say the least of it. The English at Madras were not yet in a position to assume responsibility for the carrying through of this suggestion. Finally, the idea of garrisoning all the forts and territories taken by the Nizām's troops showed a distinct incapacity to understand the quality of the Nizām's troops. Altogether, the proposals that were conceived reflected Muhammad Alī's wily design to prevent Mysore expanding in the South as it was Haidar's design to do; to prevent him in every direction from proceeding to the conquest of the South; to keep the Nizām as a friend in his own area but with the pretence of a domination in the South which would make him the titular Emperor of the South in place of the vanishing Emperor of Delhi; to keep the Mahrattas to their homelands beyond the Krishna, and to secure to the English their rights and privileges in the Karnātic through the agency of their protege Muhammad Alī

Walājah, while on the West Coast all the contending powers—Haidar, the Nizām and the Mahrattas—were to be excluded. No wonder, these proposals, as a whole, failed to prove attractive to Mādhava Rao who laughed them out in the very faces of the envoys who put them before him. In a word, the English assumed to dictate at a time when they were still supplicants. Col. Call's own comment on the proposals he put forward in his Memo is worth recording as particularising his own *personal* view quite apart from the views he had, as the spokesman of his Government, given expression to in the Memo he submitted to Governor Bouchier. "If then we are disappointed," he wrote in his letter dated the 6th April 1767, "we have nothing to blame but our own sanguine hopes, which flattered us that everything would go on as we would have it. Another time we must endeavour to know what we are going about before we set out." That was to come thirty-two years later, after three more sanguinary wars (see, on this subject, Love, *Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, pp. 22-43).

(2) ARTICLES OF A FIRMAUND GRANTED BY THE
NAWAB HYDER ALI KHAN BAHADUR,
MAY 27, 1763.²

The Nawab Hyder Ali Khan's seal.

Article 1.

The Honourable English Company have free liberty to build a commodious factory and warehouses at Onore; by the waterside, or any place they may pitch upon; and

2. Aitchison, C. V., *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* (1909), Vol. IX. pp. 194-195.

they may enclose their compound with a wall of stone and mud without any guns. The ground allotted them shall be rent-free. Whilst the English have a factory at Onore, no other European nation shall have leave to settle there.

Article 2.

The English have the sole liberty granted them of purchasing all the pepper produced between Mirjee and Batcole, both these places included; nor shall any European or other nation besides them have leave to purchase pepper within these districts. The price shall be adjusted every year between the Resident and four principal merchants of Onore.

Article 3.

The Honourable English Company have free liberty to export annually from Mangalore three hundred corgie of rice for the service of Tellicherry exempt from the duty called Adlamy; or if they choose to carry this rice to Bombay, it is exempt from the same duty. Any private English merchants who purchase rice must be liable to the same customs as other merchants.

Article 4.

Whereas several Onore merchants are largely indebted to the Honourable Company, the killadar, etc., officers must assist the English in recovering their just demands; and provided any merchants in future should be indebted to the English, and make any disputes about paying, they have free liberty to confine such merchants in their factory till they clear their debts.

Article 5.

All goods that the English import, either at Onore or Mirjee, shall pay one and a half per cent, customs on

the sales; except horses, wet and dry dates, sugar, kishmisses, cocoanuts, copra, tobacco, munchustry, opium, cotton, salt, brimstone and camphore; these fourteen articles are to pay the same customs as other merchants pay. Any goods they cannot sell they have leave to re-export without paying any customs on them, on showing them to the custom-master. Gold and silver are to pay no customs, nor any necessaries that the English may import for their own use.

Article 6.

If any ships or vessels, belonging to the English, should be cast away upon any part of the coast in the Bednure dominions, the Nawab's Killadars, etc., officers and people shall assist in saving the goods, stores, etc., which shall be all returned to the English.

Article 7.

The English have free liberty to cut timber, stones, hay and wood for to build their factory: but if they want masts for vessels, they must apply for leave to cut them.

Article 8.

No grabs, gallivats, or armed boats, belonging to the English, shall pay anchorage, but have free liberty to go and come.

Article 9.

The English will not assist the enemies of the Nawab; nor, on the other hand, shall the Nawab afford any assistance to the enemies of the English.

Article 10.

The Killadars and officers of the Nawab shall always show the English and their servants a due respect everywhere, and at all times be ready to assist them.

Signed by the Nawab.

Bednur, the 10th of Morjee, 1176, or the 27th of May Anno Domini, 1763.

(3) GRANT FROM HYDER ALI KHAN BAHADOOR,
DATED THE 23RD FEBRUARY 1766.³

I, Hyder Ali Khan Bahadoor, in consideration of the friendship subsisting between me and the Honourable United English East India Company, do hereby confirm and ratify all the several grants and privileges made over to them by the several Malabar powers, for the sole purchasing and exporting the produce of these countries, particularly pepper, sandal-wood, and cardamoms, from the Malabar frontier to the northward to the Samorine's dominions, including them ; and further, I do promise to grant and confirm the same, whithersoever my arms may prove victorious.

Given under my hand, in Mudday, the day and year above written.

(4) THE ENGLISH TREATY WITH HYDER ALI,
APRIL 3, 1769.⁴

A TREATY of PERPETUAL FRIENDSHIP and PEACE, made and concluded between the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL of FORT ST. GEORGE, in behalf of the HONOURABLE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY, for all their possessions, and for the Carnatic Payen Ghat, on the one part ; and the NAWAB HYDER ALI KHAN BAHADOOR, for the country of Mysore Hyder Nagur, and his other possessions, on the other part ; on the following conditions :—

Article 1.

That all hostilities shall immediately cease on the conclusion of this Treaty, which is to be perpetual, or as

3. Aitchison, *o.c.*, 195-196.

4. Aitchison, *o.c.*, 196-197.

long as the Company may exist ; that peace and friendship shall take place between the contracting parties (particularly including therein the Rajah of Tanjore, the Malabar Ram Rajah, Morari Rao, who are friends and allies to the Carnatic Payen Ghat), also all others, the friends and allies of the contracting parties provided they do not become the aggressors against either of them ; but if they are aggressors they are not to be assisted by either party.

Article 2.

That in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out. The pay of such assistance of troops from one party to another, to be after the following rates, *viz.*, to every soldier and horseman fifteen rupees a month, and every sepoy seven and a half rupees per month : the pay of the Sirdars and Commandants to be as it shall be agreed on at the time.

Article 3.

The Presidency of Bombay, and all the factories and places which were before or now under their government, are included in this Treaty of friendship : and the Nawab Hyder Ali Khan Bahadoor engages, out of his friendship and regard for the Company, to grant to them the factories, privileges, and exemptions in trade, in the same manner as they before held them ; moreover, to release all the Sirdars, Europeans, Sepoys, etc., who may have been taken on that side and this, immediately on the arrival of a proper person from the Governor and Council of Bombay for that purpose ; and also to settle the particulars of the privileges of trade, and other matters relative to the sandal-wood and pepper, etc., articles of trade. And as there is now established between the contracting parties (the Company and the Nawab Hyder Ali Khan)

a perpetual peace, there is no doubt but the Presidency of Bombay will exchange with the said Nawab a Treaty to the same purport as this, respecting the affairs of the said place, etc., and all the factories on that side. With regard to the ships, etc., which have been taken on both sides in the course of this war, it is hereby agreed and stipulated that they shall be mutually forgiven, and no claim or demand on any account made for them hereafter.

Article 4.

The above Nawab engages that all the officers, Europeans and sepoys belonging to the Presidency of Madras, shall immediately be released on the arrival of a proper person at Bangalore to demand them; also all the Sirdars and people belonging to the Carnatic Payen Ghat, who may have been taken in this war, shall likewise be released; the English Company engaging on their side to release the people belonging to the said Nawab who may have been taken also in this war.

Article 5.

The contracting parties mutually engage and agree that the forts and places which may have been taken by either party from other in this war shall be mutually restored, except the fort of Caroor and its districts. And whereas the English Company have in the forts of Colaur and Vencatigherry (exclusive of the former stores therein) many cannon-shot, powder, ball and muskets, the Nawab Hyder Ali Khan engages that the said Company shall have permission to bring away the same, without any let or molestation being given them therein, and as soon as they are withdrawn, the said forts shall immediately be evacuated and restored to the said Nawab.

In witness whereof, the said contracting parties have interchangeably signed and sealed two instruments, of the

same tenor and date, *viz.*, the said President and Council on behalf of the English East India Company and the Carnatic Payen Ghat, in Fort St. George, this 3rd day of April, in the year of the Christian era 1769; and the said Nawab Hyder Ali Khan Bahadoor, at his camp at Madavaram, the 25th day of the Moon Teekyd, in the year of the Hegira 1182.

(5) THE ENGLISH TREATY WITH HYDER ALI,
AUGUST 8, 1770.⁵

- ARTICLES for a TREATY of PEACE and firm FRIENDSHIP between the HONOURABLE THOMAS HODGES, ESQUIRE, PRESIDENT and GOVERNOR, and the COUNCIL of BOMBAY, in behalf of the HONOURABLE UNITED ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY, on the one part, and the NAWAB HYDER ALI KHAN BAHADUR, etc, TITLES, for the countries of MYSORE, HYDER NAGUR, and SOONDAH, on the other part.

Article 1.

That agreeable to the 3rd Article of the Treaty of Peace concluded between the Honourable the President and Council of Madras and the Nawab Hyder Ali Khan Bahadoor, there be, from this day, a firm peace and friendship between the Honourable English East India Company and the said Nawab, and their successors to continue for ever.

Article 2.

That the Honourable Company may have free liberty to build a commodious factory and warehouses at Onore,

5. Aitchison, *o.c.*, 198-200.

by the water-side, or any place they may pitch upon, and that they may enclose the compound with a suitable wall; and the ground allotted them shall be rent-free. They shall also have permission to cut timber, bring stones, hay, and wood, for their use. In like manner, they shall have a factory at Carwar; and the Nawab promises to oblige the Rajah of Bilguy to give all the pepper produced in his country to the Honourable Company at the same price as they may purchase this article at Onore.

Article 3.

That the Honourable Company shall likewise have the sole and exclusive right of purchasing all the pepper and sandalwood produced in the Nawab's dominions, the prices of which must be settled agreeable to former custom. The amount or as much of it as the Honourable Company choose to be made good in guns, muskets, salt, saltpetre, lead and gun-powder, and the balance made good in ready money.

Article 4.

That the Honourable Company shall have free liberty to export from Mangalore, or other ports of the Nawab's dominions, whatever rice they may want for Tellicherry or Bombay; three hundred corges of which is, as usual, to be free of the duty called adlany.

Article 5.

That the English shall have free liberty of trading in the several ports of the Nawab's dominions of the Malabar coast, paying customs at the rate of one and a half per cent on the sale of all goods; and to have permission to re-export any goods which will not sell free of custom, on signifying the same to the custom master. No customs to be charged on gold and silver

nor on any articles for the immediate use and consumption of the English, their servants, and dependants.

Article 6.

The Nawab obliges himself to assist the English in recovering their just debts from his subjects, by compelling them to make good the same on the debts being duly proved to his satisfaction.

Article 7.

That the Honourable Company, and the English in general, shall have free liberty to cut and purchase masts, timber, and plank at Onore, Mangalore, or any other ports of the Nawab's country, teak excepted.

Article 8.

That no vessels, of what kind or denomination, soever, belonging to the English, shall pay anchorage in any of the Nawab's ports, but have free liberty to go out and come in without hindrance or molestation.

Article 9.

Whatever vessels belonging to the English may be drove on shore on any part of the Nawab's dominions, whether by stress of weather or otherwise, his Killadars, officers, and subjects are to assist them that their goods may be saved and delivered to the proprietors.

Article 10.

That the said Nawab shall not assist the enemies of the English, nor on the other hand, shall the English assist the enemies of the Nawab; but should assistance be afforded on either part hereafter, the officers and men who may be sent to them are to be paid at the following rates, by the parties to whom they may be sent, viz.,—

The commission officers to be paid at the discretion of the party assisted but with the concurrence and approbation of the party who assist :—

		Rs.
Each European soldier	...	15 per month.
Each sepy	...	7½ „

Article 11.

Should at any time disputes arise between the servants of the English factories and the Nawab's subjects, servants, or dependants, and the former be found culpable, they shall be sent to the English Resident to be punished, as shall the Nawab's people to his killadars, hummulgars, etc., if they are found to be in fault. The servants of the English Factory, as well as their families, shall be entirely under the Honourable Company's protection.

Article 12.

That the said Nawab shall not grant any new Firmaund or privileges to any European nation, whatever, or suffer any of them to establish any new settlements in any part of his dominions. In all matters of trade or business the English to have the preference ; and in matters of ceremony or state, they are to take rank of all other European nations, as well as the country powers.

Article 13.

The said Nawab hereby ratifies and confirms the grant which he executed in February 1766 and delivered to Messrs. Sparks and Townsend relative to the privileges and immunities the Honourable Company possessed in the several countries he conquered upon this coast, before he took possession thereof ; and hereby binds and obliges himself to compel whoever may be in possession

of those countries to grant to the Honourable Company the produce thereof, as well the full enjoyment of all their rights and privileges therein utmost extent.

In witness of all which the said contracting parties have interchangeably signed and sealed two instruments of the same tenor and date, *viz.*, the said President and Council, on behalf of the English East India Company, in Bombay Castle, this 8th day of August, in the year of the Christian era, 1770, and the said Nawab Hyder Ali Khan Bahadoor.

APPENDIX II.

(1) YĀSIN KHĀN WUNT KOODRI.

Yāsin Khān was, according to Wilks, surnamed "Wunta Cooderi, single or unique horseman," from his personal exploits. "He was," Wilks narrates, "formerly in the service of Mohammed Ali, which he left in disgust in 1757; and came over to Hyder at Dindegul, with seven hundred sepoys, twenty horse, and two light guns. The number of his horse was now increased to five hundred. The blunt manners and genuine bravery of this man soon made him a personal favourite and associate of Hyder; who, although of courtly and insinuating address when the occasion demanded, was, in his ordinary habits, of coarse and vulgar manners, and a master in the slow slang which is peculiar to India; the character of which may be conjectured, by fancying the union of considerable wit with the volubility of Billingsgate, and the obscenity of a brothel. Hyder and Yaseen Khan were rivals in this obscene eloquence, and the former was in the habit of amusing himself with the foul-mouthed wit of Wunta Cooderie, which he sometimes retorted with keen severity on his master.

"It was some years after this period, that conversing on the subject of the battle of Chercolee [Chinkurli], Hyder said it had been lost by the *nemuc harames* of the army (literally being false to one's salt; properly treachery, or ingratitude, but also, figuratively, put for cowardice), and that he did not know the man who had done his duty on that day. 'You are right,' said Wunta Cooderie, 'and I ran away with the rest; but (turning up towards him the socket of an eye which he

had lost by the wound of a sabre in that battle) eodie, cujus matris in vulvam hic oculus iniit?' On the occasion of another defeat, Hyder was pronouncing another philippic on *nemuc haramée*, and looked towards Jaseen Khan. 'Why do you look at me,' said he: 'you had better consult Nunjeraj on the subject of *nemuc haramée*.' This dreadful jest would have cost the head of any other person; but Wunta Cooderie was a privileged man.

"It was the practice of Hyder to take the musters of cavalry, by sending persons, without previous notice, to count the horses in the lines. The grooms and grass-cutters of Wunta Cooderie's command were instructed how to comport themselves on such occasions: and the muster masters, pelted with clods, and bedaubed with horse-dung, were generally happy to escape before the grooms began with the reserved ammunition of stores. The muster-masters complained: but Hyder laughed at all the jokes of Wunta Cooderie: and it became well understood that his corps was exempted from muster."¹

(2) MILITARY RESOURCES OF HAIDAR IN 1780-1781.

In view of the varying estimates given by different writers on the military resources of Haidar during and about the period of the Second Mysore War, it is necessary to note and assess the position. Wilks, writing both from personal knowledge and from materials to which he had ready access, furnishes a note on the subject thus:

"The following is a correct return of the force actually mustered at Bangalore, which is exclusive of Meer

1. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 471-472, *n.* As for the anecdote about the battle of Chinkurji, see also and compare Kirmāni, fully quoted *ante* pp. 457-458 of this Vol.

Saheb's corps, still at Kurpa, altogether about 6,000 horse and foot :—

Stable horse	...	14,000
Silledar horse	...	12,000
Savanoor horse	...	2,000
Infantry regularly armed and disciplined	...	15,000
Select and veteran peons in regular pay	...	12,000
Ditto, assembled from the local establishments, subject to relief, and kept constantly complete	...	18,000
Peons of tributary Poligars, exclusively of their small contingents of cavalry	...	10,000
		<hr/> 83,000 <hr/>

Besides about 2,000 rocketmen; a corps of unarmed pioneers, of near 5,000 men, well instructed and equipped; and a commissariat admirably organized, under the direction of a bramin, named Poornia, one of his ministers of finance. Hyder's disposable force, during the greater period of the war, may be taken with probable accuracy at about ninety-thousand men" (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 812-813, *n.*; see also Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 1, *n.* 1, quoting Wilks' figure, *i.e.*, 90,000 men).

Robson, referring to the year 1775 (*i.e.*, five years preceding the Second Mysore War), estimates Haidar's force at about 70,000, enumerated as follows :—

Own cavalry	...	8,000
Hired cavalry	...	12,000
Sepoys armed, clothed and officered with Europeans and guns attached to them	...	20,000
European deserters	...	114
Matchlockmen and peons	...	10,000
Rocketmen	...	6,000
Black artillerymen	...	700
Brass fieldguns	...	40
Camels for carrying rockets	...	500
Elephants	...	200

Sepoys in different garrisons :

In Seringapatam	3,000
In Bednur	5,000
In Bangalore	3,000
In Dindigal	1,000

(Robson, *o.c.*, 103-104).

Innes Munro, writing in July 1780, refers to Haidar's force thus: "60,000 horse; 50,000 foot, regular and irregular; 100 pieces of ordnance. Of the horse, two troops were under the French under Mon. Pimoran, and of the foot, 500 European renegadoes under Mon. Lally, two experienced French officers." (Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 130). *The Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* speaks of an army having been assembled by Haidar in June 1780, to the number of an hundred thousand, horse and foot (*Memoirs*, I. 134).

Among local writers, Kirmāṇi gives the following figures:—

Horse of Paigah or guard	12,000
Kuzzaks or Predatory horse	10,000
Sillahdar horse	15,000
Regular infantry	24,000
Irregular foot	60,000
Guns, exclusive of Palegar chiefs, with their contingents	70

Total, horse and foot 121,000

(Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 380).

The anonymous author of the contemporary work *Haidar-Nāmah* (1784) gives the following details:—

Bārgir horse	13,000
Sillahdar horse	18,000
Bārr	40,000
Ahashām	20,000
Kamatacucheri	6,000
Other irregulars	4,000
Golandauze Chattegars	4,000
Europeans under Lally, etc...	2,500

Savanur horse	...	2,000
Cuddapah	...	6,000
Bārr	...	4,000
Ahashām	...	4,000
Abyssinians (<i>Habsh</i>)	...	1,000
Arabs	...	1,000
Artillery	...	300
Convoy bullocks	...	12,000
<i>Sime-Kandāchāra</i>	...	40,000
Elephants of <i>Peelkhāna</i>	...	1,000
Camels	...	6,000
Palegar sepoy	...	15,000
Harkarabs (<i>hircarrahs</i>)	...	1,000
Jascos	...	1,000

etc., etc., totalling 182,800, horse and foot, exclusively of elephants, camels and transport bullocks (*Haid. Nām.*, ff. 73-75).

The figures given by Kirmāni and the *Haid. Nām.* no doubt represent the strength of the standing army of Mysore in all its branches. It is much to be doubted whether the entire army was on the field during the war of 1780-1782. If Wilks and other authorities like the *Memoirs* and Innes Munro are to be believed, the actual fighting force, horse and foot, at any time, could not have exceeded a lakh, strong and well-equipped in every particular.

Thus, referring specifically to the battle of *Porto-Novo* (July 1781), Innes Munro speaks of Haidar's army having, on this occasion, consisted of 50,000 chosen horse, 30,000 regular infantry, 47 field-pieces, 2 troops of French *huzzaars*, and a battalion of European renegadoes, besides irregular allies composed of different petty princes, forming altogether a force computed at a hundred thousand fighting men; and the English army as having consisted of nearly 8,000 effectives (Innes Munro, *o.c.*, 225). Coote's despatch refers to Haidar's force as having been nearly as follows: Artillery, 47 pieces, very

well served ; 520 Europeans ; 1,100 Topasses, and others in European dress; cavalry, 40,000 ; 23 battalions of sepoy, strength, 18,000 ; irregular footmen armed with matchlocks, pikes and rockets, 120,000 (Wilson, *o.c.*, II. 27). Robson speaks of Haidar's army as having consisted this day of 25 battalions of infantry ; 400 Europeans, 40,000 horse and about 100,000 matchlock peons, and Pālegārs, with 47 pieces of cannon, well served ; and the English army of 1,500 Europeans and 7,000 sepoy (Robson, *o.c.*, 123-124). The *Memoirs* refers to the English army as having consisted of 8,000 rank and file, with above 60 pieces of cannon ; and Haidar's as having exceeded an hundred thousand, and did not fall short of sixty thousand men " variously armed, with a field-train of 47 pieces of different calibres " (*Memoirs*, I. 192). Wilks mentions the strength of the English force as " 8476 or exclusive of artillery, 7878 ", and that of Haidar as " eight times greater than that of his opponent " (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 61-62).

(3) HAIDAR'S TREATY WITH THE DUTCH,
SEPTEMBER 4, 1781.

Translation of an agreement between His Highness Nabob Hazarath Hyder Ally Cawn Bahauder Saib and the Hon'ble Reymer Van Vissengen, Governor and Director of the Hon'ble Dutch Company at Negapatam, dated September 4, 1781¹.

1st Article : Whereas contests have arisen in Europe between the Dutch and the English and war has been declared, the Nabob shall come and assist with his troops the Dutch Company during this war, and, whenever the English shall attack Negapatam or other places, in order to oppose the enemy and drive them away, that the

1. *Mily. Misc.*, Vol. V. pp. 80-82 (in the Madras Record Office): *Mily. Bundle* for 1781-82, No. 11.

places belonging to the Honourable Company may thereby remain unmolested.

2nd : The cannon, firelocks, ammunition, etc., that the Nabob shall have occasion for, shall be delivered to His Highness by the Dutch on their part for prime cost.

3rd : Whereas this agreement is accorded or concluded by mutual friendship, the Dutch shall bring to the assistance of His Highness in the present war the English now carry on in this country, sepoys, Europeans and Malayers, cannon and ammunition, etc.,—all under the command of European officers, and the expense thereof to be paid by the Company. After the said troops shall have joined those of the Nabob, His Highness shall provide them with a good place for quarters, and they shall remain under the command of their principal officer. The affair of the Nabob may be conducted by means of the aforesaid officer.

4th : Whenever the Dutch shall again make friends with the English and accounts of the same shall be written from Europe, they shall immediately communicate the same to the Nabob, and conduct themselves agreeable to His Highness's pleasure.

5th : When the English on any account whatsoever enter into any of the Dutch places, they will immediately arrest them.

6th : A Vackeel and ten Hircarrahs of the Nabob's shall be placed in Negapatam as well as an able European Vackeel with His Highness, and both sides shall be treated with all due honours.

7th : When the combined fleet of the Dutch and French ships shall arrive, or even the Dutch ships alone, the Dutch ships shall drive away the ships of the enemy to the satisfaction of the Nabob.

8th : Should the enemy from Tanjore or Trichinopoly attempt to act against the troops of His Highness

at Combaconam, the Honourable Company on their part promise to send from hence thither 2,000 men, Europeans, sepoys, and Malayers, together with five or six pieces of cannon and European officers, to join the aforementioned people of the Nabob, and to vanquish the enemy. Should the English besiege Negapatam, the Nabob shall send the said troops to drive them off; and further, the Company promise that on the arrival of the people belonging to His Highness, good quarters shall be prepared for them.

9th: Since His Highness the Nabob has been graciously pleased to make over to the Dutch Company the places that were under Tanjore—namely the provinces of Kuralore, Wederecum, Toppotore and Nagore, together with the villages depending thereon, their Honors shall send their own people in all those places to prevent not only paddy but every other kind of provision being supplied to the enemy. Respecting the expences of the detachment that the Company shall send to the assistance of the Nabob, it shall be adjusted.

10th: After that, the Dutch ships shall have brought a great number of men as well Europeans as Malayers, etc., shall have arrived here from Europe and Batavia. The Dutch will then conclude an agreement about the expence.

11th: The Dutch with a sincere heart taking great pleasure in the prosperity of His Highness will conduct themselves to His Highness's satisfaction. This unanimously signed in the castle of Negapatam, the 4th September 1781.

(4) ON REV. C. F. SCHWARTZ.

About the Rev. C. F. Schwartz and his secret mission to Haidar, we have set out a few particulars in the text of this Volume. Lieut. Col. L. H. Thornton, in his *Light and Shade in Bygone India*, has, as a military

critic, suggested that he was hardly fit for the purpose for which he was chosen. He observes that when the British took Mahe, Haidar protested emphatically to the English at Madras, who thought it advisable to despatch an envoy to Seringapatam to smooth over matters with Haidar, the envoy being "a missionary named Schwartz." He then remarks: "The latter was a man of great charm and of devoted service in the mission field. Wholly admirable as these qualities were in their proper sphere, they were not necessarily such as to constitute Mr. Schwartz an ideal negotiator to treat with a man like Hyder Ali. The latter talked at length to the missionary on religious questions, but on politics he did not touch at all. Mr. Schwartz therefore returned to Madras having accomplished nothing" (pp. 45-46). This seems hard on the poor and devoted servant of God, who yielded to the request of the British at Madras and undertook an arduous journey to wait on Haidar at distant Seringapatam. Doubtless he could not please Haidar, for the English could not please him even through any other envoy, one even belonging to the civil service. Their cause was poor; they had offended Haidar; they had broken their promises; they had aggravated their original offence by attacking at a vulnerable point and taken Mahe, in which he was deeply interested. No body could have succeeded with a case like that and the Government at Fort St. George tried to mollify Haidar by sending a religious devotee who was well known for his uprightness, righteousness and transparent honesty of purpose. Schwartz, it should be remembered, was a humble, polished man of great culture and superb Eastern manners, and was expected to produce the right impression—that the English meant well with Haidar. He was, besides, a University man, having passed through the Halle University. He had been in India for nearly thirty years and his experience

of men and things was vast. If he failed with Haidar, the cause he had to handle was more largely to blame than the man himself. His diary of the visit shows his efforts and indicates why he failed. If anybody could have succeeded, he could have. But the cause was a vain one and any one would have failed in it more readily than he, who tried his best to present a bad case in an admirable manner. His mission, we have to note, was a secret one and we have no more particulars than what he has set out in his own personal account. This account, compiled by a Missionary Editor, fully confirms our view. Nawāb Muhammad Ali saw to it that the English at Madras were always at variance with Haidar, as has been remarked by the compiler of the Schwartz letters. Here is an extract from it. "When I came to Hyder, he desired me to sit down alongside of him. The floor was covered with the most exquisite tapestry. He received me very politely, listened friendly, and with seeming pleasure to all what I had to say; he spoke very openly and without reserve, and said that the Europeans had broken their solemn engagements and promises, but that nevertheless, he was willing to live in peace with them, provided At last he directed a letter to be wrote, had it read unto me, and said, what I have spoken with you, that I have shortly mentioned in the letter. You will explain the whole more at length. (But the Nabob at Madras and others found means to frustrate all hopes of peace)." (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. App. VIII, p. 847). Pearson's *Life of Schwartz* does not throw any fresh light on this subject. Nor do the *Fort St. George Records* help us in this connection. Neither the secret nor the public correspondence lodged in it indicate if Schwartz submitted any report to Government on his mission. He seems to have conveyed information otherwise than in writing. However this might have

been, even in passing historical judgments, critics, military or other, have, it would seem, to bear in mind the old world saying "judge not, lest ye be judged". As one can see from the extract from Schwartz's letters given above, the letters themselves do not throw any light on the fact whether he submitted any report on his secret mission to the Madras Government detailing what took place between him and Haidar at Seringapatam. Their silence is significant; only it adds to the mystery of the whole mission undertaken by him. Wilks no doubt has given us the contents of Schwartz's letters, though the letters themselves are not traceable among the *Fort St. George Records*.

In defence of the attitude of Haidar, it might be urged that it is a little difficult to handle certain matters through diplomatic channels always and that with the gentleness one might wish in certain urgent conditions. If there is any roughness in the methods adopted, it should not be taken as intentional. From a consideration of all the relevant information in the matter of the interview of Haidar with Schwartz, it may be said that its main result took a military turn. If the English want peace, Haidar said, they must observe peace; they must wish for peace; they must secure it. One had to look at the future and try to face in the immediate present some of its problems. That, though a question of procedure, requires as much care and attention as anything else governing the situation. The short comment on this defence of Haidar is "should he not have utilized Schwartz, in his turn, for a peaceful solution and a closer understanding with those who had sent him out to him. Should the interview end necessarily in failure?" In the conflict between peace and war, war gained the mastery over Haidar's mind. The war of 1782 followed, a war that claimed his life and the blasting of the last hope of a greater Mysore.

(5) ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF *The Memoirs of
the Late War in Asia.*

The authorship of the *Late War in Asia* is still an unsolved problem of British Indian History. Its full title and description is as follows: "Memoirs of the Late War in Asia, 1780-1784, with Narrative of the Imprisonment of the Officers and Soldiers at Seringapatam, by an Officer of Col. Baillie's Detachment, with 2 plates, 2 vols. 8 vo., half-calf, 1788." Col. J. Biddulph, writing from Grey Court, Ham, under date 17th December 1903, remarked: "*The Late War in Asia*, 1788, is conjecturally assigned to Lient. Alex. Read, A. D. C. to Col. Baillie, who was afterwards distinguished as a political officer, in which capacity he had charge of the Baramahal when ceded by Tippoo to us in 1792." A further examination of the subject is, it seems, necessary before this *conjectural* identification can prove acceptable. There is however, no inherent impossibility in the correctness of this identification. Alexander Read Bahadur, as he is lovingly still remembered in Tirupattūr, in the present North Arcot District, where he had sometime his permanent headquarters, was the author of the *Report on the Baramahal* issued not long ago by the Madras Government in its Record Series. Trained under him was Col. (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro, Governor of Madras. He was the real author of the Ryotwari Settlement and the system of administration that goes under the name of Sir Thomas Munro. As regards Col. John Biddulph who refers to the conjectural identification, he rose to be Colonel and entered the Political Service, ending as Resident at Gwalior, 1892, and at Baroda, 1895. He reverted to military duty in 1895. He was the author of *Tribes of the Hindukush* (1880); *The Nineteenth Century and their Times*, (1899); and *Stringer Lawrence* (1901). Francis Edward's *Catalogue*

quotes his "opinion on the conjectural identification, at page 594 (see Francis Edward's *Catalogue*, March 1904).

(6) ON ACHANNA-PANDIT, NAWAB MUHAMMAD
ALI'S FAUJDAR AT ARCOT.

"The Brahmin Achanna Pandit," referred to in the text, was Nawāb Muhammad Ali's Faujdār at Arcot. He was a member of the Velanāḍu community. His ancestors seem to have migrated from the East Coast into the Nizāmshāhi territory of Golconda and there distinguished themselves in secular administration. They belong to the well-known "Golkonda Vyāpāri" sect, which is amongst the most tolerant in religious and sectarian matters in Southern India. Members belonging to the same family and living together in it profess different forms of religious faith. It is not unusual to find among them the father following the Śrī-Vaishnava faith, one son the Smārtha faith, while a second one may be practising the Madhva faith. While yet a youth, Achanna showed considerable precocity and rose to power under Muhammad Ali by reason of his personal merits and unceasing good work both in the military, revenue and administrative spheres. The story is current that as a youth he used to waylay Muhammad Ali in his palanquin rides and with great address and due submission say he was waiting for a job under him. Observing this, another young man began to do the same thing. One day, it would appear, Muhammad Ali called for the second young man first in his rides and asked him to write out an order of appointment in his own favour to his dictation. Unluckily for him, the young man had neither paper nor pen and said he would wait on him at the court. Muhammad Ali promptly took out a sheet of paper from his palanquin, gave him ink bottle and pen, and asked him to write out an order of appointment

which he there and then dictated. The order was written and Muhammad Alī asked the young man to proceed at once to the charge and take over the duties of the post. The young man said that the day was not a propitious one and that he would repair to the spot a couple of days hence on a good day. Muhammad Alī took back the order of appointment asking him to wait on him at court on the "good day." Muhammad Alī proceeded on his ride and a little distance off, there was waiting Achanna, who bowed and stood erect before Muhammad Alī. The Nawāb at once asked him to write out an order of appointment to his dictation. The good and ready-witted applicant at once produced his own ink bottle, pen and paper and sat down on the spot and wrote out correctly the order of appointment as dictated. With due submission, he read over the order to the Nawāb. The Nawāb told him that he was to take over charge immediately, repairing to the spot forthwith. He said he would do so at once. Muhammad Alī rejoined that for a couple of days the days were not propitious and whether it did not matter. "The day of appointment," replied the aspirant for the post, "is the luckiest day he could think of and the most propitious one too." With the blessings of the Nawāb, all ill-luck had vanished from him now and for ever. The Nawāb appreciated his services and ultimately he became *Faujdar* of Arcot and defended it against Haidar. Later he was ennobled and he was formally invested with the name of "Rāja Rāmachandra Haripant Phadak" and the title of "Rai Raiji." He was also created Rāja Bīrbal after Akbar's famous minister Bīrbal. This is said to have been in recognition of the sound political advice that he constantly tended to his master during the whole period of his services. If his master was not the better for such advice and did not ultimately improve his political position, it was not the fault of Achanna-Pandit. The more the pity.

As a revenue administrator, he stood very high and his work as such has been appreciated by subsequent revenue administrators including British Indian Revenue Officers of high experience and great eminence. "Raiji's Settlement" has become well-known in the revenue history of Southern India—including the two Arcot Districts and Trichinopoly—as based on sound financial grounds and equitable as between the raiyat and the governing power. It is even now quoted as the highest authority on the subject of Revenue Settlement as obtained in the central districts of Southern India. Raiji founded an agrahāram at Nattēri, Chingleput District, in the name of the Nawāb Muhammad Ali, and endowing it suitably, gave the houses built in it, both for Brahmīns and non-Brahmīns, the Brahmīns being chosen from the three communities of Smārthas, Madhvas and Śrī-Vaishnavas. A peculiarity of this agrahāram village is its tank, whose site has been so carefully chosen that there is always a good supply of water in it, and another is that one who bathes in it can, after a plunge, raise his head and espy the tower of the temple of Varadarāja at Conjeeveram and offer prayers to God Viṣṇu before he takes the next plunge. Achanna is now spoken of by the single name of Raiji as if it were his personal name. He was a brave, courageous and honourable administrator, whose life in better times and under better conditions would have meant much more to the country in which he laboured.

Of the early career of Achanna-Pandit, a few facts may be recorded. He started life as a village *Karnam*, his father and grandfather being also *Karnams*, it is said, in the Northern Circars. He rose to be a Mojini-dār (Majumdār) at Poonamalli near Madras. He then became a *Kārkūn* (a revenue inspector) at Pōlūr, where many stories are still told of him. He next became Tahsildār of Bhuvanagiri in the present South Arcot

District. In this capacity he distinguished himself by vigorously administering the country both on the revenue and administrative sides. He curbed the Reddis, who were turbulent and troublesome, the leading chiefs among them being Muddu Malla Reddi and others. He revised the taxation and raised incidence in such a way that the Reddis found it hard to repeat their excesses. He was then appointed Subēdār of Arcot, which included nominally or actually the four Subāhs of North and South Arcot, Trichinopoly, Madura, Tinnevely and Nellore. A writer in the *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society* (Vol. I, p. 304) describes the administration as having been "very vigorous and zealous." He surveyed the whole of the Subāh under his charge, including the wet and dry lands put together; curtailed the *vāram* of the former and assessed a ready money tax on the latter. He reduced both the local chiefs and Pālegārs (Nattamakars and Pālegārs) as their turbulence and insubordination to authority interfered with the orderly administration of the country. The administration continued during the course of 17 years until the war came about in 1780. Though the writer, referred to above, describes it to have been "violent and oppressive to individuals," it can only be described as having been strict in the matter of putting down those who interfered with the orderly administration of the country. When a choultry founded by him at Sholingur was sought to be resumed by the Madras Government, J. D. Bourdillon (1829-1861) remarked of him as Secretary to the Madras Government in the Revenue and Judicial Departments: "In the past there was not one like him and in the future there will not be one like him." J. D. Bourdillon's opinion of Raiji is entitled to great weight as he was in the Madras Civil Service from 1828 to 1861, dying only in 1883. What is more, he had served mostly in the Arcot District as also in Salem, Trichinopoly and Nellore Districts. He

had been Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Member of the Board of Revenue, and Secretary to Government in the Revenue and Public Works Departments. He knew the Madras Presidency well and advocated irrigation and the improvement of communications. He was a recognised authority on land revenue and the despatch of public business. The testimony of such an impartial observer many years after the passing away of Raiji is good testimony indeed. Haidar was sagacious to note his greatness and continued him in administrative charge of the country after taking Arcot.

It is said of Achanṇa-Paṇḍit that on his being appointed Subēdār of Arcot, he determined to carry through at least four things: (1) The founding of a public garden and beautifying Arcot town. He founded the *Navalakh Thōṭam* at that place, planting nine lakhs of trees in it. This garden is between Arcot and Ranipet and covers the area occupied by seven villages. (2) The building of an agrahāram by founding *Agaram Sirājūdoulapuram* at what is now called Nattēri, in the name of Nawāb Wālājah's father. This agrahāram is fourteen miles from Conjeeveram and ten miles from Arcot and about three miles from Kāveripak, the scene of the well-known battle fought there. It is said that the agrahāram was founded in the cyclic year Vikāri (A. D. 1779). The Nawāb ordered in favour of the agrahāram a copperplate grant confirming the gift—the same being given to the safe custody of Annadāna Rām Bhat of the village. (3) Founding of a city: this he did by the founding of *Raijipet* later and now known as Wālājapet. (4) And the digging of a lasting tank always containing crystal clear water—this he carried out by founding the Raiji tank near Conjeeveram.

A sidelight is thrown on the pact that he made the Nawāb agree to when he was appointed Subedār of Arcot. Knowing the nature of the master he was to

serve, he made him agree that he should not be called for by him at any time. If so called for, he would take it to mean his final recall, but he was privileged to see the Nawāb whenever he (Achanna-Pandit) desired to do so. Also when he came from one country to another where the Nawāb was residing for the time being, the Nawāb was to embrace him and both should go through in procession in one and the same palanquin through the whole place. It would be difficult to say, bearing the character of the Nawāb in mind, that some such pact as this was not a wrong arrangement if there was to be continuity of administration along certain sound lines by the Nawāb's Subēdār.

If Rāja Bīrbal of Akbar's days was a prominent member of Akbar's new religion, Achanna-Pandit was the founder of a new religion by himself. That religion went by the name of *Vāmana-mata*, a religion with strong Vaishṇavite leanings. He was the first to embrace it, having been in turn Śrī-Vaishṇava and Madhva. He secured some converts to it during his life-time. On his death, however, most of its adherents got themselves merged in the Madhva sect.

Raiji died by poisoning himself by swallowing the diamond solution. His descendants in his daughter's line are all Madhvas and are living at Little Conjeevaram. Though commonly known as Raiji, he was known in official correspondence as Achanna-Pandit or Achanna Pant (see *Fort St. George Records: Military Country Correspondence*, recording letters from Achanna Pant to the Nawab—22nd March 1771, Vol. XIX, pp. 96-108).

The character and abilities of Pandit Achanna will perhaps be better appreciated if a few particulars of Rāja Bīrbal of Akbar's time are given. It is not a little curious that Mountstuart Elphinstone, the historian, does not mention Bīrbal's name, though he gives a long and comprehensive account of Akbar's reign (see Cowell's

edition of Elphinstone's *History of India*, 1874, pp. 453-547); but later historians of India have in recent times given some space to him. According to these accounts, Rāja Bīrbal was born about the year 1528 of poor Brahmin parents and lost his life in 1586 in an expedition against the Afghan tribes of Swāt in the present N. W. F. Province. Though Todar Mal and Man Singh, Akbar's other generals, triumphed over them subsequently, Akbar's personal loss in the death of Bīrbal, his bosom friend, was all but irreparable. Rāja Bīrbal had been associated with Akbar from the early part of his reign. He became famous as a poet, musician, and more than all as a wit. He enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor who delighted in his company. The story goes that Bīrbal was a great and inveterate chewer of tobacco—which shows that the story is later day invention as tobacco came into use in India only about 1604 and Akbar one day jestingly said that the black leaf he was so fond of was avoided even by asses. Bīrbal, not minding the Emperor's dignity, readily rejoined that only asses had an aversion for that fragrant object, Akbar asked him if he could assign any reason for the eternal discontent of Brahmins. He answered him at once in one phrase, *lōṭa nai*, that is, no *lōṭa*, in a double sense of roll and tumblers, thereby suggesting that asses are easily discontented because they do not get their usual roll and Brahmins because they are usually so poor that they could not even afford to own a tumbler. Bīrbal was invested with the title of *Kavirāj*, king of poets, and was created a *Mansabdār* of two thousand. Unlike Rāja Bhagavān Dās and Mān Singh, Bīrbal was amongst the most prominent members of the new Divine Faith of Akbar ("Din Ilāhī"), though he greatly disagreed from his master in the latter's appreciation of the Sikh religion. His beautiful mansion at Fatepur Sikri, built about 1571, would seem to distinctly

indicate his importance at Akbar's court. Dr. V. A. Smith, who gives a picture of Rāja Bīrbal, suggests that he was not much of a military officer and that it was a mistake on the part of Akbar to have made him a general (see *Oxford History of India*, pp. 361 and 373). This, however, is a matter of opinion. It is permissible, perhaps, to add that Akbar might have had greater grounds than mere friendship to make Bīrbal a general. Like Akbar's Bīrbal, Achanna-Pandit, the South-Indian Bīrbal of the 18th century, was a remarkably resourceful, ready-witted military and revenue officer. He was the entire maker of his own career, which was a most successful and brilliant one despite the fact that he lost Arcot to Haidar. (For a brief but good account of Akbar's Bīrbal, see also R. Satyanatha Aiyar, *A College Text Book of Indian History*, Vol. II. pp. 279-280 and 318)

(7) GENERAL SIR HECTOR MUNRO (1726-1805).

Born, 1726; son of Hugh Munro; Ensign in the 48th Regiment, 1749; commanded the 89th Regiment out to Bombay in 1761; suppressed a mutiny of sepoys at Patna, 1764; won the decisive battle of Buxar, October 23, 1764, defeating the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, Shuja-ud-daula and Mīr Kāsim; Lt. Col., 1765; M. P. for the Inverness burghs, 1768-1801; commanded the Madras Army, 1778; took Pondicherry from the French, 1778; K. B., 1779; engaged in the field against Haidar Ali, 1780-1781; commanded a Division in Sir Eyre Coote's victory at Porto Novo, July 1, 1781; captured Negapatam, November 1781; returned to England; Major-General, 1782; General, 1798; died at Novar, December 27, 1805.

To General Sir Hector Munro, who unsuccessfully led the English army against Haidar Ali in September 1780, Buxar was certainly the scene of his early glory (23rd October 1764), and what he achieved there is thus

described in the graphic pages of Edward Thornton. "The army being once more in a state in which it might be trusted to meet an enemy, Major Munro prepared to take the field as early as possible after the rains; the 15th September (1764) was fixed for the rendezvous of the troops from the different cantonments. Before the army was put in motion, intelligence was received that the enemy had advanced several parties of horse, and thrown up some breastwork on the banks of the Soane to impede the passage of the English. To remove this obstacle, Major Champion was dispatched with a detachment and four field-pieces to cross the river some miles below the place where the main body were to pass, and advance on the opposite bank for the purpose of dislodging the enemy and covering the landing of the British troops. It was important that Major Champion should arrive on one side of the river at the same time that the main body reached the other. The movements of both parts of the British force were regulated with a view to secure this—and with so much precision were they executed, that Major Champion's detachment began to fire on the enemy at the moment when the van of Major Munro's army appeared on the opposite bank. The enemy was soon dislodged—the English force was thus enabled to cross the river without molestation, and in four hours the operation was completed. Major Munro then continued his march towards Buxar, where the enemy lay. On the 22nd October he arrived there, and encamped just beyond the range of the enemy's shot. He found them intrenched with the Ganges on their left and the village of Buxar in their rear. The first intention of Major Munro was to attack them before day-break on the morning after his arrival. Some spies were sent out to ascertain in what part of their encampment the force of their artillery lay, where the tents of the Vizier and Meer Cossim stood,

and whether the British artillery could be brought to bear on the enemy's right, Major Munro being resolved to avoid attacking them on their left, in order, said he, 'that we might have a better chance to drive them into the Ganges than they should us.' Midnight arrived without bringing back the spies. The British Commander concluded that they had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and he resolved to postpone the attack till the following morning. As the day broke, two of the spies returned, and reported that the enemy had been under arms all night, that they had been moving their artillery, and that the women and treasure had been sent away. A *reconnoissance* took place, and many of the enemy's troops were perceived under arms, but not beyond the intrenchments; and it was the opinion of Major Munro and all the officers, who accompanied him, that the bustle apparent in the enemy's camp was a feint. 'In this belief,' said the Major, 'I returned to our camp, wishing they would come out and attack us, for our army was encamped in order of battle.' His wish was gratified. At eight o'clock the field-officer of the day announced that the enemy's right was in motion, and that he was confident that they were seriously resolved on making an attack. The drums were immediately ordered to beat to arms, the troops advanced from their encampment, and in a few minutes were ready to receive the approaching enemy. This action commenced at nine and raged till twelve, when the enemy gave way. They retired, however, leisurely, blowing up several tumbrils and three large magazines of powder as they went off. The British army broke into columns to pursue; but pursuit was frustrated by the Vizier sacrificing part of his army to preserve the remainder. Two miles from the field of battle was a rivulet, over which a bridge of boats had been constructed. This the enemy destroyed before their rear had passed over; and through this act about

two thousand of them were drowned or otherwise lost. Destructive as was this proceeding, it was, says Major Munro, 'the best piece of generalship Shoojah-ud-Dowlah shewed that day; because, if I had crossed the rivulet with the army, I would either have taken or drowned the whole army in the Caramnassa, and come up with his treasure and jewels and Cossim Ali Khan's jewels, which, I was informed, amounted to between two and three millions.'

"The British force engaged in this memorable battle consisted of eight hundred and fifty-seven Europeans, five thousand two hundred and ninety-seven sepoy, and nine hundred and eighteen native cavalry, making a total of seven thousand and seventy-two men. They had a train of artillery of twenty field-pieces. The force of the enemy, according to some reports, amounted to sixty thousand men, and the lowest estimate fixes it at forty thousand. Of this vast number two thousand were left dead upon the field of battle, exclusive of those who perished from the destruction of the bridge; the enemy also lost one hundred and thirty-three pieces of cannon of various sizes. The loss of the English in killed and wounded was severe, amounting to no less than eight hundred and forty-seven. The situation of the wounded enemy was pitiable, but they received all the attention which it was in the power of the victors to afford.....

To ensure the due discharge of this humane provision, it was personally superintended by the Commander-in-Chief, who thus showed that, although when circumstances required severity he would not shrink from its exercise, he was not less prompt in executing the gentle offices of charity than in enforcing obedience to the demands of military law." (Edward Thornton, *History of the British Empire in India*, I. 455-459).

What General Munro gained at Buxar he lost at Conjeeveram. The idea of his cantoning at one place

and of his despatching a detachment under Major Champion to the banks of the Soane to dislodge the Vizier of Oudh (Shuja-ud-daula) in September 1764 has its interesting parallel in the same General's plan of despatching from Conjeeveram a detachment under Col. Fletcher to the assistance of Lt. Col. Baillie, situated opposite to Mysorean forces under Tipū on the banks of the Kortalaiyar river near Perambākum, in September 1780; and suggests that he perhaps sought to follow in 1780 the very preliminary tactics that he had adopted in 1764. If this was so, then General Munro was thoroughly mistaken. The actual situation in South India in 1780 was quite different from that of 1764 in North India, the disposition of the Mysore forces having proved a stumbling block to the progress of the English army advancing from the other side under Col. Baillie. Whatever the defence on the part of General Munro (*vide* text for details), expediency and prudence likewise demanded the prompt concentration of the entire English army at Perambākum, which would have certainly averted the fatal disaster which actually overtook Col. Baillie (10th September 1780).

A recent writer, Lt. Col. L. H. Thornton, criticising the conduct of General Sir Hector Munro on the occasion, observes: "The blame must rest on Munro. He had adopted with his eyes open, a most risky plan. If handled with energy and determination, this plan, faulty as it was, might still perhaps have been carried through with success, but in face of Munro's lack of decision, failure was foredoomed." "The story of Munro and Baillie," he further observes, "possesses a great interest for such as study the part played by human nature in war. It shows how the passage of time may bring about a deterioration in even the finest character, for it would be difficult to find any point of resemblance between General Sir Hector Munro, allowing the golden

moments to trickle through his palsied fingers at Conjeeveram, and Major Hector Munro, gripping a critical situation in his firm hands and, all undismayed by giant odds, snatching victory from the jaws of defeat by the corpse-paved ford of Buxar" (L. H. Thornton, *Light and Shade in Bygone India*, 66-67). This is surely a correct appraisal of the role played on two different fields by General Sir Hector Munro, who is still remembered in Indian History, as one writer (R. W. Munro, writing in the *Hindu*, dated August 4, 1943) puts it, as the "victor of Buxar and the villain of Conjeeveram," two memorable episodes which took place within an interval of sixteen years (1764-1780).

(8) COMPARISON OF HAIDAR WITH RANJIT SINGH,
LION OF LAHORE, AND ALA-UD-DIN KHILJI.

A recent writer suggests a comparison between Ranjit Singh, the Lion of Lahore, and Haidar Ali. He observes: "There were other strong points of resemblance between Hyder Ali and Ranjit Singh, in particular their indifference to all forms of religion which enabled them to offer employment to any capable man, no matter what was his creed. The two men differed in the ability to maintain peaceful relations with the British. Here Hyder failed where the Great Maharajah succeeded, but the latter had before him the object lesson provided by the fate of Mysore and of the Mahrattas. Incidentally, each of these two remarkable men was cursed with an Heir Apparent whom he neither trusted nor yet took steps to remove" (Lt. Col. L. H. Thornton, *Light and Shade in Bygone India*, p. 267, f. n. 1).

The points of resemblance between the two great men may be thus stated:—

(1) The rise of both was phenomenal, though different entirely from each other. The Sikhs built up an independent state and a confederacy, and Ranjit Singh

emerged out of it and took over the reins suppressing the confederacy even. As is well known, on the death of Guru Govind Singh, his chosen disciple, Banda, returned to the north and became the leader of the Sikhs. He assembled the scattered Sikh bands and defeated the Mughal authorities in the Punjab. Then he took over the country between the Sutlej and the Jumna. Bahadur Shah, the Mughal Emperor, hastened to the Punjab and drove Banda to the Jumna. Bahadur Shah's death, however, and the civil war which followed, helped materially and the Sikhs reappeared in the Southern Punjab. Farruksiya, Bahadur Shah's successor, sent Abdus Samad Khān, who took Gurudaspur and captured Banda. Banda was put to death at Delhi in 1716. We do not hear of the Sikhs until the invasions from the north-west gave them their next opportunity. During 1730-1765, the period of commotion, when Nādir Shah and Ahmad Shah repeatedly invaded India, the Sikhs rapidly recovered and gained power. They founded the Khalsa State, raised an army, built strongholds and even struck coins. They occupied Lahore in 1764—when Haidar was just rising to power—and became masters of the whole of the Punjab from the Jhelum to the Jumna. They said that they had to organise, if they were to exist, and accordingly they built up a confederacy. All the Sikh chiefs met once annually at Amritsar and held a council (*Gurumatha*) and decided upon subjects of mutual interest. The confederacy consisting of the twelve unions of Sikhs (called *misals*), each union obeying a *Sardār*, held its own lands and maintained a troop of horsemen. These unions in the Punjab to the north of the Sutlej went by the name of *Manjha Sanghs* and those between Sirhind and Sirsa as *Malwa Sanghs*. This confederation of the unions, however, could not function long owing to personal jealousies. Even the invasions of Shah Zamān in 1797 had little or no effect

on uniting them. The Sikhs, however, between 1765 and 1800, extended their sway in all directions, and brought not only the Punjab from Attock to Karnal but also Jammu and Multan under their control. They ravaged even the Doab and Rohilkhand, and pressed upon the borders of Oudh. Among the unions of Manjha, the Sukerkuchia finally attained the ascendancy under the leadership of Mohan Singh, father of Ranjit Singh, while among the Malwas, the Patiala branch of the Phulkians came to be acknowledged as the leader. During the Second Mahratta War (1801-1805), some of the Sikh sardārs entered into an alliance with the English, and gave them valuable help against the Mahrattas. Among these was Ranjit Singh, who all his life stuck to this policy of aiding the British against the Mahrattas.

(2) Like Haidar, Ranjit Singh believed in centralization of all power in his own hands. He realised that the Sikh confederacy, so long as it remained a confederacy, would be but a loosely organised theocracy, divided as it was into twelve unions with chiefs of their own at their heads. While they were strong in defence, they definitely lacked the centralized internal unity which alone could convert them into a visible aggressive power. Ranjit aimed at this objective. In 1799, he made Lahore his capital, and extended, as we shall see, his control over the Sikh unions gradually yet steadily.

(3) Ranjit Singh's power, like Haidar's, rested upon his magnificent army of 30,000 troops equipped and disciplined, as Haidar's, in the European manner. Also, like Haidar, he engaged able foreign officers, Ventura and Avitabile, and attained a high level of military efficiency. Both were believers in the French saying *Dieu est toujours pour les plus gros bataillons*: God is always on the side of the largest battalions; the largest army has the best chance of success.

(4) Like Haidar, again, Ranjit Singh governed with ruthless severity, which is still locally remembered. The name of Avitabile, his deputy at Peshawar, is recalled to this day with grim memories of what he did. Until a few years ago, at Peshawar, the beam upon which this fierce General hanged three prominent citizens every week to discipline, as Ranjit Singh put it, "that nest of scorpions," was still pointed out. If anything, Ranjit was worse than Haidar in using force, individually or collectively, as a weapon of aggrandizement.

(5) In his relations with the British, Ranjit followed an uniform policy of friendliness, which was possible, whereas it was not so in the case of Haidar. Here the contrast between the two begins. This requires a few words by itself.

Born about 1780, two years before Haidar's death, Ranjit pushed himself rapidly to the front. During the invasion of Shah Zaman, in 1799, the year Seringapatam fell, Ranjit Singh shot into prominence. His abilities were recognised by the Shah, who granted him Lahore. He then reduced the *misals* (Sikh unions) to submission, acquired Amritsar in 1802, and extracted homage from the chiefs of the Punjab. During the Mahratta wars, he refused to help the Mahrattas, and entered into a friendly alliance with the English. By 1806, the Sikh confederacy of *misals* had ceased to exist, and Ranjit Singh had resolved to establish a monarchy which would enable him to unite the Sikhs in a single state. When Lord Minto arrived in 1807, new dangers threatened the British in India and elsewhere. Napoleon had reached the height of his power in Europe and had just entered into an alliance with the Czar of Russia, with the object of crushing Britain, destroying its commercial prosperity and overthrowing its Empire in Asia. To meet this threat, it was necessary to overcome all those elements in India which might prove a

source of anxiety. Minto had therefore to adopt a policy of active interference in Indian affairs—giving up the strict non-intervention policy of Sir George Barlow, his predecessor, who had in this respect followed the policy of Lord Cornwallis, who had, in his second term of office, reversed the policy of Marquess Wellesley, which had led to the latter's recall—and gave effect to it by wars of conquest and by alliance. The conquests included the seizure of the French islands of Mauritius and Bourbon (1810), of the Dutch spice islands (1811), and embassies for concluding treaties of alliance were sent to Persia, Afghanistan and the Punjab. The mission to Persia was unsuccessful because of the quarrel between the British agents sent from India, and those from England. Malcolm, who had been sent by Minto from India—he was then Resident at Mysore—returned without accomplishing anything. The mission to Kabul failed too. Afghanistan was in the throes of a civil war, and the British envoy could not even reach the Afghan capital. The mission to Mahārājah Ranjit Singh of the Punjab was headed by Metcalfe and fared better. A treaty of perpetual friendship was signed at Amritsar in 1809. This Treaty was, for both sides, a masterstroke of policy. Ranjit Singh undertook to abstain from making any encroachments on the territories of the Sikh chiefs south of the Sutlej, which was recognised as the frontier between his own and the British dominions. The British posted an army at Ludhiana to watch the frontier. But in the self-same year 1809, Ranjit Singh's ambitions, however, received a rude shock. The British took the Sikhs of Sirhind and Malwa—the country south of the Sutlej—under their protection, and compelled him to remain on the other side of the river on pain of war. Ranjit Singh realized that so long as his rule was not firmly established, it would be futile for him to arouse the

hostility of a military power like the British and yielded to the obvious. The treaty of peace and friendship once made was accordingly never broken by him. This helped him to consolidate unhampered his dominion between 1809 and 1824. In 1818, he took Multan; in the following year, he annexed Kashmir; took Derajat in 1820, and Peshawar in 1823. He now became supreme in the Punjab and master of a vast territory including Kashmir, Multan and Peshawar. Undisturbed, he ruled successfully over his dominions till his death in 1839. Because the British of the day kept faith with him—unlike those of Haidar's days at Madras after the Treaty of 1769—he kept faith with them and refused to help any one against the British. The active policy of intervention followed openly by Lord Hastings (1813-1823) was rendered possible by the keeping of faith by the British with Ranjit Singh, who would not help the Mahrattas or anybody else against them. As we know, the policy of Lord Hastings and his wars put an end to the existence of all independent principalities south of the Sutlej and established the paramountcy of the British over this vast dominion. Ranjit Singh was silent witness to the war with Nepal in 1814, which ended in the Treaty of Sigauli and the cession of Garhwal and Kumaon and the acceptance of the British Resident at the Nepalese capital, Khatmandu; to the absorption of Central India by the British by the suppression of the Pindaris by 1816; to the Third Mahratta War which made Peshwa Baji Rao a British pensioner; to the defeat of the Rāja of Nagpur at Sitabaldi and of Holkar at Mahidpur and the cession and absorption of part of their respective territories; to Sindhia's cession of Ajmere and Gaikwad's cession of Ahmedabad to the Rajput States passing under British protection, and the Rāja of Satara being provided a

small principality which he ruled under British suzerainty.

As between Haider and Ranjit Singh, the times were different; the British policies pursued were different, and the character and calibre of the British representatives of the two periods were different. If Haider had to deal with a succession of Governors of Fort St. George who were still largely imbued with the commercial ideas of the period, which allowed private trade and winked at corruption a great deal, with men like George Strattan (suspended), Sir Thomas Rumbold, John Whitehill (suspended); and if honest men like Macartney were the exception and not the rule, Ranjit Singh had to do largely with men who were empire-builders, of high probity, culture and character, who, while they kept to their solemn engagements and pursued their own policies, allowed others to pursue theirs without let or hindrance, men like the first Lord Minto and Lord Hastings. During the Governor-Generalship of Lord Auckland (1836-1842), Ranjit Singh died (1839). But before then, Auckland had embroiled India in Afghan affairs, which proved disastrous to the British cause. Not only he interfered in Afghan politics, but he also got Ranjit Singh go with him in the pursuit of this wrong adventure. The Russians had, during the Napoleonic wars, made considerable advance into the East. They had defeated, in 1826, the Persians and acquired great influence in Persia. Thus deprived of their own influence in that country, the British turned to Afghanistan, in order to use it as a barrier against possible Russian invasions. Afghanistan was unfortunately then in a state of internal turmoil. The Durrāni dynasty, founded by Ahmad Shah, had been expelled from Kabul and Ghazni by Dōst Muhammad, a chief of the Barakzai clan. Shah Shūja, the Durrāni claimant to the Afghan throne, took refuge in India,

though Durrāni chiefs still held Herat and Kandahar. The Persians, aided by the Russians, laid siege to Herat in 1837. Dōst Muhammad desired for help from the British against the Russians and Persians. Auckland refused assistance and Dost Muhammad turned to the Russians for aid. On this, Lord Auckland determined to interfere. He sent a naval force into the Persian Gulf. The Shah of Persia was thus compelled to raise the siege of Herat. Next, Auckland resolved upon deposing Dōst Muhammad and placing Shah Shuja on the Afghan throne. He entered into a treaty with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja for this purpose, according to which Ranjit Singh agreed to co-operate with the British to restore Shah Shuja. It has been held that this could not be defended, as it meant interference in the affairs of a ruler who had done no injury to either the British or Ranjit Singh. The Tripartite Treaty concluded in 1838 between the British, Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja was a mistake as it led to hostilities with an inoffensive neighbour. This was the sole fault committed by Ranjit Singh during the whole period of his rule over the Punjab, having been drawn into it by the fatal mistake of Auckland. The First Afghan War followed. The British forces marched through Sindh, in breach of the agreement with the Amirs of that country concluded in 1832, as Ranjit Singh would not permit them the Punjab route. Kandahar and Ghazni fell. Dōst Muhammad fled from Kabul. Shah Shuja entered, in 1837, Kabul, with the British forces. The British, however, could not establish him firmly in authority. Ranjit died in 1839. In 1841, the Afghans rose in revolt and murdered Burnes and Macnaghten, two British officers. Akbar Khān, the son of Dōst Muhammad, assumed the leadership of the Afghans, who forced the British to leave Kabul in 1842. The retreat proved disastrous. Only a single survival out of

the whole force of 4000 reached Jalalabad, gallantly held against overwhelming odds by General Sale. Lord Ellenborough was, as the consequence of a new Government coming into power in England, appointed as Governor-General (in 1841) to replace Lord Auckland. Finding it impracticable to reverse the policy of his predecessor suddenly, he appointed General Pollock to avenge the disasters of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838. He forced the passage of the Khyber and relieved Jalalabad, while General Nott, who had all along stoutly held Kandahar against all attempts to dislodge him, advanced to Ghazni and destroyed the fort. The two forces effected a junction, and after rescuing the English captives, retired from Kabul. Dōst Muhammad, who had surrendered in November 1840 and had been brought down to India, was now allowed to return to Afghanistan unconditionally and to resume his rule. It has been held that this war among other consequences unquestionably smoothed the path for the resistance of the Sikhs, and afterwards the great Indian reaction of 1857. To Ranjit Singh, who died during its course, in June 1839, it meant worse. Weak successors followed and the Punjab was annexed, as the result of the British victories of the Second Sikh War, within less than ten years, in February 1849! Such is retribution sometimes.¹

Now to Haidar, after he came to power in 1761, there were three alternative courses that he might have adopted to avert the non-restoration of Trichinopoly. He could have threatened to go to war with the English, if they did not yield; he could have stood aside and

¹ Owen, *Selections of Despatches*, etc., Thorn, *Memoirs of War in Asia*; Hutton, *Marquess of Wellesley*; Malcolm, *Political History*. L. F. Rushbrook Williams in his *A History of India*, Part III, *British India*, severely criticises Auckland and the Whig government of the time for the policy in *re. Afgan War*. He also does not entirely approve, at the same time, of the effects of the non-intervention policy pursued by Lord Minto (see Chap. XII. 118-126).

allowed matters to take their course; or finally he could attempt to find a peaceful settlement by preparing and waiting, and if possible, by way of mediation. He rejected the first of these courses, for immediate war was both impossible from his own point of view and from the condition of the country. He had to make himself stable; he had to remake the army; and he had to get the finances ready. The country was tired of war, because it had proved fruitless. The army was broken completely. The army was also not suited to modern conditions and equal to the fight that he expected from the English side. It would have been obviously waste of human endeavour and human lives to have tried war in such circumstances. The second alternative was even more repugnant. However impossible now to get justice, Haidar could not and would not make up his mind to take the gross treachery and the malicious trick that had been played on Mysore in the matter of the Secret Treaty. But he knew in the conditions he found himself—a revolution at home and defeat abroad—he could not get justice at the hands of the English. He realized that the English would hear him only when he had rightly impressed them. He accordingly addressed himself to the third course. He realized that his object could be gained by such means—by preparing and waiting and by impressing those around him by what he could achieve, if necessary, single-handed. He saw that he had a tremendous task before him. But he bent down to it earnestly and zealously. Between the seven years 1761-1767 he chalked out for himself a programme of work which was all embracing. It was a period during which he never allowed himself to come into conflict with the English.

The English did not consider the cession of territory to be either inevitable or that it should be done

promptly to avoid conflict. They had seen that Nanjarāja was broken down; that his country had been attacked; and that he had returned home. Not only that, they had seen he had fallen for ever and that a soldier unknown to name and fame—and that one unconnected with the Royal family—had succeeded him. They did not yet perceive that Haidar was a portent and would soon prove more than a danger to them—a calamity. Measures for a peaceful settlement could have been arranged between the two Governments but there was a fly in the ointment. That was Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of the Karnātic, who goaded the English in Madras to action against everybody who stood against his own alleged rights to the office of Nawāb. The Nawāb did not realize that he had to live with Mysore, side by side with it, as a peaceful neighbour, and that the territories of the Karnātic bordered on those of Mysore. The English at Madras were, until Lord Clive interfered in the matter, equally blind to this cardinal fact in the situation. If they had but adequately appreciated that single fact, they would not have made light of the fact that Mysore was bound to fight for what it considered was justly her due—whoever might come to occupy the place of Nanjarāja. By committing this single fault, they were soon to plunge themselves in wars which were to try all their resources for nearly 28 years. As traders they desired peace; as those who found money for the war of Muhammad Alī, they wanted orderly Government, so that they might recover the funds they had provided him with for maintaining him as Nawāb of the Karnātic; and as auxiliaries of a foreign power who did not want to figure in the wars of the country powers, they were anxious to slip away unobserved from a war which had already drained their coffers and which promised to worsen their financial situa-

tion if they had to continue their warlike operations any further.

The treaty of 1769 stood in the way. It proved a trouble to them first because it bound the English to Haidar by the offer of a general guarantee against aggression—provoked or unprovoked—against him. This was a serious responsibility they had accepted, especially because the English had so far had no treaty liabilities to Mysore, except the Secret Treaty which Muhammad Ali had concluded with Nanjarāja in the Trichinopoly affair. Secondly, the Treaty was found to prove impossible of performance by the English at the very first instance that it could be put to test. It involved reciprocal obligations of a military character which the English soon found too onerous for them to be bound by, especially in view of their known and unknown obligations to Muhammad Ali.

They—the English—had yet no correct idea of Haidar or his character. They little realized that he meant what he said. They could have preserved peace with him without sacrificing their principle but they chose their own way. They were too much committed to Muhammad Ali to swerve an inch from their alliance with him, which had involved them financially very deep with him. Even a compromise with Haidar was thus an impossibility for them. Either they were against him; or they were with Muhammad Ali. They plainly could not be with both. After their first failure to respond, Haidar's distrust in the English became deep-rooted. His disbelief in their sincerity took firmer hold of him. That was the dominating factor in all that he did afterwards. The English, because of the influence of Muhammad Ali, cannot be relied on to any extent. He came to the final conclusion he should do without them, and if they stood in the way, to remove them. Haidar thus became irreconcilable and

remained unreconciled. Thus his professed hand of friendship had been rejected and he became in course of time an implacable foe. Ranjit Singh was earnest in his desire of a friendly neighbour in the English across his border, and wholeheartedly believed in them, and the English believed in him, there being no middle party—like Muhammad Ali in the case of the English at Madras and Haidar on the other—and both were satisfied at their coming together, having realized the need for such an alliance. Haidar wished for a steadfast alliance but could not get it, because of Muhammad Ali. The English desired to make friends with him, but their friendship with Muhammad Ali had committed them too far and his venality was so great as to overcome all obstacles until the atmosphere had been purged by the emergence of men like Cornwallis and Wellesley who could push aside all personal interests in the matter and concentrate entirely on public interests. The English honestly believed they would succeed in their efforts to secure Haidar's friendship and repeatedly tried to negotiate through special and other envoys. Except Schwartz, the others were civilians in the service. But they, the ambassadors from the English Company, seem to have been intent more on exploration rather than negotiation. At any rate, the key-note of their talk was to know rather than to get to a decision and help themselves in the realization of their objectives. That was why they repeatedly failed in their missions of peace with Haidar. There is thus a deep difference between the love for amicable relations with the English on the part of Ranjit Singh and Haidar, though the former, during Lord Auckland's time, committed a fatal error which meant to the British terrible trouble with Afghanistan and to Ranjit Singh's successors the loss of all their territory within ten years of the death of Ranjit Singh.

COMPARISON WITH ALA-UD-DIN KHILJI.

Yet another comparison suggests itself and that is one between Haidar and Ala-ud-dīn Khilji (or Khalji as it is latterly spelt). Though five full centuries separated the two from each other, there is a singular similarity between them (Haidar, 1761-1782; Ala-ud-dīn Khilji, 1296-1315 A. D.)

(1) Haidar, like Ala-ud-dīn Khilji, was an unlettered man, but like him, again, had seen a great deal of the world. He had convinced himself, just as Ala-ud-dīn had done before him, that none in his dominions should be allowed to hoard his wealth. He felt, instinctively as it were, the direst enmity between wealth and obedience, between riches and subjection, and between prosperity and authority. While Ala-ud-dīn applied his idea of reducing rich people to poverty to the Hindus only, Haidar applied it to all—Hindus and Muslims alike. Both plundered the rich and took all they possessed. But there was this difference between the two: Ala-ud-dīn, while he never allowed Hindus to accumulate hoards of property, just left to them sufficient from year to year of corn, milk and curds, so that they might subsist and be always submissive and obedient, Haidar did not see any need even for this small measure of concession to necessity. He took all that a servant of his had hoarded and plundered him so effectively of all he possessed that he and his dependents died in the most abject poverty. Both Haidar and Ala-ud-dīn were filled with horror at the sight of a rich man. A rich man was sure to develop pride and may thus become disobedient and thus prove destructive to those in authority. To adopt Ala-ud-dīn's language, the rich should be reduced to such poverty that they might at the

command of authority readily "creep into holes like mice," and trouble no more.²

(2) If Ala-ud-dīn was a man of vigour and ability quite exempt from all the scruples which obstructed his uncle Jalāluddīn's success, Haidar's lack of scruples in his conduct towards his benefactor Nanjarāja has only to be recalled to our minds, and the treatment he meted out to him.

(3) If Ala-ud-dīn adventurously marched to Deogiri — about 700 miles from his own place, a great part of it through the mountains and forests of the Vindhya range, which so completely separates Hindustan from the Deccan, to carry out his new conquests (1294 A. D.) despite the narrow and intricate paths, the want of supplies and the danger of exposure to the arrows of the mountaineers, making the passage difficult for a small force and impossible for a large one—and his entry into so great and populous a country as the Deccan with no more than 1000 men, seemed an act of rashness rather than of courage and gives a high impression of his military talents, Haidar's quick marches and vigorous movements, both into the Karnātīc and the West Coast, ignoring all physical barriers within, exemplify his instinctive military genius.

(4) If Ala-ud-dīn was a great dissimulator and was always insidious in his designs, even including as against his uncle and benefactor Jalāluddin, immediately before he perpetrated the foul crime of assassination against him, Haidar's capacity for the same art is too well known to need elaboration.

(5) If Ala-ud-dīn was thus a parricide, Haidar was a bad regicide, in fact the worst example Indian History affords. If Ala-ud-dīn's murder of the two sons of

2. For Ala-ud-dīn, see Barani, *Tārīkh-i-Firōz-Shāhī* in Elliot and Dowson, III. 181-188; for Haidar, see Mirza Ikbal in his *Ahwālī-Hydr Naik*, in Miles' *Kirmāni*, p. 498 *et seq.*

Jalāluddīn and the imprisoning of his queen lay bare his utter cruelty towards the family of the man who loved him more than his own sons and trusted in him, Haidar affords more than one parallel to these foul acts of cruelty and lack of the milk of human kindness in his career.³

(6) If Ala-ud-dīn was illiterate, capricious as well as cruel and tyrannical, his foreign conquests were among the greatest ever made in India. Like his, Haidar's conquests, despite his illiteracy and tyranny at home, were, for the times he lived in, vast and impressive, while his projected conquests, if he had succeeded in them, would have eclipsed Ala-ud-dīn's.

(7) If quiet and security prevailed throughout the country, if wealth increased and showed itself in private and public buildings, and in other forms of luxury and improvements in Ala-ud-dīn's time, it was equally so during Haidar's period of office as *Sarvādhikāri*, despite the torture he applied in certain cases.

(8) If Ala-ud-dīn, despite his ignorance, was so arrogant that his most experienced ministers dare not venture to contradict him, and the best informed men about his court were careful to keep their knowledge to the level of his requirements, there is reason to believe that Haidar as often superseded the counsel of his ministers, individually and collectively, and even superseded his whole cabinet and substituted his own discretion in place of their deliberations and views.

(9) Haidar would have fully agreed with one of Ala-ud-dīn's maxims, that "religion had no connection with civil government, but was only the business, or rather, amusement, of private life," and another that "the will of a wise prince was better than the venerable

3. See Elphinstone, *History of India*, 384-392; V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, 231-234.

bodies of men," the "prince" in this case being himself as absolute *Sarvādhikāri*.⁴

CONTRAST BETWEEN THE TWO.

Here the contrast begins between the two and may be briefly stated thus:—

(1) Haidar did not go so far as Ala-ud-dīn, who, in the commencement of his career of prosperity, is said to have entertained thoughts of setting up for a Prophet, and founding a new religion; and when he had laid aside that fancy, he is said to have assumed the title of "The Second Alexander," and publicly discussed a project of universal conquest. (2) Nor did Haidar interfere with private trade and go the length of fixing rates for the prices of all articles, as Alexander did.

(9) ON THE LOCATION OF THE SITE OF THE OLD PALACE IN SERINGAPATAM.

Brief mention has been made in the text of the work of the exact spot on which the ancient Palace of the Mahārājas of Mysore stood in the Seringapatam Fort. It has been stated that that spot is marked by the Memorial Mantap which was put up by His late Highness Śrī Krishnarāja Wāḍiyar Bahadur IV on 1st July 1915 in the presence of a large and distinguished gathering of citizens of Mysore from all the parts of the State.

4. See Elphinstone, *o.c.*, 398-400. Dr. V. A. Smith, in his *Oxford History of India*, takes the view "that he was a particularly savage tyrant with very little sense of justice." Prof. Rushbrook Williams differs from this view and says that this judgment "seems rather severe." He suggests that though it is true his government represents typical despotism, it would not be fair to ignore his claims as the first Muslim king who inaugurated a new imperial policy of bringing the whole country under the sway of Delhi and who attempted to introduce a strong and efficient administration and thus created a great historic precedent which had its conscious or unconscious effect in moulding and shaping the policy of the subsequent rulers of Delhi. See *A History of India*, Part I, Muhammadan Period, p. 56. Elphinstone attributes the vigour of Ala-ud-dīn to the "vigour of despotism" itself (*o.c.*).

The Mantap locates the birth-place of Śrī Krishṇarāja Wāḍiyar III of revered memory. This spot having been duly identified, a memorial mantap was erected on it, the foundation stone being laid for it by H. H. Śrī Krishṇarāja Wāḍiyar IV. "The grounds encircling this Mantap," as the Report presented on that occasion stated,¹ "contained the old spacious Palace of the heroic ancestors of the present Ruling Maharajah of Mysore. A remnant of its Karikal Thotti is just behind here still, with its finely sculptured stone known as *Panchānga bhitti kallu* and near here stood the famous *Śukravāra-sejje*, seven storeys high, so named, evidently in honour of the great goddess, Śrī Chāmundēśvarī, the tutelary deity of the Mysore Royal House, to whom *Śukravāra* (Friday) is most sacred. It was here, too, that Rāja Woḍeyar, the ninth Ruler of Mysore in the direct line, supplanted the supremacy of the Viceroy of Vijayanagar and took over his Royal Palace and acquired the historic throne there, the throne which has ever since descended to the heirs of the Mysore Royal House in unbroken succession. It was Rāja Woḍeyar who is known to have built the *Śukravāra-sejje*. His eventful reign covered the period 1578-1617. He laid the foundation of the fortunes of the Mysore Royal House here. Kanthirava Narasa Rāja added to the fort buildings, defending against the invasion of Rapa-dullā Khān, the Bijāpur General. He established a mint here. Chikkadēvarāja ruled a growing State here between 1673-1704." His successors ruled from here in an unbroken line until the death of Khāsā-Chāmarāja Woḍeyar, in 1796, when Tipū, in the exercise of his assumed autocratic powers, would not allow the rightful heir to the throne to succeed, removed the Royal Family to a mean dwelling and plundered the Palace—at Seringapatam—of everything, including the personal ornaments

1. See printed Report of Proceedings, issued 2-8-1915.

of individuals. Krishnarajā Wodeyar III, who was born in this Palace and was then but two years old, cried bitterly at the attempt to take away his little golden bracelets (see text of this work, Chapter XVI, *ante*).

When Haidar rose to power from about 1761, he built a residence for himself within the fort, called a "Palace" by De La Tour. This was within the walls of the fort and was surrounded by a high enclosure. Its remains are now commonly known as the "Palace," and for long converted into and used as sandalwood-store, though the greater part has been demolished. A description of this "Palace" has been given by Schwartz as he saw it in 1779 (see *ante* p. 500) and lately by Buchanan-Hamilton as he saw it in 1800. The Maharaja's Palace was situated near the temple of Śrī Ranganātha, where there are yet a few mud walls and a sunken granary, which are the sole relics of the seven-storeyed building that stood here in ancient days from the days anterior to the Vijayanagar Viceroys at this place and later of the Mysore Maharajas. It is of this building that Wilks says that Tipū, in removing the Royal Family from it, had intended to destroy altogether, and gave orders for that purpose, which were afterwards changed. It was with reference to the valuable contents of the Library at this Palace that Tipū gave the direction that those contents may be sent over to his stables. It was reported to him that several large apartments in it were full of books, chiefly of palm-leaf and *kadatams*, and he was asked how they were to be disposed of. "Transfer them," said he, "to the royal stables as fuel to boil the *cooltee* (grain on which horses are fed)," and this was accordingly done. A miscellaneous collection was, however, preserved from this destruction by the pious artifice of a Brahman, which, in the confusion, fell into the hands of a British officer. Among the historical tracts which this collection contained was the record of a curious inquiry into

the state of the Royal Family and its relations conducted in 1715. The high enclosure, referred to above, was for some years, after the capture of Seringapatam, used as Gun Carriage Factory.

Of Tipū's "Palace" which stood in the Lāl Bāgh, nothing now remains. Buchanan in 1800 says of it that "though built of mud, it possesses a considerable degree of elegance and is the handsomest native building that I have ever seen."

The Fort, as originally designed, appears to have had four gateways, east, west, north and south. The principal entrance was known as the Elephant Gate on the South side. This is not now used, the road being carried through a more convenient gateway made to the west of it. The Elephant Gateway bears an inscription in Persian stating that the foundation of the fort was laid in the year 1219 from the birth of Muhammad, *i.e.*, of Tipū's Maulādi Era (1791 A. D.). This can only refer to certain repairs effected in that year by Tipū. Buchanan says that the streets in the fort were narrower and more confused than in any place he had seen since leaving Bengal. The generality of the houses were very mean, although many of the chiefs were well lodged after their fashion. Tipū allowed no person to possess property in houses there. He disposed off the buildings as he thought fit, and on the slightest caprice changed the tenants. The fort was for several years occupied by the British Troops, and to provide greater space within the walls, the inner ramparts were thrown down and the inner ditch was filled up in 1800. The course of this ditch may now be traced by the line of tamarind trees planted along it when it was closed up. By its conquest in 1799, Seringapatam became the property of the British Government, who leased the island to the Mysore Government for a fixed sum of Rs. 50,000 a year. It became during this period both the administrative

capital of the State and the Headquarters of the Subsidiary Force maintained by the East India Company. The fortress was, between 1799-1804, governed by General Arthur Wellesley; the Lāl-Bāgh was assigned as the residence of the Resident, while the principal mint, the General Treasury, the Huzur Cucheri of His Highness' Government were, partly for the convenience of communication of the Resident and chiefly because Mysore, the residence of His Highness, was yet unprovided with any buildings for these purposes, stationed close to it. About the close of 1804, these deficiencies were supplied at Mysore and these offices were subsequently transferred to that place. The Lāl-Bāgh was at the same time pronounced to be uninhabitable from its extreme unhealthiness, and proposals for the transfer of the Residency to Mysore were also in hand. In 1801, owing to the continued ill-health of the British Troops at Seringapatam, a cantonment was founded at Bangalore, the salubrity of the climate of which place had then come to be widely appreciated. Accordingly, this place was fixed upon as the proper one for cantoning the troops. Seringapatam began rapidly to decline on account of its climate from then, and its decay was proportionate with the rise of Mysore. The population of the island, estimated by Buchanan to have reached at least 150,000 during the period of Tipū, before the expiration of a year, had sunk to 32,000. Meanwhile, the Palace at Mysore began to be restored and we have a description of it, when it was being restored in May 1800 by Buchanan. "It has now so far advanced," he says, "as to be a comfortable dwelling, and I found the young Prince (Śrī Krishṇarāja Wadiyar III) seated in it on a handsome throne." This work of restoration was undertaken by Pūrṇaiya, Dewān at the time, in 1799-1800. In that year, he expended Cantirai Pagodas 29,503, on the materials required for the purpose. In

1800-1801 he spent on them Pagodas 38,000. In the succeeding year, he expended on the garrison stationed in the re-built fort and on the officers employed for its repairs Pagodas 42,572, apart from Pagodas 59,522 incurred as extraordinary expenditure on their re-construction work. In 1802 and 1803 and in 1803-1864 further large sums were spent on them, besides the expenditure incurred on providing H. H. Śrī Krishnarāja Wadiyar's residence at Seringapatam as well. Col. Wilks, writing in 1805, suggested to the Governor-General the removal of all Public Departments of Government from Seringapatam to Mysore if H. H. was not to be dissociated from his officers. This suggestion was duly carried out with the result that Mysore displaced Seringapatam completely in the public eye as the Royal capital.

In the earlier stages, the Rishi Gautama is traditionally regarded as having worshipped Ranganāthaswāmi, whose temple is the principal Hindu building in the fort. The Gautama-kshētra is a small island to the west of Seringapatam where the river divides. Under two large boulders on the north side of it is what is known as the rishi scale, now closed up. Opposite, on the north bank of the river, has been found old Ganga inscriptions of the 9th century A. D. referring to the Kalbappuhill at Śravanabelagola. In 894 A. D., during the reign of the Ganga sovereign Ere Ganga (887-985 A. D.), a person named Tirumalaiya appears to have founded on the island, then entirely overrun with jungles, two temples, one of Ranganātha and a smaller one of Tirumala Dēva, enclosing them with a wall, and to have called the place Śrīrangapura or Śrīrangapaṭṭaṇa (*J. R. A. S.*, VIII, 6; *M. J. L. S.*, XIV, 13). Rāmānuja, the celebrated Vaishnavite teacher, came to Mysore and converted from the Jain faith Bitti-Dēva, the powerful Hoysala king. This king bestowed on his new teacher and his

followers the tract of country on each side of the river Cauvery at this place, known by the name *Ashtaṅgrāma* or 8 townships, over which he appointed his own officers under the ancient designations of *Prabhus* and *Hebbārs*. Apart from this tradition, there is reason to believe that the original town of *Seringapatam* was built by *Udayāditya*, brother of *Biṭṭi-Dēva*, in 1120 A. D. (*M. A. R.*, 1917, page 15). It is probable that the first fort was erected by him. In 1454, *Timmaṇṇa*, a *Hebbār*, descended from one of the officers mentioned above, who is described as the Lord of *Nāgamangala*, obtained, by a visit to *Vijayanagar*, the government of the district with the title of *Danṇāyak* and permission to erect a fort at *Seringapatam*. He is said to have done this with the aid of a hidden treasure he had discovered, and enlarged the temple of *Ranganātha*, making use of materials obtained from the demolition of some Jain temples at *Kalasvādi*, midway between *Mysore* and *Seringapatam*, distant from *Seringapatam* only by about five miles. His descendants held the government until 1495 A. D., when *Seringapatam* passed into the direct possession of the *Vijayanagar* kings.

For, we learn from inscriptions that *Narasa*, the founder at that time of the second *Vijayanagar* Dynasty, "quickly damming up the *Cauvery* when in full flood, crossed over and captured the enemy (unnamed) alive in battle. Taking possession of their kingdom, he made the ancient *Śrī-Rangapaṭṭana* his own." The place was evidently recognised as too important to remain in the hands of a nominal feudatory. It was eventually administered in the name of the *Vijayanagar* sovereigns by their Viceroy until 1610 A. D., when *Tirumala Rāja*, the last of them, surrendered his power to *Rāja Wodeyar*, the then rising Ruler of *Mysore*. Thenceforth *Seringapatam* became the capital of the *Rājas* of *Mysore*, the palace of the *Vijayanagar* Viceroy being occupied by

them. It continued to be the seat of government of the Mysore kings until its capture by the British in 1799, and for a few years later, until the formal transfer of government to Mysore City.

Since the opening of the railway, the town of Seringapatam is easily reached from the railway station. From this point, the situation of the Palace of the Mysore Royal Family at Seringapatam and other places may be fixed more conveniently from the point of view of a visitor. Crossing the south bridge, the visitor enters Seringapatam by the southern or the Mysore Gate. To the west of it is the Elephant Gate and following the road from this gate, De Haviland's Arch is reached. Crossing the railway line, the visitor ascends a south-west rampart above the historic breach marked by a plain monument to the troops, British and Indian, who fell between 4th April and 4th May 1799. This memorial was erected by H. H. Śrī Krishnarāja Wadiyar IV to celebrate the centenary of this great event. The spot from which the Storming Party issued on the opposite side of the river is also marked by a memorial erected by His Highness the Maharaja. The repaired breach and marks of the cannon balls are easily seen. Across the river two cannons still indicate the place from which the Storming Party started for the siege of Seringapatam. Passing along the ramparts, we reach the Sultan's Battery, below which are the notorious dungeons in which British prisoners taken during the Mysore Wars were kept. The way to these dungeons lies through the outer battlements, down in 20 steps. The prisoners were chained to each other in these dungeons. *Next passing small sally ports, we descend to the maidan or Parade Ground, where the Palace of the Vijayanagar Viceroys of Seringapatam, later occupied by the Royal Family of Mysore, stood. Here stands a memorial slab put up by His Highness Śrī Krishnarāja*

Wadiyar IV to mark the site of the ancient Palace, already adverted to. Near here were a number of ancient temples, of which only two or three now remain, of which the most celebrated is that of Śrī Ranganāthaswāmi, and not far from it is the Narasimhaswāmi temple built by Kanthīrava-Narasarāja Wodeyar I.

We next pass on to what are, at present, the remains of the residence of Haidar Ali and Tipū Sultān, known formerly, according to local tradition, as the Lol-Mahal. All that exists to-day of this "Palace" is part of the high plinth on which it stood. In Haidar's time, according to Schwartz, it seems to have been a plain, substantial building with an open balcony or Durbar Hall overlooking the Parade Ground, with another hall opening on the ground behind. It had been converted into a sandalwood store, though a greater part of it had gone to destruction or demolished. Retracing our steps to Col. Wellesley's tamarind trees bordered road, we reach the water-gate, where, according to tradition, Tipū fell. This is said to be the place where Tipū is said to have spent a fortnight before the last siege of Seringapatam. From here the Jumma Masjid, built by Tipū Sultān in 1787, is reached. Its two tall minarets are conspicuous from a great distance, in front of the Mysore Gate. Not far off is the Ganjam or the Bangalore Gate. A furlong off to the north-west of this gate is the Wellesley Bridge. Just outside the Fort, on the island, is the Daria-Daulat-Bāgh, or the Garden Palace of the Wealth of the Sea, built by Tipū in 1784 to commemorate his and his father's escape from the wars with the British. It was Tipū's favourite retreat from business. It is primarily attractive because of its Arabasque work in rich coloura, with which it is covered. Part of the walls is adorned with pictures in a style of broad caricature representing Col. Baillie's defeat at Conjeeveram in 1780 (September 10). It also represents Haidar

and Tipū as they appeared in public processions, besides numerous figures of Rājās and Pālegārs. These representations had been defaced by Tipū prior to the siege, but after the capture of Seringapatam, they were restored by Col. Wellesley, who occupied the Palace for some time. When by the lapse of time the pictures became partially obliterated, Lord Dalhousie, during his visit to Mysore, caused them to be repainted by an Indian artist who remembered them as they were. It may be remarked that the perspective is very bad, and the general effect is grotesque, though it must be admitted that the artist succeeded well in caricaturing the expression and attitude of the British soldier and the Frenchman under Lally. the latter evidently taken from life.

Passing the Daria-Daulat and the Travellers' Bungalow about a mile on the Gumbaz road, Ganjām is reached. Close to the road is the Church built by Abbé Dubois in 1800. The Abbé stayed here and ministered to the local charities till 1823. Though in olden days Ganjām was styled 'Shahar' Ganjām, it is now little more than a village. Towards the east, from the Ganjām road, is the Gumbaz enshrining the tombs of Haidar Alī, Tipū Sultān and Fakhr-un-nissa Bēgum, Tipū Sultān's mother. This is at the eastern end of the island towards the south. The Gumbaz is a square building surmounted by a dome with minarets at the angles and surrounded by a corridor, supported by pillars of black horn-blende. The interior is painted in lacquer with tiger stripe, adopted by Tipū for military uniforms. The double doors inlaid with ivory, which are seen here, were renewed by Dalhousie. Each of the tombs is covered with a handsome pall. The mausoleum is maintained by Government. A tablet on the tomb contains verses which by the process called *Abjad* give 1213 as the date of his death according to the *Hijira*. At short distance from the entrance of the Gumbaz to its

north-east is the tomb of Col. Baillie, erected in 1816 by his nephew, Lieutenant-Colonel John Baillie, then British Resident at Lucknow.² Of Tipū's palace which stood in the Lāl-Bāgh, nothing now remains. Buchanan's description of it as it was has been quoted above. On the rising ground not far away, locally called Sabbal Rāni Tiṭṭu, to the south of Daria-Daulat-Bāgh, is a small monument to officers who fell in the final siege.

Passing out through the Mysore Gate, Scott's Bungalow is reached. Col. Scott was the commander of the garrisons at Seringapatam and French-Rocks. He lived here with his wife, the Bungalow having been built for him by Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar III. Mysterious legends have gathered round his name. According to one of these, Scott's wife and children died suddenly and Col. Scott became so mentally distracted that he rode his charger into the raging torrents of the river Cauvery near by, and that in memory of him, Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar ordered that the bungalow which he occupied should always remain as he left it. Historically, there is nothing in fact about this picturesque story. Mrs. Scott died in child-bed, as testified to by an inscription on her tomb in the Garrison Cemetery, on 19th March 1817. This bungalow is commemorated in the *Lays of Ind* by Alif Chum (Major Yeldham). Col. Scott, it has been ascertained, returned to his native country, Ireland, after retirement from service.

From the above description of the Fort area and adjoining, the relative positions in which the Mahārāja's Palace at Seringapatam stood and the residence put up by Haidar for himself, in which Tipū also resided, and their proximity to the famous temples at Seringapatam will, it is hoped, be clearly perceived.

2. It is an octagonal domed room, enclosed by white-washed stone walls with a pillared porch. A funeral urn stands at each corner of the roof.

(10) ON HAIDAR'S RELIGION.

Something has been said in the text of this work of Haidar's religion. The question whether he professed the Shiah form of Islām or the Sunni form is a smaller matter, though of some interest. The name *Shiah* denotes a Muslim sect which differs from the Sunnis, another sect, on the question of the Imāmate. The word *Shiah* itself means followers or companions. The Shiahs maintain that Alī was really the first legitimate Imām and that he, and not Abu Bākr, was the immediate successor of the Prophet. They would only recognize Alī and his descendants. Many of the Shiahs carried their veneration for Alī and his descendants so far that they went beyond, according to Klein, all bounds of reason, though others were less extravagant. Thus the Ghaliā raised their Imāms (descendants of Alī) above the degrees of created beings and attributed to them divine properties. Some affirmed that Alī was not dead, but would return again in the clouds and fill the earth with justice. They also held the doctrine of metempsychosis, and what they call the immanency, the indwelling of God in man. (See Klein, *The Religion of Islam*, 1906 Edition).

As the whole difference between Shiahs and Sunnis turns on the question of the Imāmate, it is necessary to add that the Arabic word *Imām* means literally a "leader" in religion, from the root *amma*, "to have precedence", or "to lead." It accordingly designates one who has been appointed to be the vice-regent of Muhammad and the leader of the Muslim nation. The office was established after the death of the Prophet. To be qualified for the Imāmate, a person should be (1) a Muslim, (2) a man of full age, (3) a free man, (4) pious in word and deed, (5) a just man, and (6) a Qureish. It is the duty of every Muslim to obey the Imām inwardly and

outwardly, so long as his commands and prohibitions are in harmony with the doctrines of Islām. Should he give orders contrary to the same, *i.e.*, positively wrong or objectionable, he is not to be obeyed. When he commands what is allowable, if his orders are such as tend to promote the interests of the Muslim nation, they are to obeyed; if not, there is no obligation on the Muslim to obey them (see Klein, *o.c.*).

As regards the Sunni sect, they derive their name from the Arabic word *sunna*, which means "way, rule, mode of acting or conduct." The term is used to describe the traditional sayings, actions, etc., of Muhammad. These are rules and patterns for all other Muslims. This kind of information is also called *Hadith*. It ranks next in importance to the *Qurān*. As Klein puts it, "the Science of Tradition is considered the noblest and most excellent after that of the *Qurān*, and it stands the next in importance to that of the Holy Book. Muhammad himself is said to have encouraged his followers to keep and transmit his sayings." There is the Sunna of Saying, which consists of oral laws and utterance derived from the Prophet; the Sunna of Action, which consists of his deeds and practice; the Sunna of Approbation or Confirmation, which consists of his silent sanction of acts done by others. In course of time, it was thought necessary to have the oral traditions sifted and written down. Khalif Omar II (99-101 A. H.) ordered this to be done about one hundred years after Muhammad's death. There are six collections of exceptional authority called "The Six Books." These are: (1) The Traditions of Bukhāri (*b.* A. H. 194), which professes to include only genuine traditions. Klein quotes a learned Doctor of Islām as saying: The collection of Bukhāri is the most excellent book of Islām after the Book of God. (2) The Traditions of Muslim (*d.* A.H. 261), a disciple of Bukhāri. This again is supposed to include only genuine traditions.

(3) The Traditions of Abu Dāud (*d. A. H.* 275). (4) The Traditions of Tirmidhi (*d. A. H.* 279). (5) The Traditions of An Nisā (*d. A. H.* 303). (6) The Traditions of Ibn Māja (*d. A. H.* 273). (See Klein, *o.c.*)

The Sunnis, as remarked above, accepted, as Traditionalists, Abu Bākr's succession. This, however, was contested by the Shiahs who hold that the right of succession belonged to Alī, the son-in-law of the Prophet. Of the first four Khalifs (successors), Abu Bākr, Omar, Othman and Alī, therefore, all but the last are held by the Shiahs to have been usurpers. When Othman died, Muawiya, the Governor of Syria and Damascus, refused to recognise Alī as his successor. The result was civil war, and Alī moved his capital from Medina to Kūfa, not far from ancient Babylon. Hasan, Alī's elder son, succeeded his father, but soon abdicated in favour of Muawiya. Hussain, his younger son, who settled at Mecca, relying on help from Kūfa, contested the rule of Muawiya's son and successor, Yazid, unsuccessfully, and was killed by the Khalif's horsemen on the tenth of Muhurram, the first month of the Muhammadan year, A. H. 61 (October 10, 680 A. D.). Hussain is regarded as a martyr by the Shiah sect, who reverence him and his father with a passionate devotion. The memory of his fame and fate is kept alive on the anniversary of his death by the yearly festival of the Muhurram, with services and processions and lamentations. (In Southern India, it is worthy of record that the lamentation is kept up by an orderly procession of Shiahs marching out in the principal streets wreathing their breasts and crying out simultaneously "Husain-Husain," while others put up ever-green stalls where cool and refreshing drinks are provided *en route* to the processionists). The Khalifs of the Qureish Dynasty were succeeded by the Umayyads (661-750 A. D.). They took their name from Umayya, the great grandfather of Muawiya, who ruled at Damascus. In 750 A. D., this

dynasty, which spread the religion of the Prophet into North Africa, South-Western Spain and parts of Southern France, borders of India and Turkestan and Samārkand, was overthrown by Abul Abbās, a descendant of Abbās, an uncle of Muhammad, and the Abbāsids were established in its place. The first of the Abbāsīd Khalifs, Saffah, held his court at Aubār, on the east bank of the Euphrates; but Mansūr, his successor, founded the city of Baghdad, which became the centre of Abbāsīd power for five centuries, until, indeed, the very end of the dynasty. The Muslims of North Africa and Spain, however, refused to recognise the Abbāsids. Abdur Rahman, a scion of the Umayyad house, was made ruler in Spain, and his descendants established a Spanish Khalifate, which lasted until 1027 A. D. The power of the Abbāsids gradually waned, and practically came to an end when Baghdad was captured by Mongol hordes in 1258 A. D. Another Khalifate had risen at Kairwan, in North Africa, in 909 A. D. and had conquered Egypt in 968 A. D. This was known as the Fatimid Khalifate. These Khalifs who exercised a more or less independent rule at Cairo from 1258-1517 A. D., claimed to be directly descended from Fatimeh, the daughter of the Prophet. In 1517 A. D., when Egypt was conquered by the Ottoman Turks, the office of Khalifa was sold to the Sultān of Turkey, who thus came to be regarded as the successor of the Prophet.

Thus was surrendered by the last member of the Abbāsīd clan to the Turkish the sacred banner and other relics of the Prophet at Constantinople, to which place he had been taken. The Khilāfat became associated with the Turkish Sultān from thenceforward. Meanwhile, with the rise of the Mughals in India, the Khilāfat in India came to be vested in the Mughal Emperor as well independently of the Turks or the Sultāns of Morocco. During the Abbāsīd and Turkish Khilāfat,

there were simultaneously Khalifs in Spain, Egypt and India, but the Turkish Dynasty survived all others excepting Morocco, which had become too weak to pretend to a position which would put it in opposition to the Sultān of Turkey. After the fall of the Mughals in India, Muslim Indians acknowledged the Khilāfat of Turkey. Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908) encouraged the propaganda of Pan-Islāmism, with the view of making himself the spiritual and temporal head of all Muslims, but the Great War of 1914 brought the Kamalist party into power. This party ultimately deposed Abdul Majid, the Khalifa of Turkey, and thus the question of individual Khilāfat came to an end. But long before this, with the fall of Granada (1492) in Europe, and Kahira (1517) in Africa, and Baghdad (1258) in Asia, the political importance of Arabs practically came to an end. (See A.M.A. Shustery, *Outlines of Islamic Culture*, I. 1938 Edn.).

The Shiahs and the Shiah tenets are closely associated with Persia and Persians. Originally, the Shiahs were mostly Persians, or Iranians to give them their new name, and the Iranians are still Shiahs. The Ismailians, a sub-sect of the Shiahs, take their name from Ismail, the adopted son of Ibn Maimum, the sixth Imām. They are also sometimes called the "Sevenas," because they claim that Ismail (and not Mūsā) was rightfully the seventh and last Imām. The Druses (or Druzes) owe their name to ad-Duruzi, who was the Persian minister of al-Hakim (996-1020 A.D.), the sixth Fulamīd Khalif. They revere al-Hakim as the last and greatest incarnation of God. Among other sects of Muslims are Hashohāshins (the Assassins of Europeans), who were such a terror to the Crusaders and the Sufis, who have been influenced by Gnosticism and Greek Mysticism. From among the Sufis various orders of Darwishes have arisen. Then there are Wāhābis, who belong to the close of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. These

represent a military and rather political reform movement in Arabia. In recent years, the Bahis and Bahāids of Persia have attracted attention (see M. A. Cannay, *An Encyclopædia of Religions*, 1921, at p. 252).

While thus, according to religious tenets held, Muslims are divided broadly into Sunnis and Shiahs, besides a few minor sects, according to origin, Indian Muslims are usually classed under three heads: (1) the descendants of foreign Muslims, who came with their families into India, such as the Saiyids, Shaikhs, Mughals and Pathans; (2) the descendants of Arabs and Persians who came by sea and settled on the Coast, e.g., the Mughals and Navāyats; and (3) the descendants of converts from Hinduism. As Muslims of all ranks are allowed intermarriage with any other class, caste or creed, "there are now," says a South Indian writer, "few, if any, Mussulmans who are not at least in part of Hindoo descent" (see Dr. Maclean, I. C. S., in the *Madras Manual of Administration*, Vol. II. 238; III. 532). Of the four classes, according to their origin, the *Syeds* (also *Saiyids*) claim to be descendants of Alī and Fatimah, and also children of the other wives of Alī (Alī had nine wives, by whom he had fourteen sons and eighteen daughters). Alī and Fatimah's descendants through Hassan and Hussain are styled Hassanī and Hussainī; and Alī's offspring by his other wives, Alvī. Syeds style themselves either as Syed (Ar. Lord, Prince, Noble) or Mīr (Prince); their women are *Syedāni*, and their race, *Sandat*. The offspring by other classes of Muslim women call themselves Sharīf (noble). Indian Syeds are met serving as soldiers or in civil avocations. Many are *Maulvis* or *Pirs*, while the poorer folk follow almost any calling. Women of the Syed community generally can read the Arabic *Korān* and devotional books in Persian, though they cannot write either language. Many of the women are also good

needle-women and embroiderers. Saiyids marry among themselves, though they take wives from other classes of Muslims. There was a Syed dynasty of Rulers at Delhi from 1414 to 1451 A. D. The little principality of Banganapalli, in Kurnool District, is ruled by a family of Syeds even to this day. A great number of Syeds are to be found in the adjoining Madras districts of Bellary and Coimbatore. The *Sidis* (Ar. Saiyidis) of the West Coast are descendants of natives of Africa, employed on ships. These held high positions under the Muslim Sultāns of the Deccan. They are the same as the Spanish *Cids*.¹

The *Shaikhs* are those who profess to be descended from Abu Bākr and Umar or from the Prophet's uncle Abbās. They class themselves, according to their Arab origin, as *Ansāri*, *Farūki*, *Qureish*, *Mohajir* and *Siddiki*. The principal of these are;—Shaikh Qureishi, to which belong the Prophet and all his companions and descendants, Shaikh Siddiki, descendants of Abu Bākr: and Shaikh Farūki, descendants of Umar. All descendants of Muslim converts take the title, besides the above, of *Shaikh* (Ar. *Shai-kha*, to grow old). They are found in large numbers in the adjoining districts of Bellary, Cuddapah, Kurnool and North Arcot. The Mughals (from Mongol, Turk, a native of Mongolia) are of mixed Mongolian and Caucasian descent. The Mughal dynasty in India founded by Baber and made permanent in Upper India belong to this race. In South India, they style themselves *Agha* and *Bēg*. They generally are poor—sometimes very poor. The adjoining district of North Arcot has the largest number of them in the Madras Presidency.

The Pathāns (from Ar. *Fathān*, victor): The founder of this class is said to have been the Prophet. In South

1. *Cid Campeador*, the far-famed Castilian warrior of the 11th century A.D., much celebrated in Spanish romance, was of "Cid" extraction. The famous story of his love for Ximera is the subject of Pierre Corneilles' masterpiece "The Cid" (1606-1614).

India it indicates Afghans. They are generally immigrants into it from the Southern Mahratta country. They are here *Sunnīs*.

The following Muslim divisions are known in Southern India. They represent either accretions from Hinduism by the slow absorption process by conscious conversion from the Hindu to the Muslim faith. *Ahmadis*: evidently meaning nothing more than a Muslim; *Arab*: which sounds territorial in its origin; *Bora*: Hindu converts from the Bombay Presidency; mostly traders, who have their own usages and high priests; *Dude Kula* or *Pinjari*: who are cotton-cleaners; *Jonagan*: mentioned below; *Khojas*: Hindu converts to Muslim faith from Bombay; *Labbai*: noticed below; *Māpilla* (or Moplah): noted below; *Moghul*, of Mongol origin, and of Turkish-Caucasian descent, and not of Persian origin as mentioned in the *Madras Census Report* (1901, Chapter VIII); *Navāyat*, mentioned already; *Rāvuttar* (Rowthar), which is only a title taken by Labbais, Marakkāyars and Jonagans, from *Rāhutta*, a cavalry officer, thus indicating their mixed origin, as Muslims have generally been; horsemen rather than mere footsoldiers; *Saiyid*: more properly the name of those descended directly from the Prophet but now taken by others, including, it is said, even recent converts from Hinduism; *Shariff*: strictly the offspring of a man belonging to the Shaikh class by a Saiyid woman, but now used in a less exact sense; *Shaikh*: one descended from the first three successors of the Prophet, but now appropriated by Muslim converts and others of mixed origin.

Separate figures for these different classes of Muslims are not available for the ten years ended 1941. The Census Superintendent, Mysore, gives the following reasons for this absence: "It was usual hitherto to subdivide the Muslims into (1) Labbai, (2) Mughal, (3) Pinjari, (4) Syed, (5) Shaikh, and (6) Pathān, but the Muslim

community itself is not anxious to perpetuate this division, and the Census Commissioner for India also thought it unnecessary to do so" (*Mysore Census Report*, 1941, para 86). The Report, however, is enriched by a valuable series of maps, one of which (No. 8) shows the distribution of Muslim population in the State by taluks. Of the total population of 73 lakhs of the State, though the Muslims in it are but 4,85,000 or 6.62 p.c., they are, from a historical point of view, an important community (*Ibid*, para 87). In 1901, the term "Mussalman" was not in favour, so much so that it was considered as so vague "that its use was forbidden to enumerators but returned nevertheless" by a large number. To-day, within 40 years, the communal feeling in the country has grown so strong that the return by sects and divisions has been forbidden, while the general term "Muslim" or "Muhammadian" has been adopted in their place.

Among those who have been, in South India, accounted for as the descendants of Muslim foreigners with Hindu women, whether in the Tamil, Telugu, Kannada or Malayalam speaking areas, are the following:—

(1) *Jonagan*: more properly *Sonagan*; usually traders by profession. They number about 10,000 in the Madras Presidency. They derive their name from Sonagam, Tamil for Arabia, and are called also Sonnar. The name is also derived from Yavana, which includes both Greeks and Jews under this head. Both these races had early connection with India.

(2) *Labbai*: of Tamil origin, who are traders and betel-vine growers. They marry among themselves. They are a large community in the Madras Presidency, numbering over five lakhs of people. They speak Tamil, which contains a much smaller admixture of Arabic than that used by Marakkāyars, with whom they do not intermarry. In what the exact distinction exists

between these two classes of Tamil Muslims has still to be cleared up. The name of Labbai is said to be by some a mere corruption of the word *Arabbi* or *Arabian*. They claim to have come from that peninsula. But their existence away from the West Coast has to be explained satisfactorily as of Marakkāyars on the East Coast. It has been suggested that they are the descendants of pre-Muhammadan Arabians whom the pearl fisheries on the East Coast attracted. However this may be about Marakkāyars on the East Coast, the Labbais are a distinct community from them and the Jonagans, though earlier Census Officers and writers confused all Tamil speaking Muslims and lumped them together and enumerated them as well up to the Census of 1901 (excluded). The term Labbai has been derived by Wilks as from *Lubbeik*, the Arabic particle (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 264, f.n.), partly on the basis of the traditions current among Muslims in the 18th century, and partly on the *Saadat-Nāma*, which deals with the history of Saadat-ullah Khān, Nawāb of the Karnātic. Writing of the two classes into which the Navāyats (Nevayats) are now found to be divided, Wilks says that "about the end of the first century of the Hejira or the early part of the eighth century of the Christian era, *Hejaj Bin Yusuf*, Governor of Irāk on the part of the Khalif *Abd-al-Melik bin Merwan*, a monster abhorred for his cruelties even among the Mussulmans, drove some respectable and opulent persons of the house of Hāshem to the desperate resolution of abandoning for ever their native country. Aided by the good offices of the inhabitants of Kufa, a town of celebrity in those days, situated near to the tomb of Ali, west of the Euphrates, they departed with their families, dependants, and effects, and embarked on ships prepared for their reception in the Persian Gulph. Some of these landed on that part of the Western Coast of India called the Concan; the others to the eastward of Cape

Comorin : the descendants of the former are the Nevayets ; of the latter the *Lubbé* ; a name probably given to them by the natives from that Arabic particle (a modification of Lubbeik) corresponding with the English *here I am*, indicating attention on being spoken to. The *Lubbé* pretend to one common origin with the Nevayets, and attribute their black complexion to intermarriage with the natives ; but the Nevayets affirm that the *Lubbé* are the descendants of their domestic slaves ; and there is certainly, in the physiognomy of this very numerous class, and in their stature and form, a strong resemblance to the natives of Abyssinia. The Nevayets of the western coast preserved the purity of their original blood by systematically avoiding intermarriage with the Indians, and even with the highest Mohammedan families, for many centuries after the establishment of the Mussalman dynasties of the Deckan. Even at this time there are some Nevayets whose complexions approach the European freshness. Their adherence to each other as members of the same family preserved their respectability ; and they were famed at the Mohammedan courts of the Deckan for uniting the rare qualities of the soldier, the scholar, and the gentleman. I have seen nothing in India to approach the dignified manners, the graceful, and almost affectionate politeness of an old gentleman of this family, who resided at Avilecunda, about thirty miles north of Arcot. I became accidentally known to him at an early period of my residence in India, from having lost my way in a dark night, and wandered into a village about a mile from his habitation, whence I received an immediate invitation, conveyed by two of his sons, and a reception which might grace a castle of romance."

(3) *Māpilla* (or Moplah) : Found in Malabar. They are over 10 lakhs and speak Malayālam.

(4) *Marakkāyar* : From *Marakkār* (lit. possessors of boats, boatmen). The name is from Malayālam

Marakkalam, boat; *kār*, possessor. They are naturally traders, numbering about 5 lakhs in the southern districts of Madras; often wrongly confused with Labbais, Moplahs and other Muslims, but speaking the South Indian languages. They speak Tamil. They are to be found in large numbers on the East Coast, chiefly between Pulicat on the north and Negapatam on the south. Their headquarters is Nagore, near Negapatam, in the Tanjore District. Their patron Saint is Nagore Mīrān Sāhib Khāder Wali, to whose shrine pilgrimages are common. They are persevering fishermen and good boatmen. They are enterprising in their habits and pursuits, there being hardly a trade or calling in which they do not succeed. They are chiefly of the Sunni sect. Physically they are good looking, tall, well-made, robust, sometimes inclined to obesity, of light complexion and with well developed limbs, not unlike the Moplah in their general build-up. The cranium is singularly and strikingly small; the eyes are slightly oblique, and not wanting in expression; cheek bones prominent; lower jaw large and heavy; beard in some instances full and long, but in most cases decidedly spare. They generally wear the *lungi*, a cloth loosely wrapped round the waist and extending below the knees; they also wear bright coloured jackets, and occasionally turbans as well, though the most common head-gear is a skull-cap, fitting closely to a shaved head. They marry among themselves.

(5) *Pinjari* (in Mysore and adjoining Kannada speaking districts of Madras and *Dudekula* in the Telugu speaking districts of Madras): They are usually cotton-cleaners and rope and tape makers, speaking Kannada and Telugu according to the areas they are found in. Some speak Hindustani also. Their customs are a mixture of those of Muslims and Hindus. Their marriage is usually adult, a necklace of five beads being

used as a *tālī* after the Hindu fashion. Inheritance is according to Muslim Law. They pray in mosques and circumcise their boys at the age of 10, though they, at the same time, observe some of the Hindu festivals. They worship their tools at Bakrid and not at the Dasara as Hindus do. They raise the *Azān* (Muslim call to prayers) at sunset and also pray at the tombs of Muslim saints. They take the title of *Sāhib*. In local tradition, Haidar is spoken of as having been "the son of a Pinjari," though there is actually no evidence—contemporary or other—to substantiate this statement. They number about a lakh or so in the Madras Presidency and in Mysore they are only about 5000 strong, being most numerous in Chitaldrug (a cotton-producing area) and next in order in the following:—Kolar, Tumkur, Bangalore, Shimoga, Kadur and Hassan.

(6) *Navāyats*: A class of Muslims which appears to have originally settled at Bhatkal in North Canara, and is known on the West Coast, on that account, as Bhatkalis. The derivation of their name is much disputed. Literally the term means "newcomer." For the story of their immigration into India, see above what has been cited from Wilks. They do not intermarry with other Muslims. They are found divided into the five sub-divisions of Qureshi, Mekhri, Chida, Gheas and Mohajir. They take a high place among the Muslim community. The name is sometimes spelt as *Nevayat* (from Persian Naiti, name of a clan in Arabia). These are described as early emigrants from Arabia, which they left, it is said, owing to persecution by a local governor and settled in the Konkan, and thence spread. They are spoken of as divided into several clans and as very enterprising. The whole of the story as to their being recent or new emigrants, as above described, is denied by this account. (See *Madras Manual of Administration*, III. 593). This tradition current in Madras is

confirmed by inquiries conducted by Mr. S. M. Edwards, the Editor of Duff's *History of the Mahrattas* (o.c., I. 435). He observes: "The name by which this mixed race is known, etc.,.....the name of an Arab clan." The *Bombay Gazetteer*, however, derives the name as meaning "shipmen" or "sailors" (see *Bombay Gazetteer* under *Gujerat Mussalmans*, 14-15). Duff himself adopts Wilks' account (I. 435) of the origin of the Navāyats, while in Madras the descendants of Saadat-Ullah Khān and his successors are known as of the Navāyat family of Karnātic Nawābs. It will be recalled that in the Treaty of Madras of 1769, Haidar made it a condition with the English that all the Navāyats who were then in the Karnātic and who wanted to leave it should be permitted to do so (see *ante*, p. 108).

From the above, it will be seen that the Pinjaris, to whose sub-division of Muslims oral tradition assigns Haidar, are a mixed class of Hindu-Muslim origin. They neither profess the Shiah nor the Sunni tenets but follow their own particular customs. In this instance, apart from the value to be attached generally to it in history, oral tradition has to be rejected. As before remarked, it rests on little or no evidence of a tangible character, while credible evidence of a possible sort—in the shape of Persian annalists—affords information as to the origin of his family to either Afghan sources and emigrating from the Punjab or being directly, according to Haidar's own declarations, connected with the dynasty of Bijāpur kings. According to De La Tour (*Ayder Ali*, 34), Haidar Alī claimed the honour of being by descent a Qureshi, the tribe to which the Prophet belonged. Though the date of the emigration of his ancestors from Mecca is not known, though they were much respected in the district of Kohir (?), situated in the middle of India, between Hyderabad and Gulbarga, Wilks, on the basis of tradition as current towards the close of

the 15th century, says that the first of the family of whom any tradition is preserved, Muhammad Bhelol, came from the Punjab to the south of India (o.c., I. 261-263). Mirza Ikbal, the Persian annalist, records, as we have seen, the fact that Haidar himself was accustomed to assert that he was derived from the kings of Bijāpur (Kirmāni, o.c., 493) and that his followers emigrated after the fall of Bjiāpur to Cuddapah, and served the Afghan rulers of Cuddapah and Kurnool in the petty office of Naik. The son of one of these was Muhammad Naik; his son Alī Naik; and his son Futte Naik. The last had two sons, Haidar Naik and Shahbāz Naik (*Ibid*, 494). While the statement that his ancestors emigrated from the Punjab makes it plausible that they belonged to the Afghan race, the fact that they entered the service of Afghan rulers in the South, confirms such an inference. While such an inference makes it possible that they might have followed, as the Afghans really do, the Sunni tenets, the fact that Haidar was wont to profess his descent from the Bijāpur kings, makes it equally possible that his forbears followed, as did the generality of the kings of the Bijāpur line, the Shiah faith. This will be evident from even a cursory knowledge of the origin and history of Bijāpur kings. Yusuf Adil Shah, founder of the Bijāpur dynasty (1489 A. D.), was, according to received account, a son of the Ottoman Sultān Amurath, who fled for his life to Persia and there, he was, it is said, brought up as a Shiah. His zeal, as the first king of Bijāpur, for the Shiah religion was so great that he involved himself in many troubles. He even ordered that faith as the State religion. His son, Ismail, owing to political reasons, became a zealous adherent of the same faith, and gave preference to the Persian language as against Dekhani, a dialect of Hindustani, the language of the country. The third king, Mallu, ruled only six months, while

the fourth, Ibrahim, proved a zealous Sunni. His son Ali Adil Shah reverted to the Shiah and restored it to its former position (see Elphinstone, *o. c.*, 756-758, based on Ferishta, II). If Haidar was, indeed, descended from the Bijāpur line of kings, there is thus some plausible ground for the inference that his family also followed the Shiah faith and that he was born in it. Then, the stories recorded by Kīrmāni of his discountenancing Shiah-Sunni disputes and calling Alī, "the strongest" of the Caliphs, at the mention of whose name the horse in the mire moved farther, is intelligible to us. There is, thus, reason too for Col. Miles' inference that though Haidar trimmed between the two parties of Shiahs and Sunnis, he was a Shiah (Col. Miles in Kīrmāni, *o. c.*, 484-485).

Judging from the frequency with which the title "Ali" appears in the family of Muhammad Bhelol, the first of the family, it might perhaps be suggested that Haidar's ancestors were more devoted to the fourth Caliph, Alī, than to the first three. Thus, one of Muhammad Bhelole's two sons was named Muhammad Alī; his son was Futte Muhammad, while the latter's son was Haidar Alī, Haidar being the title of the fourth Caliph. According to another statement, recorded by Wilks (I. 261, f.n.), Muhammad Alī, father of Futte Muhammad and grandfather of Haidar, was also known as Shaikh Alī. Tipū himself was otherwise called Futte Alī Khān, though he was ordinarily known by his more famous name of Tipū Sultān, after a saint at Arcot, while one of Tipū's sons (the eldest) was known as Futte Haidar or Haidar Alī Sultān. Though the question of whether a Muslim is a Shiah or Sunni depends more largely on personal predilections or even political circumstances, as we have seen above in the case of Bijāpur Sultāns, still the ancestral history of Haidar shows a more or less consistent Shiah tradition. It is

also significant that the chief minister of Tipū, Mīr Sādik, was a Shiah by persuasion.

To illustrate the point that a dynasty of kings is either Shiah generally, with an occasional personal change in a rare case, owing to political or other reasons, the case of the Mughal dynasty of rulers may be considered. All these rulers were Sunnis by religion, though some of them like Akbar and Dara Shuko were tolerant Sunnis to a remarkable extent. Aurangzīb was rather puritanical and even possibly fanatical, putting down temples—as at holy Benares, and erecting mosques in their places—but he was undoubtedly an exception. When Humāyun lost his throne and went over to Persia to seek the aid of Shah Tahmāsp, the second of the Sufai kings, the Shiah religion was imposed on him, though cordially received, and he diplomatically accepted it but not out of a real belief in it. The interesting story of this imposition—based on Ferishta, Abul Fazl, etc.—may be read in Elphinstone's *History*.² Among the stipulations accepted by Humāyun as price of Persian aid were a profession of the Shiah religion, and a promise to introduce it into India, as well as an engagement to cede the frontier province of Kandahar. The last article was carried into effect; and it was, Elphinstone adds, probably a sense of the impossibility of fulfilling the other that made Humāyun, after his restoration to the throne,

2. Elphinstone, o.c., Book VII, Chap. IV, 468 *Et seq.* Elphinstone says that Shah Tahmasp sent a Kāzi to Humāyun with three papers, containing the Shiah confession of faith, each of which he rejected and started up to call his attendants. The Kāzi, who conducted the negotiation, was not only a kind man, but also of address; and succeeded in convincing him that although he might give up his own life for his religion, he had no right to sacrifice those of his adherents, and that his duty as well as his interest called on him to comply with a demand which he had no means of effectually resisting. That Humāyun himself professed to have been converted, appears from a pilgrimage which he made to the tomb of Shaikh Sāfi at Ardebil, a man of respect not very consistent with the character of a professed Sunni (*Ibid.*, 465 and f.n. 3).

so indifferent to a rupture with Persia, when the period of performance drew near.³ When Nādir Shah, in his turn, deposed the Shah of Persia and made himself king of Persia, he abolished the Shiah religion, and established throughout Persia the religion of the Sunnis (1739). By this change of religion Nādir Shah hoped, says Elphinstone, to eradicate all attachment to the Sufins, whose claims were founded on their being the champions of the Shiah sect. But the Persians remained secretly at heart as much devoted to their old faith as ever. The proposed change alienated the people of Persia from Nādir Shah and led to consequences equally calamitous to both.⁴ He tried to render the Sunni religion more acceptable to the Persians, and to give it something of a national character by placing its establishment under the special protection of the Imām Jāfir, who was a descendant of Alī, and a favourite saint in Persia. Yet he was aware that the people were zealous Shiahs and that the feelings of the sect were turned against him by the priests, whose lands and stipends he had confiscated immediately after his accession.⁵ He was, as we know, eventually assassinated by the Persians, "the beast, the terror and the execrator of his country."⁶

If the Mughals could not be induced to give up the Sunni religion in favour of the Shiah, the Shiahs of Persia could not be induced to give up their national religion, even by a countryman of theirs like Nādir Shah who introduced the new religion for the political purpose of strengthening his position with the people as against the local priests, who being passionately devoted to their religion, were against him and his new religion. The religious sentiment being ingrained in human nature,

3. *Ibid.*, 465.

4. *Ibid.*, 715.

5. *Ibid.*, 731.

6. *Ibid.*, 732, and f.n. 13 and authorities cited therein.

nothing can induce a dynasty of kings or the people of a country to give up the form of religion they have for ages followed and professed. Similarly the Bijāpur kings followed the Shiah faith, largely because it dated back to the founder of the dynasty and political reasons on the part of an individual sovereign could not induce the people to change their religion. Haidar, who claimed Bijāpur descent, evidently was attached to the Shiah religion professed by his family for many generations. But evidently he was not a zealous or over-ardent and fanatical Shiah to force it on others. The political instinct in him was strong, and having regard to the people and the country in which he wielded power, he kept religion to the background and would not allow any differences between the two classes of Muslim religion. He maintained such an equilibrium as between these two main divisions in the State that it is almost a problem to state which form of Muslim faith—Shiah or Sunni—it was that he and his family professed. Hence the remark of Wilks that he was "half-a-Hindu", which term should be taken literally as a description of his extreme tolerance in matters religious, and not in any other manner. Once a Sunni always a Sunni and conversely once a Shiah always a Shiah may not be true invariably, especially in individual cases, and more particularly where politics affects one's religion, but it seems generally true of dynasties and nations all over the Muslim world.

The tradition current in the Mysore State holds that Haidar Ali was a Sunni like his father Futte Haidar, though cultured Muslims in it hold that he was, like Akbar, a free thinker, and that Tipū Sultān was an orthodox Sunni, though he tolerated Shiahs and appointed some of the latter persuasion to be Ministers and Generals. There is, however, no written authority quoted in support of this tradition. Tipū assumed, as

we have seen", in 1786, the title of "Padshah" and the Kutbah read in his own name in place of Shah Ālam, the reigning Mughal Emperor. His silver coins and rupees were called *Imāmi* and borne on the obverse the legend "The religion of Ahmad enlightened the world from the victories of Hydur", and on the reverse the legend "He is the sole or only just King."⁸ He substituted the Hijiri era by a new one of his own called *Maulādi*, which is thirteen years in excess of the Hijira, being reckoned from the conclusion of the Prophet's office and the commencement of the date of his mission.⁹ He is known even to have attempted, in his zeal for Islām, to assume the role of the Prophet in 1788.¹⁰ But the attempt to outshine the celebrated Prophet gave great offence to orthodox Muslims.¹¹ He also substituted Friday for sounding of the *Nowbat* (Royal band) five times on that day of the week in place of Sunday, the day appointed for the purpose by Emperor Aurangzīb, assigning among other reasons that Sunday had been appropriated to the Christians and that on that day occurred the martyrdom of the heads of the faith.¹²

7. See *ante* Chap. XVI, p. 90

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 904-905.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 905.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 907.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*, p. 908.

APPENDIX III.

(1) THE RANA TREATY, OCTOBER 28, 1782.¹

Treaty for the Restoration of the Hindu Dynasty of Mysore concluded by Mr. John Sullivan, Political Resident at Tanjore, by virtue of powers delegated to him by the Rt. Hon. George Lord Macartney, President and Governor and Select Committee of Fort St. George, of the one part, with Tirumal Rao, the Agent of Her Excellency the Rana of Mysore (Mahārāṇi Lakshman-manniavaroo), of the other part. The Treaty is signed and sealed in the presence of John Sullivan, J. C. Hippley (Assistant, etc.), Rev. C. T. Schwartz and Tirumal Rao (in Kannada), on 28th October 1782.

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT.

“Hyder Naig has usurped all our master's country, destroyed him and his two sons and still keeps his widow our Rana in prison in Seringapatam. The English know that Hyder Naig was a servant of our master's when he did these things.

If the English who are great and powerful will punish this usurper, and deliver to our master the countries Hyder has taken from him, we will enter into the following conditions :

1st.—We will pay to the Company three lakhs of Kanthirayi pagodas as soon as their troops shall have driven the enemy out of the Coimbatour, etc., countries on this side of the mountains.

The English Company are well acquainted with the usurpation of Hyder Ali and the misfortunes which he has brought upon the family of the Rajah of Mysore, whose servant he was. They are willing to assist with their troops in reducing Hyder Ali, and in re-establishing

1. Aitchison, C. U., *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, IX. pp. 200-206, No. 39; also *Mysore State Papers*, I. pp. 2-6, No. 1.

the Rajah in his hereditary dominions upon the conditions proposed in the first, second, third and fourth Articles.

2nd.—As soon as the English troops shall have ascended the Balaghat and possessed themselves of the forts of Ardnelli (Haradanahalli) and Viseyburam (Vijayapuram), we will pay the further sum of one lakh of Pagodas.

3rd.—Upon the surrender of the fort of Mysore, and the Government of the country being given to our Rana or whoever she may adopt, we will pay another lakh of Pagodas, and,

4th.—Upon the fall of Seringapatam we will pay five lakhs of Pagodas, that is to say, in all the sum of ten lakhs of Pagodas.

5th.—We will engage further that from the day our Rana or whoever she may adopt shall be proclaimed in Seringapatam, the sum of five lakhs of Pagodas shall be paid annually to the Company by monthly instalments, and moreover that a jaghire to the annual value of one lakh of Pagodas shall be assigned to the Company, in whatever part of the said dominions they may think proper, upon the following conditions.

6th.—That the Company shall take the protection of all our country into their own hands, and that for this purpose they shall keep an army of sepoys, of European soldiers and of European artillery, with all the officers, guns, stores, etc., field and garrison equipage usually attached to such an army, in the same manner as given to the Rajah of Tanjore.

The Company will undertake to protect the Government of Mysore, and will maintain an army in that country; but as the number of troops that may be required for that purpose cannot now be determined, the Government of Mysore must engage to pay whatever the charges of such an army as may exceed the sum of five lakhs of Pagodas.

7th.—That the Company shall not interfere in the management of the country nor in the arrangements for the *peshcush* and *chout*; that the Killadars, Amuldars, and other officers who may be appointed by the Rana for the management of the country shall be employed, and none others in the collections, and that they shall be supported by the Company's troops in the execution of their office; and further that the Company shall not interfere in the business of the Polygars.

The amount of the former *peshcush* from Mysore to the Mogul as well as the amount of the former *chout* to the Mahrattas, must be regularly paid into the Company's treasury, to be by them accounted for to the Mogul's officer and to the Mahrattas. If by their influence and friendly offices the Company should prevail with the Mahrattas and the Mogul to exempt Mysore from the future payment of *peshcush* and *chout*, the amount of those charges will be held by the Company as a fund for defraying any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred either in future wars, in the building and repairing of forts, or in the augmentation of the military force for the defence and protection of Mysore. The Company will not interfere in the business of the polygars, in the collection of revenue, or in the nomination of the Killadars, etc., but will support and assist all officers who may be appointed by the Government of Mysore, provided the stipulated payments are regularly made by the Government, and provided care is taken to have twelve months' provision in every garrison where the Company's troops may be stationed, otherwise the public safety will oblige the Company to collect money and provisions to the extent of this agreement.

8th.—That the Company will order to be delivered over to us whatever jewels, treasure, elephants, horses, military stores and effects of every kind, belonging to

Hyder Naig and his officers, that may be found in the different forts, towns, etc., or that may be taken in the field.

According to the rules of war established in European armies, whatever is found in a place taken by storm, and whatever is taken in the field from the enemy, becomes the immediate property of the troops: a compromise is often made on such occasions, whereby the army relinquish their claim for a specific sum of money; the Company will recommend this measure to their officers.

9th.—That Hyder Naig and all prisoners of every rank who may be taken in the field and in the different forts, towns, etc., shall be delivered over to the Rana's officers.

As the Company are already engaged as principals in a war against Hyder Ali, they cannot agree to this Article. They will, however, shew particular regard to the interest of the Mysore Government in this and every other instance.

10th.—That Seringapatam being a place of religious worship, no troops shall be stationed within the walls of that place except in time of actual war.

It must be left to the Company to determine in what places garrisons shall be placed, what forts shall be kept up, and what shall be destroyed.

11th.—That the Rana shall be at liberty to station sebundeas and polygars in such places as may be necessary for the security of the revenue and the protection of the inhabitants.

ADMITTED.

12th.—Should it so happen that the Company may not be able to reduce Hyder Naig, but on the contrary that they should be obliged to make peace with him, in that event the Company must take us and all the people who may join with us under their protection, and

continue the same to us and our family for ever. And further they must engage to pay back whatever money may be advanced to them on account of our Rana for the purposes before mentioned.

The Company will comply with this Article in all its extent, as well in regard to the protection of persons as to the reimbursement of money.

13th.—The Governor and Council of Madras must procure a Sunnud from the Company in England to confirm to our Rana and her successors the full possession and government of all the countries that may be taken as before mentioned from Hyder Naig for ever and ever upon the conditions herein definitely expressed.

The powers of Government heretofore vested in General Coote being resumed by the Presidency of Madras, those Articles are executed under their sanction and by their authority, as before expressed. General Coote is now invested with full powers from the Company, his cowl will be sufficient for the present. A Sunnud from the Supreme Government of Bengal will be procured by him, and a public letter from the Company will be obtained as soon as possible to confirm the whole in the same manner as it has been granted to the Rajah of Tanjore.

14th.—As there is no reason to hope that the revenues of a country exhausted by a distant war could afford a larger subsidy than five lakhs of Pagodas for some years; it is therefore further proposed that as the war now carrying on by the English against Hyder Naig can only be terminated by the suppression of his power, the Company should extend the Mysore Government over all the countries now held by Hyder; in consideration of which we will engage to pay by monthly instalments to the Company the further sum of twenty-three lakhs of Pagodas, for the expenses of the war. And from the time that peace shall be re-established and the

Mysore authority acknowledged throughout the dominions now held by Hyder Naig, we will pay annually to the Company the sum of twelve lakhs of Pagodas, and moreover assign to them in perpetuity a jaghire to the yearly value of five lakhs of Pagodas, in whatever part of the said dominions they may think best. In consideration of which the Company must maintain an army for the protection and defence of those countries.

The Company cannot consent to this proposal in all its extent. Their ally the Soubah of the Decan has just claims on some of those countries; and the Mahratta State, with whom the Company are now entering into a Treaty of friendship and alliance, have claims upon other countries. All the conquests therefore made by Hyder Ali from the Soubah and the Mahrattas must be excepted, and the Company must be left at liberty to enter into such engagements with those powers relative to those countries as they may think proper. The *peshcush* and *chout* formerly paid from the other countries, which may be recovered from Hyder Ali and given up to the Rana of Mysore, must be regularly paid to the Company in the same manner and for the same purposes as has been expressed relative to the *peshcush* and *chout* from Mysore. The stipulated payments must be regularly paid, and twelve months' provision must be constantly kept in every garrison, as has been before expressed.

With these exceptions, the Company will engage to put the Rana of Mysore in possession of all the other conquests made by Hyder Ali, and to protect her and her successors in the same upon the conditions proposed.

15th.—Whatever countries may have been taken by Hyder Naig from the Governments of Hyderabad or Poonah or Sattara, that is to say, countries which are held immediately under the dominion of those Governments, we agree shall be excepted, on condition that a

proportionate deduction be made from our payments; but this must not be extended to any tributaries of either State unless in such cases as may be now particularly provided for. The Articles of *peshcush* and *chout* must be left to the decision of our Rana, to whose consideration we will recommend them.

The Company will consent to make a deduction from the Mysore payments in the proportion as the revenue of any other province that may be excepted shall stand to that of the other countries to be given up to Mysore.

16th.—We cannot consent to the restoration of Gooty. Our Rana has received particular injuries from Morarow (Murāri Rao), and besides there is a debt of thirty lakhs of Rupees which is justly due from him to the Raja of Mysore.

The Company will reserve to themselves the liberty of reinstating the family of Morarow in the country of Gooty.

I agree to all the Articles of the Company except these three points: Gooty is not to be delivered to its former possessor; in Seringapatam we will have no garrison; nothing but what belonged to the hereditary dominions of the Nizam and the Mahrattas shall be given over to them.

The foregoing Articles, etc., were drawn up previous to the definitive orders of the Presidency of Madras bearing date the 27th September 1782."

(2) SIR THOMAS RUMBOLD AND HIS CAREER.

Sir Thomas Rumbold belonged to a family which had seen already some service in India. William Rumbold, the first of these, had been the first to join the East India Company's service. He died on 15th September 1728 at Fulhaur, one of the metropolitan and parliamentary boroughs of London, the famous seat of the

Bishops of London, so full of memories of Bodey, Florio, Hallam, Crotch and Albert Smith. He left two sons, Henry and William. Henry became Secretary to the Council at Fort William and died in Bengal, September 1, 1743. He married Sarah Basnet at Fort St. George, August 17, 1731. William, his brother, rose to be Second in Council at Tellicherry, and died in 1745. He left three sons, William, Henry and Thomas. Of these, William entered the Company's military service and died at Fort St. David on August 1, 1752, in his 28th year. The second, Henry, died at sea at an early age. Thomas Rumbold, the third and youngest (1733-1791), is erroneously believed to have begun life as a boots at Arthur's¹, a fashionable gaming house in St. James, or a tide-waiter. He entered the E. I. Company's service as a Writer, in 1752, but before long exchanged the civil for the military profession, much like Clive. After serving under Lawrence in the operations round Trichinopoly in 1754, he accompanied Clive to Bengal in 1756, and for his gallantry at the siege of Calcutta, received a Captain's commission. He was Clive's Aid-de-Camp at the battle of Plassey, being severely wounded in it. Permission having been granted to him to revert to the civil service, he became, in December 1760, 3rd in Council at Chittagong (*alias* Islamabad).² He was subsequently appointed Chief at Patna, and between 1766-1769, he was a Member of Council at Fort William. He was Second in Council under Warren Hastings. Having by now made his fortune by private trade, he retired from service and returned to England. He was elected to Parliament as Member for East Shoreham and took his seat on November 26, 1770. Seven years

1. *Boots*: a boot cleaner and messenger at inn.

2. Writing on 22nd January 1763 from there to the President and Council at Fort St. George, he sent a letter to Clive and intimated that several vessels had been taken by the French squadron (see *Fort St. George Records; Letters to Fort St. George, 1760-1763*, Vol. XXIII. 22).

later, he returned to India as successor to Lord Pigot in the Governorship of Fort St. George, where he landed on February 8, 1778. He took charge on that date and continued in office till 6th April 1780, a period of about two years during which he took measures to readjust affairs in the Northern Circars, pushed through the war against the French, Pondicherry capitulating to Sir Hector Munro, the hero of Buxar, on October 17, 1778.³ Rumbold was created a Baronet on March 23, 1779. Meanwhile Mahe on the Malabar coast was also taken, Haidar, who was in possession of the whole of Malabar, protesting against its invasion and Mysore troops taking part in its defence. Guntur Circar was sought to be occupied at the request of Basālat Jang, by marching troops through Cuddapah, without Haidar's knowledge or consent, it being then under Mysore. Haidar was enraged at this procedure, the more so as he was aware of the intention of Sir Thomas Rumbold to lease it to Muhammad Ali, the Nawāb of the Karnātic (see *infra* for details). Rumbold took secret steps, in anticipation of Haidar's threatened invasion of the Karnātic, to get him deposed, while at the same time he sent the missionary Schwartz on an embassy to him and Mr. Gray, shortly thereafter, to obtain the freedom of certain Englishmen who had been seized at Calicut, and to attempt the resumption of friendly relations. The prisoners had before then been recalled, while Mr. Gray returned unsuccessful, having been treated more as a spy than as an envoy. (See text, p. 316). Sir Thomas resigned office on the ground of ill-health on April 6, 1780, and embarked for England the same day. On his arrival, he was held responsible for Haidar's invasion of

3. Sir Thomas Rumbold's internal administration of Madras, in matters not touched upon here, seems to have been both active and vigorous. See Love, *Vestiges*, III. 141-176. His successes against the French apart, he added to the Fort St. George fortifications, etc., (*Ibid.*).

the Karnatic and dismissed the service of the Company by the Court of Directors, who were displeased with his transactions relating to the Circars. Charges were brought against him of oppression and corruption. The Parliamentary enquiry which ensued proved abortive, and the charges were refuted (see *infra*). Sir Thomas continued to sit in the House of Commons until his death on November 11, 1791.⁴ Such, in brief, is the story of the connection of the Rumbold family with India and the career of Sir Thomas Rumbold himself in it. The

4. Sir Thomas Rumbold was twice married. His first wife was Frances Berriman, daughter of James Berriman and Frances Aspliuwall (married at Fort St. George on October 17, 1736), whom he married at Fort St. George on June 22, 1756. She died at Calcutta in birth on August 22, 1764, aged 26. Sir Thomas' eldest son by her, William Richard (1760-1786), was Aid-de-Camp to Sir Hector Munro at the siege of Pondicherry and carried home the despatches and the colours of the fortress for presentation to the King. The second baronet, Sir George Berriman Rumbold, so named after his mother, was born at Fort William on August 17, 1714. He rose to be His Majesty's Minister Resident at Hamburg. In 1804 he was seized by order of the French Government and conveyed as a prisoner to the Temple in Paris. Two of his sons joined the banking house of Messrs. Palmer & Co., and lie buried in the Hyderabad Residency Cemetery. William, the eldest, succeeded his father in the baronetcy and died in 1838. George, the second son, died on 17th June 1820 in his 26th year. With the death of William, the link which had bound the family with India for more than a century was snapped (see J. J. Cotton, *Lists of Tombs in Madras*, 391-392). Sir Thomas Rumbold's second wife was a daughter of Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle, and to his children by his wife he left his accumulated estates. Sir William Rumbold, third baronet, was born on May 22, 1787 and married at Castle Dormington on July 13, 1809, Henrietta Elizabeth, daughter and co-heiress of Thomas Boothby, Lord Raincliffe. She died at Ootacamund and lies buried at St. Stephen's Church and Cemetery. Sir William was a partner of the well known firm of Rumbold and Palmer and died at Hyderabad on August 24, 1883. "Rumbold Kote" at Chuddergaht, Hyderabad, commemorates the family there. Four of the sons of Sir William succeeded in turn to the baronetcy. The fifth baronet was a captain in the Army, and became President of Nevis (1857-1863) and of the Virgin Islands (1865-1869). He was also a Colonel in the Ottoman Army and served in the Turkish contingent in the Crimean war. The eighth baronet was Sir Horace Rumbold, G.C.B., G.C.M.S. He belonged to the British Diplomatic Service (1852-1900), in which he finally retired as Ambassador at Vienna. He was succeeded by his son Horace George Montagu Rumbold, who also rose to high office in the Diplomatic Service.

European Magazine for May 1782 contains a portrait of Sir Thomas, engraved by W. Angus. This has been reproduced in Love's *Vestiges* (Vol. III, at p. 148).

Considerable misconception and misstatement of facts relating to the public career and conduct of Sir Thomas Rumbold prevailed at one time on the part of the historians of India. Wilks speaks of the "imbecility of this subordinate Government" (of Madras) of the time of Sir Thomas and his successor (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 31). Mill and following him Thornton adversely criticise his proceedings during the period 1778-1780 (Mill, *History of British India*, 1817, Vol. II, pp. 466-475; Thornton, *History of British Empire in India*, 1842, Vol. II, pp. 213-226)⁵. J. C. Marshman was the first to perceive the need for a study of "a large and valuable collection of papers, compiled from original correspondence and from printed

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5. Mill finished writing his *History of India* before 23rd October 1816, in a letter of which date he refers to its completion in three 4-to Volumes. Two Volumes of it were printed by 1817 and the third was going through the Press in that year. In a letter dated 22nd August 1817, he refers to the printing of these Volumes thus: "I have printed two volumes and have begun the third. But the Ms. of a great part of the third is still to revise, and Colonel Wilks, who was Resident in Mysore, is just about to publish, or has published, two volumes more of his Historical Sketches, of which I have received the sheets and they having been written by a man with peculiar opportunities of obtaining knowledge, lay me under the obligation of making a very close comparison of my own narrative with us; and afford me here and there a few facts which render fresh writing necessary." It would seem, according to Mill, he had actually spent ten years on writing his *History of India*. In his letter dated the 23rd October 1816, he writes: "Of India I have undertaken to give no less than a complete history, in which I aim at comprising all the information in which we Europeans are very materially interested, and thank God, after having it nearly ten years upon the carpet, I am now revising it for the Press, and hope to begin to print as soon as I return to London." (see A. Bain, *James Mill. A Biography*, p. 158). Mill had thus not only the opportunity of being influenced by the views of Wilks in the writing of his Vol. III but also of adding in the shape of foot-notes to the matter included in his Volumes I and II, that was passing through the Press at the time. (See Vol. I. 460 and 466). Wilks was thus the earlier writer of the two and Mill had the opportunity of Wilks' writings on the subject of Rumbold's administration.

records long since forgotten, relative to the administration of Sir Thomas Rumbold at Madras, and intended to relieve his memory from the obloquy which has rested on it " (see Marshman, *History of India*, 1863, part I, Appendix). A subsequent study in the same direction is by Sir Thomas' own daughter Elizabeth Anne Rumbold and is entitled *A Vindication of the Character and Administration of Sir Thomas Rumbold* (Longmans, 1868). The main charges levelled against the proceedings of Sir Thomas relate to (1) the large sums remitted to England by him soon after his arrival at Madras; (2) the settlement with the Zamindars of the Northern Circars; (3) relations with the Zamindar of Vizagapatam and the bribe of a lakh of rupees sent to Sir Thomas' Secretary, Mr. Redhead, by Sitaramaraj; (4) the transfer of the Guntur Circar and allied events; (5) relations with Haidar Ali; and (6) the desertion of his post by Sir Thomas on the eve of the war with Haidar.

As regards item No. (1), the large sums remitted to England by Sir Thomas have been considered a decisive proof of the corrupt character of his proceedings. But the papers adverted to reveal that the remittances consisted of his personal earnings as a civilian on the Bengal establishment prior to his office in Madras. These, coupled with his salary as Governor, fully accounted for the fortune he had accumulated, of which he was obliged on his return to England to deliver a schedule. Regarding item No. (2), the Court of Directors had directed five of the members of Council at Madras to proceed to the Northern Circars to complete a settlement with the Zamindars. Sir Thomas has been censured for cancelling the commission and directing the Zamindars to repair to Madras, where they were required to transact business with him alone (Mill particularly stigmatises the proceedings in this connection as

“arbitrary”). But the documents under reference show that for this procedure he submitted his reasons to the Court of Directors, the chief of which was that these landholders were endeavouring to baffle the Commissioners and that the Court declared themselves perfectly satisfied with the course he had adopted. Transactions of this nature, it was further testified to in the Parliamentary investigation, had always been conducted by the President himself and subsequently communicated to the Board. In regard to item No. (3), it is stated that when Sir Thomas summoned the Zamindars of Northern Circars to Madras, the Zamindar of Vizianagaram declined to obey the injunction, pleading the injury which his estates would suffer from his absence, but that his brother Sitaramaraj hastened thither and succeeded in obtaining from Sir Thomas Rumbold the entire command of the Zamindari in spite of his brother's remonstrances. A totally different aspect is afforded by these papers, substantiated by documentary evidence. Sitaramaraj, according to these, was the eldest son and the lawful heir of the principality but under the pressure of palace intrigues was induced to relinquish his right to his brother Vijayaramaraj and to consent to act as his Dewan, in which capacity he managed the estates with such fidelity and benefit as in a few years to double the rent-roll. A competitor at length succeeded in poisoning the mind of Vijayaramaraj against his brother and supplanted him in his office. Sitaramaraj was at Madras seeking the intervention of the authorities before the arrival of Sir Thomas, who determined, if possible, to reconcile the brothers. The new Dewan, who was a defaulter to the extent of £ 90,000, was directed to proceed to the Zamindari and bring up his accounts. Sir Thomas embraced the opportunity of his absence, which relieved Vijayaramaraj from the spell of his influence, to make up the family quarrel. Sitaramaraj was reappointed Dewan and continued to

live in harmony with his brother and secured the punctual payment of the public revenue and promoted the improvement of the family property. Regarding the bribe of a lakh of rupees to Sir Thomas' Secretary, Mr. Readhead, by Sitaramaraj, it is shown that Mr. Redhead never enjoyed the confidence of Sir Thomas and was dismissed within a few months of his arrival at Madras and died soon after.

By far the most important series of events elucidated by these documents is in regard to item No. (4), relating to the transfer of the Guntur Circar, which has been assumed, without question, as the cause of the confederacy formed to exterminate the Company, and of the war with Haidar Ali. The position hitherto deemed as authentic in this connection is as follows: By the treaty made with the Nizam in 1768, a tribute of seven lakhs of rupees a year was to be paid to him for the four Circars, and he was bound to consider the enemies of the Company as his enemies. The Guntur Circar, however, was to remain in the possession of his brother, Basālat Jang, during his life, and then to revert to the Company; but if he gave protection or assistance to their enemies, they were at liberty to take possession of the province and retain it. Basālat Jang employed Mons. Lally to organize an army commanded by French officers, which was gradually increased to 500 Europeans and 3,000 sepoys, and was constantly supplied with recruits and stores through the port of Mōtupalli (the "Motapilly" of English writers). In 1779, Basālat Jang, alarmed by the encroachment of Haidar, voluntarily proposed to Sir Thomas Rumbold to lease his territory for its full value to the Company, to dismiss the French force, and to receive a British contingent in its stead. A British force was accordingly sent to take possession of the province, and Mr. Hollond was deputed to Hyderabad to explain this transaction to the Nizam, and to demand the

remission of the tribute, which had been withheld for some time. The Nizam was exasperated at a proceeding which he considered a breach of the treaty, and immediately formed a confederacy with the Mahrattas and Haidar for the extermination of English power from the Deccan. These measures were concealed from Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, who, on becoming cognizant of them, superseded the authority of the Madras Government at the court of the Nizam, ordered the province to be restored, and engaged to make good the tribute; and by this prompt and conciliatory procedure detached him from the great confederacy. Whereupon Rumbold declared that the Governor-General's action was *ultra vires*, and suspended Hollond.

Thornton, referring to Sir Thomas' proceedings relating to the remission of the tribute due to the Nizam, remarks that "the Governor's view of the subject was supported by reason, but his practical application of it can only be characterized as dishonest and disgraceful". "The time," said the Governor, "seems favourable to throw off so heavy a burden," and accordingly he proposed that it should be thrown off altogether, if possible; but if this could not be effected, a strenuous effort was to be made to reduce the amount." "However soothing the mode of advance," Thornton adds, "the demand for the surrender of the *peshcush* was not calculated to restore the Prince's equanimity, or to dispose him to regard the other acts of the English government with favour. That such a course should have been taken at a time when the Company's affairs in India were surrounded by difficulties, that it should have been adopted for the avowed purpose of escaping some of those difficulties.....are facts scarcely credible. The folly of such policy is not less apparent than its dishonesty. It threw among the raging elements of discord a new one, more active than the rest. The Northern Circars, indeed,

seem to have been rocks on which the common sense of the statesmen of Madras was destined to be wrecked. One set of rulers, with an enemy at their feet, had voluntarily and without necessity agreed to render him tribute for these districts; their successors, as shamelessly as imprudently proposed to annul the contract, and thus gave offence to a powerful prince at a time when, through the wide expanse of India, the British Government was almost without a friend." (Thornton, *o.c.*, 221-222),

The documents of the present collection give a totally different aspect to these transactions: The assemblage of a French force in Guntur had been an object of alarm equally at Calcutta and at Madras for years before the confederacy was formed. In July 1775, the Governor-General stated that no time should be lost in removing it, and authorized the Government of Madras to march a body of troops to the frontier, to demand the immediate dismissal of the French force, and if it was not complied with, to take possession of the country and retain it. The Government of Madras, instead of adopting this extreme measure, sent a remonstrance to the Nizam as Subadar of the Deccan, and urged the removal of the French corps. He promised to respect the treaty "to a hair's breadth," but constantly evaded compliance with the demand, which was often repeated. The capture of Pondicherry, in 1778, gave a new turn to affairs in the Deccan and, combined with the recent encroachments of Haidar, who threatened to absorb the Guntur Circar likewise, induced Basālat Jang to send a Vakīl to Madras and offer to make over the province to the Company on the payment of the same sum which he had hitherto derived from it, to dismiss the French, and receive an English force. A treaty, embodying these arrangements, was accordingly drawn up by Sir Thomas Rumbold, with the full concurrence of Sir Eyre Coote, then a member of the Madras Council, and submitted to

Hastings, who made diverse alterations, and then returned it to be carried into effect, with his full concurrence. A detachment of British troops was then sent to occupy the province, who were obliged to cross a corner of a district which Haidar had recently added to Mysore. The Court of Directors likewise commended the meritorious conduct of Sir Thomas in concluding the treaty.

The Nizam and Haidar resented this proceeding, but their indignation only served to demonstrate the wisdom and policy of it. The Nizam reproached his brother for having rented the Circar to the English, when he should have made it over to Haidar Ali. Haidar had resolved to oust Basālat Jang and take possession of the province, which would give him a position on the flank of the Karnatic, and a port on the Coromandel coast. He was irritated by the promptness with which this design was frustrated, and vowed that he would not allow the Circar to pass into the hands of "his old and bitter enemies." By a singular error, accidental or otherwise, the word "enemy" was substituted for "enemies," and the declaration was made to apply to Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of the Karnatic, and not to the Company whom Haidar always regarded with a feeling of rancorous hatred.

In regard to the tribute of seven lakhs of rupees a year, the papers state that it had fallen into arrears before the arrival of Sir Thomas Rumbold. The Nizam was pressing for payment, and the Madras Government had earnestly entreated the Governor-General to assist them with funds to discharge it. The Madras Presidency was reduced to such a state of poverty that when the troops had been paid for one month they knew not where to look for the next supply. Mr. Hollond was sent to Hyderabad, not to make a positive demand of remission, to be eventually supported by violence, but to

solicit a reduction of the sum, on the plea of poverty, and if the Nizam appeared to be propitious, to propose the entire relinquishment of it, coupled with certain propositions which it was thought would appear an equivalent for the sacrifice. If they were rejected, he was instructed to assure the Nizam that the current tribute as well as the arrears would be paid "as soon as they were in cash." Mr. Hollond found, on his arrival, that the Nizam had taken the French force dismissed by Basalat Jang into his own service, which, considering that the English were then at war with the French, was a gross breach of the treaty, and the Governor of Madras strenuously remonstrated with the Nizam for openly protecting and encouraging the enemies of the Company. Mr. Hollond therefore informed him that the payment of the tribute would be made on his giving full satisfaction regarding the French troops.

The hostile confederacy formed by the Nizam is attributed by the historians to the irritation produced in the mind of the Nizam by the Guntur transactions and the tribute negotiations. But the documents show that it was formed before they had occurred, and that this fact was admitted by the Governor-General himself. The animosity of the Nizam, which led to the confederacy, was created by the support given by the British Government to Raghoba, whom he considered his most inveterate enemy. He had earnestly remonstrated with the Bengal Government on this subject and announced his determination to attack the Company's dominions if the alliance was not relinquished. Another cause of annoyance was the interception of a letter addressed by the Governor-General to Mr. Elliott, the envoy sent to Nagpur, authorising him to conclude an alliance with the Raja, and to assist him in recovering certain territories from the Nizam. It is shown in the papers that it was these two transactions alone which induced

the Nizam to form a combination against the Company. It has likewise been believed that the Nizam* was detached from the confederacy by the assurance of the Bengal Government that the tribute should be paid, and the Guntur Circar restored; but a far more probable cause of this change of policy is to be found, so the papers say, in the fact that while the Nizam was inciting Haidar to attack the English, he discovered that Haidar had sent a vakil to Delhi to obtain from the puppet of an Emperor an imperial grant of the whole of the Nizam's dominions!

In regard to item No. (5), these documents deal with the assertion that the Madras Government, after having giving every provocation to Haidar, were taken by surprise when he burst on the Karnatic. Thornton, touching on this topic, speaks of Sir Thomas Rumbold having "in the last minute which he ever recorded, congratulated himself that all was tranquil, and that no disturbance of the calm was to be apprehended." "Thus," he comments, "by his last act of authority, giving countenance to a delusion which he could not believe, the Governor divested himself of the cares and responsibilities of rule, and bent his course homeward in search of ease and enjoyment" (Thornton, *o.c.*, 225-226). But, from the papers under reference, it would be obvious that every effort was made to conciliate Haidar Ali. The expedition to Mahe was undertaken by orders from home, but when it was found to be obnoxious to Haidar, Sir Thomas proposed that it should be suspended but was overruled by Sir Eyre Coote. Haidar declared that he would be revenged for Mahe in the Carnatic. The Madras Council were fully aware of his hostility, and repeatedly pointed out the danger to which the Karnatic would be exposed from his assaults, and their inability to defend it. They recommended a union of all the Presidencies to reduce

his power. In announcing Haidar's preparations to Calcutta in November 1779, Sir Thomas Rumbold stated that if he should enter the Karnatic, it was beyond their power to prevent the ravages of his horse; but so late as January 1780, Hastings wrote. "I am convinced from Hyder's conduct and disposition that he will never molest us while we preserve a good understanding with him." (The missions of Rev. Schwartz and Mr. Gray to Haidar in 1779-1780 were prompted by the same spirit of conciliation on the part of Rumbold's government towards Haidar).

As regards the last item, the papers show that the measures of Sir Thomas Rumbold had been uniformly commended by the Court of Directors, and that the first censure of his conduct which was accompanied by a sentence of disposition, was written three months after they had received his resignation and appointed his successor, and that his retirement from India was rendered imperative by the advice of the first physicians in Madras.

On Sir Thomas' return to England, Mr. Dundas introduced a bill of pains and penalties charging him with high crimes and misdemeanours, and particularly stigmatising the transaction regarding the Guntur Circar as having been done in a clandestine, treacherous, irresponsible and unjustifiable manner. The law officers of the Crown condemned these proceedings as unjust. Some of the more important allegations in the bill were abandoned, and the bill itself was withdrawn twenty months after it had been presented. Despite the withdrawal, Mill took the view that "Sir Thomas consented to accept of impunity without acquittal; his judges refused to proceed in his trial, after they had solemnly affirmed the existence of guilt and a black stain was attached to the character of both" (Vol. II. 690). Every subsequent writer has, however,

held to the view that the charges against Sir Thomas have not been proven (see Wilson, *History of Madras Army*, Vol. I. 354, quoting Marshman; Hammick's edition of Wilks, II. 31, for Hammick's opinion). Hammick goes so far as to suggest the following in defence of Sir Thomas: "It is clear from the papers referred to in this publication (*A Vindication*), that the Governor-General, as early as June 1780, must have been aware from the information transmitted to him from Madras, that the position then was critical. No attention was paid to the warnings sent to Bengal by Whitehill, and no assistance was sent until the news of Baillie's defeat arrived. *It seems not impossible that Warren Hastings himself aided Wilks by his advice, and may have induced Wilks, as the Vindication suggests, to make the strong defence of the Governor-General, which he inserts here.* As late as January 1780, Hastings wrote, 'I am convinced from Hyder's conduct and disposition, that he will never molest us while we preserve a good understanding with him.' "*Minute*, dated 17th January 1780." Evidently Hastings had been taken in by the artful Haidar Ali. Dr. Vincent Smith quotes both Marshman and Miss Rumbold's book, *A Vindication*, but does not propound any view of his opinion. (See *Oxford History of India*, pp. 540-541, f.n. 1.)

(3) THE TREATY OF MANGALORE,
MARCH 11, 1784.¹

*Treaty of Peace with the Nawab Tippoo
Sultan Bahadur, 1784.*

The
Company's
Seal.

Tippoo
Sultan's
Seal.

TREATY of PERPETUAL PEACE and
FRIENDSHIP between the HONOURABLE the

1. Aitchison, *o.c.*, IX. 207-210.

ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY, and the NAWAB TIPPoo SULTAN BAHADOOR on his own behalf, for the countries of Seringapatam, Hyder Nagur, etc., and all his other possessions, settled by ANTHONY SADLEIR, GEORGE LEONARD STAUNTON, and JOHN HUDLESTON, ESQUIRES, on behalf of the HONOURABLE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY, for all their possessions and for the Carnatic Payen Ghat, by virtue of powers delegated to the HONOURABLE the PRESIDENT and SELECT COMMITTEE of FORT ST. GEORGE for that purpose by the HONOURABLE the GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL appointed by the KING and PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN to direct and control all political affairs of the HONOURABLE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN INDIA, and by the said Nawab, agreeable to the following Articles, which are to be strictly and invariably observed, as long as the sun and the moon shall last, by both parties; that is to say, by the English Company and the three Governments of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, and the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor.

Article I.

Peace and friendship shall immediately take place between the said Company and the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor and their friends and allies, particularly including therein the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore who are friends and allies to the English and the Carnatic Payen Ghat; also Tippoo Sultan's friends and allies, the Beebee of Cannanore and the Rajahs or Zamindars of the Malabar coast are included in this Treaty. The English will not directly or indirectly assist the enemies of the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor, nor make war

upon his friends or allies; and the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor will not directly or indirectly assist the enemies, nor make war upon the friends and allies of the English.

Article 2.

Immediately after signing and sealing the Treaty by the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor and the three English Commissioners, the said Nawab shall send orders for the complete evacuation of the Carnatic and the restoration of all the forts and places in it now possessed by his troops, the forts of Amboorgur and Satgur excepted, and such evacuation and restoration shall actually be made in the space of thirty days from the day of signing the Treaty. And the said Nawab shall also, immediately after signing the Treaty, send orders for the release of all the persons who were taken and made prisoners in the late war and now alive, whether European or native; and for their being safely conducted to, and delivered at such English forts or settlements as shall be nearest to the places where they are now, so that the said release and delivery of the prisoners shall actually and effectually be made in thirty days from the day of signing the Treaty. The Nawab will cause them to be supplied with provisions and conveyances for the journey, the expenses of which shall be made good to him by the Company. The Commissioners will send an officer or officers to accompany the prisoners to the different places where they are to be delivered; in particular, Abdul Wahab Khan, taken at Chittoor, and his family shall be immediately released, and if willing to return to the Carnatic, shall be allowed to do so. If any person or persons belonging to the said Nawab, and taken by the Company in the late war, be now alive, and in prison in Bencoolen or other territories of the Company, such person or persons shall be

immediately released, and if willing to return, shall be sent without delay to the nearer fort or settlement in the Mysore country. Baswapa, late Amuldar of Pali-catcherry, shall be released and set at liberty to depart.

Article 3.

Immediately after signing and sealing the Treaty, the English Commissioners shall give written orders for the delivery of Onore, Carwar, and Sadashevagar, and forts or places adjoining thereto and send a ship or ships to bring away the garrisons. The Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadur will cause the troops in those places to be supplied with provisions and any other necessary assistance for their voyage to Bombay (they paying for the same). The Commissioners will likewise give at the same time written orders for the delivery of the forts and districts of Caroor, Auracourchy, and Darapuram; and immediately after the release and delivery of the prisoners, as before mentioned, the fort and district of Dindigul shall be evacuated and restored to the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor, and none of the troops of the Company shall afterwards remain in the country of the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor.

Article 4.

As soon as all the prisoners are released and delivered, the fort and districts of Cannanore shall be evacuated and restored to Ali Rajah Biby, the Queen of that country, in the presence of any one person without troops, whom the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor may appoint for that purpose; and at the same time that the orders are given for the evacuation and delivery of the forts of Cannanore and Dindigul, the said Nawab shall give written orders for the evacuation and delivery of Amboorgur and Satgur to the English; and in the meantime none of the troops of the said Nawab shall be

left in any part of the Carnatic, except in the two forts above mentioned.

Article 5.

After the conclusion of this treaty, the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor will make no claim whatever in future on the Carnatic.

Article 6.

All persons whatsoever who have been taken and carried away from the Carnatic Payen Ghat (which includes Tanjore) by the late Nawab Hyder Ali Khan Bahadoor, who is in heaven, or by the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor or otherwise belonging to the Carnatic, and now in Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor's dominions and willing to return, shall be immediately allowed to return with their families and children, or as soon as may be convenient to themselves; and all persons belonging to the Venkatacharry [Venkatagiri] Rajah who were taken prisoners in returning from the fort of Vellore, to which place they had been sent with provisions, shall also be released, and permitted immediately to return. Lists of the principal persons belonging to the Nawab Mahomad Ali Khan Bahadoor and to the Rajah of Venkatacharry shall be delivered to the Nawab Tippoo Sultan's ministers; and the Nawab will cause the contents of this Article to be publicly notified throughout this country.

Article 7.

This being the happy period of general peace and reconciliation, the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor, as a testimony and proof of his friendship to the English, agrees that the Rajahs or Zamindars on this coast who have favoured the English in the late war shall not be molested on that account.

Article 8.

The Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor hereby renews and confirms all the commercial privileges and immunities given to the English by the late Nawab Hyder Ali Khan Bahadoor, who is in heaven, and particularly stipulated and specified in the Treaty between the Company and the said Nawab concluded the 8th of August 1770.

Article 9.

The Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor shall restore the factory and privileges possessed by the English at Calicut until the year 1779 (or 1193 Hegira), and shall restore Mount Dilly and the district belonging to the settlement of Tellicherry, and possessed by the English, till taken by Sirdar Khan at the commencement of the late war.

Article 10.

This Treaty shall be signed and sealed by the English Commissioners and a copy of it shall afterwards be signed and sealed by the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George, and returned to the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor in one month, or sooner if possible; and the same shall be acknowledged under the hands and seals of the Governor-General and Council of Bengal and Governor and Select Committee of Bombay as binding upon all the Governments of India; and copies of Treaty, so acknowledged, shall be sent to the said Nawab in three months, or sooner if possible. In testimony whereof, the said contracting parties have signed, sealed and interchangeably delivered two instruments of the same tenor and date: to wit, the said three Commissioners on behalf of the Honourable English East India Company and the Carnatic Payen Ghat; and the said Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadoor, on his own behalf,

and the dominions of Seringapatam and Hyder Nagur, etc, This Treaty was executed at Mangalore (otherwise called Codial Bunder) this 11th day of March and year 1784 of the Christian era and 16th day of the moon Rubee-ul-sanee, in the year of the Hegira 1198.

Tippoo Sultan's	(Sd.) Anthony Sadleir (L. S.)
signature	„ George Leonard Staunton (L.S.)
	„ John Hudleston (L. S.)

(4) THE TITLE "SULTAN" AS APPLIED TO TIPU.

The appellation of "Sultan" has been associated with the name of Tipū. When exactly he assumed it cannot be made out definitely. Probably it belongs to the period of his assuming the role of spiritual sovereign by disregarding the reading in the mosques of the *Kutbah* in the name of the Mughal ruler of the time. This, we know, was Shah Alam II. So, we may safely assign the title to the period 1786 or thereabouts. As we know, the title "Sultan" means, in Arabic, "Prince", from which language it is actually derived. It is the ordinary title of Muslim sovereigns, especially of the old rulers of Turkey, who assumed the title of "Sultan of Sultans." Without any injustice to his fame, the critical modern student of history may discuss the question how far the title was justified in Tipū's case. Haidar stopped short of Royalty or any title whatever even distantly connected with it—much less with such a pompous title as "Sultan." Of his moral virtues, mercy was not, as we have seen, the most conspicuous. Those whom he contrived to put an end to—even among his own trusted commanders—would have something to allege against his sense of justice and humanity. Though his harem was added to from time to time, freedom from all libidinous desires—in fact absolute continence—might be fully conceded in his case. Like Charles the Great of

European history, he engaged in incessant activity of mind and body; his own people and his enemies were not less astonished at his sudden presence when they believed him to be at the most distant extremity of what formed Mysore dominions then. His military renown—as in the case of Charles the Great, again—should be tried by the scrutiny of his troops, his enemies, and by his actions. Alexander, with whom, as we have seen, Tipū has been compared, conquered with the arms of Philip, but Haidar, the great soldier, who preceded Tipū, left him his name, his example, and the generals who helped to win his victories. At the head of his veteran and superior armies, he attacked or rather oppressed the old Pālegārs, who were incapable of confederating for their common safety. Nor could he make up his mind to encounter—even when the just hour came—an equal antagonist in numbers, in discipline, or in arms. His military successes belong to his father's period; the only siege of note—which, if possibly conducted, would have brought fame to him—he mismanaged and has become a stain on his military character. His esteem for the piety and knowledge of *Maulvis* tempted him to imbibe wrong ideas of administration which led the way to corruption and ultimate anarchy. His literary merits are not attested by the foundation of schools—as they distinguish Charles the Great—and works produced in his name. While Charles the Great became famous by the encouragement he gave to learning, Tipū left himself no leisure to even think of it. His own studies—in this Charles the Great was not different—were tardy and his *History* is sufficient testimony to his lack of true literary grace. He did not even strive to acquire by practice a style in keeping with the highest classical types known to Persian, one of the stateliest known to ancient or modern times. No wonder he had at the end of his time acquired no lasting reputation whether as

administrator or ruler and the era founded by him could not last beyond him.

(5) THE PRELIMINARY TREATY WITH TIPPOO SULTAN,
FEBRUARY 1792.¹

Copy of the Preliminary articles agreed upon and
exchanged, dated 22nd February 1792.

Article 1.

One-half of the dominions which were in possession of Tippoo Sultan at the commencement of the present war shall be ceded to the allies adjacent to the respective boundaries, and agreeable to their selection.

Article 2.

Three crores and thirty lakhs of Sicca Rupees shall be paid to the allies, agreeable to the following particulars, etc.

One crore and thirty-five lakhs shall be paid immediately, in Pagados or gold mohurs, or Rupees, of full weight and standard or in gold or silver bullion. The remainder one crore and sixty-five lakhs at three instalments, not exceeding four months each, in the three coins before mentioned.

Article 3.

All subjects of the four several powers who may have been prisoners from the time of the late Hyder Ali Khan to the present period shall be fairly and unequivocally released.

Article 4.

Until the due performance of the three articles above mentioned, two of the three eldest sons of Tippoo Sultan shall be given as hostages, on the arrival of whom a cessation of hostilities shall take place.

1. Aitchison, *o. c.*, IX. 210-211.

Article 5.

When an agreement containing the articles above written shall arrive, bearing the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultan, counter agreements shall be sent from the three powers; and after the cessation of hostilities such a definitive treaty of perpetual friendship as shall be settled by the several parties, shall be adjusted and entered into.

(6) TREATY OF PEACE WITH TIPPOO SULTAN
(THE DEFINITIVE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM), MARCH
1792.¹

Definitive Treaty of Perpetual Friendship for the adjustment of affairs between the Honourable English East India Company, the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor and Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor and Tippoo Sultan, in virtue of the authority of the Right Honourable Charles, Earl Cornwallis, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Governor-General, etc., etc., invested with full powers to direct and control all the affairs of the said Company in the East Indies, dependent on the several Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, and of the Nawab Azim-Ool-Omrah Bahadoor possessing full powers on the part of the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, and Hurry Ram Pundit Tantea Bahadoor possessing equal powers on the part of Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor, settled the 17th day of March 1792, of the Christian era, answering to the 23rd day of the month Rajeb, 1206 of the Hegira; by Sir John Kennaway, Baronet, on the part of the Right Honourable Charles, Earl Cornwallis, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, etc., and Meer Aulum Bahadoor, on the part of the Nawab Azim-Ool-Omrah Bahadoor; and Bukhajee Pundit, on the part of Hurry Ram Pundit Tante Bahadoor, on the one part and by Gholaum Ali Khan Bahadoor and Ali

1. Aitchison, *o. c.*, IX. 212-213.

Rheza Khan, on behalf of Tippoo Sultan, according to the undermentioned Articles, which by the blessing of God shall be binding on their heirs and successors as long as the sun and moon endure, and the conditions of them be invariably observed by the contracting parties.

Article 1.

The friendship subsisting between the Honourable Company and the Circars of Tippoo Sultan, agreeably to former Treaties, with the late Nawab Hyder Ali Khan, bearing date 8th August 1770, and the other with Tippoo Sultan, of the 11th March 1784, is hereby confirmed and increased, and the Articles of the two former treaties are to remain in full, excepting such of them as by the present engagement are otherwise adjusted: and the eighth Article of the second abovementioned Treaty, dated the 11th March 1784, corresponding with the 18th of the month of Rubbee-ul-sanee, 1198 Hegira, confirming all the privileges and immunities of trade which the deceased Nawab Hyder Ali Khan granted to the said Company by the Treaty entered into in the year 1770, is also, by virtue of the present Treaty, renewed and confirmed.

Article 2.

In the fourth Article of the Preliminary Treaty entered into between the allied powers and the said Tippoo Sultan dated the 22nd February 1792, corresponding with the 28th of the month of Jemmadee-ul-sanne, 1206 Hegira, it is written "until the due performance of the three foregoing Articles" (the first Article stipulating the cession of half the country; the second the immediate payment of half the sum of money agreed to be paid, and the remainder in specie only, at three instalments, not exceeding four months each instalment; and the third engaging for the release of prisoners), "two of the sons of the said Tippoo Sultan shall be detained as

hostages", which Articles were confirmed by the present instrument; accordingly the said Tippoo Sultan shall divide the sum agreed to be paid at three instalments above mentioned into three equal parts, and shall pay to the said three powers their respective shares, at the exchange affixed for the amount to be paid immediately, at such places on the boundaries of the allies as shall be determined on by them; and after the performance of the remaining two Articles abovementioned, that is to say, the cession of one-half of the country and the release of the prisoners, in case the amount of the instalments be paid by Tippoo Sultan to the three powers prior to the expiration of the period stipulated for it, the said sons of Tippoo Sultan shall be immediately dismissed, and all pecuniary demands between the contracting parties shall cease and be at an end.

Article 3.

By the first Article of the Preliminary Treaty it is agreed that one-half of the dominions which were in the possession of the said Tippoo Sultan at the commencement of the war, shall be ceded to the allies adjacent to their respective boundaries, and subject to their selection accordingly. The general abstract of the countries, composing half the dominions of Tippoo Sultan, to be ceded to the allies agreeably to their respective shares, is hereunto subjoined and the detail of them is inserted in a separate Schedule bearing the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultan.

(7) GENERAL SIR DAVID BAIRD (1757-1829).

Son of William Baird, of Newbyth; born, December 1757; entered the Army in the 2nd foot, in 1772; came to England from Gibraltar in 1776; went to India in the 73rd in 1779-1780; was in Col. Baillie's force which was overwhelmed by Haidar Ali at Perambakam, September

10, 1780 ; was imprisoned by Haidar at Seringapatam for three and a half years, and released at the Treaty of Mangalore in 1784. His mother, knowing his intractable temper, remarked, on hearing of his imprisonment, that " she pitied the man who was chained to our Davie." He commanded a Brigade, and served under Lord Cornwallis at the capture of Savandurg in 1791, and at Seringapatam in 1792 ; in 1793 he took Pondicherry, commanded a Brigade at the Cape of Good Hope in 1797, and returning to India in 1798, as Major-General, led the storming party at the siege of Seringapatam on May 4, 1799, after which he considered himself slighted at Col. Arthur Wellesley (afterwards Duke of Wellington) being placed in command at Seringapatam ; commanded the Dinapur Brigade, 1800 ; led an expedition to Egypt down the Nile in 1801, to co-operate with the British Army, and was at the capture of Alexandria ; led back the Egyptian Indian Army, 1802 ; in 1802, he commanded a division of the Madras Army, but, when again placed under General Arthur Wellesley for the Mahratta War, resigned and returned to England, being captured on the voyage by the French ; was knighted and became Lieutenant-General ; in 1805-06 was sent to retake the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch ; served at Copenhagen, and in Spain, in 1808, losing an arm at Corunna ; was made K. B., 1809, and a Bart., and General in 1814 ; G.C.B., 1815 ; Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, in 1820 ; Governor of Fort St. George, 1829 ; died in Perthshire, August, 18, 1829. His portrait is by Raeburn.

Sir David Baird's military career in India is of perennial interest to the student of History, particularly in relation to the distinguished part played by him as the leader of the storming party at Seringapatam on the 4th of May 1799, in recognition of which he was presented by the army with the State sword of Tipu (8th June

1799) and was recommended by Marquis Wellesley for the Order of the Bath. On the death of Sir David, Theodore Hook published a biography in two volumes, in 1832, based on the papers furnished by Sir David's widow. In 1912, exactly eighty years later, Capt. W. H. Wilkin published another work entitled *The Life of Sir David Baird* (London: Allen and Unwin), basing it on Hook's book, Fortescue's *History of the British Army* and Major-General Maurice's *Diary of Sir John Moore*. Wilkin notes the partisan character of the writings of Hook, especially his comments on the events of the campaign of 1799, which provoked the following rejoinder from the editor of *Wellington's Despatches*:—"The great end of history is the exact illustration of events as they occurred, and there should be neither exaggeration nor concealment to suit angry feelings or personal disappointment. It should contain the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Mr. Hook has, however, in this respect wandered from his proper province as an historian, at the expense of the reputation of his gallant hero, by attacking the judgment, justice, impartiality, and duty of the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, for the purpose of establishing a grievance and an insinuation, which the facts and results do not warrant, and to which Sir David Baird, had he been alive, would have never given countenance. But Mr. Hook, being a civilian, could not be aware of the impropriety of publishing these letters of remonstrance, which are so inconsistent with subordination and discipline; particularly when it is known that General Baird requested permission to withdraw his intemperate appeal, which General Harris, from personal regard, allowed to pass without further notice; and, certainly, what General Baird thought unworthy of him as a soldier, his biographer had no right to bring up against him, with no other apparent purpose than that of attacking the honour of

those who are living, and the memory of those who are dead." "This reproof", Captain Wilkin observes, "was deserved, for Mr. Hook not only suppressed the reference to Colonel Browne's force in the letter written by General Baird at Seringapatam, but absolutely ignored the Governor-General's despatch on the campaign recommending the General for the Order of the Bath" (see Preface to Wilkin's *Life*, v-vi; as for the Governor-General's Despatch, see *o.c.*, 95-96).

Lady Baird set up an obelisk of Sir David Baird on the hill of Tom-a-chastel, in 1832, the foundation stone being laid on 4th May, the anniversary of the storming of Seringapatam. "Sir David Baird", writes Wilkin, "was not a heaven born genius, and as a general he was not in the same class with Moore and Wellington, but there can be no doubt that he was a first-rate fighting man and an admirable regimental officer. His career is of interest as showing what could be accomplished in those days by an officer who owed nothing either to wealth or family influence. Most of the officers who achieved fame a century ago were men who had attained the command of their regiments very quickly by the help of patronage and purchase... Things were otherwise with Baird. He served for five years with the 2nd Foot and for thirteen years with the 71st before he was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel of the latter regiment, which he commanded for seven years. Baird came to the front by his excellence as a regimental officer; he was not pushed on from one staff billet to another." The Duke of Wellington summed up Sir David in the following words: "Baird was a gallant, hard-headed, lion-hearted officer, but he had no talent, no tact." General Middlemore wrote of him: "You might implicitly place your life and honour and happiness in his bare word, and as he was firm and inflexible upon every point of discipline and duty, so was he incapable of injuring a human being;

with the courage of a hero, his heart was kind and gentle as a woman's". Of course Sir David had defects of qualities. He was, for instance, quick to resent injustice either to himself or others, and apt to suspect it, and on several occasions this had serious consequences. (Wilkin, *o.c.*, 304-305).

(8) MAJOR-GENERAL SIR THOMAS DALLAS (?-1839).

Of the early career of Captain Thomas Dallas, referred to in the text of this Volume (at p. 647), very little is known. He came into prominence as a cavalry officer in the Carnatic. He was in Sir Eyre Coote's body-guard during 1781-1782. He was then, in Wilks' words, "a young cavalry officer, distinguished for superior military address; on ordinary service, always foremost, to the verge of prudence, but never beyond it; of physical strength, seldom equalled; on foot, a figure for a sculptor; when mounted,

"he grew unto his seat,
And to such wondrous doing brought his horse
As he had been incorpsed and demi-natured
With the brave beast."

In common with the rest of the army, this officer had smiled at the recital of these absurd challenges; but, while reconnoitring on the flank of the column of march, one of them was personally addressed to himself by a horseman, who from dress and appearance, seemed to be of some distinction. He accepted the invitation, and the requisite precautions were mutually acceded to: they fought; and he slew his antagonist. After this incident, the challenges were frequently addressed, not as formerly to the whole army, but to *Dallas*, whose name became speedily known to them: and whenever his duty admitted, and his favourite horse¹ was sufficiently fresh,

1. "This singular animal," writes Wilks, "besides the common duty of carrying his rider, exercised, when required, and sometimes spontaneously, all the aggressive force with which he was furnished by nature;

the invitations were accepted, until the Mysoreans became weary of repetition. With a single exception, the result was uniform. On that one occasion, the combatants, after several rounds, feeling a respect for each other, made a significant pause, mutually saluted, and retired. As a fashion among the aspiring young officers, these adventures were not calculated for general adoption; it was found, that in single combat, the address of a native horseman is seldom equalled by an European." (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 141-142). As Captain, Dallas commanded the cavalry escort with the Commissioners to Mangalore during 1783-1784. In 1790, Dallas, by now Brigade-Major, took part in Col. Floyd's southern campaign against Tipū, during which he was "always active and fertile in expedients" and "had been foremost in every charge by day, and acted the artificer by night" (Col. Floyd's letter quoted by Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 394, f.n.). In particular, he volunteered and executed the essential service connected with General Medow's retracing of steps from Dannāyakankote to Velladi (September 1790), from where the united corps of General Medows and Col. Floyd later proceeded against the ghāts of Coimbatore. During the Cornwallis campaign of 1791, Dallas successfully accompanied Col. Floyd to Bangalore—shortly after its siege and fall (March 6, 1791)—against the opposition of Tipū's forces; and on the march of the confederate army to Seringapatam, the Nizām's cavalry force was placed under his immediate management, "in the hope that his skill and conciliation and example might render them efficient" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 445). During the final campaign against Seringapatam (1799), Major

and the Mysoreans, whose imaginations had added to the evidence of sight, would make inquiry regarding the extraordinary phenomenon of a gigantic figure mounted on a furious black horse of enormous size and destructive powers; the stature of the man being just six feet, and that of the horse fourteen hands three inches and a half" (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 141-142, f. n.).

Dallas was placed in charge of transport, and he took part in the storming of the fort, watching the movements of Tipū on the ramparts and reporting to General David Baird (L. H. Thornton, *Light and Shade in Bygone India*, 274, 304). He was with Major Allan and Lt. Col. Beatson passing along the rampart in search for the body of Tipū Sultan (May 4, 1799), when he accidentally recognized among the wounded, in a dying state, the body of Saiyid Sahib (Tipū's faithful officer), who "raised Major Dallas's hand several times to his forehead, and embraced his knees in a most affecting manner," "imploing compassion for himself, and for the honour of his family" (Beatson, *View*, 131-132; also Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 747-748). Dallas later became Major-General and earned the distinction of G. C. B.; and died, August 12, 1839. Such was the career of this well-known cavalry officer. Curiously enough, his name hardly finds a place in the accounts of the members of the 'Dallas Family' as given in the *Dictionary of National Biography* (Vol. V, pp. 393-398). He was also quite distinct from David Dallas mentioned by Princep, Lt. Col. Peter Dallas mentioned by Rice (*Mysore Tombs*, No. 378), and other Dallases in the Madras Service. Buckland's brief reference to Sir Thomas Dallas (?-1839) in his *Indian Biographical Dictionary* is evidently in keeping with the graphic description of Wilks noted above. Sir George Dallas is well known by his letter to Sir William Pulteney on *Trade between India and Europe*, 4to.

APPENDIX IV.

(1) SOME CONTEMPORARY ESTIMATES OF THE PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, RESOURCES, ETC., OF TIPU SULTAN.

We have some estimates of the personality, character, etc., of Tipū Sultān by contemporaries as they saw him in 1790-1792 and in 1799, when he was in his 43rd or 45th year and in his 50th or 52nd year respectively. It is necessary to bring them together here as they bear interesting comparison with other estimates already noticed or referred to in the text of this Volume.

Thus, referring to Tipū in 1790, the *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1799 records;—¹

"Tippoo Sultaun is about 43 years of age; his constitution is much impaired; he is subject to two disorders, the frequent return of which obliges him to take medicine daily.

He is from five feet eight to nine inches high; is now rather inclined to fat, although, a few years since, he was very thin. His face is round, with large full eyes; and there is much animation and fire in his countenance: he wears whiskers, but no beard; he is very active, and sometimes takes long walks.

He has eleven children, of whom only two are in marriage; the elder a girl of seven years; the younger a boy of four years. The eldest of his natural children is a girl of seventeen years: the second a son of fifteen years; he is a great favourite, and accompanies his father upon all occasions; his name is Gholaum Hyder. Another son, Abdul Khalik, is ten years old.

1. *Asiatic Annual Register* (1799), pp. 1-6: *Biographical Anecdotes of the late Tipu Sultan—from information of one of Tipu's officers, written in the year 1790 and translated from the Persian by Capt. J. A. Kirkpatrick.* [This appears also in Dalrymple's *Oriental Repertory*, 1793, Vol. I, from which Dr. K. N. V. Sastri quotes in *extenso* in the course of a recent article entitled *Some Particulars Relating to Tippoo Sultan, His Revenue, Establishment of Troops, etc.*—see *Q.J.M.S.*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 91-98.]

His disposition is naturally cruel ; his temper is passionate and revengeful and he is prone to be abusive ; and his words are false and hypocritical, as suit his purposes.

His policy, thus far differing widely from his father, has been ruinous to his revenues, as well as hurtful to his government. He professes himself Naib to one of the twelve Prophets, who, the Mahomedans believe, are yet to come ; and he persecutes all other castes, forcing numbers to become Mussulman. He is jealous of, and prejudiced against, his father's favourites ; most of whom he has removed from their offices, giving to some lesser appointments. When compared to his father, his understanding and judgment are supposed to be inferior : he is esteemed as a good soldier, but a less skilful general ; and he is wanting in that great resource, which his father so eminently displayed in all cases of danger. His father discriminated merit, rewarded it liberally, and punished guilt with the utmost rigour of a despot ; he gives little encouragement or reward ; and he punishes more from the influence of passion and prejudice than from any attention to justice. His father was assiduous in gaining the attachment of his army : he is rather negligent of it ; and being very parsimonious, he is led to impose upon his troops, whenever opportunities offer. He sometimes retains their pay for several months, and has his own bankers to lend him money at an enormous interest, which is stopped when the pay is issued.

On Tippoo's return to Seringapatam, after the conclusion of the war with the English,² he took an inventory of his property of every kind, which, in treasures and various other articles, on valuation, stood at 20 *crores* of Pagodas : in the treasury, Bahaduri Pagodas (4 Rupees each), 5 *crores* ; the remaining 15 *crores* were in jewels, valuables, etc., and in

Elephants	700
Camels	6,000
Horses	11,000
Bullocks and cows	400,000
Buffaloes	100,000

2. The reference here is of course to the *Second Mysore War* which terminated with the *Treaty of Mangalore* (March 11, 1784).

Sheep	600,000
Firelocks	300,000
Matchlocks	300,000
Swords and crosses	200,000
Guns in Seringapatam, of different calibres, a few of which are			
Malabar	1,000
Guns in other forts	1,000

The treasure and other valuable property are now kept entirely at Seringapatam. Formerly some part of it was kept at Bidanore, and it is said that at the time of General Mathew's taking it, there was a treasure of 25 *lacs* of Pagodas, besides 4 *crores* of Pagodas value, in gold, silver, etc.

The full collections amounted to 5 *crores* and 92 *lacs* of Canteroy Pagodas (of 3 Rupees each); the expenses of *Sebundy*, etc., 1½ *crore*; deficiencies in the collections, from various causes, which lay over 60 *lacs*; for building and repairing forts, making docks and building ships, one *crore* and 82 *lacs*; paid into the treasury, 2 *crores*. Total, 5 *crores* and 92 *lacs*.

Since Tippoo assumed the Government, the revenues have diminished greatly, in consequence of his having adopted a different policy from his father. He removed from the *Hamauldaries* all the *Brahmins* and others of the Hindoo caste, who were well versed in country business, and put Mussulmans in their places. He forbade the sale of *arrack* and *ganja* throughout his dominions, which had produced a very considerable revenue to the Circar. He removed from the Bidanore and Sonda countries about 70,000 Christian inhabitants, who were the cultivators of the ground, by which the revenues of these countries sustained a great loss. The Bidanore country alone yielded to Hyder a net revenue of 18 *lacs* of Pagodas. It has since fallen to 10 *lacs*. From these and other causes, arising from bad management, Tippoo's revenues have been greatly diminished; in so much that his net revenue did not exceed, after the foregoing deductions, the first year, 1½ *crore*, instead of two, as in his father's time; and every succeeding year only one *crore*. He has not thrown

any money into the Standing Treasury since his Government, and he has drawn from it 50 *lacs* of Pagodas.

Since the conclusion of the late war, he has thrown into Seringapatam, provisions for 100,000 men for 12 months; and into his other forts, provisions in proportion to their strength and importance; and as a precaution to prevent treachery, he has appointed to some of his principal forts six Killedars; to others, three; to others, two. Such as are not intended for defence have only one. Although all these are commonly called Killedars, yet, properly speaking, there is but one Killedar; the others go under the domination of *Munshoor* (or Councillors). The first is *Bukshy* or Commander of the sepoys; the second, *Bukshy* of the Peons; the third, *Bukshy* of the *Commatties* and Artificers; the fourth *Darogha*, in charge of the works; the fifth, *Darogha* for superintending the making of bricks and *chunam*. When Tippoo writes, he addresses the Killedars and Munshuran. They have all their respective orders from the Circar; and each is at liberty to detect the other, if anything is done contrary to order.

Tippoo has made great alterations in the establishment of his troops.³ His father was partial to his cavalry, and kept up a much larger body than he does. He is partial to his infantry, and has made great augmentation to them. 5,000 of his own stable horse are formed and trained regularly and 2,000 are Mogul horse; and there are not above 3,000 of the hired horse that can be called good cavalry. The rest are more of the plundering kind. He has adopted Persian terms for the words of command, which were heretofore given partly in English and partly in French; he has also altered the terms for the formation of the troops. In the cavalry, a troop (95 strong) is called a *Yews*; the *Subadar*, a *Yewsdar*; a *Jemidar*, *Furkele*; a regiment (4 yews) is called a *tub*; the commandant, *Tubdar*; a *mowkaub* is composed of four *tubs*; the Commander, *Mowkaubdar*. The troopers are called

3. According to the details given, the Cavalry amounted to 19,000; Artillery, 10,000 (besides 2 Companies of 30 European Artillery); Infantry (including Fighting Peons, Rocket Men, *Commattys*, 2 *Risalas* of *Topasses*, etc.), 184,900, and Lally's Party, 680.

Oskur. In the infantry, a company (125 strong) is called a *jowk*; the *Subidar*, *Jowkdar*; a *Jemidar*, *Furkele*; a battalion of 4 *jowks* is called a *Risala*; the sepoys are called *Jish*. A sentinel is called *Ezudar*; the rounds, *Kirwaun*; the parole, *Nithana*; a guard, *Munkulla*. Each *tub* has two galloper guns, three-pounders, and each *risala* has 2 six-pounders. A *koushoun*, or legion, is composed of one *tub* of cavalry, 4 *risalas* of infantry, and 2 eighteen-pounders. The gallopers are drawn by mules, and all the draught cattle belong to the *circar*. Each *koushoun* has an elephant attached to it, which is harnessed like a horse, to assist the guns through difficulties. The cavalry and infantry are clothed alike, in striped blue and white stuff, of country manufacture. The artillery have also a cotton stuff, white ground, with large round blue spots.

The manner of Tippoo's passing his time in camp: He rises sometimes at 7 o'clock, but more commonly at 8 or 9 in the morning; on halting days, washes and takes medicine; the barber then begins to shave him, during which the Head *Aukbar-Neoise*, or news-writer, comes in with the letters that have arrived by *tappauls*, and relates the news of the different countries, as he has received it. The Officer Commanding his guard then comes in, and makes his report; after which the Adjutants of Corps come and make a report of their respective corps. About 12 o'clock he goes to dinner, which is over in about an hour; he then holds his *darbar*, and transacts all business, civil and military, until 5 o'clock; he then gives out the Parole, which he takes from the Planets, or *Signs* of the *Zodiac*, writing it himself in a book, which is deposited with his own guard, where the Adjutant-General (for each *Cucheri* has one) comes and takes it; after which he lays down and sleeps about an hour; rises and makes his second meal; the *Monshies* or Secretaries are then called in; they read the letters that have been received during the day, and he gives his orders for answering them: all this done, and the letters prepared for despatch, about 2 or 3 in the morning he goes to rest. On marching days, where there is no immediate exigency, the army seldom moves before 8 o'clock after Tippoo has taken his breakfast; he goes

in his Palankeen, on the march; and if anything particular occurs, he immediately mounts his horse. The order of march is varied according to circumstances: during his late war against the Mahrattas, as they were greatly superior to him in cavalry, his infantry marched in four columns thus, $\parallel \parallel \parallel \parallel$. With the cavalry and baggage in the centre, he encamps in a square; his infantry and guns occupying the four faces, the cavalry within the square; each face has an open street, in its centre, with a bazaar. A *koushoun* forms the piquet of the front face, and is advanced from 12 to 15 hundred paces; a *risala* is advanced from it, about 500 paces and on the march all these piquets form the advance and rear guards, and flanking guards to the columns. The infantry are disencumbered of their baggage on the march, bullocks being allowed by the *circar* for carrying it.

The army marches, in common, about 4 coss Sultany. (The Sultany Coss has been established by Tippoo, and the principal roads through his dominions have three trees, of particular kinds, planted on one side, to mark the Coss. The Carnatic Coss is about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles; the Conteary or old Mysore Coss is about 3 miles; the Sultany Coss is about 4 miles. In expedition the whole army marches about six or seven coss Sultany; but a body of horse only, in order to make a push, have gone, in little more than a day and night, a very considerable distance. During the late war in the Carnatic, Hyder marched with a body of horse from Oombly, near Trichinopoly, to Chillimbrum, in 27 hours. He moved off at 3 o'clock in the morning, and at 7 next morning, he reached Chillimbrum, a distance of about 28 coss or 110 miles. The third day his infantry and guns came up. At the commencement of Tippoo's late war against the Mahrattas, he lay with his army at Perour, in the Raydoorg country. Marching at 3 o'clock in the morning, he arrived, at 7 o'clock next morning at Kinchungood, near to Adoni, and attacked a body of 4,000 Mahratta plunderers.

Tippoo keeps in his pay 300 *hircarrahs* at 3 pagodas a month each. Such as prove themselves most active and clever, are employed for intelligence. Besides these, he stations news-writers in such principal places as he thinks

necessary, and these are instructed to write in the style of the soucars, and the intelligence required is made applicable to the coins, etc., treated of; so that if a letter is intercepted, no discovery is made. Should there be anything that cannot be so introduced, it is given verbally to the bearer of the letter. Tippoo seldom rewards with presents, and when he does, they are very trifling, perhaps not more than five rupees."

Lt. Roderick Mackenzie, referring to Tipū in 1790, writes:—⁴

"It has been advanced in India and in Europe, that Tippoo Sultaun had a just claim to be considered an enlightened as well as a powerful prince. Whilst the language of Major General Medows leads to a different conclusion, various other truths strongly contradict the opinion. In every instance during the late war where a gallant defence was made by any of our garrisons or detachments, when fortune has been ultimately in favour of the Sultaun, he has invariably inflicted indignities on his unhappy prisoners; whilst, on the contrary when pusillanimity or want of experience contributed to make the conquest easy, such have been treated with uniform attention. History is replete with instances of applause bestowed on individuals for gallant discharge of duty, by generals and princes in fame, power and civilization, confessedly the first in the world, but, it remained for the Sultaun alone to cherish incapacity even in an enemy, and to reward cowardice in a soldier.

Widely different was the system of this prince among his own subjects. Rendered powerful from the immense bequests of his father, from multitudes of enthusiasts attached no less to his principles than to his person, from a degree of discipline hitherto unknown amongst the native princes of the east, from considerable territorial acquisitions obtained by a sword but little acquainted with its sheath, as well as from an economical and judicious arrangement of vast resources, he cherished engineers with artisans of every description; and alluring men of abilities to his interest, he watchfully

4. R. Mackenzie, *A Sketch of the War with Tippoo Sultaun* (1793), Vol. I. pp. 199-202.

observed their pursuits and fixed their affections by an assiduous attention to forward their prospects in life.

Whilst he thus prepared to revive Mahomedan supremacy and to establish the Koran throughout the East, nothing could be better calculated than the political system that was carefully observed over all his dominions, the warlike preparations that he everywhere carried on, and the profound secrecy of his councils. At the time that all intercourse with neighbouring powers was strictly forbidden, strong fortresses rose up on every advantageous ground; at well-constructed founderies, in the neighbourhood of all his mines, able artists from Europe were maintained in constant employ; and magazines well loaded with ample stores of provision and ammunitions were ready to support his ambitious projects”

Major Dirom, writing about Tipū in 1792, observes:—⁵

“The dominions of Tippoo Sultan, previous to the war, rendered his power formidable, not only from their extent and value, but also from their advantageous position; which, strengthened by numerous fortresses, commanded the frontiers of the adjoining countries; and the restless enterprising spirit of the sovereign obliged all around him to be in a state of constant preparation for their defence.

The Sultan’s revenues, it appears, amounted annually to about two and a half millions sterling. He was, besides, possessed of very great treasures, and had an army consisting of 18,000 cavalry, 50,000 regular infantry, formed in brigades, completely appointed with field artillery; and twice that number of irregular infantry, employed to garrison his forts, and for the collection of his revenues.

Whether from the operation of the system established by Hyder; from the principles which Tippoo had adopted for his own conduct; or from his dominions having suffered little by invasion for many years; or from the effect of these several causes united; his country was found everywhere full of inhabitants, and apparently cultivated to the utmost extent of which the soil was capable; while the discipline and fidelity

5. Dirom, *A Narrative of the Campaign in India which terminated the War with Tippoo Sultan in 1792* (London, 1793), pp. 249-251.

of his troops in the field, until their last overthrow, were testimonies equally strong, of the excellent regulations which existed in his army. His government, though strict and arbitrary, was the despotism of a polite and able sovereign, who nourishes, not oppresses, the subjects who are to be the means of his future aggrandizement; and his cruelties were, in general, inflicted only on those whom he considered as his enemies. He had been diligently employed ever since the former war, in improving his army, and in strengthening his principal forts; and had laid in such ample supplies of military stores in his frontier posts to the north, as shewed that he meditated extensive conquests.

Confiding in his superior power and talents, and aiming at universal conquest, this active Prince not only disclaimed the paramount authority of the Emperor of Delhi, and declared himself to be the greatest king on earth, but also pretending to derive his descent from the founder of his religion, announced himself to be the restorer of the Mahommedan faith. He sent forth proclamations inviting all true Mussulmen to join his standard; and thus to the advantages of the military discipline, adding the enthusiasm of religion, declared his intention to drive the European infidels out of India, and to extend the empire of Mahommed over the world.

The great seal which Tippoo adopted soon after his father's death, and which goes affixed to all his public dispatches, is sufficiently expressive of his ambition to appear both as a prophet and a conqueror.

In the midst of the seal, which is a large oval, there is the following sentence in Arabic, from the Koran—

“I am the messenger of the true faith.”

Round the edge of the seal, beyond the compartment which contains the Arabic sentence, there is a couplet in Persian to the following purport:

“From conquest, and the protection of the Royal Hyder, comes my title of Sultan: and the world, as under the sun and moon, is subject to my signet.”

Ambition thus avowed, to an extent inordinate, created immediate alarm in the powers on the Peninsula of India, and

rendered an union necessary between the Mahrattas and the Nizam: people and powers differing in religion, in government and in every point of interest, except the fear which united them against this powerful adversary, who commanded their southern frontiers. So formidable was he also to the British Government in India, that the revenues of two of their presidencies, Madras and Bombay, were inadequate to support forces equal to their defence.

The experience of the former war; the insolent conduct of the Sultan since the peace; and the fluctuating state of politics all over India; indicated the necessity of establishing a vigorous government, and a powerful army, for the protection of the British possessions in that distant quarter of the Globe."

Lt. Edward Moor of the Bombay Establishment, writing of Tipū from personal knowledge, about the same time, records :—⁶

"That Tippoo is a great man, may, we think, be asserted without much hazard of reputation: that he is a good one, has never been said. . . . Of late years, indeed, our language has been ransacked for terms in which well disposed persons were desirous to express their detestation of his name and character . . . Those who do not choose to be carried away by the torrent of popular opinion, but venture to think for themselves, can find the same excuse for the restlessness of Tippoo as for that of any other ambitious sovereign; and on the subject of his cruelties, venture to express a doubt whether they may not possibly have been exaggerated. Tippoo is not, in fact, much more justifiable in extending his territories than the Mahrattas, the French, or any other nation; but the desire of retaining self-conquered countries as well as the acquisitions of ancestors is so strong that we ought not to wonder if a man of spirit and power, in preference to relinquishing any part of his inheritance or conquests, should, to prevent their dismemberment, tenaciously endeavour to defend

6. Edward Moor, *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment against Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadur* (London, 1794), pp. 193-203.

them, or even to incroach on his neighbours; whose right of possession in the neighbourhood was established by the very means that he adopts to subvert it. It is not our business to inquire into radical establishment of sovereignties or governments: if the historic pages of remote ages were impartially indited, and its records collated with the more recent accounts of later times, we should, perhaps find the majority of governments proceeding from the same origin; and that origin to be usurpation.

On the score of cruelty:—A flowery narrator may, by an appeal to the passions, impose an act of ordinary and necessary justice, on his unsuspecting readers, as an instance of the most arbitrary despotism and unfeeling cruelty. We read with horror and indignation of a subject, at the nod of an imperious tyrant, being dragged from his family and trodden to pieces at the foot of an elephant; and without enquiring into the degree of criminality that might have called for the interference of authority in so sanguinary a proceeding, hesitate not to pronounce the punishment severe and oppressive; and involuntarily suffer ourselves to be actuated solely by emotions of pity for the subjects of such a bloody tyrant, and detestation of the tyrant himself. It should be recollected, that in governments like that of Mysore, unlimitedly monarchical, the mandate of the sovereign is the law.

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Throughout the Sultan's territories, the odium of every execution is, by strangers and observers, thrown upon him; and indeed with some degree of reason, because, as he delegates the power of life and death to his representatives in the different parts of his territories, he ought to be answerable for all abuses of that power committed by them. This doctrine, although plausible in argument, will yet bear a controversy, for many enormities may be committed by viceroys in situations remote from the seat of sovereignty, which, should they come to the monarch's ears, he has it not in his power to remedy..... Some are firmly of opinion that from the qualms of his afflicted conscience, Tippoo cannot repose without a servant and candle in his chamber; and as guilt creates suspicion in the sullied soul, it is asserted that a dish is never

brought to his table, without being previously acquitted of apprehended evil, by the cook tasting it in his presence.....

Major Rennell, in his memoir, speaking of Tippoo, says :
"His general character is that of a man of high ambition, with great abilities for war and finance, cruel to an extreme degree, and obstinately attached to his own schemes. He is unquestionably the most powerful of all the native princes of Hindoostan ; but the utter detestation in which he is held by his own subjects, renders it improbable that his reign will be long."

Impressed with the same sentiments that Tippoo was in his own country utterly detested, many highly respectable persons, at the commencement of the late war, doubted not but the defection of his whole army would be the immediate consequence of the approach of the confederate forces : but, in the very reverse, have been seen of his army, such instances of attachment and fidelity as excite our admiration, and perhaps can scarcely be equalled. Without attempting to draw a comparison....., let it be asked what troops, under such highly disadvantageous circumstances, would have shown an attachment superior to those of Tippoo?..... We have seen their fidelity unshaken, and their courage unbroken..... When we see troops, after being continually beaten for two years, fight as well at the end as at the beginning of the war, we must surely allow it to proceed from something superior to a blind obedience to commands, without admitting loyalty and attachment to the commander, to have any share in stimulating them to their duty..... His troops did oppose the British with a perseverance deserving the tribute of applause.

An opinion has been maintained that militates materially against Tippoo's character of an able statesman ; and if admitted without inquiry, will reduce his credit for political sagacity to a very low ebb. This opinion regards his having provoked the English, with all India to support them, to a declaration of war at a time when they were so well prepared and from profound tranquillity in Europe, enabled to direct their whole force with accumulated energy at him alone. The situation of his European ally, too, was most unfavourable to his interests.

From every circumstance that has come to light, we have reason to conclude that Tippoo expected from France very powerful succours to support him in his late enterprize: the distracted state of his kingdom, precluding the possibility of sending any, may therefore be deemed the dawn of Tippoo's inauspicious fortune..... Deprived by chance of his European ally, fortune frowned also upon his endeavours of attaching any of the native powers of the peninsula to his interest; and from the great abilities of the British ambassadors at the principal courts, the war commenced with a general confederacy in our favour, an instance unparallel in the annals of our history in the East. Had not our negotiations at the court of Poona succeeded in gaining to our party the powerful nation of the Mahrattas, the war would have been carried on under circumstances comparatively unfavourable; or had not the fluctuating councils of Hyderabad, by address, been fixed in our interest, we should have found the effects of the Nizam's alliance with Tippoo more severe than will at first be imagined probable, when their inactivity as our friends is only seen.....

Tippoo being thus constrained to fight his own battles unaided, was expected to fall an easy conquest to so powerful a confederacy; but every unpropitious event that could probably befall him....., he found means to support himself in a manner that astonished even those who had opportunities of knowing the probable state of his army and treasury—the life and soul of Asiatic governments. Never was more head in planning or heart in executing operations displayed, than by our generals and armies in this war..... Tippoo made his attack with almost a certainty of success, but the invincible steadiness of our troops, baffling his attempt, astonished not only his, but our army..... Tippoo, although pursued by such invaried mischance, was not yet in so desperate a case, but one lucky occurrence might have retrieved him. Hence it may be discovered that Tippoo's rashness in provoking hostilities was not so great as would at first appear; for had any one of these events taken a contrary turn, it might have given a contrary turn to the termination of the war.....

We will now consider Tippoo, not as a general or statesman, but as a guardian to his people. When a person travelling through a strange country finds it well cultivated, populous, with industrious inhabitants, cities newly founded, commerce extending, towns increasing, and everything flourishing so as to indicate happiness, he will naturally conclude it to be under a form of government congenial to the minds of the people. This is a picture of Tippoo's country, and our conclusion respecting its government..... We have reason to suppose Tippoo's subjects to be as happy as those of any other sovereign; for we do not recollect to have heard any complaints or murmurings among them, although had causes existed, no time could have been more favourable for their utterance, because the enemies of Tippoo were in power, and would have been gratified by any aspersion of his character. The inhabitants of the conquered countries submitted with apparent resignation to the direction of their conquerors, but, by no means as if relieved from an oppressive yoke in their former government: on the contrary, no sooner did an opportunity offer, than they scouted their new masters, and gladly returned to their loyalty again.

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Tippoo yet remains to be noticed under another character: in his political capacity we have perhaps detained him too long; but as a messenger from God, we have less to do with, and less to say of him. Tippoo, not content with the reputation he must have acquired as a general and a statesman, and not finding in military or political views, objects sufficiently exalted to bound his ambitions, has, it is said, assumed the specious authority of a prophet.

This, although apparently superior to worldly concerns, is perhaps only a secondary consideration, and meant to be totally subservient to sublunary projects. His subjects, he may possibly think, will with more reverence listen to his mandates when sanctioned by the authority of religion; and his armies will with more awe, contemplate the power and dignity of their sovereign and general, when the abilities they admire are annexed to the spiritual sanctity of his character.

Could not some probable reasons be assigned for Tippoo's affecting this singular distinction, we might be induced to look upon it as a childish propensity: the greatest men, however, we sometimes see emulating the trifling acquirements of inferior pursuits. We have an instance of it in the greatest prince and general in the annals of Europe; who, not content with such glorious fame, had the poor ambition to be thought a piper and a rhymer."

Lt. Col. Alexander Beatson, referring to Tipū in 1799, writes:—⁷

"The fate of Tipoo Sultan affords an awful example of the instability of human power, unsupported by justice or moderation: and though its effects upon his unoffending family cannot be contemplated without strong emotions of compassion, the example, thus heightened by misfortune, may prove the more salutary to the princes of India, by impressing on their minds a deeper sense of the danger of violating public engagements, and of inviting foreign invaders to assist them in schemes for the destruction of the British power in that quarter.

No materials have yet come into our possession, from which the charater of Tippoo Sultan can be accurately deduced. During the last seven years of his life his conduct had been a continued scene of folly, caprice, and weakness. He appears to have been accomplished, and his favourite employment, of late was to write memoranda of the most trivial occurrences. He was fond of reading, scrupulously attentive to matters of religion, and a rigid chastiser of drunkenness and other vices.

All his actions of recent date, seem to have proceeded from the impulse of the moment; and it is impossible to trace any one fixed principle on which he regulated his conduct. His arrangements in every department conveyed the idea of an unsettled and capricious mind. Every year, often every month, presented a new change of system; and before it was at all comprehended, a fresh plan was introduced and as quickly abandoned: a particular set of features, or cast of

7. Beatson, *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun* (London, 1800), pp. 149-161.

countenance, was sufficient to raise one man from obscurity to splendour, and to precipitate another from honour to disgrace. His government may be said to have been in a state of incessant revolution; and, notwithstanding the minuteness and severity of his regulations, no prince was ever so grossly imposed upon. He does not appear, like the generality of Indian princes to have been fond of hoarding his treasures; but, on the contrary, his pride was to have a number of dependents; and his indifference to the peculations of his servants was altogether unaccountable.

It is hardly possible to suppose that he wished to introduce the principle of equality among his subjects; but he disgusted all the men of rank, and his father's old servants, by an indiscriminate and capricious mixture of men of the lowest rank, with those of family and long services. He would promote a Tipdar (commander of a hundred men) or a petty Aumildar to be a Meer Meeran (the highest military rank); and raise a Risaldar (commander of ten to a hundred horse) to the honours of a Meer Asof (a member of the Board of Revenue), or a wretched Killedar on the monthly pay of 10 pagodas to those of a Meer Suddoor (Superintendent-General of Forts, etc.).

During the whole of the siege, he appears to have laboured under an infatuation that Seringapatam was impregnable (The Sultaun's constant expression upon every occasion was, who can take Seringapatam?); and this idea was confirmed by the constant reports of his courtiers, who persuaded him, till within an hour of the assault, "that the English would be obliged to raise the siege from want of provisions, and that their shot had produced little effect on the walls." In the morning of the 4th, however, on examining the works himself, his natural perception discovered to him the danger of his situation; but he never seems to have had an idea of yielding up his capital, even in the last extremity.

In short, the whole of his conduct, since the year 1792, proves him to have been a weak, head-strong and tyrannical prince, influenced in his views, both foreign and domestic, by a restless and implacable spirit, and totally unequal to the

government of a kingdom, which had been usurped by the hardiness, intrigues and talents of his father.

Tippoo Sultaun appears to have been born in 1749 (according to a manuscript history of Hyder Ali, in the possession of Major Allan, which corresponds nearly with the age Tippoo Saib was said to be at the time he commanded a detachment of his father's army in 1768). His stature was about five feet eight inches; he had a short neck, square shoulders, and was rather corpulent; his limbs were small, particularly his feet and hands; he had large full eyes, small arched eyebrows, and an aquiline nose; his complexion was brown, and the general expression of his countenance, not void of dignity.

It is related by Hubbeeb Oollah (the Sultaun's Principal Moonshy or Secretary) and Rajah Cawn (his favourite servant), both of whom were well acquainted with the Sultaun's character, that in the lifetime of his father, he was universally esteemed by the ministers and favourites of Hyder's court, who had formed the most sanguine expectations of his reign; but from the moment he ascended the musnud, those fair appearances began to decline, and his conduct from that period seemed to be directed wholly by ambition, pride, caprice and cruelty.

The British Government, in particular, was the object of his irreconcilable hatred; which he often expressed in public, and especially, on one occasion in his Durbar, when he declared, 'that a nice sense of honour should be the predominant feature in the character of a king; and that one who had suffered misfortunes from the superiority of his enemies, should never be appeased until he had obtained ample revenge. That, for his part, he should every day seek the most likely means for effecting the ruin of his enemies, and that his mind was principally occupied in the contemplation of this object.' 'The means I have taken,' he added, 'to keep in remembrance the misfortunes I experienced six years ago (alluding to the conquests of Marquis Cornwallis) from the malice of my enemies, are to discontinue sleeping in a cotton bed, and to make use of a cloth one: when I am victorious, I shall resume the bed of cotton.'

After the peace of 1792, some of his counsellors strongly urged him to discharge the superfluous persons attached to the different departments of his government, and to diminish the extent of his military establishment; without which, his receipts would never be adequate to his expenses. He replied, 'these people are fed by God, not by me'; and he never would listen to suggestions for reducing any part of his establishments.

He was fond of riding, and particularly excelled in horsemanship; he disapproved of palanquins, hackeries, and all such conveyances, as proper only for women. In his dress he was remarkably plain; he usually wore a sword slung across his body, with a dagger in his girdle. Whenever he went abroad, either on horseback or otherwise, he was accompanied by a numerous body of attendants, carrying muskets and fowling pieces; and with this retinue, he sometimes appeared on the ramparts during the siege.

His thoughts were constantly bent on war and military preparations. He has been frequently heard to say that in this world he would rather live two days like a tiger than two hundred years like a sheep. He adopted as the emblem of his State, and as a species of armorial bearing, the figure of the royal tiger, whose head and stripes constituted the chief ornaments of his throne, and of almost every article which belonged to him.

Upon most of the arms of Tippoo Sultaun there is a cypher, signifying, 'The Lion of God is the conqueror.' These are so arranged and intermixed, as to produce a resemblance of a tiger's face. The title of *Lion of God* was given by Mahomed to his son-in-law Alli, to denote the prowess and valour by which he signalized himself in fighting under the Prophet's banners. Tippoo Sultaun seems to have adopted Alli as the guardian genius, or tutelary saint, of his dominions, as the peculiar object of his veneration, and as an example to imitate. His selection of the tiger as an emblem, appears to be intended in honour of Alli.....

Subsequently to the war between Tippoo Sultaun and the English, which terminated in 1792, he adopted as the style and title of his dominions, the words *Khudadad Sirkar*,

which literally signifies, the Government by the gift of God.' By this title he invariably designated his Government, in all letters, instruments and documents whatever.....

During the siege, Hubbeeb Oollah was present at a Durbar, when Tippoo observed to Budrul Zeman Khan (who defended Darwar so gallantly in the last war), 'in the course of my life, I have been present at many actions, but never at the defence of a fort. I have no idea of the proper method of defending this fort; after the present siege, by God's favour, I will make myself master of this part of the art of war.'

When the Sultaun had any business of importance to transact, or any letters to dispatch that required deliberation, he always devoted one day to his own reflections, before he took the opinion of any of his counsellors. After having sufficiently considered the subject in question, he assembled the principal officers of the departments of the State (namely, *Meer Meeraun* or heads of the military department; *Meer Asofs*, head revenue officers; *Meer Yen*, head of the marine department; *Meer Suddoor*, head of the department connected with forts and garrisons; *Meer Khauzin*, the treasurer, and *Mullick-oo-Toojor*, heads of the commercial departments), and writing in his own hand the nature of the subject to be referred to their consideration, he required from each person, an answer in writing. He derived little benefit, however, from these deliberations, as most of those who were acquainted with the Sultaun's disposition, accommodated their opinions to his wishes. Some, who had his welfare at heart, stated freely what they thought most beneficial, without paying any regard to his prejudices. On these occasions, the Sultaun never failed to manifest great resentment His real friends were compelled at length to regulate their opinions by his whims and prejudices. No person was allowed to be present at these deliberations, except the confidential Moonshies and officers of the different departments.

The Sultaun was extremely averse to spirituous liquors, and to all kinds of exhilarating drugs, the sale of which he prohibited throughout his dominions. When *Meer Sadduck*, his minister, represented to him the extent of the loss which he had sustained in the course of a few years, by his edicts

against the sale of those articles, the Sultaun replied, 'That kings should be inflexible in their orders; that God has forbidden the use of wine; and that he should persist in exacting a strict obedience to his edicts on that subject.'

He was passionately fond of new inventions, on which he lavished immense sums, without reaping any adequate advantage. In his palace was found a great variety of curious swords, daggers, fusils, pistols, and blunderbusses; some were of exquisite workmanship, mounted with gold or silver, and beautifully inlaid and ornamented with tigers' heads and stripes, or with Persian and Arabic verses.

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The Sultaun generally rose at break of day: after being *shampoed* and rubbed, he washed himself, and read the Koran for an hour. He then gave audience to such of his officers, civil or military, as it was necessary for him to see upon public business; and afterwards spent about half an hour in inspecting the *Jamdar Khana*, which was a place where the jewellery, plate, fruit, and other articles were kept. Upon his return, his breakfast was prepared for him, and at this repast, a moonshy and the three youngest children were generally present. On occasions of particular business, he shut himself up with his councillors, and the children were not sent for. His favourites, and those whom he was in the habit of consulting, were Meer Sadduck, the Binky Nabob, Sied Mahommed Asoof, Purneah, Golam Alli, Ahmud Khan (the late ambassador to Poonah) and his principal Moonshi or secretary, Hubbeeb Oollah.

During breakfast, the conversation, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, turned chiefly on his past wars and exploits, and on his future projects; and this was the time when he dictated the heads such letters as he wished to be written. His diet at breakfast consisted chiefly of nuts, almonds, fruit, jelly and milk.

After breakfast, he dressed himself in rich clothes, and proceeded to the Durbar, where he despatched the ordinary affairs of his government. Upon other occasions, his dress was plain and coarse. It was his custom to review, every morning, the new levies and recruits. and to inquire into their

caste, country, and the extent of their religious knowledge. If he was satisfied with their examination, they were, in consequence, entertained at a higher rate of pay; but if they were found deficient in a knowledge of the faith, they were delivered over to the Cauzy of the Cutchery to which they were attached, to be instructed in the principles of the Mahomedan religion. These examinations often lasted for several hours. In the evening, when the Sultaun had leisure, he commonly went out on horseback to superintend the discipline of his troops. He generally stood upon the outwork, before the Bangalore, or eastern gate; and from thence directed their exercise and manœuvres. On other days, he inspected the repairs of the fortifications and buildings.

Returning to the palace, he received reports of the work done in the arsenals, manufactories, etc., the news of the day, and the communications from his spies and intelligencers. At this time, likewise, he delivered his orders, as well as his answers to petitions and letters from the different provinces.

He generally passed the evening with his three eldest sons, one or two of the principal officers of each of the departments of state, a Cauzy, and Moonshy Hubbeeb Oollah. All these usually sat down to supper with him; and Hubbeeb Oollah asserts, that his conversation was remarkably lively, entertaining, and instructive. During this meal, he was fond of reciting passages from the most admired historians and poets: sometimes he amused himself with sarcasms upon the *Caufers* (or infidels) and enemies of the Circar; and often discoursed upon learned and religious subjects with the Cauzy and Moonshy. Having dismissed his company, which he always did immediately after the repast, he was accustomed to walk about by himself for exercise; and when tired, to lie down on his couch, and read a book, either upon the subject of religion or history, until he fell asleep. These were his usual occupations, except on days of important business, or religious ceremonies."

Among writers who wrote about Tipū Sultān shortly after his death, Viscount Valentia records (February 29, 1804) :—⁸

"The Lolmahal, or private residence of Tippoo consists but of one square, three sides of which are divided into two stories, with a verandah of unpainted wood in front : behind were many small rooms, used by him as warehouses, but now painted and fitted up for the Resident ; the fourth side consisted of a single room, the height of the whole building. It was the durbar of the tyrant, in which he sat and wrote, or received his ministers. It is a very handsome room, about 70 feet wide in front and 40 feet deep. The walls are painted red, with a gilt trellis-work running over it, formed by the tiger's scratch, the favourite ornament of Tippoo. Sentences from the Koran in letters of gold on a red ground, each about a foot high, run round the room as a cornice. Three rows of pillars sustain the roof, which is painted like the sides of the room. Each pillar is of a single piece of wood painted red, and highly varnished. The shape is fantastic, bulging much towards the bottom, but again narrowing till they join a base of black marble. Behind the durbar is a small room where the tyrant slept, when fear or anger would permit him. There are only two windows, both grated with iron, and the door is strongly secured. The only entrances into the Lolmahal are through the harem that adjoined, and through a narrow winding passage, where his fears had chained some tigers as an additional defence. When in the vicinity of Seringapatam he never slept at any of his country palaces, but constantly returned to this more secure fortress. Tippoo seems to have been deservedly punished for his tyranny, by the fears that ever attend it. He knew that his oppression had alienated the affections of a large proportion of his subjects, whose innocent prejudices his bigotry had driven him to violate in the most cruel manner, not only by destroying their temples, and depriving the Brahmins of their revenues, but by violating their daughters and forcing them to conform to his religion. We need not

8. Valentia, *Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, etc.* Vol. I (London: 1809), pp. 414-419.

therefore wonder if he felt that every precaution was necessary for his personal safety.

I cannot help expressing my astonishment that any one should have been found to approve the conduct, and praise the character of Tippoo; yet in the public meetings of the India Company it has been asserted that he was not a tyrant. If he was not, I confess myself incapable of conceiving any character to which that title can be affixed. The internal government of his country was most oppressive, having placed unlimited confidence in a set of Amils, who had no other recommendation than that they were Mussulmans, and who, being bound no oaths, not only embezzled a large proportion of the revenue, but plundered the unfortunate Hindoos without control; and even carried their depravity so far as to make secret inquiries respecting the females in their districts, and if they heard of any remarkable for beauty, to have them forcibly removed to their zenanas. As there was no regular police throughout the country, some districts were generally in rebellion; and it was not an unfrequent circumstance for the patels, or headmen of two or three neighbouring districts, to assemble together and oblige the Amil to grant them their lands at whatever price they pleased to fix: if he resisted, he was usually murdered. Sometimes Tippoo had leisure to punish them and then he did so most severely; but at other times he had more important avocations, and their impunity encouraged a repetition of the offence. The natural consequence was that the actual revenue of the country was rapidly diminishing, and even of that not more than $\frac{2}{3}$ ever reached the royal treasury. If there could be any doubts of Tippoo's deserving the title I have given him, his conduct in Canara and Malabar would place it beyond doubt. The utter extermination of the Nairs of rank, who by conquest had become his subjects, seems to have been intended, and as far as lay in his power, was by him carried into effect; for in Malabar, at its cession to us, there were none remaining, and in Canara they were diminished one half.

To the assertion that many had quitted our provinces to live under the milder government of Tippoo, it is impossible to give any other reply than a positive denial of its truth;

and I am at a loss to conjecture on what authority it is stated. Hyder indeed carried off from the Carnatic above 60,000 families, of whom only a vestige remained when Lord Cornwallis entered Mysore; but these unfortunate beings, so far from being satisfied with their situation, had found the yoke of Tippoo so heavy, that they joyfully seized the first opportunity to return to their native places. The code of laws which Tippoo promulgated, and which has been so much praised by an Honourable gentleman at the India House, was never even attempted to be carried into effect; and was merely meant by the tyrant to hand him down to posterity as a Mussulman legislator.

Hyder was, indeed, a different character: he might be an usurper, but he certainly governed the provinces he had seized from his sovereign, or conquered from the neighbouring Princes, to the benefit of the inhabitants, without permitting his prejudices, as a Mussulman, to influence his conduct to the detriment of the Hindoos⁹..... By this uniform system of prudence and moderation, Hyder left his son a prosperous and improving kingdom, a strong, and, for an Asiatic, well-disciplined army, and a numerous and contented population. It is said that, on his deathbed, he advised his successor to reconcile himself to the English, and cultivate their friendship. Had he done so, it is probable that he would have transmitted to his posterity the advantages he received. Instead of this, a want of judgment, and a strong spirit of superstition drove him into hostilities, which ended in his destruction. Any person who has the good of mankind at heart, cannot regret the event. The tyranny of a very small proportion of Mussulmans over the native Hindoos has been put an end to; the province of Mysore, which under them was going rapidly to decay, is fast recovering, and already yields a greater real revenue than the former nominal amount: the tanks that Tippoo had destroyed, solely because they were built by Hindoo Rajahs, though of the utmost value to his subjects, are now repairing; and towns, which he had depopulated by his armies, or by the no less sure but slower, operation

9. For the text of the anecdote that follows here, see *Ante* Vol. II. p. 291, f.n. 91.

of a prohibition to trade with their neighbours, because he bore an antipathy to them, are recovering their trade and inhabitants, and rising to more than their former prosperity."

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Another writer, James Forbes, in the course of a series of familiar letters written during seventeen years' residence in India, observes :—¹⁰

"In comparing the characters of Hyder Ally and Tippoo Sultan, the former has greatly the advantage, especially considering his neglected education. Tippoo, born a prince, was educated as heir to a throne, which the Mysorean usurper vainly imagined was fixed on a solid foundation; a musnud surrounded by tributary kings and conquered provinces constantly accumulating. Like other short-sighted mortals, he little imagined the commencement and termination of a dynasty would be comprised within half a century, *sic transit gloria mundi*. For the despotic sovereignty of this empire, Tippoo was trained by his ambitious father....."

* * *

Mangalore was the great depot for marine stores of every description for the use of the Sultan's navy; Seringapatam contained the grand military arsenal, where they cast cannon, and fabricated all kinds of arms, in the oriental and European fashion. Most of the cannon cast during the reign of Tippoo were ornamented with the representation of a tiger devouring an European; emblematical of his tyrannical and revengeful disposition. It is remarked by an intelligent writer, that 'Tippoo's thoughts were constantly bent on war and military preparations; he having been frequently heard to say, that in this world he would rather *live two days* like a tiger, than 200 years like a sheep. He adopted as the emblem of his state, and as a species of armorial bearing, the figure of the royal tiger, whose head and stripes constituted the chief ornaments of his throne and of almost every article which belonged to him. This throne was of considerable beauty and magnificence. The support was a wooden tiger as large as life, covered with gold, in the attitude of standing. His

10. James Forbes, *Oriental Memoirs* (London: 1813), Vol. IV. pp. 187-198.

head and forelegs appeared in front and under the throne which was placed across his back. It was composed of an octagonal frame, 8 feet by 5, surrounded by a low railing, on which were 10 small tigerheads made of gold, beautifully inlaid with precious stones: The ascent to the throne was by small silver steps on each side. From the centre of the back part, opposite the large tiger's head, arose a gilded iron pillar, 7 feet high, surmounted by a canopy, superbly decorated with a fringe of pearls. The whole was made of wood, covered with a thin sheet of the purest gold, richly illuminated with tiger stripes and Arabic verses. The *huma* was placed on the top of the canopy, and fluttered over the Sultan's head. This bird, the most beautiful and magnificent ornament of the throne, was sent by the Marquis Wellesley to the court of Directors. It was about the size and shape of a small pigeon and intended to represent the fabulous bird of antiquity; a bird peculiar to the east, supposed to fly constantly in the air, and never to touch the ground. It is looked upon as a bird of happy omen, and that every head it overshades will in time wear a crown. The tail of the *huma* on Tippoo's throne, and its wings were in the attitude of fluttering. It was formed of gold, entirely covered with diamonds, rubies and emeralds.

Tippoo Sultaun seems to have adopted *Ally* as the guardian genius, or tutelary saint, of his dominions; as the peculiar object of his veneration and as an example to imitate. His selection of the tiger as an emblem appears to have been intended in honour of *Ally*; for the natives of Hindustan make no distinction between a lion and a tiger. Hyder, which also signifies a lion but interpreted by the natives of Hindustan as tiger, is another title of *Ally*; it was likewise the name of Tippoo Sultaun's father. The name of Hyder, thus distinguished by the triple circumstances of its being the title of *Ally*, the name of Tippoo's assumed emblem, and the name of his father, the founder of his dominion, was introduced by him on every occasion; and either the word at length or its initial letters, was stamped upon every article belonging to him.

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Sir James Sibbald resided 11 years in Hyder's dominions, and was for some time in a public character at his durbar in Seringapatam, as well as in habits of intimacy with Tippoo Sultan, during the life of his father: his description of the splendid pageantry and ostentatious ceremonies in the newly established durbar, where he (Hyder) carried his authority with a high hand; sometimes profuse in his entertainments and princely in his presents, at others equally mean and sordid. These Mahomadan sovereigns seemed anxious to revive the magnificence of former times in the palace at Seringapatam; but they had neither taste, judgment, nor wealth, to follow the example of the Mogul and Patan courts in India, still less to vie with the splendour of the Abassides, or the Moorish sovereigns in Europe, the former of whom they seemed desirous to imitate; especially Tippoo, who wished to add the character of sanctity to his other princely virtues. Rising at break of day, he always employed his first hour in reading the Koran; how far its religion and morality influenced his life, is evident from these unconnected memoirs. He then gave audience to the civil and military officers who had particular business to transact; and before breakfast visited the *Jamdar Khana*, or treasury, containing his jewels, gold and silver ornaments and utensils, curious arms, and new mechanical inventions, on which he lavished large sums; but his museums and collections are said more to have resembled the heterogenous mixtures of Asuph-ud-dowlah at Lucknow than the valuable deposits of the Mogul emperors in their days of splendour. After breakfast, arrayed in rich apparel, he gave public audience, and sometimes administered justice, reviewed the troops, hunted with the cheeta or superintended the arsenals; these and similar pursuits generally employed the succeeding hours in his capital. In camp, or severe marches, no soldier in his army could bear more fatigue: war was his delight, and everything tending to it engaged his first consideration.

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The characters of Hyder Ally and Tippoo Sultan are, in many respects, not unlike those of Mahomed and his early successors; especially in their zeal for converts and rage for conquest. Ambition and extent of empire were the ruling

passions of Hyder; to these his son was desirous of annexing the titles of apostle, priest and prophet. He gloried in being himself a religious author, and certainly possessed a library superior to that of any modern prince in Hindustan. He was at the same time vain, ostentatious, and deficient in the noble qualities of a sovereign: his own capricious cruelties and those sanctioned by his authority, have been mentioned. He affected a splendid pageantry, and marshalled his choicest troops before his durbar on the introduction of a new ambassador at the Mahommadan festivals, and other public occasions; but all his ostentatious parade was trifling, coupled with the wealth and splendour of the Caliphs of Bagdad, or the Moorish Kings of Spain.....

The short dynasty of Hyder, the annihilation of the Mogul Empire, the prostrate thrones and tottering crowns of so many European monarchs, all within the short space of 20 years, wonderfully evince the fallacy of mundane speculations, and confirm the sublime line of the poet:

"He builds too low, who builds beneath the skies."

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(2) TIGER AS TIPŪ'S EMBLEM.

In connection with the adoption of the emblem of the tiger by Tipū Sultān, it may be mentioned that he kept a Musical Tiger, which was removed to the India Office Library on the fall of Seringapatam. It has been stated that it was actually received at the Library on the 29th July 1808. Its location up to this date is not known. The fact of its being received into the India Office Library on that date is recorded in the Day Book under that date: "Received Tippoo's Musical Tiger." That it was kept in the public reading room of the Library as is suggested in the extract that follows from the *Athenæum* has been held to be highly improbable as there has been a great deal of confusion in the public mind between the Library and Museum. Dr. Arberry, who writes on the subject, is of the opinion that when the model was first received it must have gone into the

Library apartment, as at that date there was no other accommodation at the East India House. The following description of the model is taken from the *Athenæum*, dated 5th June 1869:—"But we almost forgot our old friend the tiger. Who has not seen and, what is more, heard him at the old India House, and who, having suffered under his unearthly sounds, can ever dismiss him from his memory? It seems that this horrid creature—we mean of course the figure representing it—was found among the treasures of Tipu Sultan, when he fell at the siege of Seringapatam. It was a toy of this great Sultan, representing a tiger preying on the body of an English officer, and so constructed that by turning a handle, the animal's growls mingled with the shrieks of his dying victim. These shrieks and growls were the constant plague of the students busy at work in the Library of the old India House when the Leadenhall Street public unremittingly, it appears, were bent on keeping up the performance of this barbarous machine. No doubt that a number of perverse sections have crept into the editions of our oriental works through the shocks which the tiger caused to the nerves of the readers taken unawares. Luckily he is now removed from the Library; but, what is also lucky, a kind of fate has deprived him of his handle, and stopped up, we are happy to think, some of his internal organs; or, as an ignorant visitor would say, he is out of repair; and we do sincerely hope that he will remain so, to be seen and to be admired, if necessary, but to be heard no more." Dr. Arberry offers the appropriate comment: "There seems to be an affinity of spirit between the British public's amusement at this spectacle of the symbol of the enemy's conscious loathing and the enthusiasm with which British soldiers sang during the European War the notorious German Hymn of Hate." (See on this head *The Library of the India Office* by A. J. Arberry,

Litt. D., Assistant Librarian, India Office, with a Foreword by the Marquis of Zetland, 1938, published by the India Office, London.) This tiger is now a treasure exhibit in the Indian Section of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London. Modern surgery has partly restored the beast's articulatory pipes, but the curious public is no longer permitted to divert itself with the snatching of its broken melody (*Ibid*, 29 to 31).

(3) TIPŪ'S LIBRARY.

On the 31st December 1801 the India Office Library was presented with a very interesting and curious document after the fall of Seringapatam (the original Manuscript Record of Tippoo Sultan's Dreams, 8 vo. I Vol.). Other documents of Tipū Sultān were presented to the Library on the 8th January 1802 including 3 memorandum books and 5 letters (Arberry, *o.c.*, p. 29). The manuscript of the book on *Dreams* was presented to the Court of Directors by Major Beatson, who has quoted extracts from it in translation in his *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*, published in 1800, to which reference has been made elsewhere. Beatson wrote the following note on the fly-leaf of this precious manuscript. "This register of the Sultan's Dreams was discovered by Colonel William Kirkpatrick amongst other papers of a secret nature in an escritoire found in the place in Seringapatam. Habbibulloh, one of the most confidential of the Sultaun's servants, was present at the time it was discovered. He knew that there was such a Book of the Sultan's composition, but had never seen it, as the Sultan always manifested a peculiar anxiety to conceal it from the view of any who happen to approach while he was reading or writing in it. Of these extraordinary productions, six only have been as yet translated which have been inserted in the Appendix of *A View of the Origin and Conduct*

of the War. Of some of them, it appears, that [war] and conquest and the destruction of Kaufirs were subjects of a sleeping [no less than] that of his waking thoughts." This unique human document which Dr. Arberry states is written in an execrable hand deserves to be published and studied, for it throws vivid light on the mental processes of an implacable and dangerous enemy of British rule in India (Arberry, *o. c.*, 29-30).

(4) TIPŪ'S COINAGE.

The coinage of Tipū stands in a category by itself. Though partially Mughal in lineage, in other respects it is a unique series. There is, at one end, evidence of French influence on it and at the other, especially in his copper variety, the ancient Hindu devices are found fairly intact. It has been remarked that, while Haidar was careless about his coinage, Tipū was scrupulous about its design and make-up. Haidar's coins are ugly pieces, while his son's are beautifully done and are a delight to the eye and to the hand. As Mr. C. J. Brown has observed, though the reign of Tipū Sultān lasted only seventeen years (1782-1799), it was productive of one of the most remarkable individual coinages in the history of India, comparable in many ways to that of Muhammad Bin Tughlak. Tipū's coins exist in far greater variety and number than those of his father. They were issued in gold, silver and copper, from no fewer than twelve mints, and some of them at least appeared in every one of the seventeen years of his reign. His mint-towns were: Puttun (Seringapatam), Nagar (Bednūr), Bengalūr (Bangalore), Faiz Hisar (Gooty), Farrukhyah Hisār (Chitaldrug), Kalikūt (Calicut), Farukhi (Feroke), Salāmābād (Satyamangalam), Khilyābād (Dindigal), Zafarābād (Gurramkonda), Khwursheed-Sawād (Dharwar) and Nazarbār (Mysore). The mint-towns were apparently chosen for their military or

political importance, though some of them bear fanciful names. Dharwar appears under both designations, its own proper name and Tipū's fanciful name. All these mints, however, were not equally active during the period of Tipū's ascendancy. In the first year of his reign, Tipū issued but few coins and these only from the Seringapatam and Nagar mints. In the fifth regnal year, the number of mints was increased to eight, and in the following year when Tipū may be said to have been at the summit of his power, the only mint not in operation was Calicut, which had been destroyed in the previous year and its place taken by Feroke. During the seventh and eighth years, a considerable number of mints still issued coins, but in the ninth year there was again a sudden falling off, as a result apparently of the military difficulties in which Tipū found himself before the decisive siege of Bangalore in 1791. By the treaty which followed the capture of that city, Tipū lost half of his dominions, and from that time onwards Calicut, Feroke, Dindigal, Gurramkonda and Dharwar ceased to be in his possession. From the tenth year to the end of the reign, coins were only issued from the Seringapatam, Nagar and Gooty mints, and from the last of these only in copper. In the seventeenth or last year of reign, which commenced less than a month before the death of Tipū, so far as is known, only two varieties of copper coins were struck, both at the Nagar mint. With but few exceptions, these were confined to gold and silver issues, and the name of the mint regularly occurs on the coins of Tipū Sultān. Following his father's example, Tipū has not recorded his own name on any of his coins, though the initial letter of his father's name is frequently met with on his gold and silver issues. It is equally noteworthy that the name of the ruling Mughal Emperor Shah Ālam II is not to be seen on any of his extant coins.

Coins of the first four years of Tipū's reign bear the Hijri date, the numerals reading, as usual, from left to right. From the fifth year to the end of his reign, however, his coins are dated in his special *Maulūdi* era, and the figures read from right to left. As regards the names of the cyclic years mentioned on certain of his gold and silver coins, Tipū followed first the *abjad* and then the *abtah* system, in both of which a certain numerical value is assigned to the letters of the Arabic alphabet. Two systems of nomenclature were also adopted for the twelve months of the year, the first being in use during the first four years of the reign, while the second having come into force in the fifth regnal year, along with the *Maulūdi* system of dating the coins. Not long after the introduction of the *Maulūdi* era, Tipū invented names for his coins, on the reverse of which they are usually found. We owe to Dr. E. Hultzsch the first detailed explanation of these names. The gold and silver coins are called after Muhammadan saints, *Khali-fas*, in the former coins, and *Imāms* in the latter, while the copper coins, with the single exception of the first name for the double-paisa, which is that of a *Khalifa*, bear the Arabic or Persian names of stars. About fifteen types of these coins with their names are extant (namely, Four Pagoda Piece, Double Pagoda, Pagoda, Double-Rupee, Rupee, Half-Rupee, Quarter-Rupee, One-eighth Rupee, One-sixteenth Rupee, One thirty-second Rupee, Double-Paisa, Paisa, Half-Paisa, Quarter-Paisa, One-eighth Paisa). The only coin of Tipū on which no name has been found recorded is the gold *faṣam*, and the omission can hardly be, as remarked by Henderson, due to the small size of the coin. Of the four varieties of gold coin issued by Tipū, the *Ahmadi* was struck at the Seringapatam and Nagar mints, whilst the *Sādiqī* is only known from the first of these. From the very small number of these

coins now procurable, it has been inferred that their issue cannot have been extensive. On the other hand, the *pagodas* and *fanams*, which conformed to the general South Indian gold currency, were evidently much more extensively coined. Pagodas were struck at Seringapatam, Nagar and Dharwar, while *fanams*, in addition to these three mints, were also struck at Calicut, Feroke and Dindigal. Though Tipū's copper coins are invariably unmilled, his gold and silver coins exhibit "a highly peculiar and characteristic milling", remarks Henderson, "similar to that met with in some French coins, and which, therefore, perhaps owes its origin to some of Tipū's French workmen". (For a detailed account of the technique of Tipū's coins from the numismatic point of view, see *Mysore Gazetteer*, New Edition, Vol. II. Part I. pp. 96-105, from which this Note has been drawn up).

(5) TIPU'S ICONOCLASTIC ZEAL.

The causes of Tipū Sultan's fall have been dealt with in some detail in the text. Among these causes all of which contributed to his fall, we may justly set down his hatred towards the worship of images which left a deep impression on the populace. Muslim contact during many centuries in India had softened such discordant feelings towards what has been popularly termed "idolatry" by those opposed to it, but the latent spirit of illwill is often rekindled by conquest and the consequent scope such conquest affords for the exercise of political power. The destruction by Tipū of Brahmapuri near Seringapatam and the raising of a mosque on the razed temple was such as cannot be forgotten by the generality of the Hindus. Even among the Muslims, political wisdom, however, helped to abate such feeling among some, as it did in the case of the Mughal rulers, especially of Akbar. Barring Aurangzib, the generality of the Mughal rulers proved tolerant in this respect. It

may be said generally of Haidar that his religious faith as a Shiah—if the deduction drawn as to that is well founded—helped to alter his outlook. His Muslim troops proved, however, different. A number of temples in South India invaded by them bear witness to-day of mutilated images. Tipū, however, moved away from his father's religious and political convictions, veering round more and more to the Sunni cult which is more zealous in its views, particularly in the matter of the worship of images. However that may be and whatever the real causes, the fact cannot be gainsaid that Tipū proved a zealot and wrought incalculable injury to himself. He forgot that the worship of images was not merely a question of deep popular belief among the masses of the country but also one hallowed by ages of practice. He repeated the mistake of that other zealot Aurangzīb, of which he was guilty during his time.

(6) THE PARTITION TREATY OF MYSORE,
JUNE 22ND, 1799¹.

Treaty for strengthening the Alliance and Friendship subsisting between the English East India Company Bahadoor, His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, and the Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor, and for effecting a settlement of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultan.

Whereas the deceased Tippoo Sultan, unprovoked by any act of aggression on the part of the allies, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and admitted a French force into his army, for the purpose of commencing war against the Honourable English Company Bahadoor and its allies, the Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor and the Peshwa Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor, and the said Tippoo Sultan having attempted

¹ Beatson, *o.c.*, Appendix XLV, pp. CXL-CXLVI; also *Mysore State Papers*, I. pp. 11-20, No. 2.

to evade the just demands of satisfaction and security made by the Honourable English Company Bahadoor and its allies for their defence and protection, against the joint designs of the said Sultan and of the French; the allied armies of the Honourable English Company Bahadoor and of His Highness Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, proceeded to hostilities in vindication of their rights and for the preservation of their respective Dominions from the perils of foreign invasion and from the ravages of a cruel and relentless enemy;

And whereas it has pleased Almighty God to prosper the just cause of the said allies, the Honourable English Company Bahadoor and His Highness Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, with a continued course of victory and success, and finally to crown their arms by the reduction of the capital of Mysore, the fall of Tippoo Sultan, the utter extinction of his power, and the unconditional submission of his people;

And whereas the said allies, being disposed to exercise the rights of conquest with the same moderation and forbearance, which they have observed from the commencement to the conclusion of the late successful war, have resolved to use the power, which it has pleased Almighty God to place in their hands, for the purposes of obtaining reasonable compensation for the expenses of the war, and of establishing permanent security and genuine tranquillity for themselves and their subjects, as well as for all the powers contiguous to their respective dominions;

Wherefore a Treaty for the adjustment of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultan between the English East India Company Bahadoor and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor is now concluded by Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of His Britannic Majesty and of the English East India Company Bahadoor in

the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, K.P., Governor-General for all affairs, Civil and Military of the British Nation in India; and by the Nawab Meer Allum Bahadoor on the part and in the name of His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, accordidg to the undermentioned Articles, which by the blessing of God shall be binding upon the heirs and successors of the contracting parties as long as the Sun and Moon shall endure, and of which the conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said contracting parties.

Article 1.

It being reasonable and just that the allies by this Treaty should accomplish the original objects of the war (*viz.*, a due indemnification for the expenses incurred in their own defence, and effectual security for their respective possessions against the future designs of their enemies), it is stipulated and agreed that the districts specified in Schedule A, hereunto annexed, together with the heads of all the passes leading from the territory of the late Tippoo Sultan to any part of the possessions of the English East India Company Bahadoor, of its allies, or tributaries, situated between the ghats on either coast, and all forts situated near to and commanding the said passes, shall be subjected to the authority, and be for ever incorporate with the Dominions of the English East India Company Bahadoor, the said Company Bahadoor engaging to provide effectually out of the revenues of the said districts for the suitable maintenance of the whole of the families of the late Hyder Ali Khan and of the late Tippoo Sultan, and to apply to this purpose,

with the reservation hereinafter stated, an annual sum of not less than two lakhs of Star Pagodas, making the Company's share as follows:—

Estimated value of districts enumerated in the Schedule A, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultan in 1792... 7,77,170 Canterai Pagodas.

Deduct provision for the families of Hyder Ali Khan and of Tippoo Sultan, two lakhs of Star Pagodas, in Canterai Prgodas... 2,40,000.

Remains to the East India Company..... 5,37,170 Canterai Pagodas.

Article 2.

For the same reason stated in the preceding article, the districts specified in Schedule B annexed hereunto, shall be subjected to the authority and for ever united to the dominions of the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, the said Nawab having engaged to provide liberally from the revenues of the said districts for the support of Meer Kummer-ood-Deen Khan Bahadoor, and of his family and relations, and to grant him for this purpose a personal Jaghire in the district of Gurromcondah, equal to the annual sum of Rs. 2,10,000 or of 70,000 Canterai Pagodas, over and aboye, and exclusive of a Jaghire which the said Nawab has also agreed to assign to the said Meer-Kummer-ood-Deen Khan for the pay and maintenance of a proportionate number of Troops to be employed in the service of His Highness, making the share of His Highness as follows:—

Estimated value of the territory specified in Schedule B, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultan in 1792..... 6,07,332 Canterai Pagodas.

Deduct personal jaghire to Meer Kummer-ood-Deen Khan, Rs. 2,10,000 or..... 70,000 Canterai Pagodas.

Remains to the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor..... 5,37,332 Canterai Pagodas.

Article 3.

It being further expedient, for the preservation of peace and tranquillity and for the general security on the foundations now established by the contracting parties, that the fortress of Seringapatam should be subjected to the said Company Bahadoor, it is stipulated and agreed that the said fortress and the Island on which it is situated (including the small tract of land, or island, lying to the westward of the main island, and bounded on the west by a Nullah, called the Mysore Nullah, which falls into the Cauvery near Chenagal Ghaut) shall become part of the Dominions of the said Company, in full right and sovereignty for ever.

Article 4.

A separate Government shall be established in Mysore; and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed that the Maharajah Mysore Kishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadoor, a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter described, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

Article 5.

The contracting powers mutually and severally agree that the districts specified in Schedule C hereunto annexed, shall be ceded to the said Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah and shall form the separate Government of Mysore, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

Article 6.

The English East India Company Bahadoor shall be at liberty to make such deductions from time to time from the sums allotted by the first Article of the present Treaty for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultan, as may be proper, in consequence of the decease of any member of the said families;

and in the event of any hostile attempt on the part of the said family or of any member of it, against the authority of the contracting parties, or against the peace of their respective dominions or the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, then the said English East India Company Bahadoor shall be at liberty to limit or suspend entirely the payment of the whole or any part of the stipend hereinbefore stipulated to be applied to the maintenance and support of the said families.

Article 7.

His Highness the Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor shall be invited to accede to the present Treaty and although the said Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor has neither participated in the expense or danger of the late war, and therefore is not entitled to share any part of the acquisitions made by the contracting parties (namely, the English East India Company Bahadoor and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor), yet for the maintenance of the relations of friendship and alliance between the said Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor, the English East India Company Bahadoor, His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, and Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Bahadoor, it is stipulated and agreed that certain districts, specified in Schedule D hereunto annexed, shall be reserved for the purpose of being eventually ceded to the said Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor in full right and sovereignty, in the same manner as if he had been a contracting party to this Treaty; provided, however, that the said Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor shall accede to the present Treaty in its full extent within one month from the day on which it shall be formally communicated to him by the contracting parties, and provided also that he shall give satisfaction to the

English East India Company Bahadoor, and to His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, with regard to certain points now depending between him, the said Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor and the said Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, and also with regard to such points as shall be represented to the said Peshwa, on the part of the English East India Company Bahadoor, by the Governor-General or the British Resident at the Court of Poona.

Article 8.

If, contrary to the amicable expectation of the contracting parties, the said Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor shall refuse to accede to this Treaty or to give satisfaction upon the points to which the seventh Article refers, then the right to and sovereignty of the several districts hereinbefore reserved for eventual cession to the Peshwa Rao Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor shall rest jointly on the said English East India Company Bahadoor, and the said Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor who will either exchange them with the Rajah of Mysore for other districts of equal value more contiguous to their respective territories, or otherwise arrange and settle respecting them, as they shall judge proper.

Article 9.

It being expedient, for the effectual establishment of Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah in the Government of Mysore, that His Highness should be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, it is stipulated and agreed that the whole of the said force shall be furnished by the English East India Company Bahadoor, according to the terms of a separate Treaty to be immediately concluded between the said English East India Company Bahadoor and His Highness the Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor.

Article 10.

This Treaty, consisting of ten Articles being settled and concluded this day, the 22nd of June 1799 (recitals follow).

Ratified at Hyderabad by His Highness the Nizam, 13th July 1799.

(7) THE SUBSIDIARY TREATY OF MYSORE,
JULY 8, 1799.¹

A Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance concluded on the one part by His Excellency Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of His Britannic Majesty and of the English East India Company Bahadoor in the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesly, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on behalf and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, K. P., Governor-General for all affairs, civil and military, of the British nation in India, by virtue of full powers vested in them for this purpose by the said Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor-General; and on the other part by Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, Rajah of Mysore.

Whereas it is stipulated in the Treaty concluded on the 22nd of June 1799, between the Honourable English East India Company Bahadoor and the Nawab Nizamood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor, for strengthening the alliance and friendship subsisting between the said East India Company Bahadoor, His Highness Nizamood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadoor and the Peshwa Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor, and for effecting a settlement of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultan, that a separate

1. Beatson, *o.c.*, Appendix XLVII, pp. clviii-clxv; also Aitchison, *o.c.*, IX-pp. 220-225, No. 43; and *Mysore State Papers*, I. pp. 25-33, No. 5.

government shall be established in Mysore, and that His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor shall possess certain territories, specified in Schedule C, annexed to the said Treaty, and that, for the effectual establishment of the Government of Mysore, His Highness shall be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, to be furnished by the English East India Company Bahadoor; wherefore, in order to carry the said stipulations into effect, and to increase and strengthen the friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company and the said Maharajah Mysore Kishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadoor, this Treaty is concluded by Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of His Britannic Majesty and of the said English East India Company Bahadoor, in the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor-General aforesaid, and by His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadoor, which shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

Article 1.

The friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties shall be considered as the friends and enemies of both.

Article 2.

The Honourable East India Company Bahadoor agrees to maintain, and His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor agrees to receive, a Military Force for the defence and security of His Highness's Dominions; in consideration of which protection His Highness engages to pay the annual sum of

seven lakhs of star pagodas to the said East India Company, the said sum to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments, commencing from the 1st of July Anno Domini 1799. And His Highness further agrees that the disposal of the said sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the Troops to be maintained by it, shall be entirely left to the Company.

Article 3.

If it shall be necessary for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or of either of them, that hostilities shall be undertaken, or preparations made for commencing hostilities against any State or power, His said Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadoor agrees to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense incurred by the augmentation of the military force and the unavoidable charges of war, such a sum as shall appear to the Governor-General-in-Council of Fort William, on an attentive consideration of the means of His said Highness, to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of His said Highness.

Article 4.

And whereas it is indispensably necessary that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the funds destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses described in the third Article of the present Treaty, it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor-General-in-Council of Fort William in Bengal shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor-General-in-Council shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall

deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the Government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Bahadoor such part or parts of the territorial possessions of His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadoor as shall appear to him, the said Governor-General-in-Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available, either in time of peace or war.

Article 5.

And it is hereby further agreed that whenever the said Governor-General-in-Council shall signify to the said Maharajah Mysore Kishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadoor that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the Fourth Article, His said Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor shall immediately issue orders to his aumils or other officers either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, according to the tenor of the fourth Article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and control of the English Company Bahadoor. And in case His Highness shall not issue such orders within ten days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the said Governor-General-in-Council shall be at liberty to issue orders, by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenues of the said territories, as he shall judge most expedient for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said military funds and of providing for the effectual protection of the country and the welfare of the people. Provided always, that whenever and so long as any part or parts of His said Highness's territories shall be

placed and shall remain under the exclusive authority and control of the said East India Company, the Governor-General-in-Council shall render to His Highness a true and faithful account of the revenue and produce of the territories so assumed; provided also, that in no case whatever shall His Highness's actual receipt or annual income, arising out of his territorial revenue, be less than the sum of the net revenues of the whole of the territories ceded to him by the fifth Article of the Treaty of Mysore; which sum of one lakh of Star Pagodas, together with the amount of one-fifth of the said net revenues, the East India Company engages, at all times and in every possible case, to secure and cause to be paid for His Highness's use.

Article 6.

His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadoor engages that he will be guided by a sincere and cordial attention to the relations of peace and amity now established between the English Company Bahadoor and their allies, and that he will carefully abstain from any interference in the affairs of any State in alliance with the said English Company Bahadoor, or of any State whatever. And for securing the object of this stipulation it is further stipulated and agreed that no communication or correspondence with any foreign State whatever shall be holden by His said Highness without the previous knowledge and sanction of the said English Company Bahadoor.

Article 7.

His Highness stipulates and agrees that he will not admit any European foreigners into his service without the concurrence of the English Company Bahadoor; and that he will apprehend and deliver up to the Company's Government all Europeans of whatever description who

shall be found within the territories of His said Highness without regular passports from the Company's Government, it being His Highness's determined resolution not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigners to remain within the territories now subjected to his authority, unless by consent of the said Company.

Article 8.

Whereas the complete protection of His Highness's said territories requires that various fortresses and strong places situated within the territories of His Highness should be garrisoned and commanded, as well in time of peace as of war by British troops and officers, His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadoor engages that the said English Company Bahadoor shall at all times be at liberty to garrison, in whatever manner they may judge proper, all such fortresses and strong places within His said Highness's territories as it shall appear to them advisable to take charge of.

Article 9.

And whereas, in consequence of the system of defence which it may be expedient to adopt for the security of the territorial possessions of His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, it may be necessary that certain forts and strong places within His Highness's territories should be dismantled or destroyed, and that other forts and strong places should be strengthened and repaired, it is stipulated and agreed that the English East India Company Bahadoor shall be the sole judges of the necessity of any such alterations in the said fortresses; and it is further agreed that such expenses as may be incurred on this account shall be borne and defrayed in equal proportions by the contracting parties.

Article 10.

In case it shall become necessary for enforcing and maintaining the authority and government of His Highness in the territories now subjected to his power, that the regular troops of the English East India Company Bahadoor should be employed, it is stipulated and agreed that, upon formal application being made for the service of the said troops, they shall be employed in such manner as to the said Company shall seem fit ; but it is expressly understood by the contracting parties that this stipulation shall not subject the troops of the English East India Company Bahadoor to be employed in the ordinary transactions of revenue.

Article 11.

It being expedient for the restoration and permanent establishment of tranquillity in the territories now subjected to the authority of His Highness Maharajah Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, that 'suitable provision should be made for certain officers of rank in the service of the late Tippoo Sultan, His said Highness agrees to enter into the immediate discussion of this point, and to fix the amount of the funds (as soon as the necessary information can be obtained) to be granted for this purpose, in a separate Article, to be hereafter added to this Treaty.

Article 12.

Lest the garrison of Seringapatam should at any time be subject to inconvenience from the high price of provisions and other necessaries, His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor agrees that such quantities of provisions and other necessaries as may be required for the use and consumption of the troops composing the said garrison

shall be allowed to enter the place from all and every part of his dominions free of any duty, tax or impediment whatever.

Article 13.

The contracting parties hereby agree to take into their early consideration the best means of establishing such a commercial intercourse between their respective dominions as shall be mutually beneficial to the subjects of both Governments, and to conclude a commercial treaty for this purpose with as little delay as possible.

Article 14.

His Highness Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor hereby promises to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of His Highness's interests, the happiness of his people and the mutual welfare of both States.

Article 15.

Whereas it may hereafter appear that some of the districts declared by the Treaty of Mysore to belong respectively to the English Company Bahadoor and to His Highness are inconveniently situated, with a view to the proper connection of their respective lines of frontier, it is hereby stipulated between the contracting parties that in all such cases they will proceed to such an adjustment, by means of exchanges or otherwise, as shall be best suited to the occasion.

Article 16.

This Treaty consisting of 16 Articles, being this day, the 8th of July, Anno Domini 1799, settled and concluded at the fort of Nazzarbah, near Seringapatam by His Excellency Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of His Britannic Majesty, and of the Honourable English East India Company Bahadoor in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar (recitals of names of other English officers as in Art. 1)....., the aforesaid gentlemen have delivered to the said Maharajah one copy of the same, in English and Persian, sealed and signed by them, and His Highness the Maharajah has delivered to the gentlemen aforesaid another copy, also in Persian and English, bearing his seal, and signed by Luchumma, widow of the late Kishna Rajah, and sealed and signed by Purneah, Dewan to the Maharajah Kishna Rajah Oodiaver. And the aforesaid gentlemen have engaged to procure and to deliver to the said Maharajah without delay a copy of the same, under the seal and signature of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, on receipt of which by the said Maharajah the present Treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honourable the English East India Company and on the Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, and the copy of it now delivered to the said Maharajah shall be returned.

(8) COMPARISON OF TIPU WITH SULTAN MUHAMMAD
OF GHAZNI.

It is an interesting question if Tipu ever considered himself an equal of Sultan Muhammad of Ghazni (997-1030 A.D.). There is no direct evidence on this point, although Wilks speaks of Tipu in one place as referring to Sultan Muhammad, especially in connection

with the flight from Bednur (1788) of Shaikh Ayāz, the *chēla* of Haidar. "Tippoo Sultaun, in narrating the flight of this person," Wilks writes, "affirms that the most explicit assurances of protection and encouragement had been conveyed to him on the occasion of his father's death, and amuses himself with the parallel and well-known anecdote of that Ayāz from whom he was named, the slave and unhallowed favourite of Sultaun Mahmood. This Sultaun, after exhausting his imagination in procuring for his favoured slave every gratification and convenience that Empire can command, asked him one day if any one wish remained ungratified. Yes, said the slave, I have one remaining caprice, I think it would be pleasant to run away." "This part of the parallel," as Wilks further notes, "certainly did not apply" to Tipū, and he does "not impute to either Tippoo or his secretary the intention of such insinuation, however obviously implied in the tale." (Wilks, *o.c.*, II. 211, *note*).

This apart, Tipū bears hardly any comparison with Sultan Muhammad of Ghazni, who, as a historical character of early 11th Century A.D., stands on an altogether different footing. In this connection, we cannot do better than quote what Mountstuart Elphinstone sums up about him. "Mahmud was certainly," he writes, "the greatest sovereign of his own time, and considered by the Mahometans among the greatest of any age. Though some of his qualities have been over-rated, he appears on the whole to have deserved his reputation. Prudence, activity, and enterprise he possessed in the highest degree, and the good order which he preserved in his extensive dominions during his frequent absences is a proof of his talents for government... He seems to have made no innovation in internal government; no laws or institutions are referred by tradition, to him. The real source of his glory lay in his combining the qualities of a warrior and a conqueror,

with a zeal for the encouragement of literature and the arts, which was rare in his time, and has not yet been surpassed .. As avarice is the great imputation against Mahmud in the East, so is bigotry among European writers. The first of these charges is established by facts: the other seems the result of a misconception. Mahmud carried on war with the infidels because it was a source of gain, and, in his day, the greatest source of glory. He professed, and probably felt, like other Mussalmans, an ardent wish for the propagation of his faith; but he never sacrificed the least of his interests for the accomplishment of that object; and he even seems to have been perfectly indifferent to it, when he might have attained it without loss... It is nowhere asserted that he ever put a Hindu to death except in battle or in the storm of a fort... Notwithstanding the bloodshed and misery of which he was the occasion, he does not seem to have been cruel. We hear of none of the tragedies and atrocities in his court and family which are so common in those of other despots. No inhuman punishments are recorded; and rebels, even when they are persons who had been pardoned and trusted, never suffer anything worse than imprisonment..." (Elphinstone, *History of India*, E. B. Cowell's edition, pp. 341-345).

GENEALOGICAL TABLES.

EXPLANATORY NOTE.

Tables I to X under A, relate to the genealogy of the Wodeyar Dynasty of Mysore.

Of these, Table I is intended to indicate the genealogical position in Wilks' *History* (1810), comparatively with some of the sources relied upon by him (*vide* Tables IV to VI).

Tables II and III are based upon a critical and comparative study of the data from the primary sources, namely, inscriptions of the Rulers (down to 1811) and literary works of the 17th and 18th centuries. These sources usually mention the *gōtra* and *sūtra* of the Ruling House (*i.e.*, Ātrēyasa *gōtra* and Āśvalāyana *sūtra*). The earlier inscriptions up to 1673 generally begin with [Bōla] Chāmarāja IV (1572-1576) as the originator of the main line of the Rulers. Their genealogical phraseology is very simple, only some of the records (particularly of Kaṇṭhirava Narasa I and Dēvarāja) tracing the descent from the Yādavas, with a mythological background. This feature, however, becomes more marked in the inscriptions (especially the copper-plates) of Chikkadēvarāja (1673-1704), which contain elaborate accounts of the genealogy of the dynasty in ornate *Kāvya* style (in Sanskrit), and which invariably begin with [Hiriya] Beṭṭada-Chāmarāja III (1513-1552). Most of the longer inscriptions of the eighteenth century repeat the genealogical information from the earlier ones. A lithic record of 1811 (E. C. Vi Ag. '62), noticed at some length elsewhere in the course of this work, contains a succession list of the Rulers (down to Krishnarāja III), roughly drawn up. There are slight variations in some of the later documents, as, for instance, in the Daḷavāi Agrahāram Plates II (*Ibid*, III, i, TN. 63 of 1749) and the Hanasōge Plates (*Ibid* IV, ii, Yd. 17 and 18 of 1761). These variations are, however, more apparent than real, the records themselves being compiled by writers who are not always trained genealogists. The literary works in general confirm and supplement the information from the epigraphs.

Tables IV to IX are deduced from the secondary sources (*i.e.*, quasi-historical works of the 18th and 19th centuries). These generally differ from one another. They are, however, of value in so far as they can be corrected or are corroborated by other sources, as they indicate the traditional position.

Table X, *adopted in this work*, is based on a study and co-ordination of all the sources.

Tables XI to XIII under *B* deal with the genealogy of the Kaḷale family (of Bhāradwāja gōtra and Āśvalāyana sūtra).

Of these, Tables XI and XII are based respectively on inscriptions and literary works of the 18th century, and confirm and supplement the data in regard to that branch of the family which furnished the Daḷavāis to Mysore. They are of value as the Daḷavāis played an important part in the history of the 17th and 18th centuries.


Table XIII, based on the *Kaḷale Arasu Vamśāvali* (c. 1830), relates to the genealogy of the Kaḷale House, in so far as it is necessary to trace the succession in the main of the ruling chiefs of that dynasty and corroborate and supplement Tables XI and XII.

Tables XIV to XVIII under *C* relate to the genealogy and succession of other contemporary dynasties, namely, the Āravīḍu Dynasty of Vijayanagar, the Nāyakas of Ikkēri (Keḷadi) and Madura, the Yelahanka (Māgadi) chiefs and the Nawābs of Arcot.


Where the relationship is not specifically stated or the requisite information wanting, the position is indicated by dots. The dates given in the tables are regnal years of the rulers, which are the generally accepted ones unless otherwise stated.

A. The Wodeyar Dynasty of Mysore.

I. According to Wilks (1810)¹.




¹ The regnal years in this Table bear close comparison with those given in Tables II to VI.

II. According to inscriptions (down to 1811).¹


1. Based on a comparative study of the data from the following among other records: *E.C.*, III (1) *My.* 60 (1551), *Sr.* 157 (1614), *T.N.* 116 (1615), *T.N.* 62 (The Daḷavāi Agrahāram Plate I (1623); *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, *Md.* 155 (The Honnalagere Plates, 1623); III (1) *Nj.* 198 (The Garapiṅṅana-
halli Plates, 1639); V (1) *Ag.* 64 (1647); XII, *Rg.* 37 (The Hālagere Plates, 1663); The Palace Copper Plates, 1663 *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, *Mys.* 114; The Bhērya Plates, 1666 (*E.C.* IV. 2 *Yd.* 54); *E.C.*, IV (2) *Hg.* 119 and 120 (1670); *Ch.* 92 (The Chāmarājnagar Plates, 1675); I II (1) *Sr.* 151 (Karighatta Plate, 1679); the Garapi Plates, 1680 (Bangalore *Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, *Bn.* 144); the Seringapatam Temple Plates, 1686 (*E.C.* III. 1. *Sr.* 14); the Dēvanagara Plates, c. 1686-1690, and the Kaḷale Plates, 1716 (*Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, *Mys.* 115 and *Nj.* 295); the Toṇḍanūr Plates I and II, 1722, 1724 (*E.C.*, III. 1. *Sr.* 64 and 100); *E.C.*, IX. *Ma.* 37 (1732); *M.E.R.*, 1925, *App. A.* No. 16 (1733); the Manchanahalli Plates, 1741 (*E.C.*, IV. 2. *Yd.* 58); the Daḷavāi Agrahāram Plates II, 1749 (*E.C.*, III. 1. *T.N.* 63); the Hanasōge Plates I and II, 1761 (*E.C.*, IV. 2. *Yd.* 17 and 18); *E.C.* V. 1. *Ag.* 62 (1811).

III. According to literary works (of the 17th and 18th centuries).¹



1. Based on a comparative study of the data from the *Chāmarājōkti-vilāsa* (c. 1630), *Kaṇṭhīrava-Narasarāja-Vijaya* (1648) of Gōvinda-Vaidya, *Chikkadēvarāja-Vamsavali* (c. 1680) and *Chikkadēvarāja-Vijayam* of Tirumalārya, the works of Chikkupādhyāya, Timma-Kavi, Mallikārjuna and others (17th cent.) and the literary productions of the 18th century (down to c. 1750). For the successors of Krishnarāja II, the *Haidar-Nāmāh* (1784) has been drawn upon.


IV. According to the *Mysūru-Dhoregaḷa-Pūrvābhyudaya-Vivara* (c. 1714).




V. According to the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Pūrvōttara*

(c. 1740).

(Yādava descent)
Vijayarāja Wodeyar
and
Krishnarāja Wodeyar
(Progenitors of the Dynasty)




1. In this and in the *Mysūru-Rājara-Charitre* (Table VI), the rule of Rāja Wodeyar is reckoned from the time of his acquisition of Seringapatam (1610).

VI. According to the *Mysuru-Rājara-Charitra*(c. 1800) by Venkataramanaiya.¹

1. The order of descent from Bettada Wodeyar down to Bōla-Chāmarāja Wodeyar, as given in this Table, agrees closely with the position in Tables VIII and IX.


VII. According to the *Mysūru-Dhoregaḷa-Vamśāvali*
(c. 1800)¹



1. This palm leaf Ms., which was in the possession of Rāmaiya, son of Kālaiya, the Palace scribe (*vide* ff. 1), appears to have been written in or about 1800, judging from the language, style, etc. It is, however, in its present state, much injured and incomplete, the text being traceable with considerable difficulty only up to about the middle of the reign of Kāṇṭhīrava-Nārasarāja Wodeyar I. (1638-1659). There are slight variations in the regnal years of some of the rulers.


VIII. According to the *Rājāvalī-Kathe* (1838) of Dēvachandra.¹

(Yādava descent)
Vijaya-Rāja (c. 1420)




1. Ch. XII, pp. 446-508; see also and compare Ch. X, pp. 285-372; XI, pp. 873-422 etc. The order of descent down to Bōla-Chāmarāja Woḍeyar is similar to the position in Tables VI and IX. From Rāja Woḍeyar down to Chikkadevarāja, Dēvachandra closely follows the *Chikkadevarāja-Vamśāvalī* of Tirumalārya, with slight variations. From Rāja Woḍeyar onwards, Dēvachandra also fixes his own dates, most of which hopelessly ill-tally with the other sources (compare with Tables IV to VII and IX).

IX. According to the *Annals of the Mysore Royal Family* (first compiled in 1864-1865 and revised and enlarged subsequently).¹



1. The order of descent from Hiriya-Bettada-Chāma I down to Bōla-Chāma IV agrees with the position in Tables VI and VIII.

X. Table adopted in this work (based on a study and co-ordination of all the sources).




B. The Kalale Family.


XI. According to inscriptions (18th century).¹

(The Daḷavāis of Mysore)

(Descent from a line of Chiefs of Kalale)




1. Based on the data from the *Manchanahalli Plates* (1741)—*E. C.*, IV (2) Yd. 58; the *Hampāpūr Plates* (1744)—*M. A. R.*, 1928, pp. 66-70, No. 58; and the *Daḷavāi Agrahāram Plates II* (1749)—*E. C.*, III (1) TN. 68.

XII. According to literary works (18th century).¹


1. Based on the data from the *Tulakāvēri-Mahātmya* and *Varanandī-Kalyāṇa* by Chaluvāmbā; the *Padminī-Pariṇaya* by Channaiya; and the *Sivabhakta-Vilāsa-Darpana*, *Sivagite* and *Kakudgiri-Mahātmya* by Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, etc., more fully noticed in Vol. II of this work under *Literary Activity* under the early 18th century rulers of Mysore.

XIII. According to the *Kalale-Arasugala-Vamśavali* (c. 1830).¹


1. Kānta Wodeyar I (1505-1527)




2. Timmarāja Wodeyar I (1527-1546)




1. Ft. 1-34. Regnal years are given in the Table for the 12 Ruling Chiefs. For particulars about the collaterals, etc., not specified above, *vide* text of the Ms. ft. 15-31. Another MS. of the *Kalale* Dynasty, compiled about 1800 A. D. and recently noticed in the *M.A.R.* for 1942 (pp. 78-99), is found on examination to be less reliable than this work in point of genealogical and chronological details, though some of the events mentioned find corroboration elsewhere.

XV. The Nāyaks of Ikkēri (Keḷadi)¹.

1. Based mainly on the Table appended to *Keḷadi-Nripa-Vijayam* (c. 1800). The dates of the Ruling Chiefs are, however, fixed with reference to the fuller data of the cyclic years mentioned in the chapters of this text (I-XII).

XVI. The Nāyaks of Madura.¹1. From R. Satyanātha Aiyar's *Nāyaks of Madura*, p. IX.

XVII. The Yelahanka (Māgaḍi) Chiefs.¹

1. Based mainly on the pedigree as given in Ēkāmbra Dikshita's *Virabhadra-Vijaya-Champūh* (c. 1720) (IV, 31-73). Compare the pedigrees given in the *M.A.R.*, 1922, p. 15, para 54; and in S. K. Narasimhaiya's *Kempē-Gauḍa of Māgaḍi and his ancestors*. Owing to paucity of inscriptions of the chiefs, the traditional dates mentioned in the latter work are preferred here, the available contemporary references to each chief being however mentioned in the respective places in f.n. below.
2. Mentioned as *Elavankanāḍa Prabhu Kempaiya Gauḍa* in *E.C.*, XII Kg. 23, dated in November 1525 (*Parthiva-Mārgasira* śu-3), perhaps the earliest extant record of this chief. See also *M.A.R.* 1922 (l.c.), referring to his records of 1588 and 1608(?).
3. Mentioned as *Yalahankanāḍu Prabhu Immaḍi-Hiri-Kempaiya* in *E.C.*, XII Kg. 12, dated in June 1599 (s-1521, *Vikāri Jyēṣṭha* ba. 13). See also *M.A.R.* 1922 (l.c.), referring to his records of 1628, 1630, 1631; and the *Immaḍi-Tamma-Rāya-Kempa-Rāya-Padagaḷu* (1635), mentioning him.
4. Mentioned in records dated in 1667, 1674 (see *M.A.R.* 1922, l.c.)
5. Mentioned in records dated in 1691, 1694, 1688 (*Ibid.*).
6. Mentioned in records dated in 1697, 1712, 1713, 1715 (*Ibid.*).

XVIII. The Nawābs of Arcot (down to 1795)¹.(a) The Imperial Representatives (*Nazims*).

Zūlfikar Khān (c. 1690-1700)

Daud Khān (1700-1708)

(b) The First Dynasty: The *Nawāyats*.

Sādatullā Khān (1708-1733)

Ali Dost Khān
(Nephew of Sādatullā Khān)
(1733-1740)²

Safdar Ali
(1740-1742)

(1) (Daughters)

(2) married to
Chaudā Sāhib
(Husain Dost Khān)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Muhammad Sayyid
(1743-1744)

(c) The Second Dynasty.

Nawāb Sirāj-ud-daula

Muhammad Khān-i-Jahān

Anwar-ud-dīn (1744-1749)

(1) Afrasiyab
Jang

(2) Muhammad
Mahfuz Khān

(3) Nawāb
Muhammad
Ali Walajah
(Hadrat-i-A'lā)
(1749-1795)

(4) Abdul
Wāhab Khān

(5) Muhammad
Najibulla
Khān

1. Based mainly on Burhan's *Tuzak-i-Fatājahī* (1781).

2. The *Tuzak* (i. 74) assigns to Ali Dost Khān a period of about five years' rule, but we know from the *Fort St. George Records* that the Nawāb was killed in 1740 (*vide* Vol. II. p. 80 of this work).

NOTE ON ILLUSTRATIONS.


Of the 84 plates spread over the three Volumes of this work—including the two portraits of late H. H. Śrī Krishnarāja Wadiyar IV and the present H. H. Śrī Jayachāmarāja Wadiyar as the *Frontispiece* to Vol. I—21 relate to the traditional likenesses of the Kings of Mysore down to 1796 (Vol. I plate Nos. 2 to 10, 14 to 16, 21 and 24 ; II. 1, 4 to 6 ; and III. 1, 5 and 6). These are photographic prints from the *Book of Portraits and Pictures of Mysore Kings and Worthies*, preserved in the Jagan Mohan Palace at Mysore (Book No. 1-46). The plates relating to *Bhakta-Vigrahas* and views of temples and other relics of the period of early rulers of Mysore (I. 11 to 13, 17 to 20, 22-23, 25 to 31 ; II. 2-3) are also photographic reproductions of the monuments themselves, most of which will be found referred to or described in the *Mysore Archaeological Report* and other sources. The plate on the coins of the early rulers of Mysore (I. 32) is taken from the *Mysore Archaeological Report* for 1929 by courtesy of the Director.

The other plates (especially in Vols. II and III) are from well-known publications—some of these very old and out of print—to the publishers of which acknowledgments are due. The rare contemporary portrait of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, Daḷavāi of Mysore (II. 7), is from the mezzotint print of C. Picart (Sculptor), published in Buchanan's *Journey from Madras through Mysore, Malabar and Canara* (Vol. I). The picture of Haidar Ali in his younger years (II. 13) is from C. Morrish's engraving, published in Prince. Gholam Muhammad's edition of *History of Hyder Shah and Tipu Sultan*. The conventional portrait of Haidar in tight-fitting military costume, in his middle age (III. 2), is from Major Basu's *Rise of Christian Power in India*. The one relating to Haidar in his Durbar in his advanced

age (III. 8) is from the *European Magazine*, published in Dr. V. A. Smith's *Oxford History of India*. The plate relating to Admiral Suffrein's Interview with Haidar (III.12) also depicts Haidar in his later years and is from Rushbrook Williams' *A History of India*. The well-known picture of Tipū Sultān in military uniform in his earlier years (III. 15) is from Sir Charles Lawson's *Memories of Madras*. That relating to him in his later years (III. 22) is Morrish's engraving presented by Lt-Col. Doveton to Marquis Wellesley, and published in Prince Gholam Muhammad's edition above referred to. The picture of Karīm Shah or Sāhib, younger son of Haidar Ali (III. 14), is also from the same source. The three pictures of Nawab Muhammad Ali Wālājāh in different aspects (II. 9, III. 8 and 16) are from Burhan's *Tuzak-i-Wālājāhi* (Part II), Major Basu's work and Col. Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras* (Vol. III). The pictures of Dupleix and Stringer Lawrence (II. 8 and 11) are also from the last two sources. The View of Trichinopoly Fort (II. 10) and the Attempt to take Trichinopoly by Escalade (II. 12) are from Robert Orme's *Indostan* (Vol. III). The portraits of Orme and Wilks (II. 14 and 15) are from the India Office Collection and Sir Murray Hammick's edition of Wilks' *Mysoor* (Vol. I). The picture of De Bussy (II. 16) is from Prof. A. Martineau's *Bussy Et L' Inde Francaise*.

Of the other plates, those relating to Rev. C. F. Schwartz (III. 9), Warren Hastings (III. 10) and Sir Eyre Coote (III. 11) are from Major Basu's work and Lawson's *Memories*. The portraits of Sir Thomas Rumbold (III. 13), Lord Macartney (III. 17, 18) and Marquis Cornwallis (III. 19) are from Love's *Vestiges* (Vol. III) and Lawson's *Memories*. The pictures of Marquis Wellesley (III. 23, 31) are from the works of Lawson and Rushbrook Williams. Those of Nāna Farnavis (III. 6) and Sir Thomas Munro (III. 34) are from

Basu's work. The picture of General Harris (III. 24) is from S. R. Lushington's *Lord Harris*. The portrait of Sir David Baird (III. 29) is from Capt. H. H. Wilkin's *Life of Sir David Baird*. The picture of Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley (III. 32) and Major-General Sir John Malcolm (III. 33) are from Lawson and Sir Alexander Cardew's *The White Mutiny* respectively. The plate relating to Tiruvannāmalai (III. 4) is from Orme's *Indostan* (Vol. III). The pictures of Seringapatam in 1792 and 1799 (III. 20, 25) are from V. A. Smith's *Oxford History* and Lawson's *Memories*. The plates relating to the defence arrangements in Seringapatam in 1792 and 1799 (III. 21, 26, 27) are from Lt-Col. L. H. Thornton's *Light and Shade in Bygone India* and Wilkin's *Life*. The pictures bearing on the Storming of Seringapatam and the Last Stand of Tipu Sultan in May 1799 (III. 28, 30) are from Basu's work, while the plate depicting Krishnarāja Wodeyar III at his Installation (III. 35) is from another mezzotint print of C. Picart (Sculptor), published in Buchanan's *Journey*. Col. Love refers in his Vol. III, 147, f.n.1, to a picture of Haidar Ali, which is not otherwise known. He says:—"The British Museum preserves a good print of Hyder Ali, by J. Maidstone, which is in Scotland. Done in the year 1776 by J. Leister, Esq of Madras" This name (Leister) does not appear in the Fort St. George Lists of the year. The print was published in London in 1780. All attempts to get a reproduction of this print have not been attended with success so far.



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ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page	Line	Remarks
108, n. 150	1	For "Appendix I—(8)" read "Appendix I—(4)."
112, n. 185	2	For "campaign" read "campaign."
180	Marginal heading	For "January-March 1776" read "January-March 1771."
219, n. 46	5	For "April 1770" read "April 1776."
249	19 (from top)	For "Śivarām Bhao" read "Śivarām Ghōrpaḍe."
283, n. 20	2	Add at the end:—"A Ms. account of the Dynasty of Kalale recently noticed in the <i>M.A.R.</i> (for 1942, P. 98) and compiled about 1800 A.D., speaks of the confinement of King Nanjarāja Wodeyar. This is clearly an error for Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, the old Dalavāi, in the light of other sources cited here. Even the contemporary Portuguese writer Peixoto writes of the "forced entry" into Seringapatam, in 1767, of Nanjarājaiya, the Dalavāi, whom he spells as "Raja Nanda Rajah" (see <i>M.A.R.</i> , for 1937, P. 105). The error in the Ms. under reference is perhaps attributable to the peculiar spelling of Dalavāi Nanjarājaiya's name in contemporary works, which was misconstrued as referring to King Nanjarāja Wodeyar himself!"
297, n. 53	Last line	For "Ch. VII" read "Ch. VIII."
321	21 (from top)	For "1777" read "1775."
335	23 (from top)	Delete comma after "never."
351	Marginal heading	For "1780" read "1781."
366, n. 88	4	Add at the end:—"As to particulars of English operations against other Dutch Settlements on the Coromandel Coast in 1781, <i>vide</i> Ch. IX below."
388	24 (from top)	For "ensure" read "ensnare."
496	18 (from top)	For "1780" read "1779."
507, n. 27	1	For "Appendix III—(1)" read "Appendix III—(2)."
562, n. 3	7	Insert at the end:—"Vide on this subject, Appendix III—(4)."

Page	Line	Remarks
609	3 (from bottom)	For "April" read "June."
614, n. 7	...	Add at the end:—"The Macartney Letters, of which the <i>Rana Treaty</i> forms a part, have been lithographed, by those possessing them now, at the Rajagopal Photo-Zinco Press, Bangalore (1935)."
648, n. 15	...	Add at the end:—"Re: Captain Thomas Dallas, <i>vide</i> Appendix III—(8)."
853	6 (from bottom)	For "1789" read "1788."
886	Marginal heading	For "march" read "March."
963, n. 26	4	For "adivised" read "advised."



